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【终译】苏珊 · 卡尔顿 · 阿西（出生于1970年）是一名美国微观经济学家。她是斯坦福商学院人文与科学系的经济技术的教授。在加入斯坦福之前，她已经是哈佛大学与麻省理工大学的教授。她是第一位获得约翰·贝茨·克拉克奖冠军的女性。她已经在微软担任了六年的首席经济顾问，同时也是微软研究院的顾问研究员。她目前是以非盈利创新驱动贫困行动公司的董事。她目前还是斯坦福经济政策研究所的高级研究员。她还是斯坦福人本人工智能研究所的副所长及戈卢布资本社会影响实验室的主任。

【终译】苏珊 · 卡尔顿 · 阿西（出生于1970年）是一名美国微观经济学家。她是斯坦福商学院人文与科学系的经济技术的教授。在加入斯坦福之前，她已经是哈佛大学与麻省理工大学的教授。她是第一位获得约翰·贝茨·克拉克奖冠军的女性。她已经在微软担任了六年的首席经济顾问，同时也是微软研究院的顾问研究员。她目前是以非盈利创新驱动贫困行动公司的董事。她目前还是斯坦福经济政策研究所的高级研究员。她还是斯坦福人本人工智能研究所的副所长及戈卢布资本社会影响实验室的主任。

== Early life and education ==

== Early life and education 早期生活及教育经历 ==

Athey was born in [[Boston, Massachusetts]], and grew up in [[Rockville, Maryland]]. Her parents are Elizabeth Johansen, an English teacher and freelance editor, and Whit Athey, a physics scholar.

Athey was born in [[Boston, Massachusetts]], and grew up in [[Rockville, Maryland]]. Her parents are Elizabeth Johansen, an English teacher and freelance editor, and Whit Athey, a physics scholar.

==Career==

==Career==

=== Academic career ===

=== Academic career 学术生涯 ===

Athey's first position was as an assistant professor at the [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]], where she taught for six years before returning to Stanford's Department of Economics as professor, holding the Holbrook Working Chair for another five years.  She then served as professor of economics at Harvard University until 2012, when she returned to the Stanford Graduate School of Business, her alma mater.

Athey's first position was as an assistant professor at the [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]], where she taught for six years before returning to Stanford's Department of Economics as professor, holding the Holbrook Working Chair for another five years.  She then served as professor of economics at Harvard University until 2012, when she returned to the Stanford Graduate School of Business, her alma mater.

【终译】阿西的第一份工作是在麻省理工担任助理教授，在返回斯坦福大学经济学系担任教授之前，她在此任教了6年，然后又担任了5年的霍尔布鲁克沃金研讨会的主席。之后她在哈佛大学担任经济学教授，直到2012年回到母校斯坦福大学商学院。

【终译】阿西的第一份工作是在麻省理工担任助理教授，在返回斯坦福大学经济学系担任教授之前，她在此任教了6年，然后又担任了5年的霍尔布鲁克沃金研讨会的主席。之后她在哈佛大学担任经济学教授，直到2012年回到母校斯坦福大学商学院。

=== Research Interests ===

=== Research Interests 研究兴趣 ===

Because of Athey's completion of triple majors---economics, mathematics and computer science---in Duke University during her undergraduate period, she always utilized programming and statistics as tools to solve problems in the field of economics. Based on this background, Athey is interested in economics of the Internet, economics of the news media, internet search, econometrics and machine learning, big data and math-based currency. Besides, there are other related fields such as platform markets, online advertising and industrial organization where she puts efforts on. Currently, she focuses on the economics of digitization, marketplace design, and the intersection of econometrics and machine learning.

Because of Athey's completion of triple majors---economics, mathematics and computer science---in Duke University during her undergraduate period, she always utilized programming and statistics as tools to solve problems in the field of economics. Based on this background, Athey is interested in economics of the Internet, economics of the news media, internet search, econometrics and machine learning, big data and math-based currency. Besides, there are other related fields such as platform markets, online advertising and industrial organization where she puts efforts on. Currently, she focuses on the economics of digitization, marketplace design, and the intersection of econometrics and machine learning.

