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Moved page from wikipedia:en:Moral hazard (history)
此词条暂由彩云小译翻译，翻译字数共4024，未经人工整理和审校，带来阅读不便，请见谅。
{{Short description|Increases in the exposure to risk when insured, or when another bears the cost}}
{{For|the novel|Moral Hazard (novel)}}
{{Use mdy dates|date = March 2019}}
{{Use American English|date = March 2019}}
{{Financial risk types}}
{{Finance sidebar}}
In [[economics]], a '''moral hazard''' is a situation where an economic actor has an [[incentive]] to increase its exposure to [[risk]] because it does not bear the full costs of that risk. For example, when a corporation is insured, it may take on higher risk knowing that its [[insurance]] will pay the associated costs. A moral hazard may occur where the actions of the risk-taking party change to the detriment of the cost-bearing party after a [[financial transaction]] has taken place.
In economics, a moral hazard is a situation where an economic actor has an incentive to increase its exposure to risk because it does not bear the full costs of that risk. For example, when a corporation is insured, it may take on higher risk knowing that its insurance will pay the associated costs. A moral hazard may occur where the actions of the risk-taking party change to the detriment of the cost-bearing party after a financial transaction has taken place.
在经济学中，道德风险是指经济行为者有动机增加其风险敞口，因为它不承担该风险的全部成本。例如，当一个公司投保时，它可能承担更高的风险，因为它知道它的保险将支付相关的费用。在金融交易发生后，如果冒险方的行为发生变化，对承担成本方不利，则可能发生道德风险。
Moral hazard can occur under a type of [[information asymmetry]] where the risk-taking party to a transaction knows more about its intentions than the party paying the consequences of the risk and has a tendency or incentive to take on too much risk from the perspective of the party with less information. One example is a [[principal–agent problem]], where one party, called an agent, acts on behalf of another party, called the [[Principal (commercial law)|principal]]. If the agent has more information about his or her actions or intentions than the principal then the agent may have an incentive to act too riskily (from the viewpoint of the principal) if the interests of the agent and the principal are not aligned.
Moral hazard can occur under a type of information asymmetry where the risk-taking party to a transaction knows more about its intentions than the party paying the consequences of the risk and has a tendency or incentive to take on too much risk from the perspective of the party with less information. One example is a principal–agent problem, where one party, called an agent, acts on behalf of another party, called the principal. If the agent has more information about his or her actions or intentions than the principal then the agent may have an incentive to act too riskily (from the viewpoint of the principal) if the interests of the agent and the principal are not aligned.
道德风险可能发生在一种信息不对称下，即交易的风险承担方比承担风险后果的一方更了解交易的意图，并倾向于或有动机从信息较少的一方的角度承担过多风险。一个例子是委托-代理问题，其中一方(称为代理人)代表另一方(称为委托人)行事。如果代理人比委托人对自己的行为或意图有更多的了解，那么如果代理人和委托人的利益不一致，代理人可能有动机(从委托人的角度)采取过于冒险的行动。
==History ==
According to research by Dembe and Boden,<ref>Dembe, Allard E. and Boden, Leslie I. (2000). [http://baywood.metapress.com/link.asp?id=1gu8eqn802j62rxk "Moral Hazard: A Question of Morality?"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160513150957/http://baywood.metapress.com/link.asp?id=1gu8eqn802j62rxk |date=2016-05-13 }} New Solutions 2000 10(3). 257–79</ref> the term dates back to the 17th century and was widely used by English insurance companies by the late 19th century. Early usage of the term carried negative connotations, implying [[insurance fraud|fraud]] or immoral behavior (usually on the part of an insured party). Dembe and Boden point out, however, that prominent mathematicians who studied decision-making in the 18th century used "moral" to mean "subjective", which may cloud the true ethical significance in the term.
The concept of moral hazard was the subject of renewed study by economists in the 1960s,<ref name="Arrow 1963 941–732">{{Cite journal|last=Arrow|first=Kenneth|year=1963|title=Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care|publisher=American Economic Association|volume=53|issue=5|pages=941–73|jstor=1812044|periodical=[[The American Economic Review]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Pauly|first=Mark V|year=1968|title=The economics of moral hazard: comment|publisher=American Economic Association|volume=58|issue=3|pages=531–37|jstor=1813785|periodical=The American Economic Review}}</ref> beginning with economist Ken Arrow,<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last1=FINKELSTEIN|first1=AMY|title=Moral Hazard in Health Insurance|last2=ARROW|first2=KENNETH J.|last3=GRUBER|first3=JONATHAN|last4=NEWHOUSE|first4=JOSEPH P.|last5=STIGLITZ|first5=JOSEPH E.|date=2015|publisher=Columbia University Press|doi=10.7312/fink16380|jstor=10.7312/fink16380|isbn=9780231538688}}</ref> and did not imply immoral behavior or fraud. Economists use this term to describe inefficiencies that can occur when risks are displaced or cannot be fully evaluated, rather than a description of the ethics or morals of the involved parties.
According to research by Dembe and Boden,Dembe, Allard E. and Boden, Leslie I. (2000). "Moral Hazard: A Question of Morality?" New Solutions 2000 10(3). 257–79 the term dates back to the 17th century and was widely used by English insurance companies by the late 19th century. Early usage of the term carried negative connotations, implying fraud or immoral behavior (usually on the part of an insured party). Dembe and Boden point out, however, that prominent mathematicians who studied decision-making in the 18th century used "moral" to mean "subjective", which may cloud the true ethical significance in the term.
The concept of moral hazard was the subject of renewed study by economists in the 1960s, beginning with economist Ken Arrow, and did not imply immoral behavior or fraud. Economists use this term to describe inefficiencies that can occur when risks are displaced or cannot be fully evaluated, rather than a description of the ethics or morals of the involved parties.
= = 历史 = = 根据邓比和博登，邓比，阿拉德 E 和博登，莱斯利一世的研究。(2000).“道德风险: 一个道德问题?”新方案200010(3)。这个术语可以追溯到17世纪，到19世纪末被英国保险公司广泛使用。该术语的早期使用带有负面的含义，暗示欺诈或不道德的行为(通常由被保险人)。然而，邓比和博登指出，在18世纪研究决策的杰出数学家使用“道德”来表示“主观”，这可能会掩盖该术语真正的伦理意义。道德风险的概念是经济学家在20世纪60年代重新研究的主题，从经济学家肯 · 阿罗开始，并不意味着不道德的行为或欺诈。经济学家用这个术语来描述风险被转移或无法充分评估时可能发生的低效率，而不是描述有关各方的道德或道德。
Rowell and Connelly offer a detailed description of the genesis of the term moral hazard,<ref>D Rowell, LB Connelly (2012) "A history of the term 'moral hazard'" Journal of Risk and Insurance 79 (4), 1051–75</ref> by identifying salient changes in economic thought, which are identified within the medieval theological and probability literature. Their paper compares and contrasts the predominantly normative conception of moral hazard found within the insurance-industry literature with the largely positive interpretations found within the economic literature. Often what is described as "moral hazard[s]" in the insurance literature is upon closer reading, a description of the closely related concept, [[adverse selection]].
Rowell and Connelly offer a detailed description of the genesis of the term moral hazard,D Rowell, LB Connelly (2012) "A history of the term 'moral hazard'" Journal of Risk and Insurance 79 (4), 1051–75 by identifying salient changes in economic thought, which are identified within the medieval theological and probability literature. Their paper compares and contrasts the predominantly normative conception of moral hazard found within the insurance-industry literature with the largely positive interpretations found within the economic literature. Often what is described as "moral hazard[s]" in the insurance literature is upon closer reading, a description of the closely related concept, adverse selection.
罗威尔和康奈利提供了一个术语道德风险的起源的详细描述，D 罗威尔，LB 康奈利(2012)“一个术语‘道德风险’的历史”风险和保险杂志79(4) ，1051-75通过识别经济思想的显着变化，这是在中世纪神学和概率文献中确定的。他们的论文比较和对比了在保险业文献中发现的道德风险的主要规范性概念和在经济文献中发现的大部分积极的解释。在保险文献中被描述为“道德风险”的东西，通常需要仔细阅读，这是对与之密切相关的概念——逆向选择的描述。
==Finance==
In 1998, [[William J. McDonough]], head of the New York Federal Reserve, helped the counter-parties of [[Long Term Capital Management]] avoid losses by taking over the firm. This move was criticized by former Fed Chair, Paul Volcker and others as increasing moral hazard.<ref name=nyt080907>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/business/07ltcm.html|title=Long-Term Capital: It's a Short-Term Memory|date=September 6, 2008|work=New York Times|author=Roger Lowenstein|author-link=Roger Lowenstein}}</ref><ref name=nr081229/><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/aced684c-834e-11dd-907e-000077b07658|title=The Short View: Moral hazard|author=John Authors|work=Financial Times|date=September 15, 2008}}</ref><ref>[http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00067r.pdf GAO/GGD-00-67R Questions Concerning LTCM and Our Responses] General Accounting Office, February 23, 2000</ref> [[Tyler Cowen]] concludes that "creditors came to believe that their loans to unsound financial institutions would be made good by the Fed – as long as the collapse of those institutions would threaten the global credit system."<ref name=nr081229>{{cite news|url=https://newrepublic.com/article/46760/long-term-capital-blame-todays-crisis|title=Is Long-term Capital To Blame For Today's Crisis?|date=December 29, 2008|author=Noam Scheiber|author-link=Noam Scheiber|work=The New Republic}}</ref> Fed Chair, [[Alan Greenspan]], while conceding the risk of moral hazard, defended the policy to orderly unwind Long Term Capital by saying the world economy is at stake.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://mises.org/library/mr-moral-hazard|title=Mr. Moral Hazard|author=Jeffrey Tucker|date=December 1, 1998|author-link=Jeffrey Tucker}}</ref><ref name=nyt080907/>
In 1998, William J. McDonough, head of the New York Federal Reserve, helped the counter-parties of Long Term Capital Management avoid losses by taking over the firm. This move was criticized by former Fed Chair, Paul Volcker and others as increasing moral hazard.GAO/GGD-00-67R Questions Concerning LTCM and Our Responses General Accounting Office, February 23, 2000 Tyler Cowen concludes that "creditors came to believe that their loans to unsound financial institutions would be made good by the Fed – as long as the collapse of those institutions would threaten the global credit system." Fed Chair, Alan Greenspan, while conceding the risk of moral hazard, defended the policy to orderly unwind Long Term Capital by saying the world economy is at stake.
1998年，纽约联邦储备银行(New York Federal Reserve)行长威廉 · J · 麦克多诺(William J. McDonough)接管了长期资本管理公司(Long Term Capital Management) ，帮助交易对手避免了损失。美联储前主席保罗 · 沃尔克(Paul Volcker)和其他人批评这一举措增加了道德风险。 GAO/GGD-00-67R 关于长期资本管理公司和我们的反应的问题总会计办公室，2000年2月23日泰勒 · 考恩(Tyler Cowen)总结道: “债权人开始相信，他们向不健全的金融机构提供的贷款将得到美联储的补偿——只要这些机构的崩溃会威胁到全球信贷体系。”美联储主席格林斯潘承认存在道德风险的风险，但为有序解除长期资本的政策辩护称，全球经济处于危险之中。
Economist [[Paul Krugman]] described moral hazard as "any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly."<ref name="Krugman 2009">{{cite book
| last = Krugman
| first = Paul
| year = 2009
| title = The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 | publisher = W.W. Norton Company Limited
| isbn = 978-0-393-07101-6| title-link = The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008
}}</ref> Financial [[bailouts]] of lending institutions by governments, central banks or other institutions can encourage risky lending in the future if those that take the risks come to believe that they will not have to carry the full burden of potential losses. Lending institutions need to take risks by making loans, and the riskiest loans usually have the potential for making the highest return.
Economist Paul Krugman described moral hazard as "any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly." Financial bailouts of lending institutions by governments, central banks or other institutions can encourage risky lending in the future if those that take the risks come to believe that they will not have to carry the full burden of potential losses. Lending institutions need to take risks by making loans, and the riskiest loans usually have the potential for making the highest return.
经济学家保罗•克鲁格曼(Paul Krugman)将道德风险描述为“任何一种情况，在这种情况下，一个人决定承担多少风险，而如果事情变得糟糕，其他人承担代价。”政府、央行或其它机构对贷款机构的金融纾困，可能会在未来鼓励高风险贷款，如果那些承担风险的机构开始相信，它们将不必承担潜在损失的全部负担。贷款机构需要通过发放贷款来承担风险，而风险最高的贷款通常具有获得最高回报的潜力。
Taxpayers, depositors, and other creditors often have to shoulder at least part of the burden of risky financial decisions made by lending institutions.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5ffd2606-69e8-11dc-a571-0000779fd2ac.html |last=Summers |first=Lawrence |title=Beware moral hazard fundamentalists |newspaper=[[Financial Times]] |date=2007-09-23 |access-date=2008-01-15}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/story.aspx?guid={9F4C2252-8BA7-459C-B34E-407DB32921C1}&siteid=rss |last=Brown |first=Bill |title=Uncle Sam as sugar daddy |website=MarketWatch |date=2008-11-19 |access-date=2008-11-30}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|ssrn=1321666 |title=Common (Stock) Sense about Risk-Shifting and Bank Bailouts|publisher=SSRN.com |date=December 29, 2009|last1=Wu|first1=Yan Wendy|last2=Wilson|first2=Linus}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|ssrn=1336288 |title=Debt Overhang and Bank Bailouts|publisher=SSRN.com |date=February 2, 2009|last1=Wilson|first1=Linus}}</ref>
Taxpayers, depositors, and other creditors often have to shoulder at least part of the burden of risky financial decisions made by lending institutions.
纳税人、储户和其他债权人通常不得不至少承担一部分由贷款机构做出的高风险金融决策的负担。
Many have argued that certain types of mortgage [[securitization]] contribute to moral hazard. Mortgage securitization enables mortgage originators to pass on the risk that the mortgages they originate might default and not hold the mortgages on their balance sheets and assume the risk. In one kind of mortgage securitization, known as "agency securitizations," default risk is retained by the securitizing agency that buys the mortgages from originators. These agencies thus have an incentive to monitor originators and check loan quality. "Agency securitizations" refer to securitizations by either [[Ginnie Mae]], a government agency, or by [[Fannie Mae]] and [[Freddie Mac]], both for-profit [[government-sponsored enterprise]]s. They are similar to the "covered bonds" that are commonly used in [[Western Europe]] in that the securitizing agency retains default risk. Under both models, investors take on only interest-rate risk, not default risk.
Many have argued that certain types of mortgage securitization contribute to moral hazard. Mortgage securitization enables mortgage originators to pass on the risk that the mortgages they originate might default and not hold the mortgages on their balance sheets and assume the risk. In one kind of mortgage securitization, known as "agency securitizations," default risk is retained by the securitizing agency that buys the mortgages from originators. These agencies thus have an incentive to monitor originators and check loan quality. "Agency securitizations" refer to securitizations by either Ginnie Mae, a government agency, or by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both for-profit government-sponsored enterprises. They are similar to the "covered bonds" that are commonly used in Western Europe in that the securitizing agency retains default risk. Under both models, investors take on only interest-rate risk, not default risk.
许多人认为，某些类型的抵押贷款证券化有助于道德风险。抵押贷款证券化使抵押贷款发起人能够转移其发起的抵押贷款可能违约的风险，而不将抵押贷款持有在其资产负债表上，并承担风险。在一种抵押贷款证券化，即所谓的“机构证券化”，违约风险由从发起人处购买抵押贷款的证券化机构保留。因此，这些机构有监督贷款发放者和检查贷款质量的动机。“机构证券化”是指由政府机构国民抵押协会(Ginnie Mae)或房利美(Fannie Mae)和房地美(Freddie Mac)进行的证券化，这两家公司都是以营利为目的的政府资助企业。它们类似于西欧通常使用的“担保债券”，因为证券化机构保留了违约风险。在这两种模型下，投资者只承担利率风险，而不承担违约风险。
In another type of securitization, known as "private label" securitization, default risk is generally not retained by the securitizing entity. Instead, the securitizing entity passes on default risk to investors. The securitizing entity, therefore, has relatively little incentive to monitor originators and maintain loan quality. "Private label" securitization refers to securitizations structured by financial institutions such as investment banks, commercial banks, and non-bank mortgage lenders.
In another type of securitization, known as "private label" securitization, default risk is generally not retained by the securitizing entity. Instead, the securitizing entity passes on default risk to investors. The securitizing entity, therefore, has relatively little incentive to monitor originators and maintain loan quality. "Private label" securitization refers to securitizations structured by financial institutions such as investment banks, commercial banks, and non-bank mortgage lenders.
在另一种类型的证券化，称为“私人标签”证券化，违约风险一般不保留的证券化实体。相反，证券化实体将违约风险转嫁给投资者。因此，证券化机构对监管发起人和维持贷款质量的动机相对较小。“自有品牌”证券化是指由投资银行、商业银行、非银行抵押贷款机构等金融机构组织的证券化。
During the years leading up to the [[subprime mortgage crisis]], private label securitizations grew as a share of overall mortgage securitization by purchasing and securitizing low-quality, high-risk mortgages. Agency Securitizations appear to have somewhat lowered their standards, but Agency mortgages remained considerably safer than mortgages in private-label securitizations and performed far better in terms of default rates.
During the years leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis, private label securitizations grew as a share of overall mortgage securitization by purchasing and securitizing low-quality, high-risk mortgages. Agency Securitizations appear to have somewhat lowered their standards, but Agency mortgages remained considerably safer than mortgages in private-label securitizations and performed far better in terms of default rates.
