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| [[Carl Shulman]]和[[Anders Sandberg]]认为,算法改进可能是奇点的限制因素;虽然硬件效率趋于稳步提高,但软件创新更具不可预测性,可能会受到连续、累积研究的限制。他们认为,在软件受限奇点的情况下,智能爆炸实际上比硬件受限奇点更可能发生,因为在软件有限的情况下,一旦开发出人类水平的人工智能,它可以在非常快的硬件上连续运行,廉价硬件的丰富将使人工智能研究不那么受限制。<ref name=ShulmanSandberg2010>{{cite journal|last=Shulman|first=Carl|author2=Anders Sandberg |title=Implications of a Software-Limited Singularity|journal=ECAP10: VIII European Conference on Computing and Philosophy|year=2010|url=http://intelligence.org/files/SoftwareLimited.pdf|accessdate=17 May 2014|editor1-first=Klaus|editor1-last=Mainzer}}</ref>一旦软件知道如何使用,大量积累的硬件可以释放出来,这被称为“计算过剩”<ref name=MuehlhauserSalamon2012>{{cite book|last=Muehlhauser|first=Luke|title=Singularity Hypotheses: A Scientific and Philosophical Assessment|year=2012|publisher=Springer|chapter-url=http://intelligence.org/files/IE-EI.pdf|author2=Anna Salamon |editor=Amnon Eden |editor2=Johnny Søraker |editor3=James H. Moor |editor4=Eric Steinhart|chapter=Intelligence Explosion: Evidence and Import}}</ref> | | [[Carl Shulman]]和[[Anders Sandberg]]认为,算法改进可能是奇点的限制因素;虽然硬件效率趋于稳步提高,但软件创新更具不可预测性,可能会受到连续、累积研究的限制。他们认为,在软件受限奇点的情况下,智能爆炸实际上比硬件受限奇点更可能发生,因为在软件有限的情况下,一旦开发出人类水平的人工智能,它可以在非常快的硬件上连续运行,廉价硬件的丰富将使人工智能研究不那么受限制。<ref name=ShulmanSandberg2010>{{cite journal|last=Shulman|first=Carl|author2=Anders Sandberg |title=Implications of a Software-Limited Singularity|journal=ECAP10: VIII European Conference on Computing and Philosophy|year=2010|url=http://intelligence.org/files/SoftwareLimited.pdf|accessdate=17 May 2014|editor1-first=Klaus|editor1-last=Mainzer}}</ref>一旦软件知道如何使用,大量积累的硬件可以释放出来,这被称为“计算过剩”<ref name=MuehlhauserSalamon2012>{{cite book|last=Muehlhauser|first=Luke|title=Singularity Hypotheses: A Scientific and Philosophical Assessment|year=2012|publisher=Springer|chapter-url=http://intelligence.org/files/IE-EI.pdf|author2=Anna Salamon |editor=Amnon Eden |editor2=Johnny Søraker |editor3=James H. Moor |editor4=Eric Steinhart|chapter=Intelligence Explosion: Evidence and Import}}</ref> |
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− | ===Criticisms=== | + | ===Criticisms危机=== |
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| A paper by Mahendra Prasad, published in AI Magazine, asserts that the 18th-century mathematician Marquis de Condorcet was the first person to hypothesize and mathematically model an intelligence explosion and its effects on humanity. | | A paper by Mahendra Prasad, published in AI Magazine, asserts that the 18th-century mathematician Marquis de Condorcet was the first person to hypothesize and mathematically model an intelligence explosion and its effects on humanity. |
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| Some critics, like philosopher [[Hubert Dreyfus]], assert that computers or machines cannot achieve [[human intelligence]], while others, like physicist [[Stephen Hawking]], hold that the definition of intelligence is irrelevant if the net result is the same.<ref name="dreyfus"/> | | Some critics, like philosopher [[Hubert Dreyfus]], assert that computers or machines cannot achieve [[human intelligence]], while others, like physicist [[Stephen Hawking]], hold that the definition of intelligence is irrelevant if the net result is the same.<ref name="dreyfus"/> |
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− | | + | 一些批评家,如哲学家[[Hubert Dreyfus]]断言计算机或机器无法实现[[人类智能]],而其他人,如物理学家[[Stephen Hawking]],则认为如果最终结果相同,那么智力的定义就无关紧要。<ref name="dreyfus"/> |
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| An early description of the idea was made in John Wood Campbell Jr.'s 1932 short story "The last evolution". | | An early description of the idea was made in John Wood Campbell Jr.'s 1932 short story "The last evolution". |
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| Psychologist [[Steven Pinker]] stated in 2008: | | Psychologist [[Steven Pinker]] stated in 2008: |
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| + | 心理学家[[Steven Pinker]]在2008年指出: |
