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| ===定义 === | | ===定义 === |
− | This idea of emergence has been around since at least the time of [[Aristotle]].<ref name="Meta">Aristotle, ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)]]'', Book Η 1045a 8–10: "... the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts ...", i.e., the whole is other than the sum of the parts.</ref> The many scientists and philosophers<ref>Being Emergence vs. Pattern Emergence: Complexity, Control, and Goal-Directedness in Biological Systems | + | This concept of emergence dates from at least the time of [[Aristotle]].<ref name="Meta">Aristotle, ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)]]'', Book Η 1045a 8–10: "... the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts ...", i.e., the whole is other than the sum of the parts.</ref> The many scientists and philosophers<ref> |
| + | {{cite book |
| + | | last1 = Winning |
| + | | first1 = Jason |
| + | | last2 = Bechtel |
| + | | first2 = William |
| + | | author-link2 = William Bechtel |
| + | | chapter = Being emergence vs. pattern emergence: complexity, control, and goal-directedness in biological systems |
| + | | chapter-url = https://philpapers.org/rec/WINBEV |
| + | | editor1-last = Gibb |
| + | | editor1-first = Sophie |
| + | | editor2-last = Hendry |
| + | | editor2-first = Robin Findlay |
| + | | editor3-last = Lancaster |
| + | | editor3-first = Tom |
| + | | title = The Routledge Handbook of Emergence |
| + | | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=0Tz3DwAAQBAJ |
| + | | series = Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy |
| + | | location = Abingdon |
| + | | publisher = Routledge |
| + | | date = 2019 |
| + | | page = 134 |
| + | | isbn = 9781317381501 |
| + | | access-date = 25 October 2020 |
| + | | quote = Emergence is much discussed by both philosophers and scientists. |
| + | }} |
| + | </ref> |
| + | who have written on the concept include [[John Stuart Mill]] (''[[Composition of Causes]]'', 1843)<ref>"The chemical combination of two substances produces, as is well known, a third substance with properties entirely different from those of either of the two substances separately, or of both of them taken together."</ref> and [[Julian Huxley]]<ref>Julian Huxley: "now and again there is a sudden rapid passage to a totally new and more comprehensive type of order or organization, with quite new emergent properties, and involving quite new methods of further evolution" {{Harv|Huxley|Huxley|1947|p=120}}</ref> (1887-1975). |
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| This idea of emergence has been around since at least the time of Aristotle. The many scientists and philosophers<ref>Being Emergence vs. Pattern Emergence: Complexity, Control, and Goal-Directedness in Biological Systems | | This idea of emergence has been around since at least the time of Aristotle. The many scientists and philosophers<ref>Being Emergence vs. Pattern Emergence: Complexity, Control, and Goal-Directedness in Biological Systems |
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− | 这个涌现的概念至少在亚里士多德时代就已经存在了。许多科学家和哲学家写过关于这个概念的文章,其中包括约翰·斯图尔特·密尔《原因的构成》和《朱利安 · 赫胥黎》。同样的提出存在涌现 vs. 模式涌现: 生物系统中的复杂性、控制性和目标导向性等议题。
| + | 涌现的概念至少在亚里士多德时代就已经存在了<ref name="Meta">Aristotle, ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)]]'', Book Η 1045a 8–10: "... the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts ...", i.e., the whole is other than the sum of the parts.</ref>。许多科学家和哲学家<ref> |
− | | + | {{cite book |
− | Jason Winning & William Bechtel
| + | | last1 = Winning |
− | | + | | first1 = Jason |
− | Jason Winning & William Bechtel
| + | | last2 = Bechtel |
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− | 杰森 · 温宁和威廉 · 贝克特尔
| + | | author-link2 = William Bechtel |
− | | + | | chapter = Being emergence vs. pattern emergence: complexity, control, and goal-directedness in biological systems |
− | In Sophie Gibb, Robin Hendry & Tom Lancaster (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Emergence. London: pp. 134-144 (2019)
| + | | chapter-url = https://philpapers.org/rec/WINBEV |
− | | + | | editor1-last = Gibb |