在次贷危机之前的几年里，私人标签证券化通过购买和证券化低质量、高风险的抵押贷款，在整个抵押贷款证券化中所占的比例不断增长。机构证券化似乎降低了一些标准，但机构抵押贷款仍然比自有品牌证券化中的抵押贷款安全得多，而且违约率方面的表现要好得多。
Economist [[Mark Zandi]] of [[Moody's Analytics]] described moral hazard as a root cause of the subprime mortgage crisis. He wrote that "the risks inherent in mortgage lending became so widely dispersed that no one was forced to worry about the quality of any single loan. As shaky mortgages were combined, diluting any problems into a larger pool, the incentive for responsibility was undermined." He also wrote, "Finance companies weren't subject to the same regulatory oversight as banks. Taxpayers weren't on the hook if they went belly up [pre-crisis], only their shareholders and other creditors were. Finance companies thus had little to discourage them from growing as aggressively as possible, even if that meant lowering or winking at traditional lending standards."<ref>{{cite book
| last = Zandi
| first = Mark
| year = 2009
| title = Financial Shock
| publisher = FT Press
| isbn = 978-0-13-701663-1
| url-access = registration
| url = https://archive.org/details/financialshockgl00zand
}}</ref>
Economist Mark Zandi of Moody's Analytics described moral hazard as a root cause of the subprime mortgage crisis. He wrote that "the risks inherent in mortgage lending became so widely dispersed that no one was forced to worry about the quality of any single loan. As shaky mortgages were combined, diluting any problems into a larger pool, the incentive for responsibility was undermined." He also wrote, "Finance companies weren't subject to the same regulatory oversight as banks. Taxpayers weren't on the hook if they went belly up [pre-crisis], only their shareholders and other creditors were. Finance companies thus had little to discourage them from growing as aggressively as possible, even if that meant lowering or winking at traditional lending standards."
穆迪分析(Moody’s Analytics)的经济学家马克•赞迪(Mark Zandi)将道德风险描述为次贷危机的根本原因。他写道: “抵押贷款固有的风险变得如此分散，以至于没有人被迫担心任何一笔贷款的质量。随着不稳定的抵押贷款合并在一起，将任何问题稀释到一个更大的资金池中，承担责任的动机受到了削弱。”他还写道: “金融公司不像银行那样受到同样的监管。如果纳税人(在危机前)破产，他们不会上钩，只有他们的股东和其他债权人会上钩。因此，金融公司几乎没有什么理由阻止它们尽可能大幅增长，即使这意味着降低或忽视传统的放贷标准。”
Moral hazard can also occur with borrowers. Borrowers may not act prudently (in the view of the lender) when they invest or spend funds recklessly. For example, [[credit card]] companies often limit the amount borrowers can spend with their cards because without such limits, borrowers may spend borrowed funds recklessly, leading to default.
Moral hazard can also occur with borrowers. Borrowers may not act prudently (in the view of the lender) when they invest or spend funds recklessly. For example, credit card companies often limit the amount borrowers can spend with their cards because without such limits, borrowers may spend borrowed funds recklessly, leading to default.
道德风险也可能发生在借款人身上。当借款人不顾后果地投资或花费资金时，借款人可能不会谨慎行事(在贷款人看来)。例如，信用卡公司经常限制借款人用信用卡消费的金额，因为没有这样的限制，借款人可能会不计后果地花掉借来的资金，从而导致违约。
Securitization of mortgages in America started in 1983 at [[Salomon Brothers]] and where the risk of each mortgage passed to the next purchaser instead of remaining with the original mortgaging institution. These mortgages and other debt instruments were put into a large pool of debt, and then shares in the pool were sold to many creditors.
Securitization of mortgages in America started in 1983 at Salomon Brothers and where the risk of each mortgage passed to the next purchaser instead of remaining with the original mortgaging institution. These mortgages and other debt instruments were put into a large pool of debt, and then shares in the pool were sold to many creditors.
美国的抵押贷款证券化始于1983年的所罗门兄弟，每笔抵押贷款的风险都转嫁给了下一个购买者，而不是留在最初的抵押贷款机构。这些抵押贷款和其他债务工具被投入大量债务中，然后这些债务中的股份被出售给许多债权人。
Thus, there is no one person responsible for verifying that any one particular loan is sound, that the assets securing that one particular loan are worth what they are supposed to be worth, that the borrower responsible for making payments on the loan can read and write the language in which the papers that he/she signed were written, or even that the paperwork exists and is in good order. It has been suggested that this may have caused the subprime mortgage crisis.<ref>{{cite web |title='Moral hazard' helps shape mortgage mess |author=Holden Lewis |publisher=Bankrate.com |url=http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mortgages/20070418_subprime_mortgage_morality_a1.asp?caret=3c |date=2007-04-18 |access-date=2007-12-09}}</ref>
Thus, there is no one person responsible for verifying that any one particular loan is sound, that the assets securing that one particular loan are worth what they are supposed to be worth, that the borrower responsible for making payments on the loan can read and write the language in which the papers that he/she signed were written, or even that the paperwork exists and is in good order. It has been suggested that this may have caused the subprime mortgage crisis.
因此，没有一个人负责核实任何一笔特定贷款是否健全，确保某笔特定贷款的资产是否值得其应有的价值，负责偿还贷款的借款人是否能够阅读和书写他/她签署的文件所使用的语言，甚至是否有文件存在并处于良好状态。有人认为这可能导致了次贷危机。
Brokers, who were not lending their own money, pushed risk onto the lenders. Lenders, who sold mortgages soon after underwriting them, pushed risk onto investors. Investment banks bought mortgages and chopped up mortgage-backed securities into slices, some riskier than others. Investors bought securities and hedged against the risk of default and prepayment, pushing those risks further along. In a purely capitalist scenario, the last one holding the risk (like a game of [[musical chairs]]) is the one who faces the potential losses. In the sub-prime crisis, however, national credit authorities (the [[Federal Reserve]] in the US) assumed the ultimate risk on behalf of the citizenry at large.
Brokers, who were not lending their own money, pushed risk onto the lenders. Lenders, who sold mortgages soon after underwriting them, pushed risk onto investors. Investment banks bought mortgages and chopped up mortgage-backed securities into slices, some riskier than others. Investors bought securities and hedged against the risk of default and prepayment, pushing those risks further along. In a purely capitalist scenario, the last one holding the risk (like a game of musical chairs) is the one who faces the potential losses. In the sub-prime crisis, however, national credit authorities (the Federal Reserve in the US) assumed the ultimate risk on behalf of the citizenry at large.
经纪人没有借出自己的钱，把风险推给了贷款人。贷款人在承销抵押贷款后不久就出售了抵押贷款，把风险推给了投资者。投资银行购买抵押贷款，并将抵押贷款支持证券切成小块，其中一些比另一些风险更大。投资者购买证券，对冲违约和提前还款的风险，推动这些风险进一步发展。在纯粹的资本主义场景中，最后一个承担风险的人(就像抢椅子游戏一样)是面临潜在损失的人。然而，在次贷危机中，国家信贷当局(美联储)代表广大公民承担了最终风险。
Others believe that financial bailouts of lending institutions do not encourage risky lending behavior since there is no guarantee to lending institutions that a bailout will occur. Decreased valuation of a corporation before any bailout would prevent risky, speculative business decisions by executives who fail to conduct proper due diligence in their business transactions. The risk and the burdens of loss became apparent to [[Lehman Brothers]], which did not benefit from a bailout, and other financial institutions and mortgage companies such as [[Citibank]] and [[Countrywide Financial Corporation]], whose valuation plunged during the subprime mortgage crisis.<ref>{{cite web |title=Paulson bailout: seizing moral high ground can be hazardous |author=David Wighton |publisher=TimesOnline |url=http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article4813975.ece |date=2008-09-24 |access-date=2009-03-17}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=The SEC Makes Wall Street More Fraudulent |author=HFM |publisher=Justput.com Post # 17-26 |url=http://www.justput.com/forum/showthread.php?t=6820 |date=2009-03-16 |access-date=2009-03-17 |archive-date=April 29, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110429201141/http://www.justput.com/forum/showthread.php?t=6820 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=''Moral Hazard': Why Risk Is Good' |author=Frank Ahrens |newspaper=The Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/18/AR2008031802873.html |date=2008-03-19 |access-date=2009-03-17}}</ref>
Others believe that financial bailouts of lending institutions do not encourage risky lending behavior since there is no guarantee to lending institutions that a bailout will occur. Decreased valuation of a corporation before any bailout would prevent risky, speculative business decisions by executives who fail to conduct proper due diligence in their business transactions. The risk and the burdens of loss became apparent to Lehman Brothers, which did not benefit from a bailout, and other financial institutions and mortgage companies such as Citibank and Countrywide Financial Corporation, whose valuation plunged during the subprime mortgage crisis.
其他人则认为，对贷款机构的金融救助不会鼓励高风险的贷款行为，因为对贷款机构来说，没有任何担保能保证救助会发生。在任何救助之前，降低公司的估值将防止高管在商业交易中未能进行适当尽职调查而做出高风险、投机性的商业决策。雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)以及花旗银行(Citibank)和 Countrywide Financial Corporation 等其它金融机构和抵押贷款公司的损失风险和负担变得明显起来。雷曼兄弟没有从纾困计划中获益，而花旗和 Countrywide Financial Corporation 的估值在次贷危机期间大幅下跌。
=== Incentives to moral hazard in accounting rules ===
A 2017 report by the [[Basel Committee on Banking Supervision]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/wp31.pdf|title=BCBS, The interplay of accounting and regulation and its impact on bank behaviour, 2017|work=Basel Committee on Banking Supervision}}</ref> an international regulator for the banking sector, noted that the accounting rules ([[IFRS]] # 9 and 13 in particular) leave entities significant discretion in determining financial instrument fair value and identified this discretion as a potential source of moral hazard: “The evidence consistent with accounting discretion as contributing to moral hazard behavior indicates that (additional) prudential valuation requirements may be justified.”
A 2017 report by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an international regulator for the banking sector, noted that the accounting rules (IFRS # 9 and 13 in particular) leave entities significant discretion in determining financial instrument fair value and identified this discretion as a potential source of moral hazard: “The evidence consistent with accounting discretion as contributing to moral hazard behavior indicates that (additional) prudential valuation requirements may be justified.”
国际银行业监管机构巴塞尔银行监理委员会2017年的一份报告指出，会计准则(特别是国际财务报告准则9号和13号)在确定金融工具公允价值方面给予实体很大的自由裁量权，并将这种自由裁量权确定为道德风险的潜在来源: “与会计自由裁量权相一致的证据表明，(额外的)审慎估值要求可能是合理的。”
Banking regulators have taken actions to limit discretion and reduce [[valuation risk]], i.e. the risk to banks' balance sheets arising from financial instrument valuation uncertainties. A row of regulatory documents has been issued, providing detailed prudential requirements that have many points of contact with the accounting rules and have the indirect effect of curbing the incentives for moral hazard by limiting the discretion left to banks in valuating financial instruments.<ref>{{cite web|url= https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf|title=BCBS, Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems, 2010|work=Basel Committee on Banking Supervision}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&from=en|title=Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012|work=Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019R0876|title=Regulation (EU) 2019/876 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards the leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, counterparty credit|work=Capital Requirements Regulation 2 (CRR2)}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0101&from=EN|title=Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/101 of 26 October 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for prudent valuation under Article 105(14)|work=EU Commission Regulation}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/642449/1d93ef17-d7c5-47a6-bdbc-cfdb2cf1d072/EBA-RTS-2014-06%20RTS%20on%20Prudent%20Valuation.pdf|title=EBA final draft Regulatory Technical Standards on prudent valuation under Article 105(14) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation — CRR)|work=European Banking Authority}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/market-risk/draft-technical-standards-on-the-ima-under-the-frtb|title=EBA final draft Regulatory Technical Standards on criteria for assessing the modellability of risk factors under the Internal Model Approach (IMA) under Article 325be(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (revised Capital Requirements Regulation – CRR2|work=European Banking Authority|date=June 27, 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/document_library/EBA-RTS-2020-02%20Final%20draft%20RTS%20on%20Backtesting%20and%20PLA%20requirements.pdf|title=EBA final draft Regulatory Technical Standards on Back‐testing requirements and Profit and Loss attribution requirements under Article 325 bf(9) and 325bg (4) of Regulation(EU) No575/2013(revised Capital Requirements Regulation ‐ CRR2|work=European Banking Authority}}</ref>
Banking regulators have taken actions to limit discretion and reduce valuation risk, i.e. the risk to banks' balance sheets arising from financial instrument valuation uncertainties. A row of regulatory documents has been issued, providing detailed prudential requirements that have many points of contact with the accounting rules and have the indirect effect of curbing the incentives for moral hazard by limiting the discretion left to banks in valuating financial instruments.
银行监管机构已采取行动，限制酌情决定权及减低估值风险。金融工具估值不确定性对银行资产负债表造成的风险。印发了一系列监管文件，提出了与会计规则有许多联系点的详细审慎要求，通过限制银行在估价金融工具方面的酌处权，间接抑制了道德风险的诱因。
=== Connection to financial crisis of 2007−08 ===
{{Main|Financial crisis of 2007–08}}
Many scholars and journalists have argued that moral hazard played a role in the [[Financial crisis of 2007–08|2008 financial crisis]], since numerous actors in the financial market may have had an incentive to increase their exposure to risk.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Okamoto|first=Karl|date=2009|title=After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard|url=https://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/57-1-4.pdf|journal=UCLA Law Review|pages=183–236|url-status=live|access-date=2021-06-01|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201130100922/https://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/57-1-4.pdf|archive-date=2020-11-30}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite web|url=https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/050515/how-did-moral-hazard-contribute-financial-crisis-2008.asp|title=How did moral hazard contribute to the 2008 financial crisis?|last=Investopedia|website=Investopedia|language=en|access-date=2020-03-02|date=2019-06-25|url-status=live|archive-date=2021-06-01|archive-url=https://archive.today/2021.06.01-224559/https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/050515/how-did-moral-hazard-contribute-financial-crisis-2008.asp}}</ref> In general, there are three ways in which moral hazard may have manifested itself in the lead up to the financial crisis.
Many scholars and journalists have argued that moral hazard played a role in the 2008 financial crisis, since numerous actors in the financial market may have had an incentive to increase their exposure to risk. In general, there are three ways in which moral hazard may have manifested itself in the lead up to the financial crisis.
许多学者和记者认为，道德风险在2008年金融危机中发挥了作用，因为金融市场中的许多行为者可能有动机增加他们的风险敞口。一般来说，在金融危机爆发之前，道德风险有三种表现形式。
* Asset managers may have had an incentive to take on more risk when managing other people's money, particularly if they were paid as a percentage of the fund's profits. If they took on more risk, they could expect higher payoff for themselves and were somewhat shielded from losses because they were spending other people's money.<ref name=":1" /> Therefore, asset managers may have been in a situation of moral hazard, where they would take on more risk than appropriate for a given client because they didn't bear the cost of failure.
* Mortgage loan originators, such as [[Washington Mutual]], may have had an incentive to understate the risk of loans they originated because the loans were often sold to mortgage pools (see [[Mortgage-backed security|mortgage-backed securities]]). Because loan originators were paid on a per-mortgage basis, they had an incentive to produce as many mortgages as possible, even if they were risky.<ref name=":1" /> Because these institutions didn't expect to hold on to the loans until maturity, they could pass on the risk to the buyer of the loans.<ref name=":2" /> Therefore, mortgage loan originators may have been in a situation of moral hazard, because they didn't bear the costs of the risky mortgages they were underwriting.
* Third, large banks may have believed they were "too big to fail." That is, because these banks were so ingrained in the US economy, the federal government would not have allowed them to fail in order to prevent a full-scale economic crash. This belief may have been shaped by the 1998 bailout of [[Long Term Capital Management]].<ref name="nyt0809072">{{cite news|first=Roger|last=Lowenstein|author-link=Roger Lowenstein|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/business/07ltcm.html|title=Long-Term Capital: It's a Short-Term Memory|date=September 6, 2008|work=The New York Times|url-status=live|archive-url=https://archive.today/2011.05.01-162316/https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/business/07ltcm.html|archive-date=2011-05-01}}</ref> "Too big to fail" banks may have believed they were essentially invincible to failure, thus putting them in a position of moral hazard: they could take on big risks – thus increasing their expected payoff – thinking that the federal government would bail them out in the event of a major failure. Therefore, large banks may have been in a situation of moral hazard, because they didn't bear the costs of a catastrophic collapse.
* Asset managers may have had an incentive to take on more risk when managing other people's money, particularly if they were paid as a percentage of the fund's profits. If they took on more risk, they could expect higher payoff for themselves and were somewhat shielded from losses because they were spending other people's money. Therefore, asset managers may have been in a situation of moral hazard, where they would take on more risk than appropriate for a given client because they didn't bear the cost of failure.
* Mortgage loan originators, such as Washington Mutual, may have had an incentive to understate the risk of loans they originated because the loans were often sold to mortgage pools (see mortgage-backed securities). Because loan originators were paid on a per-mortgage basis, they had an incentive to produce as many mortgages as possible, even if they were risky. Because these institutions didn't expect to hold on to the loans until maturity, they could pass on the risk to the buyer of the loans. Therefore, mortgage loan originators may have been in a situation of moral hazard, because they didn't bear the costs of the risky mortgages they were underwriting.
* Third, large banks may have believed they were "too big to fail." That is, because these banks were so ingrained in the US economy, the federal government would not have allowed them to fail in order to prevent a full-scale economic crash. This belief may have been shaped by the 1998 bailout of Long Term Capital Management. "Too big to fail" banks may have believed they were essentially invincible to failure, thus putting them in a position of moral hazard: they could take on big risks – thus increasing their expected payoff – thinking that the federal government would bail them out in the event of a major failure. Therefore, large banks may have been in a situation of moral hazard, because they didn't bear the costs of a catastrophic collapse.
* 资产管理公司在管理他人资金时，可能有承担更多风险的动机，特别是如果他们的收入占基金利润的百分比。如果他们承担更多的风险，他们可以期待自己获得更高的回报，而且由于他们花了别人的钱，他们在一定程度上避免了损失。因此，资产管理公司可能已经处于道德风险的情况下，他们将承担更多的风险，而不是适合给定的客户，因为他们不承担失败的成本。
* 华盛顿互惠银行(Washington Mutual)等抵押贷款发放机构可能有动机低估其发放的贷款的风险，因为这些贷款通常被出售给抵押贷款池(见抵押贷款支持证券)。由于贷款发放者是按照每笔抵押贷款支付的，因此他们有动机尽可能多地发放抵押贷款，即使这样做有风险。因为这些机构并不指望在贷款到期前持有这些贷款，所以它们可以将风险转嫁给贷款买家。因此，抵押贷款发放人可能已经处于道德风险的情况下，因为他们没有承担他们承保的风险抵押贷款的成本。
* 第三，大银行可能认为自己“大到不能倒”也就是说，由于这些银行在美国经济中根深蒂固，联邦政府不会为了防止全面经济崩溃而允许它们倒闭。这种信念可能是由1998年对长期资本管理公司(Long Term Capital Management)的纾困形成的。“大到不能倒”的银行可能认为他们本质上是不可战胜的，从而使他们处于道德风险的境地: 他们可以承担巨大的风险——从而增加他们的预期收益——认为联邦政府会在重大破产的情况下救助他们。因此，大银行可能处于道德风险的境地，因为它们没有承担灾难性崩溃的代价。
Notably, the [[Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission]] (FCIC), tasked by Congress with investigating the causes of the financial crisis, cited moral hazard as a component of the crisis, arguing that many factors, including deregulation in the derivatives market in 2000, reduced federal oversight, and the potential for government bailout of "too big to fail" institutions all played a role in increasing moral hazard in the years leading up to the collapse.<ref name=":5">{{Cite report|url=https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf|title=The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States|author=National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States|date=February 25, 2011|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181216095833/https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf|archive-date=2018-12-16}}</ref>
Notably, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), tasked by Congress with investigating the causes of the financial crisis, cited moral hazard as a component of the crisis, arguing that many factors, including deregulation in the derivatives market in 2000, reduced federal oversight, and the potential for government bailout of "too big to fail" institutions all played a role in increasing moral hazard in the years leading up to the collapse.
