公地悲剧

来自集智百科
跳到导航 跳到搜索

此词条暂由彩云小译翻译,未经人工整理和审校,带来阅读不便,请见谅。

模板:Economics sidebar

文件:Cows on Selsley Common - geograph.org.uk - 192472.jpg
Cows on Selsley Common. The "tragedy of the commons" is one way of accounting for overexploitation.

Selsley Common. The "tragedy of the commons" is one way of accounting for overexploitation.]]

Selsley Common.公地悲剧是解释过度开采的一种方法


The tragedy of the commons is a situation in a shared-resource system where individual users, acting independently according to their own self-interest, behave contrary to the common good of all users by depleting or spoiling the shared resource through their collective action. The theory originated in an essay written in 1833 by the British economist William Forster Lloyd, who used a hypothetical example of the effects of unregulated grazing on common land (also known as a "common") in Great Britain and Ireland.[1] The concept became widely known as the "tragedy of the commons" over a century later due to an article written by American biologist and philosopher Garrett Hardin in 1968.[2] In this modern economic context, "commons" is taken to mean any shared and unregulated resource such as atmosphere, oceans, rivers, fish stocks, roads and highways, or even an office refrigerator.

The tragedy of the commons is a situation in a shared-resource system where individual users, acting independently according to their own self-interest, behave contrary to the common good of all users by depleting or spoiling the shared resource through their collective action. The theory originated in an essay written in 1833 by the British economist William Forster Lloyd, who used a hypothetical example of the effects of unregulated grazing on common land (also known as a "common") in Great Britain and Ireland. The concept became widely known as the "tragedy of the commons" over a century later due to an article written by American biologist and philosopher Garrett Hardin in 1968. In this modern economic context, "commons" is taken to mean any shared and unregulated resource such as atmosphere, oceans, rivers, fish stocks, roads and highways, or even an office refrigerator.

在共享资源系统中,个体用户根据自身利益独立行动,通过集体行动消耗或破坏共享资源,从而违背了所有用户的共同利益,这种情况称为共享资源公地悲剧。这个理论起源于1833年英国经济学家威廉·佛司特·洛伊的一篇文章,他使用了一个假设的例子来说明在大不列颠和爱尔兰的公共土地上不受管制的放牧的影响。一个多世纪后,由于美国生物学家和哲学家 Garrett Hardin 在1968年写的一篇文章,这个概念被广泛称为“公地悲剧”。在这种现代经济背景下,“公共资源”被理解为任何共有的和不受管制的资源,如大气、海洋、河流、鱼类种群、道路和高速公路,甚至是办公室的冰箱。


The term is used in environmental science. The "tragedy of the commons" is often cited in connection with sustainable development, meshing economic growth and environmental protection, as well as in the debate over global warming. It has also been used in analyzing behavior in the fields of economics, evolutionary psychology, anthropology, game theory, politics, taxation and sociology.

The term is used in environmental science. The "tragedy of the commons" is often cited in connection with sustainable development, meshing economic growth and environmental protection, as well as in the debate over global warming. It has also been used in analyzing behavior in the fields of economics, evolutionary psychology, anthropology, game theory, politics, taxation and sociology.

这个术语在环境科学中使用。在可持续发展、融合经济增长和环境保护以及关于全球变暖的辩论中,人们经常提到公地悲剧。在经济学、进化心理学、人类学、博弈论、政治学、税收和社会学等领域,它也被用来分析行为。


Although common resource systems have been known to collapse due to overuse (such as in over-fishing), many examples have existed and still do exist where members of a community with access to a common resource co-operate or regulate to exploit those resources prudently without collapse.[3][4] Elinor Ostrom was awarded the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics for demonstrating exactly this concept in her book Governing the Commons, which included examples of how local communities were able to do this without top-down regulations or privatization.[5]

Although common resource systems have been known to collapse due to overuse (such as in over-fishing), many examples have existed and still do exist where members of a community with access to a common resource co-operate or regulate to exploit those resources prudently without collapse. Elinor Ostrom was awarded the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics for demonstrating exactly this concept in her book Governing the Commons, which included examples of how local communities were able to do this without top-down regulations or privatization.

虽然人们知道共同资源系统由于过度使用而崩溃(例如过度捕捞) ,但已经存在并且仍然存在许多这样的例子,即有机会获得共同资源的社区成员通过合作或管制谨慎地开发这些资源而不崩溃。埃莉诺 · 奥斯特罗姆(Elinor Ostrom)在她的著作《管理公共资源》(Governing the Commons)中恰好证明了这一概念,并因此获得2009年诺贝尔经济学奖。该书列举了一些例子,说明当地社区如何能够在没有自上。


Expositions

Lloyd's pamphlet

In 1833, the English economist William Forster Lloyd published a pamphlet which included a hypothetical example of over-use of a common resource. This was the situation of cattle herders sharing a common parcel of land on which they were each entitled to let their cows graze, as was the custom in English villages. He postulated that if a herder put more than his allotted number of cattle on the common, overgrazing could result. For each additional animal, a herder could receive additional benefits, while the whole group shared the resulting damage to the commons. If all herders made this individually rational economic decision, the common could be depleted or even destroyed, to the detriment of all.[1]

In 1833, the English economist William Forster Lloyd published a pamphlet which included a hypothetical example of over-use of a common resource. This was the situation of cattle herders sharing a common parcel of land on which they were each entitled to let their cows graze, as was the custom in English villages. He postulated that if a herder put more than his allotted number of cattle on the common, overgrazing could result. For each additional animal, a herder could receive additional benefits, while the whole group shared the resulting damage to the commons. If all herders made this individually rational economic decision, the common could be depleted or even destroyed, to the detriment of all.

1833年,英国经济学家威廉·佛司特·洛伊出版了一本小册子,其中包括一个假设的过度使用公共资源的例子。这就是牧牛人共享一块土地的情况,他们每个人都有权让他们的牛吃草,这是英国村庄的习俗。他假定,如果牧民在公地上放牧的牛超过了规定的数量,就可能导致过度放牧。对于每一个额外的动物,牧民可以得到额外的好处,而整个群体分担由此造成的对公地的破坏。如果所有的牧民都作出这个个体上合理的经济决定,共同财产可能会被耗尽,甚至被毁灭,对所有人都不利。


Garrett Hardin's article

{{Infobox document

{{Infobox document

模板:Infobox 文档

}}

}}


In 1968, ecologist Garrett Hardin explored this social dilemma in his article "The Tragedy of the Commons", published in the journal Science.[2] The essay derived its title from the pamphlet by Lloyd, which he cites, on the over-grazing of common land.

In 1968, ecologist Garrett Hardin explored this social dilemma in his article "The Tragedy of the Commons", published in the journal Science. The essay derived its title from the pamphlet by Lloyd, which he cites, on the over-grazing of common land.

1968年,生态学家 Garrett Hardin 在他发表在《科学》杂志上的文章《公地悲剧探讨了这种社会困境。这篇文章的标题来源于劳埃德所写的关于过度放牧公共土地的小册子,他引用了这本小册子。


Hardin discussed problems that cannot be solved by technical means, as distinct from those with solutions that require "a change only in the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of change in human values or ideas of morality". Hardin focused on human population growth, the use of the Earth's natural resources, and the welfare state.[6] Hardin argued that if individuals relied on themselves alone, and not on the relationship of society and man, then the number of children had by each family would not be of public concern. Parents breeding excessively would leave fewer descendants because they would be unable to provide for each child adequately. Such negative feedback is found in the animal kingdom.[6] Hardin said that if the children of improvident parents starved to death, if overbreeding was its own punishment, then there would be no public interest in controlling the breeding of families.[6] Hardin blamed the welfare state for allowing the tragedy of the commons; where the state provides for children and supports overbreeding as a fundamental human right, Malthusian catastrophe is inevitable. Consequently, in his article, Hardin lamented the following proposal from the United Nations:

Hardin discussed problems that cannot be solved by technical means, as distinct from those with solutions that require "a change only in the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of change in human values or ideas of morality". Hardin focused on human population growth, the use of the Earth's natural resources, and the welfare state. Hardin argued that if individuals relied on themselves alone, and not on the relationship of society and man, then the number of children had by each family would not be of public concern. Parents breeding excessively would leave fewer descendants because they would be unable to provide for each child adequately. Such negative feedback is found in the animal kingdom. Hardin said that if the children of improvident parents starved to death, if overbreeding was its own punishment, then there would be no public interest in controlling the breeding of families. Hardin blamed the welfare state for allowing the tragedy of the commons; where the state provides for children and supports overbreeding as a fundamental human right, Malthusian catastrophe is inevitable. Consequently, in his article, Hardin lamented the following proposal from the United Nations:

哈丁讨论了无法通过技术手段解决的问题,这些问题有别于那些只需要”改变自然科学技术,对人类价值观或道德观念的改变要求很少或根本不要求”的解决办法。哈丁关注的是人口增长、地球自然资源的利用和福利国家。哈丁认为,如果个人只依靠自己,而不是依靠社会和人的关系,那么每个家庭的子女数量就不会引起公众的关注。父母过度繁殖会导致后代数量减少,因为他们无法为每个孩子提供足够的生活。这种负面反馈在动物王国中也有发现。哈丁说,如果父母缺乏远见的孩子饿死了,如果过度繁殖是自己的惩罚,那么控制家庭繁殖就没有公共利益。哈丁指责福利国家允许了公地悲剧的存在; 在福利国家提供儿童并支持过度繁殖作为一项基本人权的情况下,马尔萨斯灾难是不可避免的。因此,哈丁在他的文章中对联合国提出的以下建议表示遗憾:

/* Styling for Template:Quote */ .templatequote { overflow: hidden; margin: 1em 0; padding: 0 40px; } .templatequote .templatequotecite {

   line-height: 1.5em;
   /* @noflip */
   text-align: left;
   /* @noflip */
   padding-left: 1.6em;
   margin-top: 0;

}


In addition, Hardin also pointed out the problem of individuals acting in rational self-interest by claiming that if all members in a group used common resources for their own gain and with no regard for others, all resources would still eventually be depleted. Overall, Hardin argued against relying on conscience as a means of policing commons, suggesting that this favors selfish individuals – often known as free riders – over those who are more altruistic.

