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还原论可以应用于任何现象，包括对象、问题、解释、理论和意义<ref name="Polkinghorne" /><ref name=":2" />。

还原论可以应用于任何现象，包括对象、问题、解释、理论和意义<ref name="Polkinghorne" /><ref name=":2" />。

For the sciences, application of methodological reductionism attempts explanation of entire systems in terms of their individual, constituent parts and their interactions. For example, the temperature of a gas is reduced to nothing beyond the average kinetic energy of its molecules in motion. Thomas Nagel and others speak of 'psychophysical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of psychological phenomena to physics and chemistry), and 'physico-chemical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of biology to physics and chemistry). and by Jaegwon Kim: that form of reductionism which concerns a program of replacing the facts or entities involved in one type of discourse with other facts or entities from another type, thereby providing a relationship between them. Richard Jones distinguishes ontological and epistemological reductionism, arguing that many ontological and epistemological reductionists affirm the need for different concepts for different degrees of complexity while affirming a reduction of theories. Some physicists, however, claim that reductionism and emergentism are complementary: both are needed to explain natural processes.

For the sciences, application of methodological reductionism attempts explanation of entire systems in terms of their individual, constituent parts and their interactions. For example, the temperature of a gas is reduced to nothing beyond the average kinetic energy of its molecules in motion. Thomas Nagel and others speak of 'psychophysical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of psychological phenomena to physics and chemistry), and 'physico-chemical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of biology to physics and chemistry).

对于科学而言，方法论还原论试图从个体、组成部分及其相互作用的角度对整个系统进行解释。例如，对气体温度的降低不能超过其运动着的分子的平均动能。托马斯 · 内格尔（Thomas Nagel）和其他人还谈到了“心理物理学还原论”(试图将心理现象还原为物理和化学)和“物理化学还原论”(试图将生物学还原为物理和化学)<ref name="Nagel" />。以及金在权（Jaegwon Kim） 提出的还原论: 还原论从形式上用另一类型的其他事实或实体替换论述中提及的某种类型的事实或实体，从而在它们之间提供一种联系。理查德 · 琼斯（Richard Jones）区分了本体论和认识论的还原论，他认为许多本体论和认识论的还原论者在肯定理论还原的同时，也肯定了不同程度的复杂性需要不同的概念。然而，一些物理学家声称还原论和涌现论是互补的: 对自然过程的解释二者都是必需的。

对于科学而言，方法论还原论试图从个体、组成部分及其相互作用的角度对整个系统进行解释。例如，对气体温度的降低不能超过其运动着的分子的平均动能。托马斯 · 内格尔（Thomas Nagel）和其他人还谈到了“心理物理学还原论”(试图将心理现象还原为物理和化学)和“物理化学还原论”(试图将生物学还原为物理和化学)<ref name="Nagel" />。

In a very simplified and sometimes contested form, reductionism is said to imply that a system is nothing but the sum of its parts.<ref name=Polkinghorne /><ref name=GodfreySmith /> However, a more nuanced opinion is that a system is composed entirely of its parts, but the system will have features that none of the parts have (which, in essence is the basis of [[emergentism]]).<ref name=Jones /> "The point of mechanistic explanations is usually showing how the higher level features arise from the parts."<ref name=GodfreySmith />

In a very simplified and sometimes contested form, reductionism is said to imply that a system is nothing but the sum of its parts.<ref name=Polkinghorne /><ref name=GodfreySmith /> However, a more nuanced opinion is that a system is composed entirely of its parts, but the system will have features that none of the parts have (which, in essence is the basis of [[emergentism]]).<ref name=Jones /> "The point of mechanistic explanations is usually showing how the higher level features arise from the parts."<ref name=GodfreySmith />

在一种非常简化的，有时是有争议的形式中，还原论被认为暗示一个系统只是它的部分的总和<ref name="Polkinghorne" /><ref name="GodfreySmith" />。然而，一种更微妙的观点是，一个系统完全由它的部分组成，但该系统将具有任何部分都没有的特征(这在本质上是涌现论的基础)<ref name="Jones" />。“机械论则侧重于解释整体更高层次的特征是如何从部分中产生的。”

在一种非常简化的，有时是有争议的形式中，还原论被认为暗示一个系统只是它的部分的总和<ref name="Polkinghorne" /><ref name="GodfreySmith" />。然而，与之有着细微差别的观点是，一个系统完全由它的部分组成，但该系统将具有任何部分都没有的特征(这在本质上是涌现论的基础)<ref name="Jones" />。“机械论则侧重于解释整体更高层次的特征是如何从部分中产生的。”

