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第239行： − + − − |} 'If Dani had been home tomorrow, we would’ve visited him.' − − 如果丹妮明天在家，我们就会去看他了 − − − Palestinian Arabic is another:+ − − 巴勒斯坦阿拉伯语是另一个例子: − − − + − − In formal semantics and philosophical logic, fake past is regarded as a puzzle, since it is not obvious why so many unrelated languages would repurpose a tense morpheme to mark counterfactuality. Proposed solutions to this puzzle divide into two camps: past as modal and past as past. These approaches differ in whether or not they take the past tense's core meaning to be about time. − − 在形式语义学和哲学逻辑中，虚假的过去被认为是一个谜，因为不明显的是为什么这么多不相关的语言重新使用一个时态语素来标记反事实性。针对这一难题提出的解决办法分为两个阵营: 过去为模式和过去为过去。这些方法的不同之处在于它们是否将过去时的核心意思理解为与时间有关。 + + + + − − The topic x is not the contextually-provided x+ − − 主题 x 不是上下文提供的 x − − − Depending on how this denotation composes, x can be a time interval or a possible world. When x is a time, the past tense will convey that the sentence is talking about non-current times, i.e. the past. When x is a world, it will convey that the sentence is talking about a potentially non-actual possibility. The latter is what allows for a counterfactual meaning.+ − − 根据这个指称的组成，x 可以是时间间隔，也可以是可能世界。当 x 是时间时，过去时态表示句子指的是非现在时间，也就是说，过去时态指的是非现在时间。过去。当 x 是一个世界时，它将传达出这个句子所指的是一种潜在的不真实的可能性。后者是允许反事实意义的东西。 − − + − The past as past approach treats the past tense as having an inherently temporal denotation. On this approach, so-called fake tense isn't actually fake. It differs from "real" tense only in how it takes scope, i.e. which component of the sentence's meaning is shifted to an earlier time. When a sentence has "real" past marking, it discusses something that happened at an earlier time; when a sentence has so-called fake past marking, it discusses possibilities that were accessible at an earlier time but may no longer be.+ − + − 过去时作为过去时的方法认为过去时具有内在的时间外延。在这种方法中，所谓的假时态实际上并不是假的。它与“真实”时态的区别仅在于它如何占据范围，即。句子的哪个部分的意思转移到了更早的时间。当一个句子有“真实的”过去标记时，它讨论的是发生在更早的时间的事情; 当一个句子有所谓的“假过去标记”时，它讨论的可能性在更早的时间是可以接受的，但可能不再是。 − − − +
→Variably strict conditional
Sarah Moss（2012）和Karen Lewis（2018）对这些论点做出了回应，表明一个版本的可变严格分析可以解释这些模式，并认为这样的解释是可取的，因为它也可以解释明显的例外情况。截至2020年，这一争论在文献中仍在继续，Willer（2019）等人认为，严格条件账户也可以涵盖这些例外情况。
Sarah Moss（2012）和Karen Lewis（2018）对这些论点做出了回应，表明一个版本的可变严格分析可以解释这些模式，并认为这样的解释是可取的，因为它也可以解释明显的例外情况。截至2020年，这一争论在文献中仍在继续，Willer（2019）等人认为，严格条件账户也可以涵盖这些例外情况。
====Variably strict conditional====
====可变严格条件 Variably strict conditional====
In the variably strict approach, the semantics of a conditional ''A'' > ''B'' is given by some function on the relative closeness of worlds where A is true and B is true, on the one hand, and worlds where A is true but B is not, on the other.
In the variably strict approach, the semantics of a conditional ''A'' > ''B'' is given by some function on the relative closeness of worlds where A is true and B is true, on the one hand, and worlds where A is true but B is not, on the other.
在可变严格方法中，条件''A'' > ''B''的语义是由一些函数给出的，一方面是A为真、B为真的世界，另一方面是A为真、B为假的世界的相对接近程度。
On Lewis's account, A > C is (a) vacuously true if and only if there are no worlds where A is true (for example, if A is logically or metaphysically impossible); (b) non-vacuously true if and only if, among the worlds where A is true, some worlds where C is true are closer to the actual world than any world where C is not true; or (c) false otherwise. Although in Lewis's ''Counterfactuals'' it was unclear what he meant by 'closeness', in later writings, Lewis made it clear that he did ''not'' intend the metric of 'closeness' to be simply our ordinary notion of [[Similarity (philosophy)#Respective and overall similarity|overall similarity]].
On Lewis's account, A > C is (a) vacuously true if and only if there are no worlds where A is true (for example, if A is logically or metaphysically impossible); (b) non-vacuously true if and only if, among the worlds where A is true, some worlds where C is true are closer to the actual world than any world where C is not true; or (c) false otherwise. Although in Lewis's ''Counterfactuals'' it was unclear what he meant by 'closeness', in later writings, Lewis made it clear that he did ''not'' intend the metric of 'closeness' to be simply our ordinary notion of [[Similarity (philosophy)#Respective and overall similarity|overall similarity]].
