The prisoner setting may seem contrived, but there are in fact many examples in human interaction as well as interactions in nature that have the same payoff matrix. The prisoner's dilemma is therefore of interest to the [[social science]]s such as [[economics]], [[politics]], and [[sociology]], as well as to the biological sciences such as [[ethology]] and [[evolutionary biology]]. Many natural processes have been abstracted into models in which living beings are engaged in endless games of prisoner's dilemma. This wide applicability of the PD gives the game its substantial importance.
−
−
The prisoner setting may seem contrived, but there are in fact many examples in human interaction as well as interactions in nature that have the same payoff matrix. The prisoner's dilemma is therefore of interest to the social sciences such as economics, politics, and sociology, as well as to the biological sciences such as ethology and evolutionary biology. Many natural processes have been abstracted into models in which living beings are engaged in endless games of prisoner's dilemma. This wide applicability of the PD gives the game its substantial importance.
In [[environmental studies]], the PD is evident in crises such as global [[climate change|climate-change]]. It is argued all countries will benefit from a stable climate, but any single country is often hesitant to curb [[Carbon dioxide|{{Co2}}]] emissions. The immediate benefit to any one country from maintaining current behavior is wrongly perceived to be greater than the purported eventual benefit to that country if all countries' behavior was changed, therefore explaining the impasse concerning climate-change in 2007.<ref>{{cite news|newspaper=[[The Economist]]|url=http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9867020|title=Markets & Data|date=2007-09-27}}</ref>
−
−
In environmental studies, the PD is evident in crises such as global climate-change. It is argued all countries will benefit from a stable climate, but any single country is often hesitant to curb Carbon dioxide| emissions. The immediate benefit to any one country from maintaining current behavior is wrongly perceived to be greater than the purported eventual benefit to that country if all countries' behavior was changed, therefore explaining the impasse concerning climate-change in 2007.
An important difference between climate-change politics and the prisoner's dilemma is uncertainty; the extent and pace at which pollution can change climate is not known. The dilemma faced by government is therefore different from the prisoner's dilemma in that the payoffs of cooperation are unknown. This difference suggests that states will cooperate much less than in a real iterated prisoner's dilemma, so that the probability of avoiding a possible climate catastrophe is much smaller than that suggested by a game-theoretical analysis of the situation using a real iterated prisoner's dilemma.<ref>{{cite web|last=Rehmeyer|first=Julie|title=Game theory suggests current climate negotiations won't avert catastrophe|url=https://www.sciencenews.org/article/game-theory-suggests-current-climate-negotiations-won%E2%80%99t-avert-catastrophe|work=Science News|publisher=Society for Science & the Public|date=2012-10-29}}</ref>
−
−
An important difference between climate-change politics and the prisoner's dilemma is uncertainty; the extent and pace at which pollution can change climate is not known. The dilemma faced by government is therefore different from the prisoner's dilemma in that the payoffs of cooperation are unknown. This difference suggests that states will cooperate much less than in a real iterated prisoner's dilemma, so that the probability of avoiding a possible climate catastrophe is much smaller than that suggested by a game-theoretical analysis of the situation using a real iterated prisoner's dilemma.
气候变化政治与囚徒困境之间的一个重要区别是不确定性; 污染对气候变化的影响程度和速度尚不清楚。因此，政府面临的困境不同于囚徒困境，因为合作的回报是未知的。这种差异表明，各国之间的合作远远少于真正的重复囚徒困境中的合作，因此避免可能发生的气候灾难的可能性远远小于使用真正的重复囚徒困境博弈论情景分析<ref>{{cite web|last=Rehmeyer|first=Julie|title=Game theory suggests current climate negotiations won't avert catastrophe|url=https://www.sciencenews.org/article/game-theory-suggests-current-climate-negotiations-won%E2%80%99t-avert-catastrophe|work=Science News|publisher=Society for Science & the Public|date=2012-10-29}}</ref>
气候变化政治与囚徒困境之间的一个重要区别是不确定性; 污染对气候变化的影响程度和速度尚不清楚。因此，政府面临的困境不同于囚徒困境，因为合作的回报是未知的。这种差异表明，各国之间的合作远远少于真正的重复囚徒困境中的合作，因此避免可能发生的气候灾难的可能性远远小于使用真正的重复囚徒困境博弈论情景分析<ref>{{cite web|last=Rehmeyer|first=Julie|title=Game theory suggests current climate negotiations won't avert catastrophe|url=https://www.sciencenews.org/article/game-theory-suggests-current-climate-negotiations-won%E2%80%99t-avert-catastrophe|work=Science News|publisher=Society for Science & the Public|date=2012-10-29}}</ref>
−
−
Osang and Nandy (2003) provide a theoretical explanation with proofs for a regulation-driven win-win situation along the lines of [[Michael Porter]]'s hypothesis, in which government regulation of competing firms is substantial.<ref>{{cite thesis|type=paper|url= http://faculty.smu.edu/tosang/pdf/regln0803.pdf|first=Thomas|last=Osang|first2=Arundhati|last2=Nandyyz|date=August 2003|title=Environmental Regulation of Polluting Firms: Porter's Hypothesis Revisited}}</ref>
−
−
Osang and Nandy (2003) provide a theoretical explanation with proofs for a regulation-driven win-win situation along the lines of Michael Porter's hypothesis, in which government regulation of competing firms is substantial.
欧桑 Osang和南迪 Nandy (2003)提供了一个理论解释，并根据迈克尔·波特 Michael Porter的假设，即政府对竞争企业的监管是实质性的，证明了监管驱动的双赢局面。<ref>{{cite thesis|type=paper|url= http://faculty.smu.edu/tosang/pdf/regln0803.pdf|first=Thomas|last=Osang|first2=Arundhati|last2=Nandyyz|date=August 2003|title=Environmental Regulation of Polluting Firms: Porter's Hypothesis Revisited}}</ref>
欧桑 Osang和南迪 Nandy (2003)提供了一个理论解释，并根据迈克尔·波特 Michael Porter的假设，即政府对竞争企业的监管是实质性的，证明了监管驱动的双赢局面。<ref>{{cite thesis|type=paper|url= http://faculty.smu.edu/tosang/pdf/regln0803.pdf|first=Thomas|last=Osang|first2=Arundhati|last2=Nandyyz|date=August 2003|title=Environmental Regulation of Polluting Firms: Porter's Hypothesis Revisited}}</ref>
−
+
===动物===
−
===Animals===
−
动物
−
Cooperative behavior of many animals can be understood as an example of the prisoner's dilemma. Often animals engage in long term partnerships, which can be more specifically modeled as iterated prisoner's dilemma. For example, [[guppy|guppies]] inspect predators cooperatively in groups, and they are thought to punish non-cooperative inspectors.
−
−
Cooperative behavior of many animals can be understood as an example of the prisoner's dilemma. Often animals engage in long term partnerships, which can be more specifically modeled as iterated prisoner's dilemma. For example, guppies inspect predators cooperatively in groups, and they are thought to punish non-cooperative inspectors.
吸血蝙蝠是从事相互的食物交换的群居动物。应用囚徒困境收益可以帮助解释这种行为: <ref>{{cite book|last=Dawkins|first=Richard|title=The Selfish Gene|year=1976|publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref>
−
[[Vampire bats]] are social animals that engage in reciprocal food exchange. Applying the payoffs from the prisoner's dilemma can help explain this behavior:<ref>{{cite book|last=Dawkins|first=Richard|title=The Selfish Gene|year=1976|publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref>
−
Vampire bats are social animals that engage in reciprocal food exchange. Applying the payoffs from the prisoner's dilemma can help explain this behavior:
−
−
吸血蝙蝠是从事相互的食物交换的群居动物。应用囚徒困境收益可以帮助解释这种行为: <ref>{{cite book|last=Dawkins|first=Richard|title=The Selfish Gene|year=1976|publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref>
−
−
* C/C: "Reward: I get blood on my unlucky nights, which saves me from starving. I have to give blood on my lucky nights, which doesn't cost me too much."
