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Moved page from wikipedia:en:Emergent evolution (history)
此词条暂由彩云小译翻译，未经人工整理和审校，带来阅读不便，请见谅。
{{short description|The hypothesis that, in the course of evolution, some entirely new properties, such as mind and consciousness, appear at certain critical points}}
'''Emergent evolution''' was the [[hypothesis]] that, in the course of [[evolution]], some entirely new properties, such as mind and [[consciousness]], appear at certain critical points, usually because of an unpredictable rearrangement of the already existing entities. The term was originated by the psychologist [[C. Lloyd Morgan]] in 1922 in his [[Gifford Lectures]] at St. Andrews, which would later be published as the 1923 book ''Emergent Evolution''.<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://archive.org/details/emergentevolutio00morg_0|title=Emergent evolution : the Gifford lectures, delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the year 1922|last=Morgan|first=Conway Lloyd|date=1923|publisher=New York : Henry Holt and Company ; London : William and Norgate|others=MIT Libraries}}</ref><ref name="Bowler 2001">Bowler, Peter J. (2001). ''Reconciling Science and Religion: The Debate in Early-Twentieth-Century Britain''. University of Chicago Press. pp. 140-142, pp. 376-384. {{ISBN|0-226-06858-7}}</ref>
Emergent evolution was the hypothesis that, in the course of evolution, some entirely new properties, such as mind and consciousness, appear at certain critical points, usually because of an unpredictable rearrangement of the already existing entities. The term was originated by the psychologist C. Lloyd Morgan in 1922 in his Gifford Lectures at St. Andrews, which would later be published as the 1923 book Emergent Evolution.
突生演化是这样一种假设: 在进化的过程中，一些全新的属性，如思维和意识，在某些关键点上出现，通常是因为已经存在的实体发生了不可预知的重新排列。这个术语最早由心理学家 c. Lloyd Morgan 于1922年在他位于圣安德鲁斯的吉福德的讲述教学法中提出，这本书后来作为1923年出版的《突生演化。
The hypothesis was widely criticized for providing no mechanism to how entirely new properties emerge, and for its historical roots in [[teleology]].<ref name="Bowler 2001"/><ref>McLaughlin, Brian P. (1992). ''The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism''. In A. Beckerman, H. Flohr, and J. Kim, eds., ''Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism''. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 49–93. {{ISBN|3-11-012880-2}}</ref><ref>Baylis, Charles A. (1929). ''The Philosophic Functions of Emergence''. ''[[The Philosophical Review]]''. Vol. 38, No. 4. pp. 372-384.</ref>
The hypothesis was widely criticized for providing no mechanism to how entirely new properties emerge, and for its historical roots in teleology.
这个假说受到了广泛的批评，因为它没有提供全新属性如何出现的机制，而且它的历史根源在于目的论。
==Historical context==
The term ''[[emergence|emergent]]'' was first used to describe the concept by [[George Lewes]] in volume two of his 1875 book ''Problems of Life and Mind'' (p. 412). [[Henri Bergson]] covered similar themes in his popular 1907 book ''[[Creative Evolution (book)|Creative Evolution]]'' on the [[Élan vital]]. Emergence was further developed by [[Samuel Alexander]] in his [[Gifford Lectures]] at [[University of Glasgow|Glasgow]] during 1916–18 and published as ''Space, Time, and Deity'' (1920). The related term ''emergent evolution'' was coined by [[C. Lloyd Morgan]] in his own Gifford lectures of 1921–22 at [[University of St. Andrews|St. Andrews]] and published as ''Emergent Evolution'' (1923). In an appendix to a lecture in his book, Morgan acknowledged the contributions of [[Roy Wood Sellars]]'s ''Evolutionary Naturalism'' (1922).
The term emergent was first used to describe the concept by George Lewes in volume two of his 1875 book Problems of Life and Mind (p. 412). Henri Bergson covered similar themes in his popular 1907 book Creative Evolution on the Élan vital. Emergence was further developed by Samuel Alexander in his Gifford Lectures at Glasgow during 1916–18 and published as Space, Time, and Deity (1920). The related term emergent evolution was coined by C. Lloyd Morgan in his own Gifford lectures of 1921–22 at St. Andrews and published as Emergent Evolution (1923). In an appendix to a lecture in his book, Morgan acknowledged the contributions of Roy Wood Sellars's Evolutionary Naturalism (1922).
“涌现”这个词最初是由乔治 · 刘易斯在他1875年出版的《生活与心智的问题》(412页)第二卷中用来描述这个概念的。亨利 · 柏格森在他1907年的畅销书《局域网上的创造性进化》中也提到了类似的主题。1916-18年间，Samuel Alexander 在他位于格拉斯哥的吉福德的讲述教学法中进一步发展了羽化理论，并出版了《空间、时间和神性》(1920)。相关的术语突生演化是由 c. Lloyd Morgan 于1921-1922年在圣安德鲁斯出版的《吉福德的讲述教学法创造的，1923年出版为《突生演化》。在他书中的演讲的附录中，摩根承认了罗伊 · 伍德 · 塞拉斯的进化自然主义(1922)的贡献。
== Origins ==
=== Response to Darwin's ''Origin of Species'' ===
[[Charles Darwin]] and [[Alfred Russel Wallace]]'s presentation of [[natural selection]], coupled to the idea of evolution in Western thought, had gained acceptance due to the wealth of observational data provided and the seeming replacement of divine law with natural law in the affairs of men.<ref name=Reid>{{cite book|last=Reid|first=Robert G.B.|title=Biological Emergences: Evolution by Natural Experiment|year=2007|publisher=MIT Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|isbn=978-0262182577|pages=[https://archive.org/details/degreesthatmatte00rapp_0/page/30 30]|url=https://archive.org/details/degreesthatmatte00rapp_0/page/30}}</ref> However, the mechanism of [[natural selection]] described at the time only explained how organisms adapted to variation. The cause of genetic variation was unknown at the time.
Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace's presentation of natural selection, coupled to the idea of evolution in Western thought, had gained acceptance due to the wealth of observational data provided and the seeming replacement of divine law with natural law in the affairs of men. However, the mechanism of natural selection described at the time only explained how organisms adapted to variation. The cause of genetic variation was unknown at the time.
和阿尔弗雷德·拉塞尔·华莱士对自然选择的描述，加上西方思想中的进化论观点，由于提供了丰富的观测数据，以及在人类事务中似乎用自然法则取代了神圣法则，而得到了人们的接受。然而，当时描述的自然选择机制只解释了生物如何适应变异。当时遗传变异的起因还不清楚。
{{quote|Darwin knew that nature had to produce variations before natural selection could act …The problem had been caught by other evolutionists almost as soon as ''[[The Origin of Species]]'' was first published. [[Sir Charles Lyell]] saw it clearly in 1860 before he even became an evolutionist…(Reid, p.3)<ref name=Reid />}}
[[St. George Jackson Mivart|St. George Jackson Mivart's]] ''On the Genesis of Species'' (1872) and [[Edward Drinker Cope|Edward Cope]]'s ''Origin of the Fittest'' (1887) raised the need to address the origin of variation between members of a species. [[William Bateson]] in 1884 distinguished between the origin of novel variations and the action of natural selection (''Materials for the Study of Variation Treated with Especial Regard to Discontinuity in the Origin of Species'').<ref name=Reid />
St. George Jackson Mivart's On the Genesis of Species (1872) and Edward Cope's Origin of the Fittest (1887) raised the need to address the origin of variation between members of a species. William Bateson in 1884 distinguished between the origin of novel variations and the action of natural selection (Materials for the Study of Variation Treated with Especial Regard to Discontinuity in the Origin of Species).
圣乔治·杰克逊·米瓦特的《物种起源》(1872)和 Edward Cope 的《适者生存的起源》(1887)提出了解决物种成员间变异起源的需要。在1884年，William Bateson 区分了新的变异的起源和自然选择的作用(研究变异的材料，特别是物种起源的不连续性)。
=== Wallace's further thoughts ===
Wallace throughout his life continued to support and extend the scope of Darwin's theory of evolution via the mechanism of natural selection. One of his works, ''Darwinism'', was often cited in support of Darwin's theory. He also worked to elaborate and extend Darwin and his ideas on natural selection. However, Wallace also realized that the scope and claim of the theory was limited. Darwin himself had limited it.
Wallace throughout his life continued to support and extend the scope of Darwin's theory of evolution via the mechanism of natural selection. One of his works, Darwinism, was often cited in support of Darwin's theory. He also worked to elaborate and extend Darwin and his ideas on natural selection. However, Wallace also realized that the scope and claim of the theory was limited. Darwin himself had limited it.
华莱士一生都在通过自然选择的机制继续支持和扩展达尔文的进化论。他的著作之一，达尔文主义，经常被引用来支持达尔文的理论。他还致力于阐述和扩展达尔文和他关于自然选择的思想。然而，华莱士也意识到这个理论的范围和要求是有限的。达尔文自己对其进行了限制。
{{quote|the most prominent feature is that I enter into popular yet critical examination of those underlying fundamental problems which Darwin purposely excluded from his works as being beyond the scope of his enquiry. Such are the nature and cause of Life itself, and more especially of its most fundamental and mysterious powers - growth and reproduction ...
{{quote|the most prominent feature is that I enter into popular yet critical examination of those underlying fundamental problems which Darwin purposely excluded from his works as being beyond the scope of his enquiry. Such are the nature and cause of Life itself, and more especially of its most fundamental and mysterious powers - growth and reproduction ...
{{ quote | 最突出的特点是我参与了对那些潜在的基本问题的普遍而批判性的研究，这些问题是达尔文故意将其排除在他的著作之外的，因为它们超出了他的研究范围。这就是生命本身的本质和原因，尤其是它最基本和最神秘的力量——成长和繁殖... ..。
Darwin always ... adduced the "laws of Growth with Reproduction," and of "Inheritance with Variability," as being fundamental facts of nature, without which Natural Selection would be powerless or even non-existent ...
Darwin always ... adduced the "laws of Growth with Reproduction," and of "Inheritance with Variability," as being fundamental facts of nature, without which Natural Selection would be powerless or even non-existent ...
达尔文总是... ... 引用“生殖增长法则”和“变异性遗传法则” ，作为自然界的基本事实，没有这些，自然选择就会无能为力，甚至不存在... ..。
... even if it were proved to be an exact representation of the facts, it would not be an explanation... because it would not account for the forces, the directive agency, and the organising power which are essential features of growth …<ref name=Wallace>{{cite book|last=Wallace|first=Alfred Russel|title=Theory of Life|year=1911|publisher=Moffat, Yard and Co.|url=https://archive.org/details/worldlifeamanif00wallgoog}}</ref>}}
... even if it were proved to be an exact representation of the facts, it would not be an explanation... because it would not account for the forces, the directive agency, and the organising power which are essential features of growth …}}
... 即使它被证明是事实的精确表述，它也不会是一个解释... 因为它不会考虑作为成长基本特征的力量、指导机构和组织力量... }
In examining this aspect, excluded ''ab initio'' by Darwin, Wallace came to the conclusion that ''Life'' itself cannot be understood except by means of a theory that includes "an organising and directive Life-Principle." These necessarily involve a "Creative Power", a "directive Mind" and finally "an ultimate Purpose" (the development of Man). It supports the view of [[John Hunter (surgeon)|John Hunter]] that "life is the cause, not the consequence" of the organisation of matter. Thus, life precedes matter and when it infuses matter, forms living matter (protoplasm).
In examining this aspect, excluded ab initio by Darwin, Wallace came to the conclusion that Life itself cannot be understood except by means of a theory that includes "an organising and directive Life-Principle." These necessarily involve a "Creative Power", a "directive Mind" and finally "an ultimate Purpose" (the development of Man). It supports the view of John Hunter that "life is the cause, not the consequence" of the organisation of matter. Thus, life precedes matter and when it infuses matter, forms living matter (protoplasm).