值得注意的是，受国会委托调查金融危机起因的金融危机调查委员会(FCIC) ，将道德风险列为危机的一个组成部分，认为许多因素，包括2000年衍生品市场的放松管制，联邦监督的减少，以及政府救助“大到不能倒”的机构的可能性，都在导致金融危机前几年道德风险增加的过程中发挥了作用。
Others have argued that moral hazard could not have played a role in the financial crisis for three main reasons. First, in the event of a catastrophic failure, a government bailout would only come after major losses for the company.<ref name=":3">{{Cite magazine|url=https://www.newyorker.com/business/james-surowiecki/moral-hazard-and-the-crisis|title=Moral Hazard and the Crisis|last=Surowiecki|first=James|magazine=The New Yorker|date=January 14, 2010|language=en|access-date=2020-03-02|url-status=live|archive-date=2021-06-01|archive-url=https://archive.today/2021.06.01-225851/https://www.newyorker.com/business/james-surowiecki/moral-hazard-and-the-crisis}}</ref> So even if a bailout was expected it wouldn't prevent the firm from taking losses. Second, there is some evidence that big banks were not expecting the crisis and thus were not expecting government bailouts, though the FCIC tried hard to contest this idea.<ref name=":3" /> Third, some have argued that negative [[Externality|externalities]] from corporate governance were a more important cause, since some risky investments may have had positive expected payoff for the firm but negative expected payoff to society.<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=Schwarcz|first=Steven L.|date=December 2017|title=Too Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility|url=https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1093&context=mlr|format=PDF|archive-format=PDF|journal=Minnesota Law Review|volume=102|pages=761–802|access-date=2021-06-01|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200318122717/https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1093&context=mlr|archive-date=2020-03-18|url-status=live}}</ref>
Others have argued that moral hazard could not have played a role in the financial crisis for three main reasons. First, in the event of a catastrophic failure, a government bailout would only come after major losses for the company. So even if a bailout was expected it wouldn't prevent the firm from taking losses. Second, there is some evidence that big banks were not expecting the crisis and thus were not expecting government bailouts, though the FCIC tried hard to contest this idea. Third, some have argued that negative externalities from corporate governance were a more important cause, since some risky investments may have had positive expected payoff for the firm but negative expected payoff to society.
其他人则认为，道德风险不可能在金融危机中发挥作用，原因主要有三点。首先，在发生灾难性破产的情况下，只有在公司遭受重大损失之后，政府才会出手救助。因此，即使救助计划是预期的，也不能阻止公司承担损失。其次，有一些证据表明，大银行没有预料到危机，因此也没有预料到政府的纾困，尽管 FCIC 努力对这种想法提出质疑。第三，一些人认为，公司治理的负外部性是一个更重要的原因，因为一些风险投资可能对公司产生了正的预期收益，但对社会产生了负的预期收益。
==Insurance industry==
{{more footnotes|section|date=December 2012}}
Moral hazard has been studied by insurers<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Crosby |first=Everett |year= 1905|title=Fire Prevention |periodical=Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science |volume=26 |issue= 2|pages=224–38 |jstor= 1011015|doi= 10.1177/000271620502600215|publisher=American Academy of Political and Social Science |s2cid=220837165 |url=https://zenodo.org/record/1448646}} Crosby was one of the founders of the [[National Fire Protection Association]], [http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=500&itemID=18020&URL=About%20Us/History NFPA.org] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928060123/http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=500&itemID=18020&URL=About%20Us%2FHistory |date=2007-09-28}}</ref> and academics; such as in the work of [[Kenneth Arrow]],<ref name="Arrow 1963 941–732"/><ref>{{cite book |title=Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing |last=Arrow |first=Kenneth |year=1965 |publisher=Yrjö Jahnssonin Säätiö |location=Finland |oclc=228221660 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing |last=Arrow |first=Kenneth |year=1971 |publisher=Markham |location=Chicago |isbn=978-0-8410-2001-6 }}</ref> Tom Baker,<ref name="Baker1996">{{Cite journal |last=Baker |first=Tom |year=1996 |title=On the Genealogy of Moral hazard |periodical=Texas Law Review |volume=75 |page=237 |issn=0040-4411 }}</ref> and John Nyman.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://directory.sph.umn.edu/bio/sph-a-z/john-nyman|title = John A. Nyman, PHD}}</ref>
Moral hazard has been studied by insurers Crosby was one of the founders of the National Fire Protection Association, NFPA.org and academics; such as in the work of Kenneth Arrow, Tom Baker, and John Nyman.
保险业 = = 道德风险已经被保险公司研究过了 Crosby 是国家消防协会，美国消防协会网站和学术界的创始人之一; 例如 Kenneth Arrow，Tom Baker，和 John Nyman 的工作。
The name comes originally from the [[insurance]] industry. Insurance companies worried that protecting their clients from risks (like fire, or car accidents) might encourage those clients to behave in riskier ways (like smoking in bed or not wearing seatbelts). This problem may inefficiently discourage those companies from protecting their clients as much as the clients would like to be protected.
The name comes originally from the insurance industry. Insurance companies worried that protecting their clients from risks (like fire, or car accidents) might encourage those clients to behave in riskier ways (like smoking in bed or not wearing seatbelts). This problem may inefficiently discourage those companies from protecting their clients as much as the clients would like to be protected.
这个名字来源于保险业。保险公司担心，保护他们的客户免受风险(如火灾或车祸)可能会鼓励这些客户以更危险的方式行事(如在床上吸烟或不系安全带)。这个问题可能无法有效地阻止这些公司像保护客户希望的那样保护他们的客户。
Economists argue that the [[Pareto efficiency|inefficiency]] results from information asymmetry. If insurance companies could perfectly observe the actions of their clients, they could deny coverage to clients choosing risky actions (like smoking in bed or not wearing seat belts), allowing them to provide thorough protection against risk (fire or accidents) without encouraging risky behavior. However, since insurance companies cannot perfectly observe their clients' actions, they are discouraged from providing the amount of protection that would be provided in a world with perfect information.
Economists argue that the inefficiency results from information asymmetry. If insurance companies could perfectly observe the actions of their clients, they could deny coverage to clients choosing risky actions (like smoking in bed or not wearing seat belts), allowing them to provide thorough protection against risk (fire or accidents) without encouraging risky behavior. However, since insurance companies cannot perfectly observe their clients' actions, they are discouraged from providing the amount of protection that would be provided in a world with perfect information.
经济学家辩称，效率低下是信息不对称的结果。如果保险公司能够完美地观察他们客户的行为，他们就可以拒绝为客户选择危险行为(如在床上吸烟或不系安全带)的保险，允许他们在不鼓励危险行为的情况下提供全面的风险保护(火灾或事故)。然而，由于保险公司无法完美地观察客户的行为，因此它们不愿提供在一个信息完善的世界中可以提供的保护。
Economists distinguish moral hazard from [[adverse selection]], another problem that arises in the insurance industry, which is caused by ''hidden information'', rather than ''hidden actions''.
Economists distinguish moral hazard from adverse selection, another problem that arises in the insurance industry, which is caused by hidden information, rather than hidden actions.
经济学家将道德风险与逆向选择风险区分开来。道德风险是保险业出现的另一个问题，它是由隐性信息(而非隐性行为)引起的。
The same underlying problem of non-observable actions also affects other contexts besides the insurance industry. It also arises in [[banking]] and [[finance]]: if a financial institution knows it is protected by a [[lender of last resort]], it may make riskier investments than it would in the absence of the protection.
The same underlying problem of non-observable actions also affects other contexts besides the insurance industry. It also arises in banking and finance: if a financial institution knows it is protected by a lender of last resort, it may make riskier investments than it would in the absence of the protection.
不可观察行为的同样根本问题也影响到保险业以外的其他背景。银行业和金融业也会出现这种情况: 如果金融机构知道自己受到最后贷款人的保护，它可能会进行比不受保护时更具风险的投资。
In insurance markets, moral hazard occurs when the behavior of the insured party changes in a way that raises costs for the insurer since the insured party no longer bears the full costs of that behavior. Because individuals no longer bear the cost of medical services, they have an added incentive to ask for pricier and more elaborate medical service, which would otherwise not be necessary. In those instances, individuals have an incentive to over consume, simply because they no longer bear the full cost of medical services.
In insurance markets, moral hazard occurs when the behavior of the insured party changes in a way that raises costs for the insurer since the insured party no longer bears the full costs of that behavior. Because individuals no longer bear the cost of medical services, they have an added incentive to ask for pricier and more elaborate medical service, which would otherwise not be necessary. In those instances, individuals have an incentive to over consume, simply because they no longer bear the full cost of medical services.
在保险市场中，当被保险人的行为发生变化，导致保险人的成本增加，因为被保险人不再承担该行为的全部成本时，就会产生道德风险。由于个人不再承担医疗服务的费用，他们更有动力要求更昂贵和更精细的医疗服务，否则就没有必要这样做。在这些情况下，个人有过度消费的动机，仅仅是因为他们不再承担医疗服务的全部成本。
Two types of behavior can change. One type is the risky behavior itself, resulting in a ''[[ex ante|before the event]]'' moral hazard. Insured parties then behave in a more risky manner, resulting in more negative consequences that the insurer must pay for. For example, after purchasing automobile insurance, some may tend to be less careful about locking the automobile or choose to drive more, thereby increasing the risk of theft or an accident for the insurer. After purchasing fire insurance, some may tend to be less careful about preventing fires (say, by smoking in bed or neglecting to replace the batteries in fire alarms). A further example has been identified in [[flood risk management]] in which it is proposed that the possession of insurance undermines efforts to encourage people to integrate flood protection and resilience measures in properties exposed to flooding.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=O'Hare|first1=P.|last2=White|first2=I.|last3=Connelly|first3=A.|date=2015-09-01|title=Insurance as maladaptation: Resilience and the 'business as usual paradox|journal=Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy|language=en|volume=34|issue=6|pages=1175–93|doi=10.1177/0263774x15602022|s2cid=155016786|url=https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/insurance-as-maladaptation-resilience-and-the-business-as-usual-paradox(ac6977b8-52f0-4c9f-a213-466296b14220).html}}</ref>
Two types of behavior can change. One type is the risky behavior itself, resulting in a before the event moral hazard. Insured parties then behave in a more risky manner, resulting in more negative consequences that the insurer must pay for. For example, after purchasing automobile insurance, some may tend to be less careful about locking the automobile or choose to drive more, thereby increasing the risk of theft or an accident for the insurer. After purchasing fire insurance, some may tend to be less careful about preventing fires (say, by smoking in bed or neglecting to replace the batteries in fire alarms). A further example has been identified in flood risk management in which it is proposed that the possession of insurance undermines efforts to encourage people to integrate flood protection and resilience measures in properties exposed to flooding.
有两种行为可以改变。一种类型是危险行为本身，导致事前道德风险。然后，被保险方的行为风险更大，导致更多的负面后果，保险公司必须支付。例如，在购买汽车保险之后，有些人可能不太注意锁定汽车或选择多开车，从而增加了保险公司被盗或发生事故的风险。在购买了火灾保险之后，一些人可能不太注意预防火灾(比如，在床上吸烟或忘记更换火灾报警器中的电池)。在洪水风险管理方面还发现了另一个例子，其中提出，拥有保险会破坏鼓励人们将防洪和抗灾措施纳入受洪水影响的财产的努力。
A second type of behavior that may change is the reaction to the negative consequences of risk once they have occurred and insurance is provided to cover their costs. That may be called ''ex post'' (after the event) moral hazard. Insured parties then do not behave in a more risky manner that results in more negative consequences, but they ask an insurer to pay for more of the negative consequences from risk as insurance coverage increases. For example, without medical insurance, some may forgo medical treatment due to its costs and simply deal with substandard health. However, after medical insurance becomes available, some may ask an insurance provider to pay for the cost of medical treatment that would not have occurred otherwise.
A second type of behavior that may change is the reaction to the negative consequences of risk once they have occurred and insurance is provided to cover their costs. That may be called ex post (after the event) moral hazard. Insured parties then do not behave in a more risky manner that results in more negative consequences, but they ask an insurer to pay for more of the negative consequences from risk as insurance coverage increases. For example, without medical insurance, some may forgo medical treatment due to its costs and simply deal with substandard health. However, after medical insurance becomes available, some may ask an insurance provider to pay for the cost of medical treatment that would not have occurred otherwise.
第二种可能改变的行为是对风险的负面后果的反应，一旦风险发生，并提供保险来支付其成本。这可以称为事后(事后)道德风险。因此，被保险人不会以更具风险的方式行事，从而导致更多的负面后果，但随着保险范围的扩大，他们会要求保险人为风险带来的更多负面后果买单。例如，没有医疗保险，一些人可能会因为医疗费用而放弃治疗，而只是简单地处理不合格的健康问题。然而，在医疗保险可用之后，有些人可能会要求保险提供者支付本来不会发生的医疗费用。
Sometimes moral hazard is so severe that it makes insurance policies impossible. Coinsurance, co-payments, and deductibles reduce the risk of moral hazard by increasing the out-of-pocket spending of consumers, which decreases their incentive to consume. Thus, the insured have a financial incentive to avoid making a claim.
Sometimes moral hazard is so severe that it makes insurance policies impossible. Coinsurance, co-payments, and deductibles reduce the risk of moral hazard by increasing the out-of-pocket spending of consumers, which decreases their incentive to consume. Thus, the insured have a financial incentive to avoid making a claim.
有时，道德风险是如此严重，以至于不可能有保险政策。共同保险、共同支付和免赔额通过增加消费者的现金支出来降低道德风险，从而降低他们的消费动机。因此，被保险人有避免索赔的经济动机。
== Numerical example ==
[[File:Moral_Hazard_Numerical_Example.png|alt=A graphical representation of moral hazard in health insurance. The graph plots price against quantity of health care. Without health insurance, an individual would consume less health care than with health insurance, potentially leading to moral hazard.|thumb|upright=1.3|The blue line represents the downward sloping [[Demand curve|marginal benefit curve]]. The orange line represents the constant $10 [[Supply (economics)|marginal cost curve]] without insurance. The green star is the market equilibrium. When the individual is insured, the marginal cost curve shifts down to 0, leading to a new equilibrium at the yellow star.]]
Consider a potential case of moral hazard in the health care market caused by the purchase of health insurance. Assume health care has constant marginal cost of $10 per unit and the individual's demand is given by ''Q'' = 20 − ''P''. Assuming a perfectly competitive market, at equilibrium, the price will be $10 per unit and the individual will consume 10 units of health care. Now, consider the same individual with health insurance. Assume this health insurance makes health care free for the individual. In this case, the individual will have a price of $0 for the health care and thus will consume 20 units. The price will still be $10, but the insurance company would be the one bearing the costs.
Consider a potential case of moral hazard in the health care market caused by the purchase of health insurance. Assume health care has constant marginal cost of $10 per unit and the individual's demand is given by Q = 20 − P. Assuming a perfectly competitive market, at equilibrium, the price will be $10 per unit and the individual will consume 10 units of health care. Now, consider the same individual with health insurance. Assume this health insurance makes health care free for the individual. In this case, the individual will have a price of $0 for the health care and thus will consume 20 units. The price will still be $10, but the insurance company would be the one bearing the costs.
= = 数值例子 = = 考虑购买健康保险在医疗保健市场引起的潜在道德风险的情况。假设医疗保健的边际成本为每单位10美元，个人的需求由 Q = 20-P 给出。假设一个完全竞争的市场，在均衡状态下，价格为每单位10美元，个人将消费10单位的医疗保健。现在，考虑同一个人的健康保险。假设这种医疗保险使个人的医疗保健免费。在这种情况下，个人将有一个价格为0美元的医疗保健，因此将消费20个单位。价格仍然是10美元，但保险公司将承担费用。
This example shows numerically how moral hazard could occur with health insurance. The individual consumes more health care than the equilibrium quantity because they don't bear the cost of the additional care.
This example shows numerically how moral hazard could occur with health insurance. The individual consumes more health care than the equilibrium quantity because they don't bear the cost of the additional care.
这个例子从数字上说明了健康保险是如何产生道德风险的。个人消费更多的医疗保健比均衡数量，因为他们不承担额外的医疗成本。
==Economic theory==
In economic theory, moral hazard is a situation in which the behavior of one party may change to the detriment of another after the [[financial transaction|transaction]] has taken place. For example, a person with insurance against automobile theft may be less cautious about locking their car because the negative consequences of vehicle theft are now (partially) the responsibility of the insurance company. A party makes a decision about how much risk to take, while another party bears the costs if things go badly, and the party insulated from risk behaves differently from how it would if it were fully exposed to the risk.
In economic theory, moral hazard is a situation in which the behavior of one party may change to the detriment of another after the transaction has taken place. For example, a person with insurance against automobile theft may be less cautious about locking their car because the negative consequences of vehicle theft are now (partially) the responsibility of the insurance company. A party makes a decision about how much risk to take, while another party bears the costs if things go badly, and the party insulated from risk behaves differently from how it would if it were fully exposed to the risk.