* D/C: "Temptation: You save my life on my poor night. But then I get the added benefit of not having to pay the slight cost of feeding you on my good night."
* 背叛/合作："诱惑：你在我的不幸的夜里救了我，但在我的幸运夜我不会给你血，那样我会活的更好。"
* 背叛/合作："诱惑：你在我的不幸的夜里救了我，但在我的幸运夜我不会给你血，那样我会活的更好。"
−
* C/D: "Sucker's Payoff: I pay the cost of saving your life on my good night. But on my bad night you don't feed me and I run a real risk of starving to death."
* D/D: "Punishment: I don't have to pay the slight costs of feeding you on my good nights. But I run a real risk of starving on my poor nights."
* 叛变/叛变："惩罚：我在我的幸运夜里不必付出代价来救你，但我在我的不幸夜里有挨饿的风险。"
* 叛变/叛变："惩罚：我在我的幸运夜里不必付出代价来救你，但我在我的不幸夜里有挨饿的风险。"
−
===Psychology===
−
心理学
−
In [[addiction]] research / [[behavioral economics]], [[George Ainslie (psychologist)|George Ainslie]] points out<ref>{{cite book |first=George|last=Ainslie |title=Breakdown of Will |year=2001 |isbn=978-0-521-59694-7}}</ref> that addiction can be cast as an intertemporal PD problem between the present and future selves of the addict. In this case, ''defecting'' means ''relapsing'', and it is easy to see that not defecting both today and in the future is by far the best outcome. The case where one abstains today but relapses in the future is the worst outcome – in some sense the discipline and self-sacrifice involved in abstaining today have been "wasted" because the future relapse means that the addict is right back where he started and will have to start over (which is quite demoralizing, and makes starting over more difficult). Relapsing today and tomorrow is a slightly "better" outcome, because while the addict is still addicted, they haven't put the effort in to trying to stop. The final case, where one engages in the addictive behavior today while abstaining "tomorrow" will be familiar to anyone who has struggled with an addiction. The problem here is that (as in other PDs) there is an obvious benefit to defecting "today", but tomorrow one will face the same PD, and the same obvious benefit will be present then, ultimately leading to an endless string of defections.
−
In addiction research / behavioral economics, George Ainslie points out that addiction can be cast as an intertemporal PD problem between the present and future selves of the addict. In this case, defecting means relapsing, and it is easy to see that not defecting both today and in the future is by far the best outcome. The case where one abstains today but relapses in the future is the worst outcome – in some sense the discipline and self-sacrifice involved in abstaining today have been "wasted" because the future relapse means that the addict is right back where he started and will have to start over (which is quite demoralizing, and makes starting over more difficult). Relapsing today and tomorrow is a slightly "better" outcome, because while the addict is still addicted, they haven't put the effort in to trying to stop. The final case, where one engages in the addictive behavior today while abstaining "tomorrow" will be familiar to anyone who has struggled with an addiction. The problem here is that (as in other PDs) there is an obvious benefit to defecting "today", but tomorrow one will face the same PD, and the same obvious benefit will be present then, ultimately leading to an endless string of defections.
+
===心理学===
在成瘾研究/行为经济学中，乔治·安斯利 George Ainslie指出<ref>{{cite book |first=George|last=Ainslie |title=Breakdown of Will |year=2001 |isbn=978-0-521-59694-7}}</ref>，可以将成瘾视为成瘾者现在和未来自我之间的跨期囚徒困境问题。在这种情况下，背叛意味着复发，很容易看出，目前和未来都没有背叛是迄今为止最好的结果。如果一个人今天戒了，但在将来又复吸，这是最糟糕的结果 –从某种意义上来说，今天戒瘾所包含的纪律和自我牺牲已经被“浪费”了，因为未来的复吸意味着瘾君子又回到了他开始的地方，他将被迫重新开始(这相当令人沮丧，也使得重新开始更加困难)。今天和明天复发是一个稍微“好一点”的结果，因为尽管瘾君子仍然上瘾，但他们没有努力去尝试停止。最后一种情况是，现在与成瘾斗争的任何人都会熟悉现在的成瘾行为，而在明天放弃。这里的问题是(和其他囚徒困境问题一样)，背叛“今天”有一个明显的好处，但明天这个人将面临同样的囚徒困境问题，同样明显的好处是背叛，最终导致一连串无休止的背叛。
在成瘾研究/行为经济学中，乔治·安斯利 George Ainslie指出<ref>{{cite book |first=George|last=Ainslie |title=Breakdown of Will |year=2001 |isbn=978-0-521-59694-7}}</ref>，可以将成瘾视为成瘾者现在和未来自我之间的跨期囚徒困境问题。在这种情况下，背叛意味着复发，很容易看出，目前和未来都没有背叛是迄今为止最好的结果。如果一个人今天戒了，但在将来又复吸，这是最糟糕的结果 –从某种意义上来说，今天戒瘾所包含的纪律和自我牺牲已经被“浪费”了，因为未来的复吸意味着瘾君子又回到了他开始的地方，他将被迫重新开始(这相当令人沮丧，也使得重新开始更加困难)。今天和明天复发是一个稍微“好一点”的结果，因为尽管瘾君子仍然上瘾，但他们没有努力去尝试停止。最后一种情况是，现在与成瘾斗争的任何人都会熟悉现在的成瘾行为，而在明天放弃。这里的问题是(和其他囚徒困境问题一样)，背叛“今天”有一个明显的好处，但明天这个人将面临同样的囚徒困境问题，同样明显的好处是背叛，最终导致一连串无休止的背叛。
−
+
约翰·高特曼 John Gottman在他的研究《信任的科学 the science of trust》中将良好的关系定义为伙伴知道不进入(背叛，背叛)牢房中或者至少不要陷入这样的动态循环关系中。
−
[[John Gottman]] in his research described in "the science of trust" defines good relationships as those where partners know not to enter the (D,D) cell or at least not to get dynamically stuck there in a loop.
−
−
John Gottman in his research described in "the science of trust" defines good relationships as those where partners know not to enter the (D,D) cell or at least not to get dynamically stuck there in a loop.
−
−
约翰·高特曼 John Gottman在他的研究《信任的科学》中将良好的关系定义为伙伴知道不进入(背叛，背叛)牢房中或者至少不要陷入这样的动态循环关系中。
−
−
===Economics===
−
经济学
−
The prisoner's dilemma has been called the ''[[Escherichia coli|E. coli]]'' of social psychology, and it has been used widely to research various topics such as [[Oligopoly|oligopolistic]] competition and collective action to produce a collective good.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Axelrod|first=Robert|date=1980|title=Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma|journal=The Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=24|issue=1|pages=3–25|issn=0022-0027|jstor=173932|doi=10.1177/002200278002400101|url=https://semanticscholar.org/paper/fd1ab82470446bfb12c39f0c577644291027cf76}}</ref>
−
The prisoner's dilemma has been called the E. coli of social psychology, and it has been used widely to research various topics such as oligopolistic competition and collective action to produce a collective good.