在研究这个方面时，华莱士从一开始就排除了达尔文的观点，他得出结论，生命本身不能被理解，除非通过一种包括“组织和指导性的生命原则”的理论这些必然涉及到“创造力”、“指导性思维”和最终的“终极目的”(人的发展)。它支持约翰 · 亨特的观点，即“生命是物质组织的原因，而不是结果”。因此，生命先于物质，当它注入物质时，就形成了生命物质(原生质)。
{{quote|a very well-founded doctrine, and one which was often advocated by John Hunter, that life is the cause and not the consequence of organisation ... if so, life must be antecedent to organisation, and can only be conceived as indissolubly connected with spirit and with thought, and with the cause of the directive energy everywhere manifested in the growth of living things ... endowed with the mysterious organising power we term life ...<ref name="Wallace"/>}}
Wallace then refers to the operation of another power called "mind" that utilizes the power of life and is connected with a higher realm than life or matter:
Wallace then refers to the operation of another power called "mind" that utilizes the power of life and is connected with a higher realm than life or matter:
然后，华莱士提到了另一种叫做“心灵”的力量的运作，这种力量利用了生命的力量，与比生命或物质更高的领域相连接:
{{quote|evidence of a foreseeing mind which...so directed and organised that life, in all its myriad forms, as, in the far-off future, to provide all that was most essential for the growth and development of man's spiritual nature ...<ref name="Wallace"/>}}
Proceeding from Hunter's view that Life is the directive power above and behind living matter, Wallace argues that logically, Mind is the cause of [[consciousness]], which exists in different degrees and kinds in living matter.
Proceeding from Hunter's view that Life is the directive power above and behind living matter, Wallace argues that logically, Mind is the cause of consciousness, which exists in different degrees and kinds in living matter.
华莱士从亨特的观点出发，认为生命是生命物质之上和之后的指导力量，从逻辑上讲，思想是意识的起因，意识在生命物质中以不同的程度和种类存在。
{{quote|If, as John Hunter, T.H. Huxley, and other eminent thinkers have declared, "life is the cause, not the consequence, of organisation," so we may believe that mind is the cause, not the consequence, of brain development.
{{quote|If, as John Hunter, T.H. Huxley, and other eminent thinkers have declared, "life is the cause, not the consequence, of organisation," so we may believe that mind is the cause, not the consequence, of brain development.
{引用 | If，as John Hunter，t.h。赫胥黎和其他杰出的思想家宣称，“生命是组织的原因，而不是结果，”因此我们可以相信思维是大脑发育的原因，而不是结果。
... So there are undoubtedly different degrees and probably also different kinds of mind in various grades of animal life ... And ... so the mind-giver ... enables each class or order of animals to obtain the amount of mind requisite for its place in nature ...<ref name="Wallace"/>}}
... So there are undoubtedly different degrees and probably also different kinds of mind in various grades of animal life ... And ... so the mind-giver ... enables each class or order of animals to obtain the amount of mind requisite for its place in nature ...}}
...因此，在不同等级的动物生活中，无疑存在着不同的程度，也可能存在着不同种类的思维... ... 而且... ... 所以思维授予者... ... 使得动物的每一类或每一种类都能获得其在自然界中所需的思维数量... ... }
== Emergent evolution ==
=== Early roots ===
The issue of how change in nature 'emerged' can be found in classical Greek thought - order coming out of chaos and whether by chance or necessity. [[Aristotle]] spoke of wholes that were greater than the sum of their parts because of emergent properties. The second-century anatomist and physiologist [[Galen]] also distinguished between the resultant and emergent qualities of wholes. (Reid, p. 72)<ref name=Reid />
The issue of how change in nature 'emerged' can be found in classical Greek thought - order coming out of chaos and whether by chance or necessity. Aristotle spoke of wholes that were greater than the sum of their parts because of emergent properties. The second-century anatomist and physiologist Galen also distinguished between the resultant and emergent qualities of wholes. (Reid, p. 72)
自然界的改变是如何发生的，这个问题可以在古希腊的思想秩序中找到——从混乱中产生，无论是出于偶然还是必然。亚里士多德提到，由于涌现的特性，整体大于各部分之和。公元二世纪的解剖学家和生理学家加伦也区分了整体的结果性质和涌现性质。(Reid，第72页)
[[Hegel]] spoke of the revolutionary progression of life from non-living to conscious and then to the spiritual and Kant perceived that simple parts of an organism interact to produce a progressively complex series of emergences of functional forms, a distinction that carried over to [[John Stuart Mill]] (1843), who stated that even chemical compounds have novel features that cannot be predicted from their elements. [Reid, p. 72]<ref name=Reid />
Hegel spoke of the revolutionary progression of life from non-living to conscious and then to the spiritual and Kant perceived that simple parts of an organism interact to produce a progressively complex series of emergences of functional forms, a distinction that carried over to John Stuart Mill (1843), who stated that even chemical compounds have novel features that cannot be predicted from their elements. [Reid, p. 72]
黑格尔谈到了生命从无生命到有意识，然后到精神层面的革命性发展，康德认为，一个有机体的简单部分相互作用，产生了一系列渐进复杂的功能形式，这种区别延续到约翰·斯图尔特·密尔时代(1843年) ，后者指出，即使是化合物也具有从其元素中预测不到的新特征。[ Reid，p. 72]
The idea of an emergent quality that was something new in nature was further taken up by [[George Henry Lewes]] (1874–1875), who again noted, as with Galen earlier, that these evolutionary "emergent" qualities are distinguishable from adaptive, additive "resultants." [[Henry Drummond (evangelist)|Henry Drummond]] in ''The Descent of Man'' (1894) stated that emergence can be seen in the fact that the laws of nature are different for the organic or vital compared to the inertial inorganic realm.
The idea of an emergent quality that was something new in nature was further taken up by George Henry Lewes (1874–1875), who again noted, as with Galen earlier, that these evolutionary "emergent" qualities are distinguishable from adaptive, additive "resultants." Henry Drummond in The Descent of Man (1894) stated that emergence can be seen in the fact that the laws of nature are different for the organic or vital compared to the inertial inorganic realm.
突现性质是自然界中的新事物这一观点被乔治·亨利·刘易斯(1874-1875)进一步采用，他再次指出，正如加伦之前所说的，这些进化的“突现性质”与适应性的、可加性的“结果”是有区别的亨利 · 德拉蒙德在《人类的由来(1894年)指出，自然界的涌现可以从这样一个事实中看出来: 对于有机物或生命体，自然法则与惯性的无机领域是不同的。
{{quote|When we pass from the inorganic to the organic we come upon a new set of laws - but the reason why the lower set do not seem to operate in the higher sphere is not that they are annhilated, but that they are overruled. (Drummond 1883, p. 405, quoted in Reid)<ref name=Reid />}}
As Reid points out, Drummond also realized that greater complexity brought greater adaptability. (Reid. p. 73)<ref name=Reid />
As Reid points out, Drummond also realized that greater complexity brought greater adaptability. (Reid. p. 73)
正如里德指出的那样，德拉蒙德也意识到，更大的复杂性带来了更强的适应性。(里德。P. 73)
[[Samuel Alexander]] took up the idea that emergences had properties that overruled the demands of the lower levels of organization. And more recently, this theme is taken up by John Holland (1998):
Samuel Alexander took up the idea that emergences had properties that overruled the demands of the lower levels of organization. And more recently, this theme is taken up by John Holland (1998):
塞缪尔 · 亚历山大接受了这样一个观点，即浮现具有超越下层组织需求的属性。最近，约翰•霍兰德(John Holland，1998)提出了这个主题:
{{quote|If we turn reductionism on its head we add levels. More carefully, we add new laws that satisfy the constraints imposed by laws already in place. Moreover these new laws apply to complex phenomena that are consequences of the original laws; they are at a new level.<ref name=Holland>{{cite book|last=Holland|first=John|title=Emergence. From Chaos to Order|year=1998|publisher=Addison-Wesley|location=Reading, Massachusetts}}</ref>}}
=== C. Lloyd Morgan and emergent evolution ===
Another major scientist to question natural selection as the motive force of evolution was [[C. Lloyd Morgan]], a zoologist and student of [[T.H. Huxley]], who had a strong influence on Samuel Alexander. His ''Emergent Evolution'' (1923) established the central idea that an emergence might have the appearance of [[Saltation (biology)|saltation]] but was best regarded as "a qualitative change of direction or critical turning point."(quoted in Reid, p. 73-74)<ref name=Reid /> Morgan, due to his work in animal psychology, had earlier (1894) questioned the continuity view of mental evolution, and held that there were various discontinuities in cross-species mental abilities. To offset any attempt to read [[anthropomorphism]] into his view, he created the famous, but often misunderstood methodological canon:
Another major scientist to question natural selection as the motive force of evolution was C. Lloyd Morgan, a zoologist and student of T.H. Huxley, who had a strong influence on Samuel Alexander. His Emergent Evolution (1923) established the central idea that an emergence might have the appearance of saltation but was best regarded as "a qualitative change of direction or critical turning point."(quoted in Reid, p. 73-74) Morgan, due to his work in animal psychology, had earlier (1894) questioned the continuity view of mental evolution, and held that there were various discontinuities in cross-species mental abilities. To offset any attempt to read anthropomorphism into his view, he created the famous, but often misunderstood methodological canon:
另一位质疑自然选择作为进化动力的主要科学家是 c · 劳埃德 · 摩根，他是一位动物学家，也是 t.h. 的学生。赫胥黎对塞缪尔 · 亚历山大有着深远的影响。他的《突生演化(1923)确立了一个中心思想，即突现可能有跳跃的表现，但最好被视为“方向的质变或关键的转折点。”(引自里德73-74页)摩根，由于他在动物心理学方面的工作，在早期(1894年)质疑心理进化的连续性观点，并认为在跨物种的心理能力方面存在着各种不连续性。为了抵消任何试图解读他的观点的拟人论，他创造了著名的，但经常被误解的方法经典:
{{quote|In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale.|Morgan, 1894, p. 53}}
However, Morgan realizing that this was being misused to advocate reductionism (rather than as a general methodological caution), introduced a qualification into the second edition of his ''An Introduction to Comparative Psychology'' (1903):
However, Morgan realizing that this was being misused to advocate reductionism (rather than as a general methodological caution), introduced a qualification into the second edition of his An Introduction to Comparative Psychology (1903):
然而，Morgan 意识到这被误用为倡导还原论(而不是作为一个普遍的方法论上的警告) ，于是在他1903年出版的《比较心理学第二版中加入了一个限定条件:
{{quote|To this, however, it should be added, lest the range of the principle be misunderstood, that the canon by no means excludes the interpretation of a particular activity in terms of the higher processes, if we already have independent evidence of the occurrence of these higher processes in the animal under observation.|Morgan, 1903, p. 59}}
As Reid observes,
As Reid observes,
As Reid observes,
{{quote|While the so-called historiographical "rehabilitation of the canon" has been underway for some time now, Morgan's emergent evolutionist position (which was the highest expression of his attempt to place the study of mind back into such a "wider" natural history) is seldom mentioned in more than passing terms even within contemporary history of psychology textbooks.<ref name=Reid />}}
Morgan also fought against the [[Behaviorism|behaviorist school]] and clarified even more his emergent views on evolution:
Morgan also fought against the behaviorist school and clarified even more his emergent views on evolution:
摩尔根还反对行为主义学派，并且更进一步阐明了他关于进化论的新观点:
{{quote|An influential school of 'behaviorists' roundly deny that mental relations, if such there be, are in any sense or in any manner effective... My message is that one may speak of mental relations as effective no less 'scientifically' than... physical relations...|Morgan, 1930, p. 72}}
His ''Animal Conduct'' (1930) explicitly distinguishes between three "grades" or "levels of mentality" which he labeled: 'percipient, perceptive, and reflective.' (p. 42)
His Animal Conduct (1930) explicitly distinguishes between three "grades" or "levels of mentality" which he labeled: 'percipient, perceptive, and reflective.' (p. 42)
他的《动物行为》(1930)明确区分了三个“等级”或“心态层次” ，他称之为“洞察力、感知力和反思力”(p. 42)
=== Alexander and the emergence of mind ===
Morgan's idea of a polaric relationship between lower and higher, was taken up by Samuel Alexander, who argued that the mental process is not reducible to the neural processes on which it depends at the physical-material level. Instead, they are two poles of a unity of function. Further, the neural process that expressed mental process itself possesses a quality (mind) that the other neural processes don’t. At the same time, the mental process, because it is functionally identical to this particular neural process, is also a vital one.<ref name=Alexander>{{cite book|last=Alexander|first=Samuel|title=Space, Time and Deity|year=1916–18|publisher=Gifford Lectures|location=Glasgow|url=https://archive.org/details/spacetimeanddei00alexgoog}}</ref>
Morgan's idea of a polaric relationship between lower and higher, was taken up by Samuel Alexander, who argued that the mental process is not reducible to the neural processes on which it depends at the physical-material level. Instead, they are two poles of a unity of function. Further, the neural process that expressed mental process itself possesses a quality (mind) that the other neural processes don’t. At the same time, the mental process, because it is functionally identical to this particular neural process, is also a vital one.
