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第16页: “正是在这种情况下……他分析了堂吉诃德Don Quixote的两难处境：走武装之路（praxis，行动）还是走文字之路（poiesis，创造，生产）。我第一次理解了‘poiesis’这个词的力量，并发明了我们需要的词：autopoiesis。这是一个前所未有的词，一个可以直接表达‘在生命系统特有的自主性的动态中发生了什么’的词。”

第16页: “正是在这种情况下……他分析了堂吉诃德Don Quixote的两难处境：走武装之路（praxis，行动）还是走文字之路（poiesis，创造，生产）。我第一次理解了‘poiesis’这个词的力量，并发明了我们需要的词：autopoiesis。这是一个前所未有的词，一个可以直接表达‘在生命系统特有的自主性的动态中发生了什么’的词。”

Page 78: An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network.

Page 78: An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network.

Though others have often used the term as a synonym for self-organization, Maturana himself stated he would "[n]ever use the notion of self-organization ... Operationally it is impossible. That is, if the organization of a thing changes, the thing changes". Moreover, an autopoietic system is autonomous and operationally closed, in the sense that there are sufficient processes within it to maintain the whole. Autopoietic systems are "structurally coupled" with their medium, embedded in a dynamic of changes that can be recalled as sensory-motor coupling. This continuous dynamic is considered as a rudimentary form of knowledge or cognition and can be observed throughout life-forms.

Though others have often used the term as a synonym for self-organization, Maturana himself stated he would "[n]ever use the notion of self-organization ... Operationally it is impossible. That is, if the organization of a thing changes, the thing changes". Moreover, an autopoietic system is autonomous and operationally closed, in the sense that there are sufficient processes within it to maintain the whole. Autopoietic systems are "structurally coupled" with their medium, embedded in a dynamic of changes that can be recalled as sensory-motor coupling. This continuous dynamic is considered as a rudimentary form of knowledge or cognition and can be observed throughout life-forms.

尽管其他人经常使用该术语来作为自组织self-organization的同义词，Maturana本人表示他“永远不会使自组织的概念……在操作上它是不可能的。换句话说，如果一个事物的组织发生了变化，这个事物也就发生了变化。”。此外，自创生系统是资助的，并且在操作上是封闭的。也就是说，它内部有足够的过程，来维持整个系统。自创生系统和它们的媒介“在结构上是耦合的”，嵌入在一种变化的动态中，可以被称为感知-运动的耦合。这种连续的动态被认为是知识或认知的初级形式，可以在整个生命形式中观察到。

尽管其他人经常使用该术语来作为自组织self-organization的同义词，Maturana本人表示他“永远不会使自组织的概念……在操作上它是不可能的。换句话说，如果一个事物的组织发生了变化，这个事物也就发生了变化。”。此外，自创生系统是自主的，并且在操作上是封闭的。也就是说，它内部有足够的过程，来维持整个系统。自创生系统和它们的媒介“在结构上是耦合的”，嵌入在一种变化的动态中，可以被称为感知-运动的耦合。这种连续的动态被认为是知识或认知的初级形式，可以在整个生命形式中观察到。

==Relation to complexity==

==Relation to complexity==

Autopoiesis can be defined as the ratio between the complexity of a system and the complexity of its environment.<ref name="Fernández">

Autopoiesis can be defined as the ratio between the complexity of a system and the complexity of its environment.<ref name="Fernández">

{{quote|This generalized view of autopoiesis considers systems as self-producing not in terms of their physical components, but in terms of its organization, which can be measured in terms of information and complexity. In other words, we can describe autopoietic systems as those producing more of their own complexity than the one produced by their environment.<ref name=Gershenson>{{cite arXiv |title=Requisite Variety, Autopoiesis, and Self-organization | first = Carlos | last = Gershenson | name-list-style = vanc | author-link = Carlos Gershenson|date=26 Sep 2014 |eprint= 1409.7475| class = nlin.AO }}</ref>}}

{{quote|This generalized view of autopoiesis considers systems as self-producing not in terms of their physical components, but in terms of its organization, which can be measured in terms of information and complexity. In other words, we can describe autopoietic systems as those producing more of their own complexity than the one produced by their environment.<ref name=Gershenson>{{cite arXiv |title=Requisite Variety, Autopoiesis, and Self-organization | first = Carlos | last = Gershenson | name-list-style = vanc | author-link = Carlos Gershenson|date=26 Sep 2014 |eprint= 1409.7475| class = nlin.AO }}</ref>}}