+
===经济学===
囚徒困境被称为社会心理学中的“大肠杆菌”，它被广泛用于研究寡头垄断竞争和集体行动来产生集体利益等问题。<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Axelrod|first=Robert|date=1980|title=Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma|journal=The Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=24|issue=1|pages=3–25|issn=0022-0027|jstor=173932|doi=10.1177/002200278002400101|url=https://semanticscholar.org/paper/fd1ab82470446bfb12c39f0c577644291027cf76}}</ref>
囚徒困境被称为社会心理学中的“大肠杆菌”，它被广泛用于研究寡头垄断竞争和集体行动来产生集体利益等问题。<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Axelrod|first=Robert|date=1980|title=Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma|journal=The Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=24|issue=1|pages=3–25|issn=0022-0027|jstor=173932|doi=10.1177/002200278002400101|url=https://semanticscholar.org/paper/fd1ab82470446bfb12c39f0c577644291027cf76}}</ref>
−
−
−
Advertising is sometimes cited as a real-example of the prisoner's dilemma. When [[cigarette advertising]] was legal in the United States, competing cigarette manufacturers had to decide how much money to spend on advertising. The effectiveness of Firm A's advertising was partially determined by the advertising conducted by Firm B. Likewise, the profit derived from advertising for Firm B is affected by the advertising conducted by Firm A. If both Firm A and Firm B chose to advertise during a given period, then the advertisement from each firm negates the other's, receipts remain constant, and expenses increase due to the cost of advertising. Both firms would benefit from a reduction in advertising. However, should Firm B choose not to advertise, Firm A could benefit greatly by advertising. Nevertheless, the optimal amount of advertising by one firm depends on how much advertising the other undertakes. As the best strategy is dependent on what the other firm chooses there is no dominant strategy, which makes it slightly different from a prisoner's dilemma. The outcome is similar, though, in that both firms would be better off were they to advertise less than in the equilibrium. Sometimes cooperative behaviors do emerge in business situations. For instance, cigarette manufacturers endorsed the making of laws banning cigarette advertising, understanding that this would reduce costs and increase profits across the industry. <ref>{{Citation needed|reason=This reference doesn't mention or support the claimed historical account.|date=December 2012}}</ref><ref>{{efn|1=This argument for the development of cooperation through trust is given in ''[[The Wisdom of Crowds]]'', where it is argued that long-distance [[capitalism]] was able to form around a nucleus of [[Religious Society of Friends|Quakers]], who always dealt honourably with their business partners. (Rather than defecting and reneging on promises – a phenomenon that had discouraged earlier long-term unenforceable overseas contracts). It is argued that dealings with reliable merchants allowed the [[meme]] for cooperation to spread to other traders, who spread it further until a high degree of cooperation became a profitable strategy in general [[commerce]]}} </ref> This analysis is likely to be pertinent in many other business situations involving advertising. <ref>{{Citation needed|reason=This doesn't sound like cooperation|date=November 2012}}</ref>
−
−
Advertising is sometimes cited as a real-example of the prisoner's dilemma. When cigarette advertising was legal in the United States, competing cigarette manufacturers had to decide how much money to spend on advertising. The effectiveness of Firm A's advertising was partially determined by the advertising conducted by Firm B. Likewise, the profit derived from advertising for Firm B is affected by the advertising conducted by Firm A. If both Firm A and Firm B chose to advertise during a given period, then the advertisement from each firm negates the other's, receipts remain constant, and expenses increase due to the cost of advertising. Both firms would benefit from a reduction in advertising. However, should Firm B choose not to advertise, Firm A could benefit greatly by advertising. Nevertheless, the optimal amount of advertising by one firm depends on how much advertising the other undertakes. As the best strategy is dependent on what the other firm chooses there is no dominant strategy, which makes it slightly different from a prisoner's dilemma. The outcome is similar, though, in that both firms would be better off were they to advertise less than in the equilibrium. Sometimes cooperative behaviors do emerge in business situations. For instance, cigarette manufacturers endorsed the making of laws banning cigarette advertising, understanding that this would reduce costs and increase profits across the industry. This analysis is likely to be pertinent in many other business situations involving advertising.
广告有时被认为是囚徒困境的一个真实例子。当香烟广告在美国是合法的时候，相互竞争的香烟制造商必须决定在广告上花多少钱。公司A的广告效果部分取决于公司B的广告效果。同样，公司B的广告带来的利润也受到公司A的广告影响。如果公司A和公司B都选择在给定的时间段内做广告，那么一家公司的广告就会抵消另一方的广告，倘若收入保持不变，费用就会因广告成本而增加。两家公司都将从广告减少中获益。然而，如果B公司选择不做广告，A公司就可以通过广告获得巨大的利益。尽管如此，一家公司的最佳广告数量仍取决于另一家公司的广告投放量。由于最佳策略取决于其他公司的选择，因此这里没有占主导地位的策略，这使得它与囚徒困境略有不同。但结果是相似的，如果两家公司的广告都少于均衡状态，他们的处境会更好。有时合作行为确实会在商业环境中出现。例如，香烟制造商支持立法禁止香烟广告，因为这将降低成本并增加整个行业的利润。<ref>{{Citation needed|reason=This reference doesn't mention or support the claimed historical account.|date=December 2012}}</ref><ref>{{efn|1=This argument for the development of cooperation through trust is given in ''[[The Wisdom of Crowds]]'', where it is argued that long-distance [[capitalism]] was able to form around a nucleus of [[Religious Society of Friends|Quakers]], who always dealt honourably with their business partners. (Rather than defecting and reneging on promises – a phenomenon that had discouraged earlier long-term unenforceable overseas contracts). It is argued that dealings with reliable merchants allowed the [[meme]] for cooperation to spread to other traders, who spread it further until a high degree of cooperation became a profitable strategy in general [[commerce]]}} </ref>这种分析可能适用于许多其他涉及广告的商业情况。<ref>{{Citation needed|reason=This doesn't sound like cooperation|date=November 2012}}</ref>
广告有时被认为是囚徒困境的一个真实例子。当香烟广告在美国是合法的时候，相互竞争的香烟制造商必须决定在广告上花多少钱。公司A的广告效果部分取决于公司B的广告效果。同样，公司B的广告带来的利润也受到公司A的广告影响。如果公司A和公司B都选择在给定的时间段内做广告，那么一家公司的广告就会抵消另一方的广告，倘若收入保持不变，费用就会因广告成本而增加。两家公司都将从广告减少中获益。然而，如果B公司选择不做广告，A公司就可以通过广告获得巨大的利益。尽管如此，一家公司的最佳广告数量仍取决于另一家公司的广告投放量。由于最佳策略取决于其他公司的选择，因此这里没有占主导地位的策略，这使得它与囚徒困境略有不同。但结果是相似的，如果两家公司的广告都少于均衡状态，他们的处境会更好。有时合作行为确实会在商业环境中出现。例如，香烟制造商支持立法禁止香烟广告，因为这将降低成本并增加整个行业的利润。<ref>{{Citation needed|reason=This reference doesn't mention or support the claimed historical account.|date=December 2012}}</ref><ref>{{efn|1=This argument for the development of cooperation through trust is given in ''[[The Wisdom of Crowds]]'', where it is argued that long-distance [[capitalism]] was able to form around a nucleus of [[Religious Society of Friends|Quakers]], who always dealt honourably with their business partners. (Rather than defecting and reneging on promises – a phenomenon that had discouraged earlier long-term unenforceable overseas contracts). It is argued that dealings with reliable merchants allowed the [[meme]] for cooperation to spread to other traders, who spread it further until a high degree of cooperation became a profitable strategy in general [[commerce]]}} </ref>这种分析可能适用于许多其他涉及广告的商业情况。<ref>{{Citation needed|reason=This doesn't sound like cooperation|date=November 2012}}</ref>
−
−
−
Without enforceable agreements, members of a [[cartel]] are also involved in a (multi-player) prisoner's dilemma.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Nicholson|first=Walter|year=2000|title=Intermediate microeconomics and its application|edition=8th|location=Fort Worth, TX|publisher=Dryden Press : Harcourt College Publishers|isbn=978-0-030-25916-6}}</ref> 'Cooperating' typically means keeping prices at a pre-agreed minimum level. 'Defecting' means selling under this minimum level, instantly taking business (and profits) from other cartel members. [[Anti-trust]] authorities want potential cartel members to mutually defect, ensuring the lowest possible prices for [[consumer]]s.
