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第80行： − + − 原则上，从一个普遍低效率的经济配置到一个高效率的经济配置的转变不一定被认为是一个帕累托改善。即使经济中存在总体收益，如果一个代理人在再分配中处于不利地位，分配也不是帕累托最优的。例如，如果经济政策的改变消除了垄断，市场随后变得具有竞争性，那么其他人的收益可能很大。然而，由于垄断者处于不利地位，这不是一个帕累托改善。理论上，如果经济收益大于垄断者的损失，垄断者可以得到补偿，同时仍然为经济中的其他人留下净收益，允许一百万帕累托改善。因此，在实践中，为了确保没有人会因为旨在实现帕累托最优的改变而处于不利地位，可能需要一个或多个当事方的补偿。在现实世界中，这种补偿可能会随着时间的推移导致意外后果扭曲，因为代理人可能预期这种补偿并相应地改变他们的行为。+
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In principle, a change from a generally inefficient economic allocation to an efficient one is not necessarily considered to be a Pareto improvement. Even when there are overall gains in the economy, if a single agent is disadvantaged by the reallocation, the allocation is not Pareto optimal. For instance, if a change in economic policy eliminates a monopoly and that market subsequently becomes competitive, the gain to others may be large. However, since the monopolist is disadvantaged, this is not a Pareto improvement. In theory, if the gains to the economy are larger than the loss to the monopolist, the monopolist could be compensated for its loss while still leaving a net gain for others in the economy, allowing for a Pareto improvement. Thus, in practice, to ensure that nobody is disadvantaged by a change aimed at achieving Pareto efficiency, [[compensation principle|compensation]] of one or more parties may be required. It is acknowledged, in the real world, that such compensations may have [[unintended consequences]] leading to incentive distortions over time, as agents supposedly anticipate such compensations and change their actions accordingly.<ref>See [[Ricardian equivalence]]</ref>
In principle, a change from a generally inefficient economic allocation to an efficient one is not necessarily considered to be a Pareto improvement. Even when there are overall gains in the economy, if a single agent is disadvantaged by the reallocation, the allocation is not Pareto optimal. For instance, if a change in economic policy eliminates a monopoly and that market subsequently becomes competitive, the gain to others may be large. However, since the monopolist is disadvantaged, this is not a Pareto improvement. In theory, if the gains to the economy are larger than the loss to the monopolist, the monopolist could be compensated for its loss while still leaving a net gain for others in the economy, allowing for a Pareto improvement. Thus, in practice, to ensure that nobody is disadvantaged by a change aimed at achieving Pareto efficiency, [[compensation principle|compensation]] of one or more parties may be required. It is acknowledged, in the real world, that such compensations may have [[unintended consequences]] leading to incentive distortions over time, as agents supposedly anticipate such compensations and change their actions accordingly.<ref>See [[Ricardian equivalence]]</ref>
In principle, a change from a generally inefficient economic allocation to an efficient one is not necessarily considered to be a Pareto improvement. Even when there are overall gains in the economy, if a single agent is disadvantaged by the reallocation, the allocation is not Pareto optimal. For instance, if a change in economic policy eliminates a monopoly and that market subsequently becomes competitive, the gain to others may be large. However, since the monopolist is disadvantaged, this is not a Pareto improvement. In theory, if the gains to the economy are larger than the loss to the monopolist, the monopolist could be compensated for its loss while still leaving a net gain for others in the economy, allowing for a Pareto improvement. Thus, in practice, to ensure that nobody is disadvantaged by a change aimed at achieving Pareto efficiency, compensation of one or more parties may be required. It is acknowledged, in the real world, that such compensations may have unintended consequences leading to incentive distortions over time, as agents supposedly anticipate such compensations and change their actions accordingly.
In principle, a change from a generally inefficient to an efficient one is not necessarily considered to be a Pareto improvement. Even when there are overall gains in the economy, if a single agent is disadvantaged by the reallocation, the allocation is not Pareto optimal. For instance, if a change in economic policy eliminates a monopoly and that market subsequently becomes competitive, the gain to others may be large. However, since the monopolist is disadvantaged, this is not a Pareto improvement. In theory, if the gains to the economy are larger than the loss to the monopolist, the monopolist could be compensated for its loss while still leaving a net gain for others in the economy, a Pareto improvement. Thus, in practice, to ensure that nobody is disadvantaged by a change aimed at achieving Pareto efficiency, compensation of one or more parties may be required. It is acknowledged, in the real world, that such compensations may have unintended consequences leading to incentive distortions over time, as agents supposedly anticipate such compensations and change their actions accordingly.
原则上，从一个普遍低效率的经济分配到一个高效率的经济分配的转变不一定被认为是一个帕累托改进。即使经济总体是获益的，如果一个主体在再分配中处于不利地位，这个分配也不是帕累托最优的。例如，如果经济政策的某个改变消除了垄断，市场随后变得具有竞争力，那么其他主体的收益可能很大。然而，由于垄断者处于不利地位，这不是一个帕累托改善。理论上，如果经济体系的收益大于垄断者的损失，考虑到帕累托改善，垄断者可以在为经济体系中的其他主体留下净收益的情况下得到补偿。因此，在实践中，为了确保没有人会因为旨在实现帕累托最优的改变而处于不利地位，可能需要对一个或多个当事方进行补偿。在现实世界中，因为代理人可能预期这种补偿并相应地改变他们的行为，随着时间的推移，这种补偿可能会造成意外的后果以及动机的扭曲。