An extensive discussion of the connection of autopoiesis to cognition is provided by Thompson. The basic notion of autopoiesis as involving constructive interaction with the environment is extended to include cognition. Initially, Maturana defined cognition as behavior of an organism "with relevance to the maintenance of itself". However, computer models that are self-maintaining but non-cognitive have been devised, so some additional restrictions are needed, and the suggestion is that the maintenance process, to be cognitive, involves readjustment of the internal workings of the system in some metabolic process. On this basis it is claimed that autopoiesis is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for cognition. Thompson (p.&nbsp;127) takes the view that this distinction may or may not be fruitful, but what matters is that living systems involve autopoiesis and (if it is necessary to add this point) cognition as well. It can be noted that this definition of 'cognition' is restricted, and does not necessarily entail any awareness or consciousness by the living system.

An extensive discussion of the connection of autopoiesis to cognition is provided by Thompson. The basic notion of autopoiesis as involving constructive interaction with the environment is extended to include cognition. Initially, Maturana defined cognition as behavior of an organism "with relevance to the maintenance of itself". However, computer models that are self-maintaining but non-cognitive have been devised, so some additional restrictions are needed, and the suggestion is that the maintenance process, to be cognitive, involves readjustment of the internal workings of the system in some metabolic process. On this basis it is claimed that autopoiesis is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for cognition. Thompson (p.&nbsp;127) takes the view that this distinction may or may not be fruitful, but what matters is that living systems involve autopoiesis and (if it is necessary to add this point) cognition as well. It can be noted that this definition of 'cognition' is restricted, and does not necessarily entail any awareness or consciousness by the living system.

==Relation to cognition==

==Relation to cognition==

An extensive discussion of the connection of autopoiesis to [[cognition]] is provided by Thompson.<ref name=Thompson>

An extensive discussion of the connection of autopoiesis to [[cognition]] is provided by Thompson.<ref name=Thompson>

The connection of autopoiesis to cognition, or if necessary, of living systems to cognition, is an objective assessment ascertainable by observation of a living system.

The connection of autopoiesis to cognition, or if necessary, of living systems to cognition, is an objective assessment ascertainable by observation of a living system.

</ref> The basic notion of autopoiesis as involving constructive interaction with the environment is extended to include cognition. Initially, Maturana defined cognition as behavior of an organism "with relevance to the maintenance of itself".<ref name=Maturana>

</ref> The basic notion of autopoiesis as involving constructive interaction with the environment is extended to include cognition. Initially, Maturana defined cognition as behavior of an organism "with relevance to the maintenance of itself".<ref name=Maturana>

One question that arises is about the connection between cognition seen in this manner and consciousness. The separation of cognition and consciousness recognizes that the organism may be unaware of the substratum where decisions are made. What is the connection between these realms? Thompson refers to this issue as the "explanatory gap", and one aspect of it is the hard problem of consciousness, how and why we have qualia.

One question that arises is about the connection between cognition seen in this manner and consciousness. The separation of cognition and consciousness recognizes that the organism may be unaware of the substratum where decisions are made. What is the connection between these realms? Thompson refers to this issue as the "explanatory gap", and one aspect of it is the hard problem of consciousness, how and why we have qualia.

</ref> However, computer models that are self-maintaining but non-cognitive have been devised, so some additional restrictions are needed, and the suggestion is that the maintenance process, to be cognitive, involves readjustment of the internal workings of the system in some [[Metabolism|metabolic process]]. On this basis it is claimed that autopoiesis is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for cognition.<ref name=Bitbol>

</ref> However, computer models that are self-maintaining but non-cognitive have been devised, so some additional restrictions are needed, and the suggestion is that the maintenance process, to be cognitive, involves readjustment of the internal workings of the system in some [[Metabolism|metabolic process]]. On this basis it is claimed that autopoiesis is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for cognition.<ref name=Bitbol>

A second question is whether autopoiesis can provide a bridge between these concepts. Thompson discusses this issue from the standpoint of enactivism. An autopoietic cell actively relates to its environment. Its sensory responses trigger motor behavior governed by autopoiesis, and this behavior (it is claimed) is a simplified version of a nervous system behavior. The further claim is that real-time interactions like this require attention, and an implication of attention is awareness.