 

 

不过也有作者使用另外的定义。例如，约翰·鲍金霍恩（John Polkinghorne）所称的“观念的”或“认识论的”还原论是西蒙·布莱克本<ref name="Blackburn" /> （Simon Blackburn）和金在权<ref name="Kim" /> （Jaegwon Kim）所使用的定义: 还原论从形式上用另一类型的其他事实或实体替换论述中提及的某种类型的事实或实体，从而在它们之间提供一种联系。理查德 · 琼斯（Richard Jones）区分了本体论和认识论的还原论，他认为许多本体论和认识论的还原论者在肯定理论还原的同时，也肯定了不同程度的复杂性需要不同的概念<ref name="Jones" />。

不过也有作者使用另外的定义。例如，约翰·鲍金霍恩（John Polkinghorne）所称的“观念的”或“认识论的”还原论是西蒙·布莱克本<ref name="Blackburn" /> （Simon Blackburn）和金在权<ref name="Kim" /> （Jaegwon Kim）所使用的定义: 还原论从形式上用另一类型的其他事实或实体替换论述中提及的某种类型的事实或实体，从而在它们之间提供一种联系。理查德 · 琼斯（Richard Jones）区分了本体论和认识论的还原论，他认为许多本体论和认识论的还原论者在肯定理论还原的同时，也肯定了不同程度的复杂性需要不同的概念<ref name="Jones" />。

The idea of reductionism can be expressed by "levels" of explanation, with higher levels reducible if need be to lower levels. This use of levels of understanding in part expresses our human limitations in remembering detail. However, "most philosophers would insist that our role in conceptualizing reality [our need for a hierarchy of "levels" of understanding] does not change the fact that different levels of organization in reality do have different 'properties'."<ref name="Jones" />

The idea of reductionism can be expressed by "levels" of explanation, with higher levels reducible if need be to lower levels. This use of levels of understanding in part expresses our human limitations in remembering detail. However, "most philosophers would insist that our role in conceptualizing reality [our need for a hierarchy of "levels" of understanding] does not change the fact that different levels of organization in reality do have different 'properties'."<ref name="Jones" />

还原论的概念可以用解释的“层次”来表达，根据需要可以将较高的层次简化到较低的层次。这种对理解层次的使用在一定程度上反映了人类在记忆细节方面的局限性。然而，“大多数哲学家会坚持认为，我们在概念化现实中的角色(我们对理解层次的需要)不会改变现实中不同层次的组织确实有不同的‘属性’这一事实<ref name="Jones" />。”

还原论的观点可以用解释的“层次”来表达，根据需要可以将较高的层次还原到较低的层次。这种对理解层次的使用在一定程度上反映了人类在记忆细节方面的局限性。然而，“大多数哲学家会坚持认为，我们在概念化现实中的角色(我们对理解层次的需要)不会改变现实中不同层次的组织确实有不同的‘属性’这一事实<ref name="Jones" />。”

Reductionism should be distinguished from [[Eliminative materialism|eliminationism]]: reductionists do not deny the existence of phenomena, but explain them in terms of another reality; eliminationists deny the existence of the phenomena themselves. For example, eliminationists deny the existence of life by their explanation in terms of physical and chemical processes.

Reductionism should be distinguished from [[Eliminative materialism|eliminationism]]: reductionists do not deny the existence of phenomena, but explain them in terms of another reality; eliminationists deny the existence of the phenomena themselves. For example, eliminationists deny the existence of life by their explanation in terms of physical and chemical processes.

Token ontological reductionism is the idea that every item that exists is a sum item. For perceivable items, it affirms that every perceivable item is a sum of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Token ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is generally accepted.

Token ontological reductionism is the idea that every item that exists is a sum item. For perceivable items, it affirms that every perceivable item is a sum of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Token ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is generally accepted.

== Types ==

== 类型 ==

Most philosophers delineate three types of reductionism and anti-reductionism.<ref name="Ruse" />

Most philosophers delineate three types of reductionism and anti-reductionism.<ref name="Ruse" />

Type ontological reductionism is the idea that every type of item is a sum type of item, and that every perceivable type of item is a sum of types of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Type ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is often rejected.

Type ontological reductionism is the idea that every type of item is a sum type of item, and that every perceivable type of item is a sum of types of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Type ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is often rejected.

