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第1,881行： − + − − − − − 第1,895行：
第1,890行： − 如果一个AI系统复制了人类智能的所有关键部分，那么这个系统是否也能有意识——它是否能拥有一个有意识体验的头脑？这个问题与人类意识本质的哲学问题密切相关，一般称之为意识难题。+ − − − − − − − − − David Chalmers identified two problems in understanding the mind, which he named the "hard" and "easy" problems of consciousness.<ref name=Chalmers> See also [http://consc.net/papers/facing.html this link] − − 大卫 · 查尔默斯在理解心智方面提出了两个问题，他称之为意识的“困难”和“容易”问题。 − − </ref> The easy problem is understanding how the brain processes signals, makes plans and controls behavior. The hard problem is explaining how this ''feels'' or why it should feel like anything at all. Human [[information processing]] is easy to explain, however human [[subjective experience]] is difficult to explain. − + − 简单的问题是理解大脑如何处理信号，制定计划和控制行为。困难的问题是如何解释这种感觉或者为什么它会有这种感觉。人类的信息处理过程很容易解释，然而人类的主观体验却很难解释。+ + + 第1,931行：
第1,915行： − + − − − − ====计算主义和功能主义 Computationalism and functionalism ==== − − + − − 第1,949行：
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第1,937行： − 约翰 · 塞尔称之为“强人工智能”的哲学立场指出: “具有正确输入和输出程序的计算机，将因此拥有与人脑意义完全相同的头脑。”塞尔用他的中文房间论点反驳了这种说法，他让人们看看电脑内部，并试图找出“思维”可能在哪里。+ − + − − − ====机器人权利 Robot rights ==== − − − + − − 第1,986行：
第1,948行： − 如果可以创造出一台有智能的机器，那么它是否也有感觉呢？如果它有感觉，它是否拥有与人类同样的权利？这个目前被称为“机器人权利”的问题正在被人们考虑，例如，加利福尼亚的未来研究所就在从事相关研究，尽管许多批评论家认为这种讨论为时过早。2010年的纪录片《插头与祷告》(Plug & Pray)以及《星际迷航: 下一代》(Star Trek Next Generation)等许多科幻媒体都对这个主题进行了深入讨论。《星际迷航》中有个指挥官角色叫戴塔(Data) ，他希望“变成人类”和为了旅行者号上的机器人全息图而抵抗不被人拆解。+ −
→机器意识、知觉和思维 Machine consciousness, sentience and mind
--[[用户:Qige96|Ricky]]（[[用户讨论:Qige96|讨论]]）干得漂亮
--[[用户:Qige96|Ricky]]（[[用户讨论:Qige96|讨论]]）干得漂亮
===机器意识、知觉和思维 Machine consciousness, sentience and mind ===
===机器意识、知觉和思维 ===
{{Main|Artificial consciousness}}
{{Main|Artificial consciousness}}
If an AI system replicates all key aspects of human intelligence, will that system also be sentient—will it have a mind which has conscious experiences? This question is closely related to the philosophical problem as to the nature of human consciousness, generally referred to as the hard problem of consciousness.
If an AI system replicates all key aspects of human intelligence, will that system also be sentient—will it have a mind which has conscious experiences? This question is closely related to the philosophical problem as to the nature of human consciousness, generally referred to as the hard problem of consciousness.
如果一个AI系统复制了人类智能的所有关键部分，那么这个系统是否也能有意识——它是否能拥有一个有知觉的头脑？这个问题与人类意识本质的哲学问题密切相关，一般称之为意识难题。
====意识 Consciousness ====
====意识 Consciousness ====
{{Main|Hard problem of consciousness|Theory of mind}}
{{Main|Hard problem of consciousness|Theory of mind}}
[[David Chalmers]] identified two problems in understanding the mind, which he named the "hard" and "easy" problems of consciousness.<ref name=Chalmers>{{cite journal |url=http://www.imprint.co.uk/chalmers.html |title=Facing up to the problem of consciousness |last=Chalmers |first=David |authorlink=David Chalmers |journal=[[Journal of Consciousness Studies]] |volume= 2 |issue=3 |year=1995 |pages=200–219}} See also [http://consc.net/papers/facing.html this link]
[[David Chalmers]] identified two problems in understanding the mind, which he named the "hard" and "easy" problems of consciousness.<ref name=Chalmers>{{cite journal |url=http://www.imprint.co.uk/chalmers.html |title=Facing up to the problem of consciousness |last=Chalmers |first=David |authorlink=David Chalmers |journal=[[Journal of Consciousness Studies]] |volume= 2 |issue=3 |year=1995 |pages=200–219}} See also [http://consc.net/papers/facing.html this link]
</ref> The easy problem is understanding how the brain processes signals, makes plans and controls behavior. The hard problem is explaining how this feels or why it should feel like anything at all. Human information processing is easy to explain, however human subjective experience is difficult to explain.
