信息级联

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An Information cascade or informational cascade is a phenomenon described in behavioral economics and network theory in which a number of people make the same decision in a sequential fashion. It is similar to, but distinct from herd behavior.[1][2][3]


An Information cascade or informational cascade is a phenomenon described in behavioral economics and network theory in which a number of people make the same decision in a sequential fashion. It is similar to, but distinct from herd behavior.

信息级联或信息级联是行为经济学和网络理论中描述的一种现象，在这种现象中，许多人以一种连续的方式做出相同的决策。它与从众行为相似，但又不同于从众行为。

An information cascade is generally accepted as a two-step process. For a cascade to begin an individual must encounter a scenario with a decision, typically a binary one. Second, outside factors can influence this decision (typically, through the observation of actions and their outcomes of other individuals in similar scenarios).

An information cascade is generally accepted as a two-step process. For a cascade to begin an individual must encounter a scenario with a decision, typically a binary one. Second, outside factors can influence this decision (typically, through the observation of actions and their outcomes of other individuals in similar scenarios).

信息级联通常被认为是一个两步过程。对于一个级联来说，个体必须遇到一个有决策的场景，通常是二进制的。第二，外部因素可以影响这个决定(通常，通过观察其他个体在类似情景中的行为及其结果)。

The two-step process of an informational cascade can be broken down into five basic components:

The two-step process of an informational cascade can be broken down into five basic components:

信息级联的两步过程可以分为五个基本组成部分:

  1. There is a decision to be made – for example; whether to adopt a new technology, wear a new style of clothing, eat in a new restaurant, or support a particular political position
  2. A limited action space exists (e.g. an adopt/reject decision)
  3. People make the decision sequentially, and each person can observe the choices made by those who acted earlier
  4. Each person has some information aside from their own that helps guide their decision
  5. A person can't directly observe the outside information that other people know, but he or she can make inferences about this information from what they do
  1. There is a decision to be made – for example; whether to adopt a new technology, wear a new style of clothing, eat in a new restaurant, or support a particular political position
  2. A limited action space exists (e.g. an adopt/reject decision)
  3. People make the decision sequentially, and each person can observe the choices made by those who acted earlier
  4. Each person has some information aside from their own that helps guide their decision
  5. A person can't directly observe the outside information that other people know, but he or she can make inferences about this information from what they do

例如，是否采用新技术，是否穿着新款式的服装，是否在新的餐厅用餐，或者是否支持某个特定的政治立场。人们依次做出决定，每个人都可以观察那些先前做出决定的人所做的决定 # 每个人都有一些自己的信息来帮助他们做出决定 # 一个人不能直接观察别人知道的外部信息，但是他或她可以从他们所做的事情中推断出这些信息

Social perspectives of cascades, which suggest that agents may act irrationally (e.g., against what they think is optimal) when social pressures are great, exist as complements to the concept of information cascades.[4] More often the problem is that the concept of an information cascade is confused with ideas that do not match the two key conditions of the process, such as social proof, information diffusion,[5] and social influence. Indeed, the term information cascade has even been used to refer to such processes.[6]

Social perspectives of cascades, which suggest that agents may act irrationally (e.g., against what they think is optimal) when social pressures are great, exist as complements to the concept of information cascades. More often the problem is that the concept of an information cascade is confused with ideas that do not match the two key conditions of the process, such as social proof, information diffusion, and social influence. Indeed, the term information cascade has even been used to refer to such processes.

级联的社会观点认为，当社会压力很大时，行为者可能会采取非理性行为(例如，反对他们认为的最优行为) ，作为信息级联概念的补充而存在。更常见的问题是，信息级联的概念与不符合这一过程的两个关键条件的想法相混淆，如社会证明、信息传播和社会影响。事实上，信息级联这个术语甚至已经被用来指代这样的过程。

Basic model

Basic model

= 基本模型 =

This section provides some basic examples of information cascades, as originally described by Bikchandani et al. (1992).[7] The basic model has since been developed in a variety of directions to examine its robustness and better understand its implications.[8][9]

This section provides some basic examples of information cascades, as originally described by Bikchandani et al. (1992). The basic model has since been developed in a variety of directions to examine its robustness and better understand its implications.

本节提供了一些信息级联的基本例子，如 bikkandani 等人最初所描述的。(1992).这个基本模型已经从多个方向发展起来，以检验其稳健性并更好地理解其含义。

Qualitative example

Qualitative example

= = 定性的例子 = =

Information cascades occur when external information obtained from previous participants in an event overrides one's own private signal, irrespective of the correctness of the former over the latter. The experiment conducted by Anderson[10] is a useful example of this process. The experiment consisted of two urns labeled A and B. Urn A contains two balls labeled "a" and one labeled "b". Urn B contains one ball labeled "a" and two labeled "b". The urn from which a ball must be drawn during each run is determined randomly and with equal probabilities (from the throw of a dice). The contents of the chosen urn are emptied into a neutral container. The participants are then asked in random order to draw a marble from this container. This entire process may be termed a "run", and a number of such runs are performed.

Information cascades occur when external information obtained from previous participants in an event overrides one's own private signal, irrespective of the correctness of the former over the latter. The experiment conducted by Anderson is a useful example of this process. The experiment consisted of two urns labeled A and B. Urn A contains two balls labeled "a" and one labeled "b". Urn B contains one ball labeled "a" and two labeled "b". The urn from which a ball must be drawn during each run is determined randomly and with equal probabilities (from the throw of a dice). The contents of the chosen urn are emptied into a neutral container. The participants are then asked in random order to draw a marble from this container. This entire process may be termed a "run", and a number of such runs are performed.

当从事件的前参与者那里获得的外部信息压倒了自己的私人信号时，信息级联就发生了，无论前者是否正确。安德森进行的实验就是这个过程的一个有用的例子。实验包括两个分别标记为 a 和 b 的骨灰盒，a 包含两个分别标记为“ a”和“ b”的球。瓮 b 包含一个标记为“ a”的球和两个标记为“ b”的球。在每次运动中必须从中抽出一个球的瓮是随机确定的，概率相等(来自掷骰子)。所选瓮的内容物被倒入一个中性的容器中。然后参与者被随机地要求从这个容器中抽取一个弹珠。整个过程可以称为“运行”，并且执行了许多这样的运行。

Each time a participant picks up a marble, he is to decide which urn it belongs to. His decision is then announced for the benefit of the remaining participants in the room. Thus, the (n+1)th participant has information about the decisions made by all the n participants preceding him, and also his private signal which is the label on the ball that he draws during his turn. The experimenters observed that an information cascade was observed in 41 of 56 such runs. This means, in the runs where the cascade occurred, at least one participant gave precedence to earlier decisions over his own private signal. It is possible for such an occurrence to produce the wrong result. This phenomenon is known as "Reverse Cascade".