In addition, Hardin also pointed out the problem of individuals acting in rational self-interest by claiming that if all members in a group used common resources for their own gain and with no regard for others, all resources would still eventually be depleted. Overall, Hardin argued against relying on conscience as a means of policing commons, suggesting that this favors selfish individuals – often known as free riders – over those who are more altruistic.

此外,哈丁还指出了个人出于理性自身利益行事的问题,他声称,如果一个群体的所有成员为了自己的利益而使用共同资源,而不考虑其他人,那么所有资源最终仍将耗尽。总的来说,哈丁反对依靠良心作为公共治安的一种手段,他认为这有利于自私的个人——通常被称为搭便车者——而不利于那些更为利他的人。


In the context of avoiding over-exploitation of common resources, Hardin concluded by restating Hegel's maxim (which was quoted by Engels), "freedom is the recognition of necessity". He suggested that "freedom" completes the tragedy of the commons. By recognizing resources as commons in the first place, and by recognizing that, as such, they require management, Hardin believed that humans "can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms".

In the context of avoiding over-exploitation of common resources, Hardin concluded by restating Hegel's maxim (which was quoted by Engels), "freedom is the recognition of necessity". He suggested that "freedom" completes the tragedy of the commons. By recognizing resources as commons in the first place, and by recognizing that, as such, they require management, Hardin believed that humans "can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms".

在避免过度开发公共资源的背景下,哈丁重申了黑格尔的格言“自由是对必然性的认识”。他建议用“自由”来完善公地悲剧。通过首先承认资源是公共资源,并认识到资源本身需要管理,哈丁相信人类“能够保护和培育其他更为珍贵的自由”。


The "Commons" as a modern resource concept

Hardin's article was the start of the modern use of "Commons" as a term connoting a shared resource. As Frank van Laerhoven and Elinor Ostrom have stated: "Prior to the publication of Hardin’s article on the tragedy of the commons (1968), titles containing the words 'the commons', 'common pool resources,' or 'common property' were very rare in the academic literature." They go on to say: "In 2002, Barrett and Mabry conducted a major survey of biologists to determine which publications in the twentieth century had become classic books or benchmark publications in biology. They report that Hardin’s 1968 article was the one having the greatest career impact on biologists and is the most frequently cited".[7]

Hardin's article was the start of the modern use of "Commons" as a term connoting a shared resource. As Frank van Laerhoven and Elinor Ostrom have stated: "Prior to the publication of Hardin’s article on the tragedy of the commons (1968), titles containing the words 'the commons', 'common pool resources,' or 'common property' were very rare in the academic literature." They go on to say: "In 2002, Barrett and Mabry conducted a major survey of biologists to determine which publications in the twentieth century had become classic books or benchmark publications in biology. They report that Hardin’s 1968 article was the one having the greatest career impact on biologists and is the most frequently cited".

哈丁的文章是现代使用“公共资源”作为一个术语的开始,这个术语意味着共享资源。正如 Frank van Laerhoven 和 Elinor Ostrom 所说: “在 Hardin 关于公地悲剧的文章发表之前(1968年) ,包含‘公共资源’、‘共同池资源’或‘共同财产’的标题在学术文献中是非常罕见的。”他们接着说: “2002年,巴雷特和马布里对生物学家进行了一项重大调查,以确定二十世纪的哪些出版物已成为经典书籍或生物学的基准出版物。他们报告说,哈丁1968年的文章对生物学家的职业生涯影响最大,也是被引用次数最多的一篇。


Application

Metaphoric meaning

Like Lloyd and Thomas Malthus before him, Hardin was primarily interested in the problem of human population growth. But in his essay, he also focused on the use of larger (though finite) resources such as the Earth's atmosphere and oceans, as well as pointing out the "negative commons" of pollution (i.e., instead of dealing with the deliberate privatization of a positive resource, a "negative commons" deals with the deliberate commonization of a negative cost, pollution).

Like Lloyd and Thomas Malthus before him, Hardin was primarily interested in the problem of human population growth. But in his essay, he also focused on the use of larger (though finite) resources such as the Earth's atmosphere and oceans, as well as pointing out the "negative commons" of pollution (i.e., instead of dealing with the deliberate privatization of a positive resource, a "negative commons" deals with the deliberate commonization of a negative cost, pollution).

像他之前的劳埃德和托马斯 · 马尔萨斯一样,哈丁主要对人口增长问题感兴趣。但是在他的文章中,他也关注了更大(尽管有限)资源的使用,如地球的大气和海洋,并指出了污染的“消极公地”(即,不是处理积极资源的故意私有化,而是“消极公地”处理负成本,即污染的故意共同化)。


As a metaphor, the tragedy of the commons should not be taken too literally. The "tragedy" is not in the word's conventional or theatric sense, nor a condemnation of the processes that lead to it. Similarly, Hardin's use of "commons" has frequently been misunderstood, leading him to later remark that he should have titled his work "The Tragedy of the Unregulated Commons".[8]模板:Sfn

As a metaphor, the tragedy of the commons should not be taken too literally. The "tragedy" is not in the word's conventional or theatric sense, nor a condemnation of the processes that lead to it. Similarly, Hardin's use of "commons" has frequently been misunderstood, leading him to later remark that he should have titled his work "The Tragedy of the Unregulated Commons".

作为一个比喻,公地悲剧不应该过于字面化。“悲剧”不是这个词的常规或戏剧意义,也不是对导致悲剧的过程的谴责。同样,哈丁对“公地”的使用经常被误解,导致他后来评论说,他应该把他的作品命名为“不受管制的公地的悲剧”。


The metaphor illustrates the argument that free access and unrestricted demand for a finite resource ultimately reduces the resource through over-exploitation, temporarily or permanently. This occurs because the benefits of exploitation accrue to individuals or groups, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of the resource to the point in which they become reliant on it, while the costs of the exploitation are borne by all those to whom the resource is available (which may be a wider class of individuals than those who are exploiting it). This, in turn, causes demand for the resource to increase, which causes the problem to snowball until the resource collapses (even if it retains a capacity to recover). The rate at which depletion of the resource is realized depends primarily on three factors: the number of users wanting to consume the common in question, the consumptive nature of their uses, and the relative robustness of the common.[9]

The metaphor illustrates the argument that free access and unrestricted demand for a finite resource ultimately reduces the resource through over-exploitation, temporarily or permanently. This occurs because the benefits of exploitation accrue to individuals or groups, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of the resource to the point in which they become reliant on it, while the costs of the exploitation are borne by all those to whom the resource is available (which may be a wider class of individuals than those who are exploiting it). This, in turn, causes demand for the resource to increase, which causes the problem to snowball until the resource collapses (even if it retains a capacity to recover). The rate at which depletion of the resource is realized depends primarily on three factors: the number of users wanting to consume the common in question, the consumptive nature of their uses, and the relative robustness of the common.

这个比喻说明了这样一种观点,即对有限资源的自由访问和不受限制的需求最终会通过过度开发(暂时或永久地)减少资源。出现这种情况是因为开采的好处归于个人或团体,他们每个人都有动机最大限度地利用资源,直至依赖于资源,而开采的代价则由所有可以获得资源的人承担(这些人可能比开采资源的人更为广泛)。这反过来又导致对资源的需求增加,从而导致问题滚雪球,直到资源崩溃(即使资源保持恢复的能力)。资源消耗的速度主要取决于三个因素: 想要消费共有资源的用户数量,消费性质! “我们能找到一个更好的词吗?这真是超级尴尬。- 它们的用途,以及相对稳健的普通。


The same concept is sometimes called the "tragedy of the fishers", because fishing too many fish before or during breeding could cause stocks to plummet.[10]

The same concept is sometimes called the "tragedy of the fishers", because fishing too many fish before or during breeding could cause stocks to plummet.

同样的概念有时被称为”渔民的悲剧” ,因为在繁殖之前或繁殖期间捕捞过多的鱼可能导致种群数量急剧下降。


Modern commons

The tragedy of the commons can be considered in relation to environmental issues such as sustainability. The commons dilemma stands as a model for a great variety of resource problems in society today, such as water, forests,[11] fish, and non-renewable energy sources such as oil and coal.

The tragedy of the commons can be considered in relation to environmental issues such as sustainability. The commons dilemma stands as a model for a great variety of resource problems in society today, such as water, forests, fish, and non-renewable energy sources such as oil and coal.

