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第1行： − 此词条暂由彩云小译翻译，未经人工整理和审校，带来阅读不便，请见谅。+ − + − <center>El Farol located on [[Canyon Road, Santa Fe, New Mexico</center>]]+ − 中心 El Farol 位于[峡谷路，圣达菲，新墨西哥 / 中心]+ − − The '''El Farol bar problem''' is a problem in [[game theory]]. Every Thursday night, a fixed population want to go have fun at the El Farol Bar, unless it's too crowded. − − The El Farol bar problem is a problem in game theory. Every Thursday night, a fixed population want to go have fun at the El Farol Bar, unless it's too crowded. − − 少数派博弈是博弈论中的一个问题。每个星期四的晚上，一群固定的人想去 El Farol 酒吧玩，除非那里太拥挤。 − − − − * If '''less than 60%''' of the population go to the bar, they'll all have more fun than if they stayed home. − − * If '''more than 60%''' of the population go to the bar, they'll all have less fun than if they stayed home. − − − − Everyone must decide ''at the same time'' whether to go or not, with no knowledge of others' choices. − − Everyone must decide at the same time whether to go or not, with no knowledge of others' choices. − − 每个人必须在同一时间决定是否去，不知道别人的选择。 − − − − Paradoxically, if everyone uses a deterministic [[pure strategy]] which is symmetric (same strategy for all players), it is guaranteed to fail no matter what it is. If the strategy suggests it will not be crowded, everyone will go, and thus it ''will'' be crowded; but if the strategy suggests it will be crowded, nobody will go, and thus it will ''not'' be crowded, but again no one will have fun. Better success is possible with a probablistic [[mixed strategy]]. For the single-stage El Farol Bar problem, there exists a unique symmetric [[Nash equilibrium]] mixed strategy where all players choose to go to the bar with a certain probability, determined according to the number of players, the threshold for crowdedness, and the relative utility of going to a crowded or uncrowded bar compared to staying home. There are also multiple Nash equilibria in which one or more players use a pure strategy, but these equilibria are not symmetric.<ref>{{cite web − − Paradoxically, if everyone uses a deterministic pure strategy which is symmetric (same strategy for all players), it is guaranteed to fail no matter what it is. If the strategy suggests it will not be crowded, everyone will go, and thus it will be crowded; but if the strategy suggests it will be crowded, nobody will go, and thus it will not be crowded, but again no one will have fun. Better success is possible with a probablistic mixed strategy. For the single-stage El Farol Bar problem, there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium mixed strategy where all players choose to go to the bar with a certain probability, determined according to the number of players, the threshold for crowdedness, and the relative utility of going to a crowded or uncrowded bar compared to staying home. There are also multiple Nash equilibria in which one or more players use a pure strategy, but these equilibria are not symmetric.<ref>{{cite web − − 矛盾的是，如果每个人都使用一个确定的纯策略，这是对称的(相同的策略，为所有参与者) ，它肯定会失败，无论它是什么。如果这个策略意味着它不会拥挤，每个人都会去，因此它将会拥挤; 但是如果这个策略意味着它将会拥挤，没有人会去，因此它将不会拥挤，但是再一次没有人会有乐趣。通过可能性混合策略，可能会取得更大的成功。对于单阶段少数派博弈，存在一个独特的对称纳什均衡点混合策略，所有玩家以一定的概率选择去酒吧，这个概率是根据玩家的数量、拥挤的门槛以及去拥挤或不拥挤的酒吧与呆在家里相比的效用来确定的。也有多个纳什均衡，其中一个或多个参与者使用纯策略，但这些均衡是不对称的。 1.1.1.1.1.1.2.1.2.1.2.2.