此词条暂由彩云小译翻译，翻译字数共4146，未经人工整理和审校，带来阅读不便，请见谅。

Enactivism is a position in cognitive science that argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment.^[1] It claims that the environment of an organism is brought about, or enacted, by the active exercise of that organism's sensorimotor processes. "The key point, then, is that the species brings forth and specifies its own domain of problems ...this domain does not exist "out there" in an environment that acts as a landing pad for organisms that somehow drop or parachute into the world. Instead, living beings and their environments stand in relation to each other through mutual specification or codetermination" (p. 198). ^[2] "Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems...participate in the generation of meaning ...engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: they enact a world."^[3] These authors suggest that the increasing emphasis upon enactive terminology presages a new era in thinking about cognitive science.^[3] How the actions involved in enactivism relate to age-old questions about free will remains a topic of active debate.^[4]

Enactivism is a position in cognitive science that argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. It claims that the environment of an organism is brought about, or enacted, by the active exercise of that organism's sensorimotor processes. "The key point, then, is that the species brings forth and specifies its own domain of problems ...this domain does not exist "out there" in an environment that acts as a landing pad for organisms that somehow drop or parachute into the world. Instead, living beings and their environments stand in relation to each other through mutual specification or codetermination" (p. 198). "Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems...participate in the generation of meaning ...engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: they enact a world." These authors suggest that the increasing emphasis upon enactive terminology presages a new era in thinking about cognitive science. How the actions involved in enactivism relate to age-old questions about free will remains a topic of active debate.

能动主义是认知科学中的一个立场，认为认知是通过一个行动的有机体和它的环境之间的动态相互作用而产生的。它声称，一个有机体的环境是带来的，或制定，由该有机体的积极行使的感觉运动过程。“因此，关键在于，物种会带来并指定自己的问题领域... ... 这个领域并不存在于“外面”的环境中，这个环境充当着生物体以某种方式掉落或降落到世界上的着陆台。相反，生物和它们的环境是通过相互规定或共同决定而相互关联的”(第198页)。“有机体并不是被动地从环境中接收信息，然后将其转化为内部表征。自然的认知系统... ... 参与意义的产生... ... 参与变革性的互动，而不仅仅是信息性的互动: 它们制定一个世界。”这些作者认为，对术语学的日益重视预示着认知科学思维的一个新时代。行动主义所涉及的行动如何与自由意志这个古老的问题相关，仍然是一个活跃争论的话题。

The term 'enactivism' is close in meaning to 'enaction', defined as "the manner in which a subject of perception creatively matches its actions to the requirements of its situation".^[5] The introduction of the term enaction in this context is attributed to Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch in The Embodied Mind (1991),^[5]^[6] who proposed the name to "emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs".^[2] This was further developed by Thompson and others,^[1] to place emphasis upon the idea that experience of the world is a result of mutual interaction between the sensorimotor capacities of the organism and its environment.^[6] However, some writers maintain that there remains a need for some degree of the mediating function of representation in this new approach to the science of the mind.^[7]

The term 'enactivism' is close in meaning to 'enaction', defined as "the manner in which a subject of perception creatively matches its actions to the requirements of its situation". The introduction of the term enaction in this context is attributed to Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch in The Embodied Mind (1991), who proposed the name to "emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs". This was further developed by Thompson and others, to place emphasis upon the idea that experience of the world is a result of mutual interaction between the sensorimotor capacities of the organism and its environment. However, some writers maintain that there remains a need for some degree of the mediating function of representation in this new approach to the science of the mind.

“ enactivism”一词的意思与“ enaction”相近，后者被定义为”感知主体创造性地将其行动与其情况的要求相匹配的方式”。在这方面引入”启动”一词的原因是弗朗西斯科 · 瓦雷拉、埃文 · 汤普森和埃莉诺 · 罗施在《具身心灵》(1991年)中提出的，他们提出这一名称是为了”强调日益增长的信念，即认知不是预先给定的心灵对预先给定的世界的再现，而是在世界上一个存在所做各种行为的历史基础上对世界和心灵的再现”。汤普森和其他人进一步发展了这一观点，强调世界的经验是有机体的感觉运动能力与其环境相互作用的结果。然而，一些作者坚持认为，在这种心灵科学的新方法中，仍然需要某种程度的表征中介功能。