【终译】由于她在杜克大学，完成了三个专业的学习——经济学、数学、计算机科学，因此，在本科阶段，她总是用编程和统计学作为工具解决经济学领域的问题。基于这一背景，阿西对互联网经济学、新闻媒体经济学、互联网搜索、计量经济学、机器学习、大数据和数字货币感兴趣。此外。她还致力于平台市场、在线广告和产业组织等其他相关领域。目前她专注于数字化经济学、市场设计以及计量经济学和机器学习的交叉学科。

【终译】由于她在杜克大学，完成了三个专业的学习——经济学、数学、计算机科学，因此，在本科阶段，她总是用编程和统计学作为工具解决经济学领域的问题。基于这一背景，阿西对互联网经济学、新闻媒体经济学、互联网搜索、计量经济学、机器学习、大数据和数字货币感兴趣。此外。她还致力于平台市场、在线广告和产业组织等其他相关领域。目前她专注于数字化经济学、市场设计以及计量经济学和机器学习的交叉学科。

===Applied auction research===

===Applied auction research 应用拍卖研究===

Auctions were the reason Athey went into economics. She has contributed on all dimensions to research on auctions. Athey's theoretical work on collusion in repeated games applies to auctions. As well as her existence theorem for sets with private information, she has done an innovative job on the econometrics of auctions. She has performed significant empirical work in econometrics of auctions. She also designed work that has had significant effects on business and public policy. Athey and Jonathan Levin examined the U.S. Forest Service's, oral ascending auctions for the rights to cut timber in the national forests. Typically, a given tract contains several different species of timber-yielding trees. The Forest Service publishes an estimate of the proportions of the various species based on an inspection. Potential bidders then can conduct their inspections. Bids are multidimensional: amounts to be paid per unit for each species. The winner is determined by aggregating each bidder's offer using the Forest Service's estimated proportions. The actual amount the winner pays, however, is computed by applying the bid vector to the exact amounts that are ultimately harvested (the winner has two years to complete the harvest). These rules create an incentive for a bidder whose estimate of the proportions differs from that of the Forest Service to skew its bidding, raising the price bid for the species that the bidder believes are less common than does the Forest Service.  Conversely lowering the price bid for the species that the bidder believes are more common than does the Forest Service. For example, suppose there are two species and the Forest Service estimates that they are in equal proportions, but a bidder believes they are in dimensions 3:2. Then bids of ($100, $100) and ($50, $150) yield the same amount under the Forest Service proportions and so are equally likely to win, but the bidder's expected payments under the first and under the second differ).<ref name="jstor.org">Roberts, John. “Susan C. Athey: John Bates Clark Award Winner 2007.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 22, no. 4, 2008, pp. 181–198. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27648283.</ref>

Auctions were the reason Athey went into economics. She has contributed on all dimensions to research on auctions. Athey's theoretical work on collusion in repeated games applies to auctions. As well as her existence theorem for sets with private information, she has done an innovative job on the econometrics of auctions. She has performed significant empirical work in econometrics of auctions. She also designed work that has had significant effects on business and public policy. Athey and Jonathan Levin examined the U.S. Forest Service's, oral ascending auctions for the rights to cut timber in the national forests. Typically, a given tract contains several different species of timber-yielding trees. The Forest Service publishes an estimate of the proportions of the various species based on an inspection. Potential bidders then can conduct their inspections. Bids are multidimensional: amounts to be paid per unit for each species. The winner is determined by aggregating each bidder's offer using the Forest Service's estimated proportions. The actual amount the winner pays, however, is computed by applying the bid vector to the exact amounts that are ultimately harvested (the winner has two years to complete the harvest). These rules create an incentive for a bidder whose estimate of the proportions differs from that of the Forest Service to skew its bidding, raising the price bid for the species that the bidder believes are less common than does the Forest Service.  Conversely lowering the price bid for the species that the bidder believes are more common than does the Forest Service. For example, suppose there are two species and the Forest Service estimates that they are in equal proportions, but a bidder believes they are in dimensions 3:2. Then bids of ($100, $100) and ($50, $150) yield the same amount under the Forest Service proportions and so are equally likely to win, but the bidder's expected payments under the first and under the second differ).<ref name="jstor.org">Roberts, John. “Susan C. Athey: John Bates Clark Award Winner 2007.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 22, no. 4, 2008, pp. 181–198. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27648283.</ref>

