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Some writers use "the singularity" in a broader way to refer to any radical changes in our society brought about by new technologies such as [[molecular nanotechnology]],<ref name="hplusmagazine"/><ref name="yudkowsky.net"/><ref name="agi-conf"/> although Vinge and other writers specifically state that without superintelligence, such changes would not qualify as a true singularity.<ref name="vinge1993" />
 
Some writers use "the singularity" in a broader way to refer to any radical changes in our society brought about by new technologies such as [[molecular nanotechnology]],<ref name="hplusmagazine"/><ref name="yudkowsky.net"/><ref name="agi-conf"/> although Vinge and other writers specifically state that without superintelligence, such changes would not qualify as a true singularity.<ref name="vinge1993" />
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一些<font color = "32cd32">作家writers</font>更宽泛地使用“奇点”的概念，用来指代任何我们社会中由新技术带来的剧烈变化，如[[分子纳米技术]]，<ref name="hplusmagazine"/><ref name="yudkowsky.net"/><ref name="agi-conf"/>尽管Vinge和其他<font color = "32cd32">作家</font>明确指出，如果没有超级智能，这些改变将不是真正的奇点。<ref name="vinge1993" />
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一些<font color = "#32cd32">作家writers</font>更宽泛地使用“奇点”的概念，用来指代任何我们社会中由新技术带来的剧烈变化，如[[分子纳米技术]]，<ref name="hplusmagazine"/><ref name="yudkowsky.net"/><ref name="agi-conf"/>尽管Vinge和其他<font color = "#32cd32">作家</font>明确指出，如果没有超级智能，这些改变将不是真正的奇点。<ref name="vinge1993" />
    
===Speed superintelligence速度超智能===
 
===Speed superintelligence速度超智能===
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A 2017 email survey of authors with publications at the 2015 [[Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems|NeurIPS]] and [[International Conference on Machine Learning|ICML]] machine learning conferences asked  about the chance of an intelligence explosion. Of the respondents, 12% said it was "quite likely", 17% said it was "likely", 21% said it was "about even", 24% said it was "unlikely" and 26% said it was "quite unlikely".<ref>{{cite arxiv|last1=Grace|first1=Katja|last2=Salvatier|first2=John|last3=Dafoe|first3=Allan|last4=Zhang|first4=Baobao|last5=Evans|first5=Owain|title=When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? Evidence from AI Experts|eprint=1705.08807|date=24 May 2017|class=cs.AI}}</ref>
 
A 2017 email survey of authors with publications at the 2015 [[Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems|NeurIPS]] and [[International Conference on Machine Learning|ICML]] machine learning conferences asked  about the chance of an intelligence explosion. Of the respondents, 12% said it was "quite likely", 17% said it was "likely", 21% said it was "about even", 24% said it was "unlikely" and 26% said it was "quite unlikely".<ref>{{cite arxiv|last1=Grace|first1=Katja|last2=Salvatier|first2=John|last3=Dafoe|first3=Allan|last4=Zhang|first4=Baobao|last5=Evans|first5=Owain|title=When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? Evidence from AI Experts|eprint=1705.08807|date=24 May 2017|class=cs.AI}}</ref>
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2017年对2015年[[神经信息处理系统会议| NeurIPS]]和[[International Conference on Machine Learning | ICML]]机器学习会议上发表文章的作者的电子邮件调查询问了智能爆炸的可能性。在受访者中，12%的人认为“很有可能”，17%的人说“很可能”，21%的人说“差不多”，24%的人说“不太可能”，26%的人说“不太可能”。<ref>{{cite arxiv|last1=Grace|first1=Katja|last2=Salvatier|first2=John|last3=Dafoe|first3=Allan|last4=Zhang|first4=Baobao|last5=Evans|first5=Owain|title=When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? Evidence from AI Experts|eprint=1705.08807|date=24 May 2017|class=cs.AI}}</ref>
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2017年对2015年[[神经信息处理系统会议| NeurIPS]]和[[International Conference on Machine Learning | ICML]]机器学习会议上发表文章的作者的电子邮件调查询问了智能爆炸的可能性。在受访者中，12% 的人认为“很有可能” ，17% 的人认为“有可能” ，21% 的人认为“可能性中等” ，24% 的人认为“不太可能” ，26% 的人认为“很不可能”。<ref>{{cite arxiv|last1=Grace|first1=Katja|last2=Salvatier|first2=John|last3=Dafoe|first3=Allan|last4=Zhang|first4=Baobao|last5=Evans|first5=Owain|title=When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? Evidence from AI Experts|eprint=1705.08807|date=24 May 2017|class=cs.AI}}</ref>
    
=== Speed improvements速度改进 ===
 
=== Speed improvements速度改进 ===
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Martin Ford in The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future
 
Martin Ford in The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future
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马丁 · 福特在《隧道中的灯光: 自动化，加速技术和未来经济》一书中
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马丁 · 福特Martin Ford的《隧道中的灯光: 自动化，加速技术和未来经济The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future》
    
[[Image:PPTMooresLawai.jpg|thumb|Ray Kurzweil writes that, due to [[paradigm shift]]s, a trend of exponential growth extends [[Moore's law]] from [[integrated circuits]] to earlier [[transistor]]s, [[vacuum tube]]s, [[relay]]s, and [[electromechanics|electromechanical]] computers. He predicts that the exponential growth will continue, and that in a few decades the computing power of all computers will exceed that of ("unenhanced") human brains, with superhuman [[artificial intelligence]] appearing around the same time.]]
 
[[Image:PPTMooresLawai.jpg|thumb|Ray Kurzweil writes that, due to [[paradigm shift]]s, a trend of exponential growth extends [[Moore's law]] from [[integrated circuits]] to earlier [[transistor]]s, [[vacuum tube]]s, [[relay]]s, and [[electromechanics|electromechanical]] computers. He predicts that the exponential growth will continue, and that in a few decades the computing power of all computers will exceed that of ("unenhanced") human brains, with superhuman [[artificial intelligence]] appearing around the same time.]]
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The exponential growth in computing technology suggested by Moore's law is commonly cited as a reason to expect a singularity in the relatively near future, and a number of authors have proposed generalizations of Moore's law. Computer scientist and futurist [[Hans Moravec]] proposed in a 1998 book<ref>{{cite book|author=Moravec, Hans|title=Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind|year=1999|publisher=Oxford U. Press|page=61|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fduW6KHhWtQC&pg=PA61|isbn=978-0-19-513630-2}}</ref> that the exponential growth curve could be extended back through earlier computing technologies prior to the [[integrated circuit]].
 
The exponential growth in computing technology suggested by Moore's law is commonly cited as a reason to expect a singularity in the relatively near future, and a number of authors have proposed generalizations of Moore's law. Computer scientist and futurist [[Hans Moravec]] proposed in a 1998 book<ref>{{cite book|author=Moravec, Hans|title=Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind|year=1999|publisher=Oxford U. Press|page=61|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fduW6KHhWtQC&pg=PA61|isbn=978-0-19-513630-2}}</ref> that the exponential growth curve could be extended back through earlier computing technologies prior to the [[integrated circuit]].
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摩尔定律所建议的计算技术的指数增长通常被认为是在相对不远的将来出现奇点的一个理由，许多作者已经提出了摩尔定律的推广。计算机科学家和未来学家[[Hans Moravec]]在1998年的一本书中提出<ref>{{cite book|author=Moravec, Hans|title=Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind|year=1999|publisher=Oxford U. Press|page=61|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fduW6KHhWtQC&pg=PA61|isbn=978-0-19-513630-2}}</ref>指数增长曲线可以通过[[集成电路]]之前的早期计算技术进行延伸。
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摩尔定律所建议的计算技术的指数增长通常被认为是在相对不远的将来出现奇点的一个理由，许多作者已经提出了摩尔定律的推广。计算机科学家和未来主义者[[Hans Moravec]]在1998年的一本书中提到<ref>{{cite book|author=Moravec, Hans|title=Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind|year=1999|publisher=Oxford U. Press|page=61|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fduW6KHhWtQC&pg=PA61|isbn=978-0-19-513630-2}}</ref>指数型增长可以通过[[集成电路]]之前的早期计算技术进行延伸。
    
[[Ray Kurzweil]] postulates a [[law of accelerating returns]] in which the speed of technological change (and more generally, all evolutionary processes<ref name="google"/>) increases exponentially, generalizing Moore's law in the same manner as Moravec's proposal, and also including material technology (especially as applied to [[nanotechnology]]), [[Medical Technology|medical technology]] and others.<ref name="singularity2"/> Between 1986 and 2007, machines' application-specific capacity to compute information per capita roughly doubled every 14 months; the per capita capacity of the world's general-purpose computers has doubled every 18 months; the global telecommunication capacity per capita doubled every 34 months; and the world's storage capacity per capita doubled every 40 months.<ref name="HilbertLopez2011">[http://www.sciencemag.org/content/332/6025/60 "The World's Technological Capacity to Store, Communicate, and Compute Information"], Martin Hilbert and Priscila López (2011), [[Science (journal)|Science]], 332(6025), 60–65; free access to the article through here: martinhilbert.net/WorldInfoCapacity.html</ref> On the other hand, it has been argued that the global acceleration pattern having the 21st century singularity as its parameter should be characterized as [[Hyperbolic growth|hyperbolic]] rather than exponential.<ref>[https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-33730-8 ''The 21st Century Singularity and Global Futures. A Big History Perspective''] (Springer, 2020)</ref>
 
[[Ray Kurzweil]] postulates a [[law of accelerating returns]] in which the speed of technological change (and more generally, all evolutionary processes<ref name="google"/>) increases exponentially, generalizing Moore's law in the same manner as Moravec's proposal, and also including material technology (especially as applied to [[nanotechnology]]), [[Medical Technology|medical technology]] and others.<ref name="singularity2"/> Between 1986 and 2007, machines' application-specific capacity to compute information per capita roughly doubled every 14 months; the per capita capacity of the world's general-purpose computers has doubled every 18 months; the global telecommunication capacity per capita doubled every 34 months; and the world's storage capacity per capita doubled every 40 months.<ref name="HilbertLopez2011">[http://www.sciencemag.org/content/332/6025/60 "The World's Technological Capacity to Store, Communicate, and Compute Information"], Martin Hilbert and Priscila López (2011), [[Science (journal)|Science]], 332(6025), 60–65; free access to the article through here: martinhilbert.net/WorldInfoCapacity.html</ref> On the other hand, it has been argued that the global acceleration pattern having the 21st century singularity as its parameter should be characterized as [[Hyperbolic growth|hyperbolic]] rather than exponential.<ref>[https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-33730-8 ''The 21st Century Singularity and Global Futures. A Big History Perspective''] (Springer, 2020)</ref>
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Kurzweil reserves the term "singularity" for a rapid increase in artificial intelligence (as opposed to other technologies), writing for example that "The Singularity will allow us to transcend these limitations of our biological bodies and brains ... There will be no distinction, post-Singularity, between human and machine".<ref name="singularity3"/> He also defines his predicted date of the singularity (2045) in terms of when he expects computer-based intelligences to significantly exceed the sum total of human brainpower, writing that advances in computing before that date "will not represent the Singularity" because they do "not yet correspond to a profound expansion of our intelligence."<ref name="transformation"/>
 
Kurzweil reserves the term "singularity" for a rapid increase in artificial intelligence (as opposed to other technologies), writing for example that "The Singularity will allow us to transcend these limitations of our biological bodies and brains ... There will be no distinction, post-Singularity, between human and machine".<ref name="singularity3"/> He also defines his predicted date of the singularity (2045) in terms of when he expects computer-based intelligences to significantly exceed the sum total of human brainpower, writing that advances in computing before that date "will not represent the Singularity" because they do "not yet correspond to a profound expansion of our intelligence."<ref name="transformation"/>
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Kurzweil将“奇点”一词保留为人工智能的快速增长（与其他技术相反），他举例写道，“奇点将使我们超越我们生物身体和大脑的这些限制。。。在奇点之后，人类和机器之间将没有区别。<ref name=“Singularity 3”/>他还将他预测的奇点日期（2045年）定义为，他预计基于计算机的智能将大大超过人类脑力总和，在那之前写下计算技术的进步“不会代表奇点”，因为它们“还不符合我们智力的深刻扩展”。<ref name="transformation"/>
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库兹韦尔将“奇点”一词用于描述人工智能(相对于其他技术)的快速增长，例如他写道: “奇点将允许我们超越生物体和大脑的局限……后奇点时代，人类与机器之间将不再有区别”。库兹韦尔相信奇点将在大约2045年之前出现，那时基于计算机的智能将明显超越人类脑力的总和，在这个日期之前计算机技术的进步“并不代表奇点”，因为它们“还不符合智慧的深刻扩展”。
    
====Accelerating change加速变革====
 
====Accelerating change加速变革====
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{{quote|One conversation centered on the ever accelerating progress of technology and changes in the mode of human life, which gives the appearance of approaching some essential singularity in the history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, could not continue.<ref name=mathematical/>}}
 
{{quote|One conversation centered on the ever accelerating progress of technology and changes in the mode of human life, which gives the appearance of approaching some essential singularity in the history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, could not continue.<ref name=mathematical/>}}
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一些奇点的支持者通过对过去趋势的推断，特别是那些与缩短技术进步之间差距的趋势，来论证它的必然性。在技术进步的背景下，第一次使用“奇点”一词时，[[Stanislaw Ulam]]讲述了与[[John von Neumann]]关于加速变革的谈话：{{引用}一次围绕不断加速的技术进步和人类生活方式变化的对话，这使得人类历史上出现了一些基本的奇点，超过了这些奇点，人类的事务，如我们所知，将无法继续下去。<ref name=mathematical/>}}
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一些奇点论的支持者认为，通过对过去趋势的推断，特别是那些缩减技术进步的差距有关的趋势，奇点是不可避免的。技术进步的背景下，较早使用“奇点”一词时，Stanislaw Ulam讲述了与冯·诺伊曼关于加速变革的一次谈话：
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一次围绕不断加速的技术进步和生活方式变化的对话，它使得人类历史上出现了一些基本的奇点，超过了这些奇点，人类的事务，如我们所知，将无法继续下去。
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=== here ===
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Kurzweil claims that technological progress follows a pattern of [[exponential growth]], following what he calls the "[[law of accelerating returns]]". Whenever technology approaches a barrier, Kurzweil writes, new technologies will surmount it. He predicts [[paradigm shift]]s will become increasingly common, leading to "technological change so rapid and profound it represents a rupture in the fabric of human history".<ref name="Kurzweil 2001">{{Citation
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Kurzweil believes that the singularity will occur by approximately 2045.[38] His predictions differ from Vinge's in that he predicts a gradual ascent to the singularity, rather than Vinge's rapidly self�improving superhuman intelligence.
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库兹韦尔声称，技术进步遵循[[指数增长]的模式，遵循他所称的“[[加速回报定律]”。库兹韦尔写道，每当技术接近障碍时，新技术就会克服它。他预测[[范式转变]将变得越来越普遍，导致“技术变革如此迅速和深刻，它代表着人类历史结构的断裂”。<ref name="Kurzweil 2001">{{Citation
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Kurzweil claims that technological progress follows a pattern of
 +
exponential growth, following what he calls the "law of
 +
accelerating returns". Whenever technology approaches a barrier,
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Kurzweil writes, new technologies will surmount it. He predicts
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paradigm shifts will become increasingly common, leading to
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"technological change so rapid and profound it represents a
 +
rupture in the fabric of human history".[43] Kurzweil believes that
 +
the singularity will occur by approximately 2045.[38] His
 +
predictions differ from Vinge's in that he predicts a gradual
 +
ascent to the singularity, rather than Vinge's rapidly self�improving superhuman intelligence.
 +
 
 +
Kurzweil claims that technological progress follows a pattern of
 +
exponential growth, following what he calls the "law of
 +
accelerating returns". Whenever technology approaches a barrier,
 +
Kurzweil writes, new technologies will surmount it. He predicts
 +
paradigm shifts will become increasingly common, leading to
 +
"technological change so rapid and profound it represents a
 +
rupture in the fabric of human history".[43] Kurzweil believes that
 +
the singularity will occur by approximately 2045.[38] His
 +
predictions differ from Vinge's in that he predicts a gradual
 +
ascent to the singularity, rather than Vinge's rapidly self-improving superhuman intelligence.
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库兹韦尔声称，技术进步遵循[[指数增长]的模式，遵循他所称的“<font color = "#ff8000">加速返回定律law of accelerating returns</font>”。库兹韦尔写道，每当一项技术遇到障碍时，新技术就会出来克服这个障碍。他预测范式转变将变得越来越普遍，导致“技术变革非常迅速和深刻，以至于它代表着人类历史结构的一个断裂”。库兹韦尔相信奇点将在2045年之前出现。他和Vinge预测的不同点在于他预测了技术渐变的上升，而Vinge预测了一个快速自我更新的超人类智能。
       
Oft-cited dangers include those commonly associated with molecular nanotechnology and genetic engineering. These threats are major issues for both singularity advocates and critics, and were the subject of Bill Joy's Wired magazine article "Why the future doesn't need us".
 
Oft-cited dangers include those commonly associated with molecular nanotechnology and genetic engineering. These threats are major issues for both singularity advocates and critics, and were the subject of Bill Joy's Wired magazine article "Why the future doesn't need us".
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经常被引用的危险包括那些通常与分子纳米技术和基因工程有关的危险。这些威胁是奇点倡导者和批评者的主要问题，也是比尔 · 乔伊在《连线Wired》杂志上发表文章《为什么未来不需要我们Why the future doesn't need us》的主题。
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经常被引用的危险包括那些与分子纳米技术和基因工程有关的技术。这些威胁是奇点论的倡导者和批评者面临的主要议题，也是比尔 · 乔伊《连线 Wired》杂志上所发表文章《为什么未来不需要我们Why the future doesn't need us》的主题。
    
=== Algorithm improvements算法改进 ===
 
=== Algorithm improvements算法改进 ===
    
Some intelligence technologies, like "seed AI",<ref name="Yampolskiy, Roman V 2015"/><ref name="ReferenceA"/> may also have the potential to not just make themselves faster, but also more efficient, by modifying their [[source code]]. These improvements would make further improvements possible, which would make further improvements possible, and so on.
 
Some intelligence technologies, like "seed AI",<ref name="Yampolskiy, Roman V 2015"/><ref name="ReferenceA"/> may also have the potential to not just make themselves faster, but also more efficient, by modifying their [[source code]]. These improvements would make further improvements possible, which would make further improvements possible, and so on.
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一些智能技术，比如“种子人工智能”，<ref name="Yampolskiy, Roman V 2015"/><ref name="ReferenceA"/> 通过修改它们的[[源代码]]，也可能不仅使自己更快，而且更高效。这些改进将使进一步的改进成为可能，从而再次使进一步的改进成为可能，以此类推。
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一些智能技术，比如“种子人工智能”，通过修改自己的源代码，可能使自己不仅更快，而且更高效。这些改进将使进一步的改进成为可能，以此类推。
       
The mechanism for a recursively self-improving set of algorithms differs from an increase in raw computation speed in two ways. First, it does not require external influence: machines designing faster hardware would still require humans to create the improved hardware, or to program factories appropriately.{{citation needed|date=July 2017}} An AI rewriting its own source code could do so while contained in an [[AI box]].
 