摩根关于高低之间的极化关系的观点，被塞缪尔 · 亚历山大所采纳。亚历山大认为，心理过程不能简化为神经过程，而神经过程依赖于物质-物质层面。相反，它们是功能统一体的两极。此外，表达心理过程的神经过程本身具有其他神经过程所没有的特性(思维)。与此同时，心理过程，因为它在功能上与这个特定的神经过程相同，也是一个重要的过程。
And mental process is also "something new, "a fresh creation", which precludes a psycho-physiological parallelism. Reductionism is also contrary to empirical fact.
And mental process is also "something new, "a fresh creation", which precludes a psycho-physiological parallelism. Reductionism is also contrary to empirical fact.
心理过程也是一种“新的东西，一种新的创造” ，它排除了心理和生理的平行性。还原论也与经验事实相反。
{{quote|All the available evidence of fact leads to the conclusion that the mental element is essential to the neural process which it is said to accompany...and is not accidental to it, nor is it in turn indifferent to the mental feature. Epiphenomenalism is a mere fallacy of observation.<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
At the same time Alexander stated that his view was not one of animism or vitalism, where the mind is an independent entity action on the brain, or conversely, acted upon by the brain. Mental activity is an emergent, a new "thing" not reducible to its initial neural parts.
At the same time Alexander stated that his view was not one of animism or vitalism, where the mind is an independent entity action on the brain, or conversely, acted upon by the brain. Mental activity is an emergent, a new "thing" not reducible to its initial neural parts.
与此同时，亚历山大声明他的观点不是万物有灵论或活力论，即思想是大脑上的一个独立的实体行动，或者反过来说，是大脑的行动。心理活动是一种自然产生的，一种新的“事物” ，不能还原为其最初的神经部分。
{{quote|All the available evidence of fact leads to the conclusion that the mental element is essential to the neural process which it is said to accompany...and is not accidental to it, nor is it in turn indifferent to the mental feature. Epiphenomenalism is a mere fallacy of observation.<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
For Alexander, the world unfolds in space-time, which has the inherent quality of motion. This motion through space-time results in new “complexities of motion” in the form of a new quality or emergent. The emergent retains the qualities of the prior “complexities of motion” but also has something new that was not there before. This something new comes with its own laws of behavior. Time is the quality that creates motion through Space, and matter is simply motion expressed in forms in Space, or as Alexander says a little later, “complexes of motion.” Matter arises out of the basic ground of Space-Time continuity and has an element of “body” (lower order) and an element of “mind” (higher order), or “the conception that a secondary quality is the mind of its primary substrate.”
For Alexander, the world unfolds in space-time, which has the inherent quality of motion. This motion through space-time results in new “complexities of motion” in the form of a new quality or emergent. The emergent retains the qualities of the prior “complexities of motion” but also has something new that was not there before. This something new comes with its own laws of behavior. Time is the quality that creates motion through Space, and matter is simply motion expressed in forms in Space, or as Alexander says a little later, “complexes of motion.” Matter arises out of the basic ground of Space-Time continuity and has an element of “body” (lower order) and an element of “mind” (higher order), or “the conception that a secondary quality is the mind of its primary substrate.”
对亚历山大来说，世界是在时空中展开的，具有运动的内在品质。这种穿越时空的运动导致了新的“运动的复杂性” ，以一种新的性质或涌现的形式出现。涌现保留了以前“运动的复杂性”的特性，但也有一些以前没有的新东西。这种新事物有它自己的行为规律。时间是通过空间创造运动的特性，而物质只是以空间的形式表达的运动，或者正如亚历山大稍后所说的“运动复合体” 物质产生于时空连续性的基础之上，具有“身体”(低阶)和“心灵”(高阶)的要素，或者“第二性质是其主要基底的心灵的概念”
Mind is an emergent from life and life itself is an emergent from matter. Each level contains and is interconnected with the level and qualities below it, and to the extent that it contains lower levels, these aspects are subject to the laws of that level. All mental functions are living, but not all living functions are mental; all living functions are physico-chemical, but not all physico-chemical processes are living - just as we could say that all people living in Ohio are Americans, but not all Americans live in Ohio. Thus, there are levels of existence, or natural jurisdictions, within a given higher level such that the higher level contains elements of each of the previous levels of existence. The physical level contains the pure dimensionality of Space-Time in addition to the emergent of physico-chemical processes; the next emergent level, life, also contains Space-Time as well as the physico-chemical in addition to the quality of life; the level of mind contains all of the previous three levels, plus consciousness. As a result of this nesting and inter-action of emergents, like fluid Russian dolls, higher emergents cannot be reduced to lower ones, and different laws and methods of inquiry are required for each level.
Mind is an emergent from life and life itself is an emergent from matter. Each level contains and is interconnected with the level and qualities below it, and to the extent that it contains lower levels, these aspects are subject to the laws of that level. All mental functions are living, but not all living functions are mental; all living functions are physico-chemical, but not all physico-chemical processes are living - just as we could say that all people living in Ohio are Americans, but not all Americans live in Ohio. Thus, there are levels of existence, or natural jurisdictions, within a given higher level such that the higher level contains elements of each of the previous levels of existence. The physical level contains the pure dimensionality of Space-Time in addition to the emergent of physico-chemical processes; the next emergent level, life, also contains Space-Time as well as the physico-chemical in addition to the quality of life; the level of mind contains all of the previous three levels, plus consciousness. As a result of this nesting and inter-action of emergents, like fluid Russian dolls, higher emergents cannot be reduced to lower ones, and different laws and methods of inquiry are required for each level.
心是生活的产物，生活本身是物质的产物。每个级别包含并与其下面的级别和质量相互关联，并且在其包含较低级别的范围内，这些方面受到该级别的规律的制约。所有的心理功能都是活的，但并非所有的生理功能都是心理功能; 所有的生理功能都是物理化学的，但并非所有的物理化学过程都是活的——正如我们可以说所有生活在俄亥俄州的人都是美国人，但并非所有的美国人都生活在。因此，在一个给定的更高层次上，存在着存在的层次，或自然管辖权，以至于更高层次包含以前存在的每一个层次的要素。物理层次包含纯粹的时空维度，除此之外还有物理化学过程的涌现; 下一个涌现层次，生命，除了生命的质量之外，还包含时空和物理化学; 心智层次包含前三个层次的所有内容，加上意识。由于这种嵌套和相互作用，就像流动的俄罗斯娃娃一样，不能把更高的嵌套和相互作用减少到更低的嵌套和相互作用，因此每个层次都需要不同的法律和查询方法。
{{quote|Life is not an epiphenomenon of matter but an emergent from it ... The new character or quality which the vital physico-chemical complex possesses stands to it as soul or mind to the neural basis.<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
For Alexander, the "directing agency" or entelechy is found "in the principle or plan".
For Alexander, the "directing agency" or entelechy is found "in the principle or plan".
对于亚历山大来说，“指导机构”或者“诱惑”可以在“原则或者计划”中找到。
{{quote|a given stage of material complexity is characterised by such and such special features…By accepting this we at any rate confine ourselves to noting the facts…and do not invent entities for which there seems to be no other justification than that something is done in life which is not done in matter.<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
While an emergent is a higher complexity, it also results in a new simplicity as it brings a higher order into what was previously less ordered (a new simplex out of a complex). This new simplicity does not carry any of the qualities or aspects of that emergent level prior to it, but as noted, does still carry within it such lower levels so can be understood to that extent through the science of such levels, yet not itself be understood except by a science that is able to reveal the new laws and principles applicable to it.
While an emergent is a higher complexity, it also results in a new simplicity as it brings a higher order into what was previously less ordered (a new simplex out of a complex). This new simplicity does not carry any of the qualities or aspects of that emergent level prior to it, but as noted, does still carry within it such lower levels so can be understood to that extent through the science of such levels, yet not itself be understood except by a science that is able to reveal the new laws and principles applicable to it.
虽然涌现是一个更高的复杂性，它也导致了一个新的简单性，因为它带来了一个更高的顺序以前没有那么有序(一个新的单纯形出了一个复杂)。这种新的简单性并不具备新兴水平之前的任何特征或方面，但是正如所指出的，它仍然具有如此低的水平，因此可以通过这种水平的科学来理解，但是除了能够揭示适用于它的新法则和原则的科学之外，它本身并不能被理解。
{{quote|Ascent takes place, it would seem, through complexity.[increasing order] But at each change of quality the complexity as it were gathers itself together and is expressed in a new simplicity.
{{quote|Ascent takes place, it would seem, through complexity.[increasing order] But at each change of quality the complexity as it were gathers itself together and is expressed in a new simplicity.
{{引用 | 上升发生，似乎，通过复杂性。但是在质量的每一次改变时，复杂性就会聚集在一起，并以一种新的简单性表达出来。
Within a given level of emergence, there are degrees of development.
Within a given level of emergence, there are degrees of development.
在给定的出现水平内，存在发展的程度。
... There are on one level degrees of perfection or development; and at the same time there is affinity by descent between the existents belonging to the level. This difference of perfection is not the same thing as difference of order or rank such as subsists between matter and life or life and mind ...<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
... There are on one level degrees of perfection or development; and at the same time there is affinity by descent between the existents belonging to the level. This difference of perfection is not the same thing as difference of order or rank such as subsists between matter and life or life and mind ...}}
...在一个层次上有完善或发展的程度，同时在属于这个层次的存在者之间有下降的亲和力。这种完美的差异并不等同于秩序或等级的差异，例如物质与生命或生命与心灵之间的差异
The concept or idea of mind, the highest emergent known to us, being at our level, extends all the way down to pure dimensionality or Space-Time. In other words, time is the “mind” of motion, materialising is the “mind” of matter, living the “mind” of life. Motion through pure time (or life astronomical, mind ideational) emerges as matter “materialising” (geological time, life geological, mind existential), and this emerges as life “living” (biological time, life biological, mind experiential), which in turn give us mind “minding” (historical time, life historical, mind cognitional). But there is also an extension possible upwards of mind to what we call Deity.
The concept or idea of mind, the highest emergent known to us, being at our level, extends all the way down to pure dimensionality or Space-Time. In other words, time is the “mind” of motion, materialising is the “mind” of matter, living the “mind” of life. Motion through pure time (or life astronomical, mind ideational) emerges as matter “materialising” (geological time, life geological, mind existential), and this emerges as life “living” (biological time, life biological, mind experiential), which in turn give us mind “minding” (historical time, life historical, mind cognitional). But there is also an extension possible upwards of mind to what we call Deity.
心灵的概念或想法，我们所知道的最高涌现，在我们的层面上，一直延伸到纯粹的维度或时空。换句话说，时间是运动的“心” ，物化是物质的“心” ，活在生命的“心”中。通过纯时间(或生命、天文、心灵概念)的运动，以物质的形式出现(地质时间、生命地质、心灵存在) ，并以生命的形式出现(生物时间、生命生物、心灵经验) ，进而赋予我们心灵的”思维”(历史时间、生命历史、心灵认知)。但是也有一种可能的延伸，就是我们所说的神性。
{{quote|let us describe the empirical quality of any kind of finite which performs to it the office of consciousness or mind as its 'mind.' Yet at the same time let us remember that the 'mind' of a living thing is not conscious mind but is life, and has not the empirical character of consciousness at all, and that life is not merely a lower degree of mind or consciousness, but something different. We are using 'mind' metaphorically by transference from real minds and applying it to the finites on each level in virtue of their distinctive quality; down to Space-Time itself whose existent complexes of bare space-time have for their mind bare time in its empirical variations.<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
Alexander goes back to the Greek idea of knowledge being “out there” in the object being contemplated. In that sense, there is not mental object (concept) “distinct” (that is, different in state of being) from the physical object, but only an apparent split between the two, which can then be brought together by proper compresence or participation of the consciousness in the object itself.
Alexander goes back to the Greek idea of knowledge being “out there” in the object being contemplated. In that sense, there is not mental object (concept) “distinct” (that is, different in state of being) from the physical object, but only an apparent split between the two, which can then be brought together by proper compresence or participation of the consciousness in the object itself.