公地悲剧可以被认为与环境问题,如可持续发展有关。公共资源困境是当今社会各种资源问题的典型,例如水、森林、鱼类,以及石油和煤炭等不可再生能源。


Situations exemplifying the "tragedy of the commons" include the overfishing and destruction of the Grand Banks, the destruction of salmon runs on rivers that have been dammed – most prominently in modern times on the Columbia River in the Northwest United States, and historically in North Atlantic rivers – the devastation of the sturgeon fishery – in modern Russia, but historically in the United States as well – and, in terms of water supply, the limited water available in arid regions (e.g., the area of the Aral Sea) and the Los Angeles water system supply, especially at Mono Lake and Owens Lake.

Situations exemplifying the "tragedy of the commons" include the overfishing and destruction of the Grand Banks, the destruction of salmon runs on rivers that have been dammed – most prominently in modern times on the Columbia River in the Northwest United States, and historically in North Atlantic rivers – the devastation of the sturgeon fishery – in modern Russia, but historically in the United States as well – and, in terms of water supply, the limited water available in arid regions (e.g., the area of the Aral Sea) and the Los Angeles water system supply, especially at Mono Lake and Owens Lake.

举例说明“公地悲剧”的情况包括过度捕捞和大浅滩的破坏,鲑鱼在已经筑坝的河流上流动的破坏——最突出的是在现代美国西北部的哥伦比亚河,历史上在北大西洋河流——鲟鱼渔业的破坏——在现代俄罗斯,但在历史上在美国也是如此——以及,在水供应方面,干旱地区(例如碱海地区)和洛杉矶水系供应有限,特别是在 Mono 湖和 Owens 湖。


In economics, an externality is a cost or benefit that affects a party who did not choose to incur that cost or benefit. Negative externalities are a well-known feature of the "tragedy of the commons". For example, driving cars has many negative externalities; these include pollution, carbon emissions, and traffic accidents. Every time 'Person A' gets in a car, it becomes more likely that 'Person Z'模板:Spaced ndash and millions of others模板:Spaced ndash will suffer in each of those areas.[12] Economists often urge the government to adopt policies that "internalize" an externality.[13]

In economics, an externality is a cost or benefit that affects a party who did not choose to incur that cost or benefit. Negative externalities are a well-known feature of the "tragedy of the commons". For example, driving cars has many negative externalities; these include pollution, carbon emissions, and traffic accidents. Every time 'Person A' gets in a car, it becomes more likely that 'Person Z' and millions of others will suffer in each of those areas. Economists often urge the government to adopt policies that "internalize" an externality.

在经济学中,外部性是一种影响一方的成本或利益,而这一方并没有选择产生这种成本或利益。负外部性是“公地悲剧”的一个众所周知的特征。例如,驾驶汽车有许多负面的外部性,包括污染、碳排放和交通事故。每次人物 a 上了车,人物 z 和其他数百万人就更有可能在这些方面遭受痛苦。经济学家经常敦促政府采取“内部化”外部性的政策。


The tragedy of commons can also be referred to the idea of open data. Scholars have misinterpreted the literature on computer science and statistics, thus clearly exaggerating the futility of anonymising data. Further, the risks posed by anonymised data are theoretical in nature they rarely occur. Finally, anonymised data are crucial for useful social research and represent therefore a public resource – better said a common good – which is liable to exhaustion. In conclusion, some feel that the law should provide a safe haven for the dissemination of research data, since it can be argued that current data protection policies overburden valuable research without mitigating realistic risks.[14]

The tragedy of commons can also be referred to the idea of open data. Scholars have misinterpreted the literature on computer science and statistics, thus clearly exaggerating the futility of anonymising data. Further, the risks posed by anonymised data are theoretical in nature they rarely occur. Finally, anonymised data are crucial for useful social research and represent therefore a public resource – better said a common good – which is liable to exhaustion. In conclusion, some feel that the law should provide a safe haven for the dissemination of research data, since it can be argued that current data protection policies overburden valuable research without mitigating realistic risks.

公地悲剧也可以用开放数据的概念来解释。学者们误解了计算机科学和统计学的文献,从而明显地夸大了匿名数据的无用性。此外,匿名数据所带来的风险在本质上是理论性的,它们很少发生。最后,匿名数据对于有用的社会研究是至关重要的,因此代表了一种公共资源——更好地说是一种共同利益——这种资源很容易枯竭。最后,一些人认为,法律应当为传播研究数据提供一个安全的避风港,因为可以认为,目前的数据保护政策使宝贵的研究负担过重,而没有减轻现实风险。


Examples

More general examples (some alluded to by Hardin) of potential and actual tragedies include:

More general examples (some alluded to by Hardin) of potential and actual tragedies include:

更一般的例子(哈丁提到的一些)的潜在和实际的悲剧包括:


文件:Lacanja burn.JPG
Clearing rainforest for agriculture in southern Mexico.

Clearing rainforest for agriculture in southern Mexico.

在墨西哥南部为农业砍伐雨林。

    • Light pollution模板:Spaced ndash with the loss of the night sky for research and cultural significance, affected human, flora and fauna health, nuisance, trespass and the loss of enjoyment or function of private property.[15]


  • Human health
    • Antibiotics模板:Spaced ndashAntibiotic Resistance Mis-use of antibiotics anywhere in the world will eventually result in antibiotic resistance developing at an accelerated rate. The resulting antibiotic resistance has spread (and will likely continue to do so in the future) to other bacteria and other regions, hurting or destroying the Antibiotic Commons that is shared on a worldwide basis[21]
    • Vaccines模板:Spaced ndashHerd immunity Avoiding a vaccine shot and relying on the established herd immunity instead will avoid potential vaccine risks, but if everyone does this, it will diminish herd immunity and bring risk to individuals that cannot receive vaccines for medical reasons.[22]


  • Publicly shared resources
    • Spam email degrades the usefulness of the email system and increases the cost for all users of the Internet while providing a benefit to only a tiny number of individuals.
    • Wi-Fi and its overcrowded 2.4 GHz channels.
    • Hoarding of items such as toilet paper during a perceived threat such as weather events or disease epidemics results in a few people having excess and many people not having enough.
    • Knowledge commons encompass immaterial and collectively owned goods in the information age, including, for example:
      • Skills acquisition and training, when all parties involved pass the buck on implementing it.[24]
    • Electric vehicle (EV) charging station blocked by parked vehicles, ICE vehicles whose drivers resent EVs, EVs that overstay time limits, and EVs whose owners have no intention of charging but feel they are entitled to park.
    • Space debris in Earth's surrounding space leading to limited locations for new satellites and the obstruction of universal observations.[25]


Application to evolutionary biology

A parallel was drawn recently between the tragedy of the commons and the competing behaviour of parasites that through acting selfishly eventually diminish or destroy their common host.[26] The idea has also been applied to areas such as the evolution of virulence or sexual conflict, where males may fatally harm females when competing for matings.[27] It is also raised as a question in studies of social insects, where scientists wish to understand why insect workers do not undermine the "common good" by laying eggs of their own and causing a breakdown of the society[citation needed].

A parallel was drawn recently between the tragedy of the commons and the competing behaviour of parasites that through acting selfishly eventually diminish or destroy their common host. The idea has also been applied to areas such as the evolution of virulence or sexual conflict, where males may fatally harm females when competing for matings. It is also raised as a question in studies of social insects, where scientists wish to understand why insect workers do not undermine the "common good" by laying eggs of their own and causing a breakdown of the society.

最近有人将公地悲剧寄生虫和寄生虫的竞争行为进行了类比,寄生虫的竞争行为通过自私行为最终会减少或破坏它们共同的宿主。这个观点也被应用到一些领域,例如毒性的进化或性冲突,在这些领域中,雄性在争夺配偶时可能会对雌性造成致命伤害。在研究社会性昆虫的过程中,人们也提出了这个问题,科学家们希望了解为什么昆虫工作者不会通过产卵破坏“公共利益” ,从而导致社会的崩溃。


The idea of evolutionary suicide, where adaptation at the level of the individual causes the whole species or population to be driven extinct, can be seen as an extreme form of an evolutionary tragedy of the commons.[28][29] From an evolutionary point of view, the creation of the tragedy of the commons in pathogenic microbes may provide us with advanced therapeutic methods.[30]模板:Better source needed

The idea of evolutionary suicide, where adaptation at the level of the individual causes the whole species or population to be driven extinct, can be seen as an extreme form of an evolutionary tragedy of the commons. From an evolutionary point of view, the creation of the tragedy of the commons in pathogenic microbes may provide us with advanced therapeutic methods.

进化自杀的观点,即个体层面的适应导致整个物种或种群灭绝,可以被看作是进化公地悲剧的一种极端形式。从进化的角度来看,病原微生物中公地悲剧的产生可能为我们提供先进的治疗方法。


Commons dilemma

模板:Anchor

The commons dilemma is a specific class of social dilemma in which people's short-term selfish interests are at odds with long-term group interests and the common good.[31] In academia, a range of related terminology has also been used as shorthand for the theory or aspects of it, including resource dilemma, take-some dilemma, and common pool resource.

The commons dilemma is a specific class of social dilemma in which people's short-term selfish interests are at odds with long-term group interests and the common good. In academia, a range of related terminology has also been used as shorthand for the theory or aspects of it, including resource dilemma, take-some dilemma, and common pool resource.

公地困境是一种特殊的社会困境,其中人们的短期利益与长期群体利益和公共利益相冲突。在学术界,一系列相关的术语也被用作理论或方面的速记,包括资源困境,采取一些困境,和共同池资源。


Commons dilemma researchers have studied conditions under which groups and communities are likely to under- or over-harvest common resources in both the laboratory and field. Research programs have concentrated on a number of motivational, strategic, and structural factors that might be conducive to management of commons.