Auctions were the reason Athey went into economics. She has contributed on all dimensions to research on auctions. Athey's theoretical work on collusion in repeated games applies to auctions. As well as her existence theorem for sets with private information, she has done an innovative job on the econometrics of auctions. She has performed significant empirical work in econometrics of auctions. She also designed work that has had significant effects on business and public policy. Athey and Jonathan Levin examined the U.S. Forest Service's, oral ascending auctions for the rights to cut timber in the national forests. Typically, a given tract contains several different species of timber-yielding trees. The Forest Service publishes an estimate of the proportions of the various species based on an inspection. Potential bidders then can conduct their inspections. Bids are multidimensional: amounts to be paid per unit for each species. The winner is determined by aggregating each bidder's offer using the Forest Service's estimated proportions. The actual amount the winner pays, however, is computed by applying the bid vector to the exact amounts that are ultimately harvested (the winner has two years to complete the harvest). These rules create an incentive for a bidder whose estimate of the proportions differs from that of the Forest Service to skew its bidding, raising the price bid for the species that the bidder believes are less common than does the Forest Service.  Conversely lowering the price bid for the species that the bidder believes are more common than does the Forest Service. For example, suppose there are two species and the Forest Service estimates that they are in equal proportions, but a bidder believes they are in dimensions 3:2. Then bids of ($100, $100) and ($50, $150) yield the same amount under the Forest Service proportions and so are equally likely to win, but the bidder's expected payments under the first and under the second differ).Roberts, John. “Susan C. Athey: John Bates Clark Award Winner 2007.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 22, no. 4, 2008, pp. 181–198. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27648283.

Auctions were the reason Athey went into economics. She has contributed on all dimensions to research on auctions. Athey's theoretical work on collusion in repeated games applies to auctions. As well as her existence theorem for sets with private information, she has done an innovative job on the econometrics of auctions. She has performed significant empirical work in econometrics of auctions. She also designed work that has had significant effects on business and public policy. Athey and Jonathan Levin examined the U.S. Forest Service's, oral ascending auctions for the rights to cut timber in the national forests. Typically, a given tract contains several different species of timber-yielding trees. The Forest Service publishes an estimate of the proportions of the various species based on an inspection. Potential bidders then can conduct their inspections. Bids are multidimensional: amounts to be paid per unit for each species. The winner is determined by aggregating each bidder's offer using the Forest Service's estimated proportions. The actual amount the winner pays, however, is computed by applying the bid vector to the exact amounts that are ultimately harvested (the winner has two years to complete the harvest). These rules create an incentive for a bidder whose estimate of the proportions differs from that of the Forest Service to skew its bidding, raising the price bid for the species that the bidder believes are less common than does the Forest Service.  Conversely lowering the price bid for the species that the bidder believes are more common than does the Forest Service. For example, suppose there are two species and the Forest Service estimates that they are in equal proportions, but a bidder believes they are in dimensions 3:2. Then bids of ($100, $100) and ($50, $150) yield the same amount under the Forest Service proportions and so are equally likely to win, but the bidder's expected payments under the first and under the second differ).Roberts, John. “Susan C. Athey: John Bates Clark Award Winner 2007.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 22, no. 4, 2008, pp. 181–198. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27648283.

