更改

还原论还应与消除论区别开来：还原论者不否认现象的存在，而是用另一种现实来解释现象。消除论者否认现象本身的存在。例如，消除论者通过解释物理和化学过程来否认生命的存在。

还原论还应与消除论区别开来：还原论者不否认现象的存在，而是用另一种现实来解释现象。消除论者否认现象本身的存在。例如，消除论者通过解释物理和化学过程来否认生命的存在。

Reductionism does not preclude the existence of what might be termed [[Emergence|emergent phenomena]], but it does imply the ability to understand those phenomena completely in terms of the processes from which they are composed. This reductionist understanding is very different from ontological or strong [[emergentism]], which intends that what emerges in "emergence" is more than the sum of the processes from which it emerges, respectively either in the ontological sense or in the epistemological sense.<ref name=":23">Axelrod and Cohen "Harnessing Complexity"</ref> Some physicists, however, claim that reductionism and emergentism are complementary: both are needed to explain natural processes.<ref name=":24">Piers Coleman, Center for Materials Theory, Rutgers, Hubbard Theory Consortium and Physics Department, Royal Holloway, University of London; contribution to [https://www.d-iep.org/diep DIEP]-conference "Emergence at all lengthscales" 22-01-2019</ref>

Reductionism does not preclude the existence of what might be termed [[Emergence|emergent phenomena]], but it does imply the ability to understand those phenomena completely in terms of the processes from which they are composed. This reductionist understanding is very different from ontological or strong [[emergentism]], which intends that what emerges in "emergence" is more than the sum of the processes from which it emerges, respectively either in the ontological sense or in the epistemological sense.<ref name=":23">Axelrod and Cohen "Harnessing Complexity"</ref> Some physicists, however, claim that reductionism and emergentism are complementary: both are needed to explain natural processes.<ref name=":24">Piers Coleman, Center for Materials Theory, Rutgers, Hubbard Theory Consortium and Physics Department, Royal Holloway, University of London; contribution to [https://www.d-iep.org/diep DIEP]-conference "Emergence at all lengthscales" 22-01-2019</ref>

Jouko Väänänen has argued for [[second-order logic]] as a foundation for mathematics instead of set theory,<ref name=":20">{{cite journal |first=J. |last=Väänänen |title=Second-Order Logic and Foundations of Mathematics |journal=Bulletin of Symbolic Logic |volume=7 |issue=4 |pages=504–520 |year=2001 |doi=10.2307/2687796 |jstor=2687796 |s2cid=7465054 }}</ref> whereas others have argued for [[category theory]] as a foundation for certain aspects of mathematics.<ref name=":21">{{cite journal |first=S. |last=Awodey |title=Structure in Mathematics and Logic: A Categorical Perspective |journal=Philos. Math. |series=Series III |volume=4 |issue=3 |year=1996 |pages=209–237 |doi=10.1093/philmat/4.3.209 }}</ref><ref name=":22">{{cite book |first=F. W. |last=Lawvere |chapter=The Category of Categories as a Foundation for Mathematics |title=Proceedings of the Conference on Categorical Algebra (La Jolla, Calif., 1965) |pages=1–20 |publisher=Springer-Verlag |location=New York |year=1966 }}</ref>

Jouko Väänänen has argued for [[second-order logic]] as a foundation for mathematics instead of set theory,<ref name=":20">{{cite journal |first=J. |last=Väänänen |title=Second-Order Logic and Foundations of Mathematics |journal=Bulletin of Symbolic Logic |volume=7 |issue=4 |pages=504–520 |year=2001 |doi=10.2307/2687796 |jstor=2687796 |s2cid=7465054 }}</ref> whereas others have argued for [[category theory]] as a foundation for certain aspects of mathematics.<ref name=":21">{{cite journal |first=S. |last=Awodey |title=Structure in Mathematics and Logic: A Categorical Perspective |journal=Philos. Math. |series=Series III |volume=4 |issue=3 |year=1996 |pages=209–237 |doi=10.1093/philmat/4.3.209 }}</ref><ref name=":22">{{cite book |first=F. W. |last=Lawvere |chapter=The Category of Categories as a Foundation for Mathematics |title=Proceedings of the Conference on Categorical Algebra (La Jolla, Calif., 1965) |pages=1–20 |publisher=Springer-Verlag |location=New York |year=1966 }}</ref>

