涌现进化
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Emergent evolution was the hypothesis that, in the course of evolution, some entirely new properties, such as mind and consciousness, appear at certain critical points, usually because of an unpredictable rearrangement of the already existing entities. The term was originated by the psychologist C. Lloyd Morgan in 1922 in his Gifford Lectures at St. Andrews, which would later be published as the 1923 book Emergent Evolution.[1][2]
Emergent evolution was the hypothesis that, in the course of evolution, some entirely new properties, such as mind and consciousness, appear at certain critical points, usually because of an unpredictable rearrangement of the already existing entities. The term was originated by the psychologist C. Lloyd Morgan in 1922 in his Gifford Lectures at St. Andrews, which would later be published as the 1923 book Emergent Evolution.}}
突生演化是这样一种假设: 在进化的过程中，一些全新的属性，如思维和意识，在某些关键点上出现，通常是因为已经存在的实体发生了不可预知的重新排列。1922年，心理学家 c · 劳埃德 · 摩根在他位于圣安德鲁斯的吉福德的讲述教学法中首次提出了这个术语，后来这本书在1923年出版，名为《突生演化
The hypothesis was widely criticized for providing no mechanism to how entirely new properties emerge, and for its historical roots in teleology.[2][3][4]
St. George Jackson Mivart's On the Genesis of Species (1872) and Edward Cope's Origin of the Fittest (1887) raised the need to address the origin of variation between members of a species. William Bateson in 1884 distinguished between the origin of novel variations and the action of natural selection (Materials for the Study of Variation Treated with Especial Regard to Discontinuity in the Origin of Species).
圣乔治·杰克逊·米瓦特的《物种起源》(1872)和 Edward Cope 的《适者生存的起源》(1887)提出了解决物种成员间变异起源的需要。在1884年，William Bateson 区分了新的变异的起源和自然选择的作用(研究变异的材料，特别考虑到物种起源的不连续性)。
Historical context
The term emergent was first used to describe the concept by George Lewes in volume two of his 1875 book Problems of Life and Mind (p. 412). Henri Bergson covered similar themes in his popular 1907 book Creative Evolution on the Élan vital. Emergence was further developed by Samuel Alexander in his Gifford Lectures at Glasgow during 1916–18 and published as Space, Time, and Deity (1920). The related term emergent evolution was coined by C. Lloyd Morgan in his own Gifford lectures of 1921–22 at St. Andrews and published as Emergent Evolution (1923). In an appendix to a lecture in his book, Morgan acknowledged the contributions of Roy Wood Sellars's Evolutionary Naturalism (1922).
Wallace throughout his life continued to support and extend the scope of Darwin's theory of evolution via the mechanism of natural selection. One of his works, Darwinism, was often cited in support of Darwin's theory. He also worked to elaborate and extend Darwin and his ideas on natural selection. However, Wallace also realized that the scope and claim of the theory was limited. Darwin himself had limited it.
华莱士一生都在通过自然选择的机制支持和扩展达尔文的进化论。他的著作之一，达尔文主义，经常被引用来支持达尔文的理论。他还致力于阐述和扩展达尔文和他关于自然选择的思想。然而，华莱士也意识到这个理论的范围和要求是有限的。达尔文自己对其进行了限制。
Origins
{{quote|the most prominent feature is that I enter into popular yet critical examination of those underlying fundamental problems which Darwin purposely excluded from his works as being beyond the scope of his enquiry. Such are the nature and cause of Life itself, and more especially of its most fundamental and mysterious powers - growth and reproduction ...
