961
个编辑
更改
跳到导航
跳到搜索
第196行：
第196行： − 在这个定义中，策略 t 可以是 s 的一个中性替代品(得分同样好，但不是更好)。+ − <!--For example, in ''Harm thy neighbour'', (''A'', ''A'') is a Nash equilibrium because one cannot do ''better'' by switching to ''B''. **will move this to "comparison" section, trying to avoid mixing A&B and S&T strategies in same paragraph --> − − <!--For example, in Harm thy neighbour, (A, A) is a Nash equilibrium because one cannot do better by switching to B. **will move this to "comparison" section, trying to avoid mixing A&B and S&T strategies in same paragraph --> − − <！例如，在《伤害你的邻居》中，(a，a)是一个纳什均衡点，因为一个人不能通过转换到 b 来做得更好。* * 将把这一部分移到“比较”部分，尽量避免在同一段落中将 a & b 和科技策略混为一谈 -- > 第208行：
第203行： − 即使 t 得分相同，一个纳什均衡点也被认为是稳定的，前提是玩家没有长期的动机去使用 t 而不是 s。这一事实代表了斯洛文尼亚就业服务局的出发点。+ 第216行：
第211行： − Maynard Smith 和 Price 为策略 s 指定了两个成为 ESS 的条件。对于所有 t ≠ s，也是如此+ − + − # E(''S'',''S'') > E(''T'',''S''), '''or'''+ − − E(S,S) > E(T,S), or − − E (s，s) > e (t，s) ，或 − − # E(''S'',''S'') = E(''T'',''S'') and E(''S'',''T'') > E(''T'',''T'') − − E(S,S) = E(T,S) and E(S,T) > E(T,T) − − E (s，s) = e (t，s)和 e (s，t) > e (t，t) −
→Nash equilibrium
In this definition, strategy T can be a neutral alternative to S (scoring equally well, but not better).
In this definition, strategy T can be a neutral alternative to S (scoring equally well, but not better).
在这个定义中，策略T可以成为S的中性替代（即最后得分相同，但并不更好）。
A Nash equilibrium is presumed to be stable even if ''T'' scores equally, on the assumption that there is no long-term incentive for players to adopt ''T'' instead of ''S''. This fact represents the point of departure of the ESS.
A Nash equilibrium is presumed to be stable even if ''T'' scores equally, on the assumption that there is no long-term incentive for players to adopt ''T'' instead of ''S''. This fact represents the point of departure of the ESS.
A Nash equilibrium is presumed to be stable even if T scores equally, on the assumption that there is no long-term incentive for players to adopt T instead of S. This fact represents the point of departure of the ESS.
A Nash equilibrium is presumed to be stable even if T scores equally, on the assumption that there is no long-term incentive for players to adopt T instead of S. This fact represents the point of departure of the ESS.
即使采用T后其得分相等，纳什平衡也被认为是稳定的，当然前提是假设不存在长期动机去鼓励玩家采用T而不是S。
Maynard Smith and Price specify two conditions for a strategy S to be an ESS. For all T≠S, either
Maynard Smith and Price specify two conditions for a strategy S to be an ESS. For all T≠S, either
梅纳德·史密斯和普莱斯为策略S指定了两个条件，使其成为进化均衡策略，对于所有的T≠S，两个选其一：
1. E(S,S) > E(T,S), or
2. E(S,S) = E(T,S) and E(S,T) > E(T,T)