主体间性

此词条暂由彩云小译翻译,翻译字数共2253,未经人工整理和审校,带来阅读不便,请见谅。

模板:Lead too short In philosophy, psychology, sociology, and anthropology, intersubjectivity is the relation or intersection between people's cognitive perspectives.


In philosophy, psychology, sociology, and anthropology, intersubjectivity is the relation or intersection between people's cognitive perspectives.

在哲学、心理学、社会学和人类学中,交互主体性是人们认知视角之间的关系或交叉点。

Definition

Definition

= 定义 =

模板:Em is a term coined by social scientists to refer to a variety of types of human interaction. For example, social psychologists Alex Gillespie and Flora Cornish listed at least seven definitions of intersubjectivity (and other disciplines have additional definitions):

  • people's agreement on the shared definition of a concept;
  • people's mutual awareness of agreement or disagreement, or of understanding or misunderstanding each other;
  • people's attribution of intentionality, feelings, and beliefs to each other;
  • people's implicit or automatic behavioral orientations towards other people;
  • people's interactive performance within a situation;
  • people's shared and taken-for-granted background assumptions, whether consensual or contested; and
  • "the variety of possible relations between people's perspectives".[1]
is a term coined by social scientists to refer to a variety of types of human interaction. For example, social psychologists Alex Gillespie and Flora Cornish listed at least seven definitions of intersubjectivity (and other disciplines have additional definitions): 
  • people's agreement on the shared definition of a concept;
  • people's mutual awareness of agreement or disagreement, or of understanding or misunderstanding each other;
  • people's attribution of intentionality, feelings, and beliefs to each other;
  • people's implicit or automatic behavioral orientations towards other people;
  • people's interactive performance within a situation;
  • people's shared and taken-for-granted background assumptions, whether consensual or contested; and
  • "the variety of possible relations between people's perspectives".

是社会科学家创造的一个术语,用来指各种类型的人类互动。例如,社会心理学家亚历克斯 · 吉莱斯皮(Alex Gillespie)和弗洛拉 · 科尼什(Flora Cornish)列出了至少七个关于交互主体性的定义(其他学科还有其他定义) :

  • 人们对一个概念的共同定义达成一致;
  • 人们对共同意见或不同意见的相互认识,或者对理解或误解的相互认识;
  • 人们对彼此的意图、感觉和信念的归因;。

模板:Em has been used in social science to refer to agreement. There is intersubjectivity between people if they agree on a given set of meanings or share the same perception of a situation. Similarly, Thomas Scheff defines 模板:Em as "the sharing of subjective states by two or more individuals".[2]

has been used in social science to refer to agreement. There is intersubjectivity between people if they agree on a given set of meanings or share the same perception of a situation. Similarly, Thomas Scheff defines  as "the sharing of subjective states by two or more individuals".Scheff, Thomas et al. (2006). Goffman Unbound!: A New Paradigm for Social Science (The Sociological Imagination), Paradigm Publishers ()

在社会科学中被用来表示一致。如果人们对某一特定的意义达成一致,或者对某一情况有着相同的看法,那么他们之间就会产生交互主体性。同样,托马斯 · 舍夫定义为“两个或两个以上的个体共享主观状态”。(2006).高夫曼无拘无束!《社会科学新范式》(社会学的想象力) ,《范式出版社》(出版社)

模板:Em also has been used to refer to the common-sense, shared meanings constructed by people in their interactions with each other and used as an everyday resource to interpret the meaning of elements of social and cultural life. If people share common sense, then they share a definition of the situation.[3]

also has been used to refer to the common-sense, shared meanings constructed by people in their interactions with each other and used as an everyday resource to interpret the meaning of elements of social and cultural life. If people share common sense, then they share a definition of the situation.Clive Seale. Glossary,  Researching Society and Culture.

也被用来指人们在相互交往中所建构的常识、共同的意义,并作为日常资源来解释社会和文化生活要素的意义。如果人们拥有共同的常识,那么他们对于情况的定义也是相同的。词汇,研究社会和文化。

The term has also been used to refer to shared (or partially shared) 模板:Em of meaning. Self-presentation, lying, practical jokes, and social emotions, for example, all entail not a shared definition of the situation but partially shared divergences of meaning. Someone who is telling a lie is engaged in an intersubjective act because they are working with two different definitions of the situation. Lying is thus genuinely intersubjective (in the sense of operating between two subjective definitions of reality).[citation needed]

The term has also been used to refer to shared (or partially shared) of meaning. Self-presentation, lying, practical jokes, and social emotions, for example, all entail not a shared definition of the situation but partially shared divergences of meaning. Someone who is telling a lie is engaged in an intersubjective act because they are working with two different definitions of the situation. Lying is thus genuinely intersubjective (in the sense of operating between two subjective definitions of reality).

这个术语也被用来指共享(或部分共享)的意义。例如,自我表现、说谎、恶作剧和社会情绪,所有这些都不需要一个共同的情境定义,而是部分共同的意义分歧。说谎的人是在从事主体间性行为,因为他们对情况有两种不同的定义。因此,说谎是真正的主体间性(在两个主观的现实定义之间操作的意义)。

Among the early authors who explored this conception in psychoanalysis, in an explicit or implicit way, were Jacques Lacan, Heinz Kohut, Robert Stolorow, George E. Atwood, Jessica Benjamin in the United States, and Silvia Montefoschi in Italy.