Each time a participant picks up a marble, he is to decide which urn it belongs to. His decision is then announced for the benefit of the remaining participants in the room. Thus, the (n+1)th participant has information about the decisions made by all the n participants preceding him, and also his private signal which is the label on the ball that he draws during his turn. The experimenters observed that an information cascade was observed in 41 of 56 such runs. This means, in the runs where the cascade occurred, at least one participant gave precedence to earlier decisions over his own private signal. It is possible for such an occurrence to produce the wrong result. This phenomenon is known as "Reverse Cascade".

每当参与者拿起一个大理石，他就要决定它属于哪个瓮。然后，他的决定将为会议室其他与会者的利益而宣布。因此，第(n + 1)个参与者拥有关于他之前所有 n 个参与者所做决定的信息，以及他的私人信号，也就是他在轮到他时画的球上的标签。实验者观察到，在56次这样的运行中，有41次观察到了信息级联。这意味着，在发生级联的运行中，至少有一个参与者将先前的决定置于他自己的私人信号之上。这样的事情有可能产生错误的结果。这种现象被称为“反向瀑布”。

Quantitative description

Quantitative description

= 定量描述 =

A person's signal telling them to accept is denoted as H (a high signal, where high signifies he should accept), and a signal telling them not to accept is L (a low signal). The model assumes that when the correct decision is to accept, individuals will be more likely to see an H, and conversely, when the correct decision is to reject, individuals are more likely to see an L signal. This is essentially a conditional probability – the probability of H when the correct action is to accept, or [math]\displaystyle{ P[H|A] }[/math]. Similarly [math]\displaystyle{ P[L|R] }[/math] is the probability that an agent gets an L signal when the correct action is reject. If these likelihoods are represented by q, then q > 0.5. This is summarized in the table below.[11]

A person's signal telling them to accept is denoted as (a high signal, where high signifies he should accept), and a signal telling them not to accept is (a low signal). The model assumes that when the correct decision is to accept, individuals will be more likely to see an , and conversely, when the correct decision is to reject, individuals are more likely to see an signal. This is essentially a conditional probability – the probability of when the correct action is to accept, or P[H|A]. Similarly P[L|R] is the probability that an agent gets an signal when the correct action is reject. If these likelihoods are represented by q, then q > 0.5. This is summarized in the table below.

一个人告诉他们接受的信号表示为(高信号，高表示他应该接受) ，而告诉他们不接受的信号表示为(低信号)。该模型假设，当正确的决定是接受时，个体更有可能看到一个，反之，当正确的决定是拒绝时，个体更有可能看到一个信号。这实质上是一个条件概率-- 当正确的行动是接受，或 p [ h | a ]的概率。类似地，p [ l | r ]是代理在正确的操作被拒绝时获得信号的概率。如果这些可能性用 q 表示，则 q > 0.5。下表概述了这一情况。

Agent signal True probability state
Reject Accept
L q 1-q
H 1-q q

The first agent determines whether or not to accept solely based on his own signal. As the model assumes that all agents act rationally, the action (accept or reject) the agent feels is more likely is the action he will choose to take. This decision can be explained using Bayes' rule:


[math]\displaystyle{ \begin{align} P\left(A|H\right) &= \frac{P\left(A\right) P\left(H|A\right)}{P\left(H\right)} \\ &= \frac{P\left(A\right) P\left(H|A\right)}{P\left(A\right) P\left(H|A\right) + P\left(R\right) P\left(H|R\right)} \\ &= \frac{pq}{pq + \left(1 - p\right)\left(1 - q\right)} \\ &\gt p \end{align} }[/math]

\begin{align} 

 P\left(A|H\right) &= \frac{P\left(A\right) P\left(H|A\right)}{P\left(H\right)} \\
                   &= \frac{P\left(A\right) P\left(H|A\right)}{P\left(A\right) P\left(H|A\right) + P\left(R\right) P\left(H|R\right)} \\
                   &= \frac{pq}{pq + \left(1 - p\right)\left(1 - q\right)} \\
                   &> p

\end{align}


If the agent receives an H signal, then the likelihood of accepting is obtained by calculating [math]\displaystyle{ P[A|H] }[/math]. The equation says that, by virtue of the fact that q > 0.5, the first agent, acting only on his private signal, will always increase his estimate of p with an H signal. Similarly, it can be shown that an agent will always decrease his expectation of p when he receives a low signal. Recalling that, if the value, V, of accepting is equal to the value of rejecting, then an agent will accept if he believes p > 0.5, and reject otherwise. Because this agent started out with the assumption that both accepting and rejecting are equally viable options (p = 0.5), the observation of an H signal will allow him to conclude that accepting is the rational choice.

If the agent receives an signal, then the likelihood of accepting is obtained by calculating P[A|H]. The equation says that, by virtue of the fact that q > 0.5, the first agent, acting only on his private signal, will always increase his estimate of p with an signal. Similarly, it can be shown that an agent will always decrease his expectation of p when he receives a low signal. Recalling that, if the value, , of accepting is equal to the value of rejecting, then an agent will accept if he believes p > 0.5, and reject otherwise. Because this agent started out with the assumption that both accepting and rejecting are equally viable options (p = 0.5), the observation of an signal will allow him to conclude that accepting is the rational choice.

如果代理接收到一个信号，则通过计算 p [ a | h ]得到接收的可能性。这个方程表明，由于 q > 0.5，第一个代理只根据他自己的信号行动，总是会用信号增加他对 p 的估计。类似地，可以证明，当代理接收到低信号时，它总是降低对 p 的期望值。回想一下，如果接受的价值，，等于拒绝的价值，那么代理人会接受如果他相信 p > 0.5，否则拒绝。因为这个代理人一开始就假设接受和拒绝都是同等可行的选择(p = 0.5) ，观察一个信号就可以让他得出接受是理性选择的结论。

The second agent then considers both the first agent's decision and his own signal, again in a rational fashion. In general, the nth agent considers the decisions of the previous n-1 agents, and his own signal. He makes a decision based on Bayesian reasoning to determine the most rational choice.