− | In Sophie Gibb, Robin Hendry & Tom Lancaster (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Emergence. London: pp. 134-144 (2019)
| + | | editor1-first = Sophie |
− | | + | | editor2-last = Hendry |
− | 在索菲 · 吉布,罗宾 · 亨德利和汤姆 · 兰开斯特(ed。) ,《劳特利奇出现手册》。伦敦: pp。134-144 (2019)
| + | | editor2-first = Robin Findlay |
− | | + | | editor3-last = Lancaster |
− | Authors
| + | | editor3-first = Tom |
− | | + | | title = The Routledge Handbook of Emergence |
− | Authors
| + | | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=0Tz3DwAAQBAJ |
− | | + | | series = Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy |
− | 作者
| + | | location = Abingdon |
− | | + | | publisher = Routledge |
− | | + | | date = 2019 |
− | | + | | page = 134 |
− | | + | | isbn = 9781317381501 |
− | | + | | access-date = 25 October 2020 |
− | Jason Winning
| + | | quote = Emergence is much discussed by both philosophers and scientists. |
− | | + | }} |
− | Jason Winning
| + | </ref>写过关于这个概念的文章,其中包括 约翰·斯图尔特·密尔 John Stuart Mill <ref>"The chemical combination of two substances produces, as is well known, a third substance with properties entirely different from those of either of the two substances separately, or of both of them taken together."</ref>和朱利安 · 赫胥黎 Julian Huxley <ref>Julian Huxley: "now and again there is a sudden rapid passage to a totally new and more comprehensive type of order or organization, with quite new emergent properties, and involving quite new methods of further evolution" {{Harv|Huxley|Huxley|1947|p=120}}</ref> 。 |
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− | 杰森 · 温宁
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− | University of California, San Diego
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− | University of California, San Diego
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− | 加州大学圣地亚哥分校
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− | William Bechtel
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− | 威廉 · 贝克特尔
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− | University of California, San Diego</ref> who have written on the concept include [[John Stuart Mill]] (''[[Composition of Causes]]'' (1843))<ref>"The chemical combination of two substances produces, as is well known, a third substance with properties entirely different from those of either of the two substances separately, or of both of them taken together."</ref> and [[Julian Huxley]]<ref>Julian Huxley: "now and again there is a sudden rapid passage to a totally new and more comprehensive type of order or organization, with quite new emergent properties, and involving quite new methods of further evolution" {{Harv|Huxley|Huxley|1947}}</ref> (1887-1975).
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− | University of California, San Diego</ref> who have written on the concept include John Stuart Mill (Composition of Causes (1843)) and Julian Huxley (1887-1975).
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− | 加利福尼亚大学圣地亚哥分校教员,他们写过关于这个概念的文章,其中包括《约翰·斯图尔特·密尔(1843年)和 Julian Huxley (1887-1975年)。
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| 哲学家 g· h·刘易斯 (g. h. Lewes) 在1875年创造了“涌现”(emergent)一词 | | 哲学家 g· h·刘易斯 (g. h. Lewes) 在1875年创造了“涌现”(emergent)一词 |
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− | <blockquote>Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant forces; their sum, when their directions are the same – their difference, when their directions are contrary. Further, every resultant is clearly traceable in its components, because these are [[homogeneous]] and [[Commensurability (philosophy of science)|commensurable]]. It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable motion to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-operation of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference.<ref> | + | <blockquote>Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant forces; their sum, when their directions are the same – their difference, when their directions are contrary. Further, every resultant is clearly traceable in its components, because these are [[homogeneous]] and [[Commensurability (philosophy of science)|commensurable]]. It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable motion to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-operation of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference. |