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 − − | url=http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/The%20El%20Farol%20Bar%20Problem%20Revisited.pdf − − | url=http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/The%20El%20Farol%20Bar%20Problem%20Revisited.pdf − − Http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/the%20el%20farol%20bar%20problem%20revisited.pdf − − | title=The El Farol Bar Problem Revisited: Reinforcement Learning in a Potential Game − − | title=The El Farol Bar Problem Revisited: Reinforcement Learning in a Potential Game − − 重访少数派博弈: 潜在游戏中的强化学习 − − | first=Duncan − − | first=Duncan − − 先是邓肯 − − | last=Whitehead − − | last=Whitehead − − | last Whitehead − − | date=2008-09-17 − − | date=2008-09-17 − − 日期2008-09-17 − − | publisher=[[University of Edinburgh School of Economics]] − − | publisher=University of Edinburgh School of Economics − − 爱丁堡大学经济学院 − − | accessdate=2014-12-13}}</ref> Several variants are considered in ''Game Theory Evolving'' by Herbert Gintis.<ref>{{cite journal − − | accessdate=2014-12-13}}</ref> Several variants are considered in Game Theory Evolving by Herbert Gintis.<ref>{{cite journal − − | accessdate 2014-12-13} / ref 在赫伯特 · 金蒂斯的《博弈论演进》中考虑了几个变体 − − | title=Game Theory Evolving − − | title=Game Theory Evolving − − 游戏理论的演变 − − | first=Herbert − − | first=Herbert − − 第一个赫伯特 − − | last=Gintis − − | last=Gintis − − 最后的金提斯 − − | publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] − − | publisher=Princeton University Press − − 出版商普林斯顿大学出版社 − − | volume=6 − − | volume=6 − − 第六卷 − − | issue=24 − − | issue=24 − − 第24期 − − | page=134 − − | page=134 − − 第134页 − − | date=2009}}</ref> − − | date=2009}}</ref> − − | date 2009} / ref − − − − In some variants of the problem, the players are allowed to communicate before deciding to go to the bar. However, they are not required to tell the truth. − − In some variants of the problem, the players are allowed to communicate before deciding to go to the bar. However, they are not required to tell the truth. − − 在这个问题的一些变体中，玩家被允许在决定去酒吧之前进行交流。然而，他们没有被要求说出真相。 − − − − Based on a bar in [[Santa Fe, New Mexico]], the problem was created in 1994 by [[W. Brian Arthur]]. However, under another name, the problem was formulated and solved dynamically six years earlier by B. A. Huberman and T. Hogg.<ref>"The Ecology of Computation", Studies in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence, North Holland publisher, page 99. 1988.</ref> − − Based on a bar in Santa Fe, New Mexico, the problem was created in 1994 by W. Brian Arthur. However, under another name, the problem was formulated and solved dynamically six years earlier by B. A. Huberman and T. Hogg. − − 基于新墨西哥州圣达菲的一个酒吧，这个问题是由 w · 布莱恩 · 阿瑟在1994年提出的。然而，在另一个名称下，这个问题被制定和动态地解决了六年前由 b。和 t. Hogg。 − − − − ==Minority game== − − A variant is the '''Minority Game''' proposed by Yi-Cheng Zhang and Damien Challet from the [[University of Fribourg]].<ref>D. Challet, M. Marsili, Y.-C. Zhang, Minority Games: Interacting Agents in Financial Markets, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005)</ref> An odd number of players each must make a binary choice independently at each turn, and the winners are those players who end up on the minority side. As in the El Farol Bar problem, no single (symmetric) deterministic strategy can give an equilibrium, but for mixed strategies there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (each player chooses with 50% probability), as well as multiple non-symmetric equilibria. − − A variant is the Minority Game proposed by Yi-Cheng Zhang and Damien Challet from the University of Fribourg. An odd number of players each must make a binary choice independently at each turn, and the winners are those players who end up on the minority side. As in the El Farol Bar problem, no single (symmetric) deterministic strategy can give an equilibrium, but for mixed strategies there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (each player chooses with 50% probability), as well as multiple non-symmetric equilibria. − − 少数派游戏的一个变体是弗里堡大学的张和 Damien Challet 提出的。