在经济理论中，道德风险是指交易发生后，一方的行为可能发生变化而损害另一方的情况。例如，有汽车盗窃保险的人可能对锁车不那么谨慎，因为汽车盗窃的负面后果现在(部分)是保险公司的责任。一方当事人决定承担多大的风险，而另一方当事人承担风险，如果情况恶化，与风险隔离的一方当事人的行为不同，如果它完全暴露在风险之下。
According to [[contract theory]], moral hazard results from a situation in which a hidden action occurs.<ref>[[Andreu Mas-Colell|A. Mas-Colell]], M. Whinston, and J. Green (1995), ''Microeconomic Theory''. Chapter 14, 'The Principal-Agent Problem', p. 477.</ref> [[Bengt Holmström]] said this:
{{quote|It has long been recognized that a problem of moral hazard may arise when individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions such that their privately taken actions affect the probability distribution of the outcome.<ref>Holmstrom, B. (1979), "Moral hazard and observability". ''Bell Journal of Economics'', pp. 74–91.</ref>}}
According to contract theory, moral hazard results from a situation in which a hidden action occurs.A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston, and J. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory. Chapter 14, 'The Principal-Agent Problem', p. 477. Bengt Holmström said this:
根据契约理论，道德风险源于隐性行为发生的情况。Mas-Colell M.Winston 和 J。格林(1995) ，微观经济理论。第14章，“委托代理问题”，477页。Bengt Holmström said this:
Moral hazard can be divided into two types when it involves asymmetric information (or lack of verifiability) of the outcome of a random event. An ''ex ante'' moral hazard is a change in behavior prior to the outcome of the random event, whereas ''ex post'' involves behavior after the outcome.<ref>{{Cite web|author=Mark William Jenkins|url=http://purl.stanford.edu/yb246bk3096|title=Essays on consumer credit markets|page=90}}</ref> For example, in the case of a health insurance company insuring an individual during a specific time period, the final health of the individual can be thought of as the outcome. The individual taking greater risks during the period would be ex-ante moral hazard whereas lying about a fictitious health problem to defraud the insurance company would be ex post moral hazard. A second example is the case of a bank making a loan to an entrepreneur for a risky business venture. The entrepreneur becoming overly risky would be ex ante moral hazard, but willful default (wrongly claiming the venture failed when it was profitable) is ex post moral hazard.
Moral hazard can be divided into two types when it involves asymmetric information (or lack of verifiability) of the outcome of a random event. An ex ante moral hazard is a change in behavior prior to the outcome of the random event, whereas ex post involves behavior after the outcome. For example, in the case of a health insurance company insuring an individual during a specific time period, the final health of the individual can be thought of as the outcome. The individual taking greater risks during the period would be ex-ante moral hazard whereas lying about a fictitious health problem to defraud the insurance company would be ex post moral hazard. A second example is the case of a bank making a loan to an entrepreneur for a risky business venture. The entrepreneur becoming overly risky would be ex ante moral hazard, but willful default (wrongly claiming the venture failed when it was profitable) is ex post moral hazard.
当道德风险涉及随机事件结果的不对称信息(或缺乏可验证性)时，道德风险可以分为两种类型。事前道德风险是指随机事件发生之前的行为变化，而事后道德风险是指发生之后的行为变化。例如，如果一家健康保险公司在某一特定时期为某一个人提供保险，则可将该个人的最终健康视为结果。在此期间承担更大风险的个人将是事前的道德风险，而谎报虚假的健康问题以欺骗保险公司将是事后的道德风险。第二个例子是一家银行向一位企业家发放贷款，用于进行高风险的商业投资。企业家变得过度冒险是事前的道德风险，而故意违约(错误地宣称企业在盈利时失败)则是事后的道德风险。
According to Hart and Holmström (1987), moral hazard models can be subdivided in models with hidden action and models with hidden information.<ref>{{Cite book|title = Advances in Economics and Econometrics|last1 = Hart|first1 = Oliver|publisher = Cambridge University Press|year = 1987|pages = 71–155|last2 = Holmström|first2 = Bengt|editor-last = Bewley, T.|chapter = The theory of contracts}}</ref> In the former case, after the contract has been signed the agent chooses an action (such as an effort level) that cannot be observed by the principal. In the latter case, after the contract has been signed there is a random draw by nature that determines the agent's type (such as his valuation for a good or his costs of effort). In the literature, two reasons have been discussed why moral hazard may imply that the first-best solution (the solution that would be attained under complete information) is not achieved.
According to Hart and Holmström (1987), moral hazard models can be subdivided in models with hidden action and models with hidden information. In the former case, after the contract has been signed the agent chooses an action (such as an effort level) that cannot be observed by the principal. In the latter case, after the contract has been signed there is a random draw by nature that determines the agent's type (such as his valuation for a good or his costs of effort). In the literature, two reasons have been discussed why moral hazard may imply that the first-best solution (the solution that would be attained under complete information) is not achieved.
根据 Hart 和 Holmström (1987)的理论，道德风险模型可以细分为隐藏行为模型和隐藏信息模型。在前一种情况下，在签订合同之后，代理人选择一个委托人无法观察到的行为(如努力水平)。在后一种情况下，在合同签署后，会有一个随机抽签决定代理人的类型(如他对一件商品的估价或他的努力成本)。在文献中，已经讨论了两个原因，为什么道德风险可能意味着第一最佳解决方案(在完全信息下可能达到的解决方案)不能实现。
Firstly, the agent may be risk-averse, so there is a trade-off between providing the agent with incentives and insuring the agent. Secondly, the agent may be risk-neutral but wealth-constrained and so the agent cannot make a payment to the principal and there is a trade-off between providing incentives and minimizing the agent's limited-liability rent.<ref>{{Cite book|title = The theory of incentives: The principal-agent model|last1 = Laffont|first1 = Jean-Jacques|publisher = Princeton University Press|year = 2002|last2 = Martimort|first2 = David}}</ref> Among the early contributors to the contract-theoretic literature on moral hazard were [[Oliver Hart (economist)|Oliver Hart]] and [[Sanford J. Grossman]]. In the meantime, the moral hazard model has been extended to the cases of multiple periods and multiple tasks, both with risk-averse and risk-neutral agents.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Repeated Moral Hazard|jstor = 1911724|journal = Econometrica|volume = 53|issue = 1|doi = 10.2307/1911724|first = William P.|last = Rogerson|year = 1985|pages = 69–76}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|jstor = 4135244|title = Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions|last = Schmitz|first = Patrick W.|date = 2005|journal = RAND Journal of Economics|pages = 318–36|volume = 36|issue = 2}}</ref>
Firstly, the agent may be risk-averse, so there is a trade-off between providing the agent with incentives and insuring the agent. Secondly, the agent may be risk-neutral but wealth-constrained and so the agent cannot make a payment to the principal and there is a trade-off between providing incentives and minimizing the agent's limited-liability rent. Among the early contributors to the contract-theoretic literature on moral hazard were Oliver Hart and Sanford J. Grossman. In the meantime, the moral hazard model has been extended to the cases of multiple periods and multiple tasks, both with risk-averse and risk-neutral agents.
首先，代理人可能厌恶风险，因此在为代理人提供激励和为代理人提供保险之间存在权衡。其次，代理人可能是风险中性但财富受限的，因此代理人不能向委托人支付费用，在提供激励和最小化代理人的有限责任租金之间存在权衡。奥利弗•哈特(Oliver Hart)和桑福德·J·格罗斯曼是道德风险契约理论文献的早期贡献者之一。同时，将道德风险模型推广到具有风险规避和风险中性代理的多阶段多任务情形。
There are also models that combine hidden action and hidden information.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*|journal = The Quarterly Journal of Economics|date = 2012|issn = 0033-5533|pages = 1843–1881|volume = 127|issue = 4|doi = 10.1093/qje/qjs026|language = en|first1 = Philippe|last1 = Aghion|first2 = Drew|last2 = Fudenberg|first3 = Richard|last3 = Holden|first4 = Takashi|last4 = Kunimoto|first5 = Olivier|last5 = Tercieux|citeseerx = 10.1.1.224.2883}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|title = On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems|journal = Journal of Economic Theory|date = 2002|pages = 444–60|volume = 103|issue = 2|doi = 10.1006/jeth.2001.2790|first = Patrick W.|last = Schmitz|citeseerx = 10.1.1.584.1856}}</ref> Since there is no data on unobservable variables, the contract-theoretic moral hazard model is difficult to test directly, but there have been some successful indirect tests with field data.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = The Provision of Incentives in Firms|journal = Journal of Economic Literature|date = 1999|issn = 0022-0515|pages = 7–63|volume = 37|issue = 1|doi = 10.1257/jel.37.1.7|first = Canice|last = Prendergast|citeseerx = 10.1.1.558.6657}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|title = Performance Pay and Productivity|journal = American Economic Review|date = 2000|issn = 0002-8282|pages = 1346–61|volume = 90|issue = 5|doi = 10.1257/aer.90.5.1346|first = Edward P|last = Lazear|citeseerx = 10.1.1.553.1082}}</ref> Direct tests of moral hazard theory are feasible in laboratory settings, using the tools of experimental economics. In such a setup, Hoppe and Schmitz (2018) have corroborated central insights of moral hazard theory.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Hoppe|first1=Eva I.|last2=Schmitz|first2=Patrick W.|date=2018|title=Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory|journal=Games and Economic Behavior|volume=109|pages=544–564|doi=10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.006|doi-access=free}}</ref>
There are also models that combine hidden action and hidden information. Since there is no data on unobservable variables, the contract-theoretic moral hazard model is difficult to test directly, but there have been some successful indirect tests with field data. Direct tests of moral hazard theory are feasible in laboratory settings, using the tools of experimental economics. In such a setup, Hoppe and Schmitz (2018) have corroborated central insights of moral hazard theory.
还有一些模型结合了隐藏动作和隐藏信息。由于没有关于不可观测变量的数据，契约理论的道德风险模型难以直接检验，但已有一些成功的间接检验与实地数据。利用实验经济学的工具，在实验室环境中对道德风险理论进行直接检验是可行的。在这样一个设置中，霍普和施密茨(2018)证实了道德风险理论的核心见解。
==Teamwork & Joint Monitoring==
Through teamwork theory, teamwork can decrease moral hazard in the forms of self-management systems and joint monitoring. It’s known that teamwork within [[HR management]] technologies are linked with higher productivity.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chan |first1=David |title=Teamwork and Moral Hazard |journal=Journal of Political Economy |date=2016 |issue=124 (3) |pages=734-770}}</ref>
Through teamwork theory, teamwork can decrease moral hazard in the forms of self-management systems and joint monitoring. It’s known that teamwork within HR management technologies are linked with higher productivity.
通过团队合作理论，团队合作可以以自我管理系统和联合监督的形式减少道德风险。众所周知，人力资源管理技术中的团队合作与更高的生产力相联系。
When it comes to economist, they have little say about how worker productivity can increase due to teamwork. This in understanding shows that there is a traditional prediction that joint production will end in moral hazards. Although theoretically, having vast amounts of communication, cooperation and coordination while allowing workers to have better information and knowledge about each other, teamwork can lessen the effect of moral hazard.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chan |first1=David |title=Teamwork and Moral Hazard |journal=Journal of Political Economy |date=2016 |issue=124(3) |pages=734-770}}</ref>
When it comes to economist, they have little say about how worker productivity can increase due to teamwork. This in understanding shows that there is a traditional prediction that joint production will end in moral hazards. Although theoretically, having vast amounts of communication, cooperation and coordination while allowing workers to have better information and knowledge about each other, teamwork can lessen the effect of moral hazard.
说到经济学家，他们对于如何通过团队合作提高工人的生产力几乎没有发言权。这种认识表明，有一种传统的预测认为，联合生产最终将导致道德风险。虽然从理论上讲，团队合作可以减少道德风险的影响，但是，团队合作可以使员工之间进行大量的沟通、合作和协调，同时让员工对彼此有更好的了解和认识。
For example, in a model developed by David C. Chan, he explained that within the nurse managed system, asymmetric information commonly occurs between nurse managers and physician workers.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chan |first1=David |title=Teamwork and Moral Hazard |journal=Journal of Political Economy |date=2016 |issue=124(3) |pages=734-770}}</ref> Physicians may have the tendencies to keep away from being assigned larger extents of work, thus to a degree act busier and more optimised at work than they really are. This in turn has accounted to the act of “foot-dragging” where physicians keep patients longer than they necessarily need in order to distort the true designated checkout points of workloads.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chan |first1=David |title=Teamwork and Moral Hazard |journal=Journal of Political Economy |date=2016 |issue=124(3) |pages=734-770}}</ref> To reduce these encounters, self-managed system are shown to be beneficial. By having this type of system, this would reduce the relative foot dragging found within the old nurse-managed system and will result in physicians to acquire better information about each other’s true workloads to choose the right patients at the right optimal times.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chan |first1=David |title=Teamwork and Moral Hazard |journal=Journal of Political Economy |date=2016 |issue=124(3) |pages=734-770}}</ref>
For example, in a model developed by David C. Chan, he explained that within the nurse managed system, asymmetric information commonly occurs between nurse managers and physician workers. Physicians may have the tendencies to keep away from being assigned larger extents of work, thus to a degree act busier and more optimised at work than they really are. This in turn has accounted to the act of “foot-dragging” where physicians keep patients longer than they necessarily need in order to distort the true designated checkout points of workloads. To reduce these encounters, self-managed system are shown to be beneficial. By having this type of system, this would reduce the relative foot dragging found within the old nurse-managed system and will result in physicians to acquire better information about each other’s true workloads to choose the right patients at the right optimal times.
例如，在 David C. Chan 开发的一个模型中，他解释说，在护士管理系统中，护士经理和医务工作者之间通常会发生信息不对称。医生可能倾向于避免被分配更大的工作范围，从而在一定程度上表现得比实际工作更忙碌、更乐观。这反过来解释了“拖延”的行为，即医生为了扭曲工作量的真正指定检查点，将病人留在比他们必需的时间更长的地方。为了减少这些遭遇，自我管理系统被证明是有益的。通过这种类型的系统，这将减少在旧的护士管理系统中发现的相对拖延，并将导致医生获得关于彼此的真实工作量的更好的信息，以在正确的最佳时间选择正确的病人。
One other aspect that has shown reasonable attention is how monitoring can improve the efficiency of reducing moral hazards. Social motivation has shown that when workers know that their peers can monitor them on a simple stance knowingly while also caring about what their peers are thinking, workers experience more efficient behaviours.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chan |first1=David |title=Teamwork and Moral Hazard |journal=Journal of Political Economy |date=2016 |issue=124(3) |pages=734-770}}</ref> However, by only using mutual monitoring and social motivation, it is often not enough and turns into a complete lack in productivity. Thus, joint management as a distinct teamwork formation is an important aspect for workers to use to improve to high ends of productivity.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chan |first1=David |title=Teamwork and Moral Hazard |journal=Journal of Political Economy |date=2016 |issue=124(3) |pages=734-770}}</ref>
One other aspect that has shown reasonable attention is how monitoring can improve the efficiency of reducing moral hazards. Social motivation has shown that when workers know that their peers can monitor them on a simple stance knowingly while also caring about what their peers are thinking, workers experience more efficient behaviours. However, by only using mutual monitoring and social motivation, it is often not enough and turns into a complete lack in productivity. Thus, joint management as a distinct teamwork formation is an important aspect for workers to use to improve to high ends of productivity.
另一个受到合理关注的方面是监督如何能够提高减少道德风险的效率。社会动机已经表明，当员工知道他们的同事可以明知故犯地以一种简单的姿态监视他们，同时也关心他们的同事在想什么时，他们的行为就会更有效率。然而，仅仅使用相互监督和社会动机，往往是不够的，并转变为完全缺乏生产力。因此，联合管理作为一种独特的团队合作形式，是工人们用来提高生产力的一个重要方面。
==See also==
{{div col|colwidth=20em}}
* [[Conflict of interest]]
* [[Feedback]]
* [[Free rider problem]]
* [[Game theory]]
* [[Information economics]]
* [[Offset hypothesis]]
* [[Perverse incentive]]
* [[Risk compensation]]
* [[Samaritan's dilemma]]
* [[Systemic risk]]
* [[Too big to fail]]
* [[Unintended consequences]]
{{div col end}}
* Conflict of interest
* Feedback
* Free rider problem
* Game theory
* Information economics
* Offset hypothesis
* Perverse incentive
* Risk compensation
* Samaritan's dilemma
* Systemic risk
* Too big to fail
* Unintended consequences
= = 参见同样 = =
* 利益冲突
* 反馈
* 搭便车问题
* 博弈论
* 信息经济学
* 抵消假设
* 乖张诱因
* 风险补偿
* 撒马利亚人的困境
* 系统性风险
* 大到不能倒闭
* 意外后果
== References ==
{{Reflist}}
==External links==
* {{cite news|last=Dewan|first=Shaila|title=Moral Hazard: A Tempest-Tossed Idea|work=[[The New York Times]] |date=February 26, 2012 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/business/moral-hazard-as-the-flip-side-of-self-reliance.html}}
* {{cite magazine|last=Gladwell|first=Malcolm|title=The Moral Hazard Myth|magazine=The New Yorker|date=August 29, 2005 |url=http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/08/29/050829fa_fact}}
* [http://paq.press.illinois.edu/23/1/hale.html "What's so Moral about the Moral Hazard?"]. Press.illinois.edu
* [https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/meltdown/view/ "Inside the Meltdown"], PBS's ''[[Frontline (U.S. TV series)|Frontline]]'' episode uses the idea as a central theme
*
*
* "What's so Moral about the Moral Hazard?". Press.illinois.edu
* "Inside the Meltdown", PBS's Frontline episode uses the idea as a central theme
= = 外部链接 = =
*
*
* “道德风险有什么道德可言?”。Press.illinois.edu
* 美国公共广播公司(PBS)的《前线》(Frontline)节目将这个想法作为中心主题
{{Financial_risk}}
{{Authority control}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Moral Hazard}}
[[Category:Anti-patterns]]
[[Category:Asymmetric information]]
[[Category:Ethically disputed business practices]]
[[Category:Financial risk]]
[[Category:Insurance]]
[[Category:Market failure]]
[[Category:United States housing bubble]]
Category:Anti-patterns
Category:Asymmetric information
Category:Ethically disputed business practices
Category:Financial risk
Category:Insurance
Category:Market failure
Category:United States housing bubble
分类: 反模式分类: 不对称信息分类: 有道德争议的商业行为分类: 金融风险分类: 保险分类: 市场失灵分类: 美国房地产泡沫
<noinclude>
<small>This page was moved from [[wikipedia:en:Moral hazard]]. Its edit history can be viewed at [[道德风险/edithistory]]</small></noinclude>
[[Category:待整理页面]]
{{Short description|Increases in the exposure to risk when insured, or when another bears the cost}}
{{For|the novel|Moral Hazard (novel)}}
{{Use mdy dates|date = March 2019}}
{{Use American English|date = March 2019}}
{{Financial risk types}}
{{Finance sidebar}}
In [[economics]], a '''moral hazard''' is a situation where an economic actor has an [[incentive]] to increase its exposure to [[risk]] because it does not bear the full costs of that risk. For example, when a corporation is insured, it may take on higher risk knowing that its [[insurance]] will pay the associated costs. A moral hazard may occur where the actions of the risk-taking party change to the detriment of the cost-bearing party after a [[financial transaction]] has taken place.