Among the early authors who explored this conception in psychoanalysis, in an explicit or implicit way, were Jacques Lacan, Heinz Kohut, Robert Stolorow, George E. Atwood, Jessica Benjamin in the United States, and Silvia Montefoschi in Italy.

早期的作者在精神分析学中以显性或隐性的方式探索了这一概念,其中包括雅克 · 拉康、海因茨 · 科胡特、罗伯特 · 斯托罗、乔治 · E · 阿特伍德、美国的杰西卡 · 本杰明和意大利的西尔维娅 · 蒙特福斯基。

Psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin, in The Bonds of Love, wrote, "The concept of intersubjectivity has its origins in the social theory of Jürgen Habermas (1970), who used the expression 'the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding' to designate an individual capacity and a social domain."[4] Psychoanalyst Molly Macdonald argued in 2011 that a "potential point of origin" for the term was in Jean Hyppolite's use of l'inter-subjectivité in an essay from 1955 on "The Human Situation in the Hegelian Phenomenology".[5] However, the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, whose work Habermas and Hyppolite draw upon, was the first to develop the term, which was subsequently elaborated upon by other phenomenologists such as Edith Stein, Emmanuel Levinas, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin, in The Bonds of Love, wrote, "The concept of intersubjectivity has its origins in the social theory of Jürgen Habermas (1970), who used the expression 'the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding' to designate an individual capacity and a social domain." Psychoanalyst Molly Macdonald argued in 2011 that a "potential point of origin" for the term was in Jean Hyppolite's use of l'inter-subjectivité in an essay from 1955 on "The Human Situation in the Hegelian Phenomenology".Macdonald, M (2011) "Hegel, Psychoanalysis and Intersubjectivity" in Philosophy Compass, 6/7 p449 However, the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, whose work Habermas and Hyppolite draw upon, was the first to develop the term, which was subsequently elaborated upon by other phenomenologists such as Edith Stein, Emmanuel Levinas, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

精神分析学家杰西卡 · 本杰明在《爱的纽带》中写道: “交互主体性的概念起源于于尔根 · 哈贝马斯(1970)的社会理论,他用‘相互理解的交互主体性’这个表达来指定个人能力和社会领域。”2011年,精神分析学家莫莉 · 麦克唐纳(Molly Macdonald)在一篇1955年的文章《黑格尔现象学中的人类处境》中指出,这个术语的“潜在起源点”是让 · 希波利特(Jean Hyppolite)对“主体间性”的使用。麦克唐纳德,M (2011)《黑格尔,精神分析与交互主体性》 ,哲学指南针,6/7 p449然而,现象学家埃德蒙胡塞尔,其著作《哈贝马斯与希波利特》(Habermas and hyppoli)的借鉴,是第一个发展这个术语的人,这个术语随后被其他现象学家阐述,如伊迪丝斯坦,伊曼纽尔·列维纳斯和莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂。

Philosophy

Contemporarily, intersubjectivity is the major topic in both the analytic and the continental traditions of philosophy. Intersubjectivity is considered crucial not only at the relational level but also at the epistemological and even metaphysical levels. For example, intersubjectivity is postulated as playing a role in establishing the truth of propositions, and constituting the so-called objectivity of objects.

Contemporarily, intersubjectivity is the major topic in both the analytic and the continental traditions of philosophy. Intersubjectivity is considered crucial not only at the relational level but also at the epistemological and even metaphysical levels. For example, intersubjectivity is postulated as playing a role in establishing the truth of propositions, and constituting the so-called objectivity of objects.

= = 哲学 = = 当代,交互主体性是分析哲学和大陆哲学传统中的主要话题。交互主体性被认为是至关重要的,不仅在关系层面,而且在认识论,甚至形而上学层面。例如,交互主体性被假定为在建立命题的真理和构成所谓的对象的客观性方面发挥作用。

A central concern in consciousness studies of the past 50 years is the so-called problem of other minds, which asks how we can justify our belief that people have minds much like our own and predict others' mind-states and behavior, as our experience shows we often can.[6] Contemporary philosophical theories of intersubjectivity need to address the problem of other minds.

A central concern in consciousness studies of the past 50 years is the so-called problem of other minds, which asks how we can justify our belief that people have minds much like our own and predict others' mind-states and behavior, as our experience shows we often can.Hyslop, A (2010). "Other Minds", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.) Accessed from plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/other-minds/>. Section 1. Contemporary philosophical theories of intersubjectivity need to address the problem of other minds.