=== Ontological reductionism ===

=== 本体论还原论 ===

Michael Ruse has criticized ontological reductionism as an improper argument against vitalism.

Michael Ruse has criticized ontological reductionism as an improper argument against vitalism.

迈克尔 · 鲁斯批评本体论的还原论是反对活力论的不恰当论据。

迈克尔 · 鲁斯（Michael Ruse）批评本体论的还原论是反对活力论的不恰当论据。

Ontological reductionism is the belief that reality is composed of a minimum number of kinds of entities or substances.<ref name=":0" /> This claim is usually [[metaphysics|metaphysical]], and is most commonly a form of [[monism]], in effect claiming that all objects, properties and events are reducible to a single substance. (A [[mind-body dualism|dualist]] who is an ontological reductionist would believe that everything is reducible to two substances—as one possible example, a dualist might claim that reality is composed of "[[matter]]" and "[[spirit]]".)

Ontological reductionism is the belief that reality is composed of a minimum number of kinds of entities or substances.<ref name=":0" /> This claim is usually [[metaphysics|metaphysical]], and is most commonly a form of [[monism]], in effect claiming that all objects, properties and events are reducible to a single substance. (A [[mind-body dualism|dualist]] who is an ontological reductionist would believe that everything is reducible to two substances—as one possible example, a dualist might claim that reality is composed of "[[matter]]" and "[[spirit]]".)

Richard Jones divides ontological reductionism into two: the reductionism of substances (e.g., the reduction of mind to matter) and the reduction of the number of structures operating in nature (e.g., the reduction of one physical force to another). This permits scientists and philosophers to affirm the former while being anti-reductionists regarding the latter.<ref>Richard H. Jones (2000), ''Reductionism: Analysis and the Fuullness of Reality'', pp. 24-26, 29-31. Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press.</ref>

理查德·琼斯将本体论还原论分为两种：物质还原论（例如，将精神还原为物质）和在自然界中运作的结构数量的减少(例如，将一种物理作用力还原为另一种)。这种划分使得科学家和哲学家们在对后者持反对态度的同时不得不承认前者<ref name=":3" />。

 

南希·墨菲（Nancey Murphy） 断言有两种本体论还原论: 一种声称整体不过是它们的部分; 而另一种则是原子论还原论，认为整体不是“真实的（really real）”。她承认，“真实的（really real）”这个短语显然毫无意义，但她试图解释这两种还原论之间假定的差异<ref name=":4" />。

[[Nancey Murphy]] has claimed that there are two species of ontological reductionism: one that claims that wholes are nothing more than their parts; and atomist reductionism, claiming that wholes are not "really real". She admits that the phrase "really real" is apparently senseless but she has tried to explicate the supposed difference between the two.<ref>Nancey Murphy, "Reductionism and Emergence. A Critical Perspective." In ''Human Identity at the Intersection of Science, Technology and Religion''. Edited by Nancey Murphy, and Christopher C. Knight. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010. P. 82.</ref>

In science, reductionism implies that certain topics of study are based on areas that study smaller spatial scales or organizational units. While it is commonly accepted that the foundations of chemistry are based in physics, and molecular biology is based on chemistry, similar statements become controversial when one considers less rigorously defined intellectual pursuits. For example, claims that sociology is based on psychology, or that economics is based on sociology and psychology would be met with reservations. These claims are difficult to substantiate even though there are obvious associations between these topics (for instance, most would agree that psychology can affect and inform economics). The limit of reductionism's usefulness stems from emergent properties of complex systems, which are more common at certain levels of organization. For example, certain aspects of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology are rejected by some who claim that complex systems are inherently irreducible and that a holistic method is needed to understand them.

In science, reductionism implies that certain topics of study are based on areas that study smaller spatial scales or organizational units. While it is commonly accepted that the foundations of chemistry are based in physics, and molecular biology is based on chemistry, similar statements become controversial when one considers less rigorously defined intellectual pursuits. For example, claims that sociology is based on psychology, or that economics is based on sociology and psychology would be met with reservations. These claims are difficult to substantiate even though there are obvious associations between these topics (for instance, most would agree that psychology can affect and inform economics). The limit of reductionism's usefulness stems from emergent properties of complex systems, which are more common at certain levels of organization. For example, certain aspects of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology are rejected by some who claim that complex systems are inherently irreducible and that a holistic method is needed to understand them.