奇数的玩家每一回合都必须做出一个独立的二元选择，赢家是那些最终成为少数派的玩家。正如在少数派博弈中一样，没有单一的(对称的)确定性策略可以给出均衡，但是对于混合策略，有一个唯一的对称的纳什均衡点(每个参与者以50% 的概率选择) ，以及多个非对称的均衡。 − − − − A multi-stage, cooperative Minority Game was featured in the manga ''[[Liar Game]]'', in which the majority was repeatedly eliminated until only one player was left. − − A multi-stage, cooperative Minority Game was featured in the manga Liar Game, in which the majority was repeatedly eliminated until only one player was left. − − 一个多阶段，合作少数派游戏的特点是在漫画骗子游戏，其中大多数被反复淘汰，直到只剩下一个球员。 − − − − ==Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem== − − Another variant of the El Farol Bar problem is the '''Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem''',<ref>{{cite journal − − Another variant of the El Farol Bar problem is the Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem,<ref>{{cite journal − − 少数派博弈的另一个变种是 Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem，ref { cite journal − − | title=The Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem and resource utilization − − | title=The Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem and resource utilization − − | 题目加尔各答派斯餐厅问题和资源利用 − − | authors=A. S. Chakrabarti, B. K. Chakrabarti, A. Chatterjee, M. Mitra − − | authors=A. S. Chakrabarti, B. K. Chakrabarti, A. Chatterjee, M. Mitra − − 作者: a。查克拉巴蒂，B.k. 查克拉巴蒂，a. Chatterjee，m. Mitra − − | journal=Physica A − − | journal=Physica A − − 物理学杂志 a − − | volume=388 − − | volume=388 − − 第388卷 − − | issue=12 − − | issue=12 − − 第12期 − − | pages=2420–2426 − − | pages=2420–2426 − − 第2420-2426页 − − | date=2009 − − | date=2009 − − 2009年 − − | doi=10.1016/j.physa.2009.02.039| arxiv=0711.1639| bibcode=2009PhyA..388.2420C}}</ref><ref>{{cite web − − | doi=10.1016/j.physa.2009.02.039| arxiv=0711.1639| bibcode=2009PhyA..388.2420C}}</ref><ref>{{cite web − − 10.1016 / j.physa. 2009.02.039 | arxiv 0711.1639 | bibcode 2009 phya. . 388.2420 c } / ref { cite web − − | url=http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/KolkataPaiseRestaurantKPRProblem − − | url=http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/KolkataPaiseRestaurantKPRProblem − − Http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/kolkatapaiserestaurantkprproblem − − | title=Kolkata Paise Restaurant (KPR) Problem − − | title=Kolkata Paise Restaurant (KPR) Problem − − | 加尔各答派斯餐厅(KPR)问题 − − | author=Asim Ghosh, Bikas K. Chakrabarti − − | author=Asim Ghosh, Bikas K. Chakrabarti − − 作者 Asim Ghosh，Bikas k. Chakrabarti − − | publisher=[[Wolfram Alpha]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal − − | publisher=Wolfram Alpha}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal − − | publisher Wolfram Alpha } / ref { cite journal − − | title=Phase transition in crowd dynamics of resource allocation − − | title=Phase transition in crowd dynamics of resource allocation − − 资源分配的群体动力学中的相变 − − | authors=A. Ghosh, D. D. Martino, A. Chatterjee, M. Marsili, B. K. Chakrabarti − − | authors=A. Ghosh, D. D. Martino, A. Chatterjee, M. Marsili, B. K. Chakrabarti − − 作者: a。