在刘易斯的论述中，A > C 是(a)空洞的真实，只有在没有A为真的世界时（例如，如果A在逻辑上或形而上学上是不可能的）；(b)非空洞的真实，只有在A为真的世界中，一些C为真的世界比任何C不为真的世界更接近实际世界；或者(c)虚假，在其他世界里。尽管在刘易斯的《反事实》中，他对“接近性（closeness）”的意思并不清晰，但在后来的著作中，刘易斯明确表示，他并不打算将“接近性”的尺度简单地作为我们对整体相似性的普通概念。
Example:
Example:
:If he had eaten more at breakfast, he would not have been hungry at 11 am.
:If he had eaten more at breakfast, he would not have been hungry at 11 am.
例子：
:如果他在早餐时吃多一点，他在上午11点就不会饿。
On Lewis's account, the truth of this statement consists in the fact that, among possible worlds where he ate more for breakfast, there is at least one world where he is not hungry at 11 am and which is closer to our world than any world where he ate more for breakfast but is still hungry at 11 am.
On Lewis's account, the truth of this statement consists in the fact that, among possible worlds where he ate more for breakfast, there is at least one world where he is not hungry at 11 am and which is closer to our world than any world where he ate more for breakfast but is still hungry at 11 am.
根据刘易斯的说法，这个陈述的真理在于：在他早餐吃得更多的可能世界中，至少有一个他在上午11点不饿的世界比任何他早餐吃得更多但在上午11点仍然饿的世界更接近我们的世界。
In the past as modal approach, the denotation of the past tense is not fundamentally about time. Rather, it is an underspecified skeleton which can apply either to modal or temporal content. For instance, the particular past as modal proposal of Iatridou (2000), the past tense's core meaning is what's shown schematically below:
In the past as modal approach, the denotation of the past tense is not fundamentally about time. Rather, it is an underspecified skeleton which can apply either to modal or temporal content. For instance, the particular past as modal proposal of Iatridou (2000), the past tense's core meaning is what's shown schematically below:
过去式作为情态动词的方法，过去时的外延从根本上说不是关于时间的。相反，它是一个未指定的框架，既可以应用于模态内容，也可以应用于时态内容。例如，Iatridou (2000)的特殊过去式作为情态提议，过去式的核心含义是下面的图示:
过去式作为情态动词的方法，过去时的外延从根本上说不是关于时间的。相反，它是一个未指定的框架，既可以应用于模态内容，也可以应用于时态内容。例如，Iatridou (2000)的特殊过去式作为情态提议，过去式的核心含义是下面的图示:
Stalnaker's account differs from Lewis's most notably in his acceptance of the ''limit'' and ''uniqueness assumptions''. The uniqueness assumption is the thesis that, for any antecedent A, among the possible worlds where A is true, there is a single (''unique'') one that is ''closest'' to the actual world. The limit assumption is the thesis that, for a given antecedent A, if there is a chain of possible worlds where A is true, each closer to the actual world than its predecessor, then the chain has a ''limit'': a possible world where A is true that is closer to the actual worlds than all worlds in the chain. (The uniqueness assumption [[logical consequence|entails]] the limit assumption, but the limit assumption does not entail the uniqueness assumption.) On Stalnaker's account, A > C is non-vacuously true if and only if, at the closest world where A is true, C is true. So, the above example is true just in case at the single, closest world where he ate more breakfast, he does not feel hungry at 11 am. Although it is controversial, Lewis rejected the limit assumption (and therefore the uniqueness assumption) because it rules out the possibility that there might be worlds that get closer and closer to the actual world without limit. For example, there might be an infinite series of worlds, each with a coffee cup a smaller fraction of an inch to the left of its actual position, but none of which is uniquely the closest. (See Lewis 1973: 20.)
Stalnaker's account differs from Lewis's most notably in his acceptance of the ''limit'' and ''uniqueness assumptions''. The uniqueness assumption is the thesis that, for any antecedent A, among the possible worlds where A is true, there is a single (''unique'') one that is ''closest'' to the actual world. The limit assumption is the thesis that, for a given antecedent A, if there is a chain of possible worlds where A is true, each closer to the actual world than its predecessor, then the chain has a ''limit'': a possible world where A is true that is closer to the actual worlds than all worlds in the chain. (The uniqueness assumption [[logical consequence|entails]] the limit assumption, but the limit assumption does not entail the uniqueness assumption.) On Stalnaker's account, A > C is non-vacuously true if and only if, at the closest world where A is true, C is true. So, the above example is true just in case at the single, closest world where he ate more breakfast, he does not feel hungry at 11 am. Although it is controversial, Lewis rejected the limit assumption (and therefore the uniqueness assumption) because it rules out the possibility that there might be worlds that get closer and closer to the actual world without limit. For example, there might be an infinite series of worlds, each with a coffee cup a smaller fraction of an inch to the left of its actual position, but none of which is uniquely the closest. (See Lewis 1973: 20.)