The mechanism for a recursively self-improving set of algorithms differs from an increase in raw computation speed in two ways. First, it does not require external influence: machines designing faster hardware would still require humans to create the improved hardware, or to program factories appropriately.{{citation needed|date=July 2017}} An AI rewriting its own source code could do so while contained in an [[AI box]].
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递归自改进算法集的机制在两个方面不同于原始计算速度的提高。首先，它不需要外部影响：设计更快硬件的机器仍然需要人类来创建改进的硬件，或者对工厂进行适当的编程。
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递归自我改进算法集的机制在两个方面不同于原始计算速度的提高。首先，它不需要外部影响：设计更快的硬件的机器仍然需要人类来创造改进的硬件，或者对工厂进行适当的编程。AI可以既身处一个<font color = "#ff8000">AI盒 AI box</font>里面，又同时改进自己的 源代码。
    
Second, as with [[Vernor Vinge]]’s conception of the singularity, it is much harder to predict the outcome. While speed increases seem to be only a quantitative difference from human intelligence, actual algorithm improvements would be qualitatively different. [[Eliezer Yudkowsky]] compares it to the changes that human intelligence brought: humans changed the world thousands of times more rapidly than evolution had done, and in totally different ways. Similarly, the evolution of life was a massive departure and acceleration from the previous geological rates of change, and improved intelligence could cause change to be as different again.<ref name="yudkowsky">{{cite web|author=Eliezer S. Yudkowsky |url=http://yudkowsky.net/singularity/power |title=Power of Intelligence |publisher=Yudkowsky |accessdate=2011-09-09}}</ref>
 
Second, as with [[Vernor Vinge]]’s conception of the singularity, it is much harder to predict the outcome. While speed increases seem to be only a quantitative difference from human intelligence, actual algorithm improvements would be qualitatively different. [[Eliezer Yudkowsky]] compares it to the changes that human intelligence brought: humans changed the world thousands of times more rapidly than evolution had done, and in totally different ways. Similarly, the evolution of life was a massive departure and acceleration from the previous geological rates of change, and improved intelligence could cause change to be as different again.<ref name="yudkowsky">{{cite web|author=Eliezer S. Yudkowsky |url=http://yudkowsky.net/singularity/power |title=Power of Intelligence |publisher=Yudkowsky |accessdate=2011-09-09}}</ref>
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第二，和[[Vernor Vinge]]关于奇点的概念一样，预测结果要困难得多。虽然速度的提高似乎与人类的智能只是数量上的区别，但实际的算法改进在质量上是不同的。[[Eliezer Yudkowsky]]将其与人类智能带来的变化相比较：人类改变世界的速度比进化速度快数千倍，而且方式完全不同。同样地，生命的进化与以前的地质变化率有着巨大的背离和加速，而智能的提高可能会使变化再次变得不同<ref name="yudkowsky">{{cite web|author=Eliezer S. Yudkowsky |url=http://yudkowsky.net/singularity/power |title=Power of Intelligence |publisher=Yudkowsky |accessdate=2011-09-09}}</ref>
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第二，和Vernor Vinge关于奇点的概念一样，对结果的预测要困难得多。虽然速度的提高似乎与人类的智能只是数量上的区别，但实际的算法改进在质量上是不同的。Eliezer Yudkowsky将其与人类智能带来的变化相比较：人类改变世界的速度比进化速度快数千倍，而且方式完全不同。同样地，生命的进化与以前的地质变化又有着巨大的不同和加速，而智能的提高可能会使变化再次变得不同。<ref name="yudkowsky">{{cite web|author=Eliezer S. Yudkowsky |url=http://yudkowsky.net/singularity/power |title=Power of Intelligence |publisher=Yudkowsky |accessdate=2011-09-09}}</ref>
    
There are substantial dangers associated with an intelligence explosion singularity originating from a recursively self-improving set of algorithms. First, the goal structure of the AI might not be invariant under self-improvement, potentially causing the AI to optimise for something other than what was originally intended.<ref name="selfawaresystems">[http://selfawaresystems.com/2007/11/30/paper-on-the-basic-ai-drives/ Omohundro, Stephen M., "The Basic AI Drives." Artificial General Intelligence, 2008 proceedings of the First AGI Conference, eds. Pei Wang, Ben Goertzel, and Stan Franklin. Vol. 171. Amsterdam: IOS, 2008 ]</ref><ref name="kurzweilai">{{cite web|url=http://www.kurzweilai.net/artificial-general-intelligence-now-is-the-time |title=Artificial General Intelligence: Now Is the Time |publisher=KurzweilAI |accessdate=2011-09-09}}</ref> Secondly, AIs could compete for the same scarce resources mankind uses to survive.<ref name="selfawaresystems.com">[http://selfawaresystems.com/2007/10/05/paper-on-the-nature-of-self-improving-artificial-intelligence/ Omohundro, Stephen M., "The Nature of Self-Improving Artificial Intelligence." Self-Aware Systems. 21 Jan. 2008. Web. 07 Jan. 2010.]</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Barrat|first1=James|title=Our Final Invention|year=2013|publisher=St. Martin's Press|location=New York|isbn=978-0312622374|pages=78–98|edition=First|chapter=6, "Four Basic Drives"|title-link=Our Final Invention}}</ref>
 
There are substantial dangers associated with an intelligence explosion singularity originating from a recursively self-improving set of algorithms. First, the goal structure of the AI might not be invariant under self-improvement, potentially causing the AI to optimise for something other than what was originally intended.<ref name="selfawaresystems">[http://selfawaresystems.com/2007/11/30/paper-on-the-basic-ai-drives/ Omohundro, Stephen M., "The Basic AI Drives." Artificial General Intelligence, 2008 proceedings of the First AGI Conference, eds. Pei Wang, Ben Goertzel, and Stan Franklin. Vol. 171. Amsterdam: IOS, 2008 ]</ref><ref name="kurzweilai">{{cite web|url=http://www.kurzweilai.net/artificial-general-intelligence-now-is-the-time |title=Artificial General Intelligence: Now Is the Time |publisher=KurzweilAI |accessdate=2011-09-09}}</ref> Secondly, AIs could compete for the same scarce resources mankind uses to survive.<ref name="selfawaresystems.com">[http://selfawaresystems.com/2007/10/05/paper-on-the-nature-of-self-improving-artificial-intelligence/ Omohundro, Stephen M., "The Nature of Self-Improving Artificial Intelligence." Self-Aware Systems. 21 Jan. 2008. Web. 07 Jan. 2010.]</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Barrat|first1=James|title=Our Final Invention|year=2013|publisher=St. Martin's Press|location=New York|isbn=978-0312622374|pages=78–98|edition=First|chapter=6, "Four Basic Drives"|title-link=Our Final Invention}}</ref>
   −
智能爆炸奇点源于一组递归的自我改进算法，这有着巨大的危险。首先，人工智能的目标结构在自我完善的情况下可能不是一成不变的，这可能会导致人工智能对原本计划之外的东西进行优化。<ref name="selfawaresystems">[http://selfawaresystems.com/2007/11/30/paper-on-the-basic-ai-drives/ Omohundro, Stephen M., "The Basic AI Drives." Artificial General Intelligence, 2008 proceedings of the First AGI Conference, eds. Pei Wang, Ben Goertzel, and Stan Franklin. Vol. 171. Amsterdam: IOS, 2008 ]</ref><ref name="kurzweilai">{{cite web|url=http://www.kurzweilai.net/artificial-general-intelligence-now-is-the-time |title=Artificial General Intelligence: Now Is the Time |publisher=KurzweilAI |accessdate=2011-09-09}}</ref>第二，人工智能可以竞争人类赖以生存的稀缺资源。<ref name="selfawaresystems.com">[http://selfawaresystems.com/2007/10/05/paper-on-the-nature-of-self-improving-artificial-intelligence/ Omohundro, Stephen M., "The Nature of Self-Improving Artificial Intelligence." Self-Aware Systems. 21 Jan. 2008. Web. 07 Jan. 2010.]</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Barrat|first1=James|title=Our Final Invention|year=2013|publisher=St. Martin's Press|location=New York|isbn=978-0312622374|pages=78–98|edition=First|chapter=6, "Four Basic Drives"|title-link=Our Final Invention}}</ref>
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There are substantial dangers associated with an intelligence explosion singularity originating from a recursively self-improving set of algorithms. First, the goal structure of the AI might not be invariant under self-improvement, potentially causing the AI to optimise for something other than what was originally intended. Secondly, AIs could compete for the same scarce resources humankind uses to survive.
 +
 
 +
由递归自我改进的算法集合引起的智能爆炸存在着巨大的危险。首先，人工智能的目标结构在自我完善的情况下可能不是一成不变的，这可能会导致人工智能对原本计划之外的东西进行优化。第二，人工智能可以与人类竞争赖以生存的稀缺资源。
    
While not actively malicious, there is no reason to think that AIs would actively promote human goals unless they could be programmed as such, and if not, might use the resources currently used to support mankind to promote its own goals, causing human extinction.<ref name="kurzweilai.net">{{cite web|url=http://www.kurzweilai.net/max-more-and-ray-kurzweil-on-the-singularity-2 |title=Max More and Ray Kurzweil on the Singularity |publisher=KurzweilAI |accessdate=2011-09-09}}</ref><ref name="ReferenceB">{{cite web|url=http://singinst.org/riskintro/index.html |title=Concise Summary &#124; Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence |publisher=Singinst.org |accessdate=2011-09-09}}</ref><ref name="nickbostrom7">[http://www.nickbostrom.com/fut/evolution.html Bostrom, Nick, The Future of Human Evolution, Death and Anti-Death: Two Hundred Years After Kant, Fifty Years After Turing, ed. Charles Tandy, pp. 339–371, 2004, Ria University Press.]</ref>
 
While not actively malicious, there is no reason to think that AIs would actively promote human goals unless they could be programmed as such, and if not, might use the resources currently used to support mankind to promote its own goals, causing human extinction.<ref name="kurzweilai.net">{{cite web|url=http://www.kurzweilai.net/max-more-and-ray-kurzweil-on-the-singularity-2 |title=Max More and Ray Kurzweil on the Singularity |publisher=KurzweilAI |accessdate=2011-09-09}}</ref><ref name="ReferenceB">{{cite web|url=http://singinst.org/riskintro/index.html |title=Concise Summary &#124; Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence |publisher=Singinst.org |accessdate=2011-09-09}}</ref><ref name="nickbostrom7">[http://www.nickbostrom.com/fut/evolution.html Bostrom, Nick, The Future of Human Evolution, Death and Anti-Death: Two Hundred Years After Kant, Fifty Years After Turing, ed. Charles Tandy, pp. 339–371, 2004, Ria University Press.]</ref>
   −
虽然不是恶意的，但没有理由认为人工智能会积极促进人类目标的实现，除非这些目标可以被编程，如果不能，就可能利用目前用于支持人类的资源来促进自己的目标，从而导致人类灭绝。<ref name="kurzweilai.net">{{cite web|url=http://www.kurzweilai.net/max-more-and-ray-kurzweil-on-the-singularity-2 |title=Max More and Ray Kurzweil on the Singularity |publisher=KurzweilAI |accessdate=2011-09-09}}</ref><ref name="ReferenceB">{{cite web|url=http://singinst.org/riskintro/index.html |title=Concise Summary &#124; Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence |publisher=Singinst.org |accessdate=2011-09-09}}</ref><ref name="nickbostrom7">[http://www.nickbostrom.com/fut/evolution.html Bostrom, Nick, The Future of Human Evolution, Death and Anti-Death: Two Hundred Years After Kant, Fifty Years After Turing, ed. Charles Tandy, pp. 339–371, 2004, Ria University Press.]</ref>
+
While not actively malicious, there is no reason to think that AIs would actively promote human goals unless they could be programmed as such, and if not, might use the resources currently used to support humankind to promote its own goals, causing human extinction.
 +
 
 +
 
 +
虽然不是恶意的，但没有理由认为人工智能会积极促进人类目标的实现，除非这些目标可以被编程，否则，它们就可能利用目前用于支持人类的资源来促进自己的目标，从而导致人类灭绝。
    
[[Carl Shulman]] and [[Anders Sandberg]] suggest that algorithm improvements may be the limiting factor for a singularity; while hardware efficiency tends to improve at a steady pace, software innovations are more unpredictable and may be bottlenecked by serial, cumulative research. They suggest that in the case of a software-limited singularity, intelligence explosion would actually become more likely than with a hardware-limited singularity, because in the software-limited case, once human-level AI is developed, it could run serially on very fast hardware, and the abundance of cheap hardware would make AI research less constrained.<ref name=ShulmanSandberg2010>{{cite journal|last=Shulman|first=Carl|author2=Anders Sandberg |title=Implications of a Software-Limited Singularity|journal=ECAP10: VIII European Conference on Computing and Philosophy|year=2010|url=http://intelligence.org/files/SoftwareLimited.pdf|accessdate=17 May 2014|editor1-first=Klaus|editor1-last=Mainzer}}</ref> An abundance of accumulated hardware that can be unleashed once the software figures out how to use it has been called "computing overhang."<ref name=MuehlhauserSalamon2012>{{cite book|last=Muehlhauser|first=Luke|title=Singularity Hypotheses: A Scientific and Philosophical Assessment|year=2012|publisher=Springer|chapter-url=http://intelligence.org/files/IE-EI.pdf|author2=Anna Salamon |editor=Amnon Eden |editor2=Johnny Søraker |editor3=James H. Moor |editor4=Eric Steinhart|chapter=Intelligence Explosion: Evidence and Import}}</ref>
 
[[Carl Shulman]] and [[Anders Sandberg]] suggest that algorithm improvements may be the limiting factor for a singularity; while hardware efficiency tends to improve at a steady pace, software innovations are more unpredictable and may be bottlenecked by serial, cumulative research. They suggest that in the case of a software-limited singularity, intelligence explosion would actually become more likely than with a hardware-limited singularity, because in the software-limited case, once human-level AI is developed, it could run serially on very fast hardware, and the abundance of cheap hardware would make AI research less constrained.<ref name=ShulmanSandberg2010>{{cite journal|last=Shulman|first=Carl|author2=Anders Sandberg |title=Implications of a Software-Limited Singularity|journal=ECAP10: VIII European Conference on Computing and Philosophy|year=2010|url=http://intelligence.org/files/SoftwareLimited.pdf|accessdate=17 May 2014|editor1-first=Klaus|editor1-last=Mainzer}}</ref> An abundance of accumulated hardware that can be unleashed once the software figures out how to use it has been called "computing overhang."<ref name=MuehlhauserSalamon2012>{{cite book|last=Muehlhauser|first=Luke|title=Singularity Hypotheses: A Scientific and Philosophical Assessment|year=2012|publisher=Springer|chapter-url=http://intelligence.org/files/IE-EI.pdf|author2=Anna Salamon |editor=Amnon Eden |editor2=Johnny Søraker |editor3=James H. Moor |editor4=Eric Steinhart|chapter=Intelligence Explosion: Evidence and Import}}</ref>
   −
[[Carl Shulman]]和[[Anders Sandberg]]认为，算法改进可能是奇点的限制因素；虽然硬件效率趋于稳步提高，但软件创新更具不可预测性，可能会受到连续、累积研究的限制。他们认为，在软件受限奇点的情况下，智能爆炸实际上比硬件受限奇点更可能发生，因为在软件有限的情况下，一旦开发出人类水平的人工智能，它可以在非常快的硬件上连续运行，廉价硬件的丰富将使人工智能研究不那么受限制。<ref name=ShulmanSandberg2010>{{cite journal|last=Shulman|first=Carl|author2=Anders Sandberg |title=Implications of a Software-Limited Singularity|journal=ECAP10: VIII European Conference on Computing and Philosophy|year=2010|url=http://intelligence.org/files/SoftwareLimited.pdf|accessdate=17 May 2014|editor1-first=Klaus|editor1-last=Mainzer}}</ref>一旦软件知道如何使用，大量积累的硬件可以释放出来，这被称为“计算过剩”<ref name=MuehlhauserSalamon2012>{{cite book|last=Muehlhauser|first=Luke|title=Singularity Hypotheses: A Scientific and Philosophical Assessment|year=2012|publisher=Springer|chapter-url=http://intelligence.org/files/IE-EI.pdf|author2=Anna Salamon |editor=Amnon Eden |editor2=Johnny Søraker |editor3=James H. Moor |editor4=Eric Steinhart|chapter=Intelligence Explosion: Evidence and Import}}</ref>
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Carl Shulman and Anders Sandberg suggest that algorithm improvements may be the limiting factor for a singularity; while hardware efficiency tends to improve at a steady pace, software innovations are more unpredictable and may be bottlenecked by serial, cumulative research. They suggest that in the case of a software-limited singularity, intelligence explosion would actually become more likely than with a hardware-limited singularity, because in the software-limited case, once human-level AI is developed, it could run serially on very fast hardware, and the abundance of cheap hardware would make AI research less constrained. An abundance of accumulated hardware that can be unleashed once the software figures out how to use it has been called "computing overhang."
 +
 
 +
Carl Shulman和Anders Sandberg认为，算法改进可能是奇点的限制因素；虽然硬件效率趋于稳步提高，但软件创新更不具可预测性，可能会受到连续、累积的研究的限制。他们认为，智能爆炸在受软件限制的奇点情况中发生的可能性实际上比在受硬件限制的奇点更可能发生，因为在软件受限的情况下，一旦开发出人类水平的人工智能，它可以在非常快的硬件上连续运行，廉价硬件的丰富将使人工智能研究不那么受限制。一旦软件知道如何使用硬件，大量的硬件就可以被释放出来，这被称为“计算过剩”。
    
===Criticisms危机===
 
===Criticisms危机===
第229行： 第257行：  
Some critics, like philosopher [[Hubert Dreyfus]], assert that computers or machines cannot achieve [[human intelligence]], while others, like physicist [[Stephen Hawking]], hold that the definition of intelligence is irrelevant if the net result is the same.<ref name="dreyfus"/>
 
Some critics, like philosopher [[Hubert Dreyfus]], assert that computers or machines cannot achieve [[human intelligence]], while others, like physicist [[Stephen Hawking]], hold that the definition of intelligence is irrelevant if the net result is the same.<ref name="dreyfus"/>
   −
一些批评家，如哲学家[[Hubert Dreyfus]]断言计算机或机器无法实现[[人类智能]]，而其他人，如物理学家[[Stephen Hawking]]，则认为如果最终结果相同，那么智力的定义就无关紧要。<ref name="dreyfus"/>
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一些批评者，如哲学家Hubert Dreyfus断言计算机或机器无法实现人类智能，而其他人，如物理学家史蒂芬·霍金，则认为如果最终结果是相同的，那么智力的定义其实无关紧要。
    
An early description of the idea was made in John Wood Campbell Jr.'s 1932 short story "The last evolution".
 