−
−
Without enforceable agreements, members of a cartel are also involved in a (multi-player) prisoner's dilemma. 'Cooperating' typically means keeping prices at a pre-agreed minimum level. 'Defecting' means selling under this minimum level, instantly taking business (and profits) from other cartel members. Anti-trust authorities want potential cartel members to mutually defect, ensuring the lowest possible prices for consumers.
没有可强制执行的协议，卡特尔 cartel的成员国也会陷入(多玩家)囚徒困境。<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Nicholson|first=Walter|year=2000|title=Intermediate microeconomics and its application|edition=8th|location=Fort Worth, TX|publisher=Dryden Press : Harcourt College Publishers|isbn=978-0-030-25916-6}}</ref> “合作”通常意味着将价格保持在预先商定的最低水平。“背叛”意味着低于最低价格水平销售，并立即从其他卡特尔成员那里获得业务(和利润)。反垄断机构希望潜在的卡特尔成员相互背叛，确保消费者获得尽可能低的价格。
没有可强制执行的协议，卡特尔 cartel的成员国也会陷入(多玩家)囚徒困境。<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Nicholson|first=Walter|year=2000|title=Intermediate microeconomics and its application|edition=8th|location=Fort Worth, TX|publisher=Dryden Press : Harcourt College Publishers|isbn=978-0-030-25916-6}}</ref> “合作”通常意味着将价格保持在预先商定的最低水平。“背叛”意味着低于最低价格水平销售，并立即从其他卡特尔成员那里获得业务(和利润)。反垄断机构希望潜在的卡特尔成员相互背叛，确保消费者获得尽可能低的价格。
第370行：
第316行：
−
===Sport===
+
===运动Sport===
−
运动
−
[[Doping in sport]] has been cited as an example of a prisoner's dilemma.<ref name="wired">{{cite journal|last=Schneier |first=Bruce |url=https://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/10/lance-armstrong-and-the-prisoners-dilemma-of-doping-in-professional-sports/ |title=Lance Armstrong and the Prisoners' Dilemma of Doping in Professional Sports | Wired Opinion |journal=Wired |publisher=Wired.com |date=2012-10-26 |accessdate=2012-10-29}}</ref>
−
−
Doping in sport has been cited as an example of a prisoner's dilemma.
体育运动中的兴奋剂被认为是囚徒困境的一个例子。<ref name="wired">{{cite journal|last=Schneier |first=Bruce |url=https://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/10/lance-armstrong-and-the-prisoners-dilemma-of-doping-in-professional-sports/ |title=Lance Armstrong and the Prisoners' Dilemma of Doping in Professional Sports | Wired Opinion |journal=Wired |publisher=Wired.com |date=2012-10-26 |accessdate=2012-10-29}}</ref>
体育运动中的兴奋剂被认为是囚徒困境的一个例子。<ref name="wired">{{cite journal|last=Schneier |first=Bruce |url=https://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/10/lance-armstrong-and-the-prisoners-dilemma-of-doping-in-professional-sports/ |title=Lance Armstrong and the Prisoners' Dilemma of Doping in Professional Sports | Wired Opinion |journal=Wired |publisher=Wired.com |date=2012-10-26 |accessdate=2012-10-29}}</ref>
−
−
−
Two competing athletes have the option to use an illegal and/or dangerous drug to boost their performance. If neither athlete takes the drug, then neither gains an advantage. If only one does, then that athlete gains a significant advantage over their competitor, reduced by the legal and/or medical dangers of having taken the drug. If both athletes take the drug, however, the benefits cancel out and only the dangers remain, putting them both in a worse position than if neither had used doping.<ref name="wired" />
−
−
Two competing athletes have the option to use an illegal and/or dangerous drug to boost their performance. If neither athlete takes the drug, then neither gains an advantage. If only one does, then that athlete gains a significant advantage over their competitor, reduced by the legal and/or medical dangers of having taken the drug. If both athletes take the drug, however, the benefits cancel out and only the dangers remain, putting them both in a worse position than if neither had used doping.
In [[international politics|international political theory]], the Prisoner's Dilemma is often used to demonstrate the coherence of [[strategic realism]], which holds that in international relations, all states (regardless of their internal policies or professed ideology), will act in their rational self-interest given [[anarchy (international relations)|international anarchy]]. A classic example is an arms race like the [[Cold War]] and similar conflicts.<ref>{{cite journal| title = Arms races as iterated prisoner's dilemma games | author = Stephen J. Majeski | journal = Mathematical and Social Sciences | volume = 7 | issue = 3 | pages = 253–66 | year = 1984 | doi=10.1016/0165-4896(84)90022-2}}</ref> During the Cold War the opposing alliances of [[NATO]] and the [[Warsaw Pact]] both had the choice to arm or disarm. From each side's point of view, disarming whilst their opponent continued to arm would have led to military inferiority and possible annihilation. Conversely, arming whilst their opponent disarmed would have led to superiority. If both sides chose to arm, neither could afford to attack the other, but both incurred the high cost of developing and maintaining a nuclear arsenal. If both sides chose to disarm, war would be avoided and there would be no costs.
−
−
In international political theory, the Prisoner's Dilemma is often used to demonstrate the coherence of strategic realism, which holds that in international relations, all states (regardless of their internal policies or professed ideology), will act in their rational self-interest given international anarchy. A classic example is an arms race like the Cold War and similar conflicts. During the Cold War the opposing alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact both had the choice to arm or disarm. From each side's point of view, disarming whilst their opponent continued to arm would have led to military inferiority and possible annihilation. Conversely, arming whilst their opponent disarmed would have led to superiority. If both sides chose to arm, neither could afford to attack the other, but both incurred the high cost of developing and maintaining a nuclear arsenal. If both sides chose to disarm, war would be avoided and there would be no costs.