Jouko Väänänen认为二阶逻辑是数学的基础，而不是集合论<ref name=":20" /> ，而其他人则认为范畴论是数学某些方面的基础<ref name=":21" /><ref name=":22" />。

Jouko Väänänen 认为二阶逻辑是数学的基础，而不是集合论<ref name=":20" /> ，而其他人则认为范畴论是数学某些方面的基础<ref name=":21" /><ref name=":22" />。

The concept of [[downward causation]] poses an alternative to reductionism within philosophy. This opinion is developed by [[Peter Bøgh Andersen]], [[Claus Emmeche]], [[Niels Ole Finnemann]], and [[Peder Voetmann Christiansen]], among others. These philosophers explore ways in which one can talk about phenomena at a larger-scale level of organization exerting causal influence on a smaller-scale level, and find that some, but not all proposed types of downward causation are compatible with science. In particular, they find that constraint is one way in which downward causation can operate.<ref name=":28">P.B. Andersen, C. Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann, P.V. Christiansen, ''Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter'', Aarhus University Press ({{ISBN|87-7288-814-8}}) (2001)</ref> The notion of causality as constraint has also been explored as a way to shed light on scientific concepts such as [[self-organization]], [[natural selection]], [[adaptation]], and control.<ref name=":29">{{cite web|url=http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Einmag_Abstr/AJuarrero.html |first1=A |last1=Juarrero |title=Causality as Constraint |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110612013407/http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Einmag_Abstr/AJuarrero.html |archive-date=June 12, 2011 }}</ref>

The concept of [[downward causation]] poses an alternative to reductionism within philosophy. This opinion is developed by [[Peter Bøgh Andersen]], [[Claus Emmeche]], [[Niels Ole Finnemann]], and [[Peder Voetmann Christiansen]], among others. These philosophers explore ways in which one can talk about phenomena at a larger-scale level of organization exerting causal influence on a smaller-scale level, and find that some, but not all proposed types of downward causation are compatible with science. In particular, they find that constraint is one way in which downward causation can operate.<ref name=":28">P.B. Andersen, C. Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann, P.V. Christiansen, ''Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter'', Aarhus University Press ({{ISBN|87-7288-814-8}}) (2001)</ref> The notion of causality as constraint has also been explored as a way to shed light on scientific concepts such as [[self-organization]], [[natural selection]], [[adaptation]], and control.<ref name=":29">{{cite web|url=http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Einmag_Abstr/AJuarrero.html |first1=A |last1=Juarrero |title=Causality as Constraint |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110612013407/http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Einmag_Abstr/AJuarrero.html |archive-date=June 12, 2011 }}</ref>

在哲学中，向下因果关系的概念提供了一种还原论的替代方法。这个观点是由彼得·博格·安徒生（[[Peter Bøgh Andersen]]），克劳斯（[[Claus Emmeche]]），尼尔斯·奥立（Niels Ole Finnemann），和 彼得（Peder Voetmann Christiansen ）等人提出的。这些哲学家探索人们可以在更大范围的组织层面上谈论的现象，在更小范围的组织层面上施加因果影响的方式，并发现一些(但不是所有)向下的因果类型与科学是相容的<ref name=":28" /> 。特别地，他们发现约束是向下因果关系的一种运作方式。因果关系作为约束的概念也作为一种阐明科学概念的方式，例如自组织、自然选择、适应和控制<ref name=":29" />。

在哲学中，向下因果关系的概念提供了一种还原论的替代方法。这个观点是由彼得·博格·安徒生（[[Peter Bøgh Andersen]]），克劳斯（[[Claus Emmeche]]），尼尔斯·奥立（Niels Ole Finnemann），和 彼得·克里斯蒂安森（Peder Voetmann Christiansen ）等人提出的。这些哲学家探索人们可以在更大范围的组织层面上谈论的现象，在更小范围的组织层面上施加因果影响的方式，并发现一些(但不是所有)向下的因果类型与科学是相容的<ref name=":28" /> 。特别地，他们发现约束是向下因果关系的一种运作方式。因果关系作为约束的概念也作为一种阐明科学概念的方式，例如自组织、自然选择、适应和控制<ref name=":29" />。