高希，d. 马蒂诺，a. Chatterjee，m. Marsili，b. k. Chakrabarti − − | journal=Physical Review E − − | journal=Physical Review E − − 杂志物理评论 e − − | volume=85| issue=2 − − | volume=85| issue=2 − − 第85卷，第2期 − − |page= 021116 − − |page= 021116 − − 021116页 − − | doi=10.1103/physreve.85.021116 − − | doi=10.1103/physreve.85.021116 − − 10.1103 / physicreve. 85.021116 − − | date=2012| arxiv=1109.2541| bibcode=2012PhRvE..85b1116G}}</ref><ref>{{cite book − − | date=2012| arxiv=1109.2541| bibcode=2012PhRvE..85b1116G}}</ref><ref>{{cite book − − 2012 | date 2012 | arxiv 1109.2541 | bibcode 2012PhRvE. . 85 b1116G } / ref { cite book − − | url=http://www.saha.ac.in/cmp/camcs/combined.pdf − − | url=http://www.saha.ac.in/cmp/camcs/combined.pdf − − Http://www.saha.ac.in/cmp/camcs/combined.pdf − − | title=Econophysics of Systemic Risk and Network Dynamics − − | title=Econophysics of Systemic Risk and Network Dynamics − − 系统风险和网络动态经济物理学 − − | authors=Frédéric Abergel, [[Bikas K. Chakrabarti]], Anirban Chakraborti, Asim Ghosh (2013) − − | authors=Frédéric Abergel, Bikas K. Chakrabarti, Anirban Chakraborti, Asim Ghosh (2013) − − | authors=Frédéric Abergel, Bikas K. Chakrabarti, Anirban Chakraborti, Asim Ghosh (2013) − − | doi=10.1007/978-88-470-2553-0 − − | doi=10.1007/978-88-470-2553-0 − − 10.1007 / 978-88-470-2553-0 − − | isbn=978-88-470-2552-3| series=New Economic Windows − − | isbn=978-88-470-2552-3| series=New Economic Windows − − 系列新经济窗口 − − | year=2013 − − | year=2013 − − 2013年 − − | bibcode=2013esrn.book.....A − − | bibcode=2013esrn.book.....A − − 2013 / esrn. book... a − − }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal − − }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal − − } / ref { cite journal − − | title=Statistical Mechanics of Competitive Resource Allocation using Agent-Based Models − − | title=Statistical Mechanics of Competitive Resource Allocation using Agent-Based Models − − 使用基于代理的模型的竞争性资源分配统计力学 − − | authors=A. Chakraborti, D. Challet, A. Chatterjee, M. Marsili, Y.-C. Zhang, B. K. Chakrabarti − − | authors=A. Chakraborti, D. Challet, A. Chatterjee, M. Marsili, Y.-C. Zhang, B. K. Chakrabarti − − 作者: a。查克拉伯蒂，d. Challet，a. Chatterjee，m. Marsili，Y.-C. Zhang，B.k. 查克拉巴蒂 − − | journal=Physics Reports − − | journal=Physics Reports − − 物理学报告 − − | volume=552 − − | volume=552 − − 第552卷 − − | pages= 1–25 − − | pages= 1–25 − − 第1-25页 − − | date=2015 − − | date=2015 − − 2015年 − − | doi = 10.1016/j.physrep.2014.09.006 | arxiv=1305.2121 − − | doi = 10.1016/j.physrep.2014.09.006 | arxiv=1305.2121 − − 10.1016 / j.physicrep. 2014.09.006 | arxiv 1305.2121 − − | bibcode=2015PhR...552....1C − − | bibcode=2015PhR...552....1C − − 2015 phr... 552... 1C − − }}</ref><ref>{{cite book − − }}</ref><ref>{{cite book − − } / ref { cite book − − | url=https://www.springer.com/in/book/9783319613512 − − | url=https://www.springer.com/in/book/9783319613512 − − Https://www.springer.com/in/book/9783319613512 − − | title=Econophysics of the Kolkata Restaurant Problem and Related Games: Classical and Quantum Strategies for Multi-agent, Multi-choice Repetitive Games − − | title=Econophysics of the Kolkata Restaurant Problem and Related Games: Classical and Quantum Strategies for Multi-agent, Multi-choice Repetitive Games − − | 题目: 加尔各答餐馆问题及相关游戏的经济物理学: 多主体、多选择重复游戏的经典和量子策略 − − | authors=[[Bikas K Chakrabarti]], Arnab Chatterjee, Asim Ghosh, Sudip Mukherjee, Boaz Tamir (2017) − − | authors=Bikas K Chakrabarti, Arnab Chatterjee, Asim Ghosh, Sudip Mukherjee, Boaz Tamir (2017) − − 作者 Bikas k Chakrabarti，Arnab Chatterjee，Asim Ghosh，Sudip Mukherjee，Boaz Tamir (2017) − − | isbn=978-3-319-61351-2}}</ref> named for the many cheap restaurants where laborers can grab a quick lunch, but may have to return to work hungry if their chosen restaurant is too crowded. Formally, a large number ''N'' of players each choose one of a large number ''n'' of restaurants, typically ''N'' = ''n'' (while in the El Farol Bar Problem, ''n'' = 2, including the stay-home option). At each restaurant, one customer at random is served lunch ([[Payoff matrix|payoff]] = 1) while all others lose ([[Payoff matrix|payoff]] = 0). The players do not know each others' choices on a given day, but the game is repeated daily, and the history of all players' choices is available to everyone. Optimally, each player chooses a different restaurant, but this is practically impossible without coordination, resulting in both hungry customers and unattended restaurants wasting capacity. − − | isbn=978-3-319-61351-2}}</ref> named for the many cheap restaurants where laborers can grab a quick lunch, but may have to return to work hungry if their chosen restaurant is too crowded. Formally, a large number N of players each choose one of a large number n of restaurants, typically N = n (while in the El Farol Bar Problem, n = 2, including the stay-home option). At each restaurant, one customer at random is served lunch (payoff = 1) while all others lose (payoff = 0). The players do not know each others' choices on a given day, but the game is repeated daily, and the history of all players' choices is available to everyone. Optimally, each player chooses a different restaurant, but this is practically impossible without coordination, resulting in both hungry customers and unattended restaurants wasting capacity. − − 以许多廉价餐厅命名，这些餐厅的工人可以快速吃顿午餐，但是如果他们选择的餐厅太拥挤，他们可能不得不饿着肚子回去工作。形式上，大量的 n 个玩家每个人选择一个大量的 n 餐馆，通常 n n (而在少数派博弈，n 2，包括留在家里的选择)。在每家餐厅，随机为一位顾客提供午餐(回报1) ，而其他所有顾客都吃亏(回报0)。玩家们并不知道对方在某一天的选择，但是这个游戏每天都在重复，所有玩家的选择历史对每个人都是可用的。理想情况下，每个玩家选择一个不同的餐厅，但这几乎是不可能的，没有协调，导致饥饿的顾客和无人看管的餐厅浪费能力。 − − − − Strategies are evaluated based on their aggregate payoff and/or the proportion of attended restaurants (utilization ratio). A leading stochastic strategy, with utilization ~0.79, gives each customer a probability ''p'' of choosing the same restaurant as yesterday (''p'' varying inversely with the number of players who chose that restaurant yesterday), while choosing among other restaurants with uniform probability. This is a better result than deterministic algorithms or simple random choice ([[noise trader]]), with utilization fraction 1 - <sup>1</sup>/''<sub>e</sub>'' ≈ 0.63. − − Strategies are evaluated based on their aggregate payoff and/or the proportion of attended restaurants (utilization ratio). A leading stochastic strategy, with utilization ~0.79, gives each customer a probability p of choosing the same restaurant as yesterday (p varying inversely with the number of players who chose that restaurant yesterday), while choosing among other restaurants with uniform probability. This is a better result than deterministic algorithms or simple random choice (noise trader), with utilization fraction 1 - <sup>1</sup>/<sub>e</sub> ≈ 0.63. − − 策略评估基于他们的总收益和 / 或出席餐馆的比例(利用率)。利用率在0.79左右的一个主导随机策略，给每个顾客一个概率 p，让他们选择昨天选择的同一家餐厅(p 与昨天选择该餐厅的玩家人数成反比) ，同时在其他餐厅中进行统一概率的选择。