更改

'''Bounded rationality''' is the idea that [[rationality]] is limited, when individuals make decisions, by the tractability of the decision problem, the cognitive limitations of the mind, and the time available to make the decision. Decision-makers, in this view, act as [[satisficer]]s, seeking a satisfactory solution rather than an optimal one.  

'''Bounded rationality''' is the idea that [[rationality]] is limited, when individuals make decisions, by the tractability of the decision problem, the cognitive limitations of the mind, and the time available to make the decision. Decision-makers, in this view, act as [[satisficer]]s, seeking a satisfactory solution rather than an optimal one.  

Bounded rationality is the idea that rationality is limited, when individuals make decisions, by the tractability of the decision problem, the cognitive limitations of the mind, and the time available to make the decision. Decision-makers, in this view, act as satisficers, seeking a satisfactory solution rather than an optimal one.  

Bounded rationality is the idea that rationality is limited, when individuals make decisions, by the tractability of the decision problem, the cognitive limitations of the mind, and the time available to make the decision. Decision-makers, in this view, act as satisficers, seeking a satisfactory solution rather than an optimal one.  

[[Herbert A. Simon]] proposed bounded rationality as an alternative basis for the mathematical modeling of [[decision-making]], as used in [[economics]], [[political science]] and related disciplines. It complements "rationality as optimization", which views decision-making as a fully rational process of finding an optimal choice given the information available.<ref name="bounded_rationality_1999">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/?id=dVMq5UoYS3YC&dq=%22bounded+rationality%22&printsec=frontcover|first=Gerd|last=Gigerenzer|first2=Reinhard|last2=Selten|title=Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox|publisher=MIT Press|year=2002|isbn=978-0-262-57164-7}}</ref> Simon used the analogy of a pair of scissors, where one blade represents "cognitive limitations" of actual humans and the other the "structures of the environment", illustrating how minds compensate for limited resources by exploiting known structural regularity in the environment.<ref name="bounded_rationality_1999" /> Many [[economics]] models assume that people are on average rational, and can in large enough quantities be approximated to act according to their [[preference]]s. The concept of bounded rationality revises this assumption to account for the fact that perfectly rational decisions are often not feasible in practice because of the intractability of natural decision problems and the finite computational resources available for making them.

[[Herbert A. Simon]] proposed bounded rationality as an alternative basis for the mathematical modeling of [[decision-making]], as used in [[economics]], [[political science]] and related disciplines. It complements "rationality as optimization", which views decision-making as a fully rational process of finding an optimal choice given the information available.<ref name="bounded_rationality_1999">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dVMq5UoYS3YC&dq=%22bounded+rationality%22&printsec=frontcover|first1=Gerd|last1=Gigerenzer|first2=Reinhard|last2=Selten|title=Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox|publisher=MIT Press|year=2002|isbn=978-0-262-57164-7}}</ref> Simon used the analogy of a pair of scissors, where one blade represents "cognitive limitations" of actual humans and the other the "structures of the environment", illustrating how minds compensate for limited resources by exploiting known structural regularity in the environment.<ref name="bounded_rationality_1999" /> Many [[economics]] models assume that people are on average rational, and can in large enough quantities be approximated to act according to their [[preference]]s. With bounded rationality, Simon's goal was "to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Simon|first=Herbert A.|date=1955-02-01|title=A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice|url=https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/69/1/99/1919737|journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics|language=en|volume=69|issue=1|pages=99–118|doi=10.2307/1884852|jstor=1884852|issn=0033-5533}}</ref> In short, the concept of bounded rationality revises notions of "perfect" rationality to account for the fact that perfectly rational decisions are often not feasible in practice because of the intractability of natural decision problems and the finite computational resources available for making them.

Herbert A. Simon proposed bounded rationality as an alternative basis for the mathematical modeling of decision-making, as used in economics, political science and related disciplines. It complements "rationality as optimization", which views decision-making as a fully rational process of finding an optimal choice given the information available. Simon used the analogy of a pair of scissors, where one blade represents "cognitive limitations" of actual humans and the other the "structures of the environment", illustrating how minds compensate for limited resources by exploiting known structural regularity in the environment. Many economics models assume that people are on average rational, and can in large enough quantities be approximated to act according to their preferences. The concept of bounded rationality revises this assumption to account for the fact that perfectly rational decisions are often not feasible in practice because of the intractability of natural decision problems and the finite computational resources available for making them.