= = = 应用拍卖研究 = = = 拍卖是他们进入经济领域的原因。她对拍卖研究的各个方面都有贡献。他们关于重复博弈中共谋的理论工作适用于拍卖。除了她的私人信息存在性定理，她还在拍卖计量经济学方面做了一项创新工作。她在拍卖计量经济学方面进行了大量的实证研究。她还设计了对商业和公共政策产生重大影响的作品。阿西和乔纳森 · 莱文检查了美国林务局的口头上升拍卖，以获得在国家森林中砍伐木材的权利。通常情况下，一块给定的土地包含几种不同的出材树种。林业局根据检查发表了各种树种的比例估计数。然后，潜在的投标者可以进行检查。投标是多维的: 每个物种每个单位的投标金额。中标者是通过使用林业局的估计比例将每个投标人的报价综合起来确定的。然而，中标者支付的实际金额是通过将投标向量应用于最终收获的确切金额来计算的(中标者有两年的时间来完成收获)。这些规则激励投标人扭曲其投标比例，提高投标人认为不如林业局普遍的物种的出价。相反，投标人认为比林业局更常见的物种，则降低其出价。例如，假设有两个物种，林业局估计它们的比例是相等的，但是一个投标人认为它们的比例是3:2。然后出价(100美元、100美元)和(50美元、150美元)在林务局的比例下产生相同的金额，因此中标的可能性是相同的，但是出价者在第一种情况下和第二种情况下的预期付款有所不同。约翰 · 罗伯茨。2007年约翰·贝茨·克拉克经济学奖获得者。22岁，不。4,2008，pp.181–198.Www.JSTOR.org/stable/27648283.

拍卖是他们进入经济领域的原因。她对拍卖研究的各个方面都有贡献。他们关于重复博弈中共谋的理论工作适用于拍卖。除了她的私人信息存在性定理，她还在拍卖计量经济学方面做了一项创新工作。她在拍卖计量经济学方面进行了大量的实证研究。她还设计了对商业和公共政策产生重大影响的作品。阿西和乔纳森 · 莱文检查了美国林务局的口头上升拍卖，以获得在国家森林中砍伐木材的权利。通常情况下，一块给定的土地包含几种不同的出材树种。林业局根据检查发表了各种树种的比例估计数。然后，潜在的投标者可以进行检查。投标是多维的: 每个物种每个单位的投标金额。中标者是通过使用林业局的估计比例将每个投标人的报价综合起来确定的。然而，中标者支付的实际金额是通过将投标向量应用于最终收获的确切金额来计算的(中标者有两年的时间来完成收获)。这些规则激励投标人扭曲其投标比例，提高投标人认为不如林业局普遍的物种的出价。相反，投标人认为比林业局更常见的物种，则降低其出价。例如，假设有两个物种，林业局估计它们的比例是相等的，但是一个投标人认为它们的比例是3:2。然后出价(100美元、100美元)和(50美元、150美元)在林务局的比例下产生相同的金额，因此中标的可能性是相同的，但是出价者在第一种情况下和第二种情况下的预期付款有所不同。约翰 · 罗伯茨。2007年约翰·贝茨·克拉克经济学奖获得者。22岁，不。4,2008，pp.181–198.Www.JSTOR.org/stable/27648283.

【终译】拍卖是阿西进入经济领域的直接原因。她对拍卖研究的各个方面都有贡献。阿西关于重复博弈中共谋的理论适用于拍卖，除了她的私人信息存在定理，她还在拍卖计量经济学方面做了一项创新工作。她在该领域进行了大量的实证研究，她的设计作品对商业和公共政策产生重大影响。阿西和乔纳森 · 莱文检查了美国林务局的口头上升拍卖，以获得在国家森林中砍伐木材的权利。通常情况下，一块给定的土地包含几种不同的出材树种。林业局根据对树种的的检查清点发表了各种树种的比例估计数。然后，潜在的投标者可以进行检查。投标是多维的: 每个物种每个单位的投标金额。中标者是通过使用林业局的估计比例将每个投标人的报价综合起来确定的。然而，中标者支付的实际金额是通过将投标向量应用于最终收获的确切金额来计算的(中标者有两年的时间来完成收获)。这些规则激励投标人扭曲其投标比例，提高投标人认为不如林业局普遍的物种的出价。相反，投标人认为比林业局更常见的物种，则降低其出价。例如，假设有两个物种，林业局估计它们的比例是相等的，但是一个投标人认为它们的比例是3:2。然后出价(100美元、100美元)和(50美元、150美元)在林务局的比例下产生相同的数目，因此中标的可能性是相同的，但是出价者在第一种情况下和第二种情况下的预期付款有所不同。

