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Usage of the notion "emergence" may generally be subdivided into two perspectives, that of "weak emergence" and "strong emergence". One paper discussing this division is Weak Emergence, by philosopher Mark Bedau. In terms of physical systems, weak emergence is a type of emergence in which the emergent property is amenable to computer simulation or similar forms of after-the-fact analysis (for example, the formation of a traffic jam, the structure of a flight of starlings or a school of fishes, or the formation of galaxies). Crucial in these simulations is that the interacting members retain their independence. If not (for example in a chemical reaction), a new entity is formed with new, emergent properties: this is called strong emergence, which it is argued cannot be simulated or analysed.

Usage of the notion "emergence" may generally be subdivided into two perspectives, that of "weak emergence" and "strong emergence". One paper discussing this division is Weak Emergence, by philosopher Mark Bedau. In terms of physical systems, weak emergence is a type of emergence in which the emergent property is amenable to computer simulation or similar forms of after-the-fact analysis (for example, the formation of a traffic jam, the structure of a flight of starlings or a school of fishes, or the formation of galaxies). Crucial in these simulations is that the interacting members retain their independence. If not (for example in a chemical reaction), a new entity is formed with new, emergent properties: this is called strong emergence, which it is argued cannot be simulated or analysed.

”涌现”概念的用法一般可分为”弱涌现”和”强涌现”两种观点。一篇论述这种概念区分的文章来源于哲学家马克 · 贝道的《弱涌现》。就物理系统而言，弱涌现是一种涌现类型，在这种涌现类型中，适合进行计算机模拟或类似形式的事后分析(例如，交通堵塞的形成，椋鸟飞行结构或鱼群结构，又或星系的形成)。在这些模拟中至关重要的是相互作用的成员保持他们的独立性。如果没有(例如在化学反应中) ，一个新的实体就形成了，具有新颖的、涌现的特性: 这就是所谓的强涌现，它被认为是不能被模拟或分析的。

“涌现”概念的用法一般可分为”弱涌现”和”强涌现”两种观点。一篇论述这种概念区分的文章来源于哲学家马克 · 贝道的《弱涌现》。就物理系统而言，弱涌现是一种涌现类型，在这种涌现类型中，适合进行计算机模拟或类似形式的事后分析(例如，交通堵塞的形成，椋鸟飞行结构或鱼群结构，又或星系的形成)。在这些模拟中至关重要的是相互作用的成员保持他们的独立性。如果没有(例如在化学反应中) ，一个新的实体就形成了，具有新颖的、涌现的特性: 这就是所谓的强涌现，它被认为是不能被模拟或分析的。

Some common points between the two notions are that emergence concerns new properties produced as the system grows, which is to say ones which are not shared with its components or prior states. Also, it is assumed that the properties are supervenient rather than metaphysically primitive .

Some common points between the two notions are that emergence concerns new properties produced as the system grows, which is to say ones which are not shared with its components or prior states. Also, it is assumed that the properties are supervenient rather than metaphysically primitive .

Weak emergence describes new properties arising in systems as a result of the interactions at an elemental level. However, Bedau stipulates that the properties can be determined only by observing or simulating the system, and not by any process of a reductionist analysis. As a consequence the emerging properties are scale dependent: they are only observable if the system is large enough to exhibit the phenomenon. Chaotic, unpredictable behaviour can be seen as an emergent phenomenon, while at a microscopic scale the behaviour of the constituent parts can be fully deterministic.

Weak emergence describes new properties arising in systems as a result of the interactions at an elemental level. However, Bedau stipulates that the properties can be determined only by observing or simulating the system, and not by any process of a reductionist analysis. As a consequence the emerging properties are scale dependent: they are only observable if the system is large enough to exhibit the phenomenon. Chaotic, unpredictable behaviour can be seen as an emergent phenomenon, while at a microscopic scale the behaviour of the constituent parts can be fully deterministic.

弱涌现描述了由于元素层次上的相互作用而在系统中产生的新性质。然而，《贝道》规定，只有通过观察或模拟系统才能确定系统的性质，而不是通过任何还原分析的过程。因此，新出现的属性是规模相关的: 它们只有在系统足够大以展现这种现象时才能观察到。混乱、不可预知的行为可以看作是一种突现现象，而在微观尺度上，组成部分的行为可以是完全确定的。

弱涌现描述了由于元素层次上的相互作用而在系统中产生的新颖质。然而，Mark Bedau规定，只有通过观察或模拟系统才能确定系统的性质，而不是通过任何还原分析的过程。因此，新出现的属性是具规模相关的: 它们只有在系统足够大能够展现这种现象时才能观察到。混乱、不可预知的行为可以看作是一种涌现现象，而在微观尺度上，组成部分的行为可以是完全确定的。

Bedau notes that weak emergence is not a universal metaphysical solvent, as the hypothesis that consciousness is weakly emergent would not resolve the traditional philosophical questions about the physicality of consciousness. However, Bedau concludes that adopting this view would provide a precise notion that emergence is involved in consciousness, and second, the notion of weak emergence is metaphysically benign.  