大卫 · 查尔默斯在理解心智方面提出了两个问题，他称之为意识的“困难”和“容易”问题。 <ref name=Chalmers>{{cite journal |url=http://www.imprint.co.uk/chalmers.html |title=Facing up to the problem of consciousness |last=Chalmers |first=David |authorlink=David Chalmers |journal=[[Journal of Consciousness Studies]] |volume= 2 |issue=3 |year=1995 |pages=200–219}} See also [http://consc.net/papers/facing.html this link]</ref>
The easy problem is understanding how the brain processes signals, makes plans and controls behavior. The hard problem is explaining how this ''feels'' or why it should feel like anything at all. Human [[information processing]] is easy to explain, however human [[subjective experience]] is difficult to explain.
The easy problem is understanding how the brain processes signals, makes plans and controls behavior. The hard problem is explaining how this feels or why it should feel like anything at all. Human information processing is easy to explain, however human subjective experience is difficult to explain.
“容易”的问题是理解大脑如何处理信号，制定计划和控制行为。“困难”的问题是如何解释这种感觉或者为什么它会有这种感觉。人类的信息处理过程很容易解释，然而人类的主观体验却很难解释。
For example, consider what happens when a person is shown a color swatch and identifies it, saying "it's red". The easy problem only requires understanding the machinery in the brain that makes it possible for a person to know that the color swatch is red. The hard problem is that people also know something else—they also know what red looks like. (Consider that a person born blind can know that something is red without knowing what red looks like.) Everyone knows subjective experience exists, because they do it every day (e.g., all sighted people know what red looks like). The hard problem is explaining how the brain creates it, why it exists, and how it is different from knowledge and other aspects of the brain.
For example, consider what happens when a person is shown a color swatch and identifies it, saying "it's red". The easy problem only requires understanding the machinery in the brain that makes it possible for a person to know that the color swatch is red. The hard problem is that people also know something else—they also know what red looks like. (Consider that a person born blind can know that something is red without knowing what red looks like.) Everyone knows subjective experience exists, because they do it every day (e.g., all sighted people know what red looks like). The hard problem is explaining how the brain creates it, why it exists, and how it is different from knowledge and other aspects of the brain.
例如当一个人看到一张色卡并识别它，说“它是红色的”时会发生什么。这个简单的问题只需要知道这个人大脑中认出色卡是红色的机制。困难的问题是，人们还知道其他一些东西——他们还知道红色长什么样。(想象一下，一个天生失明的人，即使不知道红色是什么样子，也能知道什么是红色。)每个人都知道主观体验的存在，因为他们每天都有主观体验(例如，所有视力正常的人都知道红色是什么样子)。困难的问题是解释大脑如何创造它，为什么它存在，以及它如何区别于知识和大脑的其他功能。
例如当一个人看到一张色卡并识别它，说“它是红色的”时会发生什么。这个简单的问题只需要知道这个人大脑中认出色卡是红色的机制。困难的问题是，人们还知道其他一些东西——他们还知道红色长什么样。(一个天生失明的人也能知道什么是红色，即使不知道红色是什么样子。)每个人都知道主观体验的存在，因为他们每天都有主观体验(例如，所有视力正常的人都知道红色是什么样子)。困难的问题是解释大脑如何创造它，为什么它存在，以及它如何区别于知识和大脑的其他方面。
====计算主义和功能主义====
{{Main|Computationalism|Functionalism (philosophy of mind)}}
{{Main|Computationalism|Functionalism (philosophy of mind)}}
Computationalism is the position in the [[philosophy of mind]] that the human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing system and that thinking is a form of computing.<ref>[[Steven Horst|Horst, Steven]], (2005) [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ "The Computational Theory of Mind"] in ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''</ref> Computationalism argues that the relationship between mind and body is similar or identical to the relationship between software and hardware and thus may be a solution to the [[mind-body problem]]. This philosophical position was inspired by the work of AI researchers and cognitive scientists in the 1960s and was originally proposed by philosophers [[Jerry Fodor]] and [[Hilary Putnam]].