[math]\displaystyle{ P (A | \text{Previous}, \text{Personal signal}) = \frac{pq^a (1 - q)^b}{p q^a (1 - q)^b + (1 - p)(1 - q)^a q^b} }[/math]

Where a is the number of accepts in the previous set plus the agent's own signal, and b is the number of rejects. Thus, 模板:Tmath. The decision is based on how the value on the right hand side of the equation compares with p.[11]

The second agent then considers both the first agent's decision and his own signal, again in a rational fashion. In general, the nth agent considers the decisions of the previous n-1 agents, and his own signal. He makes a decision based on Bayesian reasoning to determine the most rational choice.

P (A | \text{Previous}, \text{Personal signal}) = \frac{pq^a (1 - q)^b}{p q^a (1 - q)^b + (1 - p)(1 - q)^a q^b}

Where is the number of accepts in the previous set plus the agent's own signal, and is the number of rejects. Thus, . The decision is based on how the value on the right hand side of the equation compares with p.

然后，第二个代理人再次以理性的方式考虑第一个代理人的决定和他自己的信号。一般来说，第 n 个代理考虑前 n-1代理的决策和他自己的信号。他基于贝叶斯推理做出决策，以确定最理性的选择。P (a | text { Previous } ，text { Personal signal }) = frac { pq ^ a (1-q) ^ b }{ p q ^ a (1-q) ^ b + (1-p)(1-q) ^ a q ^ b }其中前一组中接受的数目加上代理自己的信号，以及拒绝的数目。因此,。这个决定是基于方程式右边的数值与 p 的比较。

Explicit model assumptions

Explicit model assumptions

= = 显式模型假设 = =

The original model makes several assumptions about human behavior and the world in which humans act,[7] some of which are relaxed in later versions[11] or in alternate definitions of similar problems, such as the diffusion of innovations.

  1. Boundedly Rational Agents: The original Independent Cascade model assumes humans are boundedly rational[12] – that is, they will always make rational decisions based on the information they can observe, but the information they observe may not be complete or correct. In other words, agents do not have complete knowledge of the world around them (which would allow them to make the correct decision in any and all situations). In this way, there is a point at which, even if a person has correct knowledge of the idea or action cascading, they can be convinced via social pressures to adopt some alternate, incorrect view of the world.
  2. Incomplete Knowledge of Others: The original information cascade model assumes that agents have incomplete knowledge of the agents which precede them in the specified order. As opposed to definitions where agents have some knowledge of the "private information" held by previous agents, the current agent makes a decision based only on the observable action (whether or not to imitate) of those preceding him. It is important to note that the original creators argue this is a reason why information cascades can be caused by small shocks.
  3. Behavior of all previous agents is known

The original model makes several assumptions about human behavior and the world in which humans act, some of which are relaxed in later versions or in alternate definitions of similar problems, such as the diffusion of innovations.

  1. Boundedly Rational Agents: The original Independent Cascade model assumes humans are boundedly rational – that is, they will always make rational decisions based on the information they can observe, but the information they observe may not be complete or correct. In other words, agents do not have complete knowledge of the world around them (which would allow them to make the correct decision in any and all situations). In this way, there is a point at which, even if a person has correct knowledge of the idea or action cascading, they can be convinced via social pressures to adopt some alternate, incorrect view of the world.
  2. Incomplete Knowledge of Others: The original information cascade model assumes that agents have incomplete knowledge of the agents which precede them in the specified order. As opposed to definitions where agents have some knowledge of the "private information" held by previous agents, the current agent makes a decision based only on the observable action (whether or not to imitate) of those preceding him. It is important to note that the original creators argue this is a reason why information cascades can be caused by small shocks.
  3. Behavior of all previous agents is known

最初的模型对人类行为和人类活动的世界做出了一些假设，其中一些在后来的版本中或在类似问题的替代定义中被放宽了，比如创新产品渗透理论。# 有限理性的代理人: 原始的独立瀑布模型假设人类是有限理性的——也就是说，他们总是根据他们可以观察到的信息做出理性的决定，但是他们观察到的信息可能并不完整或正确。换句话说，代理人并不完全了解他们周围的世界(这使他们能够在任何情况下做出正确的决定)。通过这种方式，有一个临界点，即使一个人有正确的知识或行动瀑布，他们可以说服通过社会压力采取一些不同的，不正确的世界观。# 对他人的不完全知识: 原始的信息级联模型假定代理人对他们之前的代理人按照指定的顺序有不完全的知识。与代理人对前代理人持有的”私人信息”有所了解的定义不同，当前代理人仅根据前代理人可观察到的行为(是否模仿)作出决定。值得注意的是，最初的创造者认为这就是为什么信息级联可以由小冲击引起的原因。# 已知所有先前代理的行为

Resulting conditions

Resulting conditions

= = 结果条件 = =

  1. Cascades will always occur – as discussed, in the simple mode, the likelihood of a cascade occurring increases towards 1 as the number of people making decisions increases towards infinity.
  2. Cascades can be incorrect – because agents make decisions with both bounded rationality and probabilistic knowledge of the initial truth (e.g. whether accepting or rejecting is the correct decision), the incorrect behavior may cascade through the system.
  3. Cascades can be based on little information – mathematically, a cascade of an infinite length can occur based only on the decision of two people. More generally, a small set of people who strongly promote an idea as being rational can rapidly influence a much larger subset of the general population
  4. Cascades are fragile – because agents receive no extra information after the difference between a and b increases beyond 2, and because such differences can occur at small numbers of agents, agents considering opinions from those agents who are making decisions based on actual information can be dissuaded from a choice rather easily.[7] This suggests that cascades are susceptible to the release of public information.[7] also discusses this result in the context of the underlying value p changing over time, in which case a cascade can rapidly change course.
  1. Cascades will always occur – as discussed, in the simple mode, the likelihood of a cascade occurring increases towards 1 as the number of people making decisions increases towards infinity.
  2. Cascades can be incorrect – because agents make decisions with both bounded rationality and probabilistic knowledge of the initial truth (e.g. whether accepting or rejecting is the correct decision), the incorrect behavior may cascade through the system.
  3. Cascades can be based on little information – mathematically, a cascade of an infinite length can occur based only on the decision of two people. More generally, a small set of people who strongly promote an idea as being rational can rapidly influence a much larger subset of the general population
  4. Cascades are fragile – because agents receive no extra information after the difference between a and b increases beyond 2, and because such differences can occur at small numbers of agents, agents considering opinions from those agents who are making decisions based on actual information can be dissuaded from a choice rather easily. This suggests that cascades are susceptible to the release of public information. also discusses this result in the context of the underlying value p changing over time, in which case a cascade can rapidly change course.
  1. 瀑布总是会发生-正如讨论的那样，在简单模式下，随着做决定的人数增加到无穷大，瀑布发生的可能性增加到1。# cascades 可能是不正确的-因为代理人做决策时同时考虑了初始真理的有限理性和概率知识(例如:。接受或拒绝是否是正确的决定) ，不正确的行为可能通过系统级联。# 瀑布可以基于很少的信息——数学上，一个无限长度的瀑布只能基于两个人的决定。一般来说，一小部分强烈推崇理性思想的人可以迅速影响大部分普通人 # 级联是脆弱的——因为当 a 和 b 之间的差异超过2时，代理人不会收到额外的信息，而且因为这种差异可能发生在少数代理人身上，代理人考虑那些根据实际信息做出决定的代理人的意见，可以相当容易地劝阻他们做出选择。这表明级联很容易受到公共信息的泄露。还讨论了底层值 p 随时间变化的上下文中的结果，在这种情况下，级联可以迅速改变过程。