An early description of the idea was made in John Wood Campbell Jr.'s 1932 short story "The last evolution".
   −
早在1932年约翰·W·坎贝尔的短篇小说《最后的进化》中就对这个想法进行了描述。
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早在1932年，约翰·W·坎贝尔的短篇小说《最后的进化》中就对这个想法进行了描述。
    
Psychologist [[Steven Pinker]] stated in 2008:
 
Psychologist [[Steven Pinker]] stated in 2008:
   −
心理学家[[Steven Pinker]]在2008年指出：
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心理学家史蒂芬·平克在2008年指出：
    
{{quote|... There is not the slightest reason to believe in a coming singularity. The fact that you can visualize a future in your imagination is not evidence that it is likely or even possible. Look at domed cities, jet-pack commuting, underwater cities, mile-high buildings, and nuclear-powered automobiles—all staples of futuristic fantasies when I was a child that have never arrived. Sheer processing power is not a pixie dust that magically solves all your problems. ...<ref name="spectrum.ieee.org"/>}}
 
{{quote|... There is not the slightest reason to believe in a coming singularity. The fact that you can visualize a future in your imagination is not evidence that it is likely or even possible. Look at domed cities, jet-pack commuting, underwater cities, mile-high buildings, and nuclear-powered automobiles—all staples of futuristic fantasies when I was a child that have never arrived. Sheer processing power is not a pixie dust that magically solves all your problems. ...<ref name="spectrum.ieee.org"/>}}
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 +
没有一点理由相信奇点即将到来。你可以想象一个未来并不能证明它是可能出现的。看看穹顶城市、喷气式飞行器通勤、水下城市、一英里高的建筑和核动力汽车：这些都是我小时候未来主义幻想的主要内容，然而它们都没有成真。纯粹的计算能力不是能神奇地解决所有问题的仙尘。
    
[[University of California, Berkeley]], [[philosophy]] professor [[John Searle]] writes:
 
[[University of California, Berkeley]], [[philosophy]] professor [[John Searle]] writes:
   −
[[加州大学伯克利分校]，[[哲学]]教授[[John Searle]]写道：
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[[加州大学伯克利分校]，哲学教授约翰·塞尔写道：
    
{{blockquote|[Computers] have, literally ..., no [[intelligence]], no [[motivation]], no [[autonomy]], and no agency.  We design them to behave as if they had certain sorts of [[psychology]], but there is no psychological reality to the corresponding processes or behavior. ...  [T]he machinery has no beliefs, desires, [or] motivations.<ref>[[John R. Searle]], “What Your Computer Can’t Know”, ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', 9 October 2014, p. 54.</ref>}}
 
{{blockquote|[Computers] have, literally ..., no [[intelligence]], no [[motivation]], no [[autonomy]], and no agency.  We design them to behave as if they had certain sorts of [[psychology]], but there is no psychological reality to the corresponding processes or behavior. ...  [T]he machinery has no beliefs, desires, [or] motivations.<ref>[[John R. Searle]], “What Your Computer Can’t Know”, ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', 9 October 2014, p. 54.</ref>}}
   −
{{blockquote |[计算机]从字面上讲，没有[[智能]]、没有[[动机]]、没有[[自主]]和代理。我们设计他们的行为，好像他们有某种[[心理学]]，但没有心理现实的对应过程或行为。。。[T] 机械没有信仰、欲望或动机。<ref>[[John R. Searle]], “What Your Computer Can’t Know”, ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', 9 October 2014, p. 54.</ref>}}
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毫不夸张地说，计算机没有智能，没有动机，没有自主，也没有主体。我们设计他们，使他们的行为好像表示他们有某种心理，但其实没有对应这些过程或行为的心理现实……机器没有信仰、愿望或动机。
 +
 
       
[[Martin Ford (author)|Martin Ford]] in ''The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future''<ref name="thelightsinthetunnel"/> postulates a "technology paradox" in that before the singularity could occur most routine jobs in the economy would be automated, since this would require a level of technology inferior to that of the singularity. This would cause massive unemployment and plummeting consumer demand, which in turn would destroy the incentive to invest in the technologies that would be required to bring about the Singularity. Job displacement is increasingly no longer limited to work traditionally considered to be "routine."<ref name="nytimes"/>
 
[[Martin Ford (author)|Martin Ford]] in ''The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future''<ref name="thelightsinthetunnel"/> postulates a "technology paradox" in that before the singularity could occur most routine jobs in the economy would be automated, since this would require a level of technology inferior to that of the singularity. This would cause massive unemployment and plummeting consumer demand, which in turn would destroy the incentive to invest in the technologies that would be required to bring about the Singularity. Job displacement is increasingly no longer limited to work traditionally considered to be "routine."<ref name="nytimes"/>
   −
[[Martin Ford（作者）| Martin Ford]]在“隧道中的灯光：自动化、加速技术和未来经济”<ref name=“thelightsinthetunnel”/>提出了一个“技术悖论”，即在奇点出现之前，经济体中的大多数日常工作都将自动化，因为这需要的技术水平低于奇点。这将导致大规模的失业和消费者需求的骤降，这反过来又会破坏投资于实现奇点所需技术的动力。取代工作越来越不再局限于传统上被认为是“例行公事”的工作。<ref name="nytimes"/>
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Martin Ford在“<font color = "#ff8000">隧道中的灯光：自动化、加速技术和未来经济The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future</font>”中提出了一个“技术悖论”：在奇点出现之前，经济体中的大多数日常工作都将自动化，因为这所需的技术水平低于奇点。这将导致大规模的失业和消费者需求的骤降，这反过来又会破坏投资于实现奇点所需技术的动机。取代工作将不再局限于传统上被认为是“例行公事”的工作。
    
[[Theodore Modis]]<ref name="google13"/><ref name="Singularity Myth"/> and [[Jonathan Huebner]]<ref name="technological14"/> argue that the rate of technological innovation has not only ceased to rise, but is actually now declining. Evidence for this decline is that the rise in computer [[clock rate]]s is slowing, even while Moore's prediction of exponentially increasing circuit density continues to hold. This is due to excessive heat build-up from the chip, which cannot be dissipated quickly enough to prevent the chip from melting when operating at higher speeds. Advances in speed may be possible in the future by virtue of more power-efficient CPU designs and multi-cell processors.<ref name="cnet"/> While Kurzweil used Modis' resources, and Modis' work was around accelerating change, Modis distanced himself from Kurzweil's thesis of a "technological singularity", claiming that it lacks scientific rigor.<ref name="Singularity Myth"/>
 
[[Theodore Modis]]<ref name="google13"/><ref name="Singularity Myth"/> and [[Jonathan Huebner]]<ref name="technological14"/> argue that the rate of technological innovation has not only ceased to rise, but is actually now declining. Evidence for this decline is that the rise in computer [[clock rate]]s is slowing, even while Moore's prediction of exponentially increasing circuit density continues to hold. This is due to excessive heat build-up from the chip, which cannot be dissipated quickly enough to prevent the chip from melting when operating at higher speeds. Advances in speed may be possible in the future by virtue of more power-efficient CPU designs and multi-cell processors.<ref name="cnet"/> While Kurzweil used Modis' resources, and Modis' work was around accelerating change, Modis distanced himself from Kurzweil's thesis of a "technological singularity", claiming that it lacks scientific rigor.<ref name="Singularity Myth"/>
   −
[[Theodore Modis]]<ref name=“google13”/><ref name=“Singularity Myth”/>和[[Jonathan Huebner]]<ref name=“technology14”/>认为技术创新的速度不仅停止上升，而且现在实际上在下降。这种下降的证据是计算机[[时钟速率]]的增长正在放缓，尽管摩尔关于电路密度指数增长的预测仍然成立。这是由于芯片产生过多的热量，当以较高的速度运行时，这些热量不能迅速散去，以防止芯片熔化。在未来，由于更节能的CPU设计和多单元处理器，速度的提高可能成为可能。<ref name="cnet"/>虽然库兹韦尔利用了莫迪斯的资源，而莫迪斯的工作是围绕加速变革展开的，但莫迪斯却与库兹韦尔的“技术奇点”理论保持距离，声称该理论缺乏科学严谨性。<ref name="Singularity Myth"/>
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[[Theodore Modis]]和[[Jonathan Huebner]]认为技术创新的速度不仅停止上升，而且现在实际上正在下降。这种下降的证据是计算机时钟速率的增长正在放缓，尽管摩尔关于电路密度指数增长的预测仍然成立。这是由于芯片产生过多的热量，当它们以较高的速度运行时，这些热量不能足够快地散去，可能导致芯片熔化。在未来，随着更节能的CPU设计和多单元处理器的发明，速度的提高可能实现。虽然库兹韦尔利用了莫迪斯的资源，而莫迪斯的工作是围绕加速变革展开的，但莫迪斯却与库兹韦尔的“技术奇点”理论保持距离，声称该理论缺乏科学严谨性。
    
In a detailed empirical accounting, ''The Progress of Computing'', [[William Nordhaus]] argued that, prior to 1940, computers followed the much slower growth of a traditional industrial economy, thus rejecting extrapolations of Moore's law to 19th-century computers.<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1017/S0022050707000058|title = Two Centuries of Productivity Growth in Computing| journal=The Journal of Economic History| volume=67|pages = 128–159|year = 2007|last1 = Nordhaus|first1 = William D.| citeseerx=10.1.1.330.1871}}</ref>
 
In a detailed empirical accounting, ''The Progress of Computing'', [[William Nordhaus]] argued that, prior to 1940, computers followed the much slower growth of a traditional industrial economy, thus rejecting extrapolations of Moore's law to 19th-century computers.<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1017/S0022050707000058|title = Two Centuries of Productivity Growth in Computing| journal=The Journal of Economic History| volume=67|pages = 128–159|year = 2007|last1 = Nordhaus|first1 = William D.| citeseerx=10.1.1.330.1871}}</ref>
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在一份详细的实证会计“计算的进步”中，[[William Nordhaus]]认为，在1940年以前，计算机遵循传统工业经济增长缓慢的趋势，因此拒绝了摩尔定律对19世纪计算机的推断。<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1017/S0022050707000058|title = Two Centuries of Productivity Growth in Computing| journal=The Journal of Economic History| volume=67|pages = 128–159|year = 2007|last1 = Nordhaus|first1 = William D.| citeseerx=10.1.1.330.1871}}</ref>
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在一份详细的实证记录“<font color = "#ff8000">计算的进步The Progress of Computing</font>”中，[[William Nordhaus]]认为，在1940年以前，计算机遵循传统工业经济增长缓慢的趋势，因此拒绝了摩尔定律对19世纪计算机的推断。
    
In a 2007 paper, Schmidhuber stated that the frequency of subjectively "notable events" appears to be approaching a 21st-century singularity, but cautioned readers to take such plots of subjective events with a grain of salt: perhaps differences in memory of recent and distant events could create an illusion of accelerating change where none exists.<ref>Schmidhuber, Jürgen. "New millennium AI and the convergence of history." Challenges for computational intelligence. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. 15–35.</ref>
 
In a 2007 paper, Schmidhuber stated that the frequency of subjectively "notable events" appears to be approaching a 21st-century singularity, but cautioned readers to take such plots of subjective events with a grain of salt: perhaps differences in memory of recent and distant events could create an illusion of accelerating change where none exists.<ref>Schmidhuber, Jürgen. "New millennium AI and the convergence of history." Challenges for computational intelligence. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. 15–35.</ref>
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在2007年的一篇论文中，Schmidhuber指出主观上“显著事件”的频率似乎正在接近21世纪的奇点，但提醒读者，对这些主观事件的情节要持保留态度：也许对最近和遥远的事件记忆上的差异，可能会造成一种在根本不存在的情况下加速变化的错觉。<ref>Schmidhuber, Jürgen. "New millennium AI and the convergence of history." Challenges for computational intelligence. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. 15–35.</ref>
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在2007年的一篇论文中，Schmidhuber指出主观上“明显事件”的频率似乎正在接近21世纪的奇点，但他提醒读者，对这些主观事件的情节要持保留态度：也许对最近和遥远的事件记忆上的差异，可能会造成一种在根本不存在的情况下加速变化的错觉。
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Paul Allen argued the opposite of accelerating returns, the complexity brake; the more progress science makes towards understanding intelligence, the more difficult it becomes to make additional progress. A study of the number of patents shows that human creativity does not show accelerating returns, but in fact, as suggested by Joseph Tainter in his The Collapse of Complex Societies, a law of diminishing returns. The number of patents per thousand peaked in the period from 1850 to 1900, and has been declining since.[60] The growth of complexity eventually becomes self-limiting, and leads to a widespread "general systems collapse".
       
[[Paul Allen]] argued the opposite of accelerating returns, the complexity brake;<ref name="Allen"/> the more progress science makes towards understanding intelligence, the more difficult it becomes to make additional progress.  A study of the number of patents shows that human creativity does not show accelerating returns, but in fact, as suggested by [[Joseph Tainter]] in his ''The Collapse of Complex Societies'',<ref name="university"/> a law of [[diminishing returns]]. The number of patents per thousand peaked in the period from 1850 to 1900, and has been declining since.<ref name="technological14"/><!--[Previous comment: is this from 'Collapse of Complex Societies' or some other source? Perhaps this refers to Jonathan Huebner's patent analysis mentioned in the earlier paragraph? If so, would be better to integrate this part with that paragraph, since the earlier paragraph mentions that Huebner's analysis has been criticized whereas this paragraph just seems to present it as fact --> The growth of complexity eventually becomes self-limiting, and leads to a widespread "general systems collapse".
 
[[Paul Allen]] argued the opposite of accelerating returns, the complexity brake;<ref name="Allen"/> the more progress science makes towards understanding intelligence, the more difficult it becomes to make additional progress.  A study of the number of patents shows that human creativity does not show accelerating returns, but in fact, as suggested by [[Joseph Tainter]] in his ''The Collapse of Complex Societies'',<ref name="university"/> a law of [[diminishing returns]]. The number of patents per thousand peaked in the period from 1850 to 1900, and has been declining since.<ref name="technological14"/><!--[Previous comment: is this from 'Collapse of Complex Societies' or some other source? Perhaps this refers to Jonathan Huebner's patent analysis mentioned in the earlier paragraph? If so, would be better to integrate this part with that paragraph, since the earlier paragraph mentions that Huebner's analysis has been criticized whereas this paragraph just seems to present it as fact --> The growth of complexity eventually becomes self-limiting, and leads to a widespread "general systems collapse".
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[[Paul Allen]]认为，与加速回报相反的是复杂性制动器；<ref name=“Allen”/>科学在理解智力方面取得的进展越多，取得额外进展就越困难。一项对专利数量的研究表明，人类的创造力并没有表现出加速的回报，但事实上，正如[[Joseph Tainter]]在他的《复杂社会的崩溃》中所指出的那样，<ref name="university"/>[[收益递减]定律。每千件专利的数量在1850年至1900年期间达到顶峰，此后一直在下降。<ref name="technological14"/><!--[之前的评论：这是“复杂社会的崩溃”还是其他原因？也许这是指前一段提到的jonathanhuebner的专利分析？如果是这样的话，最好将这一部分与那一段结合起来，因为前一段提到休伯纳的分析受到了批评，而这一段似乎只是把它当作事实——复杂性的增长最终变得自我限制，并导致广泛的“一般系统崩溃”。-->
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Paul Allen认为，与加速回报相反的是复杂性制动器；科学在理解智力方面取得的进展越多，就越难取得更多的进展。一项对专利数量的研究表明，人类的创造力并没有表现出加速的回报，但事实上，正如Joseph Tainter 在他的《复杂社会的崩溃》中所指出的，有一个<font color = "#ff8000">收益递减定律a law of diminishing returns</font>的限制。每千件专利的数量在1850年至1900年期间达到顶峰，此后一直在下降。复杂性的增长最终会自我限制，并导致广泛的“一般系统崩溃”。
    
[[Jaron Lanier]] refutes the idea that the Singularity is inevitable. He states: "I do not think the technology is creating itself. It's not an autonomous process."<ref name="lanier">{{cite web |author=Jaron Lanier |title=Who Owns the Future? |work=New York: Simon & Schuster |date=2013 |url=http://www.epubbud.com/read.php?g=JCB8D9LA&tocp=59}}</ref> He goes on to assert: "The reason to believe in human agency over technological determinism is that you can then have an economy where people earn their own way and invent their own lives. If you structure a society on ''not'' emphasizing individual human agency, it's the same thing operationally as denying people clout, dignity, and self-determination ... to embrace [the idea of the Singularity] would be a celebration of bad data and bad politics."<ref name="lanier" />
 
[[Jaron Lanier]] refutes the idea that the Singularity is inevitable. He states: "I do not think the technology is creating itself. It's not an autonomous process."<ref name="lanier">{{cite web |author=Jaron Lanier |title=Who Owns the Future? |work=New York: Simon & Schuster |date=2013 |url=http://www.epubbud.com/read.php?g=JCB8D9LA&tocp=59}}</ref> He goes on to assert: "The reason to believe in human agency over technological determinism is that you can then have an economy where people earn their own way and invent their own lives. If you structure a society on ''not'' emphasizing individual human agency, it's the same thing operationally as denying people clout, dignity, and self-determination ... to embrace [the idea of the Singularity] would be a celebration of bad data and bad politics."<ref name="lanier" />
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[[Jaron Lanier]]驳斥了奇点不可避免的观点。他说：“我不认为这项技术是在自我创造。这不是一个自主的过程。”<ref name="lanier">{{cite web |author=Jaron Lanier |title=Who Owns the Future? |work=New York: Simon & Schuster |date=2013 |url=http://www.epubbud.com/read.php?g=JCB8D9LA&tocp=59}}</ref> 他接着断言：“相信人的能动性而不是技术决定论的原因是，这样你就可以有一个经济体，人们可以自己挣钱，创造自己的生活。如果你在“不”的基础上构建一个强调个体人的能动性的社会，在操作上与否认人们的影响力、尊严和自决权是一样的。。。接受（奇点的想法）将是对糟糕数据和糟糕政治的庆祝。”<ref name="lanier" />
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Jaron Lanier refutes the idea that the Singularity is inevitable. He states: "I do not think the technology is creating itself. It's not an autonomous process." He goes on to assert: "The reason to believe in human agency over technological determinism is that you can then have an economy where people earn their own way and invent their own lives. If you structure a society on not emphasizing individual human agency, it's the same thing operationally as denying people clout, dignity, and self-determination ... to embrace [the idea of the Singularity] would be a celebration of bad data and bad
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politics."
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[[Jaron Lanier]]驳斥了奇点不可避免的观点。他说：“我不认为这项技术是在创造自我。这不是一个自主的过程。”他接着断言：“相信人的能动性而不是技术决定论的原因是，这样你就可以有一个经济体，人们可以自己挣钱，创造自己的生活。如果你构建一个不强调个体能动性的社会，在操作上这个社会同样会否认人们的影响力、尊严和自决权……接受奇点的想法将是对糟糕的数据和糟糕的政治的庆祝。”
    
[[Economics|Economist]] [[Robert J. Gordon]], in ''The Rise and Fall of American Growth:  The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War'' (2016), points out that measured economic growth has slowed around 1970 and slowed even further since the [[financial crisis of 2007–2008]], and argues that the economic data show no trace of a coming Singularity as imagined by mathematician [[I.J. Good]].<ref>[[William D. Nordhaus]], "Why Growth Will Fall" (a review of [[Robert J. Gordon]], ''The Rise and Fall of American Growth:  The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War'', Princeton University Press, 2016, {{ISBN|978-0691147727}}, 762 pp., $39.95), ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', vol. LXIII, no. 13 (August 18, 2016), p. 68.</ref>
 
[[Economics|Economist]] [[Robert J. Gordon]], in ''The Rise and Fall of American Growth:  The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War'' (2016), points out that measured economic growth has slowed around 1970 and slowed even further since the [[financial crisis of 2007–2008]], and argues that the economic data show no trace of a coming Singularity as imagined by mathematician [[I.J. Good]].<ref>[[William D. Nordhaus]], "Why Growth Will Fall" (a review of [[Robert J. Gordon]], ''The Rise and Fall of American Growth:  The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War'', Princeton University Press, 2016, {{ISBN|978-0691147727}}, 762 pp., $39.95), ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', vol. LXIII, no. 13 (August 18, 2016), p. 68.</ref>
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[[Economics | Economics]][[Robert J.Gordon]]在《美国经济增长的兴衰：内战以来的美国生活水平》（2016）中指出，衡量的经济增长在1970年左右放缓，自[[2007-2008年金融危机]以来甚至进一步放缓，并认为，经济数据没有显示出数学家[[I.J.Good]]所想象的未来奇点的踪迹。<ref>[[William D. Nordhaus]], "Why Growth Will Fall" (a review of [[Robert J. Gordon]], ''The Rise and Fall of American Growth:  The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War'', Princeton University Press, 2016, {{ISBN|978-0691147727}}, 762 pp., $39.95), ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', vol. LXIII, no. 13 (August 18, 2016), p. 68.</ref>
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经济学家Robert J.Gordon在<font color = "#ff8000">《美国经济增长的兴衰：内战以来的美国生活水平The Rise and Fall of American Growth:  The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War</font>》（2016）中指出，据测量，经济增长在1970年左右放缓，自2007-2008年金融危机以来甚至进一步放缓，并认为，经济数据没有显示出数学家I.J.Good所想象的未来奇点的踪迹。
    
In addition to general criticisms of the singularity concept, several critics have raised issues with Kurzweil's iconic chart. One line of criticism is that a [[Log-log plot|log-log]] chart of this nature is inherently biased toward a straight-line result. Others identify selection bias in the points that Kurzweil chooses to use. For example, biologist [[PZ Myers]] points out that many of the early evolutionary "events" were picked arbitrarily.<ref name="PZMyers"/> Kurzweil has rebutted this by charting evolutionary events from 15 neutral sources, and showing that they fit a straight line on [[:File:ParadigmShiftsFrr15Events.svg|a log-log chart]]. ''[[The Economist]]'' mocked the concept with a graph extrapolating that the number of blades on a razor, which has increased over the years from one to as many as five, will increase ever-faster to infinity.<ref name="moreblades"/>
 
In addition to general criticisms of the singularity concept, several critics have raised issues with Kurzweil's iconic chart. One line of criticism is that a [[Log-log plot|log-log]] chart of this nature is inherently biased toward a straight-line result. Others identify selection bias in the points that Kurzweil chooses to use. For example, biologist [[PZ Myers]] points out that many of the early evolutionary "events" were picked arbitrarily.<ref name="PZMyers"/> Kurzweil has rebutted this by charting evolutionary events from 15 neutral sources, and showing that they fit a straight line on [[:File:ParadigmShiftsFrr15Events.svg|a log-log chart]]. ''[[The Economist]]'' mocked the concept with a graph extrapolating that the number of blades on a razor, which has increased over the years from one to as many as five, will increase ever-faster to infinity.<ref name="moreblades"/>
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除了对奇点概念的一般性批评外，一些批评家还对库兹韦尔的标志性图表提出了质疑。一种批评是，这种性质的[[loglog plot | loglog]]图表固有地偏向于直线结果。其他人在库兹韦尔选择使用的点上识别选择偏差。例如，生物学家[[PZ Myers]]指出，许多早期的进化“事件”都是随意挑选的。<ref name="PZMyers"/>Kurzweil反驳了这一点，他绘制了15个中立来源的进化事件图，并证明它们符合一条直线[[：文件：ParadigmShiftsFrr15Events.svg|日志图表]].''[[经济学家]]'用一张图表来嘲讽这个概念：一把剃须刀上的刀片数在过去几年里从一个增加到多达五个，将以更快的速度增长到无穷大。<ref name="moreblades"/>
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除了对奇点概念的一般性批评外，一些批评者还对库兹韦尔的标志性图表提出了质疑。一种批评是，一个对数的图表天然地偏向于直线的结果。其他人批评库兹韦尔在数据点的使用上的选择偏差。例如，生物学家P. Z. Myers指出，许多早期的进化事件都是随意挑选的。库兹韦尔反驳了这一点，他绘制了15个中立来源的进化事件图，并表明它们都符合一条直线.《经济学人》用一张图表来嘲讽这个概念：一把剃须刀上的刀片数在过去几年里从一个增加到多达五个，并且它将以更快的速度增长到无穷大。
    
