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{{Redirect|The Singularity||Singularity (disambiguation)}}

{{Redirect|The Singularity||Singularity (disambiguation)}}

{{blockquote|[Computers] have, literally ..., no [[intelligence]], no [[motivation]], no [[autonomy]], and no agency.  We design them to behave as if they had certain sorts of [[psychology]], but there is no psychological reality to the corresponding processes or behavior. ...  [T]he machinery has no beliefs, desires, [or] motivations.<ref>[[John R. Searle]], “What Your Computer Can’t Know”, ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', 9 October 2014, p. 54.</ref>}}

{{blockquote|[Computers] have, literally ..., no [[intelligence]], no [[motivation]], no [[autonomy]], and no agency.  We design them to behave as if they had certain sorts of [[psychology]], but there is no psychological reality to the corresponding processes or behavior. ...  [T]he machinery has no beliefs, desires, [or] motivations.<ref>[[John R. Searle]], “What Your Computer Can’t Know”, ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', 9 October 2014, p. 54.</ref>}}

[[Martin Ford (author)|Martin Ford]] in ''The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future''<ref name="thelightsinthetunnel"/> postulates a "technology paradox" in that before the singularity could occur most routine jobs in the economy would be automated, since this would require a level of technology inferior to that of the singularity. This would cause massive unemployment and plummeting consumer demand, which in turn would destroy the incentive to invest in the technologies that would be required to bring about the Singularity. Job displacement is increasingly no longer limited to work traditionally considered to be "routine."<ref name="nytimes"/>

[[Martin Ford (author)|Martin Ford]] in ''The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future''<ref name="thelightsinthetunnel"/> postulates a "technology paradox" in that before the singularity could occur most routine jobs in the economy would be automated, since this would require a level of technology inferior to that of the singularity. This would cause massive unemployment and plummeting consumer demand, which in turn would destroy the incentive to invest in the technologies that would be required to bring about the Singularity. Job displacement is increasingly no longer limited to work traditionally considered to be "routine."<ref name="nytimes"/>

Martin Ford在“<font color = "#ff8000">隧道中的灯光：自动化、加速技术和未来经济The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future</font>”中提出了一个“技术悖论”：在奇点出现之前，经济体中的大多数日常工作都将自动化，因为这所需的技术水平低于奇点。这将导致大规模的失业和消费者需求的骤降，这反过来又会破坏投资于实现奇点所需技术的动机。取代工作将不再局限于传统上被认为是“例行公事”的工作。

Martin Ford在“隧道中的灯光：自动化、加速技术和未来经济 The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future”<ref name="thelightsinthetunnel"/>中提出了一个“技术悖论”：在奇点出现之前，经济体中的大多数日常工作都将自动化，因为这所需的技术水平低于奇点。这将导致大规模的失业和消费者需求的骤降，这反过来又会破坏投资于实现奇点所需技术的动机。工作的替代越来越不再局限于那些传统上被认为是“例行公事”的工作。<ref name="nytimes"/>

[[Theodore Modis]]<ref name="google13"/><ref name="Singularity Myth"/> and [[Jonathan Huebner]]<ref name="technological14"/> argue that the rate of technological innovation has not only ceased to rise, but is actually now declining. Evidence for this decline is that the rise in computer [[clock rate]]s is slowing, even while Moore's prediction of exponentially increasing circuit density continues to hold. This is due to excessive heat build-up from the chip, which cannot be dissipated quickly enough to prevent the chip from melting when operating at higher speeds. Advances in speed may be possible in the future by virtue of more power-efficient CPU designs and multi-cell processors.<ref name="cnet"/> While Kurzweil used Modis' resources, and Modis' work was around accelerating change, Modis distanced himself from Kurzweil's thesis of a "technological singularity", claiming that it lacks scientific rigor.<ref name="Singularity Myth"/>

[[Theodore Modis]]<ref name="google13"/><ref name="Singularity Myth"/> and [[Jonathan Huebner]]<ref name="technological14"/> argue that the rate of technological innovation has not only ceased to rise, but is actually now declining. Evidence for this decline is that the rise in computer [[clock rate]]s is slowing, even while Moore's prediction of exponentially increasing circuit density continues to hold. This is due to excessive heat build-up from the chip, which cannot be dissipated quickly enough to prevent the chip from melting when operating at higher speeds. Advances in speed may be possible in the future by virtue of more power-efficient CPU designs and multi-cell processors.<ref name="cnet"/> While Kurzweil used Modis' resources, and Modis' work was around accelerating change, Modis distanced himself from Kurzweil's thesis of a "technological singularity", claiming that it lacks scientific rigor.<ref name="Singularity Myth"/>