The initial emphasis of enactivism upon sensorimotor skills has been criticized as "cognitively marginal",^[8] but it has been extended to apply to higher level cognitive activities, such as social interactions.^[3] "In the enactive view,... knowledge is constructed: it is constructed by an agent through its sensorimotor interactions with its environment, co-constructed between and within living species through their meaningful interaction with each other. In its most abstract form, knowledge is co-constructed between human individuals in socio-linguistic interactions...Science is a particular form of social knowledge construction...[that] allows us to perceive and predict events beyond our immediate cognitive grasp...and also to construct further, even more powerful scientific knowledge."^[9]

The initial emphasis of enactivism upon sensorimotor skills has been criticized as "cognitively marginal", but it has been extended to apply to higher level cognitive activities, such as social interactions. "In the enactive view,... knowledge is constructed: it is constructed by an agent through its sensorimotor interactions with its environment, co-constructed between and within living species through their meaningful interaction with each other. In its most abstract form, knowledge is co-constructed between human individuals in socio-linguistic interactions...Science is a particular form of social knowledge construction...[that] allows us to perceive and predict events beyond our immediate cognitive grasp...and also to construct further, even more powerful scientific knowledge."

最初对感觉运动技能的能动主义强调被批评为“认知边缘性”，但是它已经扩展到更高层次的认知活动，如社会互动。“在激活观点中，... ... 知识是建构的: 它是由一个主体通过其感知运动与其环境的相互作用而建构的，通过它们之间的有意义的相互作用，在生物物种之间和它们内部共同建构的。在其最抽象的形式中，知识是人类个体在社会语言交互作用中共同构建的... 科学是社会知识构建的一种特殊形式... [它]允许我们感知和预测超出我们直接认知掌握范围的事件... 也允许我们构建更进一步，甚至更强大的科学知识。”

Enactivism is closely related to situated cognition and embodied cognition, and is presented as an alternative to cognitivism, computationalism, and Cartesian dualism.

能动主义与情境认知和具身认知密切相关，是认知主义、计算主义和笛卡尔二元论的另一种选择。

Philosophical aspects

= 哲学方面 =

Enactivism is one of a cluster of related theories sometimes known as the 4Es.^[10] As described by Mark Rowlands, mental processes are:

Embodied involving more than the brain, including a more general involvement of bodily structures and processes.
Embedded functioning only in a related external environment.
Enacted involving not only neural processes, but also things an organism does.
Extended into the organism's environment.

Enactivism is one of a cluster of related theories sometimes known as the 4Es. As described by Mark Rowlands, mental processes are:

Embodied involving more than the brain, including a more general involvement of bodily structures and processes.
Embedded functioning only in a related external environment.
Enacted involving not only neural processes, but also things an organism does.
Extended into the organism's environment.

能动主义是一系列相关理论中的一个，有时也被称为4 e 理论。正如马克 · 罗兰兹所描述的，心理过程是:

包含了比大脑更多的东西，包括更广泛的身体结构和过程的参与。
只在相关的外部环境中嵌入功能。
制定不仅涉及神经过程，而且涉及生物体的活动。
延伸至生物体的环境。

Enactivism proposes an alternative to dualism as a philosophy of mind, in that it emphasises the interactions between mind, body and the environment, seeing them all as inseparably intertwined in mental processes.^[11] The self arises as part of the process of an embodied entity interacting with the environment in precise ways determined by its physiology. In this sense, individuals can be seen to "grow into" or arise from their interactive role with the world.^[12]

"Enaction is the idea that organisms create their own experience through their actions. Organisms are not passive receivers of input from the environment, but are actors in the environment such that what they experience is shaped by how they act."^[13]

Enactivism proposes an alternative to dualism as a philosophy of mind, in that it emphasises the interactions between mind, body and the environment, seeing them all as inseparably intertwined in mental processes. The self arises as part of the process of an embodied entity interacting with the environment in precise ways determined by its physiology. In this sense, individuals can be seen to "grow into" or arise from their interactive role with the world.

"Enaction is the idea that organisms create their own experience through their actions. Organisms are not passive receivers of input from the environment, but are actors in the environment such that what they experience is shaped by how they act."