利用率分数1-sup 1 / sup / sub e / sub ≈0.63，这比确定性算法或简单的随机选择(噪声交易者)要好。 − − − − In a similar problem, there are hospital beds in every locality, but patients are tempted to go to prestigious hospitals out of their district. However, if too many patients go to a prestige hospital, some get no hospital bed at all, while additionally wasting the unused beds at their local hospitals. − − In a similar problem, there are hospital beds in every locality, but patients are tempted to go to prestigious hospitals out of their district. However, if too many patients go to a prestige hospital, some get no hospital bed at all, while additionally wasting the unused beds at their local hospitals. − − 在一个类似的问题中，每个地方都有医院床位，但是病人很想去他们所在地区以外的著名医院。然而，如果太多的病人去了名牌医院，有些人根本就没有医院的床位，而且还浪费了当地医院的空床位。 − − − − ==References== − − {{Reflist}} − − − − ==Further reading== − − * {{cite journal − − | url=http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~wbarthur/Papers/El_Farol.pdf − − | url=http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~wbarthur/Papers/El_Farol.pdf − − Http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~wbarthur/papers/el_farol.pdf − − | title=Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality − − | title=Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality − − 归纳推理和有限理性 − − | first=W. Brian − − | first=W. Brian − − 首先是 w。布莱恩 − − | last=Arthur − − | last=Arthur − − 最后的亚瑟 − − | journal=American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings − − | journal=American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings − − 美国经济评论: 论文和会议记录 − − | volume=84 − − | volume=84 − − 第84卷 − − | pages=406–411 − − | pages=406–411 − − 第406-411页 − − | date=1994 − − | date=1994 − − 1994年 − − | accessdate=2014-12-13}} − − | accessdate=2014-12-13}} − − [ accessdate 2014-12-13} − − − − ==External links== − − *[http://estebanmoro.org/post/2004-08-31-the-minority-game-an-introductory-guide/ An Introductory Guide to the Minority Game] − − *[http://news.softpedia.com/news/Minority-Games-38625.shtml Minority Games] (a popularization account) − − *[http://xstructure.inr.ac.ru/x-bin/theme3.py?level=1&index1=117820 Minority game on arxiv.org] − − *[http://elfarolsantafe.com El Farol bar in Santa Fe, New Mexico] − − *[http://jabm.sourceforge.net/doc/easss2013/EASSS_lab_elfarolbar.pdf The El Farol Bar problem in Java] using [http://jabm.sourceforge.net/ The Java Agent-Based Modelling Toolkit (JABM)] − − *[http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/KolkataPaiseRestaurantKPRProblem/ Kolkata Paise Restaurant (KPR) Problem: Wolfram Demonstrations] − − − − {{game theory}} − − − − [[Category:Non-cooperative games]] − − Category:Non-cooperative games − − 类别: 非合作性游戏 − +
Moved page from wikipedia:en:El Farol bar problem (history)
此词条暂由彩云小译翻译，翻译字数共5，未经人工整理和审校，带来阅读不便，请见谅。
[[Image:El Farol Restaurant and Cantina, Santa Fe NM.jpg|thumb|right|<center>El Farol located on [[Canyon Road, Santa Fe, New Mexico]]</center>]]
#REDIRECT [[El Farol Bar problem]] {{R from other capitalisation}}
REDIRECT El Farol Bar problem
重定向少数派博弈
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<small>This page was moved from [[wikipedia:en:El Farol Bar problem]]. Its edit history can be viewed at [[爱尔法鲁酒吧问题/edithistory]]</small></noinclude>
<small>This page was moved from [[wikipedia:en:El Farol bar problem]]. Its edit history can be viewed at [[爱尔法鲁酒吧问题/edithistory]]</small></noinclude>
[[Category:待整理页面]]
[[Category:待整理页面]]