In economics, a moral hazard is a situation where an economic actor has an incentive to increase its exposure to risk because it does not bear the full costs of that risk. For example, when a corporation is insured, it may take on higher risk knowing that its insurance will pay the associated costs. A moral hazard may occur where the actions of the risk-taking party change to the detriment of the cost-bearing party after a financial transaction has taken place.
在经济学中，道德风险是指经济行为者有动机增加其风险敞口，因为它不承担该风险的全部成本。例如，当一个公司投保时，它可能承担更高的风险，因为它知道它的保险将支付相关的费用。在金融交易发生后，如果冒险方的行为发生变化，对承担成本方不利，则可能发生道德风险。
Moral hazard can occur under a type of [[information asymmetry]] where the risk-taking party to a transaction knows more about its intentions than the party paying the consequences of the risk and has a tendency or incentive to take on too much risk from the perspective of the party with less information. One example is a [[principal–agent problem]], where one party, called an agent, acts on behalf of another party, called the [[Principal (commercial law)|principal]]. If the agent has more information about his or her actions or intentions than the principal then the agent may have an incentive to act too riskily (from the viewpoint of the principal) if the interests of the agent and the principal are not aligned.
Moral hazard can occur under a type of information asymmetry where the risk-taking party to a transaction knows more about its intentions than the party paying the consequences of the risk and has a tendency or incentive to take on too much risk from the perspective of the party with less information. One example is a principal–agent problem, where one party, called an agent, acts on behalf of another party, called the principal. If the agent has more information about his or her actions or intentions than the principal then the agent may have an incentive to act too riskily (from the viewpoint of the principal) if the interests of the agent and the principal are not aligned.
道德风险可能发生在一种信息不对称下，即交易的风险承担方比承担风险后果的一方更了解交易的意图，并倾向于或有动机从信息较少的一方的角度承担过多风险。一个例子是委托-代理问题，其中一方(称为代理人)代表另一方(称为委托人)行事。如果代理人比委托人对自己的行为或意图有更多的了解，那么如果代理人和委托人的利益不一致，代理人可能有动机(从委托人的角度)采取过于冒险的行动。
==History ==
According to research by Dembe and Boden,<ref>Dembe, Allard E. and Boden, Leslie I. (2000). [http://baywood.metapress.com/link.asp?id=1gu8eqn802j62rxk "Moral Hazard: A Question of Morality?"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160513150957/http://baywood.metapress.com/link.asp?id=1gu8eqn802j62rxk |date=2016-05-13 }} New Solutions 2000 10(3). 257–79</ref> the term dates back to the 17th century and was widely used by English insurance companies by the late 19th century. Early usage of the term carried negative connotations, implying [[insurance fraud|fraud]] or immoral behavior (usually on the part of an insured party). Dembe and Boden point out, however, that prominent mathematicians who studied decision-making in the 18th century used "moral" to mean "subjective", which may cloud the true ethical significance in the term.
The concept of moral hazard was the subject of renewed study by economists in the 1960s,<ref name="Arrow 1963 941–732">{{Cite journal|last=Arrow|first=Kenneth|year=1963|title=Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care|publisher=American Economic Association|volume=53|issue=5|pages=941–73|jstor=1812044|periodical=[[The American Economic Review]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Pauly|first=Mark V|year=1968|title=The economics of moral hazard: comment|publisher=American Economic Association|volume=58|issue=3|pages=531–37|jstor=1813785|periodical=The American Economic Review}}</ref> beginning with economist Ken Arrow,<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last1=FINKELSTEIN|first1=AMY|title=Moral Hazard in Health Insurance|last2=ARROW|first2=KENNETH J.|last3=GRUBER|first3=JONATHAN|last4=NEWHOUSE|first4=JOSEPH P.|last5=STIGLITZ|first5=JOSEPH E.|date=2015|publisher=Columbia University Press|doi=10.7312/fink16380|jstor=10.7312/fink16380|isbn=9780231538688}}</ref> and did not imply immoral behavior or fraud. Economists use this term to describe inefficiencies that can occur when risks are displaced or cannot be fully evaluated, rather than a description of the ethics or morals of the involved parties.
According to research by Dembe and Boden,Dembe, Allard E. and Boden, Leslie I. (2000). "Moral Hazard: A Question of Morality?" New Solutions 2000 10(3). 257–79 the term dates back to the 17th century and was widely used by English insurance companies by the late 19th century. Early usage of the term carried negative connotations, implying fraud or immoral behavior (usually on the part of an insured party). Dembe and Boden point out, however, that prominent mathematicians who studied decision-making in the 18th century used "moral" to mean "subjective", which may cloud the true ethical significance in the term.
The concept of moral hazard was the subject of renewed study by economists in the 1960s, beginning with economist Ken Arrow, and did not imply immoral behavior or fraud. Economists use this term to describe inefficiencies that can occur when risks are displaced or cannot be fully evaluated, rather than a description of the ethics or morals of the involved parties.
= = 历史 = = 根据邓比和博登，邓比，阿拉德 E 和博登，莱斯利一世的研究。(2000).“道德风险: 一个道德问题?”新方案200010(3)。这个术语可以追溯到17世纪，到19世纪末被英国保险公司广泛使用。该术语的早期使用带有负面的含义，暗示欺诈或不道德的行为(通常由被保险人)。然而，邓比和博登指出，在18世纪研究决策的杰出数学家使用“道德”来表示“主观”，这可能会掩盖该术语真正的伦理意义。道德风险的概念是经济学家在20世纪60年代重新研究的主题，从经济学家肯 · 阿罗开始，并不意味着不道德的行为或欺诈。经济学家用这个术语来描述风险被转移或无法充分评估时可能发生的低效率，而不是描述有关各方的道德或道德。
Rowell and Connelly offer a detailed description of the genesis of the term moral hazard,<ref>D Rowell, LB Connelly (2012) "A history of the term 'moral hazard'" Journal of Risk and Insurance 79 (4), 1051–75</ref> by identifying salient changes in economic thought, which are identified within the medieval theological and probability literature. Their paper compares and contrasts the predominantly normative conception of moral hazard found within the insurance-industry literature with the largely positive interpretations found within the economic literature. Often what is described as "moral hazard[s]" in the insurance literature is upon closer reading, a description of the closely related concept, [[adverse selection]].
Rowell and Connelly offer a detailed description of the genesis of the term moral hazard,D Rowell, LB Connelly (2012) "A history of the term 'moral hazard'" Journal of Risk and Insurance 79 (4), 1051–75 by identifying salient changes in economic thought, which are identified within the medieval theological and probability literature. Their paper compares and contrasts the predominantly normative conception of moral hazard found within the insurance-industry literature with the largely positive interpretations found within the economic literature. Often what is described as "moral hazard[s]" in the insurance literature is upon closer reading, a description of the closely related concept, adverse selection.
罗威尔和康奈利提供了一个术语道德风险的起源的详细描述，D 罗威尔，LB 康奈利(2012)“一个术语‘道德风险’的历史”风险和保险杂志79(4) ，1051-75通过识别经济思想的显着变化，这是在中世纪神学和概率文献中确定的。他们的论文比较和对比了在保险业文献中发现的道德风险的主要规范性概念和在经济文献中发现的大部分积极的解释。在保险文献中被描述为“道德风险”的东西，通常需要仔细阅读，这是对与之密切相关的概念——逆向选择的描述。
==Finance==
In 1998, [[William J. McDonough]], head of the New York Federal Reserve, helped the counter-parties of [[Long Term Capital Management]] avoid losses by taking over the firm. This move was criticized by former Fed Chair, Paul Volcker and others as increasing moral hazard.<ref name=nyt080907>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/business/07ltcm.html|title=Long-Term Capital: It's a Short-Term Memory|date=September 6, 2008|work=New York Times|author=Roger Lowenstein|author-link=Roger Lowenstein}}</ref><ref name=nr081229/><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/aced684c-834e-11dd-907e-000077b07658|title=The Short View: Moral hazard|author=John Authors|work=Financial Times|date=September 15, 2008}}</ref><ref>[http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00067r.pdf GAO/GGD-00-67R Questions Concerning LTCM and Our Responses] General Accounting Office, February 23, 2000</ref> [[Tyler Cowen]] concludes that "creditors came to believe that their loans to unsound financial institutions would be made good by the Fed – as long as the collapse of those institutions would threaten the global credit system."<ref name=nr081229>{{cite news|url=https://newrepublic.com/article/46760/long-term-capital-blame-todays-crisis|title=Is Long-term Capital To Blame For Today's Crisis?|date=December 29, 2008|author=Noam Scheiber|author-link=Noam Scheiber|work=The New Republic}}</ref> Fed Chair, [[Alan Greenspan]], while conceding the risk of moral hazard, defended the policy to orderly unwind Long Term Capital by saying the world economy is at stake.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://mises.org/library/mr-moral-hazard|title=Mr. Moral Hazard|author=Jeffrey Tucker|date=December 1, 1998|author-link=Jeffrey Tucker}}</ref><ref name=nyt080907/>
In 1998, William J. McDonough, head of the New York Federal Reserve, helped the counter-parties of Long Term Capital Management avoid losses by taking over the firm. This move was criticized by former Fed Chair, Paul Volcker and others as increasing moral hazard.GAO/GGD-00-67R Questions Concerning LTCM and Our Responses General Accounting Office, February 23, 2000 Tyler Cowen concludes that "creditors came to believe that their loans to unsound financial institutions would be made good by the Fed – as long as the collapse of those institutions would threaten the global credit system." Fed Chair, Alan Greenspan, while conceding the risk of moral hazard, defended the policy to orderly unwind Long Term Capital by saying the world economy is at stake.
1998年，纽约联邦储备银行(New York Federal Reserve)行长威廉 · J · 麦克多诺(William J. McDonough)接管了长期资本管理公司(Long Term Capital Management) ，帮助交易对手避免了损失。美联储前主席保罗 · 沃尔克(Paul Volcker)和其他人批评这一举措增加了道德风险。 GAO/GGD-00-67R 关于长期资本管理公司和我们的反应的问题总会计办公室，2000年2月23日泰勒 · 考恩(Tyler Cowen)总结道: “债权人开始相信，他们向不健全的金融机构提供的贷款将得到美联储的补偿——只要这些机构的崩溃会威胁到全球信贷体系。”美联储主席格林斯潘承认存在道德风险的风险，但为有序解除长期资本的政策辩护称，全球经济处于危险之中。
Economist [[Paul Krugman]] described moral hazard as "any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly."<ref name="Krugman 2009">{{cite book
| last = Krugman
| first = Paul
| year = 2009
| title = The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 | publisher = W.W. Norton Company Limited
| isbn = 978-0-393-07101-6| title-link = The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008
}}</ref> Financial [[bailouts]] of lending institutions by governments, central banks or other institutions can encourage risky lending in the future if those that take the risks come to believe that they will not have to carry the full burden of potential losses. Lending institutions need to take risks by making loans, and the riskiest loans usually have the potential for making the highest return.
Economist Paul Krugman described moral hazard as "any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly." Financial bailouts of lending institutions by governments, central banks or other institutions can encourage risky lending in the future if those that take the risks come to believe that they will not have to carry the full burden of potential losses. Lending institutions need to take risks by making loans, and the riskiest loans usually have the potential for making the highest return.
经济学家保罗•克鲁格曼(Paul Krugman)将道德风险描述为“任何一种情况，在这种情况下，一个人决定承担多少风险，而如果事情变得糟糕，其他人承担代价。”政府、央行或其它机构对贷款机构的金融纾困，可能会在未来鼓励高风险贷款，如果那些承担风险的机构开始相信，它们将不必承担潜在损失的全部负担。贷款机构需要通过发放贷款来承担风险，而风险最高的贷款通常具有获得最高回报的潜力。
Taxpayers, depositors, and other creditors often have to shoulder at least part of the burden of risky financial decisions made by lending institutions.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5ffd2606-69e8-11dc-a571-0000779fd2ac.html |last=Summers |first=Lawrence |title=Beware moral hazard fundamentalists |newspaper=[[Financial Times]] |date=2007-09-23 |access-date=2008-01-15}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/story.aspx?guid={9F4C2252-8BA7-459C-B34E-407DB32921C1}&siteid=rss |last=Brown |first=Bill |title=Uncle Sam as sugar daddy |website=MarketWatch |date=2008-11-19 |access-date=2008-11-30}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|ssrn=1321666 |title=Common (Stock) Sense about Risk-Shifting and Bank Bailouts|publisher=SSRN.com |date=December 29, 2009|last1=Wu|first1=Yan Wendy|last2=Wilson|first2=Linus}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|ssrn=1336288 |title=Debt Overhang and Bank Bailouts|publisher=SSRN.com |date=February 2, 2009|last1=Wilson|first1=Linus}}</ref>
Taxpayers, depositors, and other creditors often have to shoulder at least part of the burden of risky financial decisions made by lending institutions.
纳税人、储户和其他债权人通常不得不至少承担一部分由贷款机构做出的高风险金融决策的负担。
Many have argued that certain types of mortgage [[securitization]] contribute to moral hazard. Mortgage securitization enables mortgage originators to pass on the risk that the mortgages they originate might default and not hold the mortgages on their balance sheets and assume the risk. In one kind of mortgage securitization, known as "agency securitizations," default risk is retained by the securitizing agency that buys the mortgages from originators. These agencies thus have an incentive to monitor originators and check loan quality. "Agency securitizations" refer to securitizations by either [[Ginnie Mae]], a government agency, or by [[Fannie Mae]] and [[Freddie Mac]], both for-profit [[government-sponsored enterprise]]s. They are similar to the "covered bonds" that are commonly used in [[Western Europe]] in that the securitizing agency retains default risk. Under both models, investors take on only interest-rate risk, not default risk.
Many have argued that certain types of mortgage securitization contribute to moral hazard. Mortgage securitization enables mortgage originators to pass on the risk that the mortgages they originate might default and not hold the mortgages on their balance sheets and assume the risk. In one kind of mortgage securitization, known as "agency securitizations," default risk is retained by the securitizing agency that buys the mortgages from originators. These agencies thus have an incentive to monitor originators and check loan quality. "Agency securitizations" refer to securitizations by either Ginnie Mae, a government agency, or by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both for-profit government-sponsored enterprises. They are similar to the "covered bonds" that are commonly used in Western Europe in that the securitizing agency retains default risk. Under both models, investors take on only interest-rate risk, not default risk.
许多人认为，某些类型的抵押贷款证券化有助于道德风险。抵押贷款证券化使抵押贷款发起人能够转移其发起的抵押贷款可能违约的风险，而不将抵押贷款持有在其资产负债表上，并承担风险。在一种抵押贷款证券化，即所谓的“机构证券化”，违约风险由从发起人处购买抵押贷款的证券化机构保留。因此，这些机构有监督贷款发放者和检查贷款质量的动机。“机构证券化”是指由政府机构国民抵押协会(Ginnie Mae)或房利美(Fannie Mae)和房地美(Freddie Mac)进行的证券化，这两家公司都是以营利为目的的政府资助企业。它们类似于西欧通常使用的“担保债券”，因为证券化机构保留了违约风险。在这两种模型下，投资者只承担利率风险，而不承担违约风险。
In another type of securitization, known as "private label" securitization, default risk is generally not retained by the securitizing entity. Instead, the securitizing entity passes on default risk to investors. The securitizing entity, therefore, has relatively little incentive to monitor originators and maintain loan quality. "Private label" securitization refers to securitizations structured by financial institutions such as investment banks, commercial banks, and non-bank mortgage lenders.
In another type of securitization, known as "private label" securitization, default risk is generally not retained by the securitizing entity. Instead, the securitizing entity passes on default risk to investors. The securitizing entity, therefore, has relatively little incentive to monitor originators and maintain loan quality. "Private label" securitization refers to securitizations structured by financial institutions such as investment banks, commercial banks, and non-bank mortgage lenders.
在另一种类型的证券化，称为“私人标签”证券化，违约风险一般不保留的证券化实体。相反，证券化实体将违约风险转嫁给投资者。因此，证券化机构对监管发起人和维持贷款质量的动机相对较小。“自有品牌”证券化是指由投资银行、商业银行、非银行抵押贷款机构等金融机构组织的证券化。
During the years leading up to the [[subprime mortgage crisis]], private label securitizations grew as a share of overall mortgage securitization by purchasing and securitizing low-quality, high-risk mortgages. Agency Securitizations appear to have somewhat lowered their standards, but Agency mortgages remained considerably safer than mortgages in private-label securitizations and performed far better in terms of default rates.
During the years leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis, private label securitizations grew as a share of overall mortgage securitization by purchasing and securitizing low-quality, high-risk mortgages. Agency Securitizations appear to have somewhat lowered their standards, but Agency mortgages remained considerably safer than mortgages in private-label securitizations and performed far better in terms of default rates.