Computationalism is the position in the [[philosophy of mind]] that the human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing system and that thinking is a form of computing.<ref>[[Steven Horst|Horst, Steven]], (2005) [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ "The Computational Theory of Mind"] in ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''</ref> Computationalism argues that the relationship between mind and body is similar or identical to the relationship between software and hardware and thus may be a solution to the [[mind-body problem]]. This philosophical position was inspired by the work of AI researchers and cognitive scientists in the 1960s and was originally proposed by philosophers [[Jerry Fodor]] and [[Hilary Putnam]].
Computationalism is the position in the philosophy of mind that the human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing system and that thinking is a form of computing. Computationalism argues that the relationship between mind and body is similar or identical to the relationship between software and hardware and thus may be a solution to the mind-body problem. This philosophical position was inspired by the work of AI researchers and cognitive scientists in the 1960s and was originally proposed by philosophers Jerry Fodor and Hilary Putnam.
Computationalism is the position in the philosophy of mind that the human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing system and that thinking is a form of computing. Computationalism argues that the relationship between mind and body is similar or identical to the relationship between software and hardware and thus may be a solution to the mind-body problem. This philosophical position was inspired by the work of AI researchers and cognitive scientists in the 1960s and was originally proposed by philosophers Jerry Fodor and Hilary Putnam.
计算主义站在心智哲学的立场，认为人类心智或人类大脑(都)是一个信息处理系统，思维是一种计算形式。计算主义认为，思想和身体之间的关系与软件和硬件之间的关系是相似或相同的，因此这也许能帮助解决“意识和身体问题”。这一哲学立场受20世纪60年代AI研究人员和认知科学家的工作的启发，最初由哲学家杰里 · 福多和希拉里 · 普特南提出。
计算主义站在心智哲学的立场，认为人类心智或人类大脑(都)是一个信息处理系统，思维是一种计算形式。计算主义认为，思想和身体之间的关系与软件和硬件之间的关系是相似或相同的，因此这也许能帮助解决“意识和身体问题”。这一哲学立场受20世纪60年代AI研究人员和认知科学家的工作的启发，最初由哲学家杰里·福多和希拉里·普特南提出。
====强人工智能假说 Strong AI hypothesis ====
====强人工智能假说 Strong AI hypothesis ====
{{Main|Chinese room}}
{{Main|Chinese room}}
The philosophical position that [[John Searle]] has named [[strong AI hypothesis|"strong AI"]] states: "The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds."<ref name="Searle's strong AI"/> Searle counters this assertion with his [[Chinese room]] argument, which asks us to look ''inside'' the computer and try to find where the "mind" might be.<ref name="Chinese room"/>
The philosophical position that [[John Searle]] has named [[strong AI hypothesis|"strong AI"]] states: "The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds."<ref name="Searle's strong AI"/> Searle counters this assertion with his [[Chinese room]] argument, which asks us to look ''inside'' the computer and try to find where the "mind" might be.<ref name="Chinese room"/>
The philosophical position that John Searle has named "strong AI" states: "The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds." Searle counters this assertion with his Chinese room argument, which asks us to look inside the computer and try to find where the "mind" might be.
The philosophical position that John Searle has named "strong AI" states: "The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds." Searle counters this assertion with his Chinese room argument, which asks us to look inside the computer and try to find where the "mind" might be.
“具有正确输入和输出程序的计算机，将因此拥有与人脑意义完全相同的头脑。”约翰·塞尔称这种哲学立场为“强人工智能”，然后用他的中文屋论点反驳了这种说法，他让人们看看电脑内部，并试图找出“思维”可能在哪里。
--[[用户:Qige96|Ricky]]([[用户讨论:Qige96讨论]])其实我不认同中文屋，我觉得这就是对系统论（总体大于部分之和）的无视。
====机器人的权利====
{{Main|Robot rights}}
{{Main|Robot rights}}
If a machine can be created that has intelligence, could it also ''[[sentience|feel]]''? If it can feel, does it have the same rights as a human? This issue, now known as "[[robot rights]]", is currently being considered by, for example, California's [[Institute for the Future]], although many critics believe that the discussion is premature.<ref name="Robot rights"/> Some critics of [[transhumanism]] argue that any hypothetical robot rights would lie on a spectrum with [[animal rights]] and human rights. <ref Name="Evans 2015">{{cite journal | last = Evans | first = Woody | authorlink = Woody Evans | title = Posthuman Rights: Dimensions of Transhuman Worlds | journal = Teknokultura | volume = 12 | issue = 2 | date = 2015 | df = dmy-all | doi = 10.5209/rev_TK.2015.v12.n2.49072 | doi-access = free }}</ref> The subject is profoundly discussed in the 2010 documentary film ''[[Plug & Pray]]'',<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.plugandpray-film.de/en/content.html|title=Content: Plug & Pray Film – Artificial Intelligence – Robots -|author=maschafilm|work=plugandpray-film.de|url-status=live|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160212040134/http://www.plugandpray-film.de/en/content.html|archivedate=12 February 2016|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and many sci fi media such as [[Star Trek]] Next Generation, with the character of [[Commander Data]], who fought being disassembled for research, and wanted to "become human", and the robotic holograms in Voyager.