==Potential impacts潜在影响==
 
==Potential impacts潜在影响==
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Dramatic changes in the rate of economic growth have occurred in the past because of some technological advancement. Based on population growth, the economy doubled every 250,000 years from the [[Paleolithic]] era until the [[Neolithic Revolution]]. The new agricultural economy doubled every 900 years, a remarkable increase. In the current era, beginning with the Industrial Revolution, the world's economic output doubles every fifteen years, sixty times faster than during the agricultural era. If the rise of superhuman intelligence causes a similar revolution, argues Robin Hanson, one would expect the economy to double at least quarterly and possibly on a weekly basis.<ref name="Hanson">{{Citation |url=http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/robotics/robotics-software/economics-of-the-singularity |title=Economics Of The Singularity |author=Robin Hanson |work=IEEE Spectrum Special Report: The Singularity }} & [http://hanson.gmu.edu/longgrow.pdf Long-Term Growth As A Sequence of Exponential Modes]</ref>
 
Dramatic changes in the rate of economic growth have occurred in the past because of some technological advancement. Based on population growth, the economy doubled every 250,000 years from the [[Paleolithic]] era until the [[Neolithic Revolution]]. The new agricultural economy doubled every 900 years, a remarkable increase. In the current era, beginning with the Industrial Revolution, the world's economic output doubles every fifteen years, sixty times faster than during the agricultural era. If the rise of superhuman intelligence causes a similar revolution, argues Robin Hanson, one would expect the economy to double at least quarterly and possibly on a weekly basis.<ref name="Hanson">{{Citation |url=http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/robotics/robotics-software/economics-of-the-singularity |title=Economics Of The Singularity |author=Robin Hanson |work=IEEE Spectrum Special Report: The Singularity }} & [http://hanson.gmu.edu/longgrow.pdf Long-Term Growth As A Sequence of Exponential Modes]</ref>
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过去由于一些技术进步，经济增长率发生了巨大变化。以人口增长为基础，从[[旧石器时代]]到[[新石器时代革命]]，经济每25万年翻一番。新农业经济每900年翻一番，增长显著。在当今时代，从工业革命开始，世界经济产出每15年翻一番，比农业时代快60倍。罗宾·汉森认为，如果超人智慧的兴起引发了类似的革命，人们会预期经济至少每季度翻一番，甚至可能每周翻一番。<ref name="Hanson">{{Citation |url=http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/robotics/robotics-software/economics-of-the-singularity |title=Economics Of The Singularity |author=Robin Hanson |work=IEEE Spectrum Special Report: The Singularity }} & [http://hanson.gmu.edu/longgrow.pdf Long-Term Growth As A Sequence of Exponential Modes]</ref>
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过去由于一些技术进步，经济增长率发生了巨大变化。以人口增长为基础，从[[旧石器时代]]到[[新石器时代]]，经济每25万年翻一番。新农业经济每900年翻一番，增长显著。在当今时代，从工业革命开始，世界经济产出每15年翻一番，比农业时代快60倍。罗宾·汉森Robin Hanson认为，如果超人智能的兴起引发了类似的革命，人们会预期经济至少每季度翻一番，甚至可能每周翻一番。
    
===Uncertainty and risk不确定性和风险===
 
===Uncertainty and risk不确定性和风险===
    
{{Further|Existential risk from artificial general intelligence}}
 
{{Further|Existential risk from artificial general intelligence}}
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{{进一步{来自人工通用智能的存在风险}}
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{{进一步|来自人工通用智能的存在风险}}
    
The term "technological singularity" reflects the idea that such change may happen suddenly, and that it is difficult to predict how the resulting new world would operate.<ref name="positive-and-negative">{{Citation|last=Yudkowsky |first=Eliezer |title=Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk |journal=Global Catastrophic Risks |editor-last=Bostrom |editor-first=Nick |editor2-last=Cirkovic |editor2-first=Milan |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2008 |url=http://singinst.org/AIRisk.pdf |bibcode=2008gcr..book..303Y |isbn=978-0-19-857050-9 |page=303 |url-status=dead |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20080807132337/http://www.singinst.org/AIRisk.pdf |archivedate=2008-08-07 }}</ref><ref name="theuncertainfuture"/> It is unclear whether an intelligence explosion resulting in a singularity would be beneficial or harmful, or even an [[Existential risk|existential threat]].<ref name="catastrophic"/><ref name="nickbostrom"/> Because AI is a major factor in singularity risk, a number of organizations pursue a technical theory of aligning AI goal-systems with human values, including the [[Future of Humanity Institute]], the [[Machine Intelligence Research Institute]],<ref name="positive-and-negative"/> the [[Center for Human-Compatible Artificial Intelligence]], and the [[Future of Life Institute]].
 
The term "technological singularity" reflects the idea that such change may happen suddenly, and that it is difficult to predict how the resulting new world would operate.<ref name="positive-and-negative">{{Citation|last=Yudkowsky |first=Eliezer |title=Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk |journal=Global Catastrophic Risks |editor-last=Bostrom |editor-first=Nick |editor2-last=Cirkovic |editor2-first=Milan |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2008 |url=http://singinst.org/AIRisk.pdf |bibcode=2008gcr..book..303Y |isbn=978-0-19-857050-9 |page=303 |url-status=dead |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20080807132337/http://www.singinst.org/AIRisk.pdf |archivedate=2008-08-07 }}</ref><ref name="theuncertainfuture"/> It is unclear whether an intelligence explosion resulting in a singularity would be beneficial or harmful, or even an [[Existential risk|existential threat]].<ref name="catastrophic"/><ref name="nickbostrom"/> Because AI is a major factor in singularity risk, a number of organizations pursue a technical theory of aligning AI goal-systems with human values, including the [[Future of Humanity Institute]], the [[Machine Intelligence Research Institute]],<ref name="positive-and-negative"/> the [[Center for Human-Compatible Artificial Intelligence]], and the [[Future of Life Institute]].
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“技术奇点”一词反映出这样的变化可能突然发生，而且很难预测由此产生的新世界将如何运作。<ref name="positive-and-negative">{{Citation|last=Yudkowsky |first=Eliezer |title=Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk |journal=Global Catastrophic Risks |editor-last=Bostrom |editor-first=Nick |editor2-last=Cirkovic |editor2-first=Milan |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2008 |url=http://singinst.org/AIRisk.pdf |bibcode=2008gcr..book..303Y |isbn=978-0-19-857050-9 |page=303 |url-status=dead |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20080807132337/http://www.singinst.org/AIRisk.pdf |archivedate=2008-08-07 }}</ref><ref name="theuncertainfuture"/> 目前尚不清楚导致奇点的智能爆炸是有益还是有害，甚至是[[存在风险|存在威胁]]。<ref name="catastrophic"/><ref name="nickbostrom"/>由于人工智能是奇点风险的一个主要因素，许多组织追求将人工智能目标系统与人类价值观相协调的技术理论，包括[[人类未来研究所]，[[机器智能研究所]，<ref name="positive-and-negative"/> [[人类兼容人工智能中心]]和[[未来生命研究所]]。
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The term "technological singularity" reflects the idea that such change may happen suddenly, and that it is difficult to predict how the resulting new world would operate. It is unclear whether an intelligence explosion resulting in a singularity would be beneficial or harmful, or even an existential threat. Because AI is a major factor in singularity risk, a number of organizations pursue a technical theory of aligning AI goal-systems with human values, including the Future of Humanity Institute, the Machine Intelligence Research Institute, the Center for Human-Compatible Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of Life Institute
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“技术奇点”一词反映出这样的变化可能突然发生，而且很难预测由此产生的新世界将如何运作。目前尚不清楚导致奇点的智能爆炸是有益还是有害，甚至是否具有存在威胁。由于人工智能是奇点风险的一个主要因素，许多组织追求一种将人工智能的目标系统与人类价值观相协调的技术理论，这些组织包括<font color = "#ff8000">人类未来研究所Future of Humanity Institute</font>，<font color = "#ff8000">机器智能研究所the Machine Intelligence Research Institute</font>， <font color = "#ff8000">人类兼容人工智能中心the Center for Human-Compatible Artificial Intelligence</font>和<font color = "#ff8000">未来生命研究所the Future of Life Institute</font>。
    
Physicist [[Stephen Hawking]] said in 2014 that "Success in creating AI would be the biggest event in human history. Unfortunately, it might also be the last, unless we learn how to avoid the risks."<ref name=hawking_2014/> Hawking believed that in the coming decades, AI could offer "incalculable benefits and risks" such as "technology outsmarting financial markets, out-inventing human researchers, out-manipulating human leaders, and developing weapons we cannot even understand."<ref name=hawking_2014/> Hawking suggested that artificial intelligence should be taken more seriously and that more should be done to prepare for the singularity:<ref name=hawking_2014>{{cite web |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/stephen-hawking-transcendence-looks-at-the-implications-of-artificial-intelligence--but-are-we-taking-ai-seriously-enough-9313474.html |title=Stephen Hawking: 'Transcendence looks at the implications of artificial intelligence - but are we taking AI seriously enough?'  |work=[[The Independent]] |author=Stephen Hawking |date=1 May 2014 |accessdate=May 5, 2014|author-link=Stephen Hawking }}</ref>
 
Physicist [[Stephen Hawking]] said in 2014 that "Success in creating AI would be the biggest event in human history. Unfortunately, it might also be the last, unless we learn how to avoid the risks."<ref name=hawking_2014/> Hawking believed that in the coming decades, AI could offer "incalculable benefits and risks" such as "technology outsmarting financial markets, out-inventing human researchers, out-manipulating human leaders, and developing weapons we cannot even understand."<ref name=hawking_2014/> Hawking suggested that artificial intelligence should be taken more seriously and that more should be done to prepare for the singularity:<ref name=hawking_2014>{{cite web |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/stephen-hawking-transcendence-looks-at-the-implications-of-artificial-intelligence--but-are-we-taking-ai-seriously-enough-9313474.html |title=Stephen Hawking: 'Transcendence looks at the implications of artificial intelligence - but are we taking AI seriously enough?'  |work=[[The Independent]] |author=Stephen Hawking |date=1 May 2014 |accessdate=May 5, 2014|author-link=Stephen Hawking }}</ref>
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Physicist Stephen Hawking said in 2014 that "Success in creating AI would be the biggest event in human history. Unfortunately, it might also be the last, unless we learn how to avoid the risks." Hawking believed that in the coming decades, AI could offer "incalculable benefits and risks" such as "technology outsmarting financial markets, out-inventing human researchers, out-manipulating human leaders, and developing weapons we cannot even understand." Hawking suggested that artificial intelligence should be taken more seriously and that more should be done to prepare for the singularity:
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物理学家史蒂芬·霍金在2014年表示，“成功创造人工智能将是人类历史上最大的事件。不幸的是，这也可能是最后一次，除非我们学会如何规避风险。” 霍金认为，在未来几十年里，人工智能可能会带来“无法估量的利益和风险”，例如“技术超越金融市场，超越人类研究人员，超越人类领袖，开发我们甚至无法理解的武器”。
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霍金建议，人们应该更认真地对待人工智能，并应该做更多的工作来为奇点做准备：
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{{quote|So, facing possible futures of incalculable benefits and risks, the experts are surely doing everything possible to ensure the best outcome, right? Wrong. If a superior alien civilisation sent us a message saying, "We'll arrive in a few decades," would we just reply, "OK, call us when you get here – we'll leave the lights on"? Probably not – but this is more or less what is happening with AI.}}
 
{{quote|So, facing possible futures of incalculable benefits and risks, the experts are surely doing everything possible to ensure the best outcome, right? Wrong. If a superior alien civilisation sent us a message saying, "We'll arrive in a few decades," would we just reply, "OK, call us when you get here – we'll leave the lights on"? Probably not – but this is more or less what is happening with AI.}}
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物理学家[[史蒂芬霍金]]在2014年表示，“成功创造人工智能将是人类历史上最大的事件。不幸的是，这也可能是最后一次，除非我们学会如何规避风险。“霍金认为，在未来几十年里，人工智能可能会带来“无法估量的利益和风险”，例如“技术超越金融市场，超越人类研究人员，超越操纵人类领袖，开发实现我们甚至无法明白的武器”。”<ref name=hawking_2014/>霍金建议，应该更认真地对待人工智能，应该做更多的工作来为奇点做准备：<ref name=hawking_2014>{{cite web |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/stephen-hawking-transcendence-looks-at-the-implications-of-artificial-intelligence--but-are-we-taking-ai-seriously-enough-9313474.html |title=Stephen Hawking: 'Transcendence looks at the implications of artificial intelligence - but are we taking AI seriously enough?'  |work=[[The Independent]] |author=Stephen Hawking |date=1 May 2014 |accessdate=May 5, 2014|author-link=Stephen Hawking }}</ref>{{所以，面对可能出现的无法估量的利益和风险的未来，专家们肯定会尽一切可能确保最好的结果，对吧？错了。如果一个优越的外星文明给我们发了一条信息说，“我们几十年后就会到达”，我们会不会只回答，“好吧，你到了这里就打电话给我们——我们会关灯的”？可能不是——但这或多或少就是人工智能所发生的事情。}}
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So, facing possible futures of incalculable benefits and risks, the experts are surely doing everything possible to ensure the best outcome, right? Wrong. If a superior alien civilisation sent us a message saying, "We'll arrive in a few decades," would we just reply, "OK, call us when you get here – we'll leave the lights on"? Probably not – but this is more or less what is happening with AI.
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所以，面对未来可能出现的无法估量的利益和风险，专家们肯定会尽一切可能确保最好的结果，对吗？错了。如果一个优越的外星文明给我们发了一条信息说，“我们几十年后就会到达”，我们会不会只回答，“好吧，你到了这里就打电话给我们——我们会关灯的”？可能不是——但这或多或少就是人工智能所发生的事情。
    
{{Harvtxt|Berglas|2008}} claims that there is no direct evolutionary motivation for an AI to be friendly to humans. Evolution has no inherent tendency to produce outcomes valued by humans, and there is little reason to expect an arbitrary optimisation process to promote an outcome desired by mankind, rather than inadvertently leading to an AI behaving in a way not intended by its creators.<ref name="nickbostrom8">Nick Bostrom, [http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/ai.html "Ethical Issues in Advanced Artificial Intelligence"], in ''Cognitive, Emotive and Ethical Aspects of Decision Making in Humans and in Artificial Intelligence'', Vol. 2, ed. I. Smit et al., Int. Institute of Advanced Studies in Systems Research and Cybernetics, 2003, pp. 12–17</ref><ref name="singinst">[[Eliezer Yudkowsky]]: [http://singinst.org/upload/artificial-intelligence-risk.pdf Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120611190606/http://singinst.org/upload/artificial-intelligence-risk.pdf |date=2012-06-11 }}. Draft for a publication in ''Global Catastrophic Risk'' from August 31, 2006, retrieved July 18, 2011 (PDF file)</ref><ref name="singinst9">[http://www.singinst.org/blog/2007/06/11/the-stamp-collecting-device/ The Stamp Collecting Device, Nick Hay]</ref> [[Anders Sandberg]] has also elaborated on this scenario, addressing various common counter-arguments.<ref name="aleph">[http://www.aleph.se/andart/archives/2011/02/why_we_should_fear_the_paperclipper.html 'Why we should fear the Paperclipper'], 2011-02-14 entry of Sandberg's blog 'Andart'</ref> AI researcher [[Hugo de Garis]] suggests that artificial intelligences may simply eliminate the human race [[instrumental convergence|for access to scarce resources]],<ref name="selfawaresystems.com" /><ref name="selfawaresystems10">[http://selfawaresystems.com/2007/11/30/paper-on-the-basic-ai-drives/ Omohundro, Stephen M., "The Basic AI Drives." Artificial General Intelligence, 2008 proceedings of the First AGI Conference, eds. Pei Wang, Ben Goertzel, and Stan Franklin. Vol. 171. Amsterdam: IOS, 2008.]</ref> and humans would be powerless to stop them.<ref name="forbes">de Garis, Hugo. [https://www.forbes.com/2009/06/18/cosmist-terran-cyborgist-opinions-contributors-artificial-intelligence-09-hugo-de-garis.html "The Coming Artilect War"], Forbes.com, 22 June 2009.</ref> Alternatively, AIs developed under evolutionary pressure to promote their own survival could outcompete humanity.<ref name="nickbostrom7" />
 