在次贷危机之前的几年里，私人标签证券化通过购买和证券化低质量、高风险的抵押贷款，在整个抵押贷款证券化中所占的比例不断增长。机构证券化似乎降低了一些标准，但机构抵押贷款仍然比自有品牌证券化中的抵押贷款安全得多，而且违约率方面的表现要好得多。
Economist [[Mark Zandi]] of [[Moody's Analytics]] described moral hazard as a root cause of the subprime mortgage crisis. He wrote that "the risks inherent in mortgage lending became so widely dispersed that no one was forced to worry about the quality of any single loan. As shaky mortgages were combined, diluting any problems into a larger pool, the incentive for responsibility was undermined." He also wrote, "Finance companies weren't subject to the same regulatory oversight as banks. Taxpayers weren't on the hook if they went belly up [pre-crisis], only their shareholders and other creditors were. Finance companies thus had little to discourage them from growing as aggressively as possible, even if that meant lowering or winking at traditional lending standards."<ref>{{cite book
| last = Zandi
| first = Mark
| year = 2009
| title = Financial Shock
| publisher = FT Press
| isbn = 978-0-13-701663-1
| url-access = registration
| url = https://archive.org/details/financialshockgl00zand
}}</ref>
Economist Mark Zandi of Moody's Analytics described moral hazard as a root cause of the subprime mortgage crisis. He wrote that "the risks inherent in mortgage lending became so widely dispersed that no one was forced to worry about the quality of any single loan. As shaky mortgages were combined, diluting any problems into a larger pool, the incentive for responsibility was undermined." He also wrote, "Finance companies weren't subject to the same regulatory oversight as banks. Taxpayers weren't on the hook if they went belly up [pre-crisis], only their shareholders and other creditors were. Finance companies thus had little to discourage them from growing as aggressively as possible, even if that meant lowering or winking at traditional lending standards."
穆迪分析(Moody’s Analytics)的经济学家马克•赞迪(Mark Zandi)将道德风险描述为次贷危机的根本原因。他写道: “抵押贷款固有的风险变得如此分散，以至于没有人被迫担心任何一笔贷款的质量。随着不稳定的抵押贷款合并在一起，将任何问题稀释到一个更大的资金池中，承担责任的动机受到了削弱。”他还写道: “金融公司不像银行那样受到同样的监管。如果纳税人(在危机前)破产，他们不会上钩，只有他们的股东和其他债权人会上钩。因此，金融公司几乎没有什么理由阻止它们尽可能大幅增长，即使这意味着降低或忽视传统的放贷标准。”
Moral hazard can also occur with borrowers. Borrowers may not act prudently (in the view of the lender) when they invest or spend funds recklessly. For example, [[credit card]] companies often limit the amount borrowers can spend with their cards because without such limits, borrowers may spend borrowed funds recklessly, leading to default.
Moral hazard can also occur with borrowers. Borrowers may not act prudently (in the view of the lender) when they invest or spend funds recklessly. For example, credit card companies often limit the amount borrowers can spend with their cards because without such limits, borrowers may spend borrowed funds recklessly, leading to default.
道德风险也可能发生在借款人身上。当借款人不顾后果地投资或花费资金时，借款人可能不会谨慎行事(在贷款人看来)。例如，信用卡公司经常限制借款人用信用卡消费的金额，因为没有这样的限制，借款人可能会不计后果地花掉借来的资金，从而导致违约。
Securitization of mortgages in America started in 1983 at [[Salomon Brothers]] and where the risk of each mortgage passed to the next purchaser instead of remaining with the original mortgaging institution. These mortgages and other debt instruments were put into a large pool of debt, and then shares in the pool were sold to many creditors.
Securitization of mortgages in America started in 1983 at Salomon Brothers and where the risk of each mortgage passed to the next purchaser instead of remaining with the original mortgaging institution. These mortgages and other debt instruments were put into a large pool of debt, and then shares in the pool were sold to many creditors.
美国的抵押贷款证券化始于1983年的所罗门兄弟，每笔抵押贷款的风险都转嫁给了下一个购买者，而不是留在最初的抵押贷款机构。这些抵押贷款和其他债务工具被投入大量债务中，然后这些债务中的股份被出售给许多债权人。
Thus, there is no one person responsible for verifying that any one particular loan is sound, that the assets securing that one particular loan are worth what they are supposed to be worth, that the borrower responsible for making payments on the loan can read and write the language in which the papers that he/she signed were written, or even that the paperwork exists and is in good order. It has been suggested that this may have caused the subprime mortgage crisis.<ref>{{cite web |title='Moral hazard' helps shape mortgage mess |author=Holden Lewis |publisher=Bankrate.com |url=http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mortgages/20070418_subprime_mortgage_morality_a1.asp?caret=3c |date=2007-04-18 |access-date=2007-12-09}}</ref>
Thus, there is no one person responsible for verifying that any one particular loan is sound, that the assets securing that one particular loan are worth what they are supposed to be worth, that the borrower responsible for making payments on the loan can read and write the language in which the papers that he/she signed were written, or even that the paperwork exists and is in good order. It has been suggested that this may have caused the subprime mortgage crisis.
因此，没有一个人负责核实任何一笔特定贷款是否健全，确保某笔特定贷款的资产是否值得其应有的价值，负责偿还贷款的借款人是否能够阅读和书写他/她签署的文件所使用的语言，甚至是否有文件存在并处于良好状态。有人认为这可能导致了次贷危机。
Brokers, who were not lending their own money, pushed risk onto the lenders. Lenders, who sold mortgages soon after underwriting them, pushed risk onto investors. Investment banks bought mortgages and chopped up mortgage-backed securities into slices, some riskier than others. Investors bought securities and hedged against the risk of default and prepayment, pushing those risks further along. In a purely capitalist scenario, the last one holding the risk (like a game of [[musical chairs]]) is the one who faces the potential losses. In the sub-prime crisis, however, national credit authorities (the [[Federal Reserve]] in the US) assumed the ultimate risk on behalf of the citizenry at large.
Brokers, who were not lending their own money, pushed risk onto the lenders. Lenders, who sold mortgages soon after underwriting them, pushed risk onto investors. Investment banks bought mortgages and chopped up mortgage-backed securities into slices, some riskier than others. Investors bought securities and hedged against the risk of default and prepayment, pushing those risks further along. In a purely capitalist scenario, the last one holding the risk (like a game of musical chairs) is the one who faces the potential losses. In the sub-prime crisis, however, national credit authorities (the Federal Reserve in the US) assumed the ultimate risk on behalf of the citizenry at large.
经纪人没有借出自己的钱，把风险推给了贷款人。贷款人在承销抵押贷款后不久就出售了抵押贷款，把风险推给了投资者。投资银行购买抵押贷款，并将抵押贷款支持证券切成小块，其中一些比另一些风险更大。投资者购买证券，对冲违约和提前还款的风险，推动这些风险进一步发展。在纯粹的资本主义场景中，最后一个承担风险的人(就像抢椅子游戏一样)是面临潜在损失的人。然而，在次贷危机中，国家信贷当局(美联储)代表广大公民承担了最终风险。
Others believe that financial bailouts of lending institutions do not encourage risky lending behavior since there is no guarantee to lending institutions that a bailout will occur. Decreased valuation of a corporation before any bailout would prevent risky, speculative business decisions by executives who fail to conduct proper due diligence in their business transactions. The risk and the burdens of loss became apparent to [[Lehman Brothers]], which did not benefit from a bailout, and other financial institutions and mortgage companies such as [[Citibank]] and [[Countrywide Financial Corporation]], whose valuation plunged during the subprime mortgage crisis.<ref>{{cite web |title=Paulson bailout: seizing moral high ground can be hazardous |author=David Wighton |publisher=TimesOnline |url=http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article4813975.ece |date=2008-09-24 |access-date=2009-03-17}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=The SEC Makes Wall Street More Fraudulent |author=HFM |publisher=Justput.com Post # 17-26 |url=http://www.justput.com/forum/showthread.php?t=6820 |date=2009-03-16 |access-date=2009-03-17 |archive-date=April 29, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110429201141/http://www.justput.com/forum/showthread.php?t=6820 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=''Moral Hazard': Why Risk Is Good' |author=Frank Ahrens |newspaper=The Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/18/AR2008031802873.html |date=2008-03-19 |access-date=2009-03-17}}</ref>
Others believe that financial bailouts of lending institutions do not encourage risky lending behavior since there is no guarantee to lending institutions that a bailout will occur. Decreased valuation of a corporation before any bailout would prevent risky, speculative business decisions by executives who fail to conduct proper due diligence in their business transactions. The risk and the burdens of loss became apparent to Lehman Brothers, which did not benefit from a bailout, and other financial institutions and mortgage companies such as Citibank and Countrywide Financial Corporation, whose valuation plunged during the subprime mortgage crisis.
其他人则认为，对贷款机构的金融救助不会鼓励高风险的贷款行为，因为对贷款机构来说，没有任何担保能保证救助会发生。在任何救助之前，降低公司的估值将防止高管在商业交易中未能进行适当尽职调查而做出高风险、投机性的商业决策。雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)以及花旗银行(Citibank)和 Countrywide Financial Corporation 等其它金融机构和抵押贷款公司的损失风险和负担变得明显起来。雷曼兄弟没有从纾困计划中获益，而花旗和 Countrywide Financial Corporation 的估值在次贷危机期间大幅下跌。
=== Incentives to moral hazard in accounting rules ===
A 2017 report by the [[Basel Committee on Banking Supervision]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/wp31.pdf|title=BCBS, The interplay of accounting and regulation and its impact on bank behaviour, 2017|work=Basel Committee on Banking Supervision}}</ref> an international regulator for the banking sector, noted that the accounting rules ([[IFRS]] # 9 and 13 in particular) leave entities significant discretion in determining financial instrument fair value and identified this discretion as a potential source of moral hazard: “The evidence consistent with accounting discretion as contributing to moral hazard behavior indicates that (additional) prudential valuation requirements may be justified.”
A 2017 report by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an international regulator for the banking sector, noted that the accounting rules (IFRS # 9 and 13 in particular) leave entities significant discretion in determining financial instrument fair value and identified this discretion as a potential source of moral hazard: “The evidence consistent with accounting discretion as contributing to moral hazard behavior indicates that (additional) prudential valuation requirements may be justified.”
国际银行业监管机构巴塞尔银行监理委员会2017年的一份报告指出，会计准则(特别是国际财务报告准则9号和13号)在确定金融工具公允价值方面给予实体很大的自由裁量权，并将这种自由裁量权确定为道德风险的潜在来源: “与会计自由裁量权相一致的证据表明，(额外的)审慎估值要求可能是合理的。”
Banking regulators have taken actions to limit discretion and reduce [[valuation risk]], i.e. the risk to banks' balance sheets arising from financial instrument valuation uncertainties. A row of regulatory documents has been issued, providing detailed prudential requirements that have many points of contact with the accounting rules and have the indirect effect of curbing the incentives for moral hazard by limiting the discretion left to banks in valuating financial instruments.<ref>{{cite web|url= https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf|title=BCBS, Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems, 2010|work=Basel Committee on Banking Supervision}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&from=en|title=Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012|work=Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019R0876|title=Regulation (EU) 2019/876 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards the leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, counterparty credit|work=Capital Requirements Regulation 2 (CRR2)}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0101&from=EN|title=Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/101 of 26 October 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for prudent valuation under Article 105(14)|work=EU Commission Regulation}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/642449/1d93ef17-d7c5-47a6-bdbc-cfdb2cf1d072/EBA-RTS-2014-06%20RTS%20on%20Prudent%20Valuation.pdf|title=EBA final draft Regulatory Technical Standards on prudent valuation under Article 105(14) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation — CRR)|work=European Banking Authority}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/market-risk/draft-technical-standards-on-the-ima-under-the-frtb|title=EBA final draft Regulatory Technical Standards on criteria for assessing the modellability of risk factors under the Internal Model Approach (IMA) under Article 325be(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (revised Capital Requirements Regulation – CRR2|work=European Banking Authority|date=June 27, 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/document_library/EBA-RTS-2020-02%20Final%20draft%20RTS%20on%20Backtesting%20and%20PLA%20requirements.pdf|title=EBA final draft Regulatory Technical Standards on Back‐testing requirements and Profit and Loss attribution requirements under Article 325 bf(9) and 325bg (4) of Regulation(EU) No575/2013(revised Capital Requirements Regulation ‐ CRR2|work=European Banking Authority}}</ref>
Banking regulators have taken actions to limit discretion and reduce valuation risk, i.e. the risk to banks' balance sheets arising from financial instrument valuation uncertainties. A row of regulatory documents has been issued, providing detailed prudential requirements that have many points of contact with the accounting rules and have the indirect effect of curbing the incentives for moral hazard by limiting the discretion left to banks in valuating financial instruments.
银行监管机构已采取行动，限制酌情决定权及减低估值风险。金融工具估值不确定性对银行资产负债表造成的风险。印发了一系列监管文件，提出了与会计规则有许多联系点的详细审慎要求，通过限制银行在估价金融工具方面的酌处权，间接抑制了道德风险的诱因。
=== Connection to financial crisis of 2007−08 ===
{{Main|Financial crisis of 2007–08}}
Many scholars and journalists have argued that moral hazard played a role in the [[Financial crisis of 2007–08|2008 financial crisis]], since numerous actors in the financial market may have had an incentive to increase their exposure to risk.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Okamoto|first=Karl|date=2009|title=After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard|url=https://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/57-1-4.pdf|journal=UCLA Law Review|pages=183–236|url-status=live|access-date=2021-06-01|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201130100922/https://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/57-1-4.pdf|archive-date=2020-11-30}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite web|url=https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/050515/how-did-moral-hazard-contribute-financial-crisis-2008.asp|title=How did moral hazard contribute to the 2008 financial crisis?|last=Investopedia|website=Investopedia|language=en|access-date=2020-03-02|date=2019-06-25|url-status=live|archive-date=2021-06-01|archive-url=https://archive.today/2021.06.01-224559/https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/050515/how-did-moral-hazard-contribute-financial-crisis-2008.asp}}</ref> In general, there are three ways in which moral hazard may have manifested itself in the lead up to the financial crisis.
Many scholars and journalists have argued that moral hazard played a role in the 2008 financial crisis, since numerous actors in the financial market may have had an incentive to increase their exposure to risk. In general, there are three ways in which moral hazard may have manifested itself in the lead up to the financial crisis.
许多学者和记者认为，道德风险在2008年金融危机中发挥了作用，因为金融市场中的许多行为者可能有动机增加他们的风险敞口。一般来说，在金融危机爆发之前，道德风险有三种表现形式。
* Asset managers may have had an incentive to take on more risk when managing other people's money, particularly if they were paid as a percentage of the fund's profits. If they took on more risk, they could expect higher payoff for themselves and were somewhat shielded from losses because they were spending other people's money.<ref name=":1" /> Therefore, asset managers may have been in a situation of moral hazard, where they would take on more risk than appropriate for a given client because they didn't bear the cost of failure.
* Mortgage loan originators, such as [[Washington Mutual]], may have had an incentive to understate the risk of loans they originated because the loans were often sold to mortgage pools (see [[Mortgage-backed security|mortgage-backed securities]]). Because loan originators were paid on a per-mortgage basis, they had an incentive to produce as many mortgages as possible, even if they were risky.<ref name=":1" /> Because these institutions didn't expect to hold on to the loans until maturity, they could pass on the risk to the buyer of the loans.<ref name=":2" /> Therefore, mortgage loan originators may have been in a situation of moral hazard, because they didn't bear the costs of the risky mortgages they were underwriting.
* Third, large banks may have believed they were "too big to fail." That is, because these banks were so ingrained in the US economy, the federal government would not have allowed them to fail in order to prevent a full-scale economic crash. This belief may have been shaped by the 1998 bailout of [[Long Term Capital Management]].<ref name="nyt0809072">{{cite news|first=Roger|last=Lowenstein|author-link=Roger Lowenstein|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/business/07ltcm.html|title=Long-Term Capital: It's a Short-Term Memory|date=September 6, 2008|work=The New York Times|url-status=live|archive-url=https://archive.today/2011.05.01-162316/https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/business/07ltcm.html|archive-date=2011-05-01}}</ref> "Too big to fail" banks may have believed they were essentially invincible to failure, thus putting them in a position of moral hazard: they could take on big risks – thus increasing their expected payoff – thinking that the federal government would bail them out in the event of a major failure. Therefore, large banks may have been in a situation of moral hazard, because they didn't bear the costs of a catastrophic collapse.
* Asset managers may have had an incentive to take on more risk when managing other people's money, particularly if they were paid as a percentage of the fund's profits. If they took on more risk, they could expect higher payoff for themselves and were somewhat shielded from losses because they were spending other people's money. Therefore, asset managers may have been in a situation of moral hazard, where they would take on more risk than appropriate for a given client because they didn't bear the cost of failure.
* Mortgage loan originators, such as Washington Mutual, may have had an incentive to understate the risk of loans they originated because the loans were often sold to mortgage pools (see mortgage-backed securities). Because loan originators were paid on a per-mortgage basis, they had an incentive to produce as many mortgages as possible, even if they were risky. Because these institutions didn't expect to hold on to the loans until maturity, they could pass on the risk to the buyer of the loans. Therefore, mortgage loan originators may have been in a situation of moral hazard, because they didn't bear the costs of the risky mortgages they were underwriting.
* Third, large banks may have believed they were "too big to fail." That is, because these banks were so ingrained in the US economy, the federal government would not have allowed them to fail in order to prevent a full-scale economic crash. This belief may have been shaped by the 1998 bailout of Long Term Capital Management. "Too big to fail" banks may have believed they were essentially invincible to failure, thus putting them in a position of moral hazard: they could take on big risks – thus increasing their expected payoff – thinking that the federal government would bail them out in the event of a major failure. Therefore, large banks may have been in a situation of moral hazard, because they didn't bear the costs of a catastrophic collapse.
* 资产管理公司在管理他人资金时，可能有承担更多风险的动机，特别是如果他们的收入占基金利润的百分比。如果他们承担更多的风险，他们可以期待自己获得更高的回报，而且由于他们花了别人的钱，他们在一定程度上避免了损失。因此，资产管理公司可能已经处于道德风险的情况下，他们将承担更多的风险，而不是适合给定的客户，因为他们不承担失败的成本。
* 华盛顿互惠银行(Washington Mutual)等抵押贷款发放机构可能有动机低估其发放的贷款的风险，因为这些贷款通常被出售给抵押贷款池(见抵押贷款支持证券)。由于贷款发放者是按照每笔抵押贷款支付的，因此他们有动机尽可能多地发放抵押贷款，即使这样做有风险。因为这些机构并不指望在贷款到期前持有这些贷款，所以它们可以将风险转嫁给贷款买家。因此，抵押贷款发放人可能已经处于道德风险的情况下，因为他们没有承担他们承保的风险抵押贷款的成本。
* 第三，大银行可能认为自己“大到不能倒”也就是说，由于这些银行在美国经济中根深蒂固，联邦政府不会为了防止全面经济崩溃而允许它们倒闭。这种信念可能是由1998年对长期资本管理公司(Long Term Capital Management)的纾困形成的。“大到不能倒”的银行可能认为他们本质上是不可战胜的，从而使他们处于道德风险的境地: 他们可以承担巨大的风险——从而增加他们的预期收益——认为联邦政府会在重大破产的情况下救助他们。因此，大银行可能处于道德风险的境地，因为它们没有承担灾难性崩溃的代价。
Notably, the [[Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission]] (FCIC), tasked by Congress with investigating the causes of the financial crisis, cited moral hazard as a component of the crisis, arguing that many factors, including deregulation in the derivatives market in 2000, reduced federal oversight, and the potential for government bailout of "too big to fail" institutions all played a role in increasing moral hazard in the years leading up to the collapse.<ref name=":5">{{Cite report|url=https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf|title=The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States|author=National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States|date=February 25, 2011|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181216095833/https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf|archive-date=2018-12-16}}</ref>
Notably, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), tasked by Congress with investigating the causes of the financial crisis, cited moral hazard as a component of the crisis, arguing that many factors, including deregulation in the derivatives market in 2000, reduced federal oversight, and the potential for government bailout of "too big to fail" institutions all played a role in increasing moral hazard in the years leading up to the collapse.