If a machine can be created that has intelligence, could it also ''[[sentience|feel]]''? If it can feel, does it have the same rights as a human? This issue, now known as "[[robot rights]]", is currently being considered by, for example, California's [[Institute for the Future]], although many critics believe that the discussion is premature.<ref name="Robot rights"/> Some critics of [[transhumanism]] argue that any hypothetical robot rights would lie on a spectrum with [[animal rights]] and human rights. <ref Name="Evans 2015">{{cite journal | last = Evans | first = Woody | authorlink = Woody Evans | title = Posthuman Rights: Dimensions of Transhuman Worlds | journal = Teknokultura | volume = 12 | issue = 2 | date = 2015 | df = dmy-all | doi = 10.5209/rev_TK.2015.v12.n2.49072 | doi-access = free }}</ref> The subject is profoundly discussed in the 2010 documentary film ''[[Plug & Pray]]'',<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.plugandpray-film.de/en/content.html|title=Content: Plug & Pray Film – Artificial Intelligence – Robots -|author=maschafilm|work=plugandpray-film.de|url-status=live|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160212040134/http://www.plugandpray-film.de/en/content.html|archivedate=12 February 2016|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and many sci fi media such as [[Star Trek]] Next Generation, with the character of [[Commander Data]], who fought being disassembled for research, and wanted to "become human", and the robotic holograms in Voyager.
If a machine can be created that has intelligence, could it also feel? If it can feel, does it have the same rights as a human? This issue, now known as "robot rights", is currently being considered by, for example, California's Institute for the Future, although many critics believe that the discussion is premature. The subject is profoundly discussed in the 2010 documentary film Plug & Pray, and many sci fi media such as Star Trek Next Generation, with the character of Commander Data, who fought being disassembled for research, and wanted to "become human", and the robotic holograms in Voyager.
If a machine can be created that has intelligence, could it also feel? If it can feel, does it have the same rights as a human? This issue, now known as "robot rights", is currently being considered by, for example, California's Institute for the Future, although many critics believe that the discussion is premature. The subject is profoundly discussed in the 2010 documentary film Plug & Pray, and many sci fi media such as Star Trek Next Generation, with the character of Commander Data, who fought being disassembled for research, and wanted to "become human", and the robotic holograms in Voyager.
如果可以创造出一台有智能的机器，那么它是否也有感觉呢？如果它有感觉，它是否拥有与人类同样的权利？这个目前被称为“机器人权利”的问题正在被人们考虑<ref name="Robot rights"/>，例如，加利福尼亚的未来研究所就在从事相关研究，尽管许多批评论家认为这种讨论为时过早<ref Name="Evans 2015">{{cite journal | last = Evans | first = Woody | authorlink = Woody Evans | title = Posthuman Rights: Dimensions of Transhuman Worlds | journal = Teknokultura | volume = 12 | issue = 2 | date = 2015 | df = dmy-all | doi = 10.5209/rev_TK.2015.v12.n2.49072 | doi-access = free }}</ref>。2010年的纪录片《插头与祷告》(Plug & Pray)<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.plugandpray-film.de/en/content.html|title=Content: Plug & Pray Film – Artificial Intelligence – Robots -|author=maschafilm|work=plugandpray-film.de|url-status=live|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160212040134/http://www.plugandpray-film.de/en/content.html|archivedate=12 February 2016|df=dmy-all}}</ref>以及《星际迷航: 下一代》(Star Trek Next Generation)等许多科幻媒体都对这个主题进行了深入讨论。《星际迷航》中有个指挥官角色叫戴塔(Data) ，他希望“变成人类”，和为了不被拆解而抗争。
===超级智能 Superintelligence ===
===超级智能 Superintelligence ===