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Strong emergence can be criticized for being causally overdetermined. The canonical example concerns emergent mental states (M and M∗) that supervene on physical states (P and P∗) respectively. Let M and M∗ be emergent properties. Let M∗ supervene on base property P∗. What happens when M causes M∗? Jaegwon Kim says:

Strong emergence can be criticized for being causally overdetermined. The canonical example concerns emergent mental states (M and M∗) that supervene on physical states (P and P∗) respectively. Let M and M∗ be emergent properties. Let M∗ supervene on base property P∗. What happens when M causes M∗? Jaegwon Kim says:

<blockquote>In our schematic example above, we concluded that M causes M∗ by causing P∗. So M causes P∗. Now, M, as an emergent, must itself have an emergence base property, say P. Now we face a critical question: if an emergent, M, emerges from basal condition P, why cannot P displace M as a cause of any putative effect of M? Why cannot P do all the work in explaining why any alleged effect of M occurred? If causation is understood as nomological (law-based) sufficiency, P, as M's emergence base, is nomologically sufficient for it, and M, as P∗'s cause, is nomologically sufficient for P∗. It follows that P is nomologically sufficient for P∗ and hence qualifies as its cause…If M is somehow retained as a cause, we are faced with the highly implausible consequence that every case of downward causation involves overdetermination (since P remains a cause of P∗ as well). Moreover, this goes against the spirit of emergentism in any case: emergents are supposed to make distinctive and novel causal contributions.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Kim | first1 = Jaegwon | year = 2016 | title = Emergence: Core ideas and issues | url = | journal = Synthese | volume = 151 | issue = 3| pages = 547–59 | doi = 10.1007/s11229-006-9025-0 }}</ref></blockquote>

<blockquote>In our schematic example above, we concluded that M causes M∗ by causing P∗. So M causes P∗. Now, M, as an emergent, must itself have an emergence base property, say P. Now we face a critical question: if an emergent, M, emerges from basal condition P, why cannot P displace M as a cause of any putative effect of M? Why cannot P do all the work in explaining why any alleged effect of M occurred? If causation is understood as nomological (law-based) sufficiency, P, as M's emergence base, is nomologically sufficient for it, and M, as P∗'s cause, is nomologically sufficient for P∗. It follows that P is nomologically sufficient for P∗ and hence qualifies as its cause…If M is somehow retained as a cause, we are faced with the highly implausible consequence that every case of downward causation involves overdetermination (since P remains a cause of P∗ as well). Moreover, this goes against the spirit of emergentism in any case: emergents are supposed to make distinctive and novel causal contributions.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Kim | first1 = Jaegwon | year = 2016 | title = Emergence: Core ideas and issues | url = | journal = Synthese | volume = 151 | issue = 3| pages = 547–59 | doi = 10.1007/s11229-006-9025-0 }}</ref></blockquote>

<blockquote>In our schematic example above, we concluded that M causes M∗ by causing P∗. So M causes P∗. Now, M, as an emergent, must itself have an emergence base property, say P. Now we face a critical question: if an emergent, M, emerges from basal condition P, why cannot P displace M as a cause of any putative effect of M? Why cannot P do all the work in explaining why any alleged effect of M occurred? If causation is understood as nomological (law-based) sufficiency, P, as M's emergence base, is nomologically sufficient for it, and M, as P∗'s cause, is nomologically sufficient for P∗. It follows that P is nomologically sufficient for P∗ and hence qualifies as its cause…If M is somehow retained as a cause, we are faced with the highly implausible consequence that every case of downward causation involves overdetermination (since P remains a cause of P∗ as well). Moreover, this goes against the spirit of emergentism in any case: emergents are supposed to make distinctive and novel causal contributions.</blockquote>

<blockquote>In our schematic example above, we concluded that M causes M∗ by causing P∗. So M causes P∗. Now, M, as an emergent, must itself have an emergence base property, say P. Now we face a critical question: if an emergent, M, emerges from basal condition P, why cannot P displace M as a cause of any putative effect of M? Why cannot P do all the work in explaining why any alleged effect of M occurred? If causation is understood as nomological (law-based) sufficiency, P, as M's emergence base, is nomologically sufficient for it, and M, as P∗'s cause, is nomologically sufficient for P∗. It follows that P is nomologically sufficient for P∗ and hence qualifies as its cause…If M is somehow retained as a cause, we are faced with the highly implausible consequence that every case of downward causation involves overdetermination (since P remains a cause of P∗ as well). Moreover, this goes against the spirit of emergentism in any case: emergents are supposed to make distinctive and novel causal contributions.