Responding

Responding

= 响应 =

A literature exists that examines how individuals or firms might respond to the existence of informational cascades when they have products to sell but where buyers are unsure of the quality of those products. Curtis Taylor (1999)[13] shows that when selling a house the seller might wish to start with high prices, as failure to sell with low prices is indicative of low quality and might start a cascade on not buying, while failure to sell with high prices could be construed as meaning the house is just over-priced, and prices can then be reduced to get a sale. Daniel Sgroi (2002)[14] shows that firms might use "guinea pigs" who are given the opportunity to buy early to kick-start an informational cascade through their early and public purchasing decisions, and work by David Gill and Daniel Sgroi (2008)[15] show that early public tests might have a similar effect (and in particular that passing a "tough test" which is biased against the seller can instigate a cascade all by itself). Bose et al.[16] have examined how prices set by a monopolist might evolve in the presence of potential cascade behavior where the monopolist and consumers are unsure of a products quality.

A literature exists that examines how individuals or firms might respond to the existence of informational cascades when they have products to sell but where buyers are unsure of the quality of those products. Curtis Taylor (1999) shows that when selling a house the seller might wish to start with high prices, as failure to sell with low prices is indicative of low quality and might start a cascade on not buying, while failure to sell with high prices could be construed as meaning the house is just over-priced, and prices can then be reduced to get a sale. Daniel Sgroi (2002) shows that firms might use "guinea pigs" who are given the opportunity to buy early to kick-start an informational cascade through their early and public purchasing decisions, and work by David Gill and Daniel Sgroi (2008) show that early public tests might have a similar effect (and in particular that passing a "tough test" which is biased against the seller can instigate a cascade all by itself). Bose et al. have examined how prices set by a monopolist might evolve in the presence of potential cascade behavior where the monopolist and consumers are unsure of a products quality.

现有的文献研究了当个人或公司有产品要出售但买家不确定这些产品的质量时，他们如何对信息级联的存在作出反应。柯蒂斯 · 泰勒(1999年)指出，在出售房屋时，卖方可能希望以高价出售，因为不以低价出售意味着质量低下，并可能导致不买房的连锁反应，而不以高价出售则可能被解释为房屋价格过高，然后可以通过降价出售。Daniel Sgroi (2002年)表明，公司可能会利用“豚鼠”，让他们有机会提前购买，通过早期和公共采购决策启动信息级联，David Gill 和 Daniel Sgroi (2008年)的工作表明，早期公开测试可能会产生类似的效果(特别是通过对卖方有偏见的“严格测试”可能会引起一连串的连锁反应)。等人。研究了在垄断者和消费者对产品质量没有把握的情况下，垄断者设定的价格如何演变。

Examples and fields of application

Information cascades occur in situations where seeing many people make the same choice provides evidence that outweighs one's own judgment. That is, one thinks: "It's more likely that I'm wrong than that all those other people are wrong. Therefore, I will do as they do."

Information cascades occur in situations where seeing many people make the same choice provides evidence that outweighs one's own judgment. That is, one thinks: "It's more likely that I'm wrong than that all those other people are wrong. Therefore, I will do as they do."

当看到许多人做出同样的选择时，信息瀑布就会出现，这提供的证据比自己的判断更重要。也就是说，有人认为: “与其说其他人都错了，不如说我错了。所以我要照他们所行的去行

In what has been termed a reputational cascade, late responders sometimes go along with the decisions of early responders, not just because the late responders think the early responders are right, but also because they perceive their reputation will be damaged if they dissent from the early responders.[17]

In what has been termed a reputational cascade, late responders sometimes go along with the decisions of early responders, not just because the late responders think the early responders are right, but also because they perceive their reputation will be damaged if they dissent from the early responders.

在所谓的声誉级联中，迟到的反应者有时会同意早到的反应者的决定，不仅仅是因为迟到的反应者认为早到的反应者是正确的，还因为他们认为如果他们不同意早到的反应者，他们的声誉将会受到损害。

Market cascades

Information cascades have become one of the topics of behavioral economics, as they are often seen in financial markets where they can feed speculation and create cumulative and excessive price moves, either for the whole market (market bubble) or a specific asset, like a stock that becomes overly popular among investors.

Information cascades have become one of the topics of behavioral economics, as they are often seen in financial markets where they can feed speculation and create cumulative and excessive price moves, either for the whole market (market bubble) or a specific asset, like a stock that becomes overly popular among investors.