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... 即使它被证明是事实的精确表述，它也不会是一个解释... 因为它不会考虑作为成长基本特征的力量、指令机构和组织力量... }
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Wallace then refers to the operation of another power called "mind" that utilizes the power of life and is connected with a higher realm than life or matter:
然后，华莱士提到了另一种叫做“心灵”的力量的运作，这种力量利用了生命的力量，与比生命或物质更高的领域相连接:
St. George Jackson Mivart's On the Genesis of Species (1872) and Edward Cope's Origin of the Fittest (1887) raised the need to address the origin of variation between members of a species. William Bateson in 1884 distinguished between the origin of novel variations and the action of natural selection (Materials for the Study of Variation Treated with Especial Regard to Discontinuity in the Origin of Species).[5]
Wallace's further thoughts
Proceeding from Hunter's view that Life is the directive power above and behind living matter, Wallace argues that logically, Mind is the cause of consciousness, which exists in different degrees and kinds in living matter.
华莱士从亨特的观点出发，认为生命是生命物质之上和之后的指令性力量，他认为，从逻辑上讲，意识是意识的起因，意识在生命物质中以不同的程度和种类存在。
Wallace throughout his life continued to support and extend the scope of Darwin's theory of evolution via the mechanism of natural selection. One of his works, Darwinism, was often cited in support of Darwin's theory. He also worked to elaborate and extend Darwin and his ideas on natural selection. However, Wallace also realized that the scope and claim of the theory was limited. Darwin himself had limited it.
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The issue of how change in nature 'emerged' can be found in classical Greek thought - order coming out of chaos and whether by chance or necessity. Aristotle spoke of wholes that were greater than the sum of their parts because of emergent properties. The second-century anatomist and physiologist Galen also distinguished between the resultant and emergent qualities of wholes. (Reid, p. 72)
自然界的改变是如何发生的，这个问题可以在古希腊的思想秩序中找到——从混乱中产生，无论是出于偶然还是必然。亚里士多德提到，由于涌现的特性，整体大于各部分之和。公元二世纪的解剖学家和生理学家加伦也区分了整体的结果性质和涌现性质。(Reid，第72页)
In examining this aspect, excluded ab initio by Darwin, Wallace came to the conclusion that Life itself cannot be understood except by means of a theory that includes "an organising and directive Life-Principle." These necessarily involve a "Creative Power", a "directive Mind" and finally "an ultimate Purpose" (the development of Man). It supports the view of John Hunter that "life is the cause, not the consequence" of the organisation of matter. Thus, life precedes matter and when it infuses matter, forms living matter (protoplasm).
Hegel spoke of the revolutionary progression of life from non-living to conscious and then to the spiritual and Kant perceived that simple parts of an organism interact to produce a progressively complex series of emergences of functional forms, a distinction that carried over to John Stuart Mill (1843), who stated that even chemical compounds have novel features that cannot be predicted from their elements. [Reid, p. 72]
黑格尔谈到了生命从无生命到有意识，然后到精神层面的革命性发展，康德认为，一个有机体的简单部分相互作用，产生了一系列渐进复杂的功能形式，这种区别延续到约翰·斯图尔特·密尔时代(1843年) ，后者指出，即使是化合物也具有从其元素中预测不到的新特征。[ Reid，p. 72]
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Wallace then refers to the operation of another power called "mind" that utilizes the power of life and is connected with a higher realm than life or matter:
The idea of an emergent quality that was something new in nature was further taken up by George Henry Lewes (1874–1875), who again noted, as with Galen earlier, that these evolutionary "emergent" qualities are distinguishable from adaptive, additive "resultants." Henry Drummond in The Descent of Man (1894) stated that emergence can be seen in the fact that the laws of nature are different for the organic or vital compared to the inertial inorganic realm.
突现特性是自然界中的某种新事物这一观点被乔治·亨利·刘易斯(1874-1875)进一步采纳，他再次指出，正如盖伦之前所说的，这些进化的“突现”特性与适应的、可加的“结果”是有区别的亨利 · 德拉蒙德在《人类的由来(1894)指出，自然界的涌现可以从这样一个事实中看出来: 对于有机物或生命体，自然法则与惯性的无机物领域是不同的。
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Proceeding from Hunter's view that Life is the directive power above and behind living matter, Wallace argues that logically, Mind is the cause of consciousness, which exists in different degrees and kinds in living matter.