亚历山大可以追溯到希腊的观点，即知识存在于被考虑的对象中。从这个意义上说，精神客体(概念)与物质客体(即存在状态不同)并不存在“区别” ，而只是两者之间明显的分裂，这可以通过对客体本身的适当压缩或意识的参与而结合在一起。
{{quote|There is no consciousness lodged, as I have supposed, in the organism as a quality of the neural response; consciousness belongs to the totality of objects, of what are commonly called the objects of consciousness or the field of consciousness ... Consciousness is therefore "out there" where the objects are, by a new version of Berkleyanism ... Obviously for this doctrine as for mine there is no mental object as distinct from a physical object: the image of a tree is a tree in an appropriate form...<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
Because of the interconnectedness of the universe by virtue of Space-Time, and because the mind apprehends space, time and motion through a unity of sense and mind experience, there is a form of knowing that is intuitive (participative) - sense and reason are outgrowths from it.
Because of the interconnectedness of the universe by virtue of Space-Time, and because the mind apprehends space, time and motion through a unity of sense and mind experience, there is a form of knowing that is intuitive (participative) - sense and reason are outgrowths from it.
由于宇宙借助于空间-时间的相互联系，由于头脑通过感觉和头脑经验的统一来理解空间、时间和运动，存在着一种直觉(参与性)的认知形式——感觉和理性是由此而生的。
{{quote|In being conscious of its own space and time, the mind is conscious of the space and time of external things and vice versa. This is a direct consequence of the continuity of Space-Time in virtue of which any point-instant is connected sooner or later, directly or indirectly, with every other...
{{quote|In being conscious of its own space and time, the mind is conscious of the space and time of external things and vice versa. This is a direct consequence of the continuity of Space-Time in virtue of which any point-instant is connected sooner or later, directly or indirectly, with every other...
{引号 | 在意识到自己的空间和时间时，头脑意识到外部事物的空间和时间，反之亦然。这是时空连续性的一个直接后果，因为时空中的任何一点——瞬间迟早都会直接或间接地与其他任何一点——相连接。
The mind therefore does not apprehend the space of its objects, that is their shape, size and locality, by sensation, for it depends for its character on mere spatio-temporal conditions, though it is not to be had as consciousness in the absence of sensation (or else of course ideation). It is clear without repeating these considerations that the same proposition is true of Time; and of motion ... I shall call this mode of apprehension in its distinction from sensation, intuition. ... Intuition is different from reason, but reason and sense alike are outgrowths from it, empirical determinations of it...<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
The mind therefore does not apprehend the space of its objects, that is their shape, size and locality, by sensation, for it depends for its character on mere spatio-temporal conditions, though it is not to be had as consciousness in the absence of sensation (or else of course ideation). It is clear without repeating these considerations that the same proposition is true of Time; and of motion ... I shall call this mode of apprehension in its distinction from sensation, intuition. ... Intuition is different from reason, but reason and sense alike are outgrowths from it, empirical determinations of it...}}
因此，头脑并不通过感觉来理解其对象的空间，即它们的形状、大小和位置，因为它的性质仅仅取决于时空条件，虽然它在没有感觉(或者当然是思维)的情况下不能作为意识而存在。很明显，不必重复这些考虑，同样的命题也适用于时间和运动... ..。我将称这种理解模式为它与感觉、直觉的区别。 直觉和理性是不同的，但是理性和感性都是它的产物，是它的经验决定... }
In a sense, the universe is a participative one and open to participation by mind as well so that mind can intuitively know an object, contrary to what Kant asserted. Participation (togetherness) is something that is “enjoyed” (experienced) not contemplated, though in the higher level of consciousness, it would be contemplated.
In a sense, the universe is a participative one and open to participation by mind as well so that mind can intuitively know an object, contrary to what Kant asserted. Participation (togetherness) is something that is “enjoyed” (experienced) not contemplated, though in the higher level of consciousness, it would be contemplated.
从某种意义上来说，宇宙是一个参与性的宇宙，它也是一个开放的思维参与的宇宙，因此思维能够直观地认识一个对象，这与康德所断言的恰恰相反。参与(归属感)是一种“享受”(体验)的东西，没有经过深思熟虑，尽管在更高层次的意识中，它会被深思熟虑。
{{quote|The universe for Alexander is essentially in process, with Time as its ongoing aspect, and the ongoing process consists in the formation of changing complexes of motions. These complexes become ordered in repeatable ways displaying what he calls "qualities." There is a hierarchy of kinds of organized patterns of motions, in which each level depends on the subvening level, but also displays qualities not shown at the subvening level nor predictable from it… On this there sometimes supervenes a further level with the quality called "life"; and certain subtle syntheses which carry life are the foundation for a further level with a new quality. "mind." This is the highest level known to us, but not necessarily the highest possible level. The universe has a forward thrust, called its "nisus" (broadly to be identified with the Time aspect) in virtue of which further levels are to be expected...<ref name=Emmet>{{cite web|last=Emmet |first=Dorothy |title=Whitehead and Alexander |url=http://www.religion-online.org/article/whitehead-and-alexander/|accessdate=23 July 2012 }}</ref>}}
===Robert G. B. Reid===
Emergent evolution was revived by Robert G. B. Reid, a biology professor at the [[University of Victoria]]. In his book ''Evolutionary Theory: The Unfinished Synthesis'' (1985), he stated that the [[modern synthesis (20th century)|modern evolutionary synthesis]] with its emphasis on [[natural selection]] is an incomplete picture of evolution, and emergent evolution can explain the origin of genetic variation.<ref>Williams, Mary B. (1986). ''Evolutionary Theory: The Unfinished Synthesis by Robert G. B. Reid''. ''[[The Quarterly Review of Biology]]''. Vol. 61, No. 2, p. 266.</ref><ref>Cornell, John F. (1987). ''Evolutionary Theory: The Unfinished Synthesis by Robert G. B. Reid''. ''[[Journal of the History of Biology]]''. Vol. 20, No. 3. pp. 424-425.</ref> Biologist [[Ernst Mayr]] heavily criticized the book claiming it was a misinformed attack on natural selection. Mayr commented that Reid was working from an "obsolete conceptual framework", provided no solid evidence and that he was arguing for a [[Orthogenesis|teleological process of evolution]].<ref>Mayr, Ernst. (1986). ''Evolutionary Theory: The Unfinished Synthesis by Robert G. B. Reid''. [[Isis (journal)|Isis]]. Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 358-359.</ref>
Emergent evolution was revived by Robert G. B. Reid, a biology professor at the University of Victoria. In his book Evolutionary Theory: The Unfinished Synthesis (1985), he stated that the modern evolutionary synthesis with its emphasis on natural selection is an incomplete picture of evolution, and emergent evolution can explain the origin of genetic variation. Biologist Ernst Mayr heavily criticized the book claiming it was a misinformed attack on natural selection. Mayr commented that Reid was working from an "obsolete conceptual framework", provided no solid evidence and that he was arguing for a teleological process of evolution.
突生演化由维多利亚大学的生物学教授 Robert g. b. Reid 复活。在他的著作《进化论: 未完成的综合》(1985)中，他指出强调自然选择的现代进化综论是一幅不完整的进化画卷，而突生演化可以解释遗传变异的起源。生物学家恩斯特 · 迈尔严厉批评这本书，声称它是对自然选择的误导攻击。评论说 Reid 是在一个“过时的概念框架”工作，没有提供确凿的证据，他主张进化的目的论过程。
Reid later published the book ''Biological Emergences'' (2007) with a theory on how emergent novelties are generated in evolution.<ref>Rose, Christopher S. (2008). ''Biological Emergences: Evolution by Natural Experiment by Robert G. B. Reid''. ''[[Integrative and Comparative Biology]]''. Vol. 48, No. 6. pp. 871-873.</ref><ref>[https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/biological-emergences "Biological Emergences"]. [[MIT Press]].</ref> According to [[Massimo Pigliucci]] "Biological Emergences by Robert Reid is an interesting contribution to the ongoing debate on the status of evolutionary theory, but it is hard to separate the good stuff from the more dubious claims." Pigliucci noted a dubious claim in the book is that natural selection has no role in evolution.<ref>Pigliucci, Massimo. (2009). [http://philpapers.org/archive/MASDWN/ "Down with Natural Selection?"] ''[[Perspectives in Biology and Medicine]]''. 52: 134-140.</ref> It was positively reviewed by biologist Alexander Badyaev who commented that "the book succeeds in drawing attention to an under appreciated aspect of the evolutionary process".<ref>Badyaev, Alexander V. (2008). ''Evolution Despite Natural Selection? Emergence Theory and the Ever Elusive Link Between Adaptation and Adaptability''. ''[[Acta Biotheoretica]]'' 56: 249-255.</ref> Others have criticized Reid's unorthodox views on emergence and evolution. Biologist Samuel Scheiner stated that Reid's "presentation is both a caricature of evolutionary theory and severely out of date."<ref>Scheiner, Samuel M. (2004). ''The Metamorphosis of Evo-Devo''. ''[[BioScience]]''. Vol. 54, No. 12. pp. 1150-1151.</ref>
Reid later published the book Biological Emergences (2007) with a theory on how emergent novelties are generated in evolution. According to Massimo Pigliucci "Biological Emergences by Robert Reid is an interesting contribution to the ongoing debate on the status of evolutionary theory, but it is hard to separate the good stuff from the more dubious claims." Pigliucci noted a dubious claim in the book is that natural selection has no role in evolution. It was positively reviewed by biologist Alexander Badyaev who commented that "the book succeeds in drawing attention to an under appreciated aspect of the evolutionary process". Others have criticized Reid's unorthodox views on emergence and evolution. Biologist Samuel Scheiner stated that Reid's "presentation is both a caricature of evolutionary theory and severely out of date."
里德后来出版了《生物能出现》(Biological Emergences，2007)一书，其中提出了一个关于新生事物是如何在进化中产生的理论。按照 Massimo Pigliucci 的说法，“罗伯特 · 里德的《生物学浮现》是对正在进行的关于进化论地位的辩论的一个有趣的贡献，但是很难区分好的东西和更可疑的说法。”皮古奇在书中指出，自然选择在进化中没有任何作用，这一说法值得怀疑。这本书得到了生物学家亚历山大 · 巴德亚耶夫的正面评价，他评论说，“这本书成功地引起了人们对进化过程中一个不受重视的方面的注意”。其他人则批评里德关于突现和进化的非正统观点。生物学家塞缪尔 · 谢纳(samuelscheiner)指出，里德的“陈述既是对进化论的讽刺，又严重过时”
==See also==
{{Portal|Evolutionary biology}}
* [[The eclipse of Darwinism]]
* [[Emergentism]] is a corresponding belief in emergence.
* [[Evolutionary biology]]
* [[Noogenesis]]
* [[Orthogenesis]]
* [[Vitalism]]
==References==
{{Reflist|2}}
== Further reading ==
* [[Samuel Alexander|Alexander, Samuel]]. (1920). ''Space, Time, and Deity''. Kessinger Publishing Reprint. {{ISBN|0-7661-8702-0}}
* [[Henri Bergson|Bergson, Henri]]. (1911). ''Creative Evolution'' (English translation of ''L'Evolution créatrice''). Dover Publications 1998: {{ISBN|0-486-40036-0}}
* Lewes, George H. (1875). ''Problems of Life and Mind''. First Series: The Foundations of a Creed, vol. II. University of Michigan Library. {{ISBN|1-4255-5578-0}}
* MacDougall, William. (1929). ''Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution''. London: Macmillan.
* [[C. Lloyd Morgan|Morgan, C. Lloyd]]. (1923). [https://archive.org/stream/emergentevolutio032372mbp#page/n5/mode/2up ''Emergent Evolution'']. Henry Holt and Co. {{ISBN|0-404-60468-4}}
* Patrick, G. T. W. (1923). ''Emergent Evolution by C. Lloyd Morgan''. ''[[The Journal of Philosophy]]''. Vol. 20, No. 26. pp. 714–718.