信息瀑布已经成为行为经济学的主题之一，因为它们经常出现在金融市场中，它们可以助长投机行为，并造成累积和过度的价格波动，无论是对整个市场(市场泡沫)还是对某种特定资产，如在投资者中过于受欢迎的股票。

Marketers also use the idea of cascades to attempt to get a buying cascade started for a new product. If they can induce an initial set of people to adopt the new product, then those who make purchasing decisions later on may also adopt the product even if it is no better than, or perhaps even worse than, competing products. This is most effective if these later consumers are able to observe the adoption decisions, but not how satisfied the early customers actually were with the choice. This is consistent with the idea that cascades arise naturally when people can see what others do but not what they know.[18]

Marketers also use the idea of cascades to attempt to get a buying cascade started for a new product. If they can induce an initial set of people to adopt the new product, then those who make purchasing decisions later on may also adopt the product even if it is no better than, or perhaps even worse than, competing products. This is most effective if these later consumers are able to observe the adoption decisions, but not how satisfied the early customers actually were with the choice. This is consistent with the idea that cascades arise naturally when people can see what others do but not what they know.http://research.ivo-welch.info/palgrave.pdf

营销人员也利用瀑布的思想，试图得到一个新产品的购买瀑布开始。如果他们能够诱导一批人接受新产品，那么那些稍后做出购买决定的人也可能会接受这个产品，即使它并不比竞争产品好，甚至可能比竞争产品更差。这是最有效的，如果这些后来的消费者能够观察到采用的决定，但不是如何满意的早期客户实际上对选择。这与这样一个观点是一致的: 当人们能看到别人做了什么，但不能看到他们所知道的时候，瀑布就自然而然地产生了。Info/palgrave. pdf

An example is Hollywood movies. If test screenings suggest a big-budget movie might be a flop, studios often decide to spend more on initial marketing rather than less, with the aim of making as much money as possible on the opening weekend, before word gets around that it's a turkey.

An example is Hollywood movies. If test screenings suggest a big-budget movie might be a flop, studios often decide to spend more on initial marketing rather than less, with the aim of making as much money as possible on the opening weekend, before word gets around that it's a turkey.

好莱坞电影就是一个例子。如果试映表明一部大制作的电影可能会失败，那么电影公司通常会决定在最初的营销上投入更多而不是更少，目的是在首映周末尽可能多地赚钱，以免传言说这部电影是一只火鸡。

Information cascades are usually considered by economists:

  • as products of rational expectations at their start,
  • as irrational herd behavior if they persist for too long, which signals that collective emotions come also into play to feed the cascade.

Information cascades are usually considered by economists:

  • as products of rational expectations at their start,
  • as irrational herd behavior if they persist for too long, which signals that collective emotions come also into play to feed the cascade.

信息瀑布通常被经济学家认为:

  • 作为理性预期的产物，
  • 如果持续时间太长，
  • 作为非理性的羊群行为，这表明集体情绪也发挥作用，饲料瀑布。

Social network analysis

模板:See Dotey et al.[19] state that information flows in the form of cascades on the social network. According to the authors, analysis of virality of information cascades on a social network may lead to many useful applications like determining the most influential individuals within a network. This information can be used for maximizing market effectiveness or influencing public opinion. Various structural and temporal features of a network affect cascade virality. Additionally, these models are widely exploited in the problem of Rumor spread in social network to investigate it and reduce its influence in online social networks.


Dotey et al. state that information flows in the form of cascades on the social network. According to the authors, analysis of virality of information cascades on a social network may lead to many useful applications like determining the most influential individuals within a network. This information can be used for maximizing market effectiveness or influencing public opinion. Various structural and temporal features of a network affect cascade virality. Additionally, these models are widely exploited in the problem of Rumor spread in social network to investigate it and reduce its influence in online social networks.


Dotey et al.信息在社交网络中以级联的形式流动。根据作者的说法，分析社交网络上的病毒性信息串联可能会导致许多有用的应用，比如确定网络中最具影响力的个体。这些信息可以用于最大限度地提高市场效率或影响公众舆论。网络的各种结构和时间特征影响级联病毒性。此外，这些模型在社会网络谣言传播问题中得到了广泛的应用，以研究谣言在社会网络中的传播，减少谣言在网络社会网络中的影响。

In contrast to work on information cascades in social networks, the social influence model of belief spread argues that people have some notion of the private beliefs of those in their network.[20] The social influence model, then, relaxes the assumption of information cascades that people are acting only on observable actions taken by others. In addition, the social influence model focuses on embedding people within a social network, as opposed to a queue. Finally, the social influence model relaxes the assumption of the information cascade model that people will either complete an action or not by allowing for a continuous scale of the "strength" of an agents belief that an action should be completed.

In contrast to work on information cascades in social networks, the social influence model of belief spread argues that people have some notion of the private beliefs of those in their network. The social influence model, then, relaxes the assumption of information cascades that people are acting only on observable actions taken by others. In addition, the social influence model focuses on embedding people within a social network, as opposed to a queue. Finally, the social influence model relaxes the assumption of the information cascade model that people will either complete an action or not by allowing for a continuous scale of the "strength" of an agents belief that an action should be completed.

与研究社会网络中的信息级联相反，信仰传播的社会影响模型认为，人们对于他们网络中的个人信仰有一些概念。因此，社会影响模型放松了信息级联的假设，即人们只是根据他人采取的可观察的行动来行动。此外，社会影响力模型的重点是将人们嵌入到社会网络中，而不是排队。最后，社会影响模型放松了信息级联模型的假设，即人们要么会完成一个行动，要么不会通过允许一个代理人相信应该完成一个行动的“力量”的连续规模来完成。

Historical examples

  • Small protests began in Leipzig, Germany in 1989 with just a handful of activists challenging the German Democratic Republic.[21] For almost a year, protesters met every Monday growing by a few people each time.[21] By the time the government attempted to address it in September 1989, it was too big to quash.[21] In October, the number of protesters reached 100,000 and by the first Monday in November, over 400,000 people marched the streets of Leipzig. Two days later the Berlin Wall was dismantled.[21]
  • Small protests began in Leipzig, Germany in 1989 with just a handful of activists challenging the German Democratic Republic. For almost a year, protesters met every Monday growing by a few people each time. By the time the government attempted to address it in September 1989, it was too big to quash. In October, the number of protesters reached 100,000 and by the first Monday in November, over 400,000 people marched the streets of Leipzig. Two days later the Berlin Wall was dismantled.