=== 自由意志 ===

=== 自由意志 ===

Philosophers of the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] worked to insulate human free will from reductionism. [[Descartes]] separated the material world of mechanical necessity from the world of mental free will. German philosophers introduced the concept of the "[[Noumenon|noumenal]]" realm that is not governed by the deterministic laws of "[[Phenomena (philosophy)|phenomenal]]" nature, where every event is completely determined by chains of causality.<ref name=":30">Paul Guyer, "18th Century German Aesthetics," [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetics-18th-german/ ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'']</ref> The most influential formulation was by [[Immanuel Kant]], who distinguished between the causal deterministic framework the mind imposes on the world—the phenomenal realm—and the world as it exists for itself, the noumenal realm, which, as he believed, included free will. To insulate theology from reductionism, 19th century post-Enlightenment German theologians, especially [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] and [[Albrecht Ritschl]], used the [[Romanticism|Romantic]] method of basing religion on the human spirit, so that it is a person's feeling or sensibility about spiritual matters that comprises religion.<ref name=":31">Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson, eds. ''The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science'' (2006) p. 161</ref>

Philosophers of the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] worked to insulate human free will from reductionism. [[Descartes]] separated the material world of mechanical necessity from the world of mental free will. German philosophers introduced the concept of the "[[Noumenon|noumenal]]" realm that is not governed by the deterministic laws of "[[Phenomena (philosophy)|phenomenal]]" nature, where every event is completely determined by chains of causality.<ref name=":30">Paul Guyer, "18th Century German Aesthetics," [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetics-18th-german/ ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'']</ref> The most influential formulation was by [[Immanuel Kant]], who distinguished between the causal deterministic framework the mind imposes on the world—the phenomenal realm—and the world as it exists for itself, the noumenal realm, which, as he believed, included free will. To insulate theology from reductionism, 19th century post-Enlightenment German theologians, especially [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] and [[Albrecht Ritschl]], used the [[Romanticism|Romantic]] method of basing religion on the human spirit, so that it is a person's feeling or sensibility about spiritual matters that comprises religion.<ref name=":31">Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson, eds. ''The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science'' (2006) p. 161</ref>

启蒙运动时期的哲学家致力于将人类的自由意志与还原论分割开来。笛卡尔将机械必然性的物质世界与精神自由意志的世界分开。德国哲学家引入了“本体”领域的概念，这一领域不受“现象”自然的决定论法则的控制，在“现象”自然中，每一个事件都完全由一系列因果关系所决定<ref name=":30" /> 。最有影响力的是伊曼努尔·康德(Immanuel Kant)，他区分了思维强加于世界(现象界)的因果决定论框架和它自己存在的世界(本体界)，他认为本体界包括自由意志。为了将神学与还原论相互剥离，19世纪后启蒙时代的德国神学家们，尤其是施莱马赫(Friedrich Schleiermacher)和阿尔布雷希特·里施(Albrecht Ritschl)，采用了浪漫主义的方法，将宗教建立在人类精神的基础上，从而，一个人对精神事物的感觉或情感构成了宗教<ref name=":31" />。

启蒙运动时期的哲学家致力于将人类的自由意志与还原论分割开来。笛卡尔将机械必然性的物质世界与精神自由意志的世界分开。德国哲学家引入了“本体”领域的概念，这一领域不受“现象”自然的决定论法则的控制，在“现象”自然中，每一个事件都完全由一系列因果关系所决定<ref name=":30" /> 。最有影响力的是伊曼努尔·康德(Immanuel Kant)，他区分了思维强加于世界(现象界)的因果决定论框架和它自己存在的世界(本体界)，他认为本体界包括自由意志。为了将神学与还原论相互剥离开来，19世纪后启蒙时代的德国神学家们，特别是施莱马赫(Friedrich Schleiermacher)和阿尔布雷希特·里施(Albrecht Ritschl)采用了浪漫主义的方法，将宗教建立在人类精神的基础上——一个人对精神事物的感觉或情感形成了宗教<ref name=":31" />。

=== 因果关系 ===

=== 因果关系 ===

=== 反还原论主义 ===

=== 反还原论主义 ===

{{Main|Antireductionism}}

{{Main|Antireductionism}}

A contrast to reductionism is [[holism]] or [[emergentism]]. Holism is the idea that, in the whole, items can have properties, known as ''emergent properties'', that are not explainable from the sum of their parts. The principle of holism was summarized concisely by [[Aristotle]] in the [[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]: "The whole is more than the sum of its parts".