【终译】拍卖是阿西进入经济领域的直接原因。她对拍卖研究的各个方面都有贡献。阿西关于重复博弈中共谋的理论适用于拍卖，除了她的私人信息存在定理，她还在拍卖计量经济学方面做了一项创新工作。她在该领域进行了大量的实证研究，她的设计作品对商业和公共政策产生重大影响。阿西和乔纳森 · 莱文检查了美国林务局的口头上升拍卖，以获得在国家森林中砍伐木材的权利。通常情况下，一块给定的土地包含几种不同的出材树种。林业局根据对树种的的检查清点发表了各种树种的比例估计数。然后，潜在的投标者可以进行检查。投标是多维的: 每个物种每个单位的投标金额。中标者是通过使用林业局的估计比例将每个投标人的报价综合起来确定的。然而，中标者支付的实际金额是通过将投标向量应用于最终收获的确切金额来计算的(中标者有两年的时间来完成收获)。这些规则激励投标人扭曲其投标比例，提高投标人认为不如林业局普遍的物种的出价。相反，投标人认为比林业局更常见的物种，则降低其出价。例如，假设有两个物种，林业局估计它们的比例是相等的，但是一个投标人认为它们的比例是3:2。然后出价(100美元、100美元)和(50美元、150美元)在林务局的比例下产生相同的数目，因此中标的可能性是相同的，但是出价者在第一种情况下和第二种情况下的预期付款有所不同。

【终译】阿西最著名的解决拍卖问题的研究是“比较开放和密封的出价拍卖: 由木材拍卖得出的理论和证据。”在本文中，阿西（Athey） 与 乔纳森 · 莱文（Johnathan Levin） 和 恩里克· 塞拉（Enrique Seira） 合作。她和她的同事对证明参与拍卖的影响是否重要很感兴趣。”有两种类型的拍卖，公开和密封出价拍卖。公开拍卖是指竞标者不断地相互出价高于对方，直到最后一个竞标者放弃竞标，拍卖结束。密标拍卖是指个人写下自己的出价并提交出价，最高出价者获胜。他们使用的数据来自美国林务局的拍卖。作为结论，他们发现参与很重要。这甚至比拍卖过程中实际发生的情况更为重要。

【终译】阿西最著名的解决拍卖问题的研究是“比较开放和密封的出价拍卖: 由木材拍卖得出的理论和证据。”在本文中，阿西（Athey） 与 乔纳森 · 莱文（Johnathan Levin） 和 恩里克· 塞拉（Enrique Seira） 合作。她和她的同事对证明参与拍卖的影响是否重要很感兴趣。”有两种类型的拍卖，公开和密封出价拍卖。公开拍卖是指竞标者不断地相互出价高于对方，直到最后一个竞标者放弃竞标，拍卖结束。密标拍卖是指个人写下自己的出价并提交出价，最高出价者获胜。他们使用的数据来自美国林务局的拍卖。作为结论，他们发现参与很重要。这甚至比拍卖过程中实际发生的情况更为重要。

=== Research contributions ===

=== Research contributions 研究贡献 ===

Athey's early contributions included a new way to model uncertainty (the subject of her doctoral dissertation) and understand investor behavior given uncertainty, along with insights into the behavior of auctions. Athey's research on decision-making under uncertainty focused on conditions under which optimal decision policies would be monotone in a given parameter. She applied her results to establish conditions under which [[Nash equilibria]] would exist in auctions and other Bayesian games.