{{Harvtxt|Berglas|2008}} claims that there is no direct evolutionary motivation for an AI to be friendly to humans. Evolution has no inherent tendency to produce outcomes valued by humans, and there is little reason to expect an arbitrary optimisation process to promote an outcome desired by mankind, rather than inadvertently leading to an AI behaving in a way not intended by its creators.<ref name="nickbostrom8">Nick Bostrom, [http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/ai.html "Ethical Issues in Advanced Artificial Intelligence"], in ''Cognitive, Emotive and Ethical Aspects of Decision Making in Humans and in Artificial Intelligence'', Vol. 2, ed. I. Smit et al., Int. Institute of Advanced Studies in Systems Research and Cybernetics, 2003, pp. 12–17</ref><ref name="singinst">[[Eliezer Yudkowsky]]: [http://singinst.org/upload/artificial-intelligence-risk.pdf Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120611190606/http://singinst.org/upload/artificial-intelligence-risk.pdf |date=2012-06-11 }}. Draft for a publication in ''Global Catastrophic Risk'' from August 31, 2006, retrieved July 18, 2011 (PDF file)</ref><ref name="singinst9">[http://www.singinst.org/blog/2007/06/11/the-stamp-collecting-device/ The Stamp Collecting Device, Nick Hay]</ref> [[Anders Sandberg]] has also elaborated on this scenario, addressing various common counter-arguments.<ref name="aleph">[http://www.aleph.se/andart/archives/2011/02/why_we_should_fear_the_paperclipper.html 'Why we should fear the Paperclipper'], 2011-02-14 entry of Sandberg's blog 'Andart'</ref> AI researcher [[Hugo de Garis]] suggests that artificial intelligences may simply eliminate the human race [[instrumental convergence|for access to scarce resources]],<ref name="selfawaresystems.com" /><ref name="selfawaresystems10">[http://selfawaresystems.com/2007/11/30/paper-on-the-basic-ai-drives/ Omohundro, Stephen M., "The Basic AI Drives." Artificial General Intelligence, 2008 proceedings of the First AGI Conference, eds. Pei Wang, Ben Goertzel, and Stan Franklin. Vol. 171. Amsterdam: IOS, 2008.]</ref> and humans would be powerless to stop them.<ref name="forbes">de Garis, Hugo. [https://www.forbes.com/2009/06/18/cosmist-terran-cyborgist-opinions-contributors-artificial-intelligence-09-hugo-de-garis.html "The Coming Artilect War"], Forbes.com, 22 June 2009.</ref> Alternatively, AIs developed under evolutionary pressure to promote their own survival could outcompete humanity.<ref name="nickbostrom7" />
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{{Harvtxt|Berglas|2008}}声称没有直接的进化动机促使人工智能对人类友好。进化并不倾向于产生人类所重视的结果，也没有理由期望一个任意的优化过程会促进人类所期望的结果，而不是无意中导致人工智能以一种不是其创造者意图的方式行动。<ref name="nickbostrom8">Nick Bostrom, [http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/ai.html "Ethical Issues in Advanced Artificial Intelligence"], in ''Cognitive, Emotive and Ethical Aspects of Decision Making in Humans and in Artificial Intelligence'', Vol. 2, ed. I. Smit et al., Int. Institute of Advanced Studies in Systems Research and Cybernetics, 2003, pp. 12–17</ref><ref name="singinst">[[Eliezer Yudkowsky]]: [http://singinst.org/upload/artificial-intelligence-risk.pdf Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120611190606/http://singinst.org/upload/artificial-intelligence-risk.pdf |date=2012-06-11 }}2006年8月31日“全球灾难性风险”出版物草稿，2011年7月18日检索（PDF文件）</ref><ref name="singinst9">[http://www.singinst.org/blog/2007/06/11/the-stamp-collecting-device/ The Stamp Collecting Device, Nick Hay]</ref>[[Anders Sandberg]]也详细阐述了这种情况，讨论了各种常见的反驳意见。<ref name="aleph">[http://www.aleph.se/andart/archives/2011/02/why_we_should_fear_the_paperclipper.html 'Why we should fear the Paperclipper'], 2011-02-14 entry of Sandberg's blog 'Andart'</ref>人工智能研究人员[[Hugo de Garis]]认为，人工智能可能会简单地消灭人类[[工具性融合|获取稀缺资源]]，<ref name="selfawaresystems.com" /><ref name="selfawaresystems10">[http://selfawaresystems.com/2007/11/30/paper-on-the-basic-ai-drives/ Omohundro, Stephen M., "The Basic AI Drives." Artificial General Intelligence, 2008 proceedings of the First AGI Conference, eds. Pei Wang, Ben Goertzel, and Stan Franklin. Vol. 171. Amsterdam: IOS, 2008.]</ref>人类将无力阻止它们。<ref name="forbes">de Garis, Hugo. [https://www.forbes.com/2009/06/18/cosmist-terran-cyborgist-opinions-contributors-artificial-intelligence-09-hugo-de-garis.html "The Coming Artilect War"], Forbes.com, 22 June 2009.</ref>另一方面，人工智能是在进化的压力下发展起来的，以促进自身的生存，这一点可以超越人类。<ref name="nickbostrom7" />
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Berglas (2008) claims that there is no direct evolutionary motivation for an AI to be friendly to  humans. Evolution has no inherent tendency to produce outcomes valued by humans, and there is little reason to expect an arbitrary optimisation process to promote an outcome desired by  humankind, rather than inadvertently leading to an AI behaving in a way not intended by its  creators.[76][77][78] Anders Sandberg has also elaborated on this scenario, addressing various  common counter-arguments.[79] AI researcher Hugo de Garis suggests that artificial intelligences  may simply eliminate the human race for access to scarce resources,[48][80] and humans would be  powerless to stop them.[81] Alternatively, AIs developed under evolutionary pressure to promote their  own survival could outcompete humanity.
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{{Harvtxt|Berglas|2008}}声称没有直接的进化动机促使人工智能对人类友好。进化并不倾向于产生人类所重视的结果，也没有理由期望一个任意的优化过程会促进人类所期望的结果，或者期望人工智能不经意地以一种不是其创造者意图的方式行动。Anders Sandberg也详细阐述了这种情况，讨论了各种常见的反驳意见。人工智能研究员Hugo de Garis认为，人工智能可能会直接消灭人类以获取稀缺资源，并且人类将无力阻止它们。或者，在进化压力下发展起来的人工智能，为了促进自身的生存可能打败人类。
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{{Harvtxt|Bostrom|2002}} discusses human extin{{blockquote|[Computers] have, literally ..., no [[intelligence]], no [[motivation]], no [[autonomy]], and no agency.  We design them to behave as if they had certain sorts of [[psychology]], but there is no psychological reality to the corresponding processes or behavior. ...  [T]he machinery has no beliefs, desires, [or] motivations.<ref>[[John R. Searle]], “What Your Computer Can’t Know”, ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', 9 October 2014, p. 54.</ref>}}
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Bostrom (2002) discusses human extinction scenarios, and lists superintelligence as a possible cause:
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{{blockquote |[计算机]从字面上讲，没有[[智能]]、没有[[动机]]、没有[[自主]]和代理。我们设计他们的行为，好像他们有某种[[心理学]]，但没有心理现实的对应过程或行为。。。[T] 机械没有信仰、欲望或动机。<ref>[[John R. Searle]], “What Your Computer Can’t Know”, ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', 9 October 2014, p. 54.</ref>}}tion scenarios, and lists superintelligence as a possible cause:
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Bostrom(2002)讨论了人类灭绝的场景，并列举超级智能作为一个可能的原因:
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{Harvtxt|Bostrom|2002}讨论了人类灭绝的情景，并将超级智能列为可能的原因：
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{{quote|When we create the first superintelligent entity, we might make a mistake and give it goals that lead it to annihilate humankind, assuming its enormous intellectual advantage gives it the power to do so. For example, we could mistakenly elevate a subgoal to the status of a supergoal. We tell it to solve a mathematical problem, and it complies by turning all the matter in the solar system into a giant calculating device, in the process killing the person who asked the question.}}
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{{quote|When we create the first superintelligent entity, we might make a mistake and give it goals that lead it to annihilate humankind, assuming its enormous intellectual advantage gives it the power to do so. For example, we could mistakenly elevate a subgoal to the status of a supergoal. We tell it to solve a mathematical problem, and it complies by turning all the matter in the solar system into a giant calculating device, in the process killing the person who asked the question.}}
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When we create the first superintelligent entity, we might make a mistake and give it goals that lead it to annihilate humankind, assuming its enormous intellectual advantage gives it the power to do so. For example, we could mistakenly elevate a subgoal to the status of a supergoal. We tell it to solve a mathematical problem, and it complies by turning all the matter in the solar system into a giant calculating device, in the process killing the person who asked the question.  
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{{引用}当我们创建第一个超级智能实体时，我们可能会犯一个错误，给它目标，导致它毁灭人类，假设它巨大的智力优势赋予它这样做的力量。例如，我们可能会错误地将子目标提升为超级目标。我们告诉它去解决一个数学问题，然后它将太阳系中的所有物质变成一个巨大的计算装置，在这个过程中杀死了提出这个问题的人。}}
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当我们创造出第一个超级智能实体时，我们可能会犯错并给它一个导致人类毁灭的目标（假设它巨大的智力优势赋予它这样做的力量）。例如，我们可能会错误地将子目标提升为超级目标。我们告诉它去解决一个数学问题，然后它将太阳系中的所有物质变成一个巨大的计算装置，在这个过程中杀死了提出这个问题的人。
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According to [[Eliezer Yudkowsky]], a significant problem in AI safety is that unfriendly artificial intelligence is likely to be much easier to create than friendly AI. While both require large advances in recursive optimisation process design, friendly AI also requires the ability to make goal structures invariant under self-improvement (or the AI could transform itself into something unfriendly) and a goal structure that aligns with human values and does not automatically destroy the human race. An unfriendly AI, on the other hand, can optimize for an arbitrary goal structure, which does not need to be invariant under self-modification.<ref name="singinst12">[http://singinst.org/upload/CEV.html Coherent Extrapolated Volition, Eliezer S. Yudkowsky, May 2004 ] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100815055725/http://singinst.org/upload/CEV.html |date=2010-08-15 }}</ref> {{harvtxt|Bill Hibbard|2014}} proposes an AI design that avoids several dangers including self-delusion,<ref name="JAGI2012">{{Citation| journal=Journal of Artificial General Intelligence| year=2012| volume=3| issue=1| title=Model-Based Utility Functions| first=Bill| last=Hibbard| postscript=.| doi=10.2478/v10229-011-0013-5| page=1|arxiv = 1111.3934 |bibcode = 2012JAGI....3....1H | s2cid=8434596}}</ref> unintended instrumental actions,<ref name="selfawaresystems"/><ref name="AGI-12a">[http://agi-conference.org/2012/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/paper_56.pdf  Avoiding Unintended AI Behaviors.] Bill Hibbard. 2012 proceedings of the Fifth Conference on Artificial General Intelligence, eds. Joscha Bach, Ben Goertzel and Matthew Ikle. [http://intelligence.org/2012/12/19/december-2012-newsletter/ This paper won the Machine Intelligence Research Institute's 2012 Turing Prize for the Best AGI Safety Paper].</ref> and corruption of the reward generator.<ref name="AGI-12a"/> He also discusses social impacts of AI<ref name="JET2008">{{Citation| url=http://jetpress.org/v17/hibbard.htm| journal=Journal of Evolution and Technology| year=2008| volume=17| title=The Technology of Mind and a New Social Contract| first=Bill| last=Hibbard| postscript=.}}</ref> and testing AI.<ref name="AGI-12b">[http://agi-conference.org/2012/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/paper_57.pdf  Decision Support for Safe AI Design|.] Bill Hibbard. 2012 proceedings of the Fifth Conference on Artificial General Intelligence, eds. Joscha Bach, Ben Goertzel and Matthew Ikle.</ref> His 2001 book ''[[Super-Intelligent Machines]]'' advocates the need for public education about AI and public control over AI. It also proposed a simple design that was vulnerable to corruption of the reward generator.
 
According to [[Eliezer Yudkowsky]], a significant problem in AI safety is that unfriendly artificial intelligence is likely to be much easier to create than friendly AI. While both require large advances in recursive optimisation process design, friendly AI also requires the ability to make goal structures invariant under self-improvement (or the AI could transform itself into something unfriendly) and a goal structure that aligns with human values and does not automatically destroy the human race. An unfriendly AI, on the other hand, can optimize for an arbitrary goal structure, which does not need to be invariant under self-modification.<ref name="singinst12">[http://singinst.org/upload/CEV.html Coherent Extrapolated Volition, Eliezer S. Yudkowsky, May 2004 ] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100815055725/http://singinst.org/upload/CEV.html |date=2010-08-15 }}</ref> {{harvtxt|Bill Hibbard|2014}} proposes an AI design that avoids several dangers including self-delusion,<ref name="JAGI2012">{{Citation| journal=Journal of Artificial General Intelligence| year=2012| volume=3| issue=1| title=Model-Based Utility Functions| first=Bill| last=Hibbard| postscript=.| doi=10.2478/v10229-011-0013-5| page=1|arxiv = 1111.3934 |bibcode = 2012JAGI....3....1H | s2cid=8434596}}</ref> unintended instrumental actions,<ref name="selfawaresystems"/><ref name="AGI-12a">[http://agi-conference.org/2012/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/paper_56.pdf  Avoiding Unintended AI Behaviors.] Bill Hibbard. 2012 proceedings of the Fifth Conference on Artificial General Intelligence, eds. Joscha Bach, Ben Goertzel and Matthew Ikle. [http://intelligence.org/2012/12/19/december-2012-newsletter/ This paper won the Machine Intelligence Research Institute's 2012 Turing Prize for the Best AGI Safety Paper].</ref> and corruption of the reward generator.<ref name="AGI-12a"/> He also discusses social impacts of AI<ref name="JET2008">{{Citation| url=http://jetpress.org/v17/hibbard.htm| journal=Journal of Evolution and Technology| year=2008| volume=17| title=The Technology of Mind and a New Social Contract| first=Bill| last=Hibbard| postscript=.}}</ref> and testing AI.<ref name="AGI-12b">[http://agi-conference.org/2012/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/paper_57.pdf  Decision Support for Safe AI Design|.] Bill Hibbard. 2012 proceedings of the Fifth Conference on Artificial General Intelligence, eds. Joscha Bach, Ben Goertzel and Matthew Ikle.</ref> His 2001 book ''[[Super-Intelligent Machines]]'' advocates the need for public education about AI and public control over AI. It also proposed a simple design that was vulnerable to corruption of the reward generator.
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按照[[Eliezer Yudkowsky]]的观点，人工智能安全的一个重要问题是，不友好的人工智能可能比友好的人工智能更容易创建。虽然两者都需要递归优化过程设计的巨大进步，但友好的人工智能也需要能够使目标结构在自我改进下保持不变（或者人工智能可以将自己转变成不友好的东西），以及一个与人类价值观相一致且不会自动毁灭人类的目标结构。另一方面，一个不友好的人工智能可以针对任意的目标结构进行优化，而目标结构不需要在自我修改下保持不变。<ref name="singinst12">[http://singinst.org/upload/CEV.html Coherent Extrapolated Volition, Eliezer S. Yudkowsky, May 2004 ] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100815055725/http://singinst.org/upload/CEV.html |date=2010-08-15 }}</ref>{{harvxt | Bill Hibbard | 2014}提出了一种避免包括自欺欺人在内的危险的人工智能设计，<ref name="JAGI2012">{{Citation| journal=Journal of Artificial General Intelligence| year=2012| volume=3| issue=1| title=Model-Based Utility Functions| first=Bill| last=Hibbard| postscript=.| doi=10.2478/v10229-011-0013-5| page=1|arxiv = 1111.3934 |bibcode = 2012JAGI....3....1H | s2cid=8434596}}</ref>意外的工具性行为，<ref name="selfawaresystems"/><ref name="AGI-12a">[http://agi-conference.org/2012/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/paper_56.pdf  Avoiding Unintended AI Behaviors.] Bill Hibbard. 2012 proceedings of the Fifth Conference on Artificial General Intelligence, eds. Joscha Bach, Ben Goertzel and Matthew Ikle. [http://intelligence.org/2012/12/19/december-2012-newsletter/ This paper won the Machine Intelligence Research Institute's 2012 Turing Prize for the Best AGI Safety Paper].</ref> 以及奖励机制的腐败。<ref name="AGI-12a"/>他还讨论了人工智能的社会影响<ref name="JET2008">{{Citation| url=http://jetpress.org/v17/hibbard.htm| journal=Journal of Evolution and Technology| year=2008| volume=17| title=The Technology of Mind and a New Social Contract| first=Bill| last=Hibbard| postscript=.}}</ref>和人工智能测试。<ref name="AGI-12b">[http://agi-conference.org/2012/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/paper_57.pdf  Decision Support for Safe AI Design|.] Bill Hibbard. 2012 proceedings of the Fifth Conference on Artificial General Intelligence, eds. Joscha Bach, Ben Goertzel and Matthew Ikle.</ref>他在2001年出版的新书“[[超级智能机器]]”提倡公众对人工智能的教育和公众对人工智能的控制。它还提出了一个简单的设计，容易腐败的奖励生成器。
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According to Eliezer Yudkowsky, a significant problem in AI safety is that unfriendly artificial  intelligence is likely to be much easier to create than friendly AI. While both require large advances in recursive optimisation process design, friendly AI also requires the ability to make goal structures  invariant under self-improvement (or the AI could transform itself into something unfriendly) and a goal structure that aligns with human values and does not automatically destroy the human race. An unfriendly AI, on the other hand, can optimize for an arbitrary goal structure, which does not need to  be invariant under self-modification. Bill Hibbard (2014) proposes an AI design that avoids  several dangers including self-delusion, unintended instrumental actions, and corruption  of the reward generator.[84] He also discusses social impacts of AI and testing AI. His 2001  book Super-Intelligent Machines advocates the need for public education about AI and public control over AI. It also proposed a simple design that was vulnerable to corruption of the reward generator.  
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按照[[Eliezer Yudkowsky]]的观点，人工智能安全的一个重要问题是，不友好的人工智能可能比友好的人工智能更容易创建。虽然两者都需要递归优化过程的进步，但友好的人工智能还需要目标结构在自我改进过程中保持不变（否则人工智能可以将自己转变成不友好的东西），以及一个与人类价值观相一致且不会自动毁灭人类的目标结构。另一方面，一个不友好的人工智能可以针对任意的目标结构进行优化，而目标结构不需要在自我改进过程中保持不变。Bill Hibbard (2014)提出了一种人工智能设计，可以避免包括自欺欺人、无意的工具性行为和奖励机制的腐败等一些危险。他还讨论了人工智能和人工智能测试的社会影响。他在2001年出版的“<font color = "#ff8000">超级智能机器Super-Intelligent Machines</font>”一书中提倡对人工智能的公共教育和公众控制。<font color = "#cd32cd">该书还提出了一个简单的易受奖励机制的腐败影响的设计。It also proposed a simple design that was vulnerable to corruption of the reward generator.</font>
    
===Next step of sociobiological evolution社会生物进化的下一步===
 
===Next step of sociobiological evolution社会生物进化的下一步===
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While the technological singularity is usually seen as a sudden event, some scholars argue the current speed of change already fits this description.{{citation needed|date=April 2018}}
 
While the technological singularity is usually seen as a sudden event, some scholars argue the current speed of change already fits this description.{{citation needed|date=April 2018}}
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虽然技术奇点通常被视为一个突发事件，但一些学者认为目前的变化速度已经符合这种描述。{{citation needed|date=April 2018}}
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虽然技术奇点通常被视为一个突发事件，但一些学者认为目前的变化速度已经符合这种描述。
    
In addition, some argue that we are already in the midst of a [[The Major Transitions in Evolution|major evolutionary transition]] that merges technology, biology, and society. Digital technology has infiltrated the fabric of human society to a degree of indisputable and often life-sustaining dependence.
 
In addition, some argue that we are already in the midst of a [[The Major Transitions in Evolution|major evolutionary transition]] that merges technology, biology, and society. Digital technology has infiltrated the fabric of human society to a degree of indisputable and often life-sustaining dependence.
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此外，有人认为，我们已经处在一个融合了技术、生物学和社会的[[进化中的突变|进化突变]]的中间。数字技术已经渗透到人类社会的结构中，达到了无可争辩的程度，而且常常是维持生命的依赖。
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此外，有人认为，我们已经处在一个融合了技术、生物学和社会学的<font color = "#ff8000">进化巨变major evolutionary transition</font>之中。数字技术已经无可争辩地渗透到人类社会的结构中，而且生命的维持常常依赖数字技术。
       
A 2016 article in ''[[Trends in Ecology & Evolution]]'' argues that "humans already embrace fusions of biology and technology. We spend most of our waking time communicating through digitally mediated channels... we trust [[artificial intelligence]] with our lives through [[Anti-lock braking system|antilock braking in cars]] and [[autopilot]]s in planes... With one in three marriages in America beginning online, digital algorithms are also taking a role in human pair bonding and reproduction".
 
A 2016 article in ''[[Trends in Ecology & Evolution]]'' argues that "humans already embrace fusions of biology and technology. We spend most of our waking time communicating through digitally mediated channels... we trust [[artificial intelligence]] with our lives through [[Anti-lock braking system|antilock braking in cars]] and [[autopilot]]s in planes... With one in three marriages in America beginning online, digital algorithms are also taking a role in human pair bonding and reproduction".
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2016年发表在“[[Trends in Ecology&Evolution]]”的一篇文章认为，“人类已经接受了生物和技术的融合。我们醒着的大部分时间都是通过数字媒介渠道进行交流的。。。我们相信[[人工智能]]通过[[防抱死制动系统|汽车中的防抱死制动]]和飞机上的[[自动驾驶仪]]来生活。。。在美国，三分之一的婚姻都是在网络上开始的，数字算法也在人类配对和繁殖中发挥了作用”。
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2016年发表在<font color = "#ff8000">生态学和进化进展Trends in Ecology and Evolution</font>”的一篇文章认为，“人类已经接受了生物和技术的融合。我们清醒时大部分时间都是通过数字媒介进行交流的……我们拿性命相信汽车上的<font color = "#ff8000">防抱死制动系统Anti-lock braking system</font>和飞机上的<font color = "#ff8000">自动巡航模式autopilot</font>……在美国，三分之一的婚姻都是在网络上开始的，数字算法也在人类配对和繁殖中也发挥了作用”。
       
The article further argues that from the perspective of the [[evolution]], several previous [[The Major Transitions in Evolution|Major Transitions in Evolution]] have transformed life through innovations in information storage and replication ([[RNA]], [[DNA]], [[multicellularity]], and [[culture]] and [[language]]). In the current stage of life's evolution, the carbon-based biosphere has generated a [[cognitive system]] (humans) capable of creating technology that will result in a comparable [[The Major Transitions in Evolution|evolutionary transition]].
 