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| {{quote|... There is not the slightest reason to believe in a coming singularity. The fact that you can visualize a future in your imagination is not evidence that it is likely or even possible. Look at domed cities, jet-pack commuting, underwater cities, mile-high buildings, and nuclear-powered automobiles—all staples of futuristic fantasies when I was a child that have never arrived. Sheer processing power is not a pixie dust that magically solves all your problems. ...<ref name="spectrum.ieee.org"/>}} | | {{quote|... There is not the slightest reason to believe in a coming singularity. The fact that you can visualize a future in your imagination is not evidence that it is likely or even possible. Look at domed cities, jet-pack commuting, underwater cities, mile-high buildings, and nuclear-powered automobiles—all staples of futuristic fantasies when I was a child that have never arrived. Sheer processing power is not a pixie dust that magically solves all your problems. ...<ref name="spectrum.ieee.org"/>}} |
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| + | {{引用|。。。没有丝毫理由相信即将到来的奇点。事实上,你可以想象一个未来在你的想象中,并不能证明它是可能的,甚至是可能的。看看圆顶城市,喷气式飞机往返,水下城市,一英里高的建筑,核动力汽车,这些都是我小时候从未到达过的未来派幻想的主要组成部分。纯粹的处理能力并不是神奇地解决所有问题的小精灵...<ref name="spectrum.ieee.org"/>}} |
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| In his 1958 obituary for John von Neumann, Ulam recalled a conversation with von Neumann about the "ever accelerating progress of technology and changes in the mode of human life, which gives the appearance of approaching some essential singularity in the history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, could not continue." For example, Kurzweil extrapolates current technological trajectories past the arrival of self-improving AI or superhuman intelligence, which Yudkowsky argues represents a tension with both I. J. Good's proposed discontinuous upswing in intelligence and Vinge's thesis on unpredictability. | | In his 1958 obituary for John von Neumann, Ulam recalled a conversation with von Neumann about the "ever accelerating progress of technology and changes in the mode of human life, which gives the appearance of approaching some essential singularity in the history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, could not continue." For example, Kurzweil extrapolates current technological trajectories past the arrival of self-improving AI or superhuman intelligence, which Yudkowsky argues represents a tension with both I. J. Good's proposed discontinuous upswing in intelligence and Vinge's thesis on unpredictability. |
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| [[University of California, Berkeley]], [[philosophy]] professor [[John Searle]] writes: | | [[University of California, Berkeley]], [[philosophy]] professor [[John Searle]] writes: |
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| + | [[加州大学伯克利分校],[[哲学]]教授[[John Searle]]写道: |
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| Former President of the United States Barack Obama spoke about singularity in his interview to Wired in 2016: | | Former President of the United States Barack Obama spoke about singularity in his interview to Wired in 2016: |
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| {{blockquote|[Computers] have, literally ..., no [[intelligence]], no [[motivation]], no [[autonomy]], and no agency. We design them to behave as if they had certain sorts of [[psychology]], but there is no psychological reality to the corresponding processes or behavior. ... [T]he machinery has no beliefs, desires, [or] motivations.<ref>[[John R. Searle]], “What Your Computer Can’t Know”, ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', 9 October 2014, p. 54.</ref>}} | | {{blockquote|[Computers] have, literally ..., no [[intelligence]], no [[motivation]], no [[autonomy]], and no agency. We design them to behave as if they had certain sorts of [[psychology]], but there is no psychological reality to the corresponding processes or behavior. ... [T]he machinery has no beliefs, desires, [or] motivations.<ref>[[John R. Searle]], “What Your Computer Can’t Know”, ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', 9 October 2014, p. 54.</ref>}} |
