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| In this definition, strategy T can be a neutral alternative to S (scoring equally well, but not better). | | In this definition, strategy T can be a neutral alternative to S (scoring equally well, but not better). |
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− | 在这个定义中,策略 t 可以是 s 的一个中性替代品(得分同样好,但不是更好)。
| + | 在这个定义中,策略T可以成为S的中性替代(即最后得分相同,但并不更好)。 |
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− | <!--For example, in ''Harm thy neighbour'', (''A'', ''A'') is a Nash equilibrium because one cannot do ''better'' by switching to ''B''. **will move this to "comparison" section, trying to avoid mixing A&B and S&T strategies in same paragraph -->
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− | <!--For example, in Harm thy neighbour, (A, A) is a Nash equilibrium because one cannot do better by switching to B. **will move this to "comparison" section, trying to avoid mixing A&B and S&T strategies in same paragraph -->
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− | <!例如,在《伤害你的邻居》中,(a,a)是一个纳什均衡点,因为一个人不能通过转换到 b 来做得更好。* * 将把这一部分移到“比较”部分,尽量避免在同一段落中将 a & b 和科技策略混为一谈 -- >
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| A Nash equilibrium is presumed to be stable even if ''T'' scores equally, on the assumption that there is no long-term incentive for players to adopt ''T'' instead of ''S''. This fact represents the point of departure of the ESS. | | A Nash equilibrium is presumed to be stable even if ''T'' scores equally, on the assumption that there is no long-term incentive for players to adopt ''T'' instead of ''S''. This fact represents the point of departure of the ESS. |
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| A Nash equilibrium is presumed to be stable even if T scores equally, on the assumption that there is no long-term incentive for players to adopt T instead of S. This fact represents the point of departure of the ESS. | | A Nash equilibrium is presumed to be stable even if T scores equally, on the assumption that there is no long-term incentive for players to adopt T instead of S. This fact represents the point of departure of the ESS. |
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− | 即使 t 得分相同,一个纳什均衡点也被认为是稳定的,前提是玩家没有长期的动机去使用 t 而不是 s。这一事实代表了斯洛文尼亚就业服务局的出发点。
| + | 即使采用T后其得分相等,纳什平衡也被认为是稳定的,当然前提是假设不存在长期动机去鼓励玩家采用T而不是S。 |
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| Maynard Smith and Price specify two conditions for a strategy S to be an ESS. For all T≠S, either | | Maynard Smith and Price specify two conditions for a strategy S to be an ESS. For all T≠S, either |
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− | Maynard Smith 和 Price 为策略 s 指定了两个成为 ESS 的条件。对于所有 t ≠ s,也是如此
| + | 梅纳德·史密斯和普莱斯为策略S指定了两个条件,使其成为进化均衡策略,对于所有的T≠S,两个选其一: |
− | | + | 1. E(S,S) > E(T,S), or |
− | # E(''S'',''S'') > E(''T'',''S''), '''or'''
| + | 2. E(S,S) = E(T,S) and E(S,T) > E(T,T) |
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− | E(S,S) > E(T,S), or
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− | E (s,s) > e (t,s) ,或
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− | # E(''S'',''S'') = E(''T'',''S'') and E(''S'',''T'') > E(''T'',''T'')
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− | E(S,S) = E(T,S) and E(S,T) > E(T,T)
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− | E (s,s) = e (t,s)和 e (s,t) > e (t,t)
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