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− | <blockquote>Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant forces; their sum, when their directions are the same – their difference, when their directions are contrary. Further, every resultant is clearly traceable in its components, because these are homogeneous and commensurable. It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable motion to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-operation of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference.<ref>
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− | 每个合力要么是合作力的叠加,要么是合作力的差; 当它们的方向相同时,是它们的和——当它们的方向相反时,则是它们的差。 此外,每个成果在其组成部分中都可以清楚地朔源,因为这些组成部分是同质的和可公度的。与涌现情况不同的是,在此时,它们既不是在可测量的运动中再增加可测量的运动,也不是在同类个体中增加一种事物,而是在不同种类的事物之间进行合作。涌现不同于其组成部分,因为这些部分是不可通约的(有共同因子),不能被还原为它们的总和或差。
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| + | 每个合力要么是共同作用力的和,要么是共同作用力的差; 当它们的方向相同时,是它们的和——当它们的方向相反时,则是它们的差。 此外,每个成果在其组成部分中都可以清楚地朔源,因为这些组成部分是同质的和可公度的。涌现的情况与此不同,它们既不是在动量中再增加动量,也不是在同类个体中增加一种个体,而是在不同种类的事物之间进行合作。涌现不同于其组成部分,因为这些部分是不可通约的,不能被还原为它们的总和或差。 <ref> |
| {{cite book | | {{cite book |
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− | 第一名: 乔治 · 亨利
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| | author-link1 = George Henry Lewes | | | author-link1 = George Henry Lewes |
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− | | 作者链接1乔治·亨利·刘易斯
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− | | title = Problems of Life and Mind
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| | title = Problems of Life and Mind | | | title = Problems of Life and Mind |
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− | 题目: 生活与思想的问题
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| | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=0J8RAAAAYAAJ | | | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=0J8RAAAAYAAJ |
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− | Https://books.google.com/books?id=0j8raaaayaaj
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| | series = First Series: The Foundations of a Creed | | | series = First Series: The Foundations of a Creed |
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− | 系列第一集: 信条的基础
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| | publisher = Osgood | | | publisher = Osgood |
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| | date = 1875 | | | date = 1875 |
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| | access-date = 24 Mar 2019 | | | access-date = 24 Mar 2019 |
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− | | 存取日期: 2019年3月24日
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− | / 参考
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| </blockquote> | | </blockquote> |
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| In 1999, economist Jeffrey Goldstein provided a current definition of emergence in the journal ''Emergence''.<ref name="Goldstein1999">{{cite journal|last1= Goldstein|first1= Jeffrey|title= Emergence as a Construct: History and Issues|journal= Emergence|date= March 1999|volume= 1|issue= 1|pages= 49–72|doi= 10.1207/s15327000em0101_4}}</ref> Goldstein initially defined emergence as: "the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of [[self-organization]] in complex systems". | | In 1999, economist Jeffrey Goldstein provided a current definition of emergence in the journal ''Emergence''.<ref name="Goldstein1999">{{cite journal|last1= Goldstein|first1= Jeffrey|title= Emergence as a Construct: History and Issues|journal= Emergence|date= March 1999|volume= 1|issue= 1|pages= 49–72|doi= 10.1207/s15327000em0101_4}}</ref> Goldstein initially defined emergence as: "the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of [[self-organization]] in complex systems". |
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| In 1999, economist Jeffrey Goldstein provided a current definition of emergence in the journal Emergence. Goldstein initially defined emergence as: "the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of self-organization in complex systems". | | In 1999, economist Jeffrey Goldstein provided a current definition of emergence in the journal Emergence. Goldstein initially defined emergence as: "the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of self-organization in complex systems". |
