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第68行： − The modern field of operational research arose during World War II. In the World War II era, operational research was defined as "a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control."+ − − 现代作战研究领域兴起于第二次世界大战期间。在第二次世界大战时期，作战研究被定义为“为执行部门在其控制下的作战决策提供量化基础的一种科学的方法。 第81行：
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第90行： − + − {{anchor|RAF Bomber Command's Operational Research Section}} − Bomber Command's Operational Research Section (BC-ORS), analyzed a report of a survey carried out by [[RAF Bomber Command]].{{Citation needed|date=February 2007}} For the survey, Bomber Command inspected all bombers returning from bombing raids over Germany over a particular period. All damage inflicted by German [[Anti-aircraft warfare|air defences]] was noted and the recommendation was given that armour be added in the most heavily damaged areas. This recommendation was not adopted because the fact that the aircraft were able to return with these areas damaged indicated the areas were not vital, and adding armour to non-vital areas where damage is acceptable reduces aircraft performance. Their suggestion to remove some of the crew so that an aircraft loss would result in fewer personnel losses, was also rejected by RAF command. Blackett's team made the logical recommendation that the armour be placed in the areas which were completely untouched by damage in the bombers which returned. They reasoned that the survey was biased, since it only included aircraft that returned to Britain. The areas untouched in returning aircraft were probably vital areas, which, if hit, would result in the loss of the aircraft.<ref>{{cite book | title=Dirty Little Secrets of the Twentieth Century | publisher=[[Harper Paperbacks]] | author=James F. Dunnigan | year=1999 | pages=215–217}}</ref> This story has been disputed,<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://lesswrong.com/lw/bbv/examine_your_assumptions/|title = Examine your assumptions - LessWrong}}</ref> with a similar damage assessment study completed in the US by the Statistical Research Group at Columbia University,<ref>{{Cite journal|doi = 10.1080/01621459.1980.10477469|title = The Statistical Research Group, 1942–1945|journal = Journal of the American Statistical Association|volume = 75|issue = 370|pages = 320–330|year = 1980|last1 = Wallis|first1 = W. Allen}}</ref> the result of work done by [[Abraham Wald]].<ref>{{Cite journal|jstor = 2288257|title = Abraham Wald's Work on Aircraft Survivability|journal = Journal of the American Statistical Association|volume = 79|issue = 386|pages = 259|last1 = Mangel|first1 = Marc|last2 = Samaniego|first2 = Francisco J|doi = 10.2307/2288257|year = 1984}}</ref> −
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The modern field of operational research arose during World War II. In the World War II era, operational research was defined as "a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control".<ref name=C67-3-4-48-para-1>"Operational Research in the British Army 1939–1945", October 1947, Report C67/3/4/48, UK National Archives file WO291/1301<br />Quoted on the dust-jacket of: Morse, Philip M, and Kimball, George E, ''Methods of Operation Research'', 1st edition revised, MIT Press & J Wiley, 5th printing, 1954.</ref> Other names for it included operational analysis (UK Ministry of Defence from 1962)<ref name=PROCATWO291>[http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=109&CATLN=2&Highlight=&FullDetails=True UK National Archives Catalogue for WO291] lists a War Office organisation called [[Army Operational Research Group]] (AORG) that existed from 1946 to 1962. "In January 1962 the name was changed to Army Operational Research Establishment (AORE). Following the creation of a unified Ministry of Defence, a tri-service operational research organisation was established: the [[Defence Operational Analysis Establishment|Defence Operational Research Establishment]] (DOAE) which was formed in 1965, and it the Army Operational Research Establishment based at West Byfleet."</ref> and quantitative management.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://brochure.unisa.ac.za/myunisa/data/subjects/Quantitative%20Management.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=7 October 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110812213540/http://brochure.unisa.ac.za/myunisa/data/subjects/Quantitative%20Management.pdf |archive-date=12 August 2011 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