  • 1989年，德国莱比锡爆发小规模抗议活动，只有少数活动人士挑战德意志民主共和国。在将近一年的时间里，每个星期一都有越来越多的抗议者聚集在一起。到1989年9月政府试图解决这个问题时，这个问题已经大到无法平息。10月，抗议者人数达到10万，到11月的第一个星期一，超过40万人在莱比锡街头游行。两天后，柏林墙被拆除。
  • The adoption rate of drought-resistant hybrid seed corn during the Great Depression and Dust Bowl was slow despite its significant improvement over the previously available seed corn. Researchers at Iowa State University were interested in understanding the public's hesitation to the adoption of this significantly improved technology. After conducting 259 interviews with farmers[22] it was observed that the slow rate of adoption was due to how the farmers valued the opinion of their friends and neighbors instead of the word of a salesman. See[23] for the original report.
  • The adoption rate of drought-resistant hybrid seed corn during the Great Depression and Dust Bowl was slow despite its significant improvement over the previously available seed corn. Researchers at Iowa State University were interested in understanding the public's hesitation to the adoption of this significantly improved technology. After conducting 259 interviews with farmers it was observed that the slow rate of adoption was due to how the farmers valued the opinion of their friends and neighbors instead of the word of a salesman. See for the original report.


  • 在经济大萧条及沙尘暴期间，抗旱杂交种玉米的采用率较以往有显著改善，但进展缓慢。艾奥瓦州立大学的研究人员有兴趣了解公众对采用这种显著改进的技术的犹豫。在对农民进行了259次访谈之后，观察到收养速度缓慢是因为农民重视朋友和邻居的意见，而不是推销员的话。见原始报告。

Empirical Studies

In addition to the examples above, Information Cascades have been shown to exist in several empirical studies. Perhaps the best example, given above, is.[10] Participants stood in a line behind an urn which had balls of different colors. Sequentially, participants would pick a ball out of the urn, looks at it, and then places it back into the urn. The agent then voices their opinion of which color of balls (red or blue) there is a majority of in the urn for the rest of the participants to hear. Participants get a monetary reward if they guess correctly, forcing the concept of rationality.

In addition to the examples above, Information Cascades have been shown to exist in several empirical studies. Perhaps the best example, given above, is. Participants stood in a line behind an urn which had balls of different colors. Sequentially, participants would pick a ball out of the urn, looks at it, and then places it back into the urn. The agent then voices their opinion of which color of balls (red or blue) there is a majority of in the urn for the rest of the participants to hear. Participants get a monetary reward if they guess correctly, forcing the concept of rationality.

除了上面的例子，信息级联已经被证明在一些实证研究中存在。也许上面给出的最好的例子是。参与者们站成一排，站在一个装有不同颜色球的坛子后面。接下来，参与者将从骨灰盒中拿出一个球，看着它，然后将它放回骨灰盒中。然后，代理人就球的颜色(红色还是蓝色)发表意见，让其他参与者能够听到大多数球的颜色。参与者如果猜对了，就会得到金钱奖励，从而强化了理性的概念。

Other examples include

  • De Vany and Walls[24] create a statistical model of information cascades where an action is required. They apply this model to the actions people take to go see a movie that has come out at the theatre. De Vany and Walls validate their model on this data, finding a similar Pareto distribution of revenue for different movies.
  • Walden and Browne also adopt the original Information Cascade model, here into an operational model more practical for real world studies, which allows for analysis based on observed variables. Walden and Browne test their model on data about adoption of new technologies by businesses, finding support for their hypothesis that information cascades play a role in this adoption[25]

Other examples include

  • De Vany and Walls create a statistical model of information cascades where an action is required. They apply this model to the actions people take to go see a movie that has come out at the theatre. De Vany and Walls validate their model on this data, finding a similar Pareto distribution of revenue for different movies.
  • Walden and Browne also adopt the original Information Cascade model, here into an operational model more practical for real world studies, which allows for analysis based on observed variables. Walden and Browne test their model on data about adoption of new technologies by businesses, finding support for their hypothesis that information cascades play a role in this adoption

其他例子包括

  • De Vany 和 Walls 创建了一个需要采取行动的信息级联的统计模型。他们把这个模型应用到人们去看在剧院上映的电影的行为中。和 Walls 利用这些数据验证了他们的模型，为不同的电影找到了类似的帕累托分布。
  • Walden 和 Browne 也采用了原始的信息级联模型，这里的操作模型更适用于现实世界的研究，它允许基于观察到的变量进行分析。沃尔登和布朗利用企业采用新技术的数据来测试他们的模型，为他们的假设找到支持，即信息级联在这种采用中发挥了作用

Legal aspects

The negative effects of informational cascades sometimes become a legal concern and laws have been enacted to neutralize them. Ward Farnsworth, a law professor, analyzed the legal aspects of informational cascades and gave several examples in his book The Legal Analyst: in many military courts, the officers voting to decide a case vote in reverse rank order (the officer of the lowest rank votes first), and he suggested it may be done so the lower-ranked officers would not be tempted by the cascade to vote with the more senior officers, who are believed to have more accurate judgement; another example is that countries such as Israel and France have laws that prohibit polling days or weeks before elections to prevent the effect of informational cascade that may influence the election results.[26]

The negative effects of informational cascades sometimes become a legal concern and laws have been enacted to neutralize them. Ward Farnsworth, a law professor, analyzed the legal aspects of informational cascades and gave several examples in his book The Legal Analyst: in many military courts, the officers voting to decide a case vote in reverse rank order (the officer of the lowest rank votes first), and he suggested it may be done so the lower-ranked officers would not be tempted by the cascade to vote with the more senior officers, who are believed to have more accurate judgement; another example is that countries such as Israel and France have laws that prohibit polling days or weeks before elections to prevent the effect of informational cascade that may influence the election results.

信息级联的负面影响有时成为一个法律问题，人们制定了法律来中和这些负面影响。法学教授沃德 · 范斯沃斯(Ward Farnsworth)分析了信息级联的法律方面，并在他的著作《法律分析师》(The Legal Analyst)中举了几个例子: 在许多军事法庭中，军官投票决定案件的投票顺序是颠倒的(排名最低的军官优先) ，他建议这样做，这样排名较低的军官就不会受到与级别较高的军官投票的诱惑，后者被认为判断更准确; 另一个例子是，以色列和法国等国的法律禁止在选举前几天或几周进行投票，以防止信息级联可能影响选举结果的效果。