值得注意的是，受国会委托调查金融危机起因的金融危机调查委员会(FCIC) ，将道德风险列为危机的一个组成部分，认为许多因素，包括2000年衍生品市场的放松管制，联邦监督的减少，以及政府救助“大到不能倒”的机构的可能性，都在导致金融危机前几年道德风险增加的过程中发挥了作用。
Others have argued that moral hazard could not have played a role in the financial crisis for three main reasons. First, in the event of a catastrophic failure, a government bailout would only come after major losses for the company.<ref name=":3">{{Cite magazine|url=https://www.newyorker.com/business/james-surowiecki/moral-hazard-and-the-crisis|title=Moral Hazard and the Crisis|last=Surowiecki|first=James|magazine=The New Yorker|date=January 14, 2010|language=en|access-date=2020-03-02|url-status=live|archive-date=2021-06-01|archive-url=https://archive.today/2021.06.01-225851/https://www.newyorker.com/business/james-surowiecki/moral-hazard-and-the-crisis}}</ref> So even if a bailout was expected it wouldn't prevent the firm from taking losses. Second, there is some evidence that big banks were not expecting the crisis and thus were not expecting government bailouts, though the FCIC tried hard to contest this idea.<ref name=":3" /> Third, some have argued that negative [[Externality|externalities]] from corporate governance were a more important cause, since some risky investments may have had positive expected payoff for the firm but negative expected payoff to society.<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=Schwarcz|first=Steven L.|date=December 2017|title=Too Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility|url=https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1093&context=mlr|format=PDF|archive-format=PDF|journal=Minnesota Law Review|volume=102|pages=761–802|access-date=2021-06-01|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200318122717/https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1093&context=mlr|archive-date=2020-03-18|url-status=live}}</ref>
Others have argued that moral hazard could not have played a role in the financial crisis for three main reasons. First, in the event of a catastrophic failure, a government bailout would only come after major losses for the company. So even if a bailout was expected it wouldn't prevent the firm from taking losses. Second, there is some evidence that big banks were not expecting the crisis and thus were not expecting government bailouts, though the FCIC tried hard to contest this idea. Third, some have argued that negative externalities from corporate governance were a more important cause, since some risky investments may have had positive expected payoff for the firm but negative expected payoff to society.
其他人则认为，道德风险不可能在金融危机中发挥作用，原因主要有三点。首先，在发生灾难性破产的情况下，只有在公司遭受重大损失之后，政府才会出手救助。因此，即使救助计划是预期的，也不能阻止公司承担损失。其次，有一些证据表明，大银行没有预料到危机，因此也没有预料到政府的纾困，尽管 FCIC 努力对这种想法提出质疑。第三，一些人认为，公司治理的负外部性是一个更重要的原因，因为一些风险投资可能对公司产生了正的预期收益，但对社会产生了负的预期收益。
==Insurance industry==
{{more footnotes|section|date=December 2012}}
Moral hazard has been studied by insurers<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Crosby |first=Everett |year= 1905|title=Fire Prevention |periodical=Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science |volume=26 |issue= 2|pages=224–38 |jstor= 1011015|doi= 10.1177/000271620502600215|publisher=American Academy of Political and Social Science |s2cid=220837165 |url=https://zenodo.org/record/1448646}} Crosby was one of the founders of the [[National Fire Protection Association]], [http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=500&itemID=18020&URL=About%20Us/History NFPA.org] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928060123/http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=500&itemID=18020&URL=About%20Us%2FHistory |date=2007-09-28}}</ref> and academics; such as in the work of [[Kenneth Arrow]],<ref name="Arrow 1963 941–732"/><ref>{{cite book |title=Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing |last=Arrow |first=Kenneth |year=1965 |publisher=Yrjö Jahnssonin Säätiö |location=Finland |oclc=228221660 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing |last=Arrow |first=Kenneth |year=1971 |publisher=Markham |location=Chicago |isbn=978-0-8410-2001-6 }}</ref> Tom Baker,<ref name="Baker1996">{{Cite journal |last=Baker |first=Tom |year=1996 |title=On the Genealogy of Moral hazard |periodical=Texas Law Review |volume=75 |page=237 |issn=0040-4411 }}</ref> and John Nyman.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://directory.sph.umn.edu/bio/sph-a-z/john-nyman|title = John A. Nyman, PHD}}</ref>
Moral hazard has been studied by insurers Crosby was one of the founders of the National Fire Protection Association, NFPA.org and academics; such as in the work of Kenneth Arrow, Tom Baker, and John Nyman.
保险业 = = 道德风险已经被保险公司研究过了 Crosby 是国家消防协会，美国消防协会网站和学术界的创始人之一; 例如 Kenneth Arrow，Tom Baker，和 John Nyman 的工作。
The name comes originally from the [[insurance]] industry. Insurance companies worried that protecting their clients from risks (like fire, or car accidents) might encourage those clients to behave in riskier ways (like smoking in bed or not wearing seatbelts). This problem may inefficiently discourage those companies from protecting their clients as much as the clients would like to be protected.
The name comes originally from the insurance industry. Insurance companies worried that protecting their clients from risks (like fire, or car accidents) might encourage those clients to behave in riskier ways (like smoking in bed or not wearing seatbelts). This problem may inefficiently discourage those companies from protecting their clients as much as the clients would like to be protected.
这个名字来源于保险业。保险公司担心，保护他们的客户免受风险(如火灾或车祸)可能会鼓励这些客户以更危险的方式行事(如在床上吸烟或不系安全带)。这个问题可能无法有效地阻止这些公司像保护客户希望的那样保护他们的客户。
Economists argue that the [[Pareto efficiency|inefficiency]] results from information asymmetry. If insurance companies could perfectly observe the actions of their clients, they could deny coverage to clients choosing risky actions (like smoking in bed or not wearing seat belts), allowing them to provide thorough protection against risk (fire or accidents) without encouraging risky behavior. However, since insurance companies cannot perfectly observe their clients' actions, they are discouraged from providing the amount of protection that would be provided in a world with perfect information.
Economists argue that the inefficiency results from information asymmetry. If insurance companies could perfectly observe the actions of their clients, they could deny coverage to clients choosing risky actions (like smoking in bed or not wearing seat belts), allowing them to provide thorough protection against risk (fire or accidents) without encouraging risky behavior. However, since insurance companies cannot perfectly observe their clients' actions, they are discouraged from providing the amount of protection that would be provided in a world with perfect information.
经济学家辩称，效率低下是信息不对称的结果。如果保险公司能够完美地观察他们客户的行为，他们就可以拒绝为客户选择危险行为(如在床上吸烟或不系安全带)的保险，允许他们在不鼓励危险行为的情况下提供全面的风险保护(火灾或事故)。然而，由于保险公司无法完美地观察客户的行为，因此它们不愿提供在一个信息完善的世界中可以提供的保护。
Economists distinguish moral hazard from [[adverse selection]], another problem that arises in the insurance industry, which is caused by ''hidden information'', rather than ''hidden actions''.
Economists distinguish moral hazard from adverse selection, another problem that arises in the insurance industry, which is caused by hidden information, rather than hidden actions.
经济学家将道德风险与逆向选择风险区分开来。道德风险是保险业出现的另一个问题，它是由隐性信息(而非隐性行为)引起的。
The same underlying problem of non-observable actions also affects other contexts besides the insurance industry. It also arises in [[banking]] and [[finance]]: if a financial institution knows it is protected by a [[lender of last resort]], it may make riskier investments than it would in the absence of the protection.
The same underlying problem of non-observable actions also affects other contexts besides the insurance industry. It also arises in banking and finance: if a financial institution knows it is protected by a lender of last resort, it may make riskier investments than it would in the absence of the protection.
不可观察行为的同样根本问题也影响到保险业以外的其他背景。银行业和金融业也会出现这种情况: 如果金融机构知道自己受到最后贷款人的保护，它可能会进行比不受保护时更具风险的投资。
In insurance markets, moral hazard occurs when the behavior of the insured party changes in a way that raises costs for the insurer since the insured party no longer bears the full costs of that behavior. Because individuals no longer bear the cost of medical services, they have an added incentive to ask for pricier and more elaborate medical service, which would otherwise not be necessary. In those instances, individuals have an incentive to over consume, simply because they no longer bear the full cost of medical services.
In insurance markets, moral hazard occurs when the behavior of the insured party changes in a way that raises costs for the insurer since the insured party no longer bears the full costs of that behavior. Because individuals no longer bear the cost of medical services, they have an added incentive to ask for pricier and more elaborate medical service, which would otherwise not be necessary. In those instances, individuals have an incentive to over consume, simply because they no longer bear the full cost of medical services.
在保险市场中，当被保险人的行为发生变化，导致保险人的成本增加，因为被保险人不再承担该行为的全部成本时，就会产生道德风险。由于个人不再承担医疗服务的费用，他们更有动力要求更昂贵和更精细的医疗服务，否则就没有必要这样做。在这些情况下，个人有过度消费的动机，仅仅是因为他们不再承担医疗服务的全部成本。
Two types of behavior can change. One type is the risky behavior itself, resulting in a ''[[ex ante|before the event]]'' moral hazard. Insured parties then behave in a more risky manner, resulting in more negative consequences that the insurer must pay for. For example, after purchasing automobile insurance, some may tend to be less careful about locking the automobile or choose to drive more, thereby increasing the risk of theft or an accident for the insurer. After purchasing fire insurance, some may tend to be less careful about preventing fires (say, by smoking in bed or neglecting to replace the batteries in fire alarms). A further example has been identified in [[flood risk management]] in which it is proposed that the possession of insurance undermines efforts to encourage people to integrate flood protection and resilience measures in properties exposed to flooding.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=O'Hare|first1=P.|last2=White|first2=I.|last3=Connelly|first3=A.|date=2015-09-01|title=Insurance as maladaptation: Resilience and the 'business as usual paradox|journal=Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy|language=en|volume=34|issue=6|pages=1175–93|doi=10.1177/0263774x15602022|s2cid=155016786|url=https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/insurance-as-maladaptation-resilience-and-the-business-as-usual-paradox(ac6977b8-52f0-4c9f-a213-466296b14220).html}}</ref>
Two types of behavior can change. One type is the risky behavior itself, resulting in a before the event moral hazard. Insured parties then behave in a more risky manner, resulting in more negative consequences that the insurer must pay for. For example, after purchasing automobile insurance, some may tend to be less careful about locking the automobile or choose to drive more, thereby increasing the risk of theft or an accident for the insurer. After purchasing fire insurance, some may tend to be less careful about preventing fires (say, by smoking in bed or neglecting to replace the batteries in fire alarms). A further example has been identified in flood risk management in which it is proposed that the possession of insurance undermines efforts to encourage people to integrate flood protection and resilience measures in properties exposed to flooding.
有两种行为可以改变。一种类型是危险行为本身，导致事前道德风险。然后，被保险方的行为风险更大，导致更多的负面后果，保险公司必须支付。例如，在购买汽车保险之后，有些人可能不太注意锁定汽车或选择多开车，从而增加了保险公司被盗或发生事故的风险。在购买了火灾保险之后，一些人可能不太注意预防火灾(比如，在床上吸烟或忘记更换火灾报警器中的电池)。在洪水风险管理方面还发现了另一个例子，其中提出，拥有保险会破坏鼓励人们将防洪和抗灾措施纳入受洪水影响的财产的努力。
A second type of behavior that may change is the reaction to the negative consequences of risk once they have occurred and insurance is provided to cover their costs. That may be called ''ex post'' (after the event) moral hazard. Insured parties then do not behave in a more risky manner that results in more negative consequences, but they ask an insurer to pay for more of the negative consequences from risk as insurance coverage increases. For example, without medical insurance, some may forgo medical treatment due to its costs and simply deal with substandard health. However, after medical insurance becomes available, some may ask an insurance provider to pay for the cost of medical treatment that would not have occurred otherwise.
A second type of behavior that may change is the reaction to the negative consequences of risk once they have occurred and insurance is provided to cover their costs. That may be called ex post (after the event) moral hazard. Insured parties then do not behave in a more risky manner that results in more negative consequences, but they ask an insurer to pay for more of the negative consequences from risk as insurance coverage increases. For example, without medical insurance, some may forgo medical treatment due to its costs and simply deal with substandard health. However, after medical insurance becomes available, some may ask an insurance provider to pay for the cost of medical treatment that would not have occurred otherwise.
第二种可能改变的行为是对风险的负面后果的反应，一旦风险发生，并提供保险来支付其成本。这可以称为事后(事后)道德风险。因此，被保险人不会以更具风险的方式行事，从而导致更多的负面后果，但随着保险范围的扩大，他们会要求保险人为风险带来的更多负面后果买单。例如，没有医疗保险，一些人可能会因为医疗费用而放弃治疗，而只是简单地处理不合格的健康问题。然而，在医疗保险可用之后，有些人可能会要求保险提供者支付本来不会发生的医疗费用。
Sometimes moral hazard is so severe that it makes insurance policies impossible. Coinsurance, co-payments, and deductibles reduce the risk of moral hazard by increasing the out-of-pocket spending of consumers, which decreases their incentive to consume. Thus, the insured have a financial incentive to avoid making a claim.
Sometimes moral hazard is so severe that it makes insurance policies impossible. Coinsurance, co-payments, and deductibles reduce the risk of moral hazard by increasing the out-of-pocket spending of consumers, which decreases their incentive to consume. Thus, the insured have a financial incentive to avoid making a claim.
有时，道德风险是如此严重，以至于不可能有保险政策。共同保险、共同支付和免赔额通过增加消费者的现金支出来降低道德风险，从而降低他们的消费动机。因此，被保险人有避免索赔的经济动机。
== Numerical example ==
[[File:Moral_Hazard_Numerical_Example.png|alt=A graphical representation of moral hazard in health insurance. The graph plots price against quantity of health care. Without health insurance, an individual would consume less health care than with health insurance, potentially leading to moral hazard.|thumb|upright=1.3|The blue line represents the downward sloping [[Demand curve|marginal benefit curve]]. The orange line represents the constant $10 [[Supply (economics)|marginal cost curve]] without insurance. The green star is the market equilibrium. When the individual is insured, the marginal cost curve shifts down to 0, leading to a new equilibrium at the yellow star.]]
Consider a potential case of moral hazard in the health care market caused by the purchase of health insurance. Assume health care has constant marginal cost of $10 per unit and the individual's demand is given by ''Q'' = 20 − ''P''. Assuming a perfectly competitive market, at equilibrium, the price will be $10 per unit and the individual will consume 10 units of health care. Now, consider the same individual with health insurance. Assume this health insurance makes health care free for the individual. In this case, the individual will have a price of $0 for the health care and thus will consume 20 units. The price will still be $10, but the insurance company would be the one bearing the costs.
Consider a potential case of moral hazard in the health care market caused by the purchase of health insurance. Assume health care has constant marginal cost of $10 per unit and the individual's demand is given by Q = 20 − P. Assuming a perfectly competitive market, at equilibrium, the price will be $10 per unit and the individual will consume 10 units of health care. Now, consider the same individual with health insurance. Assume this health insurance makes health care free for the individual. In this case, the individual will have a price of $0 for the health care and thus will consume 20 units. The price will still be $10, but the insurance company would be the one bearing the costs.
= = 数值例子 = = 考虑购买健康保险在医疗保健市场引起的潜在道德风险的情况。假设医疗保健的边际成本为每单位10美元，个人的需求由 Q = 20-P 给出。假设一个完全竞争的市场，在均衡状态下，价格为每单位10美元，个人将消费10单位的医疗保健。现在，考虑同一个人的健康保险。假设这种医疗保险使个人的医疗保健免费。在这种情况下，个人将有一个价格为0美元的医疗保健，因此将消费20个单位。价格仍然是10美元，但保险公司将承担费用。
This example shows numerically how moral hazard could occur with health insurance. The individual consumes more health care than the equilibrium quantity because they don't bear the cost of the additional care.
This example shows numerically how moral hazard could occur with health insurance. The individual consumes more health care than the equilibrium quantity because they don't bear the cost of the additional care.
这个例子从数字上说明了健康保险是如何产生道德风险的。个人消费更多的医疗保健比均衡数量，因为他们不承担额外的医疗成本。
==Economic theory==
In economic theory, moral hazard is a situation in which the behavior of one party may change to the detriment of another after the [[financial transaction|transaction]] has taken place. For example, a person with insurance against automobile theft may be less cautious about locking their car because the negative consequences of vehicle theft are now (partially) the responsibility of the insurance company. A party makes a decision about how much risk to take, while another party bears the costs if things go badly, and the party insulated from risk behaves differently from how it would if it were fully exposed to the risk.
In economic theory, moral hazard is a situation in which the behavior of one party may change to the detriment of another after the transaction has taken place. For example, a person with insurance against automobile theft may be less cautious about locking their car because the negative consequences of vehicle theft are now (partially) the responsibility of the insurance company. A party makes a decision about how much risk to take, while another party bears the costs if things go badly, and the party insulated from risk behaves differently from how it would if it were fully exposed to the risk.