The modern field of operational research arose during World War II. In the World War II era, operational research was defined as "a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control".<ref name=C67-3-4-48-para-1>"Operational Research in the British Army 1939–1945", October 1947, Report C67/3/4/48, UK National Archives file WO291/1301<br />Quoted on the dust-jacket of: Morse, Philip M, and Kimball, George E, ''Methods of Operation Research'', 1st edition revised, MIT Press & J Wiley, 5th printing, 1954.</ref> Other names for it included operational analysis (UK Ministry of Defence from 1962)<ref name=PROCATWO291>[http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=109&CATLN=2&Highlight=&FullDetails=True UK National Archives Catalogue for WO291] lists a War Office organisation called [[Army Operational Research Group]] (AORG) that existed from 1946 to 1962. "In January 1962 the name was changed to Army Operational Research Establishment (AORE). Following the creation of a unified Ministry of Defence, a tri-service operational research organisation was established: the [[Defence Operational Analysis Establishment|Defence Operational Research Establishment]] (DOAE) which was formed in 1965, and it the Army Operational Research Establishment based at West Byfleet."</ref> and quantitative management.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://brochure.unisa.ac.za/myunisa/data/subjects/Quantitative%20Management.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=7 October 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110812213540/http://brochure.unisa.ac.za/myunisa/data/subjects/Quantitative%20Management.pdf |archive-date=12 August 2011 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
现代运筹学兴起于第二次世界大战期间。在第二次世界大战时期，运筹学被定义为“为执行部门在其控制下的作战决策提供量化基础的一种科学的方法。它又被称为战略分析或量化管理。
During the [[World War II|Second World War]], nearly 1,000 men and women in Britain were engaged in operational research. About 200 operational research scientists worked for the [[British Army]].<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA117 p. 117] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130827004623/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA117 |date=27 August 2013 }}</ref>
During the [[World War II|Second World War]], nearly 1,000 men and women in Britain were engaged in operational research. About 200 operational research scientists worked for the [[British Army]].<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA117 p. 117] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130827004623/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA117 |date=27 August 2013 }}</ref>
[[File:B 24 in raf service 23 03 05.jpg|thumb|A [[Consolidated B-24 Liberator|Liberator]] in standard RAF green/dark earth/black night bomber finish as originally used by Coastal Command|链接=Special:FilePath/B_24_in_raf_service_23_03_05.jpg]]
[[File:B 24 in raf service 23 03 05.jpg|thumb|A [[Consolidated B-24 Liberator|Liberator]] in standard RAF green/dark earth/black night bomber finish as originally used by Coastal Command|链接=Special:FilePath/B_24_in_raf_service_23_03_05.jpg]]
In 1941, Blackett moved from the RAE to the Navy, after first working with [[RAF Coastal Command]], Then, early in 1942, to the [[British Admiralty|Admiralty]].<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA109 p. 96,109] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131002032938/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA109 |date=2 October 2013 }}</ref> Blackett's team at Coastal Command's Operational Research Section (CC-ORS) included two future [[Nobel prize]] winners and many other people who went on to be pre-eminent in their fields.<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA96 p. 96] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140327234509/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA96 |date=27 March 2014 }}</ref><ref name= dyson >[[Freeman Dyson]], ''MIT Technology Review'' (1 November 2006) "[https://www.technologyreview.com/s/406789/a-failure-of-intelligence/ A Failure of Intelligence: Part I]"</ref> They undertook a number of crucial analyses that aided the war effort. Britain introduced the [[convoy]] system to reduce shipping losses, but while the principle of using warships to accompany merchant ships was generally accepted, it was unclear whether it was better for convoys to be small or large. Convoys travel at the speed of the slowest member, so small convoys can travel faster. It was also argued that small convoys would be harder for German [[U-boat]]s to detect. On the other hand, large convoys could deploy more warships against an attacker. Blackett's staff showed that the losses suffered by convoys depended largely on the number of escort vessels present, rather than the size of the convoy. Their conclusion was that a few large convoys are more defensible than many small ones.