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− | | + | {{blockquote |[计算机]从字面上讲,没有[[智能]]、没有[[动机]]、没有[[自主]]和代理。我们设计他们的行为,好像他们有某种[[心理学]],但没有心理现实的对应过程或行为。。。[T] 机械没有信仰、欲望或动机。<ref>[[John R. Searle]], “What Your Computer Can’t Know”, ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', 9 October 2014, p. 54.</ref>}} |
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| [[Martin Ford (author)|Martin Ford]] in ''The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future''<ref name="thelightsinthetunnel"/> postulates a "technology paradox" in that before the singularity could occur most routine jobs in the economy would be automated, since this would require a level of technology inferior to that of the singularity. This would cause massive unemployment and plummeting consumer demand, which in turn would destroy the incentive to invest in the technologies that would be required to bring about the Singularity. Job displacement is increasingly no longer limited to work traditionally considered to be "routine."<ref name="nytimes"/> | | [[Martin Ford (author)|Martin Ford]] in ''The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future''<ref name="thelightsinthetunnel"/> postulates a "technology paradox" in that before the singularity could occur most routine jobs in the economy would be automated, since this would require a level of technology inferior to that of the singularity. This would cause massive unemployment and plummeting consumer demand, which in turn would destroy the incentive to invest in the technologies that would be required to bring about the Singularity. Job displacement is increasingly no longer limited to work traditionally considered to be "routine."<ref name="nytimes"/> |
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− | | + | [[Martin Ford(作者)| Martin Ford]]在“隧道中的灯光:自动化、加速技术和未来经济”<ref name=“thelightsinthetunnel”/>提出了一个“技术悖论”,即在奇点出现之前,经济体中的大多数日常工作都将自动化,因为这需要的技术水平低于奇点。这将导致大规模的失业和消费者需求的骤降,这反过来又会破坏投资于实现奇点所需技术的动力。取代工作越来越不再局限于传统上被认为是“例行公事”的工作。<ref name="nytimes"/> |
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| [[Theodore Modis]]<ref name="google13"/><ref name="Singularity Myth"/> and [[Jonathan Huebner]]<ref name="technological14"/> argue that the rate of technological innovation has not only ceased to rise, but is actually now declining. Evidence for this decline is that the rise in computer [[clock rate]]s is slowing, even while Moore's prediction of exponentially increasing circuit density continues to hold. This is due to excessive heat build-up from the chip, which cannot be dissipated quickly enough to prevent the chip from melting when operating at higher speeds. Advances in speed may be possible in the future by virtue of more power-efficient CPU designs and multi-cell processors.<ref name="cnet"/> While Kurzweil used Modis' resources, and Modis' work was around accelerating change, Modis distanced himself from Kurzweil's thesis of a "technological singularity", claiming that it lacks scientific rigor.<ref name="Singularity Myth"/> | | [[Theodore Modis]]<ref name="google13"/><ref name="Singularity Myth"/> and [[Jonathan Huebner]]<ref name="technological14"/> argue that the rate of technological innovation has not only ceased to rise, but is actually now declining. Evidence for this decline is that the rise in computer [[clock rate]]s is slowing, even while Moore's prediction of exponentially increasing circuit density continues to hold. This is due to excessive heat build-up from the chip, which cannot be dissipated quickly enough to prevent the chip from melting when operating at higher speeds. Advances in speed may be possible in the future by virtue of more power-efficient CPU designs and multi-cell processors.<ref name="cnet"/> While Kurzweil used Modis' resources, and Modis' work was around accelerating change, Modis distanced himself from Kurzweil's thesis of a "technological singularity", claiming that it lacks scientific rigor.<ref name="Singularity Myth"/> |
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− | | + | [[Theodore Modis]]<ref name=“google13”/><ref name=“Singularity Myth”/>和[[Jonathan Huebner]]<ref name=“technology14”/>认为技术创新的速度不仅停止上升,而且现在实际上在下降。这种下降的证据是计算机[[时钟速率]]的增长正在放缓,尽管摩尔关于电路密度指数增长的预测仍然成立。这是由于芯片产生过多的热量,当以较高的速度运行时,这些热量不能迅速散去,以防止芯片熔化。在未来,由于更节能的CPU设计和多单元处理器,速度的提高可能成为可能。<ref name="cnet"/>虽然库兹韦尔利用了莫迪斯的资源,而莫迪斯的工作是围绕加速变革展开的,但莫迪斯却与库兹韦尔的“技术奇点”理论保持距离,声称该理论缺乏科学严谨性。<ref name="Singularity Myth"/> |