The article further argues that from the perspective of the [[evolution]], several previous [[The Major Transitions in Evolution|Major Transitions in Evolution]] have transformed life through innovations in information storage and replication ([[RNA]], [[DNA]], [[multicellularity]], and [[culture]] and [[language]]). In the current stage of life's evolution, the carbon-based biosphere has generated a [[cognitive system]] (humans) capable of creating technology that will result in a comparable [[The Major Transitions in Evolution|evolutionary transition]].
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文章进一步指出，从[[进化]]的角度来看，以前的几次[[进化的主要转变|进化中的主要转变]]通过信息存储和复制的创新（[[RNA]]、[[DNA]]、[[多细胞性]]、[[文化]]和[[语言]]来改变生命。在生命进化的当前阶段，以碳为基础的生物圈已经产生了一个[[认知系统]]（人类），它能够创造出一种可以与之相媲美的[[进化中的主要转变|进化转型]]。
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文章进一步指出，从[[进化]]的角度来看，以前的几次进化巨变通过创新信息存储和复制的方式（如RNA、DNA、多细胞性、文化和语言的出现）来改变生命。在生命进化的当前阶段，以碳为基础的生物圈已经产生了一个能够创造出可以与前几次巨变相媲美的技术的认知系统（人类）。
    
The digital information created by humans has reached a similar magnitude to biological information in the biosphere. Since the 1980s, the quantity of digital information stored has doubled about every 2.5 years, reaching about 5 [[zettabyte]]s in 2014 (5{{e|21}} bytes).{{Citation needed|date=April 2019}}
 
The digital information created by humans has reached a similar magnitude to biological information in the biosphere. Since the 1980s, the quantity of digital information stored has doubled about every 2.5 years, reaching about 5 [[zettabyte]]s in 2014 (5{{e|21}} bytes).{{Citation needed|date=April 2019}}
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人类创造的数字信息已经达到了与生物圈中生物信息相似的程度。自20世纪80年代以来，存储的数字信息量大约每2.5年翻一番，2014年达到约5[[zettabyte]]（5{e | 21}}字节）。{{Citation needed|date=April 2019}}
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人类创造的数字信息已经达到了与生物圈中生物信息相似的程度。自20世纪80年代以来，存储的数字信息量大约每2.5年翻一番，2014年达到约5泽字节（5e21字节）。
       
In biological terms, there are 7.2&nbsp;billion humans on the planet, each having a genome of 6.2&nbsp;billion nucleotides. Since one byte can encode four nucleotide pairs, the individual genomes of every human on the planet could be encoded by approximately 1{{e|19}} bytes. The digital realm stored 500 times more information than this in 2014 (see figure). The total amount of DNA contained in all of the cells on Earth is estimated to be about 5.3{{e|37}} base pairs, equivalent to 1.325{{e|37}} bytes of information.
 
In biological terms, there are 7.2&nbsp;billion humans on the planet, each having a genome of 6.2&nbsp;billion nucleotides. Since one byte can encode four nucleotide pairs, the individual genomes of every human on the planet could be encoded by approximately 1{{e|19}} bytes. The digital realm stored 500 times more information than this in 2014 (see figure). The total amount of DNA contained in all of the cells on Earth is estimated to be about 5.3{{e|37}} base pairs, equivalent to 1.325{{e|37}} bytes of information.
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在生物学方面，地球上有72亿人，每个人的基因组有62亿个核苷酸。由于一个字节可以编码四个核苷酸对，地球上每个人类的个体基因组可以编码大约1{e | 19}字节。2014年，数字领域存储的信息是这个数字领域的500倍（见图）。据估计，地球上所有细胞所含的DNA总量约为5.3{e | 37}碱基对，相当于1.325{e | 37}字节的信息。
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在生物学方面，地球上有72亿人，每个人的基因组有62亿个核苷酸。由于一个字节可以编码四个核苷酸对，地球上每个人类的个体基因组可以编码大约1{e | 19}字节。2014年，数字领域存储的信息是这个数字的500倍（见图）。据估计，地球上所有细胞所含的DNA总量约为5.3{e | 37}碱基对，相当于1.325{e | 37}字节的信息。
    
If growth in digital storage continues at its current rate of 30–38% compound annual growth per year,<ref name="HilbertLopez2011" /> it will rival the total information content contained in all of the DNA in all of the cells on Earth in about 110 years. This would represent a doubling of the amount of information stored in the biosphere across a total time period of just 150 years".<ref name="InfoBiosphere2016">{{Cite journal |url=http://escholarship.org/uc/item/38f4b791 |doi=10.1016/j.tree.2015.12.013|pmid=26777788|title=Information in the Biosphere: Biological and Digital Worlds|journal=Trends in Ecology & Evolution|volume=31|issue=3|pages=180–189|year=2016|last1=Kemp|first1=D. J.|last2=Hilbert|first2=M.|last3=Gillings|first3=M. R.}}</ref>
 
If growth in digital storage continues at its current rate of 30–38% compound annual growth per year,<ref name="HilbertLopez2011" /> it will rival the total information content contained in all of the DNA in all of the cells on Earth in about 110 years. This would represent a doubling of the amount of information stored in the biosphere across a total time period of just 150 years".<ref name="InfoBiosphere2016">{{Cite journal |url=http://escholarship.org/uc/item/38f4b791 |doi=10.1016/j.tree.2015.12.013|pmid=26777788|title=Information in the Biosphere: Biological and Digital Worlds|journal=Trends in Ecology & Evolution|volume=31|issue=3|pages=180–189|year=2016|last1=Kemp|first1=D. J.|last2=Hilbert|first2=M.|last3=Gillings|first3=M. R.}}</ref>
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如果数字存储以目前每年30-38%的复合年增长率继续增长，<ref name=“HilbertLopez2011”/>它将在大约110年内与地球上所有细胞中的所有DNA所包含的信息总量相抗衡。这将意味着在仅仅150年的时间里，生物圈中储存的信息量翻了一番”。<ref name="InfoBiosphere2016">{{Cite journal |url=http://escholarship.org/uc/item/38f4b791 |doi=10.1016/j.tree.2015.12.013|pmid=26777788|title=Information in the Biosphere: Biological and Digital Worlds|journal=Trends in Ecology & Evolution|volume=31|issue=3|pages=180–189|year=2016|last1=Kemp|first1=D. J.|last2=Hilbert|first2=M.|last3=Gillings|first3=M. R.}}</ref>
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如果数字存储以目前每年30-38%的复合年增长率继续增长，它将在大约110年内与地球上所有细胞中的所有DNA所包含的信息总量相抗衡。这将意味着在仅仅150年的时间里，生物圈中储存的信息量翻了一番”。
    
===Implications for human society对人类社会的影响===
 
===Implications for human society对人类社会的影响===
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In February 2009, under the auspices of the [[Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence]] (AAAI), [[Eric Horvitz]] chaired a meeting of leading computer scientists, artificial intelligence researchers and roboticists at Asilomar in Pacific Grove, California. The goal was to discuss the potential impact of the hypothetical possibility that robots could become self-sufficient and able to make their own decisions. They discussed the extent to which computers and robots might be able to acquire [[autonomy]], and to what degree they could use such abilities to pose threats or hazards.<ref name="nytimes july09" />
 
In February 2009, under the auspices of the [[Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence]] (AAAI), [[Eric Horvitz]] chaired a meeting of leading computer scientists, artificial intelligence researchers and roboticists at Asilomar in Pacific Grove, California. The goal was to discuss the potential impact of the hypothetical possibility that robots could become self-sufficient and able to make their own decisions. They discussed the extent to which computers and robots might be able to acquire [[autonomy]], and to what degree they could use such abilities to pose threats or hazards.<ref name="nytimes july09" />
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2009年2月，在[[人工智能促进协会]]（AAAI）的主持下，[[Eric Horvitz]]在加利福尼亚州太平洋格罗夫的Asilomar主持了一次由主要计算机科学家、人工智能研究人员和机器人学家组成的会议。其目的是讨论机器人能够自给自足并能够做出自己决定的假设可能性的潜在影响。他们讨论了计算机和机器人能够在多大程度上获得[[自主]]，以及在多大程度上可以利用这些能力构成威胁或危险。<ref name="nytimes july09" />
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2009年2月，在<font color = "#ff8000">人工智能促进协会Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, AAAI</font>的主持下，[[Eric Horvitz]]在加利福尼亚州Pacific Grove的Asilomar主持了一次由主要计算机科学家、人工智能研究人员和机器人学家组成的会议。其目的是讨论，机器人如果能够自给自足并能够做出自己决定，则其潜在影响是什么。他们讨论了计算机和机器人能够在多大程度上获得<font color = "#ff8000">自主性autonomy</font>，以及在多大程度上可以利用这些能力对人类构成威胁或危险。
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有些机器被编程成各种形式的半自治，包括定位自己的电源和选择用武器攻击的目标的能力。此外，有些[计算机病毒]可以逃避消除，根据与会科学家的说法，可以说已经达到了机器智能的“蟑螂”阶段。与会者指出，科幻小说中描述的自我意识可能不太可能，但也存在其他潜在的危险和陷阱。<ref name="nytimes july09">[https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/science/26robot.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper Scientists Worry Machines May Outsmart Man] By JOHN MARKOFF, NY Times, July 26, 2009.</ref>
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有些机器被编程成各种形式的<font color = "#ff8000">半自主semi-autonomy</font>，包括定位自己的电源和选择武器攻击的目标等。此外，有些计算机病毒可以避免被消除，根据与会科学家的说法，可以说已经达到了机器智能的“蟑螂”阶段。与会者指出，科幻小说中描述的自我意识可能不太可能，但也存在其他潜在的危险和陷阱。
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Frank S. Robinson predicts that once humans achieve a machine with the intelligence of a human, scientific and technological problems will be tackled and solved with brainpower far superior to that of humans. He notes that artificial systems are able to share data more directly than humans, and predicts that this would result in a global network of super-intelligence that would dwarf human capability.<ref name=":0">{{cite magazine |last=Robinson |first=Frank S. |title=The Human Future: Upgrade or Replacement? |magazine=[[The Humanist]] |date=27 June 2013 |url=https://thehumanist.com/magazine/july-august-2013/features/the-human-future-upgrade-or-replacement}}</ref> Robinson also discusses how vastly different the future would potentially look after such an intelligence explosion. One example of this is solar energy, where the Earth receives vastly more solar energy than humanity captures, so capturing more of that solar energy would hold vast promise for civilizational growth.
 
Frank S. Robinson predicts that once humans achieve a machine with the intelligence of a human, scientific and technological problems will be tackled and solved with brainpower far superior to that of humans. He notes that artificial systems are able to share data more directly than humans, and predicts that this would result in a global network of super-intelligence that would dwarf human capability.<ref name=":0">{{cite magazine |last=Robinson |first=Frank S. |title=The Human Future: Upgrade or Replacement? |magazine=[[The Humanist]] |date=27 June 2013 |url=https://thehumanist.com/magazine/july-august-2013/features/the-human-future-upgrade-or-replacement}}</ref> Robinson also discusses how vastly different the future would potentially look after such an intelligence explosion. One example of this is solar energy, where the Earth receives vastly more solar energy than humanity captures, so capturing more of that solar energy would hold vast promise for civilizational growth.
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弗兰克·S·罗宾逊预言，一旦人类实现了具有人类智能的机器，科学技术问题将以远远优于人类的智力来解决和解决。他指出，人工系统能够比人类更直接地共享数据，并预测这将导致一个超级智能的全球网络，使人类的能力相形见绌？<ref name=":0">{{cite magazine |last=Robinson |first=Frank S. |title=The Human Future: Upgrade or Replacement? |magazine=[[The Humanist]] |date=27 June 2013 |url=https://thehumanist.com/magazine/july-august-2013/features/the-human-future-upgrade-or-replacement}}</ref>罗宾逊还讨论了在这样一次情报爆炸之后，未来可能会有多大的不同。其中一个例子就是太阳能，地球接收到的太阳能远远多于人类捕获的太阳能，因此捕捉更多的太阳能将为文明发展带来巨大的希望。
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Frank S. Robinson 预言，一旦人类实现了具有人类智能的机器，科学技术问题将被远远优于人类的智力来解决。他指出，人工系统能够比人类更直接地共享数据，并预测这将导致一个全球的超级智能网络，使人类的能力相形见绌。Robinson还讨论了在这样一次智能爆炸之后，未来可能会有多大的不同。其中一个例子就是太阳能，地球接收到的太阳能远远多于人类捕获的太阳能，因此捕捉更多的太阳能将为文明发展带来巨大的希望。
    
==Hard vs. soft takeoff硬起飞与软起飞==
 
==Hard vs. soft takeoff硬起飞与软起飞==
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[[File:Recursive self-improvement.svg|thumb|upright=1.6|In this sample recursive self-improvement scenario, humans modifying an AI's architecture would be able to double its performance every three years through, for example, 30 generations before exhausting all feasible improvements (left). If instead the AI is smart enough to modify its own architecture as well as human researchers can, its time required to complete a redesign halves with each generation, and it progresses all 30 feasible generations in six years (right).<ref name="yudkowsky-global-risk">[[Eliezer Yudkowsky]]. "Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative factor in global risk." Global catastrophic risks (2008).</ref>]]
 
[[File:Recursive self-improvement.svg|thumb|upright=1.6|In this sample recursive self-improvement scenario, humans modifying an AI's architecture would be able to double its performance every three years through, for example, 30 generations before exhausting all feasible improvements (left). If instead the AI is smart enough to modify its own architecture as well as human researchers can, its time required to complete a redesign halves with each generation, and it progresses all 30 feasible generations in six years (right).<ref name="yudkowsky-global-risk">[[Eliezer Yudkowsky]]. "Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative factor in global risk." Global catastrophic risks (2008).</ref>]]
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[[文件：Recursive self-improvement.svg|thumb |直立=1.6 |在这个示例递归自我改进场景中，修改人工智能体系结构的人可以每三年将其性能提高一倍，例如，30代人，然后用尽所有可行的改进（左）。相反，如果人工智能足够聪明，能够像人类研究人员那样修改自己的架构，那么每一代人完成一次重新设计所需的时间将减半，并且它在6年内将所有30代可行的代都推进（右图）。<ref name="yudkowsky-global-risk">[[Eliezer Yudkowsky]]. "Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative factor in global risk." Global catastrophic risks (2008).</ref>]]
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[[文件：在这个示例递归自我改进场景中，修改人工智能体系结构的人可以每三年将其性能提高一倍，例如，30代人，然后用尽所有可行的改进（左）。相反，如果人工智能足够聪明，能够像人类研究人员那样修改自己的架构，那么每一代人完成一次重新设计所需的时间将减半，并且它在6年内将所有30代可行的代都推进（右图）。<ref name="yudkowsky-global-risk">[[Eliezer Yudkowsky]]. "Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative factor in global risk." Global catastrophic risks (2008).</ref>]]
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In a hard takeoff scenario, an AGI rapidly self-improves, "taking control" of the world (perhaps in a matter of hours), too quickly for significant human-initiated error correction or for a gradual tuning of the AGI's goals. In a soft takeoff scenario, AGI still becomes far more powerful than humanity, but at a human-like pace (perhaps on the order of decades), on a timescale where ongoing human interaction and correction can effectively steer the AGI's development.<ref>Bugaj, Stephan Vladimir, and Ben Goertzel. "Five ethical imperatives and their implications for human-AGI interaction." Dynamical Psychology (2007).</ref><ref>Sotala, Kaj, and Roman V. Yampolskiy. "Responses to catastrophic AGI risk: a survey." Physica Scripta 90.1 (2014): 018001.</ref>
 
In a hard takeoff scenario, an AGI rapidly self-improves, "taking control" of the world (perhaps in a matter of hours), too quickly for significant human-initiated error correction or for a gradual tuning of the AGI's goals. In a soft takeoff scenario, AGI still becomes far more powerful than humanity, but at a human-like pace (perhaps on the order of decades), on a timescale where ongoing human interaction and correction can effectively steer the AGI's development.<ref>Bugaj, Stephan Vladimir, and Ben Goertzel. "Five ethical imperatives and their implications for human-AGI interaction." Dynamical Psychology (2007).</ref><ref>Sotala, Kaj, and Roman V. Yampolskiy. "Responses to catastrophic AGI risk: a survey." Physica Scripta 90.1 (2014): 018001.</ref>
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在一个艰难的情况下，一个AGI迅速自我完善，“掌控”了世界（也许在几个小时内），对于人为引起的重大错误纠正或AGI目标的逐步调整来说，太快了。在软起飞的情况下，AGI仍然比人类强大得多，但以一种类似人类的速度（也许是几十年的数量级），在一个时间尺度上，持续的人类互动和纠正可以有效地指导AGI的发展。<ref>Bugaj、Stephan Vladimir和Ben Goertzel。”五项伦理要求及其对人类AGI互动的影响〉，《动力心理学》（2007年）。</ref><ref>Sotala, Kaj, and Roman V. Yampolskiy. "Responses to catastrophic AGI risk: a survey." Physica Scripta 90.1 (2014): 018001.</ref>
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在硬起飞的情况下，一个<font color = "#ff8000">人工通用智能AGI</font>迅速自我完善，“掌控”了世界（也许在几个小时内），这对于纠正人为引起的重大错误或逐步调整的AGI目标来说太快了。在软起飞的情况下，AGI仍然比人类强大得多，但以一种类似人类的速度进步（也许是几十年的数量级），在一个持续的人类互动和指导可以有效纠正AGI的时间尺度上发展。
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[[Ramez Naam]] argues against a hard takeoff. He has pointed that we already see recursive self-improvement by superintelligences, such as corporations. [[Intel]], for example, has "the collective brainpower of tens of thousands of humans and probably millions of CPU cores to... design better CPUs!" However, this has not led to a hard takeoff; rather, it has led to a soft takeoff in the form of [[Moore's law]].<ref name=Naam2014Further>{{cite web|last=Naam|first=Ramez|title=The Singularity Is Further Than It Appears|url=http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2014/02/the-singularity-is-further-tha.html|accessdate=16 May 2014|year=2014}}</ref> Naam further points out that the computational complexity of higher intelligence may be much greater than linear, such that "creating a mind of intelligence 2 is probably ''more'' than twice as hard as creating a mind of intelligence 1."<ref name=Naam2014Ascend>{{cite web|last=Naam|first=Ramez|title=Why AIs Won't Ascend in the Blink of an Eye - Some Math|url=http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2014/02/why-ais-wont-ascend-in-blink-of-an-eye.html|accessdate=16 May 2014|year=2014}}</ref>
 
[[Ramez Naam]] argues against a hard takeoff. He has pointed that we already see recursive self-improvement by superintelligences, such as corporations. [[Intel]], for example, has "the collective brainpower of tens of thousands of humans and probably millions of CPU cores to... design better CPUs!" However, this has not led to a hard takeoff; rather, it has led to a soft takeoff in the form of [[Moore's law]].<ref name=Naam2014Further>{{cite web|last=Naam|first=Ramez|title=The Singularity Is Further Than It Appears|url=http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2014/02/the-singularity-is-further-tha.html|accessdate=16 May 2014|year=2014}}</ref> Naam further points out that the computational complexity of higher intelligence may be much greater than linear, such that "creating a mind of intelligence 2 is probably ''more'' than twice as hard as creating a mind of intelligence 1."<ref name=Naam2014Ascend>{{cite web|last=Naam|first=Ramez|title=Why AIs Won't Ascend in the Blink of an Eye - Some Math|url=http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2014/02/why-ais-wont-ascend-in-blink-of-an-eye.html|accessdate=16 May 2014|year=2014}}</ref>
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[[Ramez Naam]]反对硬起飞。他指出，我们已经看到企业等超级智能体的递归自我改进。例如，[[Intel]]拥有“数万人的集体脑力，可能还有数百万个CPU核心。。。设计更好的CPU！”然而，这并没有导致一个艰难的起飞；相反，它以[[摩尔定律]]的形式实现了软起飞<ref name=Naam2014Further>{{cite web|last=Naam|first=Ramez|title=The Singularity Is Further Than It Appears|url=http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2014/02/the-singularity-is-further-tha.html|accessdate=16 May 2014|year=2014}}</ref> Naam进一步指出高智商的复杂性可能比线性复杂得多，因此，“创造一个智慧的头脑2可能比创造一个智慧的头脑1”的难度要“多”一倍多。”<ref name=Naam2014Ascend>{{cite web|last=Naam|first=Ramez|title=Why AIs Won't Ascend in the Blink of an Eye - Some Math|url=http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2014/02/why-ais-wont-ascend-in-blink-of-an-eye.html|accessdate=16 May 2014|year=2014}}</ref>
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Ramez Naam argues against a hard takeoff. He has pointed that we already see recursive self-improvement by superintelligences, such as corporations. Intel, for example, has "the collective brainpower of tens of thousands of humans and probably millions of CPU cores  to... design better CPUs!" However, this has  not led to a hard takeoff; rather, it has led to a soft takeoff in the form of Moore's law. Naam further points out that the computational complexity of higher intelligence may be much  greater than linear, such that "creating a mind of intelligence 2 is probably more than twice as hard as creating a mind of intelligence 1."
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[[Ramez Naam]]反对硬起飞。他指出，我们已经看到企业等超级智能体的递归自我改进。例如，[[Intel]]拥有“数万人的集体脑力，可能还有数百万个CPU核心……来设计更好的CPU！”然而，这并没有导致一个硬起飞；相反，它以[[摩尔定律]]的形式实现了软起飞。Naam进一步指出更高智能的复杂性可能比线性复杂得多，因此，“创造一个智慧的头脑2可能比创造一个智慧的头脑1”的难度要多一倍多。”
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[[J. Storrs Hall]] believes that "many of the more commonly seen scenarios for overnight hard takeoff are circular – they seem to assume hyperhuman capabilities at the ''starting point'' of the self-improvement process" in order for an AI to be able to make the dramatic, domain-general improvements required for takeoff. Hall suggests that rather than recursively self-improving its hardware, software, and infrastructure all on its own, a fledgling AI would be better off specializing in one area where it was most effective and then buying the remaining components on the marketplace, because the quality of products on the marketplace continually improves, and the AI would have a hard time keeping up with the cutting-edge technology used by the rest of the world.<ref name=Hall2008>{{cite journal|last=Hall|first=J. Storrs|title=Engineering Utopia|journal=Artificial General Intelligence, 2008: Proceedings of the First AGI Conference|date=2008|pages=460–467|url=http://www.agiri.org/takeoff_hall.pdf|accessdate=16 May 2014}}</ref>
 