能动主义提出了二元论作为心灵哲学的替代方案，因为它强调心灵、身体和环境之间的相互作用，认为它们在心理过程中不可分割地相互交织在一起。自我的出现是身体实体与环境以其生理学所决定的精确方式相互作用的过程的一部分。从这个意义上说，个人可以被看作是“成长”或者从他们与世界的互动角色中崛起。”激发是指有机体通过自己的行动创造自己的经验。有机体不是环境输入的被动接收者，而是环境中的行为者，因此它们的经验受其行为方式的影响。”

In The Tree of Knowledge Maturana & Varela proposed the term enactive^[14] "to evoke the view of knowledge that what is known is brought forth, in contraposition to the more classical views of either cognitivism^{[Note 1]} or connectionism.^{[Note 2]} They see enactivism as providing a middle ground between the two extremes of representationalism and solipsism. They seek to "confront the problem of understanding how our existence-the praxis of our living- is coupled to a surrounding world which appears filled with regularities that are at every instant the result of our biological and social histories.... to find a via media: to understand the regularity of the world we are experiencing at every moment, but without any point of reference independent of ourselves that would give certainty to our descriptions and cognitive assertions. Indeed the whole mechanism of generating ourselves, as describers and observers tells us that our world, as the world which we bring forth in our coexistence with others, will always have precisely that mixture of regularity and mutability, that combination of solidity and shifting sand, so typical of human experience when we look at it up close."[Tree of Knowledge, p. 241] Another important notion relating to enactivism is autopoiesis. The word refers to a system that is able to reproduce and maintain itself. Maturana & Varela describe that "This was a word without a history, a word that could directly mean what takes place in the dynamics of the autonomy proper to living systems"^[15] Using the term autopoiesis, they argue that any closed system that has autonomy, self-reference and self-construction (or, that has autopoietic activities) has cognitive capacities. Therefore, cognition is present in all living systems.^[15] This view is also called autopoietic enactivism.

In The Tree of Knowledge Maturana & Varela proposed the term enactive "to evoke the view of knowledge that what is known is brought forth, in contraposition to the more classical views of either cognitivism or connectionism. They see enactivism as providing a middle ground between the two extremes of representationalism and solipsism. They seek to "confront the problem of understanding how our existence-the praxis of our living- is coupled to a surrounding world which appears filled with regularities that are at every instant the result of our biological and social histories.... to find a via media: to understand the regularity of the world we are experiencing at every moment, but without any point of reference independent of ourselves that would give certainty to our descriptions and cognitive assertions. Indeed the whole mechanism of generating ourselves, as describers and observers tells us that our world, as the world which we bring forth in our coexistence with others, will always have precisely that mixture of regularity and mutability, that combination of solidity and shifting sand, so typical of human experience when we look at it up close."[Tree of Knowledge, p. 241] Another important notion relating to enactivism is autopoiesis. The word refers to a system that is able to reproduce and maintain itself. Maturana & Varela describe that "This was a word without a history, a word that could directly mean what takes place in the dynamics of the autonomy proper to living systems" Using the term autopoiesis, they argue that any closed system that has autonomy, self-reference and self-construction (or, that has autopoietic activities) has cognitive capacities. Therefore, cognition is present in all living systems. This view is also called autopoietic enactivism.

在《知识之树》一书中，Maturana 和 Varela 提出了 enactive 一词，以唤起对知识的观点，即已知的东西是带来的，这与认知主义或联结主义的更经典观点相对立。他们把能动主义看作是在代表主义和唯我主义这两个极端之间提供了一个中间地带。他们试图“直面理解我们的存在——我们生活的实践——是如何与周围的世界相结合的问题，这个世界似乎充满了规律性，而这些规律性每时每刻都是我们生物学和社会历史的结果... ..。找到一个通过媒介: 理解我们每时每刻都在经历的世界的规律性，但是没有任何独立于我们自己的参照点，这将给我们的描述和认知断言带来确定性。事实上，作为描述者和观察者，产生我们自己的整个机制告诉我们，我们的世界，作为我们在与他人共存中产生的世界，总是具有正确的规律性和可变性的混合体，即实体性和流动性的结合体，当我们近距离观察它时，它是典型的人类经验。“[知识之树，第241页]另一个与能动主义相关的重要概念是自创生。这个词指的是一个能够自我复制和维持的系统。Maturana & Varela 描述说: “这是一个没有历史的词，一个可以直接表示生命系统自主性动力学中发生的事情的词。”使用术语“自创生”，他们认为任何具有自主性、自我参照和自我概念的封闭系统(或者具有自创生活动的系统)都有认知能力。因此，认知存在于所有的生命系统中。这种观点也被称为自创造能动主义。