A contrast to reductionism is [[holism]] or [[emergentism]]. Holism is the idea that, in the whole, items can have properties, known as ''emergent properties'', that are not explainable from the sum of their parts. The principle of holism was summarized concisely by [[Aristotle]] in the [[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]: "The whole is more than the sum of its parts".

与还原论相对的是整体论或浮现论。整体论是这样一种观点，即整体上，项目可以具有一些属性，即所谓的涌现属性，这些属性不能用各个部分的和来解释。亚里士多德在《形而上学》一书中对整体主义原则进行了简明的概括: “整体大于各部分之和”。

与还原论相对的是整体论或涌现论。整体论认为，事物从整体上看具有的一些属性——即所谓的涌现属性，这些属性不能用各个部分的和来解释。亚里士多德在《形而上学》一书中对整体主义的原则进行了简明的概括: “整体大于部分之和”。

=== Fragmentalism ===

=== 碎片主义 ===

An alternative term for ontological reductionism is ''fragmentalism'',<ref>{{cite journal|author=Kukla A|title=Antirealist Explanations of the Success of Science|journal=Philosophy of Science|volume=63|issue=1|pages=S298–S305|year=1996|doi=10.1086/289964|jstor=188539|s2cid=171074337}}</ref> often used in a [[pejorative]] sense.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Pope ML|title=Personal construction of formal knowledge|journal=Interchange|volume=13|issue=4|pages=3–14|year=1982|doi=10.1007/BF01191417|s2cid=198195182}}</ref> [[Anti-realism|Anti-realists]] use the term ''fragmentalism'' in arguments that the world does not exist of separable [[Non-physical entity|entities]], instead consisting of wholes. For example, advocates of this idea claim that:

An alternative term for ontological reductionism is ''fragmentalism'',<ref>{{cite journal|author=Kukla A|title=Antirealist Explanations of the Success of Science|journal=Philosophy of Science|volume=63|issue=1|pages=S298–S305|year=1996|doi=10.1086/289964|jstor=188539|s2cid=171074337}}</ref> often used in a [[pejorative]] sense.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Pope ML|title=Personal construction of formal knowledge|journal=Interchange|volume=13|issue=4|pages=3–14|year=1982|doi=10.1007/BF01191417|s2cid=198195182}}</ref> [[Anti-realism|Anti-realists]] use the term ''fragmentalism'' in arguments that the world does not exist of separable [[Non-physical entity|entities]], instead consisting of wholes. For example, advocates of this idea claim that:

<blockquote>

<blockquote>

The linear deterministic approach to nature and technology promoted a fragmented perception of reality, and a loss of the ability to foresee, to adequately evaluate, in all their complexity, global crises in ecology, civilization and education.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.indiana.edu/~isre/NEWSLETTER/vol6no2/global.htm|title=Global education as a trend reflecting the problems of today and meeting the requirements of tomorrow|website=Indiana University Bloomington|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/19991003182135/http://www.indiana.edu/~isre/NEWSLETTER/vol6no2/global.htm|archive-date=3 October 1999|author=Anatoly P. Liferov}}</ref>

The linear deterministic approach to nature and technology promoted a fragmented perception of reality, and a loss of the ability to foresee, to adequately evaluate, in all their complexity, global crises in ecology, civilization and education.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.indiana.edu/~isre/NEWSLETTER/vol6no2/global.htm|title=Global education as a trend reflecting the problems of today and meeting the requirements of tomorrow|website=Indiana University Bloomington|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/19991003182135/http://www.indiana.edu/~isre/NEWSLETTER/vol6no2/global.htm|archive-date=3 October 1999|author=Anatoly P. Liferov}}</ref>