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− | 1999年,经济学家杰弗里•戈尔茨坦(Jeffrey Goldstein) 在《涌现》(Emergence)杂志上提出了现有的对“涌现”的定义。Goldstein 最初将涌现定义为: “在复杂系统自组织过程中产生的新颖而连贯的结构、模式和性质”。 | + | 1999年,经济学家杰弗里•戈尔茨坦(Jeffrey Goldstein) 在《涌现》(Emergence)杂志上提出了现有的对“涌现”的定义。戈尔茨坦最初将涌现定义为: “在复杂系统自组织过程中产生的新颖而连贯的结构、模式和性质(the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of self-organization in complex systems)”。 |
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| In 2002 systems scientist Peter Corning described the qualities of Goldstein's definition in more detail: | | In 2002 systems scientist Peter Corning described the qualities of Goldstein's definition in more detail: |
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− | 2002年,系统科学家彼得康宁(Peter Corning)更详细地描述了戈尔茨坦的定义:
| + | 2002年,系统科学家彼得·康宁(Peter Corning)更详细地描述了戈尔茨坦的定义: |
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| <blockquote>The common characteristics are: (1) radical novelty (features not previously observed in systems); (2) coherence or correlation (meaning integrated wholes that maintain themselves over some period of time); (3) A global or macro "level" (i.e. there is some property of "wholeness"); (4) it is the product of a dynamical process (it evolves); and (5) it is "ostensive" (it can be perceived).<ref name="Corning">{{Citation | doi = 10.1002/cplx.10043 | last = Corning | first = Peter A. | authorlink = Peter Corning | title = The Re-Emergence of "Emergence": A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory | year = 2002 | journal = Complexity | volume = 7 | pages = 18–30 | issue = 6 | bibcode = 2002Cmplx...7f..18C | df = | citeseerx = 10.1.1.114.1724 }}</ref></blockquote> | | <blockquote>The common characteristics are: (1) radical novelty (features not previously observed in systems); (2) coherence or correlation (meaning integrated wholes that maintain themselves over some period of time); (3) A global or macro "level" (i.e. there is some property of "wholeness"); (4) it is the product of a dynamical process (it evolves); and (5) it is "ostensive" (it can be perceived).<ref name="Corning">{{Citation | doi = 10.1002/cplx.10043 | last = Corning | first = Peter A. | authorlink = Peter Corning | title = The Re-Emergence of "Emergence": A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory | year = 2002 | journal = Complexity | volume = 7 | pages = 18–30 | issue = 6 | bibcode = 2002Cmplx...7f..18C | df = | citeseerx = 10.1.1.114.1724 }}</ref></blockquote> |
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| <blockquote>The common characteristics are: (1) radical novelty (features not previously observed in systems); (2) coherence or correlation (meaning integrated wholes that maintain themselves over some period of time); (3) A global or macro "level" (i.e. there is some property of "wholeness"); (4) it is the product of a dynamical process (it evolves); and (5) it is "ostensive" (it can be perceived).</blockquote> | | <blockquote>The common characteristics are: (1) radical novelty (features not previously observed in systems); (2) coherence or correlation (meaning integrated wholes that maintain themselves over some period of time); (3) A global or macro "level" (i.e. there is some property of "wholeness"); (4) it is the product of a dynamical process (it evolves); and (5) it is "ostensive" (it can be perceived).</blockquote> |
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− | 它们的共同特征是: (1)根本的新颖性(以前在系统中没有观察到的特征) ; (2)连贯性或相关性(意味着在一段时间内维持自身的整体) ; (3)全局或宏观的“层次”(即:它是一个整体的特性);(4)它是动力学过程的产物(进化); (5)它是一个明示的(可以被感知)。 / blockquote
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− | | + | 共同的特征有: (1)根本的新颖性(以前在系统中没有观察到的特征) ; (2)连贯性或相关性(意味着在一段时间内维持自身的完整) ; (3)全局或宏观的“层次”(即:它是一个整体的特性);(4)它是动力学过程的产物(它可以演进); (5)它是一个明显的(可以被感知)。 <ref name="Corning">{{Citation | doi = 10.1002/cplx.10043 | last = Corning | first = Peter A. | authorlink = Peter Corning | title = The Re-Emergence of "Emergence": A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory | year = 2002 | journal = Complexity | volume = 7 | pages = 18–30 | issue = 6 | bibcode = 2002Cmplx...7f..18C | df = | citeseerx = 10.1.1.114.1724 }}</ref> |