在过去50年的意识研究中,一个核心问题就是所谓的“他人思维问题”,这个问题要求我们如何证明我们的信念,即人们的思维和我们自己的很像,并预测他人的思维状态和行为,正如我们的经验表明我们经常可以做到的那样。希斯洛普 A (2010)。《其他心灵》 ,斯坦福大学哲学百科全书(秋季版) ,爱德华• N •扎尔塔(Ed.)从 plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/other-minds/进入。第一部分。当代哲学的交互主体性理论需要解决其他思想的问题。

In the debate between cognitive individualism and cognitive universalism, some aspects of thinking are neither solely personal nor fully universal. Cognitive sociology proponents argue for intersubjectivity—an intermediate perspective of social cognition that provides a balanced view between personal and universal views of our social cognition. This approach suggests that, instead of being individual or universal thinkers, human beings subscribe to "thought communities"—communities of differing beliefs. Thought community examples include churches, professions, scientific beliefs, generations, nations, and political movements.[7] This perspective explains why each individual thinks differently from another (individualism): person A may choose to adhere to expiry dates on foods, but person B may believe that expiry dates are only guidelines and it is still safe to eat the food days past the expiry date. But not all human beings think the same way (universalism).

In the debate between cognitive individualism and cognitive universalism, some aspects of thinking are neither solely personal nor fully universal. Cognitive sociology proponents argue for intersubjectivity—an intermediate perspective of social cognition that provides a balanced view between personal and universal views of our social cognition. This approach suggests that, instead of being individual or universal thinkers, human beings subscribe to "thought communities"—communities of differing beliefs. Thought community examples include churches, professions, scientific beliefs, generations, nations, and political movements. This perspective explains why each individual thinks differently from another (individualism): person A may choose to adhere to expiry dates on foods, but person B may believe that expiry dates are only guidelines and it is still safe to eat the food days past the expiry date. But not all human beings think the same way (universalism).

在认知个人主义和认知普遍主义的争论中,思维的某些方面既不完全个人化,也不完全普遍化。认知社会学的支持者主张主体间性ーー一种社会认知的中间视角,在个人和普遍的社会认知观点之间提供了一种平衡的观点。这种方法表明,人类不是个体或普遍的思想家,而是属于“思想共同体”ーー具有不同信仰的共同体。思想社区的例子包括教堂、职业、科学信仰、世代、民族和政治运动。这个观点解释了为何每个人的想法都不同于另一个人(个人主义) : A 人可能选择坚持食物的有效期,但 B 人可能认为有效期只是一个指引,过了有效期以后食用食物仍然是安全的。但并非所有人都这样想(普遍主义)。

Intersubjectivity argues that each thought community shares social experiences that are different from the social experiences of other thought communities, creating differing beliefs among people who subscribe to different thought communities. These experiences transcend our subjectivity, which explains why they can be shared by the entire thought community.[7] Proponents of intersubjectivity support the view that individual beliefs are often the result of thought community beliefs, not just personal experiences or universal and objective human beliefs. Beliefs are recast in terms of standards, which are set by thought communities.

Intersubjectivity argues that each thought community shares social experiences that are different from the social experiences of other thought communities, creating differing beliefs among people who subscribe to different thought communities. These experiences transcend our subjectivity, which explains why they can be shared by the entire thought community. Proponents of intersubjectivity support the view that individual beliefs are often the result of thought community beliefs, not just personal experiences or universal and objective human beliefs. Beliefs are recast in terms of standards, which are set by thought communities.

交互主体性认为,每个思想社区都分享不同于其他思想社区的社会经验,从而在信奉不同思想社区的人群中创造出不同的信仰。这些经验超越了我们的主观性,这就解释了为什么它们可以被整个思想共同体分享。交互主体性的支持者支持这样一种观点,即个人信仰往往是思想共同体信仰的结果,而不仅仅是个人经历或普遍和客观的人类信仰。信仰是根据标准重铸的,这些标准是由思想群体设定的。

Phenomenology

Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, recognized the importance of intersubjectivity, and wrote extensively on the topic. In German, his writings on intersubjectivity are gathered in volumes 13–15 of the Husserliana. In English, his best-known text on intersubjectivity is the Cartesian Meditations (it is this text that features solely in the Husserl reader entitled The Essential Husserl). Although Husserlian phenomenology is often charged with methodological solipsism, in the fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl attempts to grapple with the problem of intersubjectivity and puts forward his theory of transcendental, monadological intersubjectivity.[8]

Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, recognized the importance of intersubjectivity, and wrote extensively on the topic. In German, his writings on intersubjectivity are gathered in volumes 13–15 of the Husserliana. In English, his best-known text on intersubjectivity is the Cartesian Meditations (it is this text that features solely in the Husserl reader entitled The Essential Husserl). Although Husserlian phenomenology is often charged with methodological solipsism, in the fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl attempts to grapple with the problem of intersubjectivity and puts forward his theory of transcendental, monadological intersubjectivity.E. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, Klumer Academic Publishers. Translated by Dorion Cairns.