[[J. Storrs Hall]] believes that "many of the more commonly seen scenarios for overnight hard takeoff are circular – they seem to assume hyperhuman capabilities at the ''starting point'' of the self-improvement process" in order for an AI to be able to make the dramatic, domain-general improvements required for takeoff. Hall suggests that rather than recursively self-improving its hardware, software, and infrastructure all on its own, a fledgling AI would be better off specializing in one area where it was most effective and then buying the remaining components on the marketplace, because the quality of products on the marketplace continually improves, and the AI would have a hard time keeping up with the cutting-edge technology used by the rest of the world.<ref name=Hall2008>{{cite journal|last=Hall|first=J. Storrs|title=Engineering Utopia|journal=Artificial General Intelligence, 2008: Proceedings of the First AGI Conference|date=2008|pages=460–467|url=http://www.agiri.org/takeoff_hall.pdf|accessdate=16 May 2014}}</ref>
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[[J.Storrs Hall]]认为，“许多更常见的夜间硬起飞场景都是循环的——它们似乎在自我提升过程的“起点”假设了超人类能力”，以便人工智能能够实现起飞所需的戏剧性的领域总体改进。霍尔认为，一个初出茅庐的人工智能与其靠自己不断地自我改进硬件、软件和基础设施，不如专注于一个它最有效的领域，然后在市场上购买剩余的组件，因为市场上产品的质量不断提高，而人工智能也在不断提高很难跟上世界其他地区使用的尖端技术。<ref name=Hall2008>{{cite journal|last=Hall|first=J. Storrs|title=Engineering Utopia|journal=Artificial General Intelligence, 2008: Proceedings of the First AGI Conference|date=2008|pages=460–467|url=http://www.agiri.org/takeoff_hall.pdf|accessdate=16 May 2014}}</ref>
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J. Storrs Hall believes that "many of the more commonly seen scenarios for overnight hard takeoff are circular – they seem to assume hyperhuman capabilities at the starting point of the self-improvement process" in order for an AI to be able to make the dramatic, domain-general  improvements required for takeoff. Hall suggests that rather than recursively self-improving its hardware, software, and infrastructure all on its own, a fledgling AI would be better off specializing in one area where it was most effective and then buying the remaining components on the marketplace,  because the quality of products on the marketplace continually improves, and the AI would have a  hard time keeping up with the cutting-edge technology used by the rest of the world.  
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[[J.Storrs Hall]]认为，“许多常见的一夜之间出现的硬起飞场景都是循环论证——它们似乎在自我提升过程的起点上假设了超人类的能力”，以便人工智能能够实现起飞所需的戏剧性的、领域一般性的改进。Hall认为，一个初出茅庐的人工智能与其靠自己不断地自我改进硬件、软件和基础设施，不如专注于一个它最有效的领域，然后在市场上购买剩余的组件，因为市场上产品的质量不断提高，而单是人工智能的提高很难跟上世界其他地区所用的尖端技术。
       
[[Ben Goertzel]] agrees with Hall's suggestion that a new human-level AI would do well to use its intelligence to accumulate wealth. The AI's talents might inspire companies and governments to disperse its software throughout society. Goertzel is skeptical of a hard five minute takeoff but speculates that a takeoff from human to superhuman level on the order of five years is reasonable. Goerzel refers to this scenario as a "semihard takeoff".<ref name="Goertzel2014">{{cite news|last1=Goertzel|first1=Ben|title=Superintelligence — Semi-hard Takeoff Scenarios|url=http://hplusmagazine.com/2014/09/26/superintelligence-semi-hard-takeoff-scenarios/|accessdate=25 October 2014|agency=h+ Magazine|date=26 Sep 2014}}</ref>
 
[[Ben Goertzel]] agrees with Hall's suggestion that a new human-level AI would do well to use its intelligence to accumulate wealth. The AI's talents might inspire companies and governments to disperse its software throughout society. Goertzel is skeptical of a hard five minute takeoff but speculates that a takeoff from human to superhuman level on the order of five years is reasonable. Goerzel refers to this scenario as a "semihard takeoff".<ref name="Goertzel2014">{{cite news|last1=Goertzel|first1=Ben|title=Superintelligence — Semi-hard Takeoff Scenarios|url=http://hplusmagazine.com/2014/09/26/superintelligence-semi-hard-takeoff-scenarios/|accessdate=25 October 2014|agency=h+ Magazine|date=26 Sep 2014}}</ref>
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[[Ben Goertzel]]同意霍尔的建议，即一个新的人类级别的人工智能将很好地利用其智能来积累财富。人工智能的天赋可能会激励公司和政府将其软件分散到整个社会。戈尔策尔对5分钟的艰难起飞持怀疑态度，但他推测，从人类到超人的水平，以5年的速度起飞是合理的。Goerzel将这种情况称为“半硬起飞”。<ref name="Goertzel2014">{{cite news|last1=Goertzel|first1=Ben|title=Superintelligence — Semi-hard Takeoff Scenarios|url=http://hplusmagazine.com/2014/09/26/superintelligence-semi-hard-takeoff-scenarios/|accessdate=25 October 2014|agency=h+ Magazine|date=26 Sep 2014}}</ref>
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[[Ben Goertzel]]同意Hall的意见，即，一个新的人类级别的人工智能将很好地利用其智能来积累财富。人工智能的天赋可能会激励公司和政府将其软件分散到整个社会。Goertzel怀疑对5分钟的硬起飞，但他推测从人类到超人的水平，以5年的速度起飞是合理的。Goerzel将这种情况称为“<font color = "#ff8000">半硬起飞semihard takeoff</font>”。
       
[[Max More]] disagrees, arguing that if there were only a few superfast human-level AIs, that they would not radically change the world, as they would still depend on other people to get things done and would still have human cognitive constraints. Even if all superfast AIs worked on intelligence augmentation, it is unclear why they would do better in a discontinuous way than existing human cognitive scientists at producing super-human intelligence, although the rate of progress would increase. More further argues that a superintelligence would not transform the world overnight: a superintelligence would need to engage with existing, slow human systems to accomplish physical impacts on the world. "The need for collaboration, for organization, and for putting ideas into physical changes will ensure that all the old rules are not thrown out overnight or even within years."<ref name=More>{{cite web|last1=More|first1=Max|title=Singularity Meets Economy|url=http://hanson.gmu.edu/vc.html#more|accessdate=10 November 2014}}</ref>
 
[[Max More]] disagrees, arguing that if there were only a few superfast human-level AIs, that they would not radically change the world, as they would still depend on other people to get things done and would still have human cognitive constraints. Even if all superfast AIs worked on intelligence augmentation, it is unclear why they would do better in a discontinuous way than existing human cognitive scientists at producing super-human intelligence, although the rate of progress would increase. More further argues that a superintelligence would not transform the world overnight: a superintelligence would need to engage with existing, slow human systems to accomplish physical impacts on the world. "The need for collaboration, for organization, and for putting ideas into physical changes will ensure that all the old rules are not thrown out overnight or even within years."<ref name=More>{{cite web|last1=More|first1=Max|title=Singularity Meets Economy|url=http://hanson.gmu.edu/vc.html#more|accessdate=10 November 2014}}</ref>
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[[Max More]]不同意这一观点，他认为，如果只有少数超快人类水平的人工智能，它们不会从根本上改变世界，因为它们仍将依赖于其他人来完成任务，并且仍然会受到人类认知的限制。即使所有的超高速人工智能都致力于智能增强，但目前还不清楚为什么它们在产生超人类智能方面比现有的人类认知科学家做得更好，尽管进展速度会加快。更进一步指出，超级智能不会在一夜之间改变世界：超级智能需要与现有的、缓慢的人类系统进行接触，以完成对世界的物理影响。”合作、组织和将想法付诸实际变革的需要将确保所有旧规则不会在一夜之间甚至几年内被废除。”<ref name=More>{{cite web|last1=More|first1=Max|title=Singularity Meets Economy|url=http://hanson.gmu.edu/vc.html#more|accessdate=10 November 2014}}</ref>
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[[Max More]]不同意这一观点，他认为，如果只有少数超高速的人类水平的人工智能，它们不会从根本上改变世界，因为它们仍将依赖人来完成任务，并且仍然会受到人类认知的限制。即使所有的超高速人工智能都致力于智能增强，但目前还不清楚为什么它们在产生超人类智能方面比现有的人类认知科学家做得更好，尽管进展速度会加快。更进一步指出，超级智能不会在一夜之间改变世界：超级智能需要与现有的、缓慢的人类系统进行接触，以完成对世界的物理影响。”合作、组织和将想法付诸实际变革的需要将确保所有旧规则不会在一夜之间甚至几年内被废除。”
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== Immortality 永生==
 
== Immortality 永生==
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In his 2005 book, ''[[The Singularity is Near]]'', [[Ray Kurzweil|Kurzweil]] suggests that medical advances would allow people to protect their bodies from the effects of aging, making the [[Life extension|life expectancy limitless]]. Kurzweil argues that the technological advances in medicine would allow us to continuously repair and replace defective components in our bodies, prolonging life to an undetermined age.<ref>''The Singularity Is Near'', p.&nbsp;215.</ref> Kurzweil further buttresses his argument by discussing current bio-engineering advances. Kurzweil suggests [[somatic gene therapy]]; after synthetic viruses with specific genetic information, the next step would be to apply this technology to gene therapy, replacing human DNA with synthesized genes.<ref>''The Singularity is Near'', p.&nbsp;216.</ref>
 
In his 2005 book, ''[[The Singularity is Near]]'', [[Ray Kurzweil|Kurzweil]] suggests that medical advances would allow people to protect their bodies from the effects of aging, making the [[Life extension|life expectancy limitless]]. Kurzweil argues that the technological advances in medicine would allow us to continuously repair and replace defective components in our bodies, prolonging life to an undetermined age.<ref>''The Singularity Is Near'', p.&nbsp;215.</ref> Kurzweil further buttresses his argument by discussing current bio-engineering advances. Kurzweil suggests [[somatic gene therapy]]; after synthetic viruses with specific genetic information, the next step would be to apply this technology to gene therapy, replacing human DNA with synthesized genes.<ref>''The Singularity is Near'', p.&nbsp;216.</ref>
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在他2005年出版的《奇点就在眼前》一书中，他指出，医学的进步将使人们能够保护自己的身体免受衰老的影响，从而延长寿命。Kurzweil认为，医学的技术进步将使我们能够不断地修复和更换我们身体中有缺陷的部件，从而将寿命延长到不确定的年龄。<ref>''The Singularity Is Near'', p.&nbsp;215.</ref>Kurzweil通过讨论当前的生物工程进展进一步支持了他的论点。Kurzweil建议[[体细胞基因疗法]；在合成具有特定遗传信息的病毒之后，下一步将把这项技术应用到基因治疗中，用合成的基因取代人类的DNA。<ref>''The Singularity is Near'', p.&nbsp;216.</ref>
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在Kurzweil 2005年出版的《<font color = "#ff8000">奇点近了The Singularity is Near</font>》一书中，他指出，医学的进步将使人们能够保护自己的身体免受衰老的影响，从而延长寿命。Kurzweil认为，医学的技术进步将使我们能够不断地修复和更换我们身体中有缺陷的部件，从而将寿命延长到某个他无法确定的年龄。Kurzweil通过讨论当前的生物工程进展进一步支持了他的论点。Kurzweil建议了<font color = "#ff8000">体细胞基因疗法somatic gene therapy</font>；在合成具有特定遗传信息的病毒之后，下一步则是把这项技术应用到基因治疗中，用合成的基因取代人类的DNA。
       
[[K. Eric Drexler]], one of the founders of [[nanotechnology]], postulated cell repair devices, including ones operating within cells and utilizing as yet hypothetical [[biological machine]]s, in his 1986 book ''[[Engines of Creation]]''.
 
[[K. Eric Drexler]], one of the founders of [[nanotechnology]], postulated cell repair devices, including ones operating within cells and utilizing as yet hypothetical [[biological machine]]s, in his 1986 book ''[[Engines of Creation]]''.
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[[K.Eric Drexler]]，[[纳米技术]]的创始人之一，在他1986年的著作“[[创造的引擎]]”中，假设了细胞修复设备，包括在细胞内运行并利用目前假设的[[生物机器]]的设备。
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[[K.Eric Drexler]]，<font color = "#ff8000">纳米技术nanotechnology</font>的创始人之一，在他1986年的著作“<font color = "#ff8000">创造的引擎Engines of Creation</font>”中，假设了细胞修复设备，包括在细胞内运行并利用目前假设的[[生物机器]]的设备。
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据[[Richard Feynman]]所说，是他的前研究生和合作者[[Albert Hibbs]]最初向他建议（大约在1959年）费曼理论微型机械的“医学”用途。Hibbs认为，有一天，某些修理机器的尺寸可能会缩小到理论上可能（正如费曼所说的那样）“[[分子机器|生物|吞下医生]”。这个想法被纳入了费曼1959年的文章“[[在底部有很多空间]]”。<ref>{{cite web|url = http://www.its.caltech.edu/~feynman/plenty.html|title = There's Plenty of Room at the Bottom|first = Richard P.|last = Feynman |author-link = Richard Feynman|date = December 1959|url-status = dead|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20100211190050/http://www.its.caltech.edu/~feynman/plenty.html|archive-date = 2010-02-11}}</ref>
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根据[[Richard Feynman]]，他过去的研究生和合作者[[Albert Hibbs]]最初向他建议（大约在1959年）<font color = "#ff8000">费曼理论微型机械Feynman's theoretical micromachines</font>的“医学”用途。Hibbs认为，有一天，理论上某些修理机器的尺寸可能会被尽可能地缩小（正如费曼所说的那样）“[[Molecular machine#Biological|swallow the doctor]]”。这个想法被收入了费曼1959年的文章“<font color = "#ff8000">在底部有很多空间[There's Plenty of Room at the Bottom</font>”。
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Beyond merely extending the operational life of the physical body, [[Jaron Lanier]] argues for a form of immortality called "Digital Ascension" that involves "people dying in the flesh and being uploaded into a computer and remaining conscious".<ref>{{cite book |title = You Are Not a Gadget: A Manifesto |last = Lanier |first = Jaron |author-link = Jaron Lanier |publisher = [[Alfred A. Knopf]] |year = 2010 |isbn = 978-0307269645 |location = New York, NY |page = [https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780307269645/page/26 26] |url-access = registration |url = https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780307269645 }}</ref>
 
Beyond merely extending the operational life of the physical body, [[Jaron Lanier]] argues for a form of immortality called "Digital Ascension" that involves "people dying in the flesh and being uploaded into a computer and remaining conscious".<ref>{{cite book |title = You Are Not a Gadget: A Manifesto |last = Lanier |first = Jaron |author-link = Jaron Lanier |publisher = [[Alfred A. Knopf]] |year = 2010 |isbn = 978-0307269645 |location = New York, NY |page = [https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780307269645/page/26 26] |url-access = registration |url = https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780307269645 }}</ref>
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除了仅仅延长物质身体的运行寿命之外，[[Jaron Lanier]]还主张一种称为“数字提升”的不朽形式，即“人死在肉体上，被上传到电脑里，保持清醒”。<ref>{{cite book |title = You Are Not a Gadget: A Manifesto |last = Lanier |first = Jaron |author-link = Jaron Lanier |publisher = [[Alfred A. Knopf]] |year = 2010 |isbn = 978-0307269645 |location = New York, NY |page = [https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780307269645/page/26 26] |url-access = registration |url = https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780307269645 }}</ref>
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除了仅仅延长物质身体的运行寿命之外，[[Jaron Lanier]]还主张一种称为“<font color = "#ff8000">数字提升Digital Ascension</font>”的不朽形式，即“人在肉体层面死亡，意识被上传到电脑里并保持清醒”。
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==History of the concept概念史==
 
==History of the concept概念史==
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A paper by Mahendra Prasad, published in ''[[AI Magazine]]'', asserts that the 18th-century mathematician [[Marquis de Condorcet]] was the first person to hypothesize and mathematically model an intelligence explosion and its effects on humanity.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Prasad|first=Mahendra|year=2019|title=Nicolas de Condorcet and the First Intelligence Explosion Hypothesis|journal=AI Magazine|volume=40|issue=1|pages=29–33|doi=10.1609/aimag.v40i1.2855}}</ref>
 
A paper by Mahendra Prasad, published in ''[[AI Magazine]]'', asserts that the 18th-century mathematician [[Marquis de Condorcet]] was the first person to hypothesize and mathematically model an intelligence explosion and its effects on humanity.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Prasad|first=Mahendra|year=2019|title=Nicolas de Condorcet and the First Intelligence Explosion Hypothesis|journal=AI Magazine|volume=40|issue=1|pages=29–33|doi=10.1609/aimag.v40i1.2855}}</ref>
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Mahendra Prasad在“[[人工智能杂志]]”上发表的一篇论文断言，18世纪的数学家[[Marquis de Condorcet]]是第一个对智能爆炸及其对人类影响进行假设和数学建模的人。<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Prasad|first=Mahendra|year=2019|title=Nicolas de Condorcet and the First Intelligence Explosion Hypothesis|journal=AI Magazine|volume=40|issue=1|pages=29–33|doi=10.1609/aimag.v40i1.2855}}</ref>
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Mahendra Prasad在“[[人工智能杂志]]”上发表的一篇论文断言，18世纪的数学家[[Marquis de Condorcet]]是第一个对智能爆炸及其对人类影响进行假设和数学建模的人。
    
An early description of the idea was made in [[John Wood Campbell Jr.]]'s 1932 short story "The last evolution".
 
An early description of the idea was made in [[John Wood Campbell Jr.]]'s 1932 short story "The last evolution".
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1932年[[约翰.伍德.坎贝尔]的短篇小说《最后的进化》（the last evolution）对这一想法作了早期的描述。
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1932年[[约翰.伍德.坎贝尔]的短篇小说<font color = "#ff8000">《最后的进化》（the last evolution）</font>对这一想法作了早期的描述。
    
In his 1958 obituary for [[John von Neumann]], Ulam recalled a conversation with von Neumann about the "ever accelerating progress of technology and changes in the mode of human life, which gives the appearance of approaching some essential singularity in the history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, could not continue."<ref name=mathematical/>
 
In his 1958 obituary for [[John von Neumann]], Ulam recalled a conversation with von Neumann about the "ever accelerating progress of technology and changes in the mode of human life, which gives the appearance of approaching some essential singularity in the history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, could not continue."<ref name=mathematical/>
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乌兰姆在1958年为【【约翰·冯·诺依曼】】写的讣告中，回忆了与冯·诺依曼的一次对话：“技术的不断进步和人类生活方式的变化，这使我们似乎接近了种族历史上某些基本的奇点，超出了这些奇点，人类的事务就不能继续下去了。”<ref name=mathematical/>
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Ulam在1958年为约翰·冯·诺依曼写的讣告中，回忆了与冯·诺依曼的一次对话：“技术的不断进步和人类生活方式的变化，这使我们似乎接近了种族历史上某些基本的奇点，超出了这些奇点，人类的事务就不能继续下去了。”
    
In 1965, Good wrote his essay postulating an "intelligence explosion" of recursive self-improvement of a machine intelligence.
 