Commons dilemma researchers have studied conditions under which groups and communities are likely to under- or over-harvest common resources in both the laboratory and field. Research programs have concentrated on a number of motivational, strategic, and structural factors that might be conducive to management of commons.

公共资源困境研究人员研究了群体和社区在实验室和田野中可能收获不足或过多公共资源的条件。研究项目集中在一些动机,战略和结构因素,可能有利于公共资源的管理。


In game theory, which constructs mathematical models for individuals' behavior in strategic situations, the corresponding "game", developed by Hardin, is known as the Commonize Costs – Privatize Profits Game (CC–PP game).

In game theory, which constructs mathematical models for individuals' behavior in strategic situations, the corresponding "game", developed by Hardin, is known as the Commonize Costs – Privatize Profits Game (CC–PP game).

在博弈论中,为战略情境中的个人行为建立数学模型,相应的“博弈”由 Hardin 开发,被称为“公共成本-私有化利润博弈”(CC-PP 博弈)。


Psychological factors

Kopelman, Weber, & Messick (2002), in a review of the experimental research on cooperation in commons dilemmas, identify nine classes of independent variables that influence cooperation in commons dilemmas: social motives, gender, payoff structure, uncertainty, power and status, group size, communication, causes, and frames. They organize these classes and distinguish between psychological individual differences (stable personality traits) and situational factors (the environment). Situational factors include both the task (social and decision structure) and the perception of the task.模板:Sfn

Kopelman, Weber, & Messick (2002), in a review of the experimental research on cooperation in commons dilemmas, identify nine classes of independent variables that influence cooperation in commons dilemmas: social motives, gender, payoff structure, uncertainty, power and status, group size, communication, causes, and frames. They organize these classes and distinguish between psychological individual differences (stable personality traits) and situational factors (the environment). Situational factors include both the task (social and decision structure) and the perception of the task.

Kopelman,Weber,and Messick (2002) ,在对公共困境中合作的实验研究的回顾中,确定了影响公共困境中合作的9类自变量: 社会动机、性别、收益结构、不确定性、权力和地位、群体规模、沟通、原因和框架。他们组织这些课程,并区分心理上的个体差异(稳定的人格特质)和情境因素(环境)。情境因素包括任务(社会和决策结构)和对任务的感知。


Empirical findings support the theoretical argument that the cultural group is a critical factor that needs to be studied in the context of situational variables.[32]模板:Fcn Rather than behaving in line with economic incentives, people are likely to approach the decision to cooperate with an appropriateness framework.模板:Sfn An expanded, four factor model of the Logic of Appropriateness,模板:Sfn[33]模板:Fcn suggests that the cooperation is better explained by the question: "What does a person like me (identity) do (rules) in a situation like this (recognition) given this culture (group)?"

Empirical findings support the theoretical argument that the cultural group is a critical factor that needs to be studied in the context of situational variables. Rather than behaving in line with economic incentives, people are likely to approach the decision to cooperate with an appropriateness framework. An expanded, four factor model of the Logic of Appropriateness, suggests that the cooperation is better explained by the question: "What does a person like me (identity) do (rules) in a situation like this (recognition) given this culture (group)?"

实证结果支持了文化群体是情景变量背景下需要研究的关键因素这一理论论点。人们更倾向于选择合作的适当性框架,而不是遵循经济激励。“合适性逻辑”的一个扩展的四因素模型表明,这种合作更好地解释为这样一个问题: “像我这样的人(身份)在这种情况下(承认)给予这种文化(群体)做什么(规则) ? ”


Strategic factors

Strategic factors also matter in commons dilemmas. One often-studied strategic factor is the order in which people take harvests from the resource. In simultaneous play, all people harvest at the same time, whereas in sequential play people harvest from the pool according to a predetermined sequence – first, second, third, etc. There is a clear order effect in the latter games: the harvests of those who come first – the leaders – are higher than the harvest of those coming later – the followers. The interpretation of this effect is that the first players feel entitled to take more. With sequential play, individuals adopt a first come-first served rule, whereas with simultaneous play people may adopt an equality rule. Another strategic factor is the ability to build up reputations. Research 模板:By whom found that people take less from the common pool in public situations than in anonymous private situations. Moreover, those who harvest less gain greater prestige and influence within their group.

Strategic factors also matter in commons dilemmas. One often-studied strategic factor is the order in which people take harvests from the resource. In simultaneous play, all people harvest at the same time, whereas in sequential play people harvest from the pool according to a predetermined sequence – first, second, third, etc. There is a clear order effect in the latter games: the harvests of those who come first – the leaders – are higher than the harvest of those coming later – the followers. The interpretation of this effect is that the first players feel entitled to take more. With sequential play, individuals adopt a first come-first served rule, whereas with simultaneous play people may adopt an equality rule. Another strategic factor is the ability to build up reputations. Research found that people take less from the common pool in public situations than in anonymous private situations. Moreover, those who harvest less gain greater prestige and influence within their group.

战略因素在公地困境中也很重要。人们经常研究的一个战略因素是人们从资源中获取收获的顺序。在同时游戏中,所有的人同时收获,而在连续游戏中,人们根据预先确定的顺序——第一、第二、第三等等——从池中收获。在后面的游戏中有一个明显的秩序效应: 先来者——领导者——的收成高于后来者——追随者的收成。对这种效应的解释是,第一个玩家认为有权得到更多。在顺序游戏中,个体采用先来先服务的规则,而在同时游戏中,人们可能采用平等的规则。另一个战略因素是树立声誉的能力。研究发现,人们在公共场合比在匿名的私人场合从公共场合获得的更少。此外,那些收获较少的人在他们的团队中获得更高的声望和影响力。


Structural factors

Hardin stated in his analysis of the tragedy of the commons that "Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all."模板:Sfn One of the proposed solutions is to appoint a leader to regulate access to the common. Groups are more likely to endorse a leader when a common resource is being depleted and when managing a common resource is perceived as a difficult task. Groups prefer leaders who are elected, democratic, and prototypical of the group, and these leader types are more successful in enforcing cooperation. A general aversion to autocratic leadership exists, although it may be an effective solution, possibly because of the fear of power abuse and corruption.

Hardin stated in his analysis of the tragedy of the commons that "Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all." One of the proposed solutions is to appoint a leader to regulate access to the common. Groups are more likely to endorse a leader when a common resource is being depleted and when managing a common resource is perceived as a difficult task. Groups prefer leaders who are elected, democratic, and prototypical of the group, and these leader types are more successful in enforcing cooperation. A general aversion to autocratic leadership exists, although it may be an effective solution, possibly because of the fear of power abuse and corruption.

哈丁在他对公地悲剧的分析中指出: “公地的自由会毁灭一切。”建议的解决方案之一是任命一位领导人来管理公共服务的获取。当一个公共资源正在枯竭或者管理一个公共资源被认为是一项艰巨的任务时,团队更有可能支持一个领导者。团队更喜欢被选举出来的、民主的、具有团队典型特征的领导者,而且这些领导类型在加强合作方面更加成功。对专制领导的普遍厌恶是存在的,尽管这可能是一个有效的解决办法,可能是因为害怕滥用权力和腐败。


The provision of rewards and punishments may also be effective in preserving common resources. Selective punishments for overuse can be effective in promoting domestic water and energy conservation – for example, through installing water and electricity meters in houses. Selective rewards work, provided that they are open to everyone. An experimental carpool lane in the Netherlands failed because car commuters did not feel they were able to organize a carpool.[34] The rewards do not have to be tangible. In Canada, utilities considered putting "smiley faces" on electricity bills of customers below the average consumption of that customer's neighborhood.[35]

The provision of rewards and punishments may also be effective in preserving common resources. Selective punishments for overuse can be effective in promoting domestic water and energy conservation – for example, through installing water and electricity meters in houses. Selective rewards work, provided that they are open to everyone. An experimental carpool lane in the Netherlands failed because car commuters did not feel they were able to organize a carpool. The rewards do not have to be tangible. In Canada, utilities considered putting "smiley faces" on electricity bills of customers below the average consumption of that customer's neighborhood.

提供奖励和惩罚也可以有效地保护共同资源。对过度使用的选择性惩罚可以有效地促进家庭用水和节约能源——例如,通过在家里安装水表和电表。选择性奖励是可行的,只要它对每个人都开放。荷兰的一个试验性合用车道失败了,因为乘车上班的人觉得他们没有能力组织合用车辆。回报不一定是有形的。在加拿大,公用事业公司考虑在用户电费单上加上“笑脸” ,这些电费单低于用户所在社区的平均用电量。


Solutions

Articulating solutions to the tragedy of the commons is one of the main problems of political philosophy. In many situations, locals implement (often complex) social schemes that work well. The best governmental solution may be to do nothing. When these fail, there are many possible governmental solutions such as privatization, internalizing the externalities, and regulation.

Articulating solutions to the tragedy of the commons is one of the main problems of political philosophy. In many situations, locals implement (often complex) social schemes that work well. The best governmental solution may be to do nothing. When these fail, there are many possible governmental solutions such as privatization, internalizing the externalities, and regulation.