{{DEFAULTSORT:Emergent Evolution}}
[[Category:Emergence|Evolution]]
Evolution
进化
[[Category:Non-Darwinian evolution]]
Category:Non-Darwinian evolution
类别: 非达尔文进化论
[[Category:Philosophical theories]]
Category:Philosophical theories
范畴: 哲学理论
[[Category:Evolutionary biology]]
Category:Evolutionary biology
分类: 进化生物学
[[Category:Holism]]
Category:Holism
分类: 整体论
<noinclude>
<small>This page was moved from [[wikipedia:en:Emergent evolution]]. Its edit history can be viewed at [[涌现进化/edithistory]]</small></noinclude>
[[Category:待整理页面]]
{{short description|The hypothesis that, in the course of evolution, some entirely new properties, such as mind and consciousness, appear at certain critical points}}
'''Emergent evolution''' was the [[hypothesis]] that, in the course of [[evolution]], some entirely new properties, such as mind and [[consciousness]], appear at certain critical points, usually because of an unpredictable rearrangement of the already existing entities. The term was originated by the psychologist [[C. Lloyd Morgan]] in 1922 in his [[Gifford Lectures]] at St. Andrews, which would later be published as the 1923 book ''Emergent Evolution''.<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://archive.org/details/emergentevolutio00morg_0|title=Emergent evolution : the Gifford lectures, delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the year 1922|last=Morgan|first=Conway Lloyd|date=1923|publisher=New York : Henry Holt and Company ; London : William and Norgate|others=MIT Libraries}}</ref><ref name="Bowler 2001">Bowler, Peter J. (2001). ''Reconciling Science and Religion: The Debate in Early-Twentieth-Century Britain''. University of Chicago Press. pp. 140-142, pp. 376-384. {{ISBN|0-226-06858-7}}</ref>
Emergent evolution was the hypothesis that, in the course of evolution, some entirely new properties, such as mind and consciousness, appear at certain critical points, usually because of an unpredictable rearrangement of the already existing entities. The term was originated by the psychologist C. Lloyd Morgan in 1922 in his Gifford Lectures at St. Andrews, which would later be published as the 1923 book Emergent Evolution.
突生演化是这样一种假设: 在进化的过程中，一些全新的属性，如思维和意识，在某些关键点上出现，通常是因为已经存在的实体发生了不可预知的重新排列。这个术语最早由心理学家 c. Lloyd Morgan 于1922年在他位于圣安德鲁斯的吉福德的讲述教学法中提出，这本书后来作为1923年出版的《突生演化。
The hypothesis was widely criticized for providing no mechanism to how entirely new properties emerge, and for its historical roots in [[teleology]].<ref name="Bowler 2001"/><ref>McLaughlin, Brian P. (1992). ''The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism''. In A. Beckerman, H. Flohr, and J. Kim, eds., ''Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism''. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 49–93. {{ISBN|3-11-012880-2}}</ref><ref>Baylis, Charles A. (1929). ''The Philosophic Functions of Emergence''. ''[[The Philosophical Review]]''. Vol. 38, No. 4. pp. 372-384.</ref>
The hypothesis was widely criticized for providing no mechanism to how entirely new properties emerge, and for its historical roots in teleology.
这个假说受到了广泛的批评，因为它没有提供全新属性如何出现的机制，而且它的历史根源在于目的论。
==Historical context==
The term ''[[emergence|emergent]]'' was first used to describe the concept by [[George Lewes]] in volume two of his 1875 book ''Problems of Life and Mind'' (p. 412). [[Henri Bergson]] covered similar themes in his popular 1907 book ''[[Creative Evolution (book)|Creative Evolution]]'' on the [[Élan vital]]. Emergence was further developed by [[Samuel Alexander]] in his [[Gifford Lectures]] at [[University of Glasgow|Glasgow]] during 1916–18 and published as ''Space, Time, and Deity'' (1920). The related term ''emergent evolution'' was coined by [[C. Lloyd Morgan]] in his own Gifford lectures of 1921–22 at [[University of St. Andrews|St. Andrews]] and published as ''Emergent Evolution'' (1923). In an appendix to a lecture in his book, Morgan acknowledged the contributions of [[Roy Wood Sellars]]'s ''Evolutionary Naturalism'' (1922).
The term emergent was first used to describe the concept by George Lewes in volume two of his 1875 book Problems of Life and Mind (p. 412). Henri Bergson covered similar themes in his popular 1907 book Creative Evolution on the Élan vital. Emergence was further developed by Samuel Alexander in his Gifford Lectures at Glasgow during 1916–18 and published as Space, Time, and Deity (1920). The related term emergent evolution was coined by C. Lloyd Morgan in his own Gifford lectures of 1921–22 at St. Andrews and published as Emergent Evolution (1923). In an appendix to a lecture in his book, Morgan acknowledged the contributions of Roy Wood Sellars's Evolutionary Naturalism (1922).
“涌现”这个词最初是由乔治 · 刘易斯在他1875年出版的《生活与心智的问题》(412页)第二卷中用来描述这个概念的。亨利 · 柏格森在他1907年的畅销书《局域网上的创造性进化》中也提到了类似的主题。1916-18年间，Samuel Alexander 在他位于格拉斯哥的吉福德的讲述教学法中进一步发展了羽化理论，并出版了《空间、时间和神性》(1920)。相关的术语突生演化是由 c. Lloyd Morgan 于1921-1922年在圣安德鲁斯出版的《吉福德的讲述教学法创造的，1923年出版为《突生演化》。在他书中的演讲的附录中，摩根承认了罗伊 · 伍德 · 塞拉斯的进化自然主义(1922)的贡献。
== Origins ==
=== Response to Darwin's ''Origin of Species'' ===
[[Charles Darwin]] and [[Alfred Russel Wallace]]'s presentation of [[natural selection]], coupled to the idea of evolution in Western thought, had gained acceptance due to the wealth of observational data provided and the seeming replacement of divine law with natural law in the affairs of men.<ref name=Reid>{{cite book|last=Reid|first=Robert G.B.|title=Biological Emergences: Evolution by Natural Experiment|year=2007|publisher=MIT Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|isbn=978-0262182577|pages=[https://archive.org/details/degreesthatmatte00rapp_0/page/30 30]|url=https://archive.org/details/degreesthatmatte00rapp_0/page/30}}</ref> However, the mechanism of [[natural selection]] described at the time only explained how organisms adapted to variation. The cause of genetic variation was unknown at the time.
Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace's presentation of natural selection, coupled to the idea of evolution in Western thought, had gained acceptance due to the wealth of observational data provided and the seeming replacement of divine law with natural law in the affairs of men. However, the mechanism of natural selection described at the time only explained how organisms adapted to variation. The cause of genetic variation was unknown at the time.
和阿尔弗雷德·拉塞尔·华莱士对自然选择的描述，加上西方思想中的进化论观点，由于提供了丰富的观测数据，以及在人类事务中似乎用自然法则取代了神圣法则，而得到了人们的接受。然而，当时描述的自然选择机制只解释了生物如何适应变异。当时遗传变异的起因还不清楚。
{{quote|Darwin knew that nature had to produce variations before natural selection could act …The problem had been caught by other evolutionists almost as soon as ''[[The Origin of Species]]'' was first published. [[Sir Charles Lyell]] saw it clearly in 1860 before he even became an evolutionist…(Reid, p.3)<ref name=Reid />}}
[[St. George Jackson Mivart|St. George Jackson Mivart's]] ''On the Genesis of Species'' (1872) and [[Edward Drinker Cope|Edward Cope]]'s ''Origin of the Fittest'' (1887) raised the need to address the origin of variation between members of a species. [[William Bateson]] in 1884 distinguished between the origin of novel variations and the action of natural selection (''Materials for the Study of Variation Treated with Especial Regard to Discontinuity in the Origin of Species'').<ref name=Reid />
St. George Jackson Mivart's On the Genesis of Species (1872) and Edward Cope's Origin of the Fittest (1887) raised the need to address the origin of variation between members of a species. William Bateson in 1884 distinguished between the origin of novel variations and the action of natural selection (Materials for the Study of Variation Treated with Especial Regard to Discontinuity in the Origin of Species).
圣乔治·杰克逊·米瓦特的《物种起源》(1872)和 Edward Cope 的《适者生存的起源》(1887)提出了解决物种成员间变异起源的需要。在1884年，William Bateson 区分了新的变异的起源和自然选择的作用(研究变异的材料，特别是物种起源的不连续性)。
=== Wallace's further thoughts ===
Wallace throughout his life continued to support and extend the scope of Darwin's theory of evolution via the mechanism of natural selection. One of his works, ''Darwinism'', was often cited in support of Darwin's theory. He also worked to elaborate and extend Darwin and his ideas on natural selection. However, Wallace also realized that the scope and claim of the theory was limited. Darwin himself had limited it.
Wallace throughout his life continued to support and extend the scope of Darwin's theory of evolution via the mechanism of natural selection. One of his works, Darwinism, was often cited in support of Darwin's theory. He also worked to elaborate and extend Darwin and his ideas on natural selection. However, Wallace also realized that the scope and claim of the theory was limited. Darwin himself had limited it.
华莱士一生都在通过自然选择的机制继续支持和扩展达尔文的进化论。他的著作之一，达尔文主义，经常被引用来支持达尔文的理论。他还致力于阐述和扩展达尔文和他关于自然选择的思想。然而，华莱士也意识到这个理论的范围和要求是有限的。达尔文自己对其进行了限制。
{{quote|the most prominent feature is that I enter into popular yet critical examination of those underlying fundamental problems which Darwin purposely excluded from his works as being beyond the scope of his enquiry. Such are the nature and cause of Life itself, and more especially of its most fundamental and mysterious powers - growth and reproduction ...
{{quote|the most prominent feature is that I enter into popular yet critical examination of those underlying fundamental problems which Darwin purposely excluded from his works as being beyond the scope of his enquiry. Such are the nature and cause of Life itself, and more especially of its most fundamental and mysterious powers - growth and reproduction ...
{{ quote | 最突出的特点是我参与了对那些潜在的基本问题的普遍而批判性的研究，这些问题是达尔文故意将其排除在他的著作之外的，因为它们超出了他的研究范围。这就是生命本身的本质和原因，尤其是它最基本和最神秘的力量——成长和繁殖... ..。
Darwin always ... adduced the "laws of Growth with Reproduction," and of "Inheritance with Variability," as being fundamental facts of nature, without which Natural Selection would be powerless or even non-existent ...
Darwin always ... adduced the "laws of Growth with Reproduction," and of "Inheritance with Variability," as being fundamental facts of nature, without which Natural Selection would be powerless or even non-existent ...
达尔文总是... ... 引用“生殖增长法则”和“变异性遗传法则” ，作为自然界的基本事实，没有这些，自然选择就会无能为力，甚至不存在... ..。
... even if it were proved to be an exact representation of the facts, it would not be an explanation... because it would not account for the forces, the directive agency, and the organising power which are essential features of growth …<ref name=Wallace>{{cite book|last=Wallace|first=Alfred Russel|title=Theory of Life|year=1911|publisher=Moffat, Yard and Co.|url=https://archive.org/details/worldlifeamanif00wallgoog}}</ref>}}
... even if it were proved to be an exact representation of the facts, it would not be an explanation... because it would not account for the forces, the directive agency, and the organising power which are essential features of growth …}}
... 即使它被证明是事实的精确表述，它也不会是一个解释... 因为它不会考虑作为成长基本特征的力量、指导机构和组织力量... }
In examining this aspect, excluded ''ab initio'' by Darwin, Wallace came to the conclusion that ''Life'' itself cannot be understood except by means of a theory that includes "an organising and directive Life-Principle." These necessarily involve a "Creative Power", a "directive Mind" and finally "an ultimate Purpose" (the development of Man). It supports the view of [[John Hunter (surgeon)|John Hunter]] that "life is the cause, not the consequence" of the organisation of matter. Thus, life precedes matter and when it infuses matter, forms living matter (protoplasm).
In examining this aspect, excluded ab initio by Darwin, Wallace came to the conclusion that Life itself cannot be understood except by means of a theory that includes "an organising and directive Life-Principle." These necessarily involve a "Creative Power", a "directive Mind" and finally "an ultimate Purpose" (the development of Man). It supports the view of John Hunter that "life is the cause, not the consequence" of the organisation of matter. Thus, life precedes matter and when it infuses matter, forms living matter (protoplasm).