Ontological reductionism denies the idea of ontological [[emergence]], and claims that emergence is an [[Epistemology|epistemological]] phenomenon that only exists through analysis or description of a system, and does not exist fundamentally.<ref>[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00136 Michael Silberstein, John McGeever, "The Search for Ontological Emergence", ''The Philosophical Quarterly'', Vol. 49, No. 195 (April 1999)], ({{ISSN|0031-8094}}).</ref>

Ontological reductionism denies the idea of ontological [[emergence]], and claims that emergence is an [[Epistemology|epistemological]] phenomenon that only exists through analysis or description of a system, and does not exist fundamentally.<ref name=":5">[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00136 Michael Silberstein, John McGeever, "The Search for Ontological Emergence", ''The Philosophical Quarterly'', Vol. 49, No. 195 (April 1999)], ({{ISSN|0031-8094}}).</ref>

 

Some strong reductionists believe that the behavioral sciences should become "genuine" scientific disciplines based on genetic biology, and on the systematic study of culture (see Richard Dawkins's concept of memes). In his book The Blind Watchmaker, Dawkins introduced the term "hierarchical reductionism" to describe the opinion that complex systems can be described with a hierarchy of organizations, each of which is only described in terms of objects one level down in the hierarchy. He provides the example of a computer, which using hierarchical reductionism is explained in terms of the operation of hard drives, processors, and memory, but not on the level of logic gates, or on the even simpler level of electrons in a semiconductor medium.

Some strong reductionists believe that the behavioral sciences should become "genuine" scientific disciplines based on genetic biology, and on the systematic study of culture (see Richard Dawkins's concept of memes). In his book The Blind Watchmaker, Dawkins introduced the term "hierarchical reductionism" to describe the opinion that complex systems can be described with a hierarchy of organizations, each of which is only described in terms of objects one level down in the hierarchy. He provides the example of a computer, which using hierarchical reductionism is explained in terms of the operation of hard drives, processors, and memory, but not on the level of logic gates, or on the even simpler level of electrons in a semiconductor medium.

=== Methodological reductionism ===

=== 方法论还原论 ===

Disciplines such as cybernetics and systems theory imply non-reductionism, sometimes to the extent of explaining phenomena at a given level of hierarchy in terms of phenomena at a higher level, in a sense, the opposite of reductionism.

Disciplines such as cybernetics and systems theory imply non-reductionism, sometimes to the extent of explaining phenomena at a given level of hierarchy in terms of phenomena at a higher level, in a sense, the opposite of reductionism.

控制论和系统论等学科意味着非还原论，有时达到了用更高层次的现象来解释某一层次的现象的程度，在某种意义上，这是还原论的对立面。

控制论和系统论等学科意味着非还原论，有时达到了用更高层次的现象来解释某一层次的现象的程度，在某种意义上，这是还原论的对立面。

Methodological reductionism is the position that the best scientific strategy is to attempt to reduce explanations to the smallest possible entities.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|last=Montague|first=Gerard P.|title=Who Am I? Who Is She?: A Naturalistic, Holistic, Somatic Approach to Personal Identity|publisher=Transaction Books|year=2012|isbn=978-3-86838-144-3|location=Piscataway, NJ|pages=308}}</ref> In a biological context, this means attempting to explain all biological phenomena in terms of their underlying biochemical and molecular processes.<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |title=Reductionism in Biology |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/reduction-biology/ |last1=Brigandt |first1=Ingo |date=2017 |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |last2=Love |first2=Alan |access-date=2019-04-28}}</ref> Claim of efficacy is demonstrated that the gene – unit of classical heredity – is the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), a macro-molecule.<ref name=":1" />

Methodological reductionism is the position that the best scientific strategy is to attempt to reduce explanations to the smallest possible entities.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|last=Montague|first=Gerard P.|title=Who Am I? Who Is She?: A Naturalistic, Holistic, Somatic Approach to Personal Identity|publisher=Transaction Books|year=2012|isbn=978-3-86838-144-3|location=Piscataway, NJ|pages=308}}</ref> In a biological context, this means attempting to explain all biological phenomena in terms of their underlying biochemical and molecular processes.<ref name=":6">{{Cite encyclopedia |title=Reductionism in Biology |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/reduction-biology/ |last1=Brigandt |first1=Ingo |date=2017 |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |last2=Love |first2=Alan |access-date=2019-04-28}}</ref> Claim of efficacy is demonstrated that the gene – unit of classical heredity – is the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), a macro-molecule.<ref name=":1" />

 

=== Theory reductionism ===

=== Theory reductionism ===