阐明解决公地悲剧问题的方法是政治哲学的主要问题之一。在许多情况下,当地人实施的(往往是复杂的)社会计划运作良好。最好的政府解决方案可能是什么都不做。当这些失败时,有许多可能的政府解决方案,如私有化、外部性内部化和管制。


Non-governmental solution

Sometimes the best governmental solution may be to do nothing. Robert Axelrod contends that even self-interested individuals will often find ways to cooperate, because collective restraint serves both the collective and individual interests.[36] Anthropologist G. N. Appell criticized those who cited Hardin to "impos[e] their own economic and environmental rationality on other social systems of which they have incomplete understanding and knowledge."[37]

Sometimes the best governmental solution may be to do nothing. Robert Axelrod contends that even self-interested individuals will often find ways to cooperate, because collective restraint serves both the collective and individual interests. Anthropologist G. N. Appell criticized those who cited Hardin to "impos[e] their own economic and environmental rationality on other social systems of which they have incomplete understanding and knowledge."

有时候,最好的政府解决方案可能是什么都不做。罗伯特 · 阿克塞尔罗德认为,即使是自私自利的个人也常常会找到合作的方式,因为集体的克制既符合集体的利益,也符合个人的利益。人类学家 g. n. Appell 批评了那些引用 Hardin 的观点,认为他们“将自己的经济和环境理性植入到了他们对其他社会系统的理解和认识都不完整的社会系统中”


Political scientist Elinor Ostrom, who was awarded 2009's Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for her work on the issue, and others revisited Hardin's work in 1999.[38] They found the tragedy of the commons not as prevalent or as difficult to solve as Hardin maintained, since locals have often come up with solutions to the commons problem themselves.[39] For example, it was found that a commons in the Swiss Alps has been run by a collective of farmers there to their mutual and individual benefit since 1517, in spite of the farmers also having access to their own farmland. In general, it is in the interest of the users of a commons to keep them functioning and so complex social schemes are often invented by the users for maintaining them at optimum efficiency.[40][41]

Political scientist Elinor Ostrom, who was awarded 2009's Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for her work on the issue, and others revisited Hardin's work in 1999. They found the tragedy of the commons not as prevalent or as difficult to solve as Hardin maintained, since locals have often come up with solutions to the commons problem themselves. For example, it was found that a commons in the Swiss Alps has been run by a collective of farmers there to their mutual and individual benefit since 1517, in spite of the farmers also having access to their own farmland. In general, it is in the interest of the users of a commons to keep them functioning and so complex social schemes are often invented by the users for maintaining them at optimum efficiency.

政治科学家埃莉诺 · 奥斯特罗姆因在这个问题上的工作而获得2009年诺贝尔经济学奖,其他人在1999年重新审视了哈丁的工作。他们发现公地悲剧不像 Hardin 所说的那样普遍,也不像 Hardin 所说的那样难以解决,因为当地人经常自己想出解决公地问题的办法。例如,人们发现,瑞士阿尔卑斯山的一个公地自1517年以来一直由当地的农民集体经营,以实现他们的共同和个人利益,尽管农民也可以使用自己的农田。一般来说,维持公共资源的使用者是有利益的,因此复杂的社会计划往往是用户为了保持最佳效率而发明的。


Similarly, geographer Douglas L. Johnson remarks that many nomadic pastoralist societies of Africa and the Middle East in fact "balanced local stocking ratios against seasonal rangeland conditions in ways that were ecologically sound", reflecting a desire for lower risk rather than higher profit; in spite of this, it was often the case that "the nomad was blamed for problems that were not of his own making and were a product of alien forces."[42] Independently finding precedent in the opinions of previous scholars such as Ibn Khaldun as well as common currency in antagonistic cultural attitudes towards non-sedentary peoples,[42] governments and international organizations have made use of Hardin's work to help justify restrictions on land access and the eventual sedentarization of pastoral nomads despite its weak empirical basis. Examining relations between historically nomadic Bedouin Arabs and the Syrian state in the 20th century, Dawn Chatty notes that "Hardin's argument […] was curiously accepted as the fundamental explanation for the degradation of the steppe land" in development schemes for the arid interior of the country, downplaying the larger role of agricultural overexploitation in desertification as it melded with prevailing nationalist ideology which viewed nomads as socially backward and economically harmful.[43]

Similarly, geographer Douglas L. Johnson remarks that many nomadic pastoralist societies of Africa and the Middle East in fact "balanced local stocking ratios against seasonal rangeland conditions in ways that were ecologically sound", reflecting a desire for lower risk rather than higher profit; in spite of this, it was often the case that "the nomad was blamed for problems that were not of his own making and were a product of alien forces." Independently finding precedent in the opinions of previous scholars such as Ibn Khaldun as well as common currency in antagonistic cultural attitudes towards non-sedentary peoples,

同样,地理学家道格拉斯 · l · 约翰逊(Douglas l. Johnson)评论说,非洲和中东的许多游牧社会实际上是“以生态学上合理的方式,在季节性牧场条件与当地库存比率之间实现平衡” ,反映出人们希望降低风险,而不是提高利润; 尽管如此,人们往往认为,“游牧民所造成的问题并非他自己造成,而是外来势力的产物。”独立借鉴伊本 · 赫勒敦等前辈学者的观点,以及对非定居民族的敌对文化态度的通行做法,


Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues looked at how real-world communities manage communal resources, such as fisheries, land irrigation systems, and farmlands, and they identified a number of factors conducive to successful resource management. One factor is the resource itself; resources with definable boundaries (e.g., land) can be preserved much more easily. A second factor is resource dependence; there must be a perceptible threat of resource depletion, and it must be difficult to find substitutes. The third is the presence of a community; small and stable populations with a thick social network and social norms promoting conservation do better.[40] A final condition is that there be appropriate community-based rules and procedures in place with built-in incentives for responsible use and punishments for overuse. When the commons is taken over by non-locals, those solutions can no longer be used.[39]

Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues looked at how real-world communities manage communal resources, such as fisheries, land irrigation systems, and farmlands, and they identified a number of factors conducive to successful resource management. One factor is the resource itself; resources with definable boundaries (e.g., land) can be preserved much more easily. A second factor is resource dependence; there must be a perceptible threat of resource depletion, and it must be difficult to find substitutes. The third is the presence of a community; small and stable populations with a thick social network and social norms promoting conservation do better. A final condition is that there be appropriate community-based rules and procedures in place with built-in incentives for responsible use and punishments for overuse. When the commons is taken over by non-locals, those solutions can no longer be used.

埃莉诺 · 奥斯特罗姆和她的同事研究了现实世界中的社区如何管理社区资源,比如渔业、土地灌溉系统和农田,他们确定了一些有利于成功管理资源的因素。一个因素是资源本身; 有明确边界的资源(例如,土地)可以更容易地保存下来。第二个因素是对资源的依赖; 必定存在可察觉的资源枯竭威胁,而且必定很难找到替代品。第三是社区的存在; 拥有丰富的社会网络和促进保护的社会规范的小而稳定的人群做得更好。最后一个条件是,必须制定适当的基于社区的规则和程序,并为负责任地使用和过度使用制定内在的奖励措施。当公共资源被非当地人接管时,那些解决方案就不能再使用了。


An example of counteracting the tragedy of commons gets possible, if the total amount of common goods is measurable and if there is a majority who sets up the following rules: people have to pay proportionally for their consumption if they report it, but those who refuse to tell, have to pay an equal portion of the amount that is left of the total consumption after subtracting those of all reporting individuals'. Since people will consume mostly diverse amounts, those who - can - consume less, are interested in joining the club of those who report and pay proportionally. This goes on until only the biggest consumer won't be reporting, but they don't have to, as their share can already be calculated by subtracting all the reported values from the total consumption.

An example of counteracting the tragedy of commons gets possible, if the total amount of common goods is measurable and if there is a majority who sets up the following rules: people have to pay proportionally for their consumption if they report it, but those who refuse to tell, have to pay an equal portion of the amount that is left of the total consumption after subtracting those of all reporting individuals'. Since people will consume mostly diverse amounts, those who - can - consume less, are interested in joining the club of those who report and pay proportionally. This goes on until only the biggest consumer won't be reporting, but they don't have to, as their share can already be calculated by subtracting all the reported values from the total consumption.

如果公共物品的总量是可以测量的,如果大多数人制定了以下规则: 如果人们报告消费,就必须按比例付费,而那些拒绝报告的人,就必须从总消费中减去所有报告个人的消费后,付出相等的部分,这样就有可能抵消公地悲剧。由于人们的消费量大多数是不同的,那些能够减少消费的人,有兴趣加入那些报告并按比例付费的人的俱乐部。这样一直持续下去,直到只有最大的消费者不会报告,但他们不必报告,因为他们的份额已经可以通过从总消费量中减去所有报告的价值来计算。


Governmental solutions

Governmental solutions may be necessary when the above conditions are not met (such as a community being too big or too unstable to provide a thick social network). Examples of government regulation include privatization, regulation, and internalizing the externalities.

Governmental solutions may be necessary when the above conditions are not met (such as a community being too big or too unstable to provide a thick social network). Examples of government regulation include privatization, regulation, and internalizing the externalities.

当上述条件不能满足时(如社区太大或太不稳定,无法提供一个密集的社交网络) ,政府的解决方案可能是必要的。政府管制的例子包括私有化、管制和外部性的内部化。


Privatization

One solution for some resources is to convert common good into private property, giving the new owner an incentive to enforce its sustainability. Libertarians and classical liberals cite the tragedy of the commons as an example of what happens when Lockean property rights to homestead resources are prohibited by a government.[44] They argue that the solution to the tragedy of the commons is to allow individuals to take over the property rights of a resource, that is, to privatize it.[45]

One solution for some resources is to convert common good into private property, giving the new owner an incentive to enforce its sustainability. Libertarians and classical liberals cite the tragedy of the commons as an example of what happens when Lockean property rights to homestead resources are prohibited by a government. They argue that the solution to the tragedy of the commons is to allow individuals to take over the property rights of a resource, that is, to privatize it.