在研究这个方面时，华莱士从一开始就排除了达尔文的观点，他得出结论，生命本身不能被理解，除非通过一种包括“组织和指导性的生命原则”的理论这些必然涉及到“创造力”、“指导性思维”和最终的“终极目的”(人的发展)。它支持约翰 · 亨特的观点，即“生命是物质组织的原因，而不是结果”。因此，生命先于物质，当它注入物质时，就形成了生命物质(原生质)。
{{quote|a very well-founded doctrine, and one which was often advocated by John Hunter, that life is the cause and not the consequence of organisation ... if so, life must be antecedent to organisation, and can only be conceived as indissolubly connected with spirit and with thought, and with the cause of the directive energy everywhere manifested in the growth of living things ... endowed with the mysterious organising power we term life ...<ref name="Wallace"/>}}
Wallace then refers to the operation of another power called "mind" that utilizes the power of life and is connected with a higher realm than life or matter:
Wallace then refers to the operation of another power called "mind" that utilizes the power of life and is connected with a higher realm than life or matter:
然后，华莱士提到了另一种叫做“心灵”的力量的运作，这种力量利用了生命的力量，与比生命或物质更高的领域相连接:
{{quote|evidence of a foreseeing mind which...so directed and organised that life, in all its myriad forms, as, in the far-off future, to provide all that was most essential for the growth and development of man's spiritual nature ...<ref name="Wallace"/>}}
Proceeding from Hunter's view that Life is the directive power above and behind living matter, Wallace argues that logically, Mind is the cause of [[consciousness]], which exists in different degrees and kinds in living matter.
Proceeding from Hunter's view that Life is the directive power above and behind living matter, Wallace argues that logically, Mind is the cause of consciousness, which exists in different degrees and kinds in living matter.
华莱士从亨特的观点出发，认为生命是生命物质之上和之后的指导力量，从逻辑上讲，思想是意识的起因，意识在生命物质中以不同的程度和种类存在。
{{quote|If, as John Hunter, T.H. Huxley, and other eminent thinkers have declared, "life is the cause, not the consequence, of organisation," so we may believe that mind is the cause, not the consequence, of brain development.
{{quote|If, as John Hunter, T.H. Huxley, and other eminent thinkers have declared, "life is the cause, not the consequence, of organisation," so we may believe that mind is the cause, not the consequence, of brain development.
{引用 | If，as John Hunter，t.h。赫胥黎和其他杰出的思想家宣称，“生命是组织的原因，而不是结果，”因此我们可以相信思维是大脑发育的原因，而不是结果。
... So there are undoubtedly different degrees and probably also different kinds of mind in various grades of animal life ... And ... so the mind-giver ... enables each class or order of animals to obtain the amount of mind requisite for its place in nature ...<ref name="Wallace"/>}}
... So there are undoubtedly different degrees and probably also different kinds of mind in various grades of animal life ... And ... so the mind-giver ... enables each class or order of animals to obtain the amount of mind requisite for its place in nature ...}}
...因此，在不同等级的动物生活中，无疑存在着不同的程度，也可能存在着不同种类的思维... ... 而且... ... 所以思维授予者... ... 使得动物的每一类或每一种类都能获得其在自然界中所需的思维数量... ... }
== Emergent evolution ==
=== Early roots ===
The issue of how change in nature 'emerged' can be found in classical Greek thought - order coming out of chaos and whether by chance or necessity. [[Aristotle]] spoke of wholes that were greater than the sum of their parts because of emergent properties. The second-century anatomist and physiologist [[Galen]] also distinguished between the resultant and emergent qualities of wholes. (Reid, p. 72)<ref name=Reid />
The issue of how change in nature 'emerged' can be found in classical Greek thought - order coming out of chaos and whether by chance or necessity. Aristotle spoke of wholes that were greater than the sum of their parts because of emergent properties. The second-century anatomist and physiologist Galen also distinguished between the resultant and emergent qualities of wholes. (Reid, p. 72)
自然界的改变是如何发生的，这个问题可以在古希腊的思想秩序中找到——从混乱中产生，无论是出于偶然还是必然。亚里士多德提到，由于涌现的特性，整体大于各部分之和。公元二世纪的解剖学家和生理学家加伦也区分了整体的结果性质和涌现性质。(Reid，第72页)
[[Hegel]] spoke of the revolutionary progression of life from non-living to conscious and then to the spiritual and Kant perceived that simple parts of an organism interact to produce a progressively complex series of emergences of functional forms, a distinction that carried over to [[John Stuart Mill]] (1843), who stated that even chemical compounds have novel features that cannot be predicted from their elements. [Reid, p. 72]<ref name=Reid />
Hegel spoke of the revolutionary progression of life from non-living to conscious and then to the spiritual and Kant perceived that simple parts of an organism interact to produce a progressively complex series of emergences of functional forms, a distinction that carried over to John Stuart Mill (1843), who stated that even chemical compounds have novel features that cannot be predicted from their elements. [Reid, p. 72]
黑格尔谈到了生命从无生命到有意识，然后到精神层面的革命性发展，康德认为，一个有机体的简单部分相互作用，产生了一系列渐进复杂的功能形式，这种区别延续到约翰·斯图尔特·密尔时代(1843年) ，后者指出，即使是化合物也具有从其元素中预测不到的新特征。[ Reid，p. 72]
The idea of an emergent quality that was something new in nature was further taken up by [[George Henry Lewes]] (1874–1875), who again noted, as with Galen earlier, that these evolutionary "emergent" qualities are distinguishable from adaptive, additive "resultants." [[Henry Drummond (evangelist)|Henry Drummond]] in ''The Descent of Man'' (1894) stated that emergence can be seen in the fact that the laws of nature are different for the organic or vital compared to the inertial inorganic realm.
The idea of an emergent quality that was something new in nature was further taken up by George Henry Lewes (1874–1875), who again noted, as with Galen earlier, that these evolutionary "emergent" qualities are distinguishable from adaptive, additive "resultants." Henry Drummond in The Descent of Man (1894) stated that emergence can be seen in the fact that the laws of nature are different for the organic or vital compared to the inertial inorganic realm.
突现性质是自然界中的新事物这一观点被乔治·亨利·刘易斯(1874-1875)进一步采用，他再次指出，正如加伦之前所说的，这些进化的“突现性质”与适应性的、可加性的“结果”是有区别的亨利 · 德拉蒙德在《人类的由来(1894年)指出，自然界的涌现可以从这样一个事实中看出来: 对于有机物或生命体，自然法则与惯性的无机领域是不同的。
{{quote|When we pass from the inorganic to the organic we come upon a new set of laws - but the reason why the lower set do not seem to operate in the higher sphere is not that they are annhilated, but that they are overruled. (Drummond 1883, p. 405, quoted in Reid)<ref name=Reid />}}
As Reid points out, Drummond also realized that greater complexity brought greater adaptability. (Reid. p. 73)<ref name=Reid />
As Reid points out, Drummond also realized that greater complexity brought greater adaptability. (Reid. p. 73)
正如里德指出的那样，德拉蒙德也意识到，更大的复杂性带来了更强的适应性。(里德。P. 73)
[[Samuel Alexander]] took up the idea that emergences had properties that overruled the demands of the lower levels of organization. And more recently, this theme is taken up by John Holland (1998):
Samuel Alexander took up the idea that emergences had properties that overruled the demands of the lower levels of organization. And more recently, this theme is taken up by John Holland (1998):
塞缪尔 · 亚历山大接受了这样一个观点，即浮现具有超越下层组织需求的属性。最近，约翰•霍兰德(John Holland，1998)提出了这个主题:
{{quote|If we turn reductionism on its head we add levels. More carefully, we add new laws that satisfy the constraints imposed by laws already in place. Moreover these new laws apply to complex phenomena that are consequences of the original laws; they are at a new level.<ref name=Holland>{{cite book|last=Holland|first=John|title=Emergence. From Chaos to Order|year=1998|publisher=Addison-Wesley|location=Reading, Massachusetts}}</ref>}}
=== C. Lloyd Morgan and emergent evolution ===
Another major scientist to question natural selection as the motive force of evolution was [[C. Lloyd Morgan]], a zoologist and student of [[T.H. Huxley]], who had a strong influence on Samuel Alexander. His ''Emergent Evolution'' (1923) established the central idea that an emergence might have the appearance of [[Saltation (biology)|saltation]] but was best regarded as "a qualitative change of direction or critical turning point."(quoted in Reid, p. 73-74)<ref name=Reid /> Morgan, due to his work in animal psychology, had earlier (1894) questioned the continuity view of mental evolution, and held that there were various discontinuities in cross-species mental abilities. To offset any attempt to read [[anthropomorphism]] into his view, he created the famous, but often misunderstood methodological canon:
Another major scientist to question natural selection as the motive force of evolution was C. Lloyd Morgan, a zoologist and student of T.H. Huxley, who had a strong influence on Samuel Alexander. His Emergent Evolution (1923) established the central idea that an emergence might have the appearance of saltation but was best regarded as "a qualitative change of direction or critical turning point."(quoted in Reid, p. 73-74) Morgan, due to his work in animal psychology, had earlier (1894) questioned the continuity view of mental evolution, and held that there were various discontinuities in cross-species mental abilities. To offset any attempt to read anthropomorphism into his view, he created the famous, but often misunderstood methodological canon:
另一位质疑自然选择作为进化动力的主要科学家是 c · 劳埃德 · 摩根，他是一位动物学家，也是 t.h. 的学生。赫胥黎对塞缪尔 · 亚历山大有着深远的影响。他的《突生演化(1923)确立了一个中心思想，即突现可能有跳跃的表现，但最好被视为“方向的质变或关键的转折点。”(引自里德73-74页)摩根，由于他在动物心理学方面的工作，在早期(1894年)质疑心理进化的连续性观点，并认为在跨物种的心理能力方面存在着各种不连续性。为了抵消任何试图解读他的观点的拟人论，他创造了著名的，但经常被误解的方法经典:
{{quote|In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale.|Morgan, 1894, p. 53}}
However, Morgan realizing that this was being misused to advocate reductionism (rather than as a general methodological caution), introduced a qualification into the second edition of his ''An Introduction to Comparative Psychology'' (1903):
However, Morgan realizing that this was being misused to advocate reductionism (rather than as a general methodological caution), introduced a qualification into the second edition of his An Introduction to Comparative Psychology (1903):
然而，Morgan 意识到这被误用为倡导还原论(而不是作为一个普遍的方法论上的警告) ，于是在他1903年出版的《比较心理学第二版中加入了一个限定条件:
{{quote|To this, however, it should be added, lest the range of the principle be misunderstood, that the canon by no means excludes the interpretation of a particular activity in terms of the higher processes, if we already have independent evidence of the occurrence of these higher processes in the animal under observation.|Morgan, 1903, p. 59}}
As Reid observes,
As Reid observes,
As Reid observes,
{{quote|While the so-called historiographical "rehabilitation of the canon" has been underway for some time now, Morgan's emergent evolutionist position (which was the highest expression of his attempt to place the study of mind back into such a "wider" natural history) is seldom mentioned in more than passing terms even within contemporary history of psychology textbooks.<ref name=Reid />}}
Morgan also fought against the [[Behaviorism|behaviorist school]] and clarified even more his emergent views on evolution:
Morgan also fought against the behaviorist school and clarified even more his emergent views on evolution:
摩尔根还反对行为主义学派，并且更进一步阐明了他关于进化论的新观点:
{{quote|An influential school of 'behaviorists' roundly deny that mental relations, if such there be, are in any sense or in any manner effective... My message is that one may speak of mental relations as effective no less 'scientifically' than... physical relations...|Morgan, 1930, p. 72}}
His ''Animal Conduct'' (1930) explicitly distinguishes between three "grades" or "levels of mentality" which he labeled: 'percipient, perceptive, and reflective.' (p. 42)
His Animal Conduct (1930) explicitly distinguishes between three "grades" or "levels of mentality" which he labeled: 'percipient, perceptive, and reflective.' (p. 42)
他的《动物行为》(1930)明确区分了三个“等级”或“心态层次” ，他称之为“洞察力、感知力和反思力”(p. 42)
=== Alexander and the emergence of mind ===
Morgan's idea of a polaric relationship between lower and higher, was taken up by Samuel Alexander, who argued that the mental process is not reducible to the neural processes on which it depends at the physical-material level. Instead, they are two poles of a unity of function. Further, the neural process that expressed mental process itself possesses a quality (mind) that the other neural processes don’t. At the same time, the mental process, because it is functionally identical to this particular neural process, is also a vital one.<ref name=Alexander>{{cite book|last=Alexander|first=Samuel|title=Space, Time and Deity|year=1916–18|publisher=Gifford Lectures|location=Glasgow|url=https://archive.org/details/spacetimeanddei00alexgoog}}</ref>
Morgan's idea of a polaric relationship between lower and higher, was taken up by Samuel Alexander, who argued that the mental process is not reducible to the neural processes on which it depends at the physical-material level. Instead, they are two poles of a unity of function. Further, the neural process that expressed mental process itself possesses a quality (mind) that the other neural processes don’t. At the same time, the mental process, because it is functionally identical to this particular neural process, is also a vital one.