在我们上面的示意图中，我们得出结论，M 引起 M * 是由 P * 引起的。所以 M 引起 P∗.现在，M 作为一个涌现，本身必须有一个涌现基本性质，比如 P。 现在我们面临一个关键的问题: 如果一个涌现M出现在基础条件 P下，为什么P不能取代M作为M的任何假定影响的原因？为什么 P 不能充分解释发生所谓的 M 效应的原因？如果因果关系被理解为法理上（基于规则）的充分性，那么 P，作为 M 的涌现基础，同样是法理充分的。而M作为 P* 的原因，对于P*也是法理上充分的。于是出现了P对于P*也是法理有效的，并因此取得了它的理由的资格。如果 M 以某种方式作为原因被保留下来，我们就会面临一个非常难以置信的结果，那就是每一个向下的因果关系都牵涉到过度决定(因为 P 也是 P * 的原因)。此外，这在任何情况下都与涌现主义的精神背道而驰: 涌现主义者应该做出独特而新颖的因果贡献。 / blockquote

在我们上面的例子中，我们得出结论，心理状态 M 引起的另一个心理状态 M * 对应着微观的物理状态 P* ，所以我们可以说 M 引起 P∗。现在，M 作为一个涌现现象，本身必须有一个底层的基本性质，比如 P。 现在我们面临一个关键的问题: 如果一个涌现现象M出现在基础条件 P下，为什么P不能作为M的任何假定影响的原因？为什么 P 不能充分解释 M 引发的其他效应呢？如果因果关系被理解为法理上（基于规则）的充分性，那么 P，作为 M 的涌现基础，同样是法理充分的。而M作为 P* 的原因，对于P*也是法理上充分的。于是出现了P对于P*也是法理有效的，并因此能成为 P* 的理由。如果 M 以某种方式作为原因被保留下来，我们就会面临一个非常难以置信的结果，那就是每一个向下的因果关系都牵涉到过度决定(因为 P 也是 P * 的原因)。此外，这在任何情况下都与涌现主义的精神背道而驰: 涌现主义者应该做出独特而新颖的因果贡献。.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Kim | first1 = Jaegwon | year = 2016 | title = Emergence: Core ideas and issues | url = | journal = Synthese | volume = 151 | issue = 3| pages = 547–59 | doi = 10.1007/s11229-006-9025-0 }}</ref> </blockquote>

If M is the cause of M∗, then M∗ is overdetermined because M∗ can also be thought of as being determined by P. One escape-route that a strong emergentist could take would be to deny downward causation. However, this would remove the proposed reason that emergent mental states must supervene on physical states, which in turn would call physicalism into question, and thus be unpalatable for some philosophers and physicists.

If M is the cause of M∗, then M∗ is overdetermined because M∗ can also be thought of as being determined by P. One escape-route that a strong emergentist could take would be to deny downward causation. However, this would remove the proposed reason that emergent mental states must supervene on physical states, which in turn would call physicalism into question, and thus be unpalatable for some philosophers and physicists.

如果 M 是 M * 的原因，那么 M * 就被过分确定了，因为 M * 也可以被认为是由 P 决定的。 一个强涌现论者强大的紧急事件者可能采取的逃避途径是否认向下的因果关系。然而，这将消除涌现的精神状态必须附加在物理状态上的理由，这反过来会使物理主义受到质疑，因此对于一些哲学家和物理学家来说是难以接受的。

如果 M 是 M * 的原因，那么 M * 就被过分决定了，因为 M * 也可以被认为是由 P 决定的。 一个强涌现论者可能采取的逃避途径是否认向下的因果关系。然而，这将消除涌现的精神状态必须附加在物理状态上的理由，这反过来会使唯物主义受到质疑，因此对于一些哲学家和物理学家来说是难以接受的。

 

 