在经济理论中，道德风险是指交易发生后，一方的行为可能发生变化而损害另一方的情况。例如，有汽车盗窃保险的人可能对锁车不那么谨慎，因为汽车盗窃的负面后果现在(部分)是保险公司的责任。一方当事人决定承担多大的风险，而另一方当事人承担风险，如果情况恶化，与风险隔离的一方当事人的行为不同，如果它完全暴露在风险之下。
According to [[contract theory]], moral hazard results from a situation in which a hidden action occurs.<ref>[[Andreu Mas-Colell|A. Mas-Colell]], M. Whinston, and J. Green (1995), ''Microeconomic Theory''. Chapter 14, 'The Principal-Agent Problem', p. 477.</ref> [[Bengt Holmström]] said this:
{{quote|It has long been recognized that a problem of moral hazard may arise when individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions such that their privately taken actions affect the probability distribution of the outcome.<ref>Holmstrom, B. (1979), "Moral hazard and observability". ''Bell Journal of Economics'', pp. 74–91.</ref>}}
According to contract theory, moral hazard results from a situation in which a hidden action occurs.A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston, and J. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory. Chapter 14, 'The Principal-Agent Problem', p. 477. Bengt Holmström said this:
根据契约理论，道德风险源于隐性行为发生的情况。Mas-Colell M.Winston 和 J。格林(1995) ，微观经济理论。第14章，“委托代理问题”，477页。Bengt Holmström said this:
Moral hazard can be divided into two types when it involves asymmetric information (or lack of verifiability) of the outcome of a random event. An ''ex ante'' moral hazard is a change in behavior prior to the outcome of the random event, whereas ''ex post'' involves behavior after the outcome.<ref>{{Cite web|author=Mark William Jenkins|url=http://purl.stanford.edu/yb246bk3096|title=Essays on consumer credit markets|page=90}}</ref> For example, in the case of a health insurance company insuring an individual during a specific time period, the final health of the individual can be thought of as the outcome. The individual taking greater risks during the period would be ex-ante moral hazard whereas lying about a fictitious health problem to defraud the insurance company would be ex post moral hazard. A second example is the case of a bank making a loan to an entrepreneur for a risky business venture. The entrepreneur becoming overly risky would be ex ante moral hazard, but willful default (wrongly claiming the venture failed when it was profitable) is ex post moral hazard.
Moral hazard can be divided into two types when it involves asymmetric information (or lack of verifiability) of the outcome of a random event. An ex ante moral hazard is a change in behavior prior to the outcome of the random event, whereas ex post involves behavior after the outcome. For example, in the case of a health insurance company insuring an individual during a specific time period, the final health of the individual can be thought of as the outcome. The individual taking greater risks during the period would be ex-ante moral hazard whereas lying about a fictitious health problem to defraud the insurance company would be ex post moral hazard. A second example is the case of a bank making a loan to an entrepreneur for a risky business venture. The entrepreneur becoming overly risky would be ex ante moral hazard, but willful default (wrongly claiming the venture failed when it was profitable) is ex post moral hazard.
当道德风险涉及随机事件结果的不对称信息(或缺乏可验证性)时，道德风险可以分为两种类型。事前道德风险是指随机事件发生之前的行为变化，而事后道德风险是指发生之后的行为变化。例如，如果一家健康保险公司在某一特定时期为某一个人提供保险，则可将该个人的最终健康视为结果。在此期间承担更大风险的个人将是事前的道德风险，而谎报虚假的健康问题以欺骗保险公司将是事后的道德风险。第二个例子是一家银行向一位企业家发放贷款，用于进行高风险的商业投资。企业家变得过度冒险是事前的道德风险，而故意违约(错误地宣称企业在盈利时失败)则是事后的道德风险。
According to Hart and Holmström (1987), moral hazard models can be subdivided in models with hidden action and models with hidden information.<ref>{{Cite book|title = Advances in Economics and Econometrics|last1 = Hart|first1 = Oliver|publisher = Cambridge University Press|year = 1987|pages = 71–155|last2 = Holmström|first2 = Bengt|editor-last = Bewley, T.|chapter = The theory of contracts}}</ref> In the former case, after the contract has been signed the agent chooses an action (such as an effort level) that cannot be observed by the principal. In the latter case, after the contract has been signed there is a random draw by nature that determines the agent's type (such as his valuation for a good or his costs of effort). In the literature, two reasons have been discussed why moral hazard may imply that the first-best solution (the solution that would be attained under complete information) is not achieved.
According to Hart and Holmström (1987), moral hazard models can be subdivided in models with hidden action and models with hidden information. In the former case, after the contract has been signed the agent chooses an action (such as an effort level) that cannot be observed by the principal. In the latter case, after the contract has been signed there is a random draw by nature that determines the agent's type (such as his valuation for a good or his costs of effort). In the literature, two reasons have been discussed why moral hazard may imply that the first-best solution (the solution that would be attained under complete information) is not achieved.
根据 Hart 和 Holmström (1987)的理论，道德风险模型可以细分为隐藏行为模型和隐藏信息模型。在前一种情况下，在签订合同之后，代理人选择一个委托人无法观察到的行为(如努力水平)。在后一种情况下，在合同签署后，会有一个随机抽签决定代理人的类型(如他对一件商品的估价或他的努力成本)。在文献中，已经讨论了两个原因，为什么道德风险可能意味着第一最佳解决方案(在完全信息下可能达到的解决方案)不能实现。
Firstly, the agent may be risk-averse, so there is a trade-off between providing the agent with incentives and insuring the agent. Secondly, the agent may be risk-neutral but wealth-constrained and so the agent cannot make a payment to the principal and there is a trade-off between providing incentives and minimizing the agent's limited-liability rent.<ref>{{Cite book|title = The theory of incentives: The principal-agent model|last1 = Laffont|first1 = Jean-Jacques|publisher = Princeton University Press|year = 2002|last2 = Martimort|first2 = David}}</ref> Among the early contributors to the contract-theoretic literature on moral hazard were [[Oliver Hart (economist)|Oliver Hart]] and [[Sanford J. Grossman]]. In the meantime, the moral hazard model has been extended to the cases of multiple periods and multiple tasks, both with risk-averse and risk-neutral agents.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Repeated Moral Hazard|jstor = 1911724|journal = Econometrica|volume = 53|issue = 1|doi = 10.2307/1911724|first = William P.|last = Rogerson|year = 1985|pages = 69–76}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|jstor = 4135244|title = Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions|last = Schmitz|first = Patrick W.|date = 2005|journal = RAND Journal of Economics|pages = 318–36|volume = 36|issue = 2}}</ref>
Firstly, the agent may be risk-averse, so there is a trade-off between providing the agent with incentives and insuring the agent. Secondly, the agent may be risk-neutral but wealth-constrained and so the agent cannot make a payment to the principal and there is a trade-off between providing incentives and minimizing the agent's limited-liability rent. Among the early contributors to the contract-theoretic literature on moral hazard were Oliver Hart and Sanford J. Grossman. In the meantime, the moral hazard model has been extended to the cases of multiple periods and multiple tasks, both with risk-averse and risk-neutral agents.
首先，代理人可能厌恶风险，因此在为代理人提供激励和为代理人提供保险之间存在权衡。其次，代理人可能是风险中性但财富受限的，因此代理人不能向委托人支付费用，在提供激励和最小化代理人的有限责任租金之间存在权衡。奥利弗•哈特(Oliver Hart)和桑福德·J·格罗斯曼是道德风险契约理论文献的早期贡献者之一。同时，将道德风险模型推广到具有风险规避和风险中性代理的多阶段多任务情形。
There are also models that combine hidden action and hidden information.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*|journal = The Quarterly Journal of Economics|date = 2012|issn = 0033-5533|pages = 1843–1881|volume = 127|issue = 4|doi = 10.1093/qje/qjs026|language = en|first1 = Philippe|last1 = Aghion|first2 = Drew|last2 = Fudenberg|first3 = Richard|last3 = Holden|first4 = Takashi|last4 = Kunimoto|first5 = Olivier|last5 = Tercieux|citeseerx = 10.1.1.224.2883}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|title = On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems|journal = Journal of Economic Theory|date = 2002|pages = 444–60|volume = 103|issue = 2|doi = 10.1006/jeth.2001.2790|first = Patrick W.|last = Schmitz|citeseerx = 10.1.1.584.1856}}</ref> Since there is no data on unobservable variables, the contract-theoretic moral hazard model is difficult to test directly, but there have been some successful indirect tests with field data.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = The Provision of Incentives in Firms|journal = Journal of Economic Literature|date = 1999|issn = 0022-0515|pages = 7–63|volume = 37|issue = 1|doi = 10.1257/jel.37.1.7|first = Canice|last = Prendergast|citeseerx = 10.1.1.558.6657}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|title = Performance Pay and Productivity|journal = American Economic Review|date = 2000|issn = 0002-8282|pages = 1346–61|volume = 90|issue = 5|doi = 10.1257/aer.90.5.1346|first = Edward P|last = Lazear|citeseerx = 10.1.1.553.1082}}</ref> Direct tests of moral hazard theory are feasible in laboratory settings, using the tools of experimental economics. In such a setup, Hoppe and Schmitz (2018) have corroborated central insights of moral hazard theory.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Hoppe|first1=Eva I.|last2=Schmitz|first2=Patrick W.|date=2018|title=Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory|journal=Games and Economic Behavior|volume=109|pages=544–564|doi=10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.006|doi-access=free}}</ref>
There are also models that combine hidden action and hidden information. Since there is no data on unobservable variables, the contract-theoretic moral hazard model is difficult to test directly, but there have been some successful indirect tests with field data. Direct tests of moral hazard theory are feasible in laboratory settings, using the tools of experimental economics. In such a setup, Hoppe and Schmitz (2018) have corroborated central insights of moral hazard theory.
还有一些模型结合了隐藏动作和隐藏信息。由于没有关于不可观测变量的数据，契约理论的道德风险模型难以直接检验，但已有一些成功的间接检验与实地数据。利用实验经济学的工具，在实验室环境中对道德风险理论进行直接检验是可行的。在这样一个设置中，霍普和施密茨(2018)证实了道德风险理论的核心见解。
==Teamwork & Joint Monitoring==
Through teamwork theory, teamwork can decrease moral hazard in the forms of self-management systems and joint monitoring. It’s known that teamwork within [[HR management]] technologies are linked with higher productivity.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chan |first1=David |title=Teamwork and Moral Hazard |journal=Journal of Political Economy |date=2016 |issue=124 (3) |pages=734-770}}</ref>
Through teamwork theory, teamwork can decrease moral hazard in the forms of self-management systems and joint monitoring. It’s known that teamwork within HR management technologies are linked with higher productivity.
通过团队合作理论，团队合作可以以自我管理系统和联合监督的形式减少道德风险。众所周知，人力资源管理技术中的团队合作与更高的生产力相联系。
When it comes to economist, they have little say about how worker productivity can increase due to teamwork. This in understanding shows that there is a traditional prediction that joint production will end in moral hazards. Although theoretically, having vast amounts of communication, cooperation and coordination while allowing workers to have better information and knowledge about each other, teamwork can lessen the effect of moral hazard.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chan |first1=David |title=Teamwork and Moral Hazard |journal=Journal of Political Economy |date=2016 |issue=124(3) |pages=734-770}}</ref>
When it comes to economist, they have little say about how worker productivity can increase due to teamwork. This in understanding shows that there is a traditional prediction that joint production will end in moral hazards. Although theoretically, having vast amounts of communication, cooperation and coordination while allowing workers to have better information and knowledge about each other, teamwork can lessen the effect of moral hazard.
说到经济学家，他们对于如何通过团队合作提高工人的生产力几乎没有发言权。这种认识表明，有一种传统的预测认为，联合生产最终将导致道德风险。虽然从理论上讲，团队合作可以减少道德风险的影响，但是，团队合作可以使员工之间进行大量的沟通、合作和协调，同时让员工对彼此有更好的了解和认识。
For example, in a model developed by David C. Chan, he explained that within the nurse managed system, asymmetric information commonly occurs between nurse managers and physician workers.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chan |first1=David |title=Teamwork and Moral Hazard |journal=Journal of Political Economy |date=2016 |issue=124(3) |pages=734-770}}</ref> Physicians may have the tendencies to keep away from being assigned larger extents of work, thus to a degree act busier and more optimised at work than they really are. This in turn has accounted to the act of “foot-dragging” where physicians keep patients longer than they necessarily need in order to distort the true designated checkout points of workloads.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chan |first1=David |title=Teamwork and Moral Hazard |journal=Journal of Political Economy |date=2016 |issue=124(3) |pages=734-770}}</ref> To reduce these encounters, self-managed system are shown to be beneficial. By having this type of system, this would reduce the relative foot dragging found within the old nurse-managed system and will result in physicians to acquire better information about each other’s true workloads to choose the right patients at the right optimal times.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chan |first1=David |title=Teamwork and Moral Hazard |journal=Journal of Political Economy |date=2016 |issue=124(3) |pages=734-770}}</ref>
For example, in a model developed by David C. Chan, he explained that within the nurse managed system, asymmetric information commonly occurs between nurse managers and physician workers. Physicians may have the tendencies to keep away from being assigned larger extents of work, thus to a degree act busier and more optimised at work than they really are. This in turn has accounted to the act of “foot-dragging” where physicians keep patients longer than they necessarily need in order to distort the true designated checkout points of workloads. To reduce these encounters, self-managed system are shown to be beneficial. By having this type of system, this would reduce the relative foot dragging found within the old nurse-managed system and will result in physicians to acquire better information about each other’s true workloads to choose the right patients at the right optimal times.
例如，在 David C. Chan 开发的一个模型中，他解释说，在护士管理系统中，护士经理和医务工作者之间通常会发生信息不对称。医生可能倾向于避免被分配更大的工作范围，从而在一定程度上表现得比实际工作更忙碌、更乐观。这反过来解释了“拖延”的行为，即医生为了扭曲工作量的真正指定检查点，将病人留在比他们必需的时间更长的地方。为了减少这些遭遇，自我管理系统被证明是有益的。通过这种类型的系统，这将减少在旧的护士管理系统中发现的相对拖延，并将导致医生获得关于彼此的真实工作量的更好的信息，以在正确的最佳时间选择正确的病人。
One other aspect that has shown reasonable attention is how monitoring can improve the efficiency of reducing moral hazards. Social motivation has shown that when workers know that their peers can monitor them on a simple stance knowingly while also caring about what their peers are thinking, workers experience more efficient behaviours.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chan |first1=David |title=Teamwork and Moral Hazard |journal=Journal of Political Economy |date=2016 |issue=124(3) |pages=734-770}}</ref> However, by only using mutual monitoring and social motivation, it is often not enough and turns into a complete lack in productivity. Thus, joint management as a distinct teamwork formation is an important aspect for workers to use to improve to high ends of productivity.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chan |first1=David |title=Teamwork and Moral Hazard |journal=Journal of Political Economy |date=2016 |issue=124(3) |pages=734-770}}</ref>
One other aspect that has shown reasonable attention is how monitoring can improve the efficiency of reducing moral hazards. Social motivation has shown that when workers know that their peers can monitor them on a simple stance knowingly while also caring about what their peers are thinking, workers experience more efficient behaviours. However, by only using mutual monitoring and social motivation, it is often not enough and turns into a complete lack in productivity. Thus, joint management as a distinct teamwork formation is an important aspect for workers to use to improve to high ends of productivity.
另一个受到合理关注的方面是监督如何能够提高减少道德风险的效率。社会动机已经表明，当员工知道他们的同事可以明知故犯地以一种简单的姿态监视他们，同时也关心他们的同事在想什么时，他们的行为就会更有效率。然而，仅仅使用相互监督和社会动机，往往是不够的，并转变为完全缺乏生产力。因此，联合管理作为一种独特的团队合作形式，是工人们用来提高生产力的一个重要方面。
==See also==
{{div col|colwidth=20em}}
* [[Conflict of interest]]
* [[Feedback]]
* [[Free rider problem]]
* [[Game theory]]
* [[Information economics]]
* [[Offset hypothesis]]
* [[Perverse incentive]]
* [[Risk compensation]]
* [[Samaritan's dilemma]]
* [[Systemic risk]]
* [[Too big to fail]]
* [[Unintended consequences]]
{{div col end}}
* Conflict of interest
* Feedback
* Free rider problem
* Game theory
* Information economics
* Offset hypothesis
* Perverse incentive
* Risk compensation
* Samaritan's dilemma
* Systemic risk
* Too big to fail
* Unintended consequences
= = 参见同样 = =
* 利益冲突
* 反馈
* 搭便车问题
* 博弈论
* 信息经济学
* 抵消假设
* 乖张诱因
* 风险补偿
* 撒马利亚人的困境
* 系统性风险
* 大到不能倒闭
* 意外后果
== References ==
{{Reflist}}
==External links==
* {{cite news|last=Dewan|first=Shaila|title=Moral Hazard: A Tempest-Tossed Idea|work=[[The New York Times]] |date=February 26, 2012 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/business/moral-hazard-as-the-flip-side-of-self-reliance.html}}
* {{cite magazine|last=Gladwell|first=Malcolm|title=The Moral Hazard Myth|magazine=The New Yorker|date=August 29, 2005 |url=http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/08/29/050829fa_fact}}
* [http://paq.press.illinois.edu/23/1/hale.html "What's so Moral about the Moral Hazard?"]. Press.illinois.edu
* [https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/meltdown/view/ "Inside the Meltdown"], PBS's ''[[Frontline (U.S. TV series)|Frontline]]'' episode uses the idea as a central theme
*
*
* "What's so Moral about the Moral Hazard?". Press.illinois.edu
* "Inside the Meltdown", PBS's Frontline episode uses the idea as a central theme
= = 外部链接 = =
*
*
* “道德风险有什么道德可言?”。Press.illinois.edu
* 美国公共广播公司(PBS)的《前线》(Frontline)节目将这个想法作为中心主题
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{{Authority control}}
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[[Category:Anti-patterns]]
[[Category:Asymmetric information]]
[[Category:Ethically disputed business practices]]
[[Category:Financial risk]]
[[Category:Insurance]]
[[Category:Market failure]]
[[Category:United States housing bubble]]
Category:Anti-patterns
Category:Asymmetric information
Category:Ethically disputed business practices
Category:Financial risk
Category:Insurance
Category:Market failure
Category:United States housing bubble
分类: 反模式分类: 不对称信息分类: 有道德争议的商业行为分类: 金融风险分类: 保险分类: 市场失灵分类: 美国房地产泡沫
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<small>This page was moved from [[wikipedia:en:Moral hazard]]. Its edit history can be viewed at [[道德风险/edithistory]]</small></noinclude>
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