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.familyheritage.ca/Articles/victory1943.html |title="Numbers are Essential": Victory in the North Atlantic Reconsidered, March–May 1943 |publisher=Familyheritage.ca |date=24 May 1943 |access-date=13 November 2011}}</ref>
In 1941, Blackett moved from the RAE to the Navy, after first working with [[RAF Coastal Command]], Then, early in 1942, to the [[British Admiralty|Admiralty]].<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA109 p. 96,109] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131002032938/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA109 |date=2 October 2013 }}</ref> Blackett's team at Coastal Command's Operational Research Section (CC-ORS) included two future [[Nobel prize]] winners and many other people who went on to be pre-eminent in their fields.<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA96 p. 96] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140327234509/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA96 |date=27 March 2014 }}</ref><ref name= dyson >[[Freeman Dyson]], ''MIT Technology Review'' (1 November 2006) "[https://www.technologyreview.com/s/406789/a-failure-of-intelligence/ A Failure of Intelligence: Part I]"</ref> They undertook a number of crucial analyses that aided to win the war. Britain introduced the [[convoy]] system to reduce shipping losses, but while the principle of using warships to accompany merchant ships was generally accepted, it was unclear whether it was better for convoys to be small or large. Convoys travel at the speed of the slowest member, so small convoys can travel faster. It was also argued that small convoys would be harder for German [[U-boat]]s to detect. On the other hand, large convoys could deploy more warships against an attacker. Blackett's staff showed that the losses suffered by convoys depended largely on the number of escort vessels present, rather than the size of the convoy. Their conclusion was that a few large convoys are more defensible than many small ones.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.familyheritage.ca/Articles/victory1943.html |title="Numbers are Essential": Victory in the North Atlantic Reconsidered, March–May 1943 |publisher=Familyheritage.ca |date=24 May 1943 |access-date=13 November 2011}}</ref>
1941年，布莱克特从英国皇家空军转入海军，此前他曾在英国皇家空军海防司令部工作，1942年初转入英国海军部。布莱克特在海岸司令部作战研究部(CC-ORS)的团队包括两位未来的诺贝尔奖获得者和其他在自己的领域中继续取得卓越成就的人。他们进行了一些关键的分析，以协助战争胜利。英国引入护航系统是为了减少航运损失。尽管使用军舰陪同商船的原则得到普遍接受，但护航船队是小型还是大型还不清楚。船队虽然以最慢的速度行驶，但船小好调头，因此小型船队可以行驶得更快。还有人认为，小型护航舰队将更难被德国 U 型潜艇发现。另一方面，大型护航舰队可以部署更多的战舰对付攻击者。布莱克特的工作人员表示，护航船队遭受的损失程度在很大程度上取决于护航船只的数量，而不是护航船队的规模。他们的结论是，小型船队比大型船队更有利于迂回作战。
1941年，布莱克特从英国皇家空军转入海军，此前他曾在英国皇家空军海防司令部工作，1942年初转入英国海军部。布莱克特在海岸司令部作战研究部(CC-ORS)的团队包括两位未来的诺贝尔奖获得者和其他在自己的领域中继续取得卓越成就的人。他们进行了一些关键的分析，以协助战争胜利。英国引入护航系统是为了减少航运损失。尽管使用军舰陪同商船的原则得到普遍接受，但护航船队是小型还是大型还不清楚。实际上，船队虽然以最慢的速度行驶，但船小好调头，因此可以得出小型船队可以行驶得更快的结论。还有人认为，小型护航舰队将更难被德国 U 型潜艇发现。另一方面，大型护航舰队可以部署更多的战舰对付攻击者。布莱克特的工作人员表示，护航船队遭受的损失程度在很大程度上取决于护航船只的数量，而不是护航船队的规模。他们的结论是，小型船队比大型船队更有利于迂回作战。
While performing an analysis of the methods used by [[RAF Coastal Command]] to hunt and destroy submarines, one of the analysts asked what colour the aircraft were. As most of them were from Bomber Command they were painted black for night-time operations. At the suggestion of CC-ORS a test was run to see if that was the best colour to camouflage the aircraft for daytime operations in the grey North Atlantic skies. Tests showed that aircraft painted white were on average not spotted until they were 20% closer than those painted black. This change indicated that 30% more submarines would be attacked and sunk for the same number of sightings.<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA101 p. 101]</ref> As a result of these findings Coastal Command changed their aircraft to using white undersurfaces.
