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第65行： − + − + − − It is implied that the prisoners will have no opportunity to reward or punish their partner other than the prison sentences they get and that their decision will not affect their reputation in the future. Because betraying a partner offers a greater reward than cooperating with them, all purely rational self-interested prisoners will betray the other, meaning the only possible outcome for two purely rational prisoners is for them to betray each other.<ref>{{cite web|last=Milovsky|first=Nicholas|title=The Basics of Game Theory and Associated Games|url=https://issuu.com/johnsonnick895/docs/game_theory_paper|accessdate=11 February 2014}}</ref> In reality, humans display a [[systemic bias]] towards cooperative behavior in this and similar games despite what is predicted by simple models of "rational" self-interested action.<ref name = Fehr>{{cite journal | last1=Fehr | first1= Ernst | last2=Fischbacher | first2=Urs | date= Oct 23, 2003 | title=The Nature of human altruism |journal=Nature | volume=425 | pages=785–91 | doi=10.1038/nature02043 | url=http://www.iwp.jku.at/born/mpwfst/04/nature02043_f_born.pdf | accessdate=February 27, 2013 | pmid=14574401 | issue=6960|bibcode = 2003Natur.425..785F }}</ref><ref name = Amos>{{cite book | title=Preference, belief, and similarity: selected writings. | publisher=Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press | first1= Amos | last1=Tversky | first2=Eldar | last2=Shafir | url=http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~gary/PAPER-SUGGESTIONS/Preference,%20Belief,%20and%20Similarity%20Selected%20Writings%20(Bradford%20Books).pdf | year=2004 | isbn=9780262700931 | accessdate=February 27, 2013}}</ref><ref name="Ahn">{{cite journal |last1 = Toh-Kyeong|first1 = Ahn|last2 = Ostrom|first2 = Elinor|last3 = Walker|first3 = James|date = Sep 5, 2002|title = Incorporating Motivational Heterogeneity into Game-Theoretic Models of Collective Action|journal = Public Choice|volume = 117|issue = 3–4|pages = 295–314|doi =10.1023/b:puch.0000003739.54365.fd |url = http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/seminars/papers/ahnostromwalker_092402.pdf|accessdate = June 27, 2015|hdl = 10535/4697}}</ref><ref name="Hessel">{{cite journal|last1 = Oosterbeek|first1 = Hessel|last2 = Sloof|first2 = Randolph|last3 = Van de Kuilen|first3 = Gus|date = Dec 3, 2003|title = Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis|journal = Experimental Economics|volume = 7|issue = 2|pages = 171–88|doi = 10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026978.14316.74|url = http://www.econ.nagoya-cu.ac.jp/~yhamagu/ultimatum.pdf|accessdate = February 27, 2013|url-status = dead|archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20130512175243/http://www.econ.nagoya-cu.ac.jp/~yhamagu/ultimatum.pdf|archivedate = May 12, 2013}}</ref> This bias towards cooperation has been known since the test was first conducted at RAND; the secretaries involved trusted each other and worked together for the best common outcome.<ref>{{Cite book | url=https://books.google.com/?id=WIhZlB86nJwC&pg=PT96&lpg=PT96&dq=rand+secretaries+prisoner%27s+dilemma#v=onepage |title = Why Most Things Fail|isbn = 9780571266142|last1 = Ormerod|first1 = Paul|date = 2010-12-22}}</ref> The prisoner's dilemma became the focus of extensive experimental research.<ref>Deutsch, M. (1958). Trust and suspicion. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2(4), 265–279. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200275800200401</ref> <ref>Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. M. (1965). Prisoner’s Dilemma: A study of conflict and cooperation. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.</ref> − − It is implied that the prisoners will have no opportunity to reward or punish their partner other than the prison sentences they get and that their decision will not affect their reputation in the future. Because betraying a partner offers a greater reward than cooperating with them, all purely rational self-interested prisoners will betray the other, meaning the only possible outcome for two purely rational prisoners is for them to betray each other. In reality, humans display a systemic bias towards cooperative behavior in this and similar games despite what is predicted by simple models of "rational" self-interested action. This bias towards cooperation has been known since the test was first conducted at RAND; the secretaries involved trusted each other and worked together for the best common outcome. The prisoner's dilemma became the focus of extensive experimental research. + − An extended "iterated" version of the game also exists. In this version, the classic game is played repeatedly between the same prisoners, who continuously have the opportunity to penalize the other for previous decisions. If the number of times the game will be played is known to the players, then (by [[backward induction]]) two classically rational players will betray each other repeatedly, for the same reasons as the single-shot variant. In an infinite or unknown length game there is no fixed optimum strategy, and prisoner's dilemma tournaments have been held to compete and test algorithms for such cases.<ref>{{cite journal|url = https://egtheory.wordpress.com/2015/03/02/ipd/|title = Short history of iterated prisoner's dilemma tournaments|date = March 2, 2015|access-date = February 8, 2016|journal = Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume = 24|issue = 3|pages = 379–403|last = Kaznatcheev|first = Artem|doi = 10.1177/002200278002400301}}</ref>+ − − An extended "iterated" version of the game also exists. In this version, the classic game is played repeatedly between the same prisoners, who continuously have the opportunity to penalize the other for previous decisions. If the number of times the game will be played is known to the players, then (by backward induction) two classically rational players will betray each other repeatedly, for the same reasons as the single-shot variant. In an infinite or unknown length game there is no fixed optimum strategy, and prisoner's dilemma tournaments have been held to compete and test algorithms for such cases. − − 一个扩展的<font color="#ff8000">重复iterated</font>版本的博弈由此衍生出来。在这个版本中，经典博弈会在在同一组囚犯之间重复进行，他们不断有机会为了之前的决定对其他囚犯进行惩罚。如果参与者知道博弈的次数，那么(通过<font color="#ff8000">逆向归纳法 backward induction </font>)两个经典的理性的玩家就会因为和在单次博弈中相同的原因反复背叛对方。在无限次或未知次数的博弈中，没有固定的最优策略，因而，举办囚徒困境竞赛来竞争和检验这种情况下的算法。