As Reid points out, Drummond also realized that greater complexity brought greater adaptability. (Reid. p. 73)
正如里德指出的那样，德拉蒙德也意识到，更大的复杂性带来了更强的适应性。(里德。P. 73)
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{{quote|If we turn reductionism on its head we add levels. More carefully, we add new laws that satisfy the constraints imposed by laws already in place. Moreover these new laws apply to complex phenomena that are consequences of the original laws; they are at a new level. Morgan, due to his work in animal psychology, had earlier (1894) questioned the continuity view of mental evolution, and held that there were various discontinuities in cross-species mental abilities. To offset any attempt to read anthropomorphism into his view, he created the famous, but often misunderstood methodological canon:
摩根关于高低之间的极化关系的观点，被塞缪尔 · 亚历山大所采纳。亚历山大认为，心理过程不能简化为神经过程，而神经过程依赖于物质-物质层面。相反，它们是功能统一体的两极。此外，表达心理过程的神经过程本身具有其他神经过程所没有的特性(思维)。同时，心理过程，因为它在功能上与这个特定的神经过程相同，也是一个重要的过程
Another major scientist to question natural selection as the motive force of evolution was C. Lloyd Morgan, a zoologist and student of T.H. Huxley, who had a strong influence on Samuel Alexander. His Emergent Evolution (1923) established the central idea that an emergence might have the appearance of saltation but was best regarded as "a qualitative change of direction or critical turning point."(quoted in Reid, p. 73-74)[5] Morgan, due to his work in animal psychology, had earlier (1894) questioned the continuity view of mental evolution, and held that there were various discontinuities in cross-species mental abilities. To offset any attempt to read anthropomorphism into his view, he created the famous, but often misunderstood methodological canon:
At the same time Alexander stated that his view was not one of animism or vitalism, where the mind is an independent entity action on the brain, or conversely, acted upon by the brain. Mental activity is an emergent, a new "thing" not reducible to its initial neural parts.
与此同时，亚历山大声明他的观点不是万物有灵论或活力论，即思想是大脑上的一个独立的实体行动，或者反过来说，是大脑的行动。心理活动是一种自然产生的，一种新的“事物” ，不能还原为它最初的神经部分。
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However, Morgan realizing that this was being misused to advocate reductionism (rather than as a general methodological caution), introduced a qualification into the second edition of his An Introduction to Comparative Psychology (1903):
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For Alexander, the world unfolds in space-time, which has the inherent quality of motion. This motion through space-time results in new “complexities of motion” in the form of a new quality or emergent. The emergent retains the qualities of the prior “complexities of motion” but also has something new that was not there before. This something new comes with its own laws of behavior. Time is the quality that creates motion through Space, and matter is simply motion expressed in forms in Space, or as Alexander says a little later, “complexes of motion.” Matter arises out of the basic ground of Space-Time continuity and has an element of “body” (lower order) and an element of “mind” (higher order), or “the conception that a secondary quality is the mind of its primary substrate.”
对于亚历山大来说，世界在时空中展开，具有运动的内在特性。这种穿越时空的运动导致了新的“运动复杂性” ，以一种新的性质或涌现的形式出现。涌现保留了以前“运动的复杂性”的特性，但也有一些以前没有的新东西。这种新事物有它自己的行为规律。时间是通过空间创造运动的特性，而物质只是以空间的形式表达的运动，或者正如亚历山大稍后所说的“运动复合体”物质产生于时空连续性的基础之上，具有“身体”(低阶)和“心灵”(高阶)的元素，或者“第二性质是其主要基底的心灵的概念”
As Reid observes,
Mind is an emergent from life and life itself is an emergent from matter. Each level contains and is interconnected with the level and qualities below it, and to the extent that it contains lower levels, these aspects are subject to the laws of that level. All mental functions are living, but not all living functions are mental; all living functions are physico-chemical, but not all physico-chemical processes are living - just as we could say that all people living in Ohio are Americans, but not all Americans live in Ohio. Thus, there are levels of existence, or natural jurisdictions, within a given higher level such that the higher level contains elements of each of the previous levels of existence. The physical level contains the pure dimensionality of Space-Time in addition to the emergent of physico-chemical processes; the next emergent level, life, also contains Space-Time as well as the physico-chemical in addition to the quality of life; the level of mind contains all of the previous three levels, plus consciousness. As a result of this nesting and inter-action of emergents, like fluid Russian dolls, higher emergents cannot be reduced to lower ones, and different laws and methods of inquiry are required for each level.