Herbert A. Simon proposed bounded rationality as an alternative basis for the mathematical modeling of decision-making, as used in economics, political science and related disciplines. It complements "rationality as optimization", which views decision-making as a fully rational process of finding an optimal choice given the information available. Many economics models assume that people are on average rational, and can in large enough quantities be approximated to act according to their preferences. With bounded rationality, Simon's goal was "to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist."

Some models of [[human behavior]] in the [[social sciences]] assume that [[humans]] can be reasonably approximated or described as "[[rationality|rational]]" entities, as in [[rational choice theory]] or Downs Political Agency Models.<ref name="Olson">Mancur Olson, Jr.  ([1965] 1971). ''The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups'', 2nd ed. Harvard University Press, [http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674537514 Description], [http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?recid=24500&content=toc Table of Contents], and [https://archive.org/details/logicofcollectiv00olso_0/page/5 preview].</ref>  

The concept of bounded rationality continues to influence (and be debated in) different disciplines, including economics, psychology, law, political science and cognitive science.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Chater|first1=Nick|last2=Felin|first2=Teppo|last3=Funder|first3=David C.|last4=Gigerenzer|first4=Gerd|last5=Koenderink|first5=Jan J.|last6=Krueger|first6=Joachim I.|last7=Noble|first7=Denis|last8=Nordli|first8=Samuel A.|last9=Oaksford|first9=Mike|last10=Schwartz|first10=Barry|last11=Stanovich|first11=Keith E.|date=2018-04-01|title=Mind, rationality, and cognition: An interdisciplinary debate|journal=Psychonomic Bulletin & Review|language=en|volume=25|issue=2|pages=793–826|doi=10.3758/s13423-017-1333-5|issn=1531-5320|pmc=5902517|pmid=28744767}}</ref> Some models of [[human behavior]] in the [[social sciences]] assume that [[humans]] can be reasonably approximated or described as "[[rationality|rational]]" entities, as in [[rational choice theory]] or Downs Political Agency Models.<ref name="Olson">Mancur Olson, Jr.  ([1965] 1971). ''The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups'', 2nd ed. Harvard University Press, [http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674537514 Description], [http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?recid=24500&content=toc Table of Contents], and [https://archive.org/details/logicofcollectiv00olso_0/page/5 preview].</ref>

Some models of human behavior in the social sciences assume that humans can be reasonably approximated or described as "rational" entities, as in rational choice theory or Downs Political Agency Models.

Huw Dixon later argues that it may not be necessary to analyze in detail the process of reasoning underlying bounded rationality.  If we believe that agents will choose an action that gets them "close" to the optimum, then we can use the notion of epsilon-optimization, which means we choose our actions so that the payoff is within epsilon of the optimum. If we define the optimum (best possible) payoff as <math> U^* </math>, then the set of epsilon-optimizing options S(ε) can be defined as all those options s such that:

==Origins==

==Origins==

The term was coined by [[Herbert A. Simon]]. In ''Models of Man'', Simon points out that most people are only partly rational, and are irrational in the remaining part of their actions. In another work, he states "boundedly rational agents experience limits in formulating and solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) [[information]]".<ref>[[Oliver E. Williamson]], p.&nbsp;553, citing Simon.</ref> Simon describes a number of dimensions along which "classical" models of rationality can be made somewhat more realistic, while sticking within the vein of fairly rigorous formalization. These include:

The term was coined by [[Herbert A. Simon]]. In ''Models of Man'', Simon points out that most people are only partly rational, and are irrational in the remaining part of their actions. In another work, he states "boundedly rational agents experience limits in formulating and solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) [[information]]".<ref>[[Oliver E. Williamson]], p.&nbsp;553, citing Simon.</ref> Simon describes a number of dimensions along which "classical" models of rationality can be made somewhat more realistic, while sticking within the vein of fairly rigorous formalization. These include:

* limiting the types of [[utility]] functions

* limiting the types of [[utility]] functions

* recognizing the costs of gathering and processing information

* recognizing the costs of gathering and processing information

* the possibility of having a "[[vector (geometry)|vector]]" or "multi-valued" utility function

* the possibility of having a "[[vector (geometry)|vector]]" or "multi-valued" utility function

Simon suggests that economic agents use [[heuristics in judgment and decision-making|heuristics]] to make decisions rather than a strict rigid rule of optimization. They do this because of the complexity of the situation.

Simon suggests that economic agents use [[heuristics in judgment and decision-making|heuristics]] to make decisions rather than a strict rigid rule of optimization. They do this because of the complexity of the situation.