Globalization

As previously stated, informational cascades are logical processes describing how an individual's decision process changes based upon outside information. Cascades have never been a household name; at best, they exist hypothetically. Over the past few decades, cascades saw an increase in popularity through various fields of study. Specifically, they have been quite useful in comparing thought processes between Greek and German organic farmers. The aforementioned study suggests discrepancies between Greek and German thought processes based upon their cultural and socioeconomic differences.[27] Even further, cascades have been extrapolated to ideas such as financial volatility and monetary policy. In 2004 Helmut Wagner and Wolfram Berger suggested cascades as an analytical vehicle to examine changes to the financial market as it became more globalized. Wagner and Berger noticed structural changes to the framework of understanding financial markets due to globalization; giving rise to volatility in capital flow and spawning uncertainty which affected central banks.[28] Additionally, information cascades are useful in understanding the origins of terrorist tactics. When the attack by Black September occurred in 1972 it was hard not to see the similarities between their tactics and the Baader-Meinhof group (also known as the Red Army Faction [RAF]).[29] All of these examples portray how the process of cascades were put into use. Moreover, it is important to understand the framework of cascades to move forward in a more globalized society. Establishing a foundation to understanding the passage of information through transnational and multinational organizations, and even more, is critical to the arising modern society.[30] Summing up all of these points, cascades, as a general term, encompass a spectrum of different concepts. Information cascades have been the underlying thread in how information is transferred, overwritten, and understood through various cultures spanning from a multitude of different countries.[31]

As previously stated, informational cascades are logical processes describing how an individual's decision process changes based upon outside information. Cascades have never been a household name; at best, they exist hypothetically. Over the past few decades, cascades saw an increase in popularity through various fields of study. Specifically, they have been quite useful in comparing thought processes between Greek and German organic farmers. The aforementioned study suggests discrepancies between Greek and German thought processes based upon their cultural and socioeconomic differences. Even further, cascades have been extrapolated to ideas such as financial volatility and monetary policy. In 2004 Helmut Wagner and Wolfram Berger suggested cascades as an analytical vehicle to examine changes to the financial market as it became more globalized. Wagner and Berger noticed structural changes to the framework of understanding financial markets due to globalization; giving rise to volatility in capital flow and spawning uncertainty which affected central banks. Additionally, information cascades are useful in understanding the origins of terrorist tactics. When the attack by Black September occurred in 1972 it was hard not to see the similarities between their tactics and the Baader-Meinhof group (also known as the Red Army Faction [RAF]). All of these examples portray how the process of cascades were put into use. Moreover, it is important to understand the framework of cascades to move forward in a more globalized society. Establishing a foundation to understanding the passage of information through transnational and multinational organizations, and even more, is critical to the arising modern society. Summing up all of these points, cascades, as a general term, encompass a spectrum of different concepts. Information cascades have been the underlying thread in how information is transferred, overwritten, and understood through various cultures spanning from a multitude of different countries.

如前所述，信息级联是描述个人决策过程如何根据外部信息发生变化的逻辑过程。瀑布从来都不是一个家喻户晓的名字，它们充其量只是假设性的存在。在过去的几十年里，瀑布看到了通过各种领域的研究普及。具体来说，他们在比较希腊和德国有机农场主的思维过程中非常有用。上述研究表明，基于文化和社会经济差异，希腊人和德国人的思维过程存在差异。更进一步说，瀑布效应已经被外推到金融动荡和货币政策等想法上。2004年，赫尔穆特 · 瓦格纳和沃尔夫拉姆 · 伯格尔建议将瀑布作为一种分析工具，用以研究随着金融市场变得更加全球化而发生的变化。瓦格纳和伯格尔注意到，由于全球化，理解金融市场的框架发生了结构性变化，导致了资本流动的波动，并产生了影响中央银行的不确定性。此外，情报级联对于理解恐怖主义策略的起源也很有用。当1972年黑九月袭击事件发生时，很难不看出他们的战术与红军派空军(也被称为红军派空军)之间的相似之处。所有这些例子都描述了级联的过程是如何投入使用的。此外，重要的是要了解在一个更加全球化的社会中向前迈进的级联框架。建立一个基础，以了解信息通过跨国和多国组织，甚至更多，是至关重要的现代社会的兴起。总结所有这些要点，级联，作为一个一般性的术语，包含了一系列不同的概念。信息级联一直是信息如何通过来自不同国家的不同文化传递、覆盖和理解的基本线索。

See also

  • Asch conformity experiments
  • Conformity
  • Groupthink
  • Group polarization
  • Herd behavior
  • Sheeple
  • Social proof
  • Woozle effect
  • Other modelling approaches
    • Adaptive market hypothesis
    • Agent-based computational economics
    • Financial economics#Challenges and criticism
    • Noisy market hypothesis
    • Random walk hypothesis#A non-random walk hypothesis

其他建模方法

  • 适应性市场假说
  • 基于阿希从众实验的计算经济学
  • 金融经济学
  • 挑战和批评
  • 嘈杂的市场假说
  • 随机游走假说 # 非随机游走假说