 

Meanwhile, others have worked towards developing analytical evidence of strong emergence. In 2009, Gu et al. presented a class of physical systems that exhibits non-computable macroscopic properties. More precisely, if one could compute certain macroscopic properties of these systems from the microscopic description of these systems, then one would be able to solve computational problems known to be undecidable in computer science. Gu et al. concluded that

Meanwhile, others have worked towards developing analytical evidence of strong emergence. In 2009, Gu et al. presented a class of physical systems that exhibits non-computable macroscopic properties. More precisely, if one could compute certain macroscopic properties of these systems from the microscopic description of these systems, then one would be able to solve computational problems known to be undecidable in computer science. Gu et al. concluded that

   --[[用户:趣木木|趣木木]]（[[用户讨论:趣木木|讨论]]）探究一下是Gu  是谷还是顾

 

   --[[用户:趣木木|趣木木]]（[[用户讨论:趣木木|讨论]]）探究一下是Gu  是谷还是顾。

<blockquote>Although macroscopic concepts are essential for understanding our world, much of fundamental physics has been devoted to the search for a 'theory of everything', a set of equations that perfectly describe the behavior of all fundamental particles. The view that this is the goal of science rests in part on the rationale that such a theory would allow us to derive the behavior of all macroscopic concepts, at least in principle. The evidence we have presented suggests that this view may be overly optimistic. A 'theory of everything' is one of many components necessary for complete understanding of the universe, but is not necessarily the only one. The development of macroscopic laws from first principles may involve more than just systematic logic, and could require conjectures suggested by experiments, simulations or insight.<ref name="morereally" /></blockquote>

<blockquote>Although macroscopic concepts are essential for understanding our world, much of fundamental physics has been devoted to the search for a 'theory of everything', a set of equations that perfectly describe the behavior of all fundamental particles. The view that this is the goal of science rests in part on the rationale that such a theory would allow us to derive the behavior of all macroscopic concepts, at least in principle. The evidence we have presented suggests that this view may be overly optimistic. A 'theory of everything' is one of many components necessary for complete understanding of the universe, but is not necessarily the only one. The development of macroscopic laws from first principles may involve more than just systematic logic, and could require conjectures suggested by experiments, simulations or insight.<ref name="morereally" /></blockquote>

<blockquote>Although macroscopic concepts are essential for understanding our world, much of fundamental physics has been devoted to the search for a 'theory of everything', a set of equations that perfectly describe the behavior of all fundamental particles. The view that this is the goal of science rests in part on the rationale that such a theory would allow us to derive the behavior of all macroscopic concepts, at least in principle. The evidence we have presented suggests that this view may be overly optimistic. A 'theory of everything' is one of many components necessary for complete understanding of the universe, but is not necessarily the only one. The development of macroscopic laws from first principles may involve more than just systematic logic, and could require conjectures suggested by experiments, simulations or insight.</blockquote>

<blockquote>Although macroscopic concepts are essential for understanding our world, much of fundamental physics has been devoted to the search for a 'theory of everything', a set of equations that perfectly describe the behavior of all fundamental particles. The view that this is the goal of science rests in part on the rationale that such a theory would allow us to derive the behavior of all macroscopic concepts, at least in principle. The evidence we have presented suggests that this view may be overly optimistic. A 'theory of everything' is one of many components necessary for complete understanding of the universe, but is not necessarily the only one. The development of macroscopic laws from first principles may involve more than just systematic logic, and could require conjectures suggested by experiments, simulations or insight.

尽管宏观概念对于理解我们的世界来说是必不可少的，大部分的基础物理学已经致力于寻找一个万有理论，一个完美描述所有基本粒子行为的方程组。这种观点这是科学目标的观点，部分依赖于这样一个理论的基本原理，即这样一个理论将允许我们得出所有宏观概念的行为，至少在原则上是这样的。我们提供的证据表明，这种观点可能过于乐观。“万有理论”是完全理解宇宙所必需的许多要素之一，但不一定是唯一的要素。从第一原理发展宏观定律可能不仅仅涉及系统的逻辑，而且可能需要实验、模拟或洞察力的推测。 / blockquote

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===涌现和相互作用===

===涌现和相互作用===