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| − | It is assumed that both prisoners understand the nature of the game, have no loyalty to each other, and will have no opportunity for retribution or reward outside the game. Regardless of what the other decides, each prisoner gets a higher reward by betraying the other ("defecting"). The reasoning involves an argument by [[Dilemma#Use in logic|dilemma]]: B will either cooperate or defect. If B cooperates, A should defect, because going free is better than serving 1 year. If B defects, A should also defect, because serving 2 years is better than serving 3. So either way, A should defect. Parallel reasoning will show that B should defect.
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| − | It is assumed that both prisoners understand the nature of the game, have no loyalty to each other, and will have no opportunity for retribution or reward outside the game. Regardless of what the other decides, each prisoner gets a higher reward by betraying the other ("defecting"). The reasoning involves an argument by dilemma: B will either cooperate or defect. If B cooperates, A should defect, because going free is better than serving 1 year. If B defects, A should also defect, because serving 2 years is better than serving 3. So either way, A should defect. Parallel reasoning will show that B should defect.
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| | 假设两个囚犯都了解博弈的本质，对彼此不忠诚，且在博弈之外没有机会得到报复或奖励。那么不管对方怎么决定，每个犯人背叛对方都会得到更高的奖励(“叛变”)。推理涉及一个进退两难的论点:B 要么合作，要么叛变。如果B合作，A 应该叛变，因为得到释放总比服刑1年好。如果 B叛变，A也应该叛变，因为服刑2年总比服刑3年好。所以不管怎样，A都应该叛变。并行推理表明B应该选择叛变。 | | 假设两个囚犯都了解博弈的本质，对彼此不忠诚，且在博弈之外没有机会得到报复或奖励。那么不管对方怎么决定，每个犯人背叛对方都会得到更高的奖励(“叛变”)。推理涉及一个进退两难的论点:B 要么合作，要么叛变。如果B合作，A 应该叛变，因为得到释放总比服刑1年好。如果 B叛变，A也应该叛变，因为服刑2年总比服刑3年好。所以不管怎样，A都应该叛变。并行推理表明B应该选择叛变。 |
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| | + | 因为不管对方的选择如何，背叛总是比合作带来更好的回报，所以这是一个占优策略 dominant strategy。相互背叛是博弈中唯一的强[[纳什均衡点]]（即每个参与者单方面的改变策略只能使自己的情况变糟)。因此，困境在于，虽然相互合作比相互背叛产生更好的结果，但它却不是理性的结果，因为从自我利益的角度来看，合作的选择是非理性的。 |
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| − | Because defection always results in a better payoff than cooperation regardless of the other player's choice, it is a [[dominant strategy]]. Mutual defection is the only strong [[Nash equilibrium]] in the game (i.e. the only outcome from which each player could only do worse by unilaterally changing strategy). The dilemma, then, is that mutual cooperation yields a better outcome than mutual defection but is not the rational outcome because the choice to cooperate, from a self-interested perspective, is irrational.
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| − | Because defection always results in a better payoff than cooperation regardless of the other player's choice, it is a dominant strategy. Mutual defection is the only strong Nash equilibrium in the game (i.e. the only outcome from which each player could only do worse by unilaterally changing strategy). The dilemma, then, is that mutual cooperation yields a better outcome than mutual defection but is not the rational outcome because the choice to cooperate, from a self-interested perspective, is irrational.
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| − | 因为不管对方的选择如何，背叛总是比合作带来更好的回报，所以这是一个<font color="#ff8000">占优策略 dominant strategy</font>。相互背叛是博弈中唯一的强<font color="#ff8000">纳什均衡点 dominant strategy </font>（即每个参与者单方面的改变策略只能使自己的情况变糟)。因此，困境在于，虽然相互合作比相互背叛产生更好的结果，但它却不是理性的结果，因为从自我利益的角度来看，合作的选择是非理性的。
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| | ==Generalized form== | | ==Generalized form== |