现象学现象学的创始人埃德蒙胡塞尔认识到了交互主体性的重要性,并就这一主题写了大量的文章。在德语中,他关于交互主体性的著作被收录在胡塞利亚纳书中的第13-15卷中。在英语中,他最著名的关于交互主体性的文本是笛卡尔沉思录(正是这本文本在胡塞尔的读者名为《胡塞尔本质》中独具特色)。尽管胡塞尔现象学经常被指责为方法论唯我主义,但在第五笛卡尔冥想中,胡塞尔试图抓住交互主体性的问题,并提出了他的先验的、单一的主体间性理论。胡塞尔,笛卡尔沉思,克鲁默学术出版社。翻译: Dorion Cairns。

Husserl's student Edith Stein extended intersubjectivity's basis in empathy in her 1917 doctoral dissertation, On the Problem of Empathy (Zum Problem der Einfühlung).

Husserl's student Edith Stein extended intersubjectivity's basis in empathy in her 1917 doctoral dissertation, On the Problem of Empathy (Zum Problem der Einfühlung).

胡塞尔的学生伊迪丝 · 斯坦在她1917年的交互主体性博士论文《论移情问题》中扩展了移情的基础。

Intersubjectivity also helps to constitute objectivity: in the experience of the world as available not only to oneself, but also to the other, there is a bridge between the personal and the shared, the self and the others.模板:Fact

Intersubjectivity also helps to constitute objectivity: in the experience of the world as available not only to oneself, but also to the other, there is a bridge between the personal and the shared, the self and the others.

交互主体性也有助于构成客观性: 在世界经验中,不仅对自己可用,而且对他人也可用,在个人与共享、自我与他人之间有一座桥梁。

Psychology

Discussions and theories of intersubjectivity are prominent and of importance in contemporary psychology, theory of mind, and consciousness studies. Three major contemporary theories of intersubjectivity are theory theory, simulation theory, and interaction theory.

Discussions and theories of intersubjectivity are prominent and of importance in contemporary psychology, theory of mind, and consciousness studies. Three major contemporary theories of intersubjectivity are theory theory, simulation theory, and interaction theory.

= = 心理学 = = 关于交互主体性的讨论和理论在当代心理学、心理理论和意识研究中非常突出和重要。当代三大交互主体性理论是理论理论、模拟理论和互动理论。

Shannon Spaulding, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Oklahoma State University, wrote: /* Styling for Template:Quote */ .templatequote { overflow: hidden; margin: 1em 0; padding: 0 40px; } .templatequote .templatequotecite {

   line-height: 1.5em;
   /* @noflip */
   text-align: left;
   /* @noflip */
   padding-left: 1.6em;
   margin-top: 0;

}

Shannon Spaulding, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Oklahoma State University, wrote:

奥克拉荷马州立大学哲学系助理教授香农•斯波尔丁(Shannon Spaulding)写道:

Simulation theorists, on the other hand, claim that we explain and predict others' behaviour by using our own minds as a model and "putting ourselves in another's shoes"—that is, by imagining what our mental states would be and how we would behave if we were in the other's situation. More specifically, we simulate what the other's mental states could have been to cause the observed behaviour, then use the simulated mental states, pretend beliefs, and pretend desires as input, running them through our own decision-making mechanism. We then take the resulting conclusion and attribute it to the other person.[9] Authors like Vittorio Gallese have proposed a theory of embodied simulation that refers to neuroscientific research on mirror neurons and phenomenological research.[10]

Simulation theorists, on the other hand, claim that we explain and predict others' behaviour by using our own minds as a model and "putting ourselves in another's shoes"—that is, by imagining what our mental states would be and how we would behave if we were in the other's situation. More specifically, we simulate what the other's mental states could have been to cause the observed behaviour, then use the simulated mental states, pretend beliefs, and pretend desires as input, running them through our own decision-making mechanism. We then take the resulting conclusion and attribute it to the other person. Authors like Vittorio Gallese have proposed a theory of embodied simulation that refers to neuroscientific research on mirror neurons and phenomenological research.Gallese, V & Sinigaglia, C. (2011) What is so special about embodied simulation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Vol. 15, No. 11.

另一方面,模拟理论家声称,我们解释和预测他人的行为是通过使用我们自己的大脑作为模型,并“设身处地地为他人着想”ーー也就是说,通过想象我们的心理状态会是什么,以及如果我们处于他人的情况下我们会如何行事。更具体地说,我们模拟其他人的精神状态可能导致观察到的行为,然后使用模拟的精神状态、假装的信念和假装的欲望作为输入,通过我们自己的决策机制运行它们。然后,我们得出结论,并将其归因于另一个人。像 Vittorio Gallese 这样的作者已经提出了一种体验模拟理论,这种理论指的是对镜像神经元和现象学研究的神经科学研究。Gallese,V & Sinigaglia,C. (2011)具体化模拟有什么特别之处。认知科学的发展趋势。沃尔。15,不。11.

Spaulding noted that this debate has stalled in the past few years, with progress limited to articulating various hybrid simulation theories—"theory theory" accounts.[9] To resolve this impasse, authors like Shaun Gallagher put forward interaction theory. Gallagher writes that an "... important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward ... participatory aspects of social understanding...." Interaction theory is put forward to "galvanize" the interactive turn in explanations of intersubjectivity.[11] Gallagher defines an interaction as two or more autonomous agents engaged in co-regulated coupling behavior. For example, when walking a dog, both the owner's behavior is regulated by the dog stopping and sniffing, and the dog's behavior is regulated by the lead and the owner's commands. Ergo, walking the dog is an example of an interactive process. For Gallagher, interaction and direct perception constitute what he terms "primary" (or basic) intersubjectivity.