一些资源的一个解决方案是将共同利益转化为私有财产,给新的所有者一个强制其可持续性的激励。自由主义者和古典自由主义者引用《公地悲剧作为例子,说明当洛克人对宅地资源的产权被政府禁止时会发生什么。他们认为,解决公地悲剧的办法是允许个人接管资源的产权,也就是说,私有化。


In England, this solution was attempted in the Inclosure Acts.

In England, this solution was attempted in the Inclosure Acts.

在英国,这种解决方案在《封闭法案》中尝试过。


Regulation

In a typical example, governmental regulations can limit the amount of a common good that is available for use by any individual. Permit systems for extractive economic activities including mining, fishing, hunting, livestock raising and timber extraction are examples of this approach. Similarly, limits to pollution are examples of governmental intervention on behalf of the commons. This idea is used by the United Nations Moon Treaty, Outer Space Treaty and Law of the Sea Treaty as well as the UNESCO World Heritage Convention which involves the international law principle that designates some areas or resources the Common Heritage of Mankind.[46]

In a typical example, governmental regulations can limit the amount of a common good that is available for use by any individual. Permit systems for extractive economic activities including mining, fishing, hunting, livestock raising and timber extraction are examples of this approach. Similarly, limits to pollution are examples of governmental intervention on behalf of the commons. This idea is used by the United Nations Moon Treaty, Outer Space Treaty and Law of the Sea Treaty as well as the UNESCO World Heritage Convention which involves the international law principle that designates some areas or resources the Common Heritage of Mankind.

在一个典型的例子中,政府规章可以限制任何个人可以使用的公共物品的数量。采矿、渔业、狩猎、畜牧业和木材开采等采掘经济活动的许可证制度就是这种方法的例子。同样,污染限制是政府代表公地进行干预的例子。《联合国月球条约》、《外层空间条约》和《海洋法公约》以及联合国教科文组织《世界遗产公约》都采用了这一想法,其中涉及指定某些地区或资源为人类共同遗产的国际法原则。


In Hardin's essay, he proposed that the solution to the problem of overpopulation must be based on "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" and result in "relinquishing the freedom to breed". Hardin discussed this topic further in a 1979 book, Managing the Commons, co-written with John A. Baden.[47] He framed this prescription in terms of needing to restrict the "reproductive right", to safeguard all other rights. Several countries have a variety of population control laws in place.

In Hardin's essay, he proposed that the solution to the problem of overpopulation must be based on "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" and result in "relinquishing the freedom to breed". Hardin discussed this topic further in a 1979 book, Managing the Commons, co-written with John A. Baden. He framed this prescription in terms of needing to restrict the "reproductive right", to safeguard all other rights. Several countries have a variety of population control laws in place.

在哈丁的文章中,他提出解决人口过剩问题必须建立在“相互强制,相互同意”的基础上,并导致“放弃繁殖的自由”。哈丁在1979年与约翰 · a · 巴登合著的《管理下议院》一书中进一步讨论了这个话题。他从需要限制”生殖权利”和保障所有其他权利的角度阐述了这一规定。一些国家制定了各种各样的人口控制法律。


German historian Joachim Radkau thought Hardin advocates strict management of common goods via increased government involvement or international regulation bodies.[48] An asserted impending "tragedy of the commons" is frequently warned of as a consequence of the adoption of policies which restrict private property and espouse expansion of public property.[49][50]

German historian Joachim Radkau thought Hardin advocates strict management of common goods via increased government involvement or international regulation bodies. An asserted impending "tragedy of the commons" is frequently warned of as a consequence of the adoption of policies which restrict private property and espouse expansion of public property.

德国历史学家约阿希姆 · 拉德考认为,哈丁主张通过增加政府干预或国际监管机构来严格管理公共物品。一个断言即将到来的“公地悲剧”经常被警告,因为采取了限制私有财产和支持扩大公有财产的政策。


Internalizing externalities

Privatization works when the person who owns the property (or rights of access to that property) pays the full price of its exploitation. As discussed above negative externalities (negative results, such as air or water pollution, that do not proportionately affect the user of the resource) is often a feature driving the tragedy of the commons. Internalizing the externalities, in other words ensuring that the users of resource pay for all of the consequences of its use, can provide an alternate solution between privatization and regulation. One example is gasoline taxes which are intended to include both the cost of road maintenance and of air pollution. This solution can provide the flexibility of privatization while minimizing the amount of government oversight and overhead that is needed.

Privatization works when the person who owns the property (or rights of access to that property) pays the full price of its exploitation. As discussed above negative externalities (negative results, such as air or water pollution, that do not proportionately affect the user of the resource) is often a feature driving the tragedy of the commons. Internalizing the externalities, in other words ensuring that the users of resource pay for all of the consequences of its use, can provide an alternate solution between privatization and regulation. One example is gasoline taxes which are intended to include both the cost of road maintenance and of air pollution. This solution can provide the flexibility of privatization while minimizing the amount of government oversight and overhead that is needed.

当拥有财产的人(或对该财产的使用权)支付其开发的全部价格时,私有化就起作用了。正如上面所讨论的负外部性(负面的结果,如空气或水污染,不会成比例地影响资源的使用者)通常是驱动公地悲剧的一个特征。将外部因素内部化,换言之,确保资源使用者为其使用的所有后果付费,可以在私有化和管制之间提供另一种解决办法。一个例子是汽油税,其目的是包括道路维护费用和空气污染费用。这种解决办法可以提供私有化的灵活性,同时尽量减少所需的政府监督和管理费用。


The Mid-Way Solution

One of the significant actions areas which can dwell as potential solution is to have co-shared communities that have partial ownership from governmental side and partial ownership from the community. By ownership, here it is referred to planning, sharing, using, benefiting and supervision of the resources which ensure that the power is not held in one or two hands only. Since, involvement of multiple stakeholders is necessary responsibilities can be shared across them based on their abilities and capacities in terms of human resources, infrastructure development ability and legal aspects etc.模板:Cn

One of the significant actions areas which can dwell as potential solution is to have co-shared communities that have partial ownership from governmental side and partial ownership from the community. By ownership, here it is referred to planning, sharing, using, benefiting and supervision of the resources which ensure that the power is not held in one or two hands only. Since, involvement of multiple stakeholders is necessary responsibilities can be shared across them based on their abilities and capacities in terms of human resources, infrastructure development ability and legal aspects etc.

可作为潜在解决办法的重要行动领域之一是共享社区,政府拥有部分所有权,社区拥有部分所有权。所有权在这里指的是对资源的规划、分享、使用、受益和监督,以确保权力不仅仅掌握在一个或两个人手中。由于多个利益攸关方的参与是必要的,因此可以根据它们在人力资源、基础设施发展能力和法律方面的能力,在它们之间分担责任。


Criticism

Radical environmentalist Derrick Jensen claims the tragedy of the commons is used as propaganda for private ownership.[51]模板:Pn He says it has been used by the political right wing to hasten the final enclosure of the "common resources" of third world and indigenous people worldwide, as a part of the Washington Consensus. He argues that in true situations, those who abuse the commons would have been warned to desist and if they failed would have punitive sanctions against them. He says that rather than being called "The Tragedy of the Commons", it should be called "the Tragedy of the Failure of the Commons".模板:Cn

Radical environmentalist Derrick Jensen claims the tragedy of the commons is used as propaganda for private ownership. He says it has been used by the political right wing to hasten the final enclosure of the "common resources" of third world and indigenous people worldwide, as a part of the Washington Consensus. He argues that in true situations, those who abuse the commons would have been warned to desist and if they failed would have punitive sanctions against them. He says that rather than being called "The Tragedy of the Commons", it should be called "the Tragedy of the Failure of the Commons".

激进的环保人士 · 德里克 · 詹森声称,公地悲剧被用作私人所有权的宣传。他说,作为华盛顿共识的一部分,它已经被政治右翼分子用来加速对第三世界和东南亚塔鲁人的“共同资源”的最终圈定。他认为,在真实的情况下,那些滥用公地的人会被警告停止,如果他们失败了,将会受到惩罚性的制裁。他说,与其被称为“公地悲剧” ,不如被称为“公地失败的悲剧”。


Marxist geographer David Harvey has a similar criticism, noting that "The dispossession of indigenous populations in North America by 'productive' colonists, for instance, was justified because indigenous populations did not produce value", and asks generally: "Why, for instance, do we not focus in Hardin's metaphor on the individual ownership of the cattle rather than on the pasture as a common?"[52]

Marxist geographer David Harvey has a similar criticism, noting that "The dispossession of indigenous populations in North America by 'productive' colonists, for instance, was justified because indigenous populations did not produce value", and asks generally: "Why, for instance, do we not focus in Hardin's metaphor on the individual ownership of the cattle rather than on the pasture as a common?"