While performing an analysis of the methods used by [[RAF Coastal Command]] to hunt and destroy submarines, one of the analysts asked what colour the aircraft were. As most of them were from Bomber Command they were painted black for night-time operations. At the suggestion of CC-ORS a test was run to see if that was the best colour to camouflage the aircraft for daytime operations in the grey North Atlantic skies. Tests showed that aircraft painted white were on average not spotted until they were 20% closer than those painted black. This change indicated that 30% more submarines would be attacked and sunk for the same number of sightings.<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA101 p. 101]</ref> As a result of these findings Coastal Command changed their aircraft to using white undersurfaces.
CC-ORS 的其他工作表明，如果空投深水炸弹的触发深度平均从100英尺改为25英尺，炸死率将上升。原因在于，如果 U 型潜艇在飞机到达目标上空前不久就看到了飞机，那么在100英尺的高度，炸药不会造成任何损害(因为 U 型潜艇没有时间下降到100英尺的高度) ，如果它看到飞机离目标很远，它就有时间在水下改变航向，因此它进入20英尺炸药杀伤区的可能性很小。当目标的位置更加清楚时，攻击那些靠近水面的潜艇要比试图在更深的地方摧毁它们更有效率，因为它们的位置只能靠猜测。在设置从100英尺改为25英尺之前，1% 的潜艇沉没，14% 的潜艇受损。改变之后，7% 的潜艇被击沉，11% 的潜艇被损坏; 如果潜艇在水面上被抓住，但在被攻击之前有时间潜入水中，数字上升到11% 的潜艇被击沉，15% 的潜艇被损坏。布莱克特指出，“通过如此微小而简单的战术改变，就能获得如此巨大的行动收益的情况很少。”。(Kirby，pp.102,103)
CC-ORS 的其他工作表明，如果空投深水炸弹的触发深度平均从100英尺改为25英尺，炸死率将上升。原因在于，如果 U 型潜艇在飞机到达目标上空前不久就看到了飞机，那么在100英尺的高度，炸药不会造成任何损害(因为 U 型潜艇没有时间下降到100英尺的高度) ，如果它看到飞机离目标很远，它就有时间在水下改变航向，因此它进入20英尺炸药杀伤区的可能性很小。当目标的位置更加清楚时，攻击那些靠近水面的潜艇要比试图在更深的地方摧毁它们更有效率，因为在更深的地方只能靠猜测。在设置从100英尺改为25英尺之前，1% 的潜艇沉没，14% 的潜艇受损。改变之后，7% 的潜艇被击沉，11% 的潜艇被损坏; 如果潜艇在水面上被抓住，但在被攻击之前有时间潜入水中，数字上升到11% 的潜艇被击沉，15% 的潜艇被损坏。布莱克特指出，“通过如此微小而简单的战术改变，就能获得如此巨大的行动收益的情况很少。”
[[File:Kammhuber Line Map - Agent Tegal.png|thumb|upright|left|Map of ''[[Kammhuber Line]]''|链接=Special:FilePath/Kammhuber_Line_Map_-_Agent_Tegal.png]]
[[File:Kammhuber Line Map - Agent Tegal.png|thumb|upright|left|Map of ''[[Kammhuber Line]]''|链接=Special:FilePath/Kammhuber_Line_Map_-_Agent_Tegal.png]]