Spaulding noted that this debate has stalled in the past few years, with progress limited to articulating various hybrid simulation theories—"theory theory" accounts. To resolve this impasse, authors like Shaun Gallagher put forward interaction theory. Gallagher writes that an "... important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward ... participatory aspects of social understanding...." Interaction theory is put forward to "galvanize" the interactive turn in explanations of intersubjectivity.De Jaeger, H., Di Paulo, E., & Gallagher, S. (2010) Can social interaction constitute social cognition? Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Vol. 14, No. 10. Pg 441. Gallagher defines an interaction as two or more autonomous agents engaged in co-regulated coupling behavior. For example, when walking a dog, both the owner's behavior is regulated by the dog stopping and sniffing, and the dog's behavior is regulated by the lead and the owner's commands. Ergo, walking the dog is an example of an interactive process. For Gallagher, interaction and direct perception constitute what he terms "primary" (or basic) intersubjectivity.

Spaulding 指出,这场辩论在过去几年已经停滞不前,进展仅限于阐明各种混合模拟理论ーー“理论理论”的说法。为了解决这一僵局,肖恩 · 加拉格尔等作家提出了互动理论。加拉格尔写道: “在社会认知研究中,一个重要的转变正在发生,从关注个人思想转向... 社会理解的参与性方面...”互动理论被提出来“刺激”解释 intersubjectivity.de 的互动性转变。(2010)社会互动能构成社会认知吗?认知科学的发展趋势。沃尔。14号,不。10.Pg 441.Gallagher 将交互定义为参与共同调节耦合行为的两个或多个自治代理。例如,当遛狗时,主人的行为都是由狗停下来嗅闻来调节的,而狗的行为则是由领导和主人的命令来调节的。因此,遛狗是一个互动过程的例子。在加拉格尔看来,互动和直接感知构成了他所说的“基本”(或基本)交互主体性。

Studies of dialogue and dialogism reveal how language is deeply intersubjective. When we speak, we always address our interlocutors, taking their perspective and orienting to what we think they think (or, more often, don't think).[12] Within this tradition of research, it has been argued that the structure of individual signs or symbols, the basis of language, is intersubjective[13] and that the psychological process of self-reflection entails intersubjectivity.[14] Recent research on mirror neurons provides evidence for the deeply intersubjective basis of human psychology,[15] and arguably much of the literature on empathy and theory of mind relates directly to intersubjectivity.

Studies of dialogue and dialogism reveal how language is deeply intersubjective. When we speak, we always address our interlocutors, taking their perspective and orienting to what we think they think (or, more often, don't think).Linell, P. (2009). Rethinking language, mind and world dialogically. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing Within this tradition of research, it has been argued that the structure of individual signs or symbols, the basis of language, is intersubjectiveGillespie, A. (2009). The intersubjective nature of symbols. In Brady Wagoner (Ed), Symbolic transformations. London: Routledge and that the psychological process of self-reflection entails intersubjectivity.Gillespie, A. (2007). The social basis of self-reflection. In Valsiner and Rosa (Eds), The Cambridge handbook of sociocultural psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University press Recent research on mirror neurons provides evidence for the deeply intersubjective basis of human psychology,Rizzolatti, G. & Arbib, M. A. (1998). Language within our grasp. Trends in neurosciences, 21, 188-194. and arguably much of the literature on empathy and theory of mind relates directly to intersubjectivity.

对话和对话的研究揭示了语言是如何深刻的主体间性。当我们说话的时候,我们总是对我们的对话者说话,采纳他们的观点,并且倾向于我们认为他们在想什么(或者,更多的时候,不这样认为)。Linell,P. (2009).对话地反思语言、心灵和世界。NC,夏洛特: 信息时代出版在这种研究传统中,有人认为,个体符号或符号的结构,语言的基础,是主体间性的。(2009).符号的主体间性。在布雷迪瓦格纳(编) ,符号转换。伦敦: 劳特利奇和自我反省的心理过程需要交互主体性。(2007).自我反省的社会基础。在 Valsiner 和罗莎(教育出版社) ,剑桥大学社会文化心理学手册。剑桥: 剑桥大学出版社最近关于镜像神经元的研究为人类心理学的深刻的主体间性基础提供了证据,Rizzolatti,G。 & Arbib,M.A。(1998).语言在我们掌握之中。神经科学的发展趋势,21,188-194。可以说,许多关于同理心和心理理论的文献都与交互主体性直接相关。

In child development

Colwyn Trevarthen has applied intersubjectivity to the very rapid cultural development of new born infants.[16] Research suggests that as babies, humans are biologically wired to "coordinate their actions with others".[17] This ability to coordinate and sync with others facilitates cognitive and emotional learning through social interaction. Additionally, the most socially productive relationship between children and adults is bidirectional, where both parties actively define a shared culture.[17] The bidirectional aspect lets the active parties organize the relationship how they see fit—what they see as important receives the most focus. Emphasis is placed on the idea that children are actively involved in how they learn, using intersubjectivity.[17]

Colwyn Trevarthen has applied intersubjectivity to the very rapid cultural development of new born infants. Research suggests that as babies, humans are biologically wired to "coordinate their actions with others". This ability to coordinate and sync with others facilitates cognitive and emotional learning through social interaction. Additionally, the most socially productive relationship between children and adults is bidirectional, where both parties actively define a shared culture. The bidirectional aspect lets the active parties organize the relationship how they see fit—what they see as important receives the most focus. Emphasis is placed on the idea that children are actively involved in how they learn, using intersubjectivity.