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

The term ''fragmentalism'' is usually applied to reductionist modes of thought, often with the related pejorative term ''[[scientism]]''. This usage is popular among some ecological activists: <blockquote>There is a need now to move away from [[scientism]] and the ideology of cause-and-effect determinism toward a radical [[empiricism]], such as [[William James]] proposed, as an [[epistemology]] of science.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://bioregionalanimism.blogspot.com/|title=Redirecting|website=bioregionalanimism.blogspot.com}}</ref></blockquote> These perspectives are not new; during the early 20th century, [[William James]] noted that rationalist science emphasized what he called fragmentation and disconnection.<ref name=Lumpkin />

The term ''fragmentalism'' is usually applied to reductionist modes of thought, often with the related pejorative term ''[[scientism]]''. This usage is popular among some ecological activists:

 

“碎片主义”一词通常用来指还原主义的思维模式，通常与贬义的“科学主义”相关。这种用法在一些生态活动家中很流行: <blockquote>There is a need now to move away from [[scientism]] and the ideology of cause-and-effect determinism toward a radical [[empiricism]], such as [[William James]] proposed, as an [[epistemology]] of science.<ref name=":32">{{cite web|url=http://bioregionalanimism.blogspot.com/|title=Redirecting|website=bioregionalanimism.blogspot.com}}</ref>

 

现在有必要摆脱科学主义和因果决定论的思想，转向彻底的经验主义，如威廉·詹姆斯（[[William James]] ）提出的科学认识论<ref name=":32" />。</blockquote> These perspectives are not new; during the early 20th century, [[William James]] noted that rationalist science emphasized what he called fragmentation and disconnection.<ref name=Lumpkin />

碎片主义一词通常用于还原主义的思维模式，通常带有相关的贬义词科学主义。这种用法在一些生态活动家中很流行: 现在有必要摆脱科学主义和因果决定论的思想，转向彻底的经验主义，如威廉 · 詹姆斯提出的科学认识论。这些观点并不新鲜; 在20世纪早期，威廉 · 詹姆斯注意到理性主义科学强调他所谓的分裂和脱节。

这些观点并不新鲜; 在20世纪早期，威廉 · 詹姆斯注意到理性主义科学强调他所谓的分裂和脱节<ref name="Lumpkin" />。

Such opinions also motivate many criticisms of the scientific method:

Such opinions also motivate many criticisms of the scientific method:

<blockquote

 

<blockquote>The scientific method only acknowledges monophasic consciousness. The method is a specialized system that emphasizes studying small and distinctive parts in isolation, which results in fragmented knowledge.<ref name="Lumpkin">[http://www.bioregionalanimism.com/2006/12/is-polyphasic-consciousness-necessary.html Tara W. Lumpkin, ''Perceptual Diversity: Is Polyphasic Consciousness Necessary for Global Survival?'' December 28, 2006]</ref>

>The scientific method only acknowledges monophasic consciousness. The method is a specialized system that emphasizes studying small and distinctive parts in isolation, which results in fragmented knowledge.<ref name=Lumpkin>[http://www.bioregionalanimism.com/2006/12/is-polyphasic-consciousness-necessary.html Tara W. Lumpkin, ''Perceptual Diversity: Is Polyphasic Consciousness Necessary for Global Survival?'' December 28, 2006]</ref></blockquote>

科学方法只承认单相意识（monophasic consciousness）。这种方法强调孤立地研究小而独特的部分特定系统，从而导致知识的碎片化<ref name="Lumpkin" />。</blockquote>

== Alternatives ==

== 替代方案 ==

The development of [[systems thinking]] has provided methods that seek to describe issues in a [[holism|holistic]] rather than a reductionist way, and many scientists use a [[Holism in science|holistic paradigm]].<ref>[[Dossey, Larry]]. ''Reinventing Medicine: Beyond Mind-Body to a New Era of Healing.'' ({{ISBN|0-06-251622-1}}) HarperSanFrancisco. (1999)</ref> When the terms are used in a scientific context, holism and reductionism refer primarily to what sorts of [[scientific model|models]] or theories offer valid explanations of the natural world; the scientific method of falsifying hypotheses, checking empirical data against theory, is largely unchanged, but the method guides which theories are considered.