==Model extensions==

==Model extensions==

As decision-makers have to make decisions about how and when to decide, [[Ariel Rubinstein]] proposed to model bounded rationality by explicitly specifying decision-making procedures.<ref>{{cite book |author=Rubinstein, Ariel |title=Modeling bounded rationality |publisher=MIT Press |year=1997 |url = http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/book-br.html | isbn=9780262681001 }}</ref> This puts the study of decision procedures on the research agenda.

Bounded rationality was shown to be essential to predict human sociability properties in a particular model by Vernon L. Smith and Michael J. Campbell. There, an agent-based model correctly predicts that agents are averse to resentment and punishment, and that there is an asymmetry between gratitude/reward and resentment/punishment. The purely rational Nash equilibrium is shown to have no predictive power for that model, and the boundedly rational Gibbs equilibrium must be used to predict phenomena outlined in Humanomics.

As decision-makers have to make decisions about how and when to decide, Ariel Rubinstein proposed to model bounded rationality by explicitly specifying decision-making procedures. This puts the study of decision procedures on the research agenda.

由 Vernon l. Smith 和 Michael j. Campbell 研究表明，在一个特定的模型中，有限理性对于预测人类的社交能力是必不可少的。在这里，个体为本模型预测正确地预测了代理人厌恶怨恨和惩罚，并且在感激/奖励和怨恨/惩罚之间存在着不对称。纯理性的纳什均衡点对于这个模型没有预测能力，有限理性的吉布斯平衡必须用来预测在 Humanomics 概述的现象。

[[Gerd Gigerenzer]] opines that decision theorists have not really adhered to Simon's original ideas. Rather, they have considered how decisions may be crippled by limitations to rationality, or have modeled how people might cope with their inability to optimize. Gigerenzer proposes and shows that simple [[heuristic]]s often lead to better decisions than theoretically optimal procedures.<ref name="Olson"/>

[[Gerd Gigerenzer]] opines that decision theorists have not really adhered to Simon's original ideas. Rather, they have considered how decisions may be crippled by limitations to rationality, or have modeled how people might cope with their inability to optimize. Gigerenzer proposes and shows that simple [[heuristic]]s often lead to better decisions than theoretically optimal procedures.<ref name="Olson"/>

[[Huw Dixon]] later argues that it may not be necessary to analyze in detail the process of reasoning underlying bounded rationality.<ref>{{cite book |chapter=Some Thoughts on Artificial Intelligence and Economic Theory |editor-last=Moss |editor2-last=Rae |title=Artificial Intelligence and Economic Analysis |publisher=Edward Elgar |location= |year=1992 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/artificialintell0000unse_a9c0/page/131 131–154] |doi= |isbn=978-1852786854 |url=https://archive.org/details/artificialintell0000unse_a9c0/page/131 }}</ref>  If we believe that agents will choose an action that gets them "close" to the optimum, then we can use the notion of ''epsilon-optimization'', which means we choose our actions so that the payoff is within epsilon of the optimum. If we define the optimum (best possible) payoff as <math> U^* </math>, then the set of epsilon-optimizing options '''S(ε)''' can be defined as all those options '''s''' such that:

[[Huw Dixon]] later argues that it may not be necessary to analyze in detail the process of reasoning underlying bounded rationality.<ref>{{cite book |chapter=Some Thoughts on Artificial Intelligence and Economic Theory |editor-last=Moss |editor2-last=Rae |title=Artificial Intelligence and Economic Analysis |publisher=Edward Elgar |location= |year=1992 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/artificialintell0000unse_a9c0/page/131 131–154] |doi= |isbn=978-1852786854 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/artificialintell0000unse_a9c0/page/131 }}</ref>  If we believe that agents will choose an action that gets them "close" to the optimum, then we can use the notion of ''epsilon-optimization'', which means we choose our actions so that the payoff is within epsilon of the optimum. If we define the optimum (best possible) payoff as <math> U^* </math>, then the set of epsilon-optimizing options '''S(ε)''' can be defined as all those options '''s''' such that:

 

 

后来认为，也许没有必要详细分析有限理性的推理过程。如果我们相信代理人会选择一个让他们“接近”最优的行动，那么我们可以使用 epsilon 优化的概念，这意味着我们选择我们的行动，使得回报在最优的 epsilon 之内。如果我们将最优(最佳可能)收益定义为 math u ^ * / math，那么 epsilon-optimization 选项集 s ()可以定义为所有这些选项，如下:

<math> U(s) \geq U^*-\epsilon</math>.

<math> U(s) \geq U^*-\epsilon</math>.

<math> U(s) \geq U^*-\epsilon</math>.