[[Theodore Modis]]和[[Jonathan Huebner]]认为技术创新的速度不仅停止上升，而且现在实际上正在下降。这种下降的证据是计算机时钟速率的增长正在放缓，尽管摩尔关于电路密度指数增长的预测仍然成立。这是由于芯片产生过多的热量，当它们以较高的速度运行时，这些热量不能足够快地散去，可能导致芯片熔化。在未来，随着更节能的CPU设计和多单元处理器的发明，速度的提高可能实现。虽然库兹韦尔利用了莫迪斯的资源，而莫迪斯的工作是围绕加速变革展开的，但莫迪斯却与库兹韦尔的“技术奇点”理论保持距离，声称该理论缺乏科学严谨性。

Theodore Modis<ref name="google13"/><ref name="Singularity Myth"/>和Jonathan Huebner<ref name="technological14"/> 认为技术创新的速度不仅停止上升，而且现在实际上正在下降。这种下降的证据是计算机时钟速率的增长正在放缓，尽管摩尔关于电路密度指数增长的预测仍然成立。这是由于芯片产生过多的热量，当它们以较高的速度运行时，这些热量不能足够快地散去，可能导致芯片熔化。在未来，随着更节能的CPU设计和多单元处理器的发明，速度的提高可能实现。<ref name="cnet"/>尽管 Kurzweil 利用了Modis的（工作成果）作为资源，同时 Modis 的工作围绕着加速变革，但 Modis 与 Kurzweil 的“技术奇点”理论保持距离，称其缺乏科学严谨性。<ref name="Singularity Myth"/>

 

In a detailed empirical accounting, ''The Progress of Computing'', [[William Nordhaus]] argued that, prior to 1940, computers followed the much slower growth of a traditional industrial economy, thus rejecting extrapolations of Moore's law to 19th-century computers.<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1017/S0022050707000058|title = Two Centuries of Productivity Growth in Computing| journal=The Journal of Economic History| volume=67|pages = 128–159|year = 2007|last1 = Nordhaus|first1 = William D.| citeseerx=10.1.1.330.1871}}</ref>

In a detailed empirical accounting, ''The Progress of Computing'', [[William Nordhaus]] argued that, prior to 1940, computers followed the much slower growth of a traditional industrial economy, thus rejecting extrapolations of Moore's law to 19th-century computers.<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1017/S0022050707000058|title = Two Centuries of Productivity Growth in Computing| journal=The Journal of Economic History| volume=67|pages = 128–159|year = 2007|last1 = Nordhaus|first1 = William D.| citeseerx=10.1.1.330.1871}}</ref>

在一份详细的实证记录“<font color = "#ff8000">计算的进步The Progress of Computing</font>”中，[[William Nordhaus]]认为，在1940年以前，计算机遵循传统工业经济增长缓慢的趋势，因此拒绝了摩尔定律对19世纪计算机的推断。

在一份详细的实证报告《计算的进步 The Progress of Computing》中，威廉·诺德豪斯 William Nordhaus 认为，在 1940 年之前，计算机遵循传统工业经济增长缓慢的趋势，因此拒绝了摩尔定律对19世纪计算机的推断。<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1017/S0022050707000058|title = Two Centuries of Productivity Growth in Computing| journal=The Journal of Economic History| volume=67|pages = 128–159|year = 2007|last1 = Nordhaus|first1 = William D.| citeseerx=10.1.1.330.1871}}</ref>

In a 2007 paper, Schmidhuber stated that the frequency of subjectively "notable events" appears to be approaching a 21st-century singularity, but cautioned readers to take such plots of subjective events with a grain of salt: perhaps differences in memory of recent and distant events could create an illusion of accelerating change where none exists.<ref>Schmidhuber, Jürgen. "New millennium AI and the convergence of history." Challenges for computational intelligence. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. 15–35.</ref>

In a 2007 paper, Schmidhuber stated that the frequency of subjectively "notable events" appears to be approaching a 21st-century singularity, but cautioned readers to take such plots of subjective events with a grain of salt: perhaps differences in memory of recent and distant events could create an illusion of accelerating change where none exists.<ref>Schmidhuber, Jürgen. "New millennium AI and the convergence of history." Challenges for computational intelligence. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. 15–35.</ref>

 

Paul Allen argued the opposite of accelerating returns, the complexity brake; the more progress science makes towards understanding intelligence, the more difficult it becomes to make additional progress. A study of the number of patents shows that human creativity does not show accelerating returns, but in fact, as suggested by Joseph Tainter in his The Collapse of Complex Societies, a law of diminishing returns. The number of patents per thousand peaked in the period from 1850 to 1900, and has been declining since.[60] The growth of complexity eventually becomes self-limiting, and leads to a widespread "general systems collapse".

Paul Allen argued the opposite of accelerating returns, the complexity brake; the more progress science makes towards understanding intelligence, the more difficult it becomes to make additional progress. A study of the number of patents shows that human creativity does not show accelerating returns, but in fact, as suggested by Joseph Tainter in his The Collapse of Complex Societies, a law of diminishing returns. The number of patents per thousand peaked in the period from 1850 to 1900, and has been declining since.[60] The growth of complexity eventually becomes self-limiting, and leads to a widespread "general systems collapse".