In 1965, Good wrote his essay postulating an "intelligence explosion" of recursive self-improvement of a machine intelligence.
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In 1981, [[Stanisław Lem]] published his [[science fiction]] novel ''[[Golem XIV]]''. It describes a military AI computer (Golem XIV) who obtains consciousness and starts to increase his own intelligence, moving towards personal technological singularity. Golem XIV was originally created to aid its builders in fighting wars, but as its intelligence advances to a much higher level than that of humans, it stops being interested in the military requirement because it finds them lacking internal logical consistency.
 
In 1981, [[Stanisław Lem]] published his [[science fiction]] novel ''[[Golem XIV]]''. It describes a military AI computer (Golem XIV) who obtains consciousness and starts to increase his own intelligence, moving towards personal technological singularity. Golem XIV was originally created to aid its builders in fighting wars, but as its intelligence advances to a much higher level than that of humans, it stops being interested in the military requirement because it finds them lacking internal logical consistency.
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1981年，[[Stanisław Lem]]出版了他的[[科幻小说]]小说“[[Golem XIV]]”。它描述了一台军用人工智能计算机（魔像十四），他获得意识并开始增加自己的智能，朝着个人技术奇点迈进。傀儡十四世最初是为了帮助它的建造者打仗，但随着它的智力发展到比人类更高的水平，它不再对军事需求感兴趣，因为它发现它们缺乏内在的逻辑一致性。
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1981年，[[Stanisław Lem]]出版了他的[[科幻小说]]小说“[[Golem XIV]]”。它描述了一台军用人工智能计算机（Golem XIV）获得了意识并开始增加自己的智能，朝着个体的技术奇点迈进。Golem XIV最初是为了帮助它的建造者打仗，但随着它的智力发展到比人类更高的水平，它不再对军事感兴趣，因为它发现它们缺乏内在的逻辑一致性。
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In 1983, [[Vernor Vinge]] greatly popularized Good's intelligence explosion in a number of writings, first addressing the topic in print in the January 1983 issue of ''[[Omni (magazine)|Omni]]'' magazine. In this op-ed piece, Vinge seems to have been the first to use the term "singularity" in a way that was specifically tied to the creation of intelligent machines:<ref name="google4"/><ref name="technological"/>
 
In 1983, [[Vernor Vinge]] greatly popularized Good's intelligence explosion in a number of writings, first addressing the topic in print in the January 1983 issue of ''[[Omni (magazine)|Omni]]'' magazine. In this op-ed piece, Vinge seems to have been the first to use the term "singularity" in a way that was specifically tied to the creation of intelligent machines:<ref name="google4"/><ref name="technological"/>
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1983年，[[Vernor Vinge]]在许多著作中极大地普及了Good的智能爆炸，第一次在1983年1月出版的“[[Omni（magazine）| Omni]]”杂志上发表了这一主题。在这篇评论文章中，文奇似乎是第一个使用“奇点”一词的人，这种用法与智能机器的创造有着特别的联系：<ref name=“google4”/><ref name=“technology”/>
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1983年，[[Vernor Vinge]]在许多著作中极大地普及了Good的智能爆炸，他第一次在1983年1月出版的“[[Omni”杂志上提到了这一主题。在这篇评论文章中，Vinge似乎是第一个使用“奇点”一词的人，并将“奇点”的概念特别地与智能机器的创造进行联系：
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{{quote|We will soon create intelligences greater than our own. When this happens, human history will have reached a kind of singularity, an intellectual transition as impenetrable as the knotted space-time at the center of a black hole, and the world will pass far beyond our understanding. This singularity, I believe, already haunts a number of science-fiction writers. It makes realistic extrapolation to an interstellar future impossible. To write a story set more than a century hence, one needs a nuclear war in between ... so that the world remains intelligible.}}
 
{{quote|We will soon create intelligences greater than our own. When this happens, human history will have reached a kind of singularity, an intellectual transition as impenetrable as the knotted space-time at the center of a black hole, and the world will pass far beyond our understanding. This singularity, I believe, already haunts a number of science-fiction writers. It makes realistic extrapolation to an interstellar future impossible. To write a story set more than a century hence, one needs a nuclear war in between ... so that the world remains intelligible.}}
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{{我们很快就会创造出比我们自己更强大的智能。当这种情况发生时，人类历史将达到一种奇点，一种如同黑洞中心打结的时空一样难以逾越的知识转变，世界将远远超出我们的理解。我相信，这种奇点已经困扰了许多科幻作家。这使得对星际未来的现实推断变得不可能。要写一个多世纪以来的故事，就需要一场核战争。。。这样世界就可以理解了。}}
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{{我们很快就会创造出比我们自己更强大的智能。当这种情况发生时，人类历史将达到一种奇点，一种如同黑洞中心打结的时空一样难以逾越的知识转变，世界将远远超出我们的理解。我相信，这种奇点已经困扰了许多科幻作家。这使得对星际未来的现实推断变得不可能。要写一个多世纪以后的故事，科幻小说家需要一场核战争……这样世界就可以理解了。}}
    
In 1985, in "The Time Scale of Artificial Intelligence", artificial intelligence researcher [[Ray Solomonoff]] articulated mathematically the related notion of what he called an "infinity point": if a research community of human-level self-improving AIs take four years to double their own speed, then two years, then one year and so on, their capabilities increase infinitely in finite time.<ref name=chalmers /><ref name="std"/>
 
In 1985, in "The Time Scale of Artificial Intelligence", artificial intelligence researcher [[Ray Solomonoff]] articulated mathematically the related notion of what he called an "infinity point": if a research community of human-level self-improving AIs take four years to double their own speed, then two years, then one year and so on, their capabilities increase infinitely in finite time.<ref name=chalmers /><ref name="std"/>
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1985年，在《人工智能的时间尺度》一书中，人工智能研究人员[[Ray Solomonoff]]以数学的方式阐述了他所说的“无限点”的相关概念：如果一个人类水平的自我改进人工智能的研究社区需要四年时间使其速度加倍，那么两年，然后一年，依此类推，它们的能力在有限的时间内无限增长。<ref name=chalmers/><ref name=“std”/>
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1985年，在《<font color = "#ff8000">人工智能的时间尺度The Time Scale of Artificial Intelligence</font>》一书中，人工智能研究人员[[Ray Solomonoff]]以数学的方式阐述了他所说的“无限点”的相关概念：如果一个人类水平的能自我改进人工智能的研究社区需要四年时间使其速度加倍，那么两年，然后一年，依此类推，它们的能力在有限的时间内无限增长。<ref name=chalmers/><ref name=“std”/>
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Vinge's 1993 article "The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era",<ref name="vinge1993" /> spread widely on the internet and helped to popularize the idea.<ref name="google5"/> This article contains the statement, "Within thirty years, we will have the technological means to create superhuman intelligence. Shortly after, the human era will be ended." Vinge argues that science-fiction authors cannot write realistic post-singularity characters who surpass the human intellect, as the thoughts of such an intellect would be beyond the ability of humans to express.<ref name="vinge1993" />
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Vinge's 1993 article "The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era",<ref name="vinge1993" /> spread widely on the internet and helped to popularize the idea.<ref name="google5"/> This article contains the statement, "Within thirty years, we will have the technological means to create superhuman intelligence. Shortly after, the human era will be ended." Vinge argues that science-fiction authors cannot write realistic post-singularity characters who surpass the human intellect, as the thoughts of such an intellect would be beyond the ability of humans to express.<ref name="vinge1993" />
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Vinge 1993年的文章《<font color = "#ff8000">未来的技术奇点：如何在后人类时代生存The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era</font>》在互联网上广为传播，普及了这一理念。“在三十年内，我们将拥有创造超人智慧的技术手段。不久之后，人类时代将结束。”Vinge认为，科幻小说作者无法写出超越人类智力的现实主义后奇点人物，因为这种智力的思想将超出人类的表达能力。
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Vinge 1993年的文章《未来的技术奇点：如何在后人类时代生存》<ref name=“vinge1993”/>在互联网上广为传播，并有助于推广这一理念。不久之后，人类时代将结束。”文奇认为，科幻小说作者无法写出超越人类智力的现实主义后奇点人物，因为这种智力的思想将超出人类的表达能力。<ref name=“vinge1993”/>
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In 2000, [[Bill Joy]], a prominent technologist and a co-founder of [[Sun Microsystems]], voiced concern over the potential dangers of the singularity.<ref name="JoyFuture"/>
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In 2000, [[Bill Joy]], a prominent technologist and a co-founder of [[Sun Microsystems]], voiced concern over the potential dangers of the singularity.<ref name="JoyFuture"/>
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在2000年，[[Bill Joy]]，一位著名的技术专家和[[Sun Microsystems]]的联合创始人，表达了对奇点的潜在危险的担忧。
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在2000年，[[Bill Joy]]，一位著名的技术专家和[[Sun Microsystems]]的联合创始人，表达了对奇点的潜在危险的担忧。<ref name="JoyFuture"/>
         
In 2005, Kurzweil published ''[[The Singularity is Near]]''. Kurzweil's publicity campaign included an appearance on ''[[The Daily Show with Jon Stewart]]''.<ref name="episode"/>
 
In 2005, Kurzweil published ''[[The Singularity is Near]]''. Kurzweil's publicity campaign included an appearance on ''[[The Daily Show with Jon Stewart]]''.<ref name="episode"/>
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2005年，库兹韦尔发表了“[[奇点临近]]”。库兹韦尔的宣传活动在“[[乔恩·斯图尔特的每日秀]]”上露面<ref name="episode"/>
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2005年，库兹韦尔发表了“<font color = "#ff8000">奇点近了The Singularity is Near</font>”。库兹韦尔的宣传活动包括上“[[乔恩·斯图尔特的每日秀The Daily Show with Jon Stewart]]”。
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| first = I. J.
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第一个 = i. j。
      
In 2007, [[Eliezer Yudkowsky]] suggested that many of the varied definitions that have been assigned to "singularity" are mutually incompatible rather than mutually supporting.<ref name="yudkowsky.net"/><ref>Sandberg, Anders. "An overview of models of technological singularity." Roadmaps to AGI and the Future of AGI Workshop, Lugano, Switzerland, March. Vol. 8. 2010.</ref> For example, Kurzweil extrapolates current technological trajectories past the arrival of self-improving AI or superhuman intelligence, which Yudkowsky argues represents a tension with both I. J. Good's proposed discontinuous upswing in intelligence and Vinge's thesis on unpredictability.<ref name="yudkowsky.net"/>
 
In 2007, [[Eliezer Yudkowsky]] suggested that many of the varied definitions that have been assigned to "singularity" are mutually incompatible rather than mutually supporting.<ref name="yudkowsky.net"/><ref>Sandberg, Anders. "An overview of models of technological singularity." Roadmaps to AGI and the Future of AGI Workshop, Lugano, Switzerland, March. Vol. 8. 2010.</ref> For example, Kurzweil extrapolates current technological trajectories past the arrival of self-improving AI or superhuman intelligence, which Yudkowsky argues represents a tension with both I. J. Good's proposed discontinuous upswing in intelligence and Vinge's thesis on unpredictability.<ref name="yudkowsky.net"/>
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2007年，[[Eliezer Yudkowsky]]指出，许多被赋予“奇点”的不同定义是相互不相容的，而不是相互支持的<ref name="yudkowsky.net"/><ref>Sandberg, Anders. "An overview of models of technological singularity." Roadmaps to AGI and the Future of AGI Workshop, Lugano, Switzerland, March. Vol. 8. 2010.</ref>例如，Kurzweil推断了当前的技术发展轨迹，而这些都是在自我完善的人工智能或超人智能的到来之后，尤德科夫斯基认为，这代表着一种紧张关系，既有I.J.古德提出的智力不连续上升，也有文奇关于不可预测性的论文。<ref name="yudkowsky.net"/>
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| last = Good
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2007年，[[Eliezer Yudkowsky]]指出，许多被赋予“奇点”的不同定义是相互不兼容的，而不是相互支持的。例如，Kurzweil认为的当前的技术发展轨迹，都是在自我完善的人工智能或超人智能的到来之后才会出现的。Yudkowsky认为，这代表着一种既有I.J.Good提出的智力不连续上升，也有Vinge关于不可预测性的紧张关系。
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| last = Good
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| author-link = I. J. Good
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| 作者链接 = i. j。很好
      
In 2009, Kurzweil and [[X-Prize]] founder [[Peter Diamandis]] announced the establishment of [[Singularity University]], a nonaccredited private institute whose stated mission is "to educate, inspire and empower leaders to apply exponential technologies to address humanity's grand challenges."<ref name="singularityu"/> Funded by [[Google]], [[Autodesk]], [[ePlanet Ventures]], and a group of [[High tech|technology industry]] leaders, Singularity University is based at [[NASA]]'s [[Ames Research Center]] in [[Mountain View, California|Mountain View]], [[California]]. The not-for-profit organization runs an annual ten-week graduate program during summer that covers ten different technology and allied tracks, and a series of executive programs throughout the year.
 
In 2009, Kurzweil and [[X-Prize]] founder [[Peter Diamandis]] announced the establishment of [[Singularity University]], a nonaccredited private institute whose stated mission is "to educate, inspire and empower leaders to apply exponential technologies to address humanity's grand challenges."<ref name="singularityu"/> Funded by [[Google]], [[Autodesk]], [[ePlanet Ventures]], and a group of [[High tech|technology industry]] leaders, Singularity University is based at [[NASA]]'s [[Ames Research Center]] in [[Mountain View, California|Mountain View]], [[California]]. The not-for-profit organization runs an annual ten-week graduate program during summer that covers ten different technology and allied tracks, and a series of executive programs throughout the year.
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2009年，Kurzweil和[[X-Prize]]的创始人[[Peter Diamandis]]宣布成立[[奇点大学]]，这是一所未经认可的私立学院，其宣称的使命是“教育、激励和授权领导者应用指数技术应对人类的重大挑战。”<ref name="singularityu"/>奇点大学由[[Google]]、[[Autodesk]]、[[ePlanet Ventures]]和一群[[高科技 | 技术产业]]的领导团队资助，总部设在[[NASA]]的[[Ames Research Center]]，位于[[Mountain View，California]]的[[California]]。这家非营利组织在夏季每年夏季举办为期十周的研究生课程，涵盖十种不同的技术和相关领域，并全年举办一系列高管课程。
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2009年，Kurzweil和[[X-Prize]]的创始人[[Peter Diamandis]]宣布成立[[奇点大学]]，这是一所未经认可的私立学院，其宣称的使命是“教育、激励和赋能领导者来使用指数技术应对人类的重大挑战。”奇点大学由[[Google]]、[[Autodesk]]、[[ePlanet Ventures]]和一群高科技产业的领导团队资助，总部设在[[NASA]]的[[Ames Research Center]]（加利福尼亚州，Mountain View）。这家非营利组织在每年夏季举办为期十周的研究生课程，涵盖十种不同的技术和相关领域，并全年举办一系列高管课程。
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| chapter = Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine
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关于第一台超智能机器的推测
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| year = 1965
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1965年
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==In politics==
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| volume=6
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==In politics 在政治中==
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6
      
In 2007, the Joint Economic Committee of the [[United States Congress]] released a report about the future of nanotechnology. It predicts significant technological and political changes in the mid-term future, including possible technological singularity.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vyp1AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA375|title=Encyclopedia of Nanoscience and Society|first=David H.|last=Guston|date=14 July 2010|publisher=SAGE Publications|isbn=978-1-4522-6617-6}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/20120213_TheFutureisComingSoonerThanYouThink.pdf | title=Nanotechnology: The Future is Coming Sooner Than You Think | publisher=Joint Economic Committee | date=March 2007}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://crnano.typepad.com/crnblog/2007/03/congress_and_th.html|title=Congress and the Singularity}}</ref>
 
In 2007, the Joint Economic Committee of the [[United States Congress]] released a report about the future of nanotechnology. It predicts significant technological and political changes in the mid-term future, including possible technological singularity.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vyp1AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA375|title=Encyclopedia of Nanoscience and Society|first=David H.|last=Guston|date=14 July 2010|publisher=SAGE Publications|isbn=978-1-4522-6617-6}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/20120213_TheFutureisComingSoonerThanYouThink.pdf | title=Nanotechnology: The Future is Coming Sooner Than You Think | publisher=Joint Economic Committee | date=March 2007}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://crnano.typepad.com/crnblog/2007/03/congress_and_th.html|title=Congress and the Singularity}}</ref>
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2007年，美国国会联合经济委员会发布了一份关于纳米技术未来的报告。它预测在中期的未来会发生重大的技术和政治变化，包括可能出现的技术奇点。<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vyp1AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA375|title=Encyclopedia of Nanoscience and Society|first=David H.|last=Guston|date=14 July 2010|publisher=SAGE Publications|isbn=978-1-4522-6617-6}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/20120213_TheFutureisComingSoonerThanYouThink.pdf | title=Nanotechnology: The Future is Coming Sooner Than You Think | publisher=Joint Economic Committee | date=March 2007}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://crnano.typepad.com/crnblog/2007/03/congress_and_th.html|title=Congress and the Singularity}}</ref>
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2007年，<font color = "#ff8000">美国国会联合经济委员会the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress</font>一份关于纳米技术的未来的报告预测，在中期的未来会发生诸多重大的技术和政治变化，包括可能出现的技术奇点。
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One thing that we haven't talked about too much, and I just want to go back to, is we really have to think through the economic implications. Because most people aren't spending a lot of time right now worrying about singularity—they are worrying about "Well, is my job going to be replaced by a machine?"
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有一件事我们没有谈得太多，我只想回到过去，那就是我们真的必须考虑经济影响。因为大多数人现在并没有花太多时间去担心奇点，他们在担心“好吧，我的工作会被机器取代吗？
      
Former President of the United States [[Barack Obama]] spoke about singularity in his interview to ''[[Wired (magazine)|Wired]]'' in 2016:<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.wired.com/2016/10/president-obama-mit-joi-ito-interview/|title=Barack Obama Talks AI, Robo Cars, and the Future of the World|first=Scott|last=Dadich|journal=Wired|date=12 October 2016}}</ref>
 
Former President of the United States [[Barack Obama]] spoke about singularity in his interview to ''[[Wired (magazine)|Wired]]'' in 2016:<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.wired.com/2016/10/president-obama-mit-joi-ito-interview/|title=Barack Obama Talks AI, Robo Cars, and the Future of the World|first=Scott|last=Dadich|journal=Wired|date=12 October 2016}}</ref>
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美国前总统[[Barack Obama]]在2016年接受“[[Wired（magazine）| Wired]]”采访时谈到了奇点：<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.wired.com/2016/10/president-obama-mit-joi-ito-interview/|title=Barack Obama Talks AI, Robo Cars, and the Future of the World|first=Scott|last=Dadich|journal=Wired|date=12 October 2016}}</ref>
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美国前总统[[Barack Obama]]在2016年接受“Wired”杂志采访时谈到了奇点：
       
{{Quote|text=One thing that we haven't talked about too much, and I just want to go back to, is we really have to think through the economic implications. Because most people aren't spending a lot of time right now worrying about singularity—they are worrying about "Well, is my job going to be replaced by a machine?"}}
 
{{Quote|text=One thing that we haven't talked about too much, and I just want to go back to, is we really have to think through the economic implications. Because most people aren't spending a lot of time right now worrying about singularity—they are worrying about "Well, is my job going to be replaced by a machine?"}}
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{{Quote | text=有一件事我们没有谈得太多，我只想回到过去，那就是我们真的必须考虑经济影响。因为大多数人现在并没有花太多时间去担心奇点，他们在担心“好吧，我的工作会被机器取代吗？”}}
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| chapter-url = http://www.aeiveos.com/~bradbury/Authors/Computing/Good-IJ/SCtFUM.html
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| chapter-url =  http://www.aeiveos.com/~bradbury/authors/computing/good-ij/sctfum.html
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One thing that we haven't talked about too much, and I just want to go back to, is we really have to think through the economic implications. Because most people aren't spending a lot of time right now worrying about singularity—they are worrying about "Well, is my job going to be replaced by a machine?"
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| access-date=2007-08-07
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有一件事我们没有谈得太多，我还想回过去谈谈，那就是我们真的必须考虑对经济的影响。因为大多数人现在并没有花太多时间去担心奇点，而是在担心“好吧，我的工作会被机器取代吗？”
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| access-date = 2007-08-07
      
==See also参阅==
 
==See also参阅==
嘉树
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