561
个编辑
更改
跳到导航
跳到搜索
第335行：
第335行： − + −
→Universal solution通解
If avoiding a zero-sum game is an action choice with some probability for players, avoiding is always an equilibrium strategy for at least one player at a zero-sum game. For any two players zero-sum game where a zero-zero draw is impossible or non-credible after the play is started, such as poker, there is no Nash equilibrium strategy other than avoiding the play. Even if there is a credible zero-zero draw after a zero-sum game is started, it is not better than the avoiding strategy. In this sense, it's interesting to find reward-as-you-go in optimal choice computation shall prevail over all two players zero-sum games with regard to starting the game or not.<ref>Wenliang Wang (2015). Pooling Game Theory and Public Pension Plan. {{ISBN|978-1507658246}}. Chapter 4.</ref>
If avoiding a zero-sum game is an action choice with some probability for players, avoiding is always an equilibrium strategy for at least one player at a zero-sum game. For any two players zero-sum game where a zero-zero draw is impossible or non-credible after the play is started, such as poker, there is no Nash equilibrium strategy other than avoiding the play. Even if there is a credible zero-zero draw after a zero-sum game is started, it is not better than the avoiding strategy. In this sense, it's interesting to find reward-as-you-go in optimal choice computation shall prevail over all two players zero-sum games with regard to starting the game or not.<ref>Wenliang Wang (2015). Pooling Game Theory and Public Pension Plan. {{ISBN|978-1507658246}}. Chapter 4.</ref>
如果避免零和博弈对玩家来说是一种有一定概率的行为选择，那么在零和博弈中，回避总是至少一个参与者的均衡策略。对于任何两个玩家的零和游戏，在游戏开始后零-零平局是不可能或不可信的，例如扑克，没有纳什均衡策略，除非不做游戏。即使在零和博弈开始后出现了可信的零-零平局，也不比回避策略好。从这个意义上说，有趣的是，在最优选择计算中，在开始游戏或不开始游戏时，最佳选择计算应优先于所有两个玩家的零和游戏。<ref>Wenliang Wang (2015). Pooling Game Theory and Public Pension Plan. {{ISBN|978-1507658246}}. Chapter 4.</ref>
如果避免零和博弈对玩家来说是一种有一定概率的行为选择，那么在零和博弈中，回避总是至少一个参与者的均衡策略。对于任何两个玩家的零和游戏，在游戏开始后零-零平局是不可能或不可信的，例如扑克，没有纳什均衡策略，除非不做游戏。即使在零和博弈开始后出现了可信的零-零平局，也不比回避策略好。从这个意义上说，有趣的是，在最优选择计算中，在开始游戏或不开始游戏时，最佳选择计算应优先于所有两个玩家的零和游戏。