= = 在儿童发展领域 = = Colwyn Trevarthen 将交互主体性应用于新生婴儿非常快速的文化发展。研究表明,在婴儿时期,人类的生理机能就是“与他人协调行动”。这种与他人协调和同步的能力通过社会互动促进了认知和情感学习。此外,儿童和成年人之间最具社会生产力的关系是双向的,双方积极定义一种共同的文化。双向方面允许主动方按照他们认为合适的方式来组织关系ーー他们认为重要的东西得到最多的关注。重点放在孩子积极参与如何学习的想法上,使用交互主体性。

Across cultures

The ways intersubjectivity occurs varies across cultures. In certain Indigenous American communities, nonverbal communication is so prevalent that intersubjectivity may occur regularly amongst all members of the community, in part perhaps due to a "joint cultural understanding" and a history of shared endeavors.[18] This "joint cultural understanding" may develop in small, Indigenous American communities where children have grown up embedded in their community's values, expectations, and livelihoods—learning through participation with adults rather than through intent verbal instruction—working in cohesion with one another in shared endeavors on a daily basis. Having grown up within this context may have led to members of this community to have what is described by some as a "blending of agendas",[18] or by others as a "dovetailing of motives".[19] If community or family members have the same general goals in mind they may thus act cohesively within an overlapping state of mind. Whether persons are in each other's presence or merely within the same community this blending of agendas or dovetailing of motives enables intersubjectivity to occur within these shared endeavors.[18]

The ways intersubjectivity occurs varies across cultures. In certain Indigenous American communities, nonverbal communication is so prevalent that intersubjectivity may occur regularly amongst all members of the community, in part perhaps due to a "joint cultural understanding" and a history of shared endeavors.Correa-Chávez, M., & Roberts, A. (2012). A cultural analysis is necessary in understanding intersubjectivity. Culture & Psychology, 18(1), 99-108. doi: 10.1177/1354067X11427471 This "joint cultural understanding" may develop in small, Indigenous American communities where children have grown up embedded in their community's values, expectations, and livelihoods—learning through participation with adults rather than through intent verbal instruction—working in cohesion with one another in shared endeavors on a daily basis. Having grown up within this context may have led to members of this community to have what is described by some as a "blending of agendas", or by others as a "dovetailing of motives".Danziger, E., & Rumsey, A. (2013). Introduction: From Opacity to intersubjectivity across languages and cultures. Language & Communication, 33(3), 247-250. If community or family members have the same general goals in mind they may thus act cohesively within an overlapping state of mind. Whether persons are in each other's presence or merely within the same community this blending of agendas or dovetailing of motives enables intersubjectivity to occur within these shared endeavors.

= = = 跨文化 = = = = 交互主体性发生的方式因文化而异。在某些美洲原住民社区,非言语交际是如此普遍,以至于交互主体性可能在社区的所有成员之间定期发生,部分原因可能是由于“共同的文化理解”和共同努力的历史。科雷亚-查韦斯 M & Roberts,A。(2012).文化分析是理解交互主体性的必要条件。文化与心理学,18(1) ,99-108。Doi: 10.1177/1354067X11427471这种“共同的文化理解”可能在美国原住民小社区发展,在那里,儿童已经成长为社区价值观、期望和生计的一部分ーー通过与成年人的共同参与而不是通过有目的的口头教导来学习ーー每天在共同努力的基础上相互协调地工作。在这种背景下成长起来,可能会导致这个群体的成员产生某些人所说的“议程的混合”,或者其他人所说的“动机的衔接”。Danziger E. 和 Rumsey A。(2013).介绍: 从不透明到跨语言和跨文化的交互主体性。语言与沟通,33(3) ,247-250。如果社区或家庭成员在头脑中有相同的一般目标,他们可能因此在一个重叠的思维状态中协调一致地行动。无论人们是在对方的存在或仅仅是在同一个社区,这种议程的混合或动机的吻合,使交互主体性发生在这些共同的努力。

The cultural value of respeto may also contribute to intersubjectivity in some communities; unlike the English definition of 'respect', respeto refers loosely to a mutual consideration for others' activities, needs, wants, etc.[18] Similar to "putting yourself in another's shoes" the prevalence of respeto in certain Indigenous American communities in Mexico and South America may promote intersubjectivity as persons act in accordance with one another within consideration for the community or the individual's current needs or state of mind.