在国际政治理论中，囚徒困境经常被用来证明战略现实主义的一致性，这种战略现实主义认为，在国际关系中，由于国际无政府状态，所有国家(无论其国内政策或公开宣称的意识形态如何)都会为了自身的理性利益来行动。一个典型的例子是类似冷战和类似冲突的军备竞赛。<ref>{{cite journal| title = Arms races as iterated prisoner's dilemma games | author = Stephen J. Majeski | journal = Mathematical and Social Sciences | volume = 7 | issue = 3 | pages = 253–66 | year = 1984 | doi=10.1016/0165-4896(84)90022-2}}</ref>在冷战期间，北约和华约组织的对立联盟都可以选择武装或解除武装。从双方的观点来看，解除武装而对手继续武装可能会导致军事劣势和被歼灭。相反，如果选择武装而对手已经解除了武装，那么就会获得优势。如果双方都选择武装自己，那么任何一方都承担不起攻击对方的代价，但是双方都为发展和维持核武库付出了高昂的代价。如果双方都选择裁军，战争就可以避免，也不会有任何代价。
在国际政治理论中，囚徒困境经常被用来证明战略现实主义的一致性，这种战略现实主义认为，在国际关系中，由于国际无政府状态，所有国家(无论其国内政策或公开宣称的意识形态如何)都会为了自身的理性利益来行动。一个典型的例子是类似冷战和类似冲突的军备竞赛。<ref>{{cite journal| title = Arms races as iterated prisoner's dilemma games | author = Stephen J. Majeski | journal = Mathematical and Social Sciences | volume = 7 | issue = 3 | pages = 253–66 | year = 1984 | doi=10.1016/0165-4896(84)90022-2}}</ref>在冷战期间，北约和华约组织的对立联盟都可以选择武装或解除武装。从双方的观点来看，解除武装而对手继续武装可能会导致军事劣势和被歼灭。相反，如果选择武装而对手已经解除了武装，那么就会获得优势。如果双方都选择武装自己，那么任何一方都承担不起攻击对方的代价，但是双方都为发展和维持核武库付出了高昂的代价。如果双方都选择裁军，战争就可以避免，也不会有任何代价。
−
−
−
Although the 'best' overall outcome is for both sides to disarm, the rational course for both sides is to arm, and this is indeed what happened. Both sides poured enormous resources into military research and armament in a [[War of attrition (game)|war of attrition]] for the next thirty years until the Soviet Union could not withstand the economic cost.<ref>{{Citation|last=Kuhn|first=Steven|title=Prisoner's Dilemma|date=2019|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/prisoner-dilemma/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2019|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2020-04-12}}</ref> The same logic could be applied in any similar scenario, be it economic or technological competition between sovereign states.
−
−
Although the 'best' overall outcome is for both sides to disarm, the rational course for both sides is to arm, and this is indeed what happened. Both sides poured enormous resources into military research and armament in a war of attrition for the next thirty years until the Soviet Union could not withstand the economic cost. The same logic could be applied in any similar scenario, be it economic or technological competition between sovereign states.
虽然最好的结果是双方解除武装，但是双方的理性选择是武装起来，事实也的确如此。在接下来的三十年里，双方都在军事研究和武器装备的消耗战上投入了大量的资源，直到苏联无法承受经济损失。<ref>{{Citation|last=Kuhn|first=Steven|title=Prisoner's Dilemma|date=2019|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/prisoner-dilemma/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2019|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2020-04-12}}</ref>同样的逻辑也适用于任何类似的情况，无论是主权国家之间的经济竞争还是技术竞争。
虽然最好的结果是双方解除武装，但是双方的理性选择是武装起来，事实也的确如此。在接下来的三十年里，双方都在军事研究和武器装备的消耗战上投入了大量的资源，直到苏联无法承受经济损失。<ref>{{Citation|last=Kuhn|first=Steven|title=Prisoner's Dilemma|date=2019|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/prisoner-dilemma/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2019|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2020-04-12}}</ref>同样的逻辑也适用于任何类似的情况，无论是主权国家之间的经济竞争还是技术竞争。
Many real-life dilemmas involve multiple players.<ref>Gokhale CS, Traulsen A. Evolutionary games in the multiverse. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2010 Mar 23. 107(12):5500–04.</ref> Although metaphorical, [[Garrett Hardin|Hardin's]] [[tragedy of the commons]] may be viewed as an example of a multi-player generalization of the PD: Each villager makes a choice for personal gain or restraint. The collective reward for unanimous (or even frequent) defection is very low payoffs (representing the destruction of the "commons"). A commons dilemma most people can relate to is washing the dishes in a shared house. By not washing dishes an individual can gain by saving his time, but if that behavior is adopted by every resident the collective cost is no clean plates for anyone.
−
−
Many real-life dilemmas involve multiple players. Although metaphorical, Hardin's tragedy of the commons may be viewed as an example of a multi-player generalization of the PD: Each villager makes a choice for personal gain or restraint. The collective reward for unanimous (or even frequent) defection is very low payoffs (representing the destruction of the "commons"). A commons dilemma most people can relate to is washing the dishes in a shared house. By not washing dishes an individual can gain by saving his time, but if that behavior is adopted by every resident the collective cost is no clean plates for anyone.
许多现实生活中的困境牵涉到多个参与者。<ref>Gokhale CS, Traulsen A. Evolutionary games in the multiverse. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2010 Mar 23. 107(12):5500–04.</ref>尽管具有隐喻性，但哈丁的<font color="#ff8000">公地悲剧 tragedy of the commons</font>可以看作是囚徒困境多个参与者的一个例子: 每个村民做出选择是为了个人利益还是克制。对于一致(甚至频繁)叛变的集体回报是非常低的(代表了对“公共资源”的破坏)。大多数人可能会遇到的公地困境是在一个共用的房子里洗碗。通过不洗碗，个人可以节省时间，但如果每个居民都选择这种行为，那么集体的代价是任何人都没有干净的盘子。
许多现实生活中的困境牵涉到多个参与者。<ref>Gokhale CS, Traulsen A. Evolutionary games in the multiverse. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2010 Mar 23. 107(12):5500–04.</ref>尽管具有隐喻性，但哈丁的<font color="#ff8000">公地悲剧 tragedy of the commons</font>可以看作是囚徒困境多个参与者的一个例子: 每个村民做出选择是为了个人利益还是克制。对于一致(甚至频繁)叛变的集体回报是非常低的(代表了对“公共资源”的破坏)。大多数人可能会遇到的公地困境是在一个共用的房子里洗碗。通过不洗碗，个人可以节省时间，但如果每个居民都选择这种行为，那么集体的代价是任何人都没有干净的盘子。
−
−
−
The commons are not always exploited: [[William Poundstone]], in a book about the prisoner's dilemma (see References below), describes a situation in New Zealand where newspaper boxes are left unlocked. It is possible for people to [[Excludability|take a paper without paying]] (''defecting'') but very few do, feeling that if they do not pay then neither will others, destroying the system. Subsequent research by [[Elinor Ostrom]], winner of the 2009 [[Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences]], hypothesized that the tragedy of the commons is oversimplified, with the negative outcome influenced by outside influences. Without complicating pressures, groups communicate and manage the commons among themselves for their mutual benefit, enforcing social norms to preserve the resource and achieve the maximum good for the group, an example of effecting the best case outcome for PD.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://volokh.com/2009/10/12/elinor-ostrom-and-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/ |title=The Volokh Conspiracy " Elinor Ostrom and the Tragedy of the Commons |publisher=Volokh.com |date=2009-10-12 |accessdate=2011-12-17}}</ref>
−
−
The commons are not always exploited: William Poundstone, in a book about the prisoner's dilemma (see References below), describes a situation in New Zealand where newspaper boxes are left unlocked. It is possible for people to take a paper without paying (defecting) but very few do, feeling that if they do not pay then neither will others, destroying the system. Subsequent research by Elinor Ostrom, winner of the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, hypothesized that the tragedy of the commons is oversimplified, with the negative outcome influenced by outside influences. Without complicating pressures, groups communicate and manage the commons among themselves for their mutual benefit, enforcing social norms to preserve the resource and achieve the maximum good for the group, an example of effecting the best case outcome for PD.