References

  1. ↑ Duan, Wenjing; Gu, Bin; Whinston, Andrew B. (March 2009). "Informational Cascades and Software Adoption on the Internet: An Empirical Investigation". MIS Quarterly. Rochester, NY. 33 (1): 23–48. doi:10.2307/20650277. hdl:2144/42029. JSTOR 20650277. SSRN 1103165.
  2. ↑ "The Difference Between Information Cascades and Herd Behavior : Networks Course blog for INFO 2040/CS 2850/Econ 2040/SOC 2090". Retrieved 2019-04-15.
  3. ↑ Çelen, Boğaçhan; Kariv, Shachar (May 2004). "Distinguishing Informational Cascades from Herd Behavior in the Laboratory". American Economic Review. 94 (3): 484–498. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.357.3265. doi:10.1257/0002828041464461. ISSN 0002-8282.
  4. ↑ Schiller, R.J. (1995). "Conversation, Information and Herd Behavior". Rhetoric and Economic Behavior. 85 (3): 181–185.
  5. ↑ Gruhl, Daniel; Guha, R.; Liben-Nowell, D.; Tomkins, A. (2004). Information diffusion through blogspace. pp. 491–501. doi:10.1145/988672.988739. ISBN 978-1581138443. 
  6. ↑ Sadikov, E.; Medina, M.; Leskovec, J.; Garcia-Molina, H. (2011). "Correcting for Missing Data in Information Cascades" (PDF). WSDM.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 Bikhchandani, S.; Hirshleifer, D.; Welch, I. (1992). "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades" (PDF). Journal of Political Economy. 100 (5): 992–1026. doi:10.1086/261849. S2CID 7784814. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-07-13.
  8. ↑ Bikhchandani, Sushil; Hirshleifer, David; Welch, Ivo (1998). "Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades". Journal of Economic Perspectives. 12 (3): 151–170. doi:10.1257/jep.12.3.151. ISSN 0895-3309.
  9. ↑ Smith, Lones; Sorensen, Peter (March 2000). "Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning". Econometrica (in English). 68 (2): 371–398. doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00113. hdl:1721.1/64049. ISSN 0012-9682.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 Anderson, L.R.; Holt, C.A. (1997). "Information Cascades in the Laboratory". The American Economic Review. 87 (5): 847–862.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 Easley, David (2010). Networks, Crowds and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World. Cambridge University Press. pp. 483–506. http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book/. 
  12. ↑ Newell, A. (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NY: Prentice Hall. https://archive.org/details/humanproblemsolv0000newe. 
  13. ↑ Taylor, C. (1999). "Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality". Review of Economic Studies. 66 (3): 555–578. doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00098.
  14. ↑ Sgroi, D. (2002). "Optimizing Information in the Herd: Guinea Pigs, Profits, and Welfare" (PDF). Games and Economic Behavior. 39: 137–166. doi:10.1006/game.2001.0881.
  15. ↑ Gill, D.; D. Sgroi (2008). "Sequential Decisions with Tests". Games and Economic Behavior. 63 (2): 663–678. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.322.7566. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.004. S2CID 5793119.
  16. ↑ Bose, S.; G. Orosel; M. Ottaviani; L. Vesterlund (2006). "Dynamic Monopoly Pricing and Herding". RAND Journal of Economics. 37 (4): 910–928. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.493.1834. doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00063.x. S2CID 2984643.
  17. ↑ Lemieux, Pierre (Winter 2003–2004). "Following the Herd" (PDF). Regulation. Cato Institute: 21. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2010-06-16. Retrieved 2010-07-14.
  18. ↑ http://research.ivo-welch.info/palgrave.pdfhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defekte_Weblinks?dwl={{{url}}} Seite nicht mehr abrufbar], Suche in Webarchiven: Kategorie:Wikipedia:Weblink offline (andere Namensräume)[http://timetravel.mementoweb.org/list/2010/Kategorie:Wikipedia:Vorlagenfehler/Vorlage:Toter Link/URL_fehlt
  19. ↑ Dotey, A., Rom, H. and Vaca C. (2011). "Information Diffusion in Social Media" (PDF). Stanford University.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  20. ↑ Friedkin, Noah E.; Johnsen, Eugene C. (2009). Social Influence Network Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511976735. ISBN 978-0-511-97673-5. 
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 Shirky, Clay (2008). Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations. New York: Penguin Press. pp. 161–164. ISBN 978-1-59420-153-0. 
  22. ↑ Carboneau, Clark (2005). "Using Diffusion of Innovations and Academic Detailing to Spread Evidence-based Practices". Journal for Healthcare Quality. 27 (2): 48–52. doi:10.1111/j.1945-1474.2005.tb01117.x. PMID 16190312. S2CID 6946662.
  23. ↑ Beal, George M.; Bohlen, Joe M. (November 1981). "The Diffusion Process" (PDF). Special Report No. 18. Iowa State University of Science and Technology of Ames, Iowa. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2009-04-08. Retrieved 2008-11-11.
  24. ↑ De Vany, A.; D. Walls (1999). "Uncertainty in the movie industry: does star power reduce the terror of the box office?". Journal of Cultural Economics. 23 (4): 285–318. doi:10.1023/a:1007608125988. S2CID 54614446.
  25. ↑ Walden, Eric; Browne, Glenn (2002). "Information Cascades in the Adoption of New Technology". ICIS Proceedings.
  26. ↑ Farnsworth, Ward (2007). The legal analyst : a toolkit for thinking about the law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-23835-7. OCLC 76828864. 
  27. ↑ Chatzimichael, Konstantinos; Genius, Margarita; Tzouvelekas, Vangelis (2013-07-03). "Informational cascades and technology adoption: Evidence from Greek and German organic growers" (PDF). Journal of Food Policy. 49: 186–195. doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2014.08.001.
  28. ↑ Wagner, Helmut; Berger, Wolfram (2004-06-01). "Globalization, Financial Volatility and Monetary Policy". Empirica (in English). 31 (2–3): 163–184. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.466.2938. doi:10.1007/s10633-004-0915-4. ISSN 0340-8744. S2CID 53471608.
  29. ↑ 1981-, Passmore, Leith (2011-11-03). Ulrike Meinhof and the Red Army Faction : performing terrorism (First ed.). New York. ISBN 9780230370777. OCLC 904285976. 
  30. ↑ Hamlett, Patrick W.; Cobb, Michael D. (2006-11-01). "Potential Solutions to Public Deliberation Problems: Structured Deliberations and Polarization Cascades". Policy Studies Journal (in English). 34 (4): 629–648. doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2006.00195.x. ISSN 1541-0072.
  31. ↑ Drezner, Daniel W. (2010). "Weighing the Scales: The Internet's Effect On State-Society Relations". The Brown Journal of World Affairs. 16 (2): 31–44. JSTOR 24590907.

External links

  • Informational Cascades and Rational Herding: An Annotated Bibliography and Resource Reference
  • A Bibliography of Information Cascades and Herd Effects
  • How a Bubble Stayed Under the Radar, Robert Shiller NYT article, may require login.
  • How the Low-Fat, Low-Fact Cascade Just Keeps Rolling Along, John Tierney October 9, 2007 NYT blog, does not require login.
  • Schopenhauer on Cascades, John Tierney, October 10, 2007 NYT blog, does not require login.
  • Is Justin Timberlake a Product of Cumulative Advantage? Informational Cascade with another name, NYT article, may require login.
  • Information Cascades in Magic

信息瀑布和理性羊群行为: 附有注释的参考书目和资源参考

  • 信息瀑布和羊群效应参考书目
  • 泡沫如何躲过雷达，Robert Shiller NYT 文章，可能需要登录。低脂肪、低事实的瀑布如何继续滚动，John Tierney 2007年10月9日纽约时报博客，不需要登录。
  • Schopenhauer on Cascades，John Tierney，October 10,2007 NYT blog，does not require login.贾斯汀.提姆布莱克是累积优势的产物吗？信息级联与另一个名称，纽约时报的文章，可能需要登录。
  • 魔法信息级联

模板:World view

Category:Behavioral finance Category:Conformity Category:Information

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