A second question is whether autopoiesis can provide a bridge between these concepts. Thompson discusses this issue from the standpoint of enactivism. An autopoietic cell actively relates to its environment. Its sensory responses trigger motor behavior governed by autopoiesis, and this behavior (it is claimed) is a simplified version of a nervous system behavior. The further claim is that real-time interactions like this require attention, and an implication of attention is awareness.

</ref> Thompson (p.&nbsp;127) takes the view that this distinction may or may not be fruitful, but what matters is that living systems involve autopoiesis and (if it is necessary to add this point) cognition as well. It can be noted that this definition of 'cognition' is restricted, and does not necessarily entail any awareness or [[consciousness]] by the living system.

</ref> Thompson (p.&nbsp;127) takes the view that this distinction may or may not be fruitful, but what matters is that living systems involve autopoiesis and (if it is necessary to add this point) cognition as well. It can be noted that this definition of 'cognition' is restricted, and does not necessarily entail any awareness or [[consciousness]] by the living system.

There are multiple criticisms of the use of the term in both its original context, as an attempt to define and explain the living, and its various expanded usages, such as applying it to self-organizing systems in general or social systems in particular. Critics have argued that the concept and its theory fail to define or explain living systems and that, because of the extreme language of self-referentiality it uses without any external reference, it is really an attempt to give substantiation to Maturana's radical constructivist or solipsistic epistemology, or what Danilo Zolo has called instead a "desolate theology". An example is the assertion by Maturana and Varela that "We do not see what we do not see and what we do not see does not exist". The autopoietic model, said Rod Swenson, is "miraculously decoupled from the physical world by its progenitors&nbsp;... (and thus) grounded on a solipsistic foundation that flies in the face of both common sense and scientific knowledge".

There are multiple criticisms of the use of the term in both its original context, as an attempt to define and explain the living, and its various expanded usages, such as applying it to self-organizing systems in general or social systems in particular. Critics have argued that the concept and its theory fail to define or explain living systems and that, because of the extreme language of self-referentiality it uses without any external reference, it is really an attempt to give substantiation to Maturana's radical constructivist or solipsistic epistemology, or what Danilo Zolo has called instead a "desolate theology". An example is the assertion by Maturana and Varela that "We do not see what we do not see and what we do not see does not exist". The autopoietic model, said Rod Swenson, is "miraculously decoupled from the physical world by its progenitors&nbsp;... (and thus) grounded on a solipsistic foundation that flies in the face of both common sense and scientific knowledge".

对于在其原始上下文中使用这一术语，试图界定和解释生活及其各种扩大的用法，例如将其应用于一般的自组织系统或具体的社会系统，有多种批评意见。批评家们认为，这一概念及其理论未能界定或解释生命系统，而且由于它在没有任何外部参照的情况下使用的自指向性的极端语言，它实际上是试图为马图拉纳激进的建构主义或唯我认识论或达尼洛 · 佐罗所称的“荒凉神学”提供实证。一个例子是 Maturana 和 Varela 的断言，即”我们看不到我们看不到的东西，我们看不到的东西不存在”。罗德•斯文森说，自创生模型“奇迹般地与物质世界分离... ... (因此)建立在唯我论的基础上，与常识和科学知识背道而驰”。

对于该术语的应用，无论是在其最初的语境中（即试图定义和解释生命体），还是在其各种扩展的使用中（如将其应用到一半的自组织系统，特别是社会系统），都有多种批评意见[37]。批评者认为，该概念及其理论未能定义或解释神明系统。而且，由于其使用的极端的自我指涉语言没有任何外部参照，它实际上是在为Maturana的激进建构主义constructivist或唯我论solipsistic的认识论epistemology[38]（又被Danilo Zolo称为“荒凉神学”[39][40]）提供证据。自我指涉的一个例子是Maturana和Varela的断言：“我们看不到我们没有看到的东西，我们没有看到的东西也不存在。”Rod Swenson说，自创生模型“奇迹般地与物质世界分离... ... (因此)建立在唯我论的基础上，与常识和科学知识背道而驰。”