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The notion of strict rationality is then a special case (ε=0). The advantage of this approach is that it avoids having to specify in detail the process of reasoning, but rather simply assumes that whatever the process is, it is good enough to get near to the optimum.

The notion of strict rationality is then a special case (ε=0). The advantage of this approach is that it avoids having to specify in detail the process of reasoning, but rather simply assumes that whatever the process is, it is good enough to get near to the optimum.

从计算的角度来看，决策过程可以编码在算法和启发式。曾荫权认为，智能体的有效合理性取决于其计算智能。在其他条件相同的情况下，一个拥有更好算法和启发式的智能体可以比那些启发式和算法较差的智能体做出“更理性”(更优化)的决策。Tshilidzi Marwala 和 Evan Hurwitz 在他们关于有限理性的研究中观察到技术的进步(例如:。计算机处理能力因为摩尔定律、人工智能和大数据分析)扩展了界定可行理性空间的边界。由于这种理性边界的扩展，机器自动决策使市场更有效率。

From a computational point of view, decision procedures can be encoded in [[algorithms]] and [[heuristics]]. [[Edward Tsang]] argues that the effective rationality of an agent is determined by its [[computational intelligence]]. Everything else being equal, an agent that has better algorithms and heuristics could make "more rational" (more optimal) decisions than one that has poorer heuristics and algorithms.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1007/s11633-008-0063-6 |author=Tsang, E.P.K. |title=Computational intelligence determines effective rationality |journal= International Journal of Automation and Computing|volume=5 |issue=1 |pages=63–6 |year=2008 |s2cid=9769519 }}</ref> [[Tshilidzi Marwala]] and [[Evan Hurwitz]] in their study on bounded rationality observed that advances in technology (e.g. computer processing power because of [[Moore's law]], [[artificial intelligence]] and big data analytics) expand the bounds that define the feasible rationality space. Because of this expansion of the bounds of rationality, machine automated decision making makes markets more efficient.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Marwala |first1= Tshilidzi| last2=Hurwitz |first2= Evan |title=Artificial Intelligence and Economic Theory: Skynet in the Market |year=2017 |publisher=[[Springer Science+Business Media|Springer]] |location=London |isbn=978-3-319-66104-9}}</ref>

{{further|Behavioral economics}}

{{further|Behavioral economics}}

Bounded rationality implies the idea that humans take reasoning shortcuts that may lead to suboptimal decision-making. Behavioral economists engage in mapping the decision shortcuts that agents use in order to help increase the effectiveness of human decision-making. One treatment of this idea comes from [[Cass Sunstein]] and [[Richard Thaler]]'s ''[[Nudge (book)|Nudge]]''.<ref>{{cite book|title=Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness|isbn=978-0-14-311526-7|oclc=791403664|date=April 8, 2008|publisher=Yale University Press|authors=Thaler, Richard H., Sunstein, Cass R.|title-link=Nudge (book)}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|title=Choice Architecture|authors=Thaler, Richard H., Sunstein, Cass R. and Balz, John P.|doi=10.2139/ssrn.1583509|ssrn=1583509|date=April 2, 2010}}</ref> Sunstein and Thaler recommend that choice architectures are modified in light of human agents' bounded rationality. A widely cited proposal from Sunstein and Thaler urges that healthier food be placed at sight level in order to increase the likelihood that a person will opt for that choice instead of a less healthy option. Some critics of ''Nudge'' have lodged attacks that modifying choice architectures will lead to people becoming worse decision-makers.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Wright|first1=Joshua|first2=Douglas|last2=Ginsberg|title=Free to Err?: Behavioral Law and Economics and its Implications for Liberty|url=http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/free-to-err-behavioral-law-and-economics-and-its-implications-for-liberty/|date=February 16, 2012|work=Library of Law & Liberty}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Sunstein|first1=Cass|title=Going to extreems: How Like Minds Unite and Divide|url=https://books.google.com/?id=jEWplxVkEEEC|isbn=9780199793143|date=2009-05-13}}</ref>