The cultural value of respeto may also contribute to intersubjectivity in some communities; unlike the English definition of 'respect', respeto refers loosely to a mutual consideration for others' activities, needs, wants, etc. Similar to "putting yourself in another's shoes" the prevalence of respeto in certain Indigenous American communities in Mexico and South America may promote intersubjectivity as persons act in accordance with one another within consideration for the community or the individual's current needs or state of mind.

不同于英语中“尊重”的定义,respeto 的文化价值也可能对某些社区的交互主体性有所贡献,它宽泛地指对他人的活动、需求、欲望等的相互考虑。与“设身处地为他人着想”类似,在墨西哥和南美洲的某些美洲原住民社区,当人们在考虑到社区或个人当前的需要或心态的情况下相互依从时,反交互主体性的流行可能会促进人们的行为。

Shared reference during an activity facilitates learning. Adults either teach by doing the task with children, or by directing attention toward experts. Children that had to ask questions in regard to how to perform a task were scolded for not learning by another's example, as though they were ignoring the available resources to learn a task, as seen in Tz'utujil Maya parents who scolded questioning children and asking "if they had eyes".[20]

Shared reference during an activity facilitates learning. Adults either teach by doing the task with children, or by directing attention toward experts. Children that had to ask questions in regard to how to perform a task were scolded for not learning by another's example, as though they were ignoring the available resources to learn a task, as seen in Tz'utujil Maya parents who scolded questioning children and asking "if they had eyes".

在活动中共同参考有助于学习。成年人要么和孩子一起完成这项任务,要么把注意力转向专家。那些不得不提出关于如何完成任务的问题的孩子会因为没有以他人为榜样而受到责备,就好像他们忽视了学习任务的可用资源一样,就像 Tz‘ utujil 玛雅父母那样,他们会责备提问的孩子并问“他们有没有眼睛”。

Children from the Chillihuani village in the Andean mountains learned to weave without explicit instruction. They learned the basic technique from others by observing, eager to participate in their community. The learning process was facilitated by watching adults and by being allowed to play and experiment using tools to create their own weaving techniques.[21]

Children from the Chillihuani village in the Andean mountains learned to weave without explicit instruction. They learned the basic technique from others by observing, eager to participate in their community. The learning process was facilitated by watching adults and by being allowed to play and experiment using tools to create their own weaving techniques.

来自安第斯山脉 Chillihuani 村庄的孩子们在没有明确指导的情况下学会了编织。他们通过观察从别人那里学到了基本的技巧,渴望参与到他们的社区中。通过观察成年人以及允许玩耍和试验使用工具创造自己的编织技术,促进了学习过程。

See also

  • Intersubjective verifiability
  • Intersubjective psychoanalysis
  • Intertextuality
  • Perspectivism

= 参见同样 = =

  • 主体间验证性
  • 主体间精神分析
  • 互文性
  • 透视主义

References

  1. Gillespie, Alex; Cornish, Flora (March 2010). "Intersubjectivity: towards a dialogical analysis" (PDF). Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. 40 (1): 19–46. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.724.7095. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.2009.00419.x. hdl:1893/2576.
  2. Scheff, Thomas et al. (2006). Goffman Unbound!: A New Paradigm for Social Science (The Sociological Imagination), Paradigm Publishers ()
  3. Clive Seale. Glossary, Researching Society and Culture.
  4. Benjamin, Jessica (July 12, 1988). The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, & the Problem of Domination. Pantheon. pp. 320. ISBN 0394757300. https://archive.org/details/bondsoflovetexte00benj_0/page/320. 
  5. Macdonald, M (2011) "Hegel, Psychoanalysis and Intersubjectivity" in Philosophy Compass, 6/7 p449
  6. Hyslop, A (2010). "Other Minds", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.) Accessed from plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/other-minds/>. Section 1.
  7. 7.0 7.1 Zerubavel, Eviatar (1997). Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
  8. E. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, Klumer Academic Publishers. Translated by Dorion Cairns.
  9. 9.0 9.1 引用错误:无效<ref>标签;未给name属性为Spaulding的引用提供文字
  10. Gallese, V & Sinigaglia, C. (2011) What is so special about embodied simulation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Vol. 15, No. 11.
  11. De Jaeger, H., Di Paulo, E., & Gallagher, S. (2010) Can social interaction constitute social cognition? Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Vol. 14, No. 10. Pg 441. 脚本错误:没有“Vorlage:Handle”这个模块。
  12. Linell, P. (2009). Rethinking language, mind and world dialogically. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing
  13. Gillespie, A. (2009). The intersubjective nature of symbols. In Brady Wagoner (Ed), Symbolic transformations. London: Routledge
  14. Gillespie, A. (2007). The social basis of self-reflection. In Valsiner and Rosa (Eds), The Cambridge handbook of sociocultural psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University press
  15. Rizzolatti, G. & Arbib, M. A. (1998). Language within our grasp. Trends in neurosciences, 21, 188-194.
  16. Trevarthen, Colwyn (January 2011). "What is it like to be a person who knows nothing? Defining the active intersubjective mind of a newborn human being". Infant and Child Development. 20 (1): 119–135. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.475.9911. doi:10.1002/icd.689.
  17. 17.0 17.1 17.2 Stone, Lynda; Underwood, Charles; Hotchkiss, Jacqueline. "The Relational Habitus: Intersubjective Processes in Learning Settings". Retrieved 10 December 2014.
  18. 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 Correa-Chávez, M., & Roberts, A. (2012). A cultural analysis is necessary in understanding intersubjectivity. Culture & Psychology, 18(1), 99-108. doi: 10.1177/1354067X11427471
  19. Danziger, E., & Rumsey, A. (2013). Introduction: From Opacity to intersubjectivity across languages and cultures. Language & Communication, 33(3), 247-250.
  20. Paradise, Ruth; Rogoff, Barbara (2009). "Side by Side: Learning by Observing and Pitching In". Ethos. 37 (1): 102–138. doi:10.1111/j.1548-1352.2009.01033.x.
  21. Bolin, Inge (2006). Growing Up in a Culture of Respect: Childrearing in highland Peru (2 ed.). Austin: University of Texas. pp. 90–99. ISBN 978-0-292-71298-0. 