Radical enactivism is another form of enactivist view of cognition. Radical enactivists often adopt a thoroughly non-representational, enactive account of basic cognition. Basic cognitive capacities mentioned by Hutto and Myin include perceiving, imagining and remembering.^[16]^[17] They argue that those forms of basic cognition can be explained without positing mental representations. With regard to complex forms of cognition such as language, they think mental representations are needed, because there needs explanations of content. In human being's public practices, they claim that "such intersubjective practices and sensitivity to the relevant norms comes with the mastery of the use of public symbol systems" (2017, p. 120), and so "as it happens, this appears only to have occurred in full form with construction of sociocultural cognitive niches in the human lineage" (2017, p. 134).^[16] They conclude that basic cognition as well as cognition in simple organisms such as bacteria are best characterized as non-representational.^[18]^[16]^[17]

Radical enactivism is another form of enactivist view of cognition. Radical enactivists often adopt a thoroughly non-representational, enactive account of basic cognition. Basic cognitive capacities mentioned by Hutto and Myin include perceiving, imagining and remembering. They argue that those forms of basic cognition can be explained without positing mental representations. With regard to complex forms of cognition such as language, they think mental representations are needed, because there needs explanations of content. In human being's public practices, they claim that "such intersubjective practices and sensitivity to the relevant norms comes with the mastery of the use of public symbol systems" (2017, p. 120), and so "as it happens, this appears only to have occurred in full form with construction of sociocultural cognitive niches in the human lineage" (2017, p. 134). They conclude that basic cognition as well as cognition in simple organisms such as bacteria are best characterized as non-representational.

激进主义是激进主义认知观的另一种形式。激进激进主义者常常采用一种完全非代表性的、活跃的基本认知解释。Hutto 和 Myin 提到的基本认知能力包括感知、想象和记忆。他们认为，这些基本认知形式可以解释，而不需要假定心理表征。对于复杂的认知形式，如语言，他们认为心理表征是必要的，因为需要对内容进行解释。在人类的公共实践中，他们声称“这种主体间的实践和对相关规范的敏感性来自于对公共符号系统的使用的掌握”(2017年，第120页) ，因此“碰巧的是，这似乎只是在人类血统的社会文化认知小生态系统的建设中以完整的形式发生”(2017年，第134页)。他们的结论是，细菌等简单生物的基本认知和认知最具有非表征性的特征。

Enactivism also addresses the hard problem of consciousness, referred to by Thompson as part of the explanatory gap in explaining how consciousness and subjective experience are related to brain and body.^[19] "The problem with the dualistic concepts of consciousness and life in standard formulations of the hard problem is that they exclude each other by construction".^[20] Instead, according to Thompson's view of enactivism, the study of consciousness or phenomenology as exemplified by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty is to complement science and its objectification of the world. "The whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression" (Merleau-Ponty, The phenomenology of perception as quoted by Thompson, p. 165). In this interpretation, enactivism asserts that science is formed or enacted as part of humankind's interactivity with its world, and by embracing phenomenology "science itself is properly situated in relation to the rest of human life and is thereby secured on a sounder footing."^[21]^[22]

Enactivism also addresses the hard problem of consciousness, referred to by Thompson as part of the explanatory gap in explaining how consciousness and subjective experience are related to brain and body. "The problem with the dualistic concepts of consciousness and life in standard formulations of the hard problem is that they exclude each other by construction". Instead, according to Thompson's view of enactivism, the study of consciousness or phenomenology as exemplified by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty is to complement science and its objectification of the world. "The whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression" (Merleau-Ponty, The phenomenology of perception as quoted by Thompson, p. 165). In this interpretation, enactivism asserts that science is formed or enacted as part of humankind's interactivity with its world, and by embracing phenomenology "science itself is properly situated in relation to the rest of human life and is thereby secured on a sounder footing."

能量主义也解决了意识的难题，汤普森认为这是解释意识和感质如何与大脑和身体联系的一部分空白。“意识和生命的二元概念在难题的标准表述中的问题在于它们通过建构而相互排斥”。相反，根据汤普森的能行主义观点，以胡塞尔和梅洛-庞蒂为例的意识或现象学研究是对科学及其对世界的客观化的补充。“科学的整个宇宙是建立在直接经验的世界之上的，如果我们想要对科学本身进行严格的审查，并对其意义和范围作出精确的评估，我们必须从重新唤醒科学是二级表达的世界的基本经验开始”(梅洛-庞蒂，汤普森引用的感知现象学，第165页)。在这种解释中，能动主义声称，科学是作为人类与世界互动的一部分而形成或颁布的，通过接受现象学，“科学本身恰当地与人类生活的其他部分相联系，因此有了更稳固的基础”