<ref>{{cite journal|url = https://egtheory.wordpress.com/2015/03/02/ipd/|title = Short history of iterated prisoner's dilemma tournaments|date = March 2, 2015|access-date = February 8, 2016|journal = Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume = 24|issue = 3|pages = 379–403|last = Kaznatcheev|first = Artem|doi = 10.1177/002200278002400301}}</ref> − − − − The prisoner's dilemma game can be used as a model for many [[#Real-life examples|real world situations]] involving cooperative behavior. In casual usage, the label "prisoner's dilemma" may be applied to situations not strictly matching the formal criteria of the classic or iterative games: for instance, those in which two entities could gain important benefits from cooperating or suffer from the failure to do so, but find it difficult or expensive—not necessarily impossible—to coordinate their activities. − − The prisoner's dilemma game can be used as a model for many real world situations involving cooperative behavior. In casual usage, the label "prisoner's dilemma" may be applied to situations not strictly matching the formal criteria of the classic or iterative games: for instance, those in which two entities could gain important benefits from cooperating or suffer from the failure to do so, but find it difficult or expensive—not necessarily impossible—to coordinate their activitie − − + − 囚徒困境的策略 − − − Two prisoners are separated into individual rooms and cannot communicate with each other. − − Two prisoners are separated into individual rooms and cannot communicate with each other. − The normal game is shown below: − − The normal game is shown below: − − − − {| class="wikitable" − − {| class="wikitable" − + − |- − − |- − − ! {{diagonal split header|<br />Prisoner A|Prisoner B}} !! Prisoner B stays silent<br>(''cooperates'') !! Prisoner B betrays<br>(''defects'') − − − − ! {{diagonal split header|<br />犯人A|犯人B}}！！犯人B保持沉默<br>(''合作'') !! 犯人B背叛<br>(''背叛'') − − |- − − |- − − − ! Prisoner A stays silent<br>(''cooperates'') − − ! Prisoner A stays silent<br>(cooperates) − − − | Each serves 1 year|| Prisoner A: 3 years<br />Prisoner B: goes free − − | Each serves 1 year|| Prisoner A: 3 years<br />Prisoner B: goes free − − − |- − − |- − − − ! Prisoner A betrays<br>(''defects'') − − ! Prisoner A betrays<br>(defects) − − − | Prisoner A: goes free<br />Prisoner B: 3 years || Each serves 2 years − − | Prisoner A: goes free<br />Prisoner B: 3 years || Each serves 2 years − − − |} − − |} −
无编辑摘要
<qouteblock>一个犯罪团伙的两名成员被捕入狱。每个囚犯都被单独监禁，与他人无法沟通。检察官缺乏足够的证据来对这两个人定罪，但有足够的证据以较低的罪名定罪。同时，检察官向每个犯人提供了一个交易。每个囚犯都有机会出卖对方，证明对方犯下的罪行，或者他们可以合作，保持沉默。可能的结果有:
<blockquote>一个犯罪团伙的两名成员被捕入狱。每个囚犯都被单独监禁，与他人无法沟通。检察官缺乏足够的证据来对这两个人定罪，但有足够的证据以较低的罪名定罪。同时，检察官向每个犯人提供了一个交易。每个囚犯都有机会出卖对方，证明对方犯下的罪行，或者他们可以合作，保持沉默。可能的结果有:
*如果A和B都背叛了对方，他们都会在监狱服刑两年。
*如果A和B都背叛了对方，他们都会在监狱服刑两年。
*如果A背叛了B但B保持沉默，A会被无罪释放而B会服刑三年。
*如果A背叛了B但B保持沉默，A会被无罪释放而B会服刑三年。
*如果A保持沉默但B背叛了A，A会服刑三年而B会无罪释放。
*如果A保持沉默但B背叛了A，A会服刑三年而B会无罪释放。
*如果A和B都保持沉默，他们就只用服刑一年（以较低的罪名）。</qouteblock>
*如果A和B都保持沉默，他们就只用服刑一年（以较低的罪名）。</blockquote>
这意味着，囚犯除了监禁刑罚之外，没有机会奖励或惩罚他们的同伴，他们的决定也不会影响他们未来的声誉。因为背叛一个同伴比与他们合作能得到更大的回报，所以所有纯粹理性的、自私自利的囚犯都会背叛对方，这意味着，对于两个纯粹理性的囚犯来说，唯一可能的结果就是他们相互背叛。<ref>{{cite web|last=Milovsky|first=Nicholas|title=The Basics of Game Theory and Associated Games|url=https://issuu.com/johnsonnick895/docs/game_theory_paper|accessdate=11 February 2014}}</ref>实际上，尽管“理性的”自利行为的简单模型已经预测到了这一点，但人类在这种和类似的博弈中仍然表现出对合作行为的<font color="#ff8000">系统性偏差 systemic bias </font>。