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| Corning suggests a narrower definition, requiring that the components be unlike in kind (following Lewes), and that they involve division of labor between these components. He also says that living systems (like the game of chess), while emergent, cannot be reduced to underlying laws of emergence: | | Corning suggests a narrower definition, requiring that the components be unlike in kind (following Lewes), and that they involve division of labor between these components. He also says that living systems (like the game of chess), while emergent, cannot be reduced to underlying laws of emergence: |
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− | 康宁公司提出了一个狭义的定义,要求组分不同于实体(传承了刘易斯的观点),并且它们涉及这些组分之间的劳动分工。他还表示,活跃系统(如国际象棋)虽然是涌现的,但不能简化为涌现的基本规律:
| + | 康宁提出了一个狭义的定义,要求组分不同于实体(传承了刘易斯的观点),并且它们涉及这些组分之间的分工。他还表示,涌现的系统不能简化为底层的基本规律: |
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| <blockquote><span id="CorningDefn" class="citation">Rules, or laws, have no causal efficacy; they do not in fact 'generate' anything. They serve merely to describe regularities and consistent relationships in nature. These patterns may be very illuminating and important, but the underlying causal agencies must be separately specified (though often they are not). But that aside, the game of chess illustrates ... why any laws or rules of emergence and evolution are insufficient. Even in a chess game, you cannot use the rules to predict 'history' – i.e., the course of any given game. Indeed, you cannot even reliably predict the next move in a chess game. Why? Because the 'system' involves more than the rules of the game. It also includes the players and their unfolding, moment-by-moment decisions among a very large number of available options at each choice point. The game of chess is inescapably historical, even though it is also constrained and shaped by a set of rules, not to mention the laws of physics. Moreover, and this is a key point, the game of chess is also shaped by [[teleonomic]], [[cybernetic]], feedback-driven influences. It is not simply a self-ordered process; it involves an organized, 'purposeful' activity.</span><ref name = Corning/></blockquote> | | <blockquote><span id="CorningDefn" class="citation">Rules, or laws, have no causal efficacy; they do not in fact 'generate' anything. They serve merely to describe regularities and consistent relationships in nature. These patterns may be very illuminating and important, but the underlying causal agencies must be separately specified (though often they are not). But that aside, the game of chess illustrates ... why any laws or rules of emergence and evolution are insufficient. Even in a chess game, you cannot use the rules to predict 'history' – i.e., the course of any given game. Indeed, you cannot even reliably predict the next move in a chess game. Why? Because the 'system' involves more than the rules of the game. It also includes the players and their unfolding, moment-by-moment decisions among a very large number of available options at each choice point. The game of chess is inescapably historical, even though it is also constrained and shaped by a set of rules, not to mention the laws of physics. Moreover, and this is a key point, the game of chess is also shaped by [[teleonomic]], [[cybernetic]], feedback-driven influences. It is not simply a self-ordered process; it involves an organized, 'purposeful' activity.</span><ref name = Corning/></blockquote> |
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| <blockquote><span id="CorningDefn" class="citation">Rules, or laws, have no causal efficacy; they do not in fact 'generate' anything. They serve merely to describe regularities and consistent relationships in nature. These patterns may be very illuminating and important, but the underlying causal agencies must be separately specified (though often they are not). But that aside, the game of chess illustrates ... why any laws or rules of emergence and evolution are insufficient. Even in a chess game, you cannot use the rules to predict 'history' – i.e., the course of any given game. Indeed, you cannot even reliably predict the next move in a chess game. Why? Because the 'system' involves more than the rules of the game. It also includes the players and their unfolding, moment-by-moment decisions among a very large number of available options at each choice point. The game of chess is inescapably historical, even though it is also constrained and shaped by a set of rules, not to mention the laws of physics. Moreover, and this is a key point, the game of chess is also shaped by teleonomic, cybernetic, feedback-driven influences. It is not simply a self-ordered process; it involves an , 'purposeful' activity.