Bedau notes that weak emergence is not a universal metaphysical solvent, as the hypothesis that consciousness is weakly emergent would not resolve the traditional philosophical questions about the physicality of consciousness. However, Bedau concludes that adopting this view would provide a precise notion that emergence is involved in consciousness, and second, the notion of weak emergence is metaphysically benign.  

指出，弱涌现不是一种普遍的形而上学溶剂，因为意识是弱涌现的假设不能解决关于意识的物质性的传统哲学问题。然而，Bedau 的结论是，采用这种观点将提供一个精确的概念，即涌现是包含在意识中的，其次，弱涌现的概念在形而上学上是良性的。

Mark Bedau指出，弱涌现不是一种普遍的形而上学的solvent，因为意识是弱涌现的假设不能解决关于意识的物质性的传统哲学问题。然而，Bedau 的结论是，采用这种观点将提供一个精确的概念，即涌现是包含在意识中的，其次，弱涌现的概念在形而上学上是良性的。

Strong emergence describes the direct causal action of a high-level system upon its components; qualities produced this way are irreducible to the system's constituent parts . The whole is other than the sum of its parts. An example from physics of such emergence is water, which appears unpredictable even after an exhaustive study of the properties of its constituent atoms of hydrogen and oxygen. It follows then that no simulation of the system can exist, for such a simulation would itself constitute a reduction of the system to its constituent parts. .

Strong emergence describes the direct causal action of a high-level system upon its components; qualities produced this way are irreducible to the system's constituent parts . The whole is other than the sum of its parts. An example from physics of such emergence is water, which appears unpredictable even after an exhaustive study of the properties of its constituent atoms of hydrogen and oxygen. It follows then that no simulation of the system can exist, for such a simulation would itself constitute a reduction of the system to its constituent parts. .

强涌现描述了一个高级系统对其组成部分的直接因果作用; 这种方式产生的质量不可能还原为系统的组成部分。整体不是各部分的总和。从物理学角度来看，这种现象的一个例子是水，即使对其组成原子氢和氧的性质进行了详尽的研究，水也显得不可预测。因此，不可能存在任何对系统的模拟，因为这种模拟本身将构成对系统组成部分的简化。.

强涌现描述了一个高级系统对其组成部分的直接因果作用; 这种方式产生的质量不可能还原为系统的组成部分。整体不是各部分的总和。从物理学角度来看，这种现象的一个例子是水，即使对其组成原子氢和氧的性质进行了详尽的研究，水的形成也显得不可预测。因此，不可能存在任何对系统的模拟，因为这种模拟本身将构成对系统组成部分的简化。.

However, biologist Peter Corning has asserted that "the debate about whether or not the whole can be predicted from the properties of the parts misses the point. Wholes produce unique combined effects, but many of these effects may be co-determined by the context and the interactions between the whole and its environment(s)" . In accordance with his Synergism Hypothesis , Corning also stated: "It is the synergistic effects produced by wholes that are the very cause of the evolution of complexity in nature." Novelist Arthur Koestler used the metaphor of Janus (a symbol of the unity underlying complements like open/shut, peace/war) to illustrate how the two perspectives (strong vs. weak or holistic vs. reductionistic) should be treated as non-exclusive, and should work together to address the issues of emergence . Theoretical physicist PW Anderson states it this way:

However, biologist Peter Corning has asserted that "the debate about whether or not the whole can be predicted from the properties of the parts misses the point. Wholes produce unique combined effects, but many of these effects may be co-determined by the context and the interactions between the whole and its environment(s)" . In accordance with his Synergism Hypothesis , Corning also stated: "It is the synergistic effects produced by wholes that are the very cause of the evolution of complexity in nature." Novelist Arthur Koestler used the metaphor of Janus (a symbol of the unity underlying complements like open/shut, peace/war) to illustrate how the two perspectives (strong vs. weak or holistic vs. reductionistic) should be treated as non-exclusive, and should work together to address the issues of emergence . Theoretical physicist PW Anderson states it this way:

然而，生物学家彼得 · 康宁声称，“关于是否可以从部件的特性来预测整体的争论没有抓住要点。整体产生独特的综合效应，但其中许多效应可能由环境和整体及其环境之间的相互作用共同决定”。根据他的协同论假说，康宁还指出: “正是整体产生的协同效应才是自然界复杂性进化的根本原因。”小说家亚瑟 · 凯斯特勒(Arthur Koestler)用“两面神”(Janus)这个隐喻(两面神是开 / 关、和平 / 战争等潜在补充的统一的象征)来说明两种观点(强与弱、整体与简化论)应该如何被视为非排他性的，并且应该一起解决涌现的问题。理论物理学家 PW Anderson 是这样说的:

然而，生物学家彼得 · 康宁声称，“关于是否可以从部件的特性来预测整体的争论并没有抓住要点。整体产生独特的综合效应，但其中许多效应可能由环境和整体及其环境之间的相互作用共同决定”。根据他的协同论假说，康宁还指出: “正是整体产生的协同效应才是自然界复杂性进化的根本原因。”小说家亚瑟 · 凯斯特勒(Arthur Koestler)用“两面神”(Janus)这个隐喻(两面神是开 / 关、和平 / 战争等潜在补充的统一的象征)来说明两种观点(强与弱、整体与简化论)应该如何被视为非排他性的，并且应该一起解决涌现的问题。理论物理学家 PW Anderson 是这样说的:

<blockquote>The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe. The constructionist hypothesis breaks down when confronted with the twin difficulties of scale and complexity. At each level of complexity entirely new properties appear. Psychology is not applied biology, nor is biology applied chemistry. We can now see that the whole becomes not merely more, but very different from the sum of its parts .</blockquote>

<blockquote>The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe. The constructionist hypothesis breaks down when confronted with the twin difficulties of scale and complexity. At each level of complexity entirely new properties appear. Psychology is not applied biology, nor is biology applied chemistry. We can now see that the whole becomes not merely more, but very different from the sum of its parts .</blockquote>

把一切都简化为简单的基本定律的能力并不意味着从这些定律出发并重建宇宙的能力。当面对规模和复杂性的双重困难时，建构主义假设就失败了。在复杂性的每个级别上，都会出现全新的属性。心理学不是应用生物学，生物学也不是应用化学。我们现在可以看到，整体不仅变得更多，而且与各部分的总和大不相同。 / blockquote

把一切都简化为简单的基本定律的能力并不意味着从这些定律出发并重建宇宙的能力。当面对规模和复杂性的双重困难时，建构主义假设就失败了。在复杂性的每个层级上，都会出现全新的属性。心理学不是应用生物学，生物学也不是应用化学。我们现在可以看到，整体不仅变得更多，而且与各部分的总和大不相同。 / blockquote

Some thinkers question the plausibility of strong emergence as contravening our usual understanding of physics. Mark A. Bedau observes:

Some thinkers question the plausibility of strong emergence as contravening our usual understanding of physics. Mark A. Bedau observes:

一些思想家质疑强大涌现的可能性，因为它违背了我们对物理学的通常理解。马克 · 贝道观察到:

一些思想家质疑强涌现的可能性，因为它违背了我们对物理学的通常理解。马克 · 贝道观察到:

<blockquote>Although strong emergence is logically possible, it is uncomfortably like magic. How does an irreducible but supervenient downward causal power arise, since by definition it cannot be due to the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities? Such causal powers would be quite unlike anything within our scientific ken. This not only indicates how they will discomfort reasonable forms of materialism. Their mysteriousness will only heighten the traditional worry that emergence entails illegitimately getting something from nothing.</blockquote>

<blockquote>Although strong emergence is logically possible, it is uncomfortably like magic. How does an irreducible but supervenient downward causal power arise, since by definition it cannot be due to the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities? Such causal powers would be quite unlike anything within our scientific ken. This not only indicates how they will discomfort reasonable forms of materialism. Their mysteriousness will only heighten the traditional worry that emergence entails illegitimately getting something from nothing.</blockquote>

Strong emergence can be criticized for being causally overdetermined. The canonical example concerns emergent mental states (M and M∗) that supervene on physical states (P and P∗) respectively. Let M and M∗ be emergent properties. Let M∗ supervene on base property P∗. What happens when M causes M∗? Jaegwon Kim says:

Strong emergence can be criticized for being causally overdetermined. The canonical example concerns emergent mental states (M and M∗) that supervene on physical states (P and P∗) respectively. Let M and M∗ be emergent properties. Let M∗ supervene on base property P∗. What happens when M causes M∗? Jaegwon Kim says:

强烈的涌现可以被批评为因果过度决定。典型的例子是关于突现的心理状态(m 和 m *) ，它们分别在物理状态(p 和 p *)上叠加。设 m 和 m * 是涌现性质。乘以 m 的立方乘以基数 p * 。当 m 导致 m * 时会发生什么？Jaegwon Kim 表示:

强涌现可以被批评为因果过度决定。典型的例子是关于涌现的心理状态(m 和 m *) ，它们分别在物理状态(p 和 p *)上叠加。设 m 和 m * 是涌现性质。乘以 m 的立方乘以基数 p * 。当 m 导致 m * 时会发生什么？Jaegwon Kim 表示:

<blockquote>In our schematic example above, we concluded that M causes M∗ by causing P∗. So M causes P∗. Now, M, as an emergent, must itself have an emergence base property, say P. Now we face a critical question: if an emergent, M, emerges from basal condition P, why cannot P displace M as a cause of any putative effect of M? Why cannot P do all the work in explaining why any alleged effect of M occurred? If causation is understood as nomological (law-based) sufficiency, P, as M's emergence base, is nomologically sufficient for it, and M, as P∗'s cause, is nomologically sufficient for P∗. It follows that P is nomologically sufficient for P∗ and hence qualifies as its cause…If M is somehow retained as a cause, we are faced with the highly implausible consequence that every case of downward causation involves overdetermination (since P remains a cause of P∗ as well). Moreover, this goes against the spirit of emergentism in any case: emergents are supposed to make distinctive and novel causal contributions.</blockquote>

<blockquote>In our schematic example above, we concluded that M causes M∗ by causing P∗. So M causes P∗. Now, M, as an emergent, must itself have an emergence base property, say P. Now we face a critical question: if an emergent, M, emerges from basal condition P, why cannot P displace M as a cause of any putative effect of M? Why cannot P do all the work in explaining why any alleged effect of M occurred? If causation is understood as nomological (law-based) sufficiency, P, as M's emergence base, is nomologically sufficient for it, and M, as P∗'s cause, is nomologically sufficient for P∗. It follows that P is nomologically sufficient for P∗ and hence qualifies as its cause…If M is somehow retained as a cause, we are faced with the highly implausible consequence that every case of downward causation involves overdetermination (since P remains a cause of P∗ as well). Moreover, this goes against the spirit of emergentism in any case: emergents are supposed to make distinctive and novel causal contributions.</blockquote>

在我们上面的示意图中，我们得出结论，m 引起 m * 是由 p * 引起的。So M causes P∗.现在，m，作为一个涌现，本身必须有一个涌现基本性质，比如 p。 现在我们面临一个关键的问题: 如果一个涌现，m，出现在基础条件 p，为什么不能 p 置换 m 作为任何假定的影响的原因？为什么 p 不能做所有的工作来解释为什么会发生所谓的 m 效应？如果因果关系被理解为法律上的充分性，那么 p，作为 m 的涌现基础，在法律上就足够了，m，作为 p * 的原因，在法律上就足够了。如果 m 以某种方式作为原因被保留下来，我们就会面临一个非常难以置信的结果，那就是每一个向下的因果关系都牵涉到过度决定(因为 p 也是 p * 的原因)。此外，这在任何情况下都与紧急主义的精神背道而驰: 紧急主义者应该做出独特而新颖的因果贡献。 / blockquote

在我们上面的示意图中，我们得出结论，m 引起 m * 是由 p * 引起的。所以 M 引起 P∗.现在，m，作为一个涌现，本身必须有一个涌现基本性质，比如 p。 现在我们面临一个关键的问题: 如果一个涌现，m，出现在基础条件 p下，为什么不能 p 置换 m 作为任何假定的影响的原因？为什么 p 不能做所有的工作来解释为什么会发生所谓的 m 效应？如果因果关系被理解为定律上的充分性，那么 p，作为 m 的涌现基础，在定律上就足够了，m，作为 p * 的原因，在定律上就足够了。如果 m 以某种方式作为原因被保留下来，我们就会面临一个非常难以置信的结果，那就是每一个向下的因果关系都牵涉到过度决定(因为 p 也是 p * 的原因)。此外，这在任何情况下都与涌现主义的精神背道而驰: 涌现主义者应该做出独特而新颖的因果贡献。 / blockquote

If M is the cause of M∗, then M∗ is overdetermined because M∗ can also be thought of as being determined by P. One escape-route that a strong emergentist could take would be to deny downward causation. However, this would remove the proposed reason that emergent mental states must supervene on physical states, which in turn would call physicalism into question, and thus be unpalatable for some philosophers and physicists.