心是生活的产物，生活本身是物质的产物。每个层次包含并与其下面的层次和质量相互关联，并且在其包含较低层次的范围内，这些方面受该层次的规律的制约。所有的心理功能都是活的，但并非所有的生理功能都是心理功能; 所有的生理功能都是物理化学的，但并非所有的物理化学过程都是活的——正如我们可以说，所有生活在俄亥俄州的人都是美国人，但并非所有美国人都生活在。因此，在一个给定的更高层次上存在着存在的层次，或自然管辖权，以至于更高层次包含了以前存在的每一个层次的要素。物理层次包含纯粹的时空维度，除此之外还有物理化学过程的涌现; 下一个涌现层次，生命，除了生命的质量之外，还包含时空和物理化学; 心智层次包含前三个层次的所有内容，加上意识。由于这种嵌套和相互作用，就像流动的俄罗斯娃娃一样，更高的嵌套和相互作用不能降低为更低的嵌套和相互作用，因此每个层次都需要不同的法律和查询方法。
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Morgan also fought against the behaviorist school and clarified even more his emergent views on evolution:
For Alexander, the "directing agency" or entelechy is found "in the principle or plan".
对于亚历山大来说，“指导机构”或者“诱惑”存在于“原则或者计划”中。
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His Animal Conduct (1930) explicitly distinguishes between three "grades" or "levels of mentality" which he labeled: 'percipient, perceptive, and reflective.' (p. 42)
While an emergent is a higher complexity, it also results in a new simplicity as it brings a higher order into what was previously less ordered (a new simplex out of a complex). This new simplicity does not carry any of the qualities or aspects of that emergent level prior to it, but as noted, does still carry within it such lower levels so can be understood to that extent through the science of such levels, yet not itself be understood except by a science that is able to reveal the new laws and principles applicable to it.
虽然涌现是一个更高的复杂性，它也导致了一个新的简单性，因为它带来了一个更高的秩序，以前是较少的(一个新的单纯形的复杂)。这种新的简单性并不具备新兴水平之前的任何特性或方面，但是正如所指出的，它仍然具有如此低的水平，因此可以通过这种水平的科学来理解，但是除了能够揭示适用于它的新法则和原则的科学之外，它本身并不能被理解。
Alexander and the emergence of mind
{{quote|Ascent takes place, it would seem, through complexity.[increasing order] But at each change of quality the complexity as it were gathers itself together and is expressed in a new simplicity.
...在一个层次上有完善或发展的程度，同时在属于这个层次的存在者之间有下降的亲和力。这种完美的差异并不等同于秩序或等级的差异，例如物质与生命或生命与心灵之间的差异
And mental process is also "something new, "a fresh creation", which precludes a psycho-physiological parallelism. Reductionism is also contrary to empirical fact.
The concept or idea of mind, the highest emergent known to us, being at our level, extends all the way down to pure dimensionality or Space-Time. In other words, time is the “mind” of motion, materialising is the “mind” of matter, living the “mind” of life. Motion through pure time (or life astronomical, mind ideational) emerges as matter “materialising” (geological time, life geological, mind existential), and this emerges as life “living” (biological time, life biological, mind experiential), which in turn give us mind “minding” (historical time, life historical, mind cognitional). But there is also an extension possible upwards of mind to what we call Deity.