The development of [[systems thinking]] has provided methods that seek to describe issues in a [[holism|holistic]] rather than a reductionist way, and many scientists use a [[Holism in science|holistic paradigm]].<ref name=":33">[[Dossey, Larry]]. ''Reinventing Medicine: Beyond Mind-Body to a New Era of Healing.'' ({{ISBN|0-06-251622-1}}) HarperSanFrancisco. (1999)</ref> When the terms are used in a scientific context, holism and reductionism refer primarily to what sorts of [[scientific model|models]] or theories offer valid explanations of the natural world; the scientific method of falsifying hypotheses, checking empirical data against theory, is largely unchanged, but the method guides which theories are considered.

In many cases (such as the [[kinetic theory of gases]]), given a good understanding of the components of the system, one can predict all the important properties of the system as a whole. In other systems, especially concerned with life and life's emergent properties ([[morphogenesis]], [[autopoiesis]], and [[metabolism]]), [[emergent properties]] of the system are said to be almost impossible to predict from knowledge of the parts of the system. [[Complex systems|Complexity theory]] studies systems and properties of the latter type.

In many cases (such as the [[kinetic theory of gases]]), given a good understanding of the components of the system, one can predict all the important properties of the system as a whole. In other systems, especially concerned with life and life's emergent properties ([[morphogenesis]], [[autopoiesis]], and [[metabolism]]), [[emergent properties]] of the system are said to be almost impossible to predict from knowledge of the parts of the system. [[Complex systems|Complexity theory]] studies systems and properties of the latter type.

在许多情况下(例如分子运动论) ，只要对系统的组成部分有很好的了解，就可以预测整个系统的所有重要特性。在其他系统中，特别是关于生命和生命的涌现特性(形态发生、自创生和新陈代谢) ，系统的涌现特性据说几乎不可能从系统各部分的知识中预测。复杂性理论研究系统和后一种类型的性质。

在许多情况下(例如气体动力学理论) ，只要对系统的组成部分有很好的了解，就可以预测系统作为一个整体的所有重要性质。在其他系统中，特别是与生命或与有关生命的涌现特性(形态发生、自生成和新陈代谢) ，从系统各部分的知识来预测系统的涌现特性被认为几乎是不可能的。复杂性理论研究系统和后一种类型的性质。

[[Alfred North Whitehead]]'s metaphysics opposed reductionism. He refers to this as the "fallacy of the misplaced concreteness". His scheme was to frame a rational, general understanding of phenomena, derived from our reality.

[[Alfred North Whitehead]]'s metaphysics opposed reductionism. He refers to this as the "fallacy of the misplaced concreteness". His scheme was to frame a rational, general understanding of phenomena, derived from our reality.

 

 

 

 

[[Ecologist]] [[Sven Erik Jorgensen]] makes both theoretical and practical arguments for a [[holistic]] method in certain topics of science, especially [[ecology]]. He argues that many systems are so complex that they can ever be described in complete detail. In analogy to the Heisenberg [[uncertainty principle]] in physics, he argues that many interesting ecological phenomena cannot be replicated in laboratory conditions, and so cannot be measured or observed without changing the system in some way. He also indicates the importance of inter-connectedness in biological systems. He believes that science can only progress by outlining questions that are unanswerable and by using models that do not try to explain everything in terms of smaller hierarchical levels of organization, but instead model them on the scale of the system itself, taking into account some (but not all) factors from levels higher and lower in the hierarchy.<ref>S. E. Jørgensen, ''Integration of Ecosystem Theories: A Pattern'', 3rd ed. Kluwer Academic Publishers, ({{ISBN|1-4020-0651-9}}) (2002) Chapters 1 & 2.</ref>

在认知心理学领域，乔治 · 凯利（George Kelly）发展了“构建替代主义”作为个人建构心理学的一种形式，也是他所认为的“累积碎片主义”的替代。在这一理论中，知识被看作是外部世界的成功的心理模型的构建，而不是独立的“真理金块”的累积<ref name=":35" />。

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