Athey's early contributions included a new way to model uncertainty (the subject of her doctoral dissertation) and understand investor behavior given uncertainty, along with insights into the behavior of auctions. Athey's research on decision-making under uncertainty focused on conditions under which optimal decision policies would be monotone in a given parameter. She applied her results to establish conditions under which [[Nash equilibria]] would exist in auctions and other Bayesian games.

【终译】他们的工作改变了拍卖的方式。在20世纪90年代早期，通过在拍卖会上向美国政府出售电脑，他们发现了过于宽松的争端解决机制的弱点，发现导致频繁法律纠纷的公开拍卖实际上充斥着共谋，例如，拍卖获胜者与合作竞标的输家分享他们的战利品。她还帮助不列颠哥伦比亚省设计了公有木材的定价系统。她还发表了关于在线广告拍卖的文章，并就微软搜索广告拍卖的设计向微软提供建议。

【终译】他们的工作改变了拍卖的方式。在20世纪90年代早期，通过在拍卖会上向美国政府出售电脑，他们发现了过于宽松的争端解决机制的弱点，发现导致频繁法律纠纷的公开拍卖实际上充斥着共谋，例如，拍卖获胜者与合作竞标的输家分享他们的战利品。她还帮助不列颠哥伦比亚省设计了公有木材的定价系统。她还发表了关于在线广告拍卖的文章，并就微软搜索广告拍卖的设计向微软提供建议。

=== Professional service ===

=== Professional service 专业服务 ===

Athey has served as an associate editor of several leading journals, including the ''[[American Economic Review]]'', ''[[Review of Economic Studies]]'', and the ''[[RAND Journal of Economics]]'', as well as the [[National Science Foundation]] economics panel, and she also served as an associate editor for ''[[Econometrica]]'', ''[[Theoretical Economics]]'', and the ''[[Quarterly Journal of Economics]]''. She is a past co-editor of the ''Journal of Economics and Management Strategy'' and ''[[American Economic Journal]]: Microeconomics''. She was the chair of the program committee for the 2006 North American Winter Meetings, and has served on numerous committees for the [[Econometric Society]], the [[American Economic Association]], and the Committee for the Status of Women in the Economics Profession.  She is a member of President Obama's Committee for the [[National Medal of Science]].<ref>{{cite web|title=NMS|url=https://www.nsf.gov/od/nms/committee.jsp}}</ref>

Athey has served as an associate editor of several leading journals, including the ''[[American Economic Review]]'', ''[[Review of Economic Studies]]'', and the ''[[RAND Journal of Economics]]'', as well as the [[National Science Foundation]] economics panel, and she also served as an associate editor for ''[[Econometrica]]'', ''[[Theoretical Economics]]'', and the ''[[Quarterly Journal of Economics]]''. She is a past co-editor of the ''Journal of Economics and Management Strategy'' and ''[[American Economic Journal]]: Microeconomics''. She was the chair of the program committee for the 2006 North American Winter Meetings, and has served on numerous committees for the [[Econometric Society]], the [[American Economic Association]], and the Committee for the Status of Women in the Economics Profession.  She is a member of President Obama's Committee for the [[National Medal of Science]].<ref>{{cite web|title=NMS|url=https://www.nsf.gov/od/nms/committee.jsp}}</ref>

她曾担任《美国经济评论》、《经济学评论》、《兰德经济学期刊》以及美国国家科学基金会经济学小组的副主编，还担任《经济学》、《理论经济学》和《经济学季刊》的副主编。她是《经济学与管理战略》和《美国经济学杂志: 微观经济学》的前联合编辑。她曾担任2006年北美冬季会议项目委员会主席，并为美国经济计量学会经济委员会、美国经济协会和经济职业妇女地位委员会等多个委员会服务。她是奥巴马总统美国国家科学奖章委员会的成员。