心灵的概念或想法，我们所知道的最高涌现，在我们的层面上，一直延伸到纯粹的维度或时空。换句话说，时间是运动的“心” ，物化是物质的“心” ，活在生命的“心”中。在纯粹时间(或生命、天文、心灵概念)中的运动，以物质的形式出现(地质时间、生命地质、心灵存在) ，以生命的形式出现(生物时间、生命生物、心灵经验) ，从而赋予我们心灵的”思维”(历史时间、生命历史、心灵认知)。但是也有一种可能的延伸，就是我们所说的神性。
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At the same time Alexander stated that his view was not one of animism or vitalism, where the mind is an independent entity action on the brain, or conversely, acted upon by the brain. Mental activity is an emergent, a new "thing" not reducible to its initial neural parts.
Alexander goes back to the Greek idea of knowledge being “out there” in the object being contemplated. In that sense, there is not mental object (concept) “distinct” (that is, different in state of being) from the physical object, but only an apparent split between the two, which can then be brought together by proper compresence or participation of the consciousness in the object itself.
亚历山大追溯到希腊的观点，认为知识存在于所考虑的对象之外。在这个意义上，并不存在精神客体(概念)与物理客体(即存在状态不同)之间的“区别” ，而只是两者之间的明显分裂，这可以通过对客体本身的适当压缩或意识的参与而聚合在一起。
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For Alexander, the world unfolds in space-time, which has the inherent quality of motion. This motion through space-time results in new “complexities of motion” in the form of a new quality or emergent. The emergent retains the qualities of the prior “complexities of motion” but also has something new that was not there before. This something new comes with its own laws of behavior. Time is the quality that creates motion through Space, and matter is simply motion expressed in forms in Space, or as Alexander says a little later, “complexes of motion.” Matter arises out of the basic ground of Space-Time continuity and has an element of “body” (lower order) and an element of “mind” (higher order), or “the conception that a secondary quality is the mind of its primary substrate.”
Because of the interconnectedness of the universe by virtue of Space-Time, and because the mind apprehends space, time and motion through a unity of sense and mind experience, there is a form of knowing that is intuitive (participative) - sense and reason are outgrowths from it.
由于宇宙借助于时空的相互联系，又由于头脑通过感觉和头脑经验的统一来理解空间、时间和运动，所以存在着一种直觉(参与性)的认知形式——感觉和理性是由此而生的。
Mind is an emergent from life and life itself is an emergent from matter. Each level contains and is interconnected with the level and qualities below it, and to the extent that it contains lower levels, these aspects are subject to the laws of that level. All mental functions are living, but not all living functions are mental; all living functions are physico-chemical, but not all physico-chemical processes are living - just as we could say that all people living in Ohio are Americans, but not all Americans live in Ohio. Thus, there are levels of existence, or natural jurisdictions, within a given higher level such that the higher level contains elements of each of the previous levels of existence. The physical level contains the pure dimensionality of Space-Time in addition to the emergent of physico-chemical processes; the next emergent level, life, also contains Space-Time as well as the physico-chemical in addition to the quality of life; the level of mind contains all of the previous three levels, plus consciousness. As a result of this nesting and inter-action of emergents, like fluid Russian dolls, higher emergents cannot be reduced to lower ones, and different laws and methods of inquiry are required for each level.
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因此，头脑并不通过感觉来理解其对象的空间，即它们的形状、大小和位置，因为它的性质仅仅取决于时空条件，虽然它在没有感觉(或者当然是思维)的情况下不能作为意识而存在。很明显，不必重复这些考虑，同样的命题也适用于时间和运动... ..。我将称这种理解模式为它与感觉、直觉的区别。直觉和理性是不同的，但是理性和感觉都是由它产生的，是对它的经验决定
For Alexander, the "directing agency" or entelechy is found "in the principle or plan".