If M is the cause of M∗, then M∗ is overdetermined because M∗ can also be thought of as being determined by P. One escape-route that a strong emergentist could take would be to deny downward causation. However, this would remove the proposed reason that emergent mental states must supervene on physical states, which in turn would call physicalism into question, and thus be unpalatable for some philosophers and physicists.

如果 m * 是 m * 的原因，那么 m * 就被过分确定了，因为 m * 也可以被认为是由 p 决定的。 一个强大的刚出现论者可以采取的一条退路是否定向下的因果关系。然而，这将消除突现的精神状态必须附加在物理状态上的理由，这反过来会使物理主义成为问题，因此对于一些哲学家和物理学家来说是难以接受的。

如果 m * 是 m * 的原因，那么 m * 就被过分确定了，因为 m * 也可以被认为是由 p 决定的。 一个强涌现论者可以采取的一条退路是否定向下的因果关系。然而，这将消除涌现的精神状态必须附加在物理状态上的理由，这反过来会使物理主义成为问题，因此对于一些哲学家和物理学家来说是难以接受的。

Meanwhile, others have worked towards developing analytical evidence of strong emergence. In 2009, Gu et al. presented a class of physical systems that exhibits non-computable macroscopic properties. More precisely, if one could compute certain macroscopic properties of these systems from the microscopic description of these systems, then one would be able to solve computational problems known to be undecidable in computer science. Gu et al. concluded that

Meanwhile, others have worked towards developing analytical evidence of strong emergence. In 2009, Gu et al. presented a class of physical systems that exhibits non-computable macroscopic properties. More precisely, if one could compute certain macroscopic properties of these systems from the microscopic description of these systems, then one would be able to solve computational problems known to be undecidable in computer science. Gu et al. concluded that

<blockquote>Although macroscopic concepts are essential for understanding our world, much of fundamental physics has been devoted to the search for a 'theory of everything', a set of equations that perfectly describe the behavior of all fundamental particles. The view that this is the goal of science rests in part on the rationale that such a theory would allow us to derive the behavior of all macroscopic concepts, at least in principle. The evidence we have presented suggests that this view may be overly optimistic. A 'theory of everything' is one of many components necessary for complete understanding of the universe, but is not necessarily the only one. The development of macroscopic laws from first principles may involve more than just systematic logic, and could require conjectures suggested by experiments, simulations or insight.</blockquote>

<blockquote>Although macroscopic concepts are essential for understanding our world, much of fundamental physics has been devoted to the search for a 'theory of everything', a set of equations that perfectly describe the behavior of all fundamental particles. The view that this is the goal of science rests in part on the rationale that such a theory would allow us to derive the behavior of all macroscopic concepts, at least in principle. The evidence we have presented suggests that this view may be overly optimistic. A 'theory of everything' is one of many components necessary for complete understanding of the universe, but is not necessarily the only one. The development of macroscopic laws from first principles may involve more than just systematic logic, and could require conjectures suggested by experiments, simulations or insight.</blockquote>

尽管宏观概念对于理解我们的世界来说是必不可少的，大部分的基础物理学已经致力于寻找一个万有理论，一个完美描述所有基本粒子行为的方程组。认为这是科学目标的观点部分依赖于这样一个理论的基本原理，即这样一个理论将允许我们得出所有宏观概念的行为，至少在原则上。我们提供的证据表明，这种观点可能过于乐观。“万有理论”是完全理解宇宙所必需的许多要素之一，但不一定是唯一的要素。从第一原理发展宏观定律可能不仅仅涉及系统的逻辑，而且可能需要实验、模拟或洞察力的推测。 / blockquote

尽管宏观概念对于理解我们的世界来说是必不可少的，大部分的基础物理学已经致力于寻找一个万有理论，一个完美描述所有基本粒子行为的方程组。这种认为这是科学目标的观点，部分依赖于这样一个理论的基本原理，即这样一个理论将允许我们得出所有宏观概念的行为，至少在原则上是这样的。我们提供的证据表明，这种观点可能过于乐观。“万有理论”是完全理解宇宙所必需的许多要素之一，但不一定是唯一的要素。从第一原理发展宏观定律可能不仅仅涉及系统的逻辑，而且可能需要实验、模拟或洞察力的推测。 / blockquote

===Emergence and interaction===

===Emergence and interaction===