摩根关于高低之间的极化关系的观点，被塞缪尔 · 亚历山大所采纳。亚历山大认为，心理过程不能简化为神经过程，而神经过程依赖于物质-物质层面。相反，它们是功能统一体的两极。此外，表达心理过程的神经过程本身具有其他神经过程所没有的特性(思维)。与此同时，心理过程，因为它在功能上与这个特定的神经过程相同，也是一个重要的过程。
And mental process is also "something new, "a fresh creation", which precludes a psycho-physiological parallelism. Reductionism is also contrary to empirical fact.
And mental process is also "something new, "a fresh creation", which precludes a psycho-physiological parallelism. Reductionism is also contrary to empirical fact.
心理过程也是一种“新的东西，一种新的创造” ，它排除了心理和生理的平行性。还原论也与经验事实相反。
{{quote|All the available evidence of fact leads to the conclusion that the mental element is essential to the neural process which it is said to accompany...and is not accidental to it, nor is it in turn indifferent to the mental feature. Epiphenomenalism is a mere fallacy of observation.<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
At the same time Alexander stated that his view was not one of animism or vitalism, where the mind is an independent entity action on the brain, or conversely, acted upon by the brain. Mental activity is an emergent, a new "thing" not reducible to its initial neural parts.
At the same time Alexander stated that his view was not one of animism or vitalism, where the mind is an independent entity action on the brain, or conversely, acted upon by the brain. Mental activity is an emergent, a new "thing" not reducible to its initial neural parts.
与此同时，亚历山大声明他的观点不是万物有灵论或活力论，即思想是大脑上的一个独立的实体行动，或者反过来说，是大脑的行动。心理活动是一种自然产生的，一种新的“事物” ，不能还原为其最初的神经部分。
{{quote|All the available evidence of fact leads to the conclusion that the mental element is essential to the neural process which it is said to accompany...and is not accidental to it, nor is it in turn indifferent to the mental feature. Epiphenomenalism is a mere fallacy of observation.<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
For Alexander, the world unfolds in space-time, which has the inherent quality of motion. This motion through space-time results in new “complexities of motion” in the form of a new quality or emergent. The emergent retains the qualities of the prior “complexities of motion” but also has something new that was not there before. This something new comes with its own laws of behavior. Time is the quality that creates motion through Space, and matter is simply motion expressed in forms in Space, or as Alexander says a little later, “complexes of motion.” Matter arises out of the basic ground of Space-Time continuity and has an element of “body” (lower order) and an element of “mind” (higher order), or “the conception that a secondary quality is the mind of its primary substrate.”
For Alexander, the world unfolds in space-time, which has the inherent quality of motion. This motion through space-time results in new “complexities of motion” in the form of a new quality or emergent. The emergent retains the qualities of the prior “complexities of motion” but also has something new that was not there before. This something new comes with its own laws of behavior. Time is the quality that creates motion through Space, and matter is simply motion expressed in forms in Space, or as Alexander says a little later, “complexes of motion.” Matter arises out of the basic ground of Space-Time continuity and has an element of “body” (lower order) and an element of “mind” (higher order), or “the conception that a secondary quality is the mind of its primary substrate.”
对亚历山大来说，世界是在时空中展开的，具有运动的内在品质。这种穿越时空的运动导致了新的“运动的复杂性” ，以一种新的性质或涌现的形式出现。涌现保留了以前“运动的复杂性”的特性，但也有一些以前没有的新东西。这种新事物有它自己的行为规律。时间是通过空间创造运动的特性，而物质只是以空间的形式表达的运动，或者正如亚历山大稍后所说的“运动复合体” 物质产生于时空连续性的基础之上，具有“身体”(低阶)和“心灵”(高阶)的要素，或者“第二性质是其主要基底的心灵的概念”
Mind is an emergent from life and life itself is an emergent from matter. Each level contains and is interconnected with the level and qualities below it, and to the extent that it contains lower levels, these aspects are subject to the laws of that level. All mental functions are living, but not all living functions are mental; all living functions are physico-chemical, but not all physico-chemical processes are living - just as we could say that all people living in Ohio are Americans, but not all Americans live in Ohio. Thus, there are levels of existence, or natural jurisdictions, within a given higher level such that the higher level contains elements of each of the previous levels of existence. The physical level contains the pure dimensionality of Space-Time in addition to the emergent of physico-chemical processes; the next emergent level, life, also contains Space-Time as well as the physico-chemical in addition to the quality of life; the level of mind contains all of the previous three levels, plus consciousness. As a result of this nesting and inter-action of emergents, like fluid Russian dolls, higher emergents cannot be reduced to lower ones, and different laws and methods of inquiry are required for each level.
Mind is an emergent from life and life itself is an emergent from matter. Each level contains and is interconnected with the level and qualities below it, and to the extent that it contains lower levels, these aspects are subject to the laws of that level. All mental functions are living, but not all living functions are mental; all living functions are physico-chemical, but not all physico-chemical processes are living - just as we could say that all people living in Ohio are Americans, but not all Americans live in Ohio. Thus, there are levels of existence, or natural jurisdictions, within a given higher level such that the higher level contains elements of each of the previous levels of existence. The physical level contains the pure dimensionality of Space-Time in addition to the emergent of physico-chemical processes; the next emergent level, life, also contains Space-Time as well as the physico-chemical in addition to the quality of life; the level of mind contains all of the previous three levels, plus consciousness. As a result of this nesting and inter-action of emergents, like fluid Russian dolls, higher emergents cannot be reduced to lower ones, and different laws and methods of inquiry are required for each level.
心是生活的产物，生活本身是物质的产物。每个级别包含并与其下面的级别和质量相互关联，并且在其包含较低级别的范围内，这些方面受到该级别的规律的制约。所有的心理功能都是活的，但并非所有的生理功能都是心理功能; 所有的生理功能都是物理化学的，但并非所有的物理化学过程都是活的——正如我们可以说所有生活在俄亥俄州的人都是美国人，但并非所有的美国人都生活在。因此，在一个给定的更高层次上，存在着存在的层次，或自然管辖权，以至于更高层次包含以前存在的每一个层次的要素。物理层次包含纯粹的时空维度，除此之外还有物理化学过程的涌现; 下一个涌现层次，生命，除了生命的质量之外，还包含时空和物理化学; 心智层次包含前三个层次的所有内容，加上意识。由于这种嵌套和相互作用，就像流动的俄罗斯娃娃一样，不能把更高的嵌套和相互作用减少到更低的嵌套和相互作用，因此每个层次都需要不同的法律和查询方法。
{{quote|Life is not an epiphenomenon of matter but an emergent from it ... The new character or quality which the vital physico-chemical complex possesses stands to it as soul or mind to the neural basis.<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
For Alexander, the "directing agency" or entelechy is found "in the principle or plan".
For Alexander, the "directing agency" or entelechy is found "in the principle or plan".
对于亚历山大来说，“指导机构”或者“诱惑”可以在“原则或者计划”中找到。
{{quote|a given stage of material complexity is characterised by such and such special features…By accepting this we at any rate confine ourselves to noting the facts…and do not invent entities for which there seems to be no other justification than that something is done in life which is not done in matter.<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
While an emergent is a higher complexity, it also results in a new simplicity as it brings a higher order into what was previously less ordered (a new simplex out of a complex). This new simplicity does not carry any of the qualities or aspects of that emergent level prior to it, but as noted, does still carry within it such lower levels so can be understood to that extent through the science of such levels, yet not itself be understood except by a science that is able to reveal the new laws and principles applicable to it.
While an emergent is a higher complexity, it also results in a new simplicity as it brings a higher order into what was previously less ordered (a new simplex out of a complex). This new simplicity does not carry any of the qualities or aspects of that emergent level prior to it, but as noted, does still carry within it such lower levels so can be understood to that extent through the science of such levels, yet not itself be understood except by a science that is able to reveal the new laws and principles applicable to it.
虽然涌现是一个更高的复杂性，它也导致了一个新的简单性，因为它带来了一个更高的顺序以前没有那么有序(一个新的单纯形出了一个复杂)。这种新的简单性并不具备新兴水平之前的任何特征或方面，但是正如所指出的，它仍然具有如此低的水平，因此可以通过这种水平的科学来理解，但是除了能够揭示适用于它的新法则和原则的科学之外，它本身并不能被理解。
{{quote|Ascent takes place, it would seem, through complexity.[increasing order] But at each change of quality the complexity as it were gathers itself together and is expressed in a new simplicity.
{{quote|Ascent takes place, it would seem, through complexity.[increasing order] But at each change of quality the complexity as it were gathers itself together and is expressed in a new simplicity.
{{引用 | 上升发生，似乎，通过复杂性。但是在质量的每一次改变时，复杂性就会聚集在一起，并以一种新的简单性表达出来。
Within a given level of emergence, there are degrees of development.
Within a given level of emergence, there are degrees of development.
在给定的出现水平内，存在发展的程度。
... There are on one level degrees of perfection or development; and at the same time there is affinity by descent between the existents belonging to the level. This difference of perfection is not the same thing as difference of order or rank such as subsists between matter and life or life and mind ...<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
... There are on one level degrees of perfection or development; and at the same time there is affinity by descent between the existents belonging to the level. This difference of perfection is not the same thing as difference of order or rank such as subsists between matter and life or life and mind ...}}
...在一个层次上有完善或发展的程度，同时在属于这个层次的存在者之间有下降的亲和力。这种完美的差异并不等同于秩序或等级的差异，例如物质与生命或生命与心灵之间的差异
The concept or idea of mind, the highest emergent known to us, being at our level, extends all the way down to pure dimensionality or Space-Time. In other words, time is the “mind” of motion, materialising is the “mind” of matter, living the “mind” of life. Motion through pure time (or life astronomical, mind ideational) emerges as matter “materialising” (geological time, life geological, mind existential), and this emerges as life “living” (biological time, life biological, mind experiential), which in turn give us mind “minding” (historical time, life historical, mind cognitional). But there is also an extension possible upwards of mind to what we call Deity.
The concept or idea of mind, the highest emergent known to us, being at our level, extends all the way down to pure dimensionality or Space-Time. In other words, time is the “mind” of motion, materialising is the “mind” of matter, living the “mind” of life. Motion through pure time (or life astronomical, mind ideational) emerges as matter “materialising” (geological time, life geological, mind existential), and this emerges as life “living” (biological time, life biological, mind experiential), which in turn give us mind “minding” (historical time, life historical, mind cognitional). But there is also an extension possible upwards of mind to what we call Deity.
心灵的概念或想法，我们所知道的最高涌现，在我们的层面上，一直延伸到纯粹的维度或时空。换句话说，时间是运动的“心” ，物化是物质的“心” ，活在生命的“心”中。通过纯时间(或生命、天文、心灵概念)的运动，以物质的形式出现(地质时间、生命地质、心灵存在) ，并以生命的形式出现(生物时间、生命生物、心灵经验) ，进而赋予我们心灵的”思维”(历史时间、生命历史、心灵认知)。但是也有一种可能的延伸，就是我们所说的神性。
{{quote|let us describe the empirical quality of any kind of finite which performs to it the office of consciousness or mind as its 'mind.' Yet at the same time let us remember that the 'mind' of a living thing is not conscious mind but is life, and has not the empirical character of consciousness at all, and that life is not merely a lower degree of mind or consciousness, but something different. We are using 'mind' metaphorically by transference from real minds and applying it to the finites on each level in virtue of their distinctive quality; down to Space-Time itself whose existent complexes of bare space-time have for their mind bare time in its empirical variations.<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
Alexander goes back to the Greek idea of knowledge being “out there” in the object being contemplated. In that sense, there is not mental object (concept) “distinct” (that is, different in state of being) from the physical object, but only an apparent split between the two, which can then be brought together by proper compresence or participation of the consciousness in the object itself.
Alexander goes back to the Greek idea of knowledge being “out there” in the object being contemplated. In that sense, there is not mental object (concept) “distinct” (that is, different in state of being) from the physical object, but only an apparent split between the two, which can then be brought together by proper compresence or participation of the consciousness in the object itself.