Enaction has been seen as a move to conjoin representationalism with phenomenalism, that is, as adopting a constructivist epistemology, an epistemology centered upon the active participation of the subject in constructing reality.^[23]^[24] However, 'constructivism' focuses upon more than a simple 'interactivity' that could be described as a minor adjustment to 'assimilate' reality or 'accommodate' to it.^[25] Constructivism looks upon interactivity as a radical, creative, revisionist process in which the knower constructs a personal 'knowledge system' based upon their experience and tested by its viability in practical encounters with their environment. Learning is a result of perceived anomalies that produce dissatisfaction with existing conceptions.^[26]

Enaction has been seen as a move to conjoin representationalism with phenomenalism, that is, as adopting a constructivist epistemology, an epistemology centered upon the active participation of the subject in constructing reality. However, 'constructivism' focuses upon more than a simple 'interactivity' that could be described as a minor adjustment to 'assimilate' reality or 'accommodate' to it. Constructivism looks upon interactivity as a radical, creative, revisionist process in which the knower constructs a personal 'knowledge system' based upon their experience and tested by its viability in practical encounters with their environment. Learning is a result of perceived anomalies that produce dissatisfaction with existing conceptions.

行动被看作是将表征主义与现象主义相结合的一种行动，也就是说，采用了一种构成主义认识论，一种以主体积极参与建构现实为中心的认识论。然而，建构主义关注的不仅仅是一个简单的“交互性”，它可以被描述为一个次要的调整，以“吸收”现实或“适应”现实。建构主义把互动看作是一个激进的、创造性的、修正主义的过程，认知者根据自己的经验构建一个个人的知识体系，并在实际遇到自己的环境时通过其生存能力进行检验。学习是一种感知异常的结果，这种异常会产生对现有概念的不满。

Shaun Gallagher also points out that pragmatism is a forerunner of enactive and extended approaches to cognition.^[27] According to him, enactive conceptions of cognition can be found in many pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey. For example, Dewey says that "The brain is essentially an organ for effecting the reciprocal adjustment to each other of the stimuli received from the environment and responses directed upon it" (1916, pp. 336–337).^[28] This view is fully consistent with enactivist arguments that cognition is not just a matter of brain processes and brain is one part of the body consisting of the dynamical regulation.^[27]^[29] Robert Brandom, a neo-pragmatist, comments that "A founding idea of pragmatism is that the most fundamental kind of intentionality (in the sense of directedness towards objects) is the practical involvement with objects exhibited by a sentient creature dealing skillfully with its world" (2008, p. 178).^[30]

Shaun Gallagher also points out that pragmatism is a forerunner of enactive and extended approaches to cognition. According to him, enactive conceptions of cognition can be found in many pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey. For example, Dewey says that "The brain is essentially an organ for effecting the reciprocal adjustment to each other of the stimuli received from the environment and responses directed upon it" (1916, pp. 336–337). This view is fully consistent with enactivist arguments that cognition is not just a matter of brain processes and brain is one part of the body consisting of the dynamical regulation. Robert Brandom, a neo-pragmatist, comments that "A founding idea of pragmatism is that the most fundamental kind of intentionality (in the sense of directedness towards objects) is the practical involvement with objects exhibited by a sentient creature dealing skillfully with its world" (2008, p. 178).

肖恩•加拉格尔(Shaun Gallagher)还指出，实用主义是认知活跃和扩展方法的先驱。根据他的观点，认知活动概念可以在许多实用主义者身上找到，比如查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔士和约翰 · 杜威。例如，杜威说: “大脑本质上是一个器官，对从环境中接收到的刺激以及针对它的反应进行相互调节”(1916，pp。336–337).这一观点完全符合激进的论点，认为认知不仅仅是一个大脑过程的问题，大脑是身体的一部分，组成的动态调节。新实用主义者罗伯特 · 布兰登评论说: “实用主义的一个基本理念是，最基本的意向性(对物体的指向性)是一个有知觉的生物对物体的实际参与，这个生物能够巧妙地处理它的世界”(2008，p. 178)。

How does constructivism relate to enactivism? From the above remarks it can be seen that Glasersfeld expresses an interactivity between the knower and the known quite acceptable to an enactivist, but does not emphasize the structured probing of the environment by the knower that leads to the "perturbation relative to some expected result" that then leads to a new understanding.^[26] It is this probing activity, especially where it is not accidental but deliberate, that characterizes enaction, and invokes affect,^[31] that is, the motivation and planning that lead to doing and to fashioning the probing, both observing and modifying the environment, so that "perceptions and nature condition one another through generating one another."^[32] The questioning nature of this probing activity