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第402行： − 捐赠博弈可能适用于市场。假设 X种橘子，Y 种苹果。苹果对橙子种植者 X 的<font color="#ff8000">边际效用 marginal utility</font>是''b''，这比橙子的边际效用''c''高，因为X有橙子剩余而没有苹果。同样地，对于苹果种植者Y来说，橙子的边际效用是''b''，而苹果的边际效用是''c''。 如果X和Y签约交换一个苹果和一个橙子，并且每个人都完成了交易，那么每个人都会得到''b-c''的收益。如果一方违约没有按照承诺交货，那么这个违约者将得到''b''的收益，而合作者将失去''c''的收益。 如果两者都违约，那么谁也不会得到或失去任何东西。+ − −
→Special case: donation game
===Special case: donation game===
===Special case: donation game===
特例：<font color="#ff8000">捐赠博弈 donation game </font>
特例：<font color="#ff8000">捐赠博弈 donation game </font>
The "donation game"<ref name=Hilbe2013>{{cite journal|last=Hilbe|first=Christian |author2=Martin A. Nowak |author3=Karl Sigmund|title=Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games|journal=PNAS|date=April 2013|volume=110|issue=17|pages=6913–18|doi=10.1073/pnas.1214834110|pmid=23572576 |pmc=3637695 |bibcode=2013PNAS..110.6913H |arxiv=1212.1067}}</ref> is a form of prisoner's dilemma in which cooperation corresponds to offering the other player a benefit ''b'' at a personal cost ''c'' with ''b'' > ''c''. Defection means offering nothing. The payoff matrix is thus
The "donation game"<ref name=Hilbe2013>{{cite journal|last=Hilbe|first=Christian |author2=Martin A. Nowak |author3=Karl Sigmund|title=Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games|journal=PNAS|date=April 2013|volume=110|issue=17|pages=6913–18|doi=10.1073/pnas.1214834110|pmid=23572576 |pmc=3637695 |bibcode=2013PNAS..110.6913H |arxiv=1212.1067}}</ref> is a form of prisoner's dilemma in which cooperation corresponds to offering the other player a benefit ''b'' at a personal cost ''c'' with ''b'' > ''c''. Defection means offering nothing. The payoff matrix is thus
The "donation game" is a form of prisoner's dilemma in which cooperation corresponds to offering the other player a benefit b at a personal cost c with b > c. Defection means offering nothing. The payoff matrix is thus
The "donation game" is a form of prisoner's dilemma in which cooperation corresponds to offering the other player a benefit b at a personal cost c with b > c. Defection means offering nothing. The payoff matrix is thus
捐赠博弈<ref name=Hilbe2013>{{cite journal|last=Hilbe|first=Christian |author2=Martin A. Nowak |author3=Karl Sigmund|title=Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games|journal=PNAS|date=April 2013|volume=110|issue=17|pages=6913–18|doi=10.1073/pnas.1214834110|pmid=23572576 |pmc=3637695 |bibcode=2013PNAS..110.6913H |arxiv=1212.1067}}</ref>是囚徒困境的一种形式，在这种博弈中，合作相当于以''b'' > ''c''条件下的个人成本''c''为另一方提供一个收益''b''，而叛变意味着什么也不提供。收益矩阵是这样的
捐赠博弈<ref name=Hilbe2013>{{cite journal|last=Hilbe|first=Christian |author2=Martin A. Nowak |author3=Karl Sigmund|title=Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games|journal=PNAS|date=April 2013|volume=110|issue=17|pages=6913–18|doi=10.1073/pnas.1214834110|pmid=23572576 |pmc=3637695 |bibcode=2013PNAS..110.6913H |arxiv=1212.1067}}</ref>是囚徒困境的一种形式，在这种博弈中，合作相当于以''b'' > ''c''条件下的个人成本''c''为另一方提供一个收益''b''，而叛变意味着什么也不提供。收益矩阵如下：
The donation game may be applied to markets. Suppose X grows oranges, Y grows apples. The marginal utility of an apple to the orange-grower X is b, which is higher than the marginal utility (c) of an orange, since X has a surplus of oranges and no apples. Similarly, for apple-grower Y, the marginal utility of an orange is b while the marginal utility of an apple is c. If X and Y contract to exchange an apple and an orange, and each fulfills their end of the deal, then each receive a payoff of b-c. If one "defects" and does not deliver as promised, the defector will receive a payoff of b, while the cooperator will lose c. If both defect, then neither one gains or loses anything.
The donation game may be applied to markets. Suppose X grows oranges, Y grows apples. The marginal utility of an apple to the orange-grower X is b, which is higher than the marginal utility (c) of an orange, since X has a surplus of oranges and no apples. Similarly, for apple-grower Y, the marginal utility of an orange is b while the marginal utility of an apple is c. If X and Y contract to exchange an apple and an orange, and each fulfills their end of the deal, then each receive a payoff of b-c. If one "defects" and does not deliver as promised, the defector will receive a payoff of b, while the cooperator will lose c. If both defect, then neither one gains or loses anything.
捐赠博弈可能适用于市场。假设种植者X 种橘子，种植者Y 种苹果。苹果对橙子种植者 X 的<font color="#ff8000">边际效用 marginal utility</font>是''b''，“b”比橙子的边际效用''c''高，因为X有橙子剩余而没有苹果。同样地，对于苹果种植者Y来说，橙子的边际效用是''b''，而苹果的边际效用是''c''。 如果X和Y签约交换一个苹果和一个橙子，并且每个人都完成了交易，那么每个人都会得到''b-c''的收益。如果一方违约没有按照承诺交货，那么这个违约者将得到''b''的收益，而合作者将失去''c''的收益。 如果两者都违约，那么谁也不会得到或失去任何东西。
==The iterated prisoner's dilemma==
==The iterated prisoner's dilemma==