她曾担任《美国经济评论》、《经济学评论》、《兰德经济学期刊》以及美国国家科学基金会经济学小组的副主编，还担任《经济学》、《理论经济学》和《经济学季刊》的副主编。她是《经济学与管理战略》和《美国经济学杂志: 微观经济学》的前联合编辑。她曾担任2006年北美冬季会议项目委员会主席，并为美国经济计量学会经济委员会、美国经济协会和经济职业妇女地位委员会等多个委员会服务。她是奥巴马总统美国国家科学奖章委员会的成员。

Furthermore, besides professional services in academic committees, Athey, as a "tech economist", also used to serve as consultant chief economist for Microsoft Corporation for a few years and now serves on the board of Expedia, Lending Club, Rover Turo, and Ripple. She also serves as a long-term advisor to the British Columbia Ministry of Forests, helping architect and implement their auction-based pricing system. Athey is the founding director of the Golub Capital Social Impact Lab at Stanford GSB, and associate director of the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Susan Athey|url=https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/faculty/susan-athey|access-date=2020-12-11|website=Stanford Graduate School of Business|language=en}}</ref>

Furthermore, besides professional services in academic committees, Athey, as a "tech economist", also used to serve as consultant chief economist for Microsoft Corporation for a few years and now serves on the board of Expedia, Lending Club, Rover Turo, and Ripple. She also serves as a long-term advisor to the British Columbia Ministry of Forests, helping architect and implement their auction-based pricing system. Athey is the founding director of the Golub Capital Social Impact Lab at Stanford GSB, and associate director of the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Susan Athey|url=https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/faculty/susan-athey|access-date=2020-12-11|website=Stanford Graduate School of Business|language=en}}</ref>

此外，除了在学术委员会提供专业服务外，作为“技术经济学家”，艾西还曾担任过微软公司(Microsoft Corporation)首席经济顾问数年，现在是 Expedia、 Lending Club、 Rover Turo 和 Ripple 的董事会成员。她还担任不列颠哥伦比亚省森林部的长期顾问，帮助建筑师和实施他们的拍卖为基础的定价系统。他是斯坦福大学商学院 Golub 资本社会影响实验室的创始主任，以及斯坦福人为中心的人工智能研究所的副主任。

此外，除了在学术委员会提供专业服务外，作为“技术经济学家”，艾西还曾担任过微软公司(Microsoft Corporation)首席经济顾问数年，现在是 Expedia、 Lending Club、 Rover Turo 和 Ripple 的董事会成员。她还担任不列颠哥伦比亚省森林部的长期顾问，帮助建筑师和实施他们的拍卖为基础的定价系统。他是斯坦福大学商学院 Golub 资本社会影响实验室的创始主任，以及斯坦福人为中心的人工智能研究所的副主任。

=== Ripple Labs ===

 

=== Ripple Labs 瑞波实验室 ===

Athey has been personally named in a group of class actions, notably ''Zakinov v. [[Ripple Labs]] Inc.'' (case number 18-6753), running since 2018 that claim Athey and her employers, Ripple Labs Inc. have been in breach of various California and Federal securities laws.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-06753|title=18-6753 - Zakinov et al v. Ripple Labs, Inc. et al|publisher=[[U.S. Government Publishing Office]]|date=2020-10-02|access-date=2020-10-23}}</ref>

Athey has been personally named in a group of class actions, notably ''Zakinov v. [[Ripple Labs]] Inc.'' (case number 18-6753), running since 2018 that claim Athey and her employers, Ripple Labs Inc. have been in breach of various California and Federal securities laws.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-06753|title=18-6753 - Zakinov et al v. Ripple Labs, Inc. et al|publisher=[[U.S. Government Publishing Office]]|date=2020-10-02|access-date=2020-10-23}}</ref>