</span></blockquote> | | <blockquote><span id="CorningDefn" class="citation">Rules, or laws, have no causal efficacy; they do not in fact 'generate' anything. They serve merely to describe regularities and consistent relationships in nature. These patterns may be very illuminating and important, but the underlying causal agencies must be separately specified (though often they are not). But that aside, the game of chess illustrates ... why any laws or rules of emergence and evolution are insufficient. Even in a chess game, you cannot use the rules to predict 'history' – i.e., the course of any given game. Indeed, you cannot even reliably predict the next move in a chess game. Why? Because the 'system' involves more than the rules of the game. It also includes the players and their unfolding, moment-by-moment decisions among a very large number of available options at each choice point. The game of chess is inescapably historical, even though it is also constrained and shaped by a set of rules, not to mention the laws of physics. Moreover, and this is a key point, the game of chess is also shaped by teleonomic, cybernetic, feedback-driven influences. It is not simply a self-ordered process; it involves an , 'purposeful' activity.</span></blockquote> |
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− | 这些规则,或者说定律,没有有效的因果关系; 它们实际上并不‘产生’任何东西。它们只是用来描述自然界中的规律性和一致性关系。这些模式可能非常重要且给人以启发,但必须分别说明潜在的因果关系(尽管通常不是这样)。但是除此之外,国际象棋游戏说明了为什么任何关于出现和进化的法则和规则都是不充分的。即使在国际象棋游戏中,你也不能用这些规则来预测“历史”——也就是说,任何给定游戏进程都不能被预测。事实上,你甚至无法可靠地预测下一步棋的走法。为什么?因为“系统”涉及的不仅仅是游戏规则。它还包括玩家及其在每个选择点对大量可用选项做出决策。国际象棋是不可避免地具有历史性,尽管它也受到一系列规则的约束和塑造,在此之上更不用说物理定律了。此外,着重点也在这,国际象棋的游戏也塑形于目的性,控制论,反馈驱动的影响。它不仅仅是一个自我有序的过程,它还包括一个有组织的、“有目的的”活动
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| + | <span id="CorningDefn" class="citation">Rules, or laws, have no causal efficacy; they do not in fact 'generate' anything. They serve merely to describe regularities and consistent relationships in nature. These patterns may be very illuminating and important, but the underlying causal agencies must be separately specified (though often they are not). But that aside, the game of chess illustrates ... why any laws or rules of emergence and evolution are insufficient. Even in a chess game, you cannot use the rules to predict 'history' – i.e., the course of any given game. Indeed, you cannot even reliably predict the next move in a chess game. Why? Because the 'system' involves more than the rules of the game. It also includes the players and their unfolding, moment-by-moment decisions among a very large number of available options at each choice point. The game of chess is inescapably historical, even though it is also constrained and shaped by a set of rules, not to mention the laws of physics. Moreover, and this is a key point, the game of chess is also shaped by [[teleonomic]], [[cybernetic]], feedback-driven influences. It is not simply a self-ordered process; it involves an organized, 'purposeful' activity.</span><ref name = Corning/> |
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| + | <span id="CorningDefn" class="citation"> |
| + | 这些规则,或者说定律,没有有效的因果关系,它们实际上并不‘产生’任何东西。它们只是用来描述自然界中的规律性和一致性关系。国际象棋游戏说明了为什么任何关于出现和进化的法则和规则都是不充分的。即使在国际象棋游戏中,你也不能用这些规则来预测“历史”——也就是说,任何给定游戏进程都不能被预测。事实上,你甚至无法可靠地预测下一步棋的走法。为什么?因为“系统”涉及的不仅仅是游戏规则。它还包括玩家及其在每个选择点对大量可用选项做出决策。国际象棋是不可避免地具有历史性,尽管它也受到一系列规则的约束和塑造,在此之上更不用说物理定律了。更重要的是,国际象棋的游戏还受到目的性,控制论,反馈驱动的影响。它不仅仅是一个自我有序的过程,它还包括一个有组织的、“有目的的”活动。 |
| + | </span></blockquote> |
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| ===Strong and weak emergence强涌现和弱涌现=== | | ===Strong and weak emergence强涌现和弱涌现=== |