Stalnaker的论述与Lewis的论述最明显的不同在于，他接受了“极限（limit）”和“唯一性假设（uniqueness assumptions）”。唯一性假设的论点是：对于任何前件A，在A为真的可能世界中，有一个最接近实际世界的单一（唯一）世界。极限假设的论点是，对于一个给定的前件A，如果存在一个A为真的可能世界链，每个世界都比它的前一个世界更接近实际世界，那么这个链就有一个极限：一个A为真的可能世界比这个链中的所有世界更接近实际世界。（唯一性假设包含了极限假设，但极限假设并不包含唯一性假设）。根据Stalnaker的观点，当且仅当在最接近A为真的世界中，C为真时，A>C才是非空洞的真。因此，上面的例子是真的，只是在他吃了更多早餐的唯一最接近的世界中，他在上午11点不觉得饿。虽然有争议，但Lewis拒绝了极限假设（因此也拒绝了唯一性假设），因为它排除了这样一种可能性，即可能存在着越来越接近实际世界的世界，而没有极限。例如，可能会有一系列无限的世界，每个世界的咖啡杯都在其实际位置的左边小几分之一英寸，但其中没有一个是唯一最接近的。（见Lewis 1973: 20）。
One consequence of Stalnaker's acceptance of the uniqueness assumption is that, if the [[law of excluded middle]] is true, then all instances of the formula (A > C) ∨ (A > ¬C) are true. The law of excluded middle is the thesis that for all propositions p, p ∨ ¬p is true. If the uniqueness assumption is true, then for every antecedent A, there is a uniquely closest world where A is true. If the law of excluded middle is true, any consequent C is either true or false at that world where A is true. So for every counterfactual A > C, either A > C or A > ¬C is true. This is called conditional excluded middle (CEM). Example:
One consequence of Stalnaker's acceptance of the uniqueness assumption is that, if the [[law of excluded middle]] is true, then all instances of the formula (A > C) ∨ (A > ¬C) are true. The law of excluded middle is the thesis that for all propositions p, p ∨ ¬p is true. If the uniqueness assumption is true, then for every antecedent A, there is a uniquely closest world where A is true. If the law of excluded middle is true, any consequent C is either true or false at that world where A is true. So for every counterfactual A > C, either A > C or A > ¬C is true. This is called conditional excluded middle (CEM). Example:
Stalnaker接受唯一性假设的一个结果是，如果排除中间律是真的，那么公式(A>C)∨(A>¬C)的所有实例都是真的。排他性中间律的论题是：对于所有命题p，p∨¬p都是真的。如果唯一性假设为真，那么对于每一个前件A，都有一个唯一最接近的世界，其中A为真。如果排除中间法则是真的，任何结果C在A为真的那个世界里要么是真，要么是假。所以对于每一个反事实A>C，要么A>C，要么A>¬C为真。这就是所谓的条件排除中间法（CEM）。例子：
:(1) If the fair coin had been flipped, it would have landed heads.
:(1) If the fair coin had been flipped, it would have landed heads.
:(2) If the fair coin had been flipped, it would have landed tails (i.e. not heads).
:(1) 如果公平的硬币被抛出，它将会正面朝上。
:(2) 如果公平的硬币被抛出，它将会反面朝上（即不是正面朝上）。
:(2) If the fair coin had been flipped, it would have landed tails (i.e. not heads).
On Stalnaker's analysis, there is a closest world where the fair coin mentioned in (1) and (2) is flipped and at that world either it lands heads or it lands tails. So either (1) is true and (2) is false or (1) is false and (2) true. On Lewis's analysis, however, both (1) and (2) are false, for the worlds where the fair coin lands heads are no more or less close than the worlds where they land tails. For Lewis, "If the coin had been flipped, it would have landed heads or tails" is true, but this does not entail that "If the coin had been flipped, it would have landed heads, or: If the coin had been flipped it would have landed tails."
On Stalnaker's analysis, there is a closest world where the fair coin mentioned in (1) and (2) is flipped and at that world either it lands heads or it lands tails. So either (1) is true and (2) is false or (1) is false and (2) true. On Lewis's analysis, however, both (1) and (2) are false, for the worlds where the fair coin lands heads are no more or less close than the worlds where they land tails. For Lewis, "If the coin had been flipped, it would have landed heads or tails" is true, but this does not entail that "If the coin had been flipped, it would have landed heads, or: If the coin had been flipped it would have landed tails."
根据Stalnaker的分析，存在一个最接近的世界，在这个世界里，(1)和(2)中提到的公平的硬币被抛出，硬币要么正面朝上，要么反面朝上。因此，要么（1）是真，（2）是假，要么（1）是假，（2）是真。然而，根据Lewis的分析，(1)和(2)都是假的，因为公平的硬币正面朝上的世界并不比反面朝上的世界更接近或更远离。对Lewis来说，“如果硬币被抛出，它将正面朝上或反面朝上”是真的，但这并不意味着“如果硬币被抛出，它将落在正面”，或“如果硬币被抛出，它就会反面朝上”。
=== Other accounts ===
=== Other accounts ===