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| In a detailed empirical accounting, ''The Progress of Computing'', [[William Nordhaus]] argued that, prior to 1940, computers followed the much slower growth of a traditional industrial economy, thus rejecting extrapolations of Moore's law to 19th-century computers.<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1017/S0022050707000058|title = Two Centuries of Productivity Growth in Computing| journal=The Journal of Economic History| volume=67|pages = 128–159|year = 2007|last1 = Nordhaus|first1 = William D.| citeseerx=10.1.1.330.1871}}</ref> | | In a detailed empirical accounting, ''The Progress of Computing'', [[William Nordhaus]] argued that, prior to 1940, computers followed the much slower growth of a traditional industrial economy, thus rejecting extrapolations of Moore's law to 19th-century computers.<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1017/S0022050707000058|title = Two Centuries of Productivity Growth in Computing| journal=The Journal of Economic History| volume=67|pages = 128–159|year = 2007|last1 = Nordhaus|first1 = William D.| citeseerx=10.1.1.330.1871}}</ref> |
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− | | + | 在一份详细的实证会计“计算的进步”中,[[William Nordhaus]]认为,在1940年以前,计算机遵循传统工业经济增长缓慢的趋势,因此拒绝了摩尔定律对19世纪计算机的推断。<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1017/S0022050707000058|title = Two Centuries of Productivity Growth in Computing| journal=The Journal of Economic History| volume=67|pages = 128–159|year = 2007|last1 = Nordhaus|first1 = William D.| citeseerx=10.1.1.330.1871}}</ref> |
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| In a 2007 paper, Schmidhuber stated that the frequency of subjectively "notable events" appears to be approaching a 21st-century singularity, but cautioned readers to take such plots of subjective events with a grain of salt: perhaps differences in memory of recent and distant events could create an illusion of accelerating change where none exists.<ref>Schmidhuber, Jürgen. "New millennium AI and the convergence of history." Challenges for computational intelligence. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. 15–35.</ref> | | In a 2007 paper, Schmidhuber stated that the frequency of subjectively "notable events" appears to be approaching a 21st-century singularity, but cautioned readers to take such plots of subjective events with a grain of salt: perhaps differences in memory of recent and distant events could create an illusion of accelerating change where none exists.<ref>Schmidhuber, Jürgen. "New millennium AI and the convergence of history." Challenges for computational intelligence. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. 15–35.</ref> |
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| + | 在2007年的一篇论文中,Schmidhuber指出主观上“显著事件”的频率似乎正在接近21世纪的奇点,但提醒读者,对这些主观事件的情节要持保留态度:也许对最近和遥远的事件记忆上的差异,可能会造成一种在根本不存在的情况下加速变化的错觉。<ref>Schmidhuber, Jürgen. "New millennium AI and the convergence of history." Challenges for computational intelligence. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. 15–35.</ref> |
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| [[Paul Allen]] argued the opposite of accelerating returns, the complexity brake;<ref name="Allen"/> the more progress science makes towards understanding intelligence, the more difficult it becomes to make additional progress. A study of the number of patents shows that human creativity does not show accelerating returns, but in fact, as suggested by [[Joseph Tainter]] in his ''The Collapse of Complex Societies'',<ref name="university"/> a law of [[diminishing returns]]. The number of patents per thousand peaked in the period from 1850 to 1900, and has been declining since.<ref name="technological14"/><!