In a sense, the universe is a participative one and open to participation by mind as well so that mind can intuitively know an object, contrary to what Kant asserted. Participation (togetherness) is something that is “enjoyed” (experienced) not contemplated, though in the higher level of consciousness, it would be contemplated.
从某种意义上说，宇宙是一个参与性的宇宙，它也是一个开放的思维参与的宇宙，因此思维能够直观地认识一个对象，这与康德所断言的恰恰相反。参与(归属感)是一种“享受”(体验)的东西，没有经过深思熟虑，尽管在更高层次的意识中，它会被深思熟虑。
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While an emergent is a higher complexity, it also results in a new simplicity as it brings a higher order into what was previously less ordered (a new simplex out of a complex). This new simplicity does not carry any of the qualities or aspects of that emergent level prior to it, but as noted, does still carry within it such lower levels so can be understood to that extent through the science of such levels, yet not itself be understood except by a science that is able to reveal the new laws and principles applicable to it.
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Reid later published the book Biological Emergences (2007) with a theory on how emergent novelties are generated in evolution. According to Massimo Pigliucci "Biological Emergences by Robert Reid is an interesting contribution to the ongoing debate on the status of evolutionary theory, but it is hard to separate the good stuff from the more dubious claims." Pigliucci noted a dubious claim in the book is that natural selection has no role in evolution. It was positively reviewed by biologist Alexander Badyaev who commented that "the book succeeds in drawing attention to an under appreciated aspect of the evolutionary process". Others have criticized Reid's unorthodox views on emergence and evolution. Biologist Samuel Scheiner stated that Reid's "presentation is both a caricature of evolutionary theory and severely out of date."
里德后来出版了《生物能出现》(Biological Emergences，2007)一书，其中提出了一个关于新生事物如何在进化中产生的理论。按照 Massimo Pigliucci 的说法，“罗伯特 · 里德的《生物荣誉》是对进化论地位的持续辩论的一个有趣贡献，但是很难把好的东西和更可疑的说法区分开来。”皮格里乌奇在书中提到了一个可疑的观点，即自然选择在进化中没有任何作用。这本书得到了生物学家亚历山大 · 巴德耶夫的正面评价，他评论说: “这本书成功地引起了人们对进化过程中一个不受重视的方面的注意”。其他人则批评里德关于突现和进化的非正统观点。生物学家塞缪尔 · 谢纳(samuelscheiner)指出，里德的“陈述既是对进化论的讽刺，又严重过时”
The concept or idea of mind, the highest emergent known to us, being at our level, extends all the way down to pure dimensionality or Space-Time. In other words, time is the “mind” of motion, materialising is the “mind” of matter, living the “mind” of life. Motion through pure time (or life astronomical, mind ideational) emerges as matter “materialising” (geological time, life geological, mind existential), and this emerges as life “living” (biological time, life biological, mind experiential), which in turn give us mind “minding” (historical time, life historical, mind cognitional). But there is also an extension possible upwards of mind to what we call Deity.
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Alexander goes back to the Greek idea of knowledge being “out there” in the object being contemplated. In that sense, there is not mental object (concept) “distinct” (that is, different in state of being) from the physical object, but only an apparent split between the two, which can then be brought together by proper compresence or participation of the consciousness in the object itself.
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Because of the interconnectedness of the universe by virtue of Space-Time, and because the mind apprehends space, time and motion through a unity of sense and mind experience, there is a form of knowing that is intuitive (participative) - sense and reason are outgrowths from it.
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In a sense, the universe is a participative one and open to participation by mind as well so that mind can intuitively know an object, contrary to what Kant asserted. Participation (togetherness) is something that is “enjoyed” (experienced) not contemplated, though in the higher level of consciousness, it would be contemplated.