Further reading

Psychoanalysis

  • Brandchaft, Doctors & Sorter (2010). Toward an Emancipatory Psychoanalysis. Routledge: New York.
  • Laplanche, J. & Pontalis, J. B. (1974). The Language of Psycho-Analysis, Edited by W. W. Norton & Company,
    • Orange, Atwood & Stolorow (1997). Working Intersubjectively. The Analytic Press: Hillsdale, NJ.
    • Stolorow, R. D., Atwood, G. E., & Orange, D. M. (2002). Worlds of Experience: Interweaving Philosophical and Clinical Dimensions in Psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books.
    • Stolorow & Atwood (1992). Contexts of Being. The Analytic Press: Hillsdale, NJ.
    • Stolorow, Brandchaft & Atwood (1987). Psychoanalytic Treatment: An Intersubjective Approach. The Analytic Press:Hillsdale, NJ.
    • Brandchaft, Doctors & Sorter (2010). Toward an Emancipatory Psychoanalysis. Routledge: New York.
    • Laplanche, J. & Pontalis, J. B. (1974). The Language of Psycho-Analysis, Edited by W. W. Norton & Company,
    • Orange, Atwood & Stolorow (1997). Working Intersubjectively. The Analytic Press: Hillsdale, NJ.
    • Stolorow, R. D., Atwood, G. E., & Orange, D. M. (2002). Worlds of Experience: Interweaving Philosophical and Clinical Dimensions in Psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books.
    • Stolorow & Atwood (1992). Contexts of Being. The Analytic Press: Hillsdale, NJ.
    • Stolorow, Brandchaft & Atwood (1987). Psychoanalytic Treatment: An Intersubjective Approach. The Analytic Press:Hillsdale, NJ.

    = 延伸阅读 = = = = = 精神分析 = =

    • Brandchaft,Doctor & Sorter (2010)。走向解放的精神分析。纽约。
    • Laplanche,J.& Pontalis,J.B.(1974).《精神分析的语言》 ,威廉·沃德尔·诺顿公司编辑,
    • Orange,Atwood & Stolorow (1997)。主体间性工作。分析出版社: 希尔斯代尔。
    • 斯托罗,罗德,阿特伍德,通用电气,& 奥兰治,博士(2002)。经验的世界: 交织在精神分析的哲学和临床维度。纽约: 基础书籍。
    • Stolorow & Atwood (1992).存在的背景。分析出版社: 希尔斯代尔。
    • Stolorow,Brandchaft & Atwood (1987).精神分析治疗: 主体间性研究。分析出版社: 希尔斯代尔。

    Philosophy

    • Edmund Husserl Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1905-1920
    • Edmund Husserl Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1921-1928
    • Edmund Husserl Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1929-1935
    • Edmund Husserl Cartesian Meditations, Edited by S. Strasser, 1950.
      • Edmund Husserl Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1905-1920
      • Edmund Husserl Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1921-1928
      • Edmund Husserl Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1929-1935
      • Edmund Husserl Cartesian Meditations, Edited by S. Strasser, 1950.

      Philosophy

      • Edmund Husserl Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität.Texte aus dem Nachlass 1905-1920
      • Edmund Husserl Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität.Texte aus dem Nachlass 1921-1928
      • Edmund Husserl Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität.Texte aus dem Nachlass 1929-1935
      • Edmund Husserl Cartesian Meditations, Edited by S. Strasser, 1950.

      External links

      • Critique of intersubjectivity Article by Mats Winther
      • Edmund Husserl: Empathy, intersubjectivity and lifeworld, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

      = 外部链接 =

      • 交互主体性评论文章作者: 马茨 · 温特
      • 埃德蒙 · 胡塞尔: 同理心,交互主体性和生活世界,斯坦福大学哲学百科全书

      Category:Epistemology Category:Philosophy of mind Category:Sociological terminology Category:Philosophical anthropology

      分类: 认识学分类: 心灵哲学分类: 社会学术语分类: 哲学人类学


      This page was moved from wikipedia:en:Intersubjectivity. Its edit history can be viewed at 主体间性/edithistory