Bounded rationality implies the idea that humans take reasoning shortcuts that may lead to suboptimal decision-making. Behavioral economists engage in mapping the decision shortcuts that agents use in order to help increase the effectiveness of human decision-making. One treatment of this idea comes from [[Cass Sunstein]] and [[Richard Thaler]]'s ''[[Nudge (book)|Nudge]]''.<ref>{{cite book|title=Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness|isbn=978-0-14-311526-7|oclc=791403664|date=April 8, 2008|publisher=Yale University Press|authors=Thaler, Richard H., Sunstein, Cass R.|title-link=Nudge (book)}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|title=Choice Architecture|authors=Thaler, Richard H., Sunstein, Cass R. and Balz, John P.|doi=10.2139/ssrn.1583509|ssrn=1583509|date=April 2, 2010|s2cid=219382170}}</ref> Sunstein and Thaler recommend that choice architectures are modified in light of human agents' bounded rationality. A widely cited proposal from Sunstein and Thaler urges that healthier food be placed at sight level in order to increase the likelihood that a person will opt for that choice instead of a less healthy option. Some critics of ''Nudge'' have lodged attacks that modifying choice architectures will lead to people becoming worse decision-makers.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Wright|first1=Joshua|first2=Douglas|last2=Ginsberg|title=Free to Err?: Behavioral Law and Economics and its Implications for Liberty|url=http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/free-to-err-behavioral-law-and-economics-and-its-implications-for-liberty/|date=February 16, 2012|work=Library of Law & Liberty}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Sunstein|first1=Cass|title=Going to extreems: How Like Minds Unite and Divide|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jEWplxVkEEEC|isbn=9780199793143|date=2009-05-13}}</ref>

最近的研究表明，个体的有限理性可能会影响其中进化的社交网络的拓扑结构。特别是，Kasthurirathna 和 Piraveenan 已经表明，在社会生态系统中，平均而言，改善理性的驱动力可能是无尺度特性出现的进化原因。他们这样做是通过模拟一个最初的随机网络上的一些策略游戏和分布式有限理性，然后重新布线网络，使网络平均收敛到纳什均衡，尽管有有限理性的节点。他们观察到，这种重新布线的过程导致了无标度网络。由于无标度网络在社会系统中无处不在，有限理性分布和社会结构之间的联系是解释社会现象的一个重要因素。

Recent research has shown that bounded rationality of individuals may influence the topology of the social networks that evolve among them. In particular, Kasthurirathna and Piraveenan<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Kasthurirathna|first1=Dharshana|last2=Piraveenan|first2=Mahendra|date=2015-06-11|title=Emergence of scale-free characteristics in socio-ecological systems with bounded rationality|journal=Scientific Reports|language=en|volume=5|issue=1|page=10448|doi=10.1038/srep10448|pmid=26065713|pmc=4464151|issn=2045-2322|doi-access=free}}</ref> have shown that in socio-ecological systems, the drive towards improved rationality on average might be an evolutionary reason for the emergence of scale-free properties. They did this by simulating a number of strategic games on an initially random network with distributed bounded rationality, then re-wiring the network so that the network on average converged towards Nash equilibria, despite the bounded rationality of nodes. They observed that this re-wiring process results in scale-free networks. Since scale-free networks are ubiquitous in social systems, the link between bounded rationality distributions and social structure is an important one in explaining social phenomena.

{{Columns-list|colwidth=20em|

{{Columns-list|colwidth=20em|

* ''[[Administrative Behavior]]''

* ''[[Administrative Behavior]]''

* ''[[Homo economicus]]''

* ''[[Homo economicus]]''

* [[Memetics]]

* [[Memetics]]

* [[Utility maximization problem]]

* [[Utility maximization problem]]

}}

}}

* {{cite book |author=Elster, Jon |title=Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge, UK |year=1983 |isbn=978-0-521-25230-0 }}

* {{cite book |author=Elster, Jon |title=Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge, UK |year=1983 |isbn=978-0-521-25230-0 }}

* {{cite book |author1=Gigerenzer, Gerd  |author2=Selten, Reinhard  |lastauthoramp=yes |title=Bounded Rationality |publisher=[[MIT Press]] |location=Cambridge |year=2002 |isbn=978-0-262-57164-7 }}

 

 

* {{cite book |author1=Gigerenzer, Gerd  |author2=Selten, Reinhard  |name-list-style=amp |title=Bounded Rationality |publisher=[[MIT Press]] |location=Cambridge |year=2002 |isbn=978-0-262-57164-7 }}

* Hayek, F.A (1948) Individualism and Economic order

* Hayek, F.A (1948) Individualism and Economic order

* Simon, Herbert (1957). "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice", in Models of Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting. New York: Wiley.

* Simon, Herbert (1957). "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice", in Models of Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting. New York: Wiley.

Category:Behavioral economics

Category:Behavioral economics

分类: 行为经济学

分类: 行为经济学

Category:Game theory

Category:Game theory

范畴: 博弈论

范畴: 博弈论

Category:Rational choice theory

Category:Rational choice theory