<ref name = Fehr>{{cite journal | last1=Fehr | first1= Ernst | last2=Fischbacher | first2=Urs | date= Oct 23, 2003 | title=The Nature of human altruism |journal=Nature | volume=425 | pages=785–91 | doi=10.1038/nature02043 | url=http://www.iwp.jku.at/born/mpwfst/04/nature02043_f_born.pdf | accessdate=February 27, 2013 | pmid=14574401 | issue=6960|bibcode = 2003Natur.425..785F }}</ref><ref name = Amos>{{cite book | title=Preference, belief, and similarity: selected writings. | publisher=Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press | first1= Amos | last1=Tversky | first2=Eldar | last2=Shafir | url=http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~gary/PAPER-SUGGESTIONS/Preference,%20Belief,%20and%20Similarity%20Selected%20Writings%20(Bradford%20Books).pdf | year=2004 | isbn=9780262700931 | accessdate=February 27, 2013}}</ref><ref name="Ahn">{{cite journal |last1 = Toh-Kyeong|first1 = Ahn|last2 = Ostrom|first2 = Elinor|last3 = Walker|first3 = James|date = Sep 5, 2002|title = Incorporating Motivational Heterogeneity into Game-Theoretic Models of Collective Action|journal = Public Choice|volume = 117|issue = 3–4|pages = 295–314|doi =10.1023/b:puch.0000003739.54365.fd |url = http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/seminars/papers/ahnostromwalker_092402.pdf|accessdate = June 27, 2015|hdl = 10535/4697}}</ref><ref name="Hessel">{{cite journal|last1 = Oosterbeek|first1 = Hessel|last2 = Sloof|first2 = Randolph|last3 = Van de Kuilen|first3 = Gus|date = Dec 3, 2003|title = Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis|journal = Experimental Economics|volume = 7|issue = 2|pages = 171–88|doi = 10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026978.14316.74|url = http://www.econ.nagoya-cu.ac.jp/~yhamagu/ultimatum.pdf|accessdate = February 27, 2013|url-status = dead|archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20130512175243/http://www.econ.nagoya-cu.ac.jp/~yhamagu/ultimatum.pdf|archivedate = May 12, 2013}}</ref>自从在兰德公司首次进行这项测试以来，人们就已经知道了这种对合作的偏见; 参与测试的秘书们相互信任，为了最好的共同的目标而努力。<ref>{{Cite book | url=https://books.google.com/?id=WIhZlB86nJwC&pg=PT96&lpg=PT96&dq=rand+secretaries+prisoner%27s+dilemma#v=onepage |title = Why Most Things Fail|isbn = 9780571266142|last1 = Ormerod|first1 = Paul|date = 2010-12-22}}</ref>囚徒困境成为大量实验研究的焦点。<ref>Deutsch, M. (1958). Trust and suspicion. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2(4), 265–279. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200275800200401</ref> <ref>Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. M. (1965). Prisoner’s Dilemma: A study of conflict and cooperation. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.</ref>
这意味着，囚犯除了监禁刑罚之外，没有机会奖励或惩罚他们的同伴，他们的决定也不会影响他们未来的声誉。因为背叛一个同伴比与他们合作能得到更大的回报，所以所有纯粹理性的、自私自利的囚犯都会背叛对方，这意味着，对于两个纯粹理性的囚犯来说，唯一可能的结果就是他们相互背叛。<ref>{{cite web|last=Milovsky|first=Nicholas|title=The Basics of Game Theory and Associated Games|url=https://issuu.com/johnsonnick895/docs/game_theory_paper|accessdate=11 February 2014}}</ref>实际上，尽管“理性的”自利行为的简单模型已经预测到了这一点，但人类在这种和类似的博弈中仍然表现出对合作行为的<font color="#ff8000">系统性偏差 systemic bias </font>。<ref name = Fehr>{{cite journal | last1=Fehr | first1= Ernst | last2=Fischbacher | first2=Urs | date= Oct 23, 2003 | title=The Nature of human altruism |journal=Nature | volume=425 | pages=785–91 | doi=10.1038/nature02043 | url=http://www.iwp.jku.at/born/mpwfst/04/nature02043_f_born.pdf | accessdate=February 27, 2013 | pmid=14574401 | issue=6960|bibcode = 2003Natur.425..785F }}</ref><ref name = Amos>{{cite book | title=Preference, belief, and similarity: selected writings. | publisher=Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press | first1= Amos | last1=Tversky | first2=Eldar | last2=Shafir | url=http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~gary/PAPER-SUGGESTIONS/Preference,%20Belief,%20and%20Similarity%20Selected%20Writings%20(Bradford%20Books).pdf | year=2004 | isbn=9780262700931 | accessdate=February 27, 2013}}</ref><ref name="Ahn">{{cite journal |last1 = Toh-Kyeong|first1 = Ahn|last2 = Ostrom|first2 = Elinor|last3 = Walker|first3 = James|date = Sep 5, 2002|title = Incorporating Motivational Heterogeneity into Game-Theoretic Models of Collective Action|journal = Public Choice|volume = 117|issue = 3–4|pages = 295–314|doi =10.1023/b:puch.0000003739.54365.fd |url = http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/seminars/papers/ahnostromwalker_092402.pdf|accessdate = June 27, 2015|hdl = 10535/4697}}</ref><ref name="Hessel">{{cite journal|last1 = Oosterbeek|first1 = Hessel|last2 = Sloof|first2 = Randolph|last3 = Van de Kuilen|first3 = Gus|date = Dec 3, 2003|title = Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis|journal = Experimental Economics|volume = 7|issue = 2|pages = 171–88|doi = 10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026978.14316.74|url = http://www.econ.nagoya-cu.ac.jp/~yhamagu/ultimatum.pdf|accessdate = February 27, 2013|url-status = dead|archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20130512175243/http://www.econ.nagoya-cu.ac.jp/~yhamagu/ultimatum.pdf|archivedate = May 12, 2013}}</ref>自从在兰德公司首次进行这项测试以来，人们就已经知道了这种对合作的偏见; 参与测试的秘书们相互信任，为了最好的共同的目标而努力。<ref>{{Cite book | url=https://books.google.com/?id=WIhZlB86nJwC&pg=PT96&lpg=PT96&dq=rand+secretaries+prisoner%27s+dilemma#v=onepage |title = Why Most Things Fail|isbn = 9780571266142|last1 = Ormerod|first1 = Paul|date = 2010-12-22}}</ref>囚徒困境成为大量实验研究的焦点。<ref>Deutsch, M. (1958). Trust and suspicion. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2(4), 265–279. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200275800200401</ref> <ref>Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. M. (1965). Prisoner’s Dilemma: A study of conflict and cooperation. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.</ref>
一个扩展的重复版本的博弈由此衍生出来。在这个版本中，经典博弈会在在同一组囚犯之间重复进行，他们不断有机会为了之前的决定对其他囚犯进行惩罚。如果参与者知道博弈的次数，那么(通过逆向归纳法 backward induction )两个经典的理性的玩家就会因为和在单次博弈中相同的原因反复背叛对方。在无限次或未知次数的博弈中，没有固定的最优策略，因而，举办囚徒困境竞赛来竞争和检验这种情况下的算法。<ref>{{cite journal|url = https://egtheory.wordpress.com/2015/03/02/ipd/|title = Short history of iterated prisoner's dilemma tournaments|date = March 2, 2015|access-date = February 8, 2016|journal = Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume = 24|issue = 3|pages = 379–403|last = Kaznatcheev|first = Artem|doi = 10.1177/002200278002400301}}</ref>
囚徒困境博弈可以作为许多现实中涉及合作行为的模型。在非正式用法中，“囚徒困境”一词可适用于不严格符合经典或重复博弈的形式标准的情况: 例如，两个实体可以从合作中获得巨大利益或者会因为合作失败而遭受损失，但发现协调他们的活动很困难或者代价昂贵（并非是不可能的）。
囚徒困境博弈可以作为许多现实中涉及合作行为的模型。在非正式用法中，“囚徒困境”一词可适用于不严格符合经典或重复博弈的形式标准的情况: 例如，两个实体可以从合作中获得巨大利益或者会因为合作失败而遭受损失，但发现协调他们的活动很困难或者代价昂贵（并非是不可能的）。
==Strategy for the prisoner's dilemma==
==囚徒困境的策略==
两名囚犯被分开关押在各自的房间里，不能相互交流。
两名囚犯被分开关押在各自的房间里，不能相互交流。
正常的博弈如下:
正常的博弈如下:
{ | class“ wikitable”
{ | class“ wikitable”
|-
|-
! ！！犯人B保持沉默<br>(''合作'') !! 犯人B背叛<br>(''背叛'')
! !! Prisoner B stays silent<br>(cooperates) !! Prisoner B betrays<br>(defects)
|-
|-
!犯人 a 保持沉默<br>(''合作'')
!犯人 a 保持沉默<br>(''合作'')
|每人服刑1年||囚犯 A: 3年<br />囚犯 B: 无罪释放
|每人服刑1年||囚犯 A: 3年<br />囚犯 B: 无罪释放
|-
|-
!犯人A背叛<br>(''背叛'')
!犯人A背叛<br>(''背叛'')
|囚犯 A: 获释<br />囚犯 B: 3年||每人服刑2年
|囚犯 A: 获释<br />囚犯 B: 3年||每人服刑2年
|}
|}