马克思主义地理学家戴维 · 哈维(David Harvey)也提出了类似的批评,他指出,“例如,‘生产力’的殖民者剥夺北美洲的土著人口是正当的,因为土著人口没有创造价值” ,并笼统地问道: “例如,我们为什么不把哈丁的比喻集中在牛的个人所有权上,而不是集中在作为一个共同点的牧场上? ”


Hardin's work was also criticised[53]模板:Fcn as historically inaccurate in failing to account for the demographic transition, and for failing to distinguish between common property and open access resources.[54] In a similar vein, Carl Dahlman argues that commons were effectively managed to prevent overgrazing.[55] Likewise, Susan Jane Buck Cox argues that the common land example used to argue this economic concept is on very weak historical ground, and misrepresents what she terms was actually the "triumph of the commons": the successful common usage of land for many centuries. She argues that social changes and agricultural innovation, and not the behaviour of the commoners, led to the demise of the commons.[4]

Hardin's work was also criticised as historically inaccurate in failing to account for the demographic transition, and for failing to distinguish between common property and open access resources. In a similar vein, Carl Dahlman argues that commons were effectively managed to prevent overgrazing. Likewise, Susan Jane Buck Cox argues that the common land example used to argue this economic concept is on very weak historical ground, and misrepresents what she terms was actually the "triumph of the commons": the successful common usage of land for many centuries. She argues that social changes and agricultural innovation, and not the behaviour of the commoners, led to the demise of the commons.

哈丁的工作也被批评为在历史上不准确,没有考虑到人口结构的转变,也没有区分公共财产和开放存取资源。卡尔•达尔曼(Carl Dahlman)也持类似观点,他认为,公地得到了有效管理,以防止过度放牧。同样,苏珊•简•巴克•考克斯(Susan Jane Buck Cox)认为,用于论证这一经济概念的常见土地例子,其历史依据非常薄弱,并且曲解了她所称的实际上是“公地的胜利”——多个世纪以来对土地的成功常用。她认为,社会变革和农业创新,而不是老百姓的行为,导致了公地的消亡。


Some authors, like Yochai Benkler, say that with the rise of the Internet and digitalisation, an economics system based on commons becomes possible again. He wrote in his book The Wealth of Networks in 2006 that cheap computing power plus networks enable people to produce valuable products through non-commercial processes of interaction: "as human beings and as social beings, rather than as market actors through the price system". He uses the term networked information economy to refer to a "system of production, distribution, and consumption of information goods characterized by decentralized individual action carried out through widely distributed, nonmarket means that do not depend on market strategies."[56] He also coined the term commons-based peer production for collaborative efforts based on sharing information.[57] Examples of commons-based peer production are free and open source software and open-source hardware.

Some authors, like Yochai Benkler, say that with the rise of the Internet and digitalisation, an economics system based on commons becomes possible again. He wrote in his book The Wealth of Networks in 2006 that cheap computing power plus networks enable people to produce valuable products through non-commercial processes of interaction: "as human beings and as social beings, rather than as market actors through the price system". He uses the term networked information economy to refer to a "system of production, distribution, and consumption of information goods characterized by decentralized individual action carried out through widely distributed, nonmarket means that do not depend on market strategies." He also coined the term commons-based peer production for collaborative efforts based on sharing information. Examples of commons-based peer production are free and open source software and open-source hardware.

一些作者,比如 Yochai Benkler,说随着互联网的兴起和数字化,一个基于公共资源的经济系统再次成为可能。他在2006年出版的《网络财富》(The Wealth of Networks)一书中写道,廉价的计算能力加上网络,使人们能够通过非商业互动过程生产有价值的产品: “作为人类和社会人,而不是通过价格体系的市场参与者。”。他用网络信息经济这个术语来指代一个信息商品的生产、分销和消费系统,这个系统通过广泛分布的、不依赖于市场策略的非市场手段来实现拥有属性分散的个体行为他还创造了基于信息共享的协作努力的术语共同对等生产。共同对等生产的例子有免费的开源软件和开源硬件。


Comedy of the commons

In certain cases, exploiting a resource more may be a good thing. Carol M. Rose, in a 1986 article, discussed the concept of the "comedy of the commons", where the public property in question exhibits "increasing returns to scale" in usage (hence the phrase, "the more the merrier"), in that the more people use the resource, the higher the benefit to each one. Rose cites as examples commerce and group recreational activities. According to Rose, public resources with the "comedic" characteristic may suffer from under-investment rather than over usage.[58] According to an example explained by Garrett Richards in his article "Comedy of the Commons: Cheerful Options for Shared Resources in an Era of Climate Change" he suggested that climate change issue specifically carbon emissions can be tackled effectively only when the efforts are directly addressing the issues along with the collective efforts from the world economies. His example sheds a light on the fact that if funding is collectively done and solutions are shared across the nations it might help in identifying technologies that can solve the problem of carbon emission issues. Additionally, the more that nations are willing to join up for the cause, collectively work together, and pour in resources, the higher are the chances for successful technological developments.[59]

In certain cases, exploiting a resource more may be a good thing. Carol M. Rose, in a 1986 article, discussed the concept of the "comedy of the commons", where the public property in question exhibits "increasing returns to scale" in usage (hence the phrase, "the more the merrier"), in that the more people use the resource, the higher the benefit to each one. Rose cites as examples commerce and group recreational activities. According to Rose, public resources with the "comedic" characteristic may suffer from under-investment rather than over usage. According to an example explained by Garrett Richards in his article "Comedy of the Commons: Cheerful Options for Shared Resources in an Era of Climate Change" he suggested that climate change issue specifically carbon emissions can be tackled effectively only when the efforts are directly addressing the issues along with the collective efforts from the world economies. His example sheds a light on the fact that if funding is collectively done and solutions are shared across the nations it might help in identifying technologies that can solve the problem of carbon emission issues. Additionally, the more that nations are willing to join up for the cause, collectively work together, and pour in resources, the higher are the chances for successful technological developments.

在某些情况下,更多地开发资源可能是一件好事。卡罗尔 · m · 罗斯(Carol m. Rose)在1986年的一篇文章中讨论了“公地的喜剧”这一概念,在这一概念中,所涉及的公共财产在使用方面呈现出“规模收益递增”(increasing returns to scale)的特点(因此有了“越多越开心”(more the merrier)这一短语) ,因为越多的人使用资源,对。罗斯以商业和团体娱乐活动为例。罗斯认为,具有“喜剧性”特征的公共资源可能遭受的是投资不足,而不是过度使用。根据 Garrett Richards 在他的文章“ Comedy of the Commons: Cheerful Options for Shared Resources in a Era of Climate Change”中解释的一个例子,他建议,只有在世界各经济体的共同努力下直接解决问题,才能有效地解决气候变化问题,特别是碳排放问题。他的例子揭示了一个事实,如果资金集体完成,解决方案在各国之间共享,这可能有助于确定能够解决碳排放问题的技术。此外,越多的国家愿意加入这项事业,共同努力,投入资源,成功的技术发展的机会就越大。