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Robert G. B. Reid
Emergent evolution was revived by Robert G. B. Reid (March 20, 1939 - May 28, 2016), a biology professor at the University of Victoria (in British Columbia, Canada). In his book Evolutionary Theory: The Unfinished Synthesis (1985), he stated that the modern evolutionary synthesis with its emphasis on natural selection is an incomplete picture of evolution, and emergent evolution can explain the origin of genetic variation.[6][7] Biologist Ernst Mayr heavily criticized the book claiming it was a misinformed attack on natural selection. Mayr commented that Reid was working from an "obsolete conceptual framework", provided no solid evidence and that he was arguing for a teleological process of evolution.[8]
Reid later published the book Biological Emergences (2007) with a theory on how emergent novelties are generated in evolution.[9][10] According to Massimo Pigliucci "Biological Emergences by Robert Reid is an interesting contribution to the ongoing debate on the status of evolutionary theory, but it is hard to separate the good stuff from the more dubious claims." Pigliucci noted a dubious claim in the book is that natural selection has no role in evolution.[11] It was positively reviewed by biologist Alexander Badyaev who commented that "the book succeeds in drawing attention to an under appreciated aspect of the evolutionary process".[12] Others have criticized Reid's unorthodox views on emergence and evolution. Biologist Samuel Scheiner stated that Reid's "presentation is both a caricature of evolutionary theory and severely out of date."[13]
Evolution
进化
See also
Category:Non-Darwinian evolution
类别: 非达尔文进化论
Category:Philosophical theories
范畴: 哲学理论
Category:Evolutionary biology
分类: 进化生物学
Category:Holism
分类: 整体论
This page was moved from wikipedia:en:Emergent evolution. Its edit history can be viewed at 涌现进化/edithistory
- ↑ Morgan, Conway Lloyd (1923). Emergent evolution : the Gifford lectures, delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the year 1922. MIT Libraries. New York : Henry Holt and Company ; London : William and Norgate. http://archive.org/details/emergentevolutio00morg_0.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Bowler, Peter J. (2001). Reconciling Science and Religion: The Debate in Early-Twentieth-Century Britain. University of Chicago Press. pp. 140-142, pp. 376-384.
- ↑ McLaughlin, Brian P. (1992). The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism. In A. Beckerman, H. Flohr, and J. Kim, eds., Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 49–93.
- ↑ Baylis, Charles A. (1929). The Philosophic Functions of Emergence. The Philosophical Review. Vol. 38, No. 4. pp. 372-384.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 引用错误：无效
<ref>标签；未给name属性为Reid的引用提供文字 - ↑ Williams, Mary B. (1986). Evolutionary Theory: The Unfinished Synthesis by Robert G. B. Reid. The Quarterly Review of Biology. Vol. 61, No. 2, p. 266.
- ↑ Cornell, John F. (1987). Evolutionary Theory: The Unfinished Synthesis by Robert G. B. Reid. Journal of the History of Biology. Vol. 20, No. 3. pp. 424-425.
- ↑ Mayr, Ernst. (1986). Evolutionary Theory: The Unfinished Synthesis by Robert G. B. Reid. Isis. Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 358-359.
- ↑ Rose, Christopher S. (2008). Biological Emergences: Evolution by Natural Experiment by Robert G. B. Reid. Integrative and Comparative Biology. Vol. 48, No. 6. pp. 871-873.
- ↑ "Biological Emergences". MIT Press.
- ↑ Pigliucci, Massimo. (2009). "Down with Natural Selection?" Perspectives in Biology and Medicine. 52: 134-140.
- ↑ Badyaev, Alexander V. (2008). Evolution Despite Natural Selection? Emergence Theory and the Ever Elusive Link Between Adaptation and Adaptability. Acta Biotheoretica 56: 249-255.
- ↑ Scheiner, Samuel M. (2004). The Metamorphosis of Evo-Devo. BioScience. Vol. 54, No. 12. pp. 1150-1151.