亚历山大可以追溯到希腊的观点，即知识存在于被考虑的对象中。从这个意义上说，精神客体(概念)与物质客体(即存在状态不同)并不存在“区别” ，而只是两者之间明显的分裂，这可以通过对客体本身的适当压缩或意识的参与而结合在一起。
{{quote|There is no consciousness lodged, as I have supposed, in the organism as a quality of the neural response; consciousness belongs to the totality of objects, of what are commonly called the objects of consciousness or the field of consciousness ... Consciousness is therefore "out there" where the objects are, by a new version of Berkleyanism ... Obviously for this doctrine as for mine there is no mental object as distinct from a physical object: the image of a tree is a tree in an appropriate form...<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
Because of the interconnectedness of the universe by virtue of Space-Time, and because the mind apprehends space, time and motion through a unity of sense and mind experience, there is a form of knowing that is intuitive (participative) - sense and reason are outgrowths from it.
Because of the interconnectedness of the universe by virtue of Space-Time, and because the mind apprehends space, time and motion through a unity of sense and mind experience, there is a form of knowing that is intuitive (participative) - sense and reason are outgrowths from it.
由于宇宙借助于空间-时间的相互联系，由于头脑通过感觉和头脑经验的统一来理解空间、时间和运动，存在着一种直觉(参与性)的认知形式——感觉和理性是由此而生的。
{{quote|In being conscious of its own space and time, the mind is conscious of the space and time of external things and vice versa. This is a direct consequence of the continuity of Space-Time in virtue of which any point-instant is connected sooner or later, directly or indirectly, with every other...
{{quote|In being conscious of its own space and time, the mind is conscious of the space and time of external things and vice versa. This is a direct consequence of the continuity of Space-Time in virtue of which any point-instant is connected sooner or later, directly or indirectly, with every other...
{引号 | 在意识到自己的空间和时间时，头脑意识到外部事物的空间和时间，反之亦然。这是时空连续性的一个直接后果，因为时空中的任何一点——瞬间迟早都会直接或间接地与其他任何一点——相连接。
The mind therefore does not apprehend the space of its objects, that is their shape, size and locality, by sensation, for it depends for its character on mere spatio-temporal conditions, though it is not to be had as consciousness in the absence of sensation (or else of course ideation). It is clear without repeating these considerations that the same proposition is true of Time; and of motion ... I shall call this mode of apprehension in its distinction from sensation, intuition. ... Intuition is different from reason, but reason and sense alike are outgrowths from it, empirical determinations of it...<ref name="Alexander"/>}}
The mind therefore does not apprehend the space of its objects, that is their shape, size and locality, by sensation, for it depends for its character on mere spatio-temporal conditions, though it is not to be had as consciousness in the absence of sensation (or else of course ideation). It is clear without repeating these considerations that the same proposition is true of Time; and of motion ... I shall call this mode of apprehension in its distinction from sensation, intuition. ... Intuition is different from reason, but reason and sense alike are outgrowths from it, empirical determinations of it...}}
因此，头脑并不通过感觉来理解其对象的空间，即它们的形状、大小和位置，因为它的性质仅仅取决于时空条件，虽然它在没有感觉(或者当然是思维)的情况下不能作为意识而存在。很明显，不必重复这些考虑，同样的命题也适用于时间和运动... ..。我将称这种理解模式为它与感觉、直觉的区别。 直觉和理性是不同的，但是理性和感性都是它的产物，是它的经验决定... }
In a sense, the universe is a participative one and open to participation by mind as well so that mind can intuitively know an object, contrary to what Kant asserted. Participation (togetherness) is something that is “enjoyed” (experienced) not contemplated, though in the higher level of consciousness, it would be contemplated.
In a sense, the universe is a participative one and open to participation by mind as well so that mind can intuitively know an object, contrary to what Kant asserted. Participation (togetherness) is something that is “enjoyed” (experienced) not contemplated, though in the higher level of consciousness, it would be contemplated.
从某种意义上来说，宇宙是一个参与性的宇宙，它也是一个开放的思维参与的宇宙，因此思维能够直观地认识一个对象，这与康德所断言的恰恰相反。参与(归属感)是一种“享受”(体验)的东西，没有经过深思熟虑，尽管在更高层次的意识中，它会被深思熟虑。
{{quote|The universe for Alexander is essentially in process, with Time as its ongoing aspect, and the ongoing process consists in the formation of changing complexes of motions. These complexes become ordered in repeatable ways displaying what he calls "qualities." There is a hierarchy of kinds of organized patterns of motions, in which each level depends on the subvening level, but also displays qualities not shown at the subvening level nor predictable from it… On this there sometimes supervenes a further level with the quality called "life"; and certain subtle syntheses which carry life are the foundation for a further level with a new quality. "mind." This is the highest level known to us, but not necessarily the highest possible level. The universe has a forward thrust, called its "nisus" (broadly to be identified with the Time aspect) in virtue of which further levels are to be expected...<ref name=Emmet>{{cite web|last=Emmet |first=Dorothy |title=Whitehead and Alexander |url=http://www.religion-online.org/article/whitehead-and-alexander/|accessdate=23 July 2012 }}</ref>}}
===Robert G. B. Reid===
Emergent evolution was revived by Robert G. B. Reid, a biology professor at the [[University of Victoria]]. In his book ''Evolutionary Theory: The Unfinished Synthesis'' (1985), he stated that the [[modern synthesis (20th century)|modern evolutionary synthesis]] with its emphasis on [[natural selection]] is an incomplete picture of evolution, and emergent evolution can explain the origin of genetic variation.<ref>Williams, Mary B. (1986). ''Evolutionary Theory: The Unfinished Synthesis by Robert G. B. Reid''. ''[[The Quarterly Review of Biology]]''. Vol. 61, No. 2, p. 266.</ref><ref>Cornell, John F. (1987). ''Evolutionary Theory: The Unfinished Synthesis by Robert G. B. Reid''. ''[[Journal of the History of Biology]]''. Vol. 20, No. 3. pp. 424-425.</ref> Biologist [[Ernst Mayr]] heavily criticized the book claiming it was a misinformed attack on natural selection. Mayr commented that Reid was working from an "obsolete conceptual framework", provided no solid evidence and that he was arguing for a [[Orthogenesis|teleological process of evolution]].<ref>Mayr, Ernst. (1986). ''Evolutionary Theory: The Unfinished Synthesis by Robert G. B. Reid''. [[Isis (journal)|Isis]]. Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 358-359.</ref>
Emergent evolution was revived by Robert G. B. Reid, a biology professor at the University of Victoria. In his book Evolutionary Theory: The Unfinished Synthesis (1985), he stated that the modern evolutionary synthesis with its emphasis on natural selection is an incomplete picture of evolution, and emergent evolution can explain the origin of genetic variation. Biologist Ernst Mayr heavily criticized the book claiming it was a misinformed attack on natural selection. Mayr commented that Reid was working from an "obsolete conceptual framework", provided no solid evidence and that he was arguing for a teleological process of evolution.
突生演化由维多利亚大学的生物学教授 Robert g. b. Reid 复活。在他的著作《进化论: 未完成的综合》(1985)中，他指出强调自然选择的现代进化综论是一幅不完整的进化画卷，而突生演化可以解释遗传变异的起源。生物学家恩斯特 · 迈尔严厉批评这本书，声称它是对自然选择的误导攻击。评论说 Reid 是在一个“过时的概念框架”工作，没有提供确凿的证据，他主张进化的目的论过程。
Reid later published the book ''Biological Emergences'' (2007) with a theory on how emergent novelties are generated in evolution.<ref>Rose, Christopher S. (2008). ''Biological Emergences: Evolution by Natural Experiment by Robert G. B. Reid''. ''[[Integrative and Comparative Biology]]''. Vol. 48, No. 6. pp. 871-873.</ref><ref>[https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/biological-emergences "Biological Emergences"]. [[MIT Press]].</ref> According to [[Massimo Pigliucci]] "Biological Emergences by Robert Reid is an interesting contribution to the ongoing debate on the status of evolutionary theory, but it is hard to separate the good stuff from the more dubious claims." Pigliucci noted a dubious claim in the book is that natural selection has no role in evolution.<ref>Pigliucci, Massimo. (2009). [http://philpapers.org/archive/MASDWN/ "Down with Natural Selection?"] ''[[Perspectives in Biology and Medicine]]''. 52: 134-140.</ref> It was positively reviewed by biologist Alexander Badyaev who commented that "the book succeeds in drawing attention to an under appreciated aspect of the evolutionary process".<ref>Badyaev, Alexander V. (2008). ''Evolution Despite Natural Selection? Emergence Theory and the Ever Elusive Link Between Adaptation and Adaptability''. ''[[Acta Biotheoretica]]'' 56: 249-255.</ref> Others have criticized Reid's unorthodox views on emergence and evolution. Biologist Samuel Scheiner stated that Reid's "presentation is both a caricature of evolutionary theory and severely out of date."<ref>Scheiner, Samuel M. (2004). ''The Metamorphosis of Evo-Devo''. ''[[BioScience]]''. Vol. 54, No. 12. pp. 1150-1151.</ref>
Reid later published the book Biological Emergences (2007) with a theory on how emergent novelties are generated in evolution. According to Massimo Pigliucci "Biological Emergences by Robert Reid is an interesting contribution to the ongoing debate on the status of evolutionary theory, but it is hard to separate the good stuff from the more dubious claims." Pigliucci noted a dubious claim in the book is that natural selection has no role in evolution. It was positively reviewed by biologist Alexander Badyaev who commented that "the book succeeds in drawing attention to an under appreciated aspect of the evolutionary process". Others have criticized Reid's unorthodox views on emergence and evolution. Biologist Samuel Scheiner stated that Reid's "presentation is both a caricature of evolutionary theory and severely out of date."
里德后来出版了《生物能出现》(Biological Emergences，2007)一书，其中提出了一个关于新生事物是如何在进化中产生的理论。按照 Massimo Pigliucci 的说法，“罗伯特 · 里德的《生物学浮现》是对正在进行的关于进化论地位的辩论的一个有趣的贡献，但是很难区分好的东西和更可疑的说法。”皮古奇在书中指出，自然选择在进化中没有任何作用，这一说法值得怀疑。这本书得到了生物学家亚历山大 · 巴德亚耶夫的正面评价，他评论说，“这本书成功地引起了人们对进化过程中一个不受重视的方面的注意”。其他人则批评里德关于突现和进化的非正统观点。生物学家塞缪尔 · 谢纳(samuelscheiner)指出，里德的“陈述既是对进化论的讽刺，又严重过时”
==See also==
{{Portal|Evolutionary biology}}
* [[The eclipse of Darwinism]]
* [[Emergentism]] is a corresponding belief in emergence.
* [[Evolutionary biology]]
* [[Noogenesis]]
* [[Orthogenesis]]
* [[Vitalism]]
==References==
{{Reflist|2}}
== Further reading ==
* [[Samuel Alexander|Alexander, Samuel]]. (1920). ''Space, Time, and Deity''. Kessinger Publishing Reprint. {{ISBN|0-7661-8702-0}}
* [[Henri Bergson|Bergson, Henri]]. (1911). ''Creative Evolution'' (English translation of ''L'Evolution créatrice''). Dover Publications 1998: {{ISBN|0-486-40036-0}}
* Lewes, George H. (1875). ''Problems of Life and Mind''. First Series: The Foundations of a Creed, vol. II. University of Michigan Library. {{ISBN|1-4255-5578-0}}
* MacDougall, William. (1929). ''Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution''. London: Macmillan.
* [[C. Lloyd Morgan|Morgan, C. Lloyd]]. (1923). [https://archive.org/stream/emergentevolutio032372mbp#page/n5/mode/2up ''Emergent Evolution'']. Henry Holt and Co. {{ISBN|0-404-60468-4}}
* Patrick, G. T. W. (1923). ''Emergent Evolution by C. Lloyd Morgan''. ''[[The Journal of Philosophy]]''. Vol. 20, No. 26. pp. 714–718.
{{DEFAULTSORT:Emergent Evolution}}
[[Category:Emergence|Evolution]]
Evolution
进化
[[Category:Non-Darwinian evolution]]
Category:Non-Darwinian evolution
类别: 非达尔文进化论
[[Category:Philosophical theories]]
Category:Philosophical theories
范畴: 哲学理论
[[Category:Evolutionary biology]]
Category:Evolutionary biology
分类: 进化生物学
[[Category:Holism]]
Category:Holism
分类: 整体论
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<small>This page was moved from [[wikipedia:en:Emergent evolution]]. Its edit history can be viewed at [[涌现进化/edithistory]]</small></noinclude>
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