公共资源并不总是被利用: 威廉·庞德斯通 William Poundstone在一本关于囚徒困境的书(见下文参考文献)中描述了新西兰的一种情况，信箱没有上锁。人们可以不付钱就拿报纸(背叛) ，但很少有人这样做，他们觉得如果他们不付钱，那么其他人也不会付钱，这会摧毁整个系统。2009年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆 Elinor Ostrom随后的研究认为公地悲剧过于简单化，其负面结果会受到外部影响。在没有复杂压力的情况下，团体之间为了共同利益进行沟通和管理，执行社会规范以保护资源并为团体实现最大利益，这是实现囚徒困境最佳结果的一个例子。<ref>{{cite web|url=http://volokh.com/2009/10/12/elinor-ostrom-and-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/ |title=The Volokh Conspiracy " Elinor Ostrom and the Tragedy of the Commons |publisher=Volokh.com |date=2009-10-12 |accessdate=2011-12-17}}</ref>
公共资源并不总是被利用: 威廉·庞德斯通 William Poundstone在一本关于囚徒困境的书(见下文参考文献)中描述了新西兰的一种情况，信箱没有上锁。人们可以不付钱就拿报纸(背叛) ，但很少有人这样做，他们觉得如果他们不付钱，那么其他人也不会付钱，这会摧毁整个系统。2009年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆 Elinor Ostrom随后的研究认为公地悲剧过于简单化，其负面结果会受到外部影响。在没有复杂压力的情况下，团体之间为了共同利益进行沟通和管理，执行社会规范以保护资源并为团体实现最大利益，这是实现囚徒困境最佳结果的一个例子。<ref>{{cite web|url=http://volokh.com/2009/10/12/elinor-ostrom-and-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/ |title=The Volokh Conspiracy " Elinor Ostrom and the Tragedy of the Commons |publisher=Volokh.com |date=2009-10-12 |accessdate=2011-12-17}}</ref>
回报关系[math]\displaystyle{ R \gt P }[/math]意味着相互合作优于相互背叛，然而回报关系[math]\displaystyle{ T \gt R }[/math]和[math]\displaystyle{ P \gt S }[/math]也意味着相互背叛是双方的占优策略。
罗伯特·阿克塞尔罗德 Robert Axelrod在他的著作《合作的进化 The Evolution of Cooperation》(1984)中激起了人们对重复囚徒困境(IPD)的兴趣。在这篇文章中，他报道了自己组织的固定N次囚徒困境的比赛，参与者必须一次又一次地选择他们的共同策略，并且要记住他们之前的遭遇。Axelrod邀请世界各地的学术界同仁设计计算机策略来参加IPD锦标赛。输入的程序在算法复杂性、最初敌意、宽恕能力等方面有很大差异。
在随机重复囚徒困境博弈中，策略由“合作概率”来确定。[18]在玩家X和玩家Y之间的遭遇中，X的策略由一组与Y合作的概率P确定，P是他们之前遭遇的结果的函数，或者是其中的一些子集。如果P只是它们最近遇到次数 n的函数，那么它被称为“记忆-n”策略。我们可以由四个联合概率指定一个记忆-1策略: [math]\displaystyle{ P=\{P_{cc},P_{cd},P_{dc},P_{dd}\} }[/math]，其中[math]\displaystyle{ P_{ab} }[/math]是在当前遭遇中基于先前联合的概率。如果每个概率都是1或0，这种策略称为确定性策略。确定性策略的一个例子是针锋相对策略，写成 p {1,0,1,0} ，其中 x 的反应和 y 在前一次遭遇中的反应一样。另一种是胜-保持-败-转换策略，它被写成 p {1,0,0,1} ，在这种策略中，如果 x 获得胜利(即:cc 或 dc)，x会做出与上一次遭遇一样的反应 ，但如果失败，x会改变策略(即cd 或 dd)。研究表明，对于任何一种记忆-n 策略，存在一个相应的记忆-1策略，这个策略给出相同的统计结果，因此只需要考虑记忆-1策略。[18]
随机理论的一个结果是，矩阵M存在一个平稳向量v使得[math]\displaystyle{ v\cdot M=v }[/math]成立。一般地，我们可以指定v是标准化的，因此它的4个组成部分之和为1。the equilibrium payoffs for and can now be specified as and, allowing the two strategies P and Q to be compared for their long term payoffs.第ij项[math]\displaystyle{ M^n }[/math]给出了X和Y相遇的结果的概率为j，给定前面相遇n步的概率是i。当n趋于无穷时，M收敛于一个具有固定值的矩阵，并且j趋向一个长期概率，与i独立。换句话说， [math]\displaystyle{ M^\infty }[/math]的行将是相同的，从而给出了重复囚徒困境的长期均衡结果概率，而不需要明确地计算大量的相互作用。可以看出，v是[math]\displaystyle{ M^n }[/math]特别是[math]\displaystyle{ M^\infty }[/math], 的平稳向量，因此[math]\displaystyle{ M^\infty }[/math]的每一行都等于v。因此平稳向量指定了X的均衡结果概率。定义[math]\displaystyle{ S_x=\{R,S,T,P\} }[/math]和[math]\displaystyle{ S_y=\{R,T,S,P\} }[/math]作为{cc,cd,dc,dd}结果的短期收益向量(从X的角度来看) ，现在可以将X和Y的均衡收益指定为[math]\displaystyle{ s_x=v\cdot S_x }[/math]和[math]\displaystyle{ s_y=v\cdot S_y }[/math]，使得P、Q两种策略的长期收益可以比较。
虽然勒索零决定策略在人口众多的情况下并不稳定，但另一种宽松的零决定策略既稳定又稳健。事实上，当人口不算太少的时候，这些策略可以取代任何其他零决定策略，甚至在一系列针对重复囚徒困境的广泛通用策略（包括“获胜-保持-输”的转换策略）中表现良好。亚历山大·斯图尔特 Alexander Stewart和约书亚·普洛特金 Joshua Plotkin在2013年的捐赠博弈中证明了这一点。[20]宽松的策略会与其他合作的玩家合作，面对背叛，慷慨的玩家比他的对手失去更多的效用。宽松策略是零决定策略和所谓的“好”策略的交集，阿金(2013) [21] Among good strategies, the generous (ZD) subset performs well when the population is not too small. If the population is very small, defection strategies tend to dominate.将这两种策略定义为玩家对过去的相互合作作出回应，并在至少获得合作预期收益的情况下平均分配预期收益的策略。在好的策略中，当总体不太小时，宽松(零决定)子集表现良好。如果总体很少，背叛策略往往占主导地位。[20]
在成瘾研究/行为经济学中，乔治·安斯利 George Ainslie指出[30]，可以将成瘾视为成瘾者现在和未来自我之间的跨期囚徒困境问题。在这种情况下，背叛意味着复发，很容易看出，目前和未来都没有背叛是迄今为止最好的结果。如果一个人今天戒了，但在将来又复吸，这是最糟糕的结果 –从某种意义上来说，今天戒瘾所包含的纪律和自我牺牲已经被“浪费”了，因为未来的复吸意味着瘾君子又回到了他开始的地方，他将被迫重新开始(这相当令人沮丧，也使得重新开始更加困难)。今天和明天复发是一个稍微“好一点”的结果，因为尽管瘾君子仍然上瘾，但他们没有努力去尝试停止。最后一种情况是，现在与成瘾斗争的任何人都会熟悉现在的成瘾行为，而在明天放弃。这里的问题是(和其他囚徒困境问题一样)，背叛“今天”有一个明显的好处，但明天这个人将面临同样的囚徒困境问题，同样明显的好处是背叛，最终导致一连串无休止的背叛。
约翰·高特曼 John Gottman在他的研究《信任的科学 the science of trust》中将良好的关系定义为伙伴知道不进入(背叛，背叛)牢房中或者至少不要陷入这样的动态循环关系中。
许多现实生活中的困境牵涉到多个参与者。[39]尽管具有隐喻性，但哈丁的公地悲剧 tragedy of the commons可以看作是囚徒困境多个参与者的一个例子: 每个村民做出选择是为了个人利益还是克制。对于一致(甚至频繁)叛变的集体回报是非常低的(代表了对“公共资源”的破坏)。大多数人可能会遇到的公地困境是在一个共用的房子里洗碗。通过不洗碗，个人可以节省时间，但如果每个居民都选择这种行为，那么集体的代价是任何人都没有干净的盘子。
公共资源并不总是被利用: 威廉·庞德斯通 William Poundstone在一本关于囚徒困境的书(见下文参考文献)中描述了新西兰的一种情况，信箱没有上锁。人们可以不付钱就拿报纸(背叛) ，但很少有人这样做，他们觉得如果他们不付钱，那么其他人也不会付钱，这会摧毁整个系统。2009年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆 Elinor Ostrom随后的研究认为公地悲剧过于简单化，其负面结果会受到外部影响。在没有复杂压力的情况下，团体之间为了共同利益进行沟通和管理，执行社会规范以保护资源并为团体实现最大利益，这是实现囚徒困境最佳结果的一个例子。[40]
Douglas Hofstadter[41] once suggested that people often find problems such as the PD problem easier to understand when it is illustrated in the form of a simple game, or trade-off. One of several examples he used was "closed bag exchange":
Douglas Hofstadter once suggested that people often find problems such as the PD problem easier to understand when it is illustrated in the form of a simple game, or trade-off. One of several examples he used was "closed bag exchange":
侯世达 Douglas Hofstadter [41]曾经指出，人们通常会发现诸如囚徒困境的问题，比如，当它以一个简单囚徒困境博弈的形式，或者以权衡的方式表现出来时，会更容易理解。他使用的几个例子之一是“封闭袋子交换” :
朋友还是敌人？
Friend or Foe? is a game show that aired from 2002 to 2005 on the Game Show Network in the US. It is an example of the prisoner's dilemma game tested on real people, but in an artificial setting. On the game show, three pairs of people compete. When a pair is eliminated, they play a game similar to the prisoner's dilemma to determine how the winnings are split. If they both cooperate (Friend), they share the winnings 50–50. If one cooperates and the other defects (Foe), the defector gets all the winnings and the cooperator gets nothing. If both defect, both leave with nothing. Notice that the reward matrix is slightly different from the standard one given above, as the rewards for the "both defect" and the "cooperate while the opponent defects" cases are identical. This makes the "both defect" case a weak equilibrium, compared with being a strict equilibrium in the standard prisoner's dilemma. If a contestant knows that their opponent is going to vote "Foe", then their own choice does not affect their own winnings. In a specific sense, Friend or Foe has a rewards model between prisoner's dilemma and the game of Chicken.
Friend or Foe? is a game show that aired from 2002 to 2005 on the Game Show Network in the US. It is an example of the prisoner's dilemma game tested on real people, but in an artificial setting. On the game show, three pairs of people compete. When a pair is eliminated, they play a game similar to the prisoner's dilemma to determine how the winnings are split. If they both cooperate (Friend), they share the winnings 50–50. If one cooperates and the other defects (Foe), the defector gets all the winnings and the cooperator gets nothing. If both defect, both leave with nothing. Notice that the reward matrix is slightly different from the standard one given above, as the rewards for the "both defect" and the "cooperate while the opponent defects" cases are identical. This makes the "both defect" case a weak equilibrium, compared with being a strict equilibrium in the standard prisoner's dilemma. If a contestant knows that their opponent is going to vote "Foe", then their own choice does not affect their own winnings. In a specific sense, Friend or Foe has a rewards model between prisoner's dilemma and the game of Chicken.
朋友还是敌人？是一个竞赛节目，从2002年至2005年在美国的Game show Network播出。这是囚徒困境博弈在真人身上测试的一个例子，只是在人为的环境中。在游戏节目中，有三对选手参加比赛。当一对被淘汰时，他们会玩一个类似囚徒困境的游戏来决定奖金如何分配。如果他们都合作(朋友) ，他们分享奖金50-50。如果一方合作而另一方背叛(敌人) ，那么叛变者将得到所有的奖金，而合作者将一无所获。如果双方都背叛，那么双方都将一无所有。请注意，奖励矩阵与上面给出的标准矩阵略有不同，因为“双方都背叛”和“合作而对方背叛”情况下的奖励是相同的。与标准囚徒困境中的严格均衡相比，这使得“两个都背叛”情况成为一个弱均衡。如果一个参赛者知道他们的对手将投票给“敌人” ，那么他们自己的选择不会影响他们自己的奖金。从特定意义上讲，“朋友还是敌人”节目在囚徒困境和“胆小鬼”博弈之间有一个奖励模型。
This payoff matrix has also been used on the Britishtelevision programmes Trust Me, Shafted, The Bank Job and Golden Balls, and on the American shows Bachelor Pad and Take It All. Game data from the Golden Balls series has been analyzed by a team of economists, who found that cooperation was "surprisingly high" for amounts of money that would seem consequential in the real world, but were comparatively low in the context of the game.[44]
This payoff matrix has also been used on the British television programmes Trust Me, Shafted, The Bank Job and Golden Balls, and on the American shows Bachelor Pad and Take It All. Game data from the Golden Balls series has been analyzed by a team of economists, who found that cooperation was "surprisingly high" for amounts of money that would seem consequential in the real world, but were comparatively low in the context of the game.
Researchers from the University of Lausanne and the University of Edinburgh have suggested that the "Iterated Snowdrift Game" may more closely reflect real-world social situations. Although this model is actually a chicken game, it will be described here. In this model, the risk of being exploited through defection is lower, and individuals always gain from taking the cooperative choice. The snowdrift game imagines two drivers who are stuck on opposite sides of a snowdrift, each of whom is given the option of shoveling snow to clear a path, or remaining in their car. A player's highest payoff comes from leaving the opponent to clear all the snow by themselves, but the opponent is still nominally rewarded for their work.
Researchers from the University of Lausanne and the University of Edinburgh have suggested that the "Iterated Snowdrift Game" may more closely reflect real-world social situations. Although this model is actually a chicken game, it will be described here. In this model, the risk of being exploited through defection is lower, and individuals always gain from taking the cooperative choice. The snowdrift game imagines two drivers who are stuck on opposite sides of a snowdrift, each of whom is given the option of shoveling snow to clear a path, or remaining in their car. A player's highest payoff comes from leaving the opponent to clear all the snow by themselves, but the opponent is still nominally rewarded for their work.
This may better reflect real world scenarios, the researchers giving the example of two scientists collaborating on a report, both of whom would benefit if the other worked harder. "But when your collaborator doesn’t do any work, it’s probably better for you to do all the work yourself. You’ll still end up with a completed project."[46]
This may better reflect real world scenarios, the researchers giving the example of two scientists collaborating on a report, both of whom would benefit if the other worked harder. "But when your collaborator doesn’t do any work, it’s probably better for you to do all the work yourself. You’ll still end up with a completed project."
In coordination games, players must coordinate their strategies for a good outcome. An example is two cars that abruptly meet in a blizzard; each must choose whether to swerve left or right. If both swerve left, or both right, the cars do not collide. The local left- and right-hand traffic convention helps to co-ordinate their actions.
In coordination games, players must coordinate their strategies for a good outcome. An example is two cars that abruptly meet in a blizzard; each must choose whether to swerve left or right. If both swerve left, or both right, the cars do not collide. The local left- and right-hand traffic convention helps to co-ordinate their actions.
Symmetrical co-ordination games include Stag hunt and Bach or Stravinsky.