See also

! ——按字母顺序——


References

Notes

  1. 1.0 1.1 模板:Cite wikisource
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2 脚本错误:没有“Footnotes”这个模块。
  3. Wade, R. (1986). "Common Property Resource Management in South Indian Villages" (in en). Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management, April 21-26, 1985. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. ISBN 9780309042581. OCLC 16727857. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/756181468914058595/pdf/ARU36000Common0outh0Indian0villages.pdf. 
  4. 4.0 4.1 Cox, Susan Jane Buck (1985). "No Tragedy on the Commons" (PDF). Environmental Ethics. 7 (1): 49–61. doi:10.5840/enviroethics1985716. hdl:10535/3113.
  5. "Elinor Ostrom - Facts". www.nobelprize.org. Retrieved 2018-08-15.
  6. 6.0 6.1 6.2 脚本错误:没有“Footnotes”这个模块。
  7. van Laerhoven, Frank; Ostrom, Elinor (2007). "Traditions and Trends in the Study of the Commons" (PDF). International Journal of the Commons. 1 (1): 3–28. doi:10.18352/ijc.76.
  8. Hesse, Stephen (2006-07-26). "Will commons sense dawn again in time?". The Japan Times Online. Search.japantimes.co.jp. Retrieved 22 October 2013.
  9. Daniels, Brigham (2007). "Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions". Environmental Law. 37 (3): 515–571. JSTOR 43267404. SSRN 1227745. Page 536.
  10. Bowles, Samuel (2004). Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1400829316. https://books.google.com/?id=HAiMDU4qv0IC&pg=PA27. 
  11. Andersson, K. (1996). "The Tragedy of the Common Forest: Why the Pacific Northwest Forest Conflict is a 'No Technical Solution' Problem". Oregon Daily Emerald.
  12. Dubner, Stephen J.; Levitt, Steven D. (2008-04-20). "Not-So-Free Ride". The New York Times (in English). Retrieved 2020-02-25.
  13. Jaeger, William. Environmental Economics for Tree Huggers and Other Skeptics, p. 80 (Island Press 2012): "Economists often say that externalities need to be 'internalized,' meaning that some action needs to be taken to correct this kind of market failure."
  14. Yakowitz Bambauer, Jane (2011). "Tragedy of the Data Commons". Harvard Journal of Law and Technology (in English). 25 (1). SSRN 1789749.
  15. Madren, Carrie (August 31, 2010). "Dark nights: the global effort to tackle light pollution". The Ecologist (in English). Retrieved 2020-02-24.
  16. Shiklomanov, Igor A. (2000). "Appraisal and Assessment of World Water Resources". Water International. 25 (1): 11–32. doi:10.1080/02508060008686794.
  17. Wilson, E.O., 2002, The Future of Life, Vintage
  18. Leakey, Richard and Roger Lewin, 1996, The Sixth Extinction : Patterns of Life and the Future of Humankind, Anchor,
  19. Hogan, C. Michael (2014). Overfishing. Encyclopedia of Earth. National Council for Science and the Environment. eds. Sidney Draggan and C. Cleveland. Washington DC.
  20. ch 11–12. Mark Kurlansky, 1997. Cod: A Biography of the Fish That Changed the World, New York: Walker, .
  21. Flockers, Small (15 January 2016). "Small Flock Poultry Farmers of Canada: MCR-1: Tragedy of the Commons for Antibiotics".
  22. Hendrix, K. S.; Sturm, L. A.; Zimet, G. D.; Meslin, E. M. (2016). "Ethics and Childhood Vaccination Policy in the United States". American Journal of Public Health. 106 (2): 273–278. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2015.302952. PMC 4815604. PMID 26691123. Section 3: The tragedy of the (herd immunity) commons.
  23. Prause, Christian R. (2011). "Reputation-based self-management of software process artifact quality in consortium research projects". Proceedings of the 19th ACM SIGSOFT symposium and the 13th European conference on Foundations of software engineering - SIGSOFT/FSE '11. pp. 380–383. doi:10.1145/2025113.2025166. ISBN 9781450304436. https://www.drprause.de/files/ESEC2011-ReputationbasedSelfmanagementQuality.pdf. 
  24. Stephane Kasriel (2017-07-31). "Skill, re-skill and re-skill again. How to keep up with the future of work". World Economic Forum.
  25. "Satellite constellations: Astronomers warn of threat to view of Universe". BBC. December 27, 2019. Retrieved February 3, 2020.
  26. Dionisio, Francisco; Gordo, Isabel (2006). "The tragedy of the commons, the public goods dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and excludability in evolutionary biology" (PDF). Evolutionary Ecology Research. 8: 321–332. hdl:10400.7/88. ISSN 1522-0613. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-09-27.
  27. Rankin, Daniel J.; Kokko, Hanna (2006). "Sex, death and tragedy" (PDF). Trends in Ecology & Evolution. 21 (5): 225–226. doi:10.1016/j.tree.2006.02.013. PMID 16697906.
  28. Rankin, Daniel J. (2005). "Can adaptation lead to extinction?" (PDF). Oikos. 111 (3): 616–619. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.692.9713. doi:10.1111/j.1600-0706.2005.14541.x. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-05-03.
  29. Rankin, Daniel J.; Bargum, Katja; Kokko, Hanna (2007). "The tragedy of the commons in evolutionary biology" (PDF). Trends in Ecology & Evolution. 22 (12): 643–651. doi:10.1016/j.tree.2007.07.009. hdl:1975/7498. PMID 17981363.
  30. Ibrahim, Ahmed (2015). "The tragedy of the commons and prisoner's dilemma may improve our realization of the theory of life and provide us with advanced therapeutic ways". Figshare.
  31. Druzin, Bryan (2016). "A Plan to strengthen the Paris Agreement". Fordham Law Review. 84: 19–20.
  32. Gelfand & Dyer, 2000
  33. Myers & Kopelman, 2012.
  34. Van Vugt, M.; Van Lange, P. A. M.; Meertens, R. M.; Joireman, J. A. (1996). "How a Structural Solution to a Real-World Social Dilemma Failed: A Field Experiment on the First Carpool Lane in Europe" (PDF). Social Psychology Quarterly. 59 (4): 364–374. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.318.656. doi:10.2307/2787077. JSTOR 2787077. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2017-08-09.
  35. "Put on a happy face, lower your electric bill". Toronto Sun. 2009-06-17. Archived from the original on 2009-06-17. Retrieved 2020-02-25.
  36. Axelrod, Robert (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 978-0-465-02121-5. https://archive.org/details/evolutionofcoop00axel. 
  37. Appell, George N. (1993). "Hardin's Myth of the Commons: The Tragedy of Conceptual Confusions. With Appendix: Diagrams of Forms of Co-ownership" (PDF) (Working Paper). Phillips, ME: Social Transformation and Adaptation Research Institute. hdl:10535/4532. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  38. Ostrom, Elinor; Burger, Joanna; Field, Christopher B.; Norgaard, Richard B.; Policansky, David (1999). "Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges" (PDF). Science. 284 (5412): 278–282. Bibcode:1999Sci...284..278.. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.510.4369. doi:10.1126/science.284.5412.278. PMID 10195886. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2017-08-09. Retrieved 2018-07-23.
  39. 39.0 39.1 "Ostrom 'revisits the commons' in 'Science'". Archived from the original on 2012-03-05.
  40. 40.0 40.1 Elinor Ostrom: Beyond the tragedy of commons. Stockholm whiteboard seminars. (Video, 8:26 min.)
  41. Smith, Vernon L. (October 12, 2009). "Governing The Commons". Forbes (in English). Retrieved 2020-02-25.
  42. 42.0 42.1 Johnson, Douglas L. (1993). "Nomadism and Desertification in Africa and the Middle East". GeoJournal. 31 (1): 51–66. doi:10.1007/bf00815903.
  43. Chatty, Dawn (2010). "The Bedouin in Contemporary Syria: The Persistence of Tribal Authority and Control". Middle East Journal. 64 (1): 29–69. doi:10.3751/64.1.12.
  44. Smith, Robert J. (Fall 1981), Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife (PDF), Cato Journal, 1, Cato Institute, pp. 439–468
  45. John Locke, "Sect. 27" and following sections in Second Treatise of Government (1690). Also available here.
  46. Frakes, Jennifer (2003). "The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach a Compromise". Wisconsin International Law Journal. 21 (2): 409–434. HOL wisint21_18.
  47. "Managing the Commons by Garrett Hardin and John Baden". Ecobooks.com. Retrieved 22 October 2013.
  48. Radkau, Joachim (2008). Nature and Power: A Global History of the Environment. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521851299. https://books.google.com/?id=mvQYxDG6QkoC. 
  49. Mirovitskaya, N.; Soroos, M. S. (January 1995). "Socialism and the Tragedy of the Commons: Reflections on Environmental Practice in the Soviet Union and Russia". The Journal of Environment & Development. 4 (1): 77–110. doi:10.1177/107049659500400105.
  50. Perry, Mark (June 1995). "Why Socialism Failed". The Freeman. 45 (6). Archived from the original on 2009-06-29. Retrieved 2011-06-08.
  51. Jensen, Derrick (2007), "Endgame Vol 1: The Problem of Civilization" and "Endgame Vol II: Resistance" (Seven Stories Press)
  52. Harvey, David (2011). "The future of the commons" (PDF). Radical History Review. 2011 (109): 101–107. doi:10.1215/01636545-2010-017.
  53. Dasgupta, Partha. "Human Well-Being and the Natural Environment". Retrieved 2016-03-13.
  54. Ciriacy-Wantrup, S.; Bishop, Richard (1975). "Common Property as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy". Natural Resources Journal. 15 (4): 713–727. ISSN 0028-0739.
  55. Benkler, Yochai (2006). The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press. p. 3. ISBN 978-0-300-11056-2. https://archive.org/details/wealthofnetworks00benk. 
  56. Steven Johnson (September 21, 2012). "The Internet? We Built That". New York Times. Retrieved 2012-09-24. The Harvard legal scholar Yochai Benkler has called this phenomenon 'commons-based peer production'.
  57. Rose, Carol M. (1986). "The Comedy of the Commons: Commerce, Custom, and Inherently Public Property". Faculty Scholarship Series, Yale Law School. Paper 1828.
  58. Richards, Garrett (2015-12-01). "Comedy of the Commons: Cheerful Options for Shared Resources in an Era of Climate Change". Alternatives Journal. 41: 50.


Bibliography

  • Foddy, M., Smithson, M., Schneider, S., and Hogg, M. (1999). Resolving social dilemmas. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
  • Frischmann, Brett M.; Marciano, Alain; Ramello, Giovanni Battista (2019). "Retrospectives: Tragedy of the Commons after 50 Years". Journal of Economic Perspectives. 33 (4): 211–228. doi:10.1257/jep.33.4.211.
  • Johnson, Douglas L. (1993). "Nomadism and Desertification in Africa and the Middle East". GeoJournal. 31 (1): 51–66. doi:10.1007/bf00815903.
  • Messick, D. M.; Wilke, H. A. M.; Brewer, M. B.; Kramer, R. M.; Zemke, P. E.; Lui, L. (1983). "Individual adaptations and structural change as solutions to social dilemmas". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 44 (294): 309. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.44.2.294.
  • Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Rachlin, Howard (1974). "Self-Control". Behaviorism. 2 (1): 94–107. JSTOR 27758811.
  • Weber, M.; Kopelman, S.; Messick, D. (2004). "A conceptual review of decision making in social dilemmas: applying the logic of appropriateness". Personality and Social Psychology Review. 8 (3): 281–307. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0803_4. PMID 15454350.


External links

模板:Wiktionary

模板:Wikiquote


============-->

============-->


模板:Game theory

模板:Property navbox

模板:Sustainability

模板:Unintended consequences

模板:Portal bar

Category:1968 introductions

类别: 1968年引言

Category:Economic inequality

分类: 经济不平等

Category:Environmental economics

类别: 环境经济学

Category:Environmental social science concepts

类别: 环境社会科学概念

Category:Game theory

范畴: 博弈论

Category:Land use

类别: 土地用途

Category:Market failure

分类: 市场失灵

Category:Metaphors

类别: 隐喻

Category:Public commons

类别: 公共共享


This page was moved from wikipedia:en:Tragedy of the commons. Its edit history can be viewed at 公地悲剧/edithistory