--[Previous comment: is this from 'Collapse of Complex Societies' or some other source? Perhaps this refers to Jonathan Huebner's patent analysis mentioned in the earlier paragraph? If so, would be better to integrate this part with that paragraph, since the earlier paragraph mentions that Huebner's analysis has been criticized whereas this paragraph just seems to present it as fact --> The growth of complexity eventually becomes self-limiting, and leads to a widespread "general systems collapse". | | [[Paul Allen]] argued the opposite of accelerating returns, the complexity brake;<ref name="Allen"/> the more progress science makes towards understanding intelligence, the more difficult it becomes to make additional progress. A study of the number of patents shows that human creativity does not show accelerating returns, but in fact, as suggested by [[Joseph Tainter]] in his ''The Collapse of Complex Societies'',<ref name="university"/> a law of [[diminishing returns]]. The number of patents per thousand peaked in the period from 1850 to 1900, and has been declining since.<ref name="technological14"/><!--[Previous comment: is this from 'Collapse of Complex Societies' or some other source? Perhaps this refers to Jonathan Huebner's patent analysis mentioned in the earlier paragraph? If so, would be better to integrate this part with that paragraph, since the earlier paragraph mentions that Huebner's analysis has been criticized whereas this paragraph just seems to present it as fact --> The growth of complexity eventually becomes self-limiting, and leads to a widespread "general systems collapse". |
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− | | + | [[Paul Allen]]认为,与加速回报相反的是复杂性制动器;<ref name=“Allen”/>科学在理解智力方面取得的进展越多,取得额外进展就越困难。一项对专利数量的研究表明,人类的创造力并没有表现出加速的回报,但事实上,正如[[Joseph Tainter]]在他的《复杂社会的崩溃》中所指出的那样,<ref name="university"/>[[收益递减]定律。每千件专利的数量在1850年至1900年期间达到顶峰,此后一直在下降。<ref name="technological14"/><!--[之前的评论:这是“复杂社会的崩溃”还是其他原因?也许这是指前一段提到的jonathanhuebner的专利分析?如果是这样的话,最好将这一部分与那一段结合起来,因为前一段提到休伯纳的分析受到了批评,而这一段似乎只是把它当作事实——复杂性的增长最终变得自我限制,并导致广泛的“一般系统崩溃”。 |
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| [[Jaron Lanier]] refutes the idea that the Singularity is inevitable. He states: "I do not think the technology is creating itself. It's not an autonomous process."<ref name="lanier">{{cite web |author=Jaron Lanier |title=Who Owns the Future? |work=New York: Simon & Schuster |date=2013 |url=http://www.epubbud.com/read.php?g=JCB8D9LA&tocp=59}}</ref> He goes on to assert: "The reason to believe in human agency over technological determinism is that you can then have an economy where people earn their own way and invent their own lives. If you structure a society on ''not'' emphasizing individual human agency, it's the same thing operationally as denying people clout, dignity, and self-determination ... to embrace [the idea of the Singularity] would be a celebration of bad data and bad politics."<ref name="lanier" /> | | [[Jaron Lanier]] refutes the idea that the Singularity is inevitable. He states: "I do not think the technology is creating itself. It's not an autonomous process."<ref name="lanier">{{cite web |author=Jaron Lanier |title=Who Owns the Future? |work=New York: Simon & Schuster |date=2013 |url=http://www.epubbud.com/read.php?g=JCB8D9LA&tocp=59}}</ref> He goes on to assert: "The reason to believe in human agency over technological determinism is that you can then have an economy where people earn their own way and invent their own lives. If you structure a society on ''not'' emphasizing individual human agency, it's the same thing operationally as denying people clout, dignity, and self-determination ... to embrace [the idea of the Singularity] would be a celebration of bad data and bad politics."<ref name="lanier" /> |
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− | | + | [[Jaron Lanier]]驳斥了奇点不可避免的观点。他说:“我不认为这项技术是在自我创造。这不是一个自主的过程。”<ref name="lanier">{{cite web |author=Jaron Lanier |title=Who Owns the Future? |work=New York: Simon & Schuster |date=2013 |url=http://www.epubbud.com/read.php?g=JCB8D9LA&tocp=59}}</ref> 他接着断言:“相信人的能动性而不是技术决定论的原因是,这样你就可以有一个经济体,人们可以自己挣钱,创造自己的生活。如果你在“不”的基础上构建一个强调个体人的能动性的社会,在操作上与否认人们的影响力、尊严和自决权是一样的。。。接受(奇点的想法)将是对糟糕数据和糟糕政治的庆祝。”<ref name="lanier" /> |