对称的协调游戏包括猎鹿 Stag hunt和巴赫 Bach或斯特拉文斯基 Stravinsky。
Asymmetric prisoner's dilemmas
不对称的囚徒困境 Asymmetric prisoner's dilemmas
A more general set of games are asymmetric. As in the prisoner's dilemma, the best outcome is co-operation, and there are motives for defection. Unlike the symmetric prisoner's dilemma, though, one player has more to lose and/or more to gain than the other. Some such games have been described as a prisoner's dilemma in which one prisoner has an alibi, whence the term "alibi game".[48]
A more general set of games are asymmetric. As in the prisoner's dilemma, the best outcome is co-operation, and there are motives for defection. Unlike the symmetric prisoner's dilemma, though, one player has more to lose and/or more to gain than the other. Some such games have been described as a prisoner's dilemma in which one prisoner has an alibi, whence the term "alibi game".
In experiments, players getting unequal payoffs in repeated games may seek to maximize profits, but only under the condition that both players receive equal payoffs; this may lead to a stable equilibrium strategy in which the disadvantaged player defects every X games, while the other always co-operates. Such behaviour may depend on the experiment's social norms around fairness.[50]
In experiments, players getting unequal payoffs in repeated games may seek to maximize profits, but only under the condition that both players receive equal payoffs; this may lead to a stable equilibrium strategy in which the disadvantaged player defects every X games, while the other always co-operates. Such behaviour may depend on the experiment's social norms around fairness.
在小说中
Hannu Rajaniemi set the opening scene of his The Quantum Thief trilogy in a "dilemma prison". The main theme of the series has been described as the "inadequacy of a binary universe" and the ultimate antagonist is a character called the All-Defector. Rajaniemi is particularly interesting as an artist treating this subject in that he is a Cambridge-trained mathematician and holds a PhD in mathematical physics – the interchangeability of matter and information is a major feature of the books, which take place in a "post-singularity" future. The first book in the series was published in 2010, with the two sequels, The Fractal Prince and The Causal Angel, published in 2012 and 2014, respectively.
Hannu Rajaniemi set the opening scene of his The Quantum Thief trilogy in a "dilemma prison". The main theme of the series has been described as the "inadequacy of a binary universe" and the ultimate antagonist is a character called the All-Defector. Rajaniemi is particularly interesting as an artist treating this subject in that he is a Cambridge-trained mathematician and holds a PhD in mathematical physics – the interchangeability of matter and information is a major feature of the books, which take place in a "post-singularity" future. The first book in the series was published in 2010, with the two sequels, The Fractal Prince and The Causal Angel, published in 2012 and 2014, respectively.
汉努·拉贾尼埃米 Hannu Rajaniemi将他的《量子窃贼》三部曲的开场场景设置在一个“囚徒困境”中。该系列的主题被描述为“双重宇宙的不足” ，最终的对手是一个叫做全面背叛者的角色。作为一个处理这个问题的艺术家，拉贾尼埃米尤其有趣，因为他是剑桥大学培养的数学家，拥有数学物理学博士学位——物质和信息的可互换性是这本书的一个主要特征，它发生在后奇点post-singularity的未来。该系列的第一本书于2010年出版，其续集《分形王子》和《因果天使》分别于2012年和2014年出版。
A game modeled after the (iterated) prisoner's dilemma is a central focus of the 2012 video game Zero Escape: Virtue's Last Reward and a minor part in its 2016 sequel Zero Escape: Zero Time Dilemma.
In The Mysterious Benedict Society and the Prisoner's Dilemma by Trenton Lee Stewart, the main characters start by playing a version of the game and escaping from the "prison" altogether. Later they become actual prisoners and escape once again.
In The Mysterious Benedict Society and the Prisoner's Dilemma by Trenton Lee Stewart, the main characters start by playing a version of the game and escaping from the "prison" altogether. Later they become actual prisoners and escape once again.
在特伦顿·李·斯图尔特 Trenton Lee Stewart的《神秘的本尼迪克特社会和囚徒困境》中，主要角色从玩一个版本的游戏开始，然后一起逃离“监狱”。后来他们变成了真正的囚犯，再次越狱。
In The Adventure Zone: Balance during The Suffering Game subarc, the player characters are twice presented with the prisoner's dilemma during their time in two liches' domain, once cooperating and once defecting.
In The Adventure Zone: Balance during The Suffering Game subarc, the player characters are twice presented with the prisoner's dilemma during their time in two liches' domain, once cooperating and once defecting.
In the 8th novel from the author James S. A. Corey Tiamat's Wrath . Winston Duarte explains the prisoners dilemma in his 14-year-old daughter, Teresa, to train her in strategic thinking. 模板:Cn
In the 8th novel from the author James S. A. Corey Tiamat's Wrath . Winston Duarte explains the prisoners dilemma in his 14-year-old daughter, Teresa, to train her in strategic thinking.
在作者詹姆斯·S·A·科里·提亚玛特 James S. A. Corey Tiamat的《愤怒》中的第八部小说中，温斯顿•杜阿尔特 Winston Duarte向他14岁的女儿特蕾莎 Teresa解释了她面临的囚徒困境，来训练她的战略思维能力。
↑Dal Bó, Pedro; Fréchette, Guillaume R. (2019). "Strategy Choice in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma". American Economic Review (in English). 109 (11): 3929–3952. doi:10.1257/aer.20181480. ISSN0002-8282.
↑Wu, Jiadong; Zhao, Chengye (2019), Sun, Xiaoming; He, Kun; Chen, Xiaoyun (eds.), "Cooperation on the Monte Carlo Rule: Prisoner's Dilemma Game on the Grid", Theoretical Computer Science (in English), Springer Singapore, vol. 1069, pp. 3–15, doi:10.1007/978-981-15-0105-0_1, ISBN978-981-15-0104-3
↑Akin, Ethan (2013). "Stable Cooperative Solutions for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma". p. 9. arXiv:1211.0969 [math.DS]. 模板:Bibcode
↑Le, S.; Boyd, R. (2007). "Evolutionary Dynamics of the Continuous Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma". Journal of Theoretical Biology. 245 (2): 258–67. doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.09.016. PMID17125798. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |name-list-format= ignored (help)
↑Hammerstein, P. (2003). Why is reciprocity so rare in social animals? A protestant appeal. In: P. Hammerstein, Editor, Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation, MIT Press. pp. 83–94.
↑Spaniel, William (2011). Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook.
↑Nicholson, Walter (2000). Intermediate microeconomics and its application (8th ed.). Fort Worth, TX: Dryden Press : Harcourt College Publishers. ISBN978-0-030-25916-6.
↑Stephen J. Majeski (1984). "Arms races as iterated prisoner's dilemma games". Mathematical and Social Sciences. 7 (3): 253–66. doi:10.1016/0165-4896(84)90022-2.
↑Kuhn, Steven (2019), "Prisoner's Dilemma", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2020-04-12
↑Gokhale CS, Traulsen A. Evolutionary games in the multiverse. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2010 Mar 23. 107(12):5500–04.
↑ 41.041.1Hofstadter, Douglas R. (1985). "Ch.29 The Prisoner's Dilemma Computer Tournaments and the Evolution of Cooperation.". Metamagical Themas: questing for the essence of mind and pattern. Bantam Dell Pub Group. ISBN978-0-465-04566-2.
Aumann, Robert (1959). "Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games". In Luce, R. D.; Tucker, A. W.. Contributions to the Theory 23 of Games IV. Annals of Mathematics Study. 40. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. pp. 287–324. MR0104521.
.svg){kind=link}