瑞波实验室公司(Ripple Labs inc.)自2018年以来一直被列入一系列集体诉讼案中，其中最著名的是 Zakinov 诉瑞波实验室公司(Zakinov v. Ripple Labs inc.)(案件编号18-6753) ，该案声称瑞波实验室公司(ripples Labs inc.)和她的雇主们违反了加利福尼亚州和联邦证券法。

瑞波实验室公司(Ripple Labs inc.)自2018年以来一直被列入一系列集体诉讼案中，其中最著名的是 Zakinov 诉瑞波实验室公司(Zakinov v. Ripple Labs inc.)(案件编号18-6753) ，该案声称瑞波实验室公司(ripples Labs inc.)和她的雇主们违反了加利福尼亚州和联邦证券法。

== Awards and honors ==

== Awards and honors ==

*CME Group - MSRI Prize (2019)

*CME Group - MSRI Prize (2019)

= = = = =  

= = 学术性= =  

* 杜克大学艾丽丝 · 鲍德温纪念奖学金，1990-1991

* 杜克大学艾丽丝 · 鲍德温纪念奖学金，1990-1991年

* 1992年 Chi Omega 基金会玛丽 · 洛夫 · 柯林斯奖学金

* Chi Omega 基金会玛丽 · 洛夫 · 柯林斯奖学金，1991-1992年

* 1992-1993年斯坦福大学商学院 Jaedicke 奖学金

* 斯坦福大学商学院 Jaedicke 奖学金，1992-1993年

* 1991-1994年美国国家科学基金会研究生奖学金

* 美国国家科学基金会研究生奖学金，1991-1994年

* 1994年国家农场商学论文奖

* 国家农场商学论文奖，1994年

* 1995年国家农场奖

* 国家农场奖，1995年

* 2000年伊莱恩 · 贝内特研究奖(该奖每两年颁发一次，表彰在任何领域有杰出贡献的年轻女经济学家)

* 伊莱恩 · 贝内特研究奖(该奖每两年颁发一次，表彰在任何领域有杰出贡献的年轻女经济学家)，2000年

* 美国经济计量学会研究院院士(2004年)

* 美国经济计量学会研究院院士，2004年

* 美国约翰·贝茨·克拉克奖研究院院士(2007年)

* 美国约翰·贝茨·克拉克奖研究院院士，2007年

* 美国艺术与科学院院士(2008年)

* 美国艺术与科学院院士，2008年

* 斯坦福大学 Leiberman 院士

* 斯坦福大学利伯曼奖学金，2007年

* 当选美国国家科学院院士(2012年)

* 当选美国国家科学院院士，2012年

* 杜克大学荣誉学位(2009年)

* 杜克大学荣誉学位，2009年

* 费舍尔-舒尔茨讲座，经济计量学会(2011年)

* 费舍尔-舒尔茨讲座，经济计量学会，2011年

* 让-雅克·拉丰奖(2016年)

* 让-雅克·拉丰奖，2016年

* 约翰·冯·诺伊曼奖(2019年)

* 约翰·冯·诺伊曼奖，2019年

* CME 集团-MSRI 奖(2019年)

* CME 集团-MSRI 奖，2019年

=== Non-academic ===

=== Non-academic ===

= = 非学术性 = =

 

* 基尔比奖学金之青年创新奖，1998年

= = 非学术性 = =  

* 多元化 MBA 的50位不同执行官的前100名

 

* 快速公司100位最具创造力的商业人士

* Kilby Award Foundation's Young Innovator Award, 1998

* 世界经济论坛2008年全球青年领袖

* Diversity MBA's Top 100 under 50 Diverse Executives

* 创业与创新世界创新峰会2012年世界最具创新力人才奖

* 微软研究院杰出合作者奖，2016年

 

 

 

* Fast Company’s 100 Most Creative People in Business

* World Economic Forum Young Global Leader，selected 2008

* World Innovation Summit on Entrepreneurship and Innovation’s World’s Most Innovative People Award，2012

* Microsoft Research Distinguished Collaborator Award，2016

== Publications ==

== Publications ==