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| [[Economics|Economist]] [[Robert J. Gordon]], in ''The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War'' (2016), points out that measured economic growth has slowed around 1970 and slowed even further since the [[financial crisis of 2007–2008]], and argues that the economic data show no trace of a coming Singularity as imagined by mathematician [[I.J. Good]].<ref>[[William D. Nordhaus]], "Why Growth Will Fall" (a review of [[Robert J. Gordon]], ''The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War'', Princeton University Press, 2016, {{ISBN|978-0691147727}}, 762 pp., $39.95), ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', vol. LXIII, no. 13 (August 18, 2016), p. 68.</ref> | | [[Economics|Economist]] [[Robert J. Gordon]], in ''The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War'' (2016), points out that measured economic growth has slowed around 1970 and slowed even further since the [[financial crisis of 2007–2008]], and argues that the economic data show no trace of a coming Singularity as imagined by mathematician [[I.J. Good]].<ref>[[William D. Nordhaus]], "Why Growth Will Fall" (a review of [[Robert J. Gordon]], ''The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War'', Princeton University Press, 2016, {{ISBN|978-0691147727}}, 762 pp., $39.95), ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', vol. LXIII, no. 13 (August 18, 2016), p. 68.</ref> |
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− | | + | [[Economics | Economics]][[Robert J.Gordon]]在《美国经济增长的兴衰:内战以来的美国生活水平》(2016)中指出,衡量的经济增长在1970年左右放缓,自[[2007-2008年金融危机]以来甚至进一步放缓,并认为,经济数据没有显示出数学家[[I.J.Good]]所想象的未来奇点的踪迹。<ref>[[William D. Nordhaus]], "Why Growth Will Fall" (a review of [[Robert J. Gordon]], ''The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War'', Princeton University Press, 2016, {{ISBN|978-0691147727}}, 762 pp., $39.95), ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'', vol. LXIII, no. 13 (August 18, 2016), p. 68.</ref> |
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| In addition to general criticisms of the singularity concept, several critics have raised issues with Kurzweil's iconic chart. One line of criticism is that a [[Log-log plot|log-log]] chart of this nature is inherently biased toward a straight-line result. Others identify selection bias in the points that Kurzweil chooses to use. For example, biologist [[PZ Myers]] points out that many of the early evolutionary "events" were picked arbitrarily.<ref name="PZMyers"/> Kurzweil has rebutted this by charting evolutionary events from 15 neutral sources, and showing that they fit a straight line on [[:File:ParadigmShiftsFrr15Events.svg|a log-log chart]]. ''[[The Economist]]'' mocked the concept with a graph extrapolating that the number of blades on a razor, which has increased over the years from one to as many as five, will increase ever-faster to infinity.<ref name="moreblades"/> | | In addition to general criticisms of the singularity concept, several critics have raised issues with Kurzweil's iconic chart. One line of criticism is that a [[Log-log plot|log-log]] chart of this nature is inherently biased toward a straight-line result. Others identify selection bias in the points that Kurzweil chooses to use. For example, biologist [[PZ Myers]] points out that many of the early evolutionary "events" were picked arbitrarily.<ref name="PZMyers"/> Kurzweil has rebutted this by charting evolutionary events from 15 neutral sources, and showing that they fit a straight line on [[:File:ParadigmShiftsFrr15Events.svg|a log-log chart]]. ''[[The Economist]]'' mocked the concept with a graph extrapolating that the number of blades on a razor, which has increased over the years from one to as many as five, will increase ever-faster to infinity.<ref name="moreblades"/> |
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− | | + | 除了对奇点概念的一般性批评外,一些批评家还对库兹韦尔的标志性图表提出了质疑。一种批评是,这种性质的[[loglog plot | loglog]]图表固有地偏向于直线结果。其他人在库兹韦尔选择使用的点上识别选择偏差。例如,生物学家[[PZ Myers]]指出,许多早期的进化“事件”都是随意挑选的。<ref name="PZMyers"/>Kurzweil反驳了这一点,他绘制了15个中立来源的进化事件图,并证明它们符合一条直线[[:文件:ParadigmShiftsFrr15Events.svg|日志图表]].''[[经济学家]]'用一张图表来嘲讽这个概念:一把剃须刀上的刀片数在过去几年里从一个增加到多达五个,将以更快的速度增长到无穷大。<ref name="moreblades"/> |
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| ==Potential impacts== | | ==Potential impacts== |