− | ''哥德尔的论点'':哥德尔本人 、John Lucas(在1961年——和Roger Penrose(在1989年以后的一个更详细的争论中)提出了高度技术性的观点,认为人类数学家可以看到他们自己的“'''哥德尔不完备定理 Gödel Satements'''”的真实性,因此计算能力超过机械图灵机。然而,也有一些人不同意“哥德尔不完备定理”。<ref>{{cite web|author1=Graham Oppy|title=Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#GdeArgAgaMec|website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|accessdate=27 April 2016|date=20 January 2015|quote=These Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments are, however, problematic, and there is wide consensus that they fail.}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author1=Stuart J. Russell|author2=Peter Norvig|title=Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach|date=2010|publisher=Prentice Hall|location=Upper Saddle River, NJ|isbn=978-0-13-604259-4|edition=3rd|chapter=26.1.2: Philosophical Foundations/Weak AI: Can Machines Act Intelligently?/The mathematical objection|quote=even if we grant that computers have limitations on what they can prove, there is no evidence that humans are immune from those limitations.|}}</ref><ref>Mark Colyvan. An introduction to the philosophy of mathematics. Cambridge University Press, 2012. From 2.2.2, 'Philosophical significance of Gödel's incompleteness results': "The accepted wisdom (with which I concur) is that the Lucas-Penrose arguments fail."</ref> | + | ''哥德尔的论点'':哥德尔本人 、John Lucas和Roger Penrose(在1989年以后的一个更详细的争论中)提出了高度技术性的观点,认为人类数学家可以看到他们自己的“'''哥德尔不完备定理 Gödel Satements'''”的真实性,因此计算能力超过机械图灵机。然而,也有一些人不同意“哥德尔不完备定理”。<ref>{{cite web|author1=Graham Oppy|title=Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#GdeArgAgaMec|website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|accessdate=27 April 2016|date=20 January 2015|quote=These Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments are, however, problematic, and there is wide consensus that they fail.}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author1=Stuart J. Russell|author2=Peter Norvig|title=Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach|date=2010|publisher=Prentice Hall|location=Upper Saddle River, NJ|isbn=978-0-13-604259-4|edition=3rd|chapter=26.1.2: Philosophical Foundations/Weak AI: Can Machines Act Intelligently?/The mathematical objection|quote=even if we grant that computers have limitations on what they can prove, there is no evidence that humans are immune from those limitations.|}}</ref><ref>Mark Colyvan. An introduction to the philosophy of mathematics. Cambridge University Press, 2012. From 2.2.2, 'Philosophical significance of Gödel's incompleteness results': "The accepted wisdom (with which I concur) is that the Lucas-Penrose arguments fail."</ref> |
| ''AI效应'': 机器本来就是智能的,但是观察者却没有意识到这一点。当深蓝在国际象棋比赛中击败加里 · 卡斯帕罗夫时,机器就在做出智能行为。然而,旁观者通常对AI程序的行为不屑一顾,认为它根本不是“真正的”智能; 因此,“真正的”智能就是人任何类能够做到但机器仍然做不到的智能行为。这就是众所周知的AI效应: “AI就是一切尚未完成的事情"。 | | ''AI效应'': 机器本来就是智能的,但是观察者却没有意识到这一点。当深蓝在国际象棋比赛中击败加里 · 卡斯帕罗夫时,机器就在做出智能行为。然而,旁观者通常对AI程序的行为不屑一顾,认为它根本不是“真正的”智能; 因此,“真正的”智能就是人任何类能够做到但机器仍然做不到的智能行为。这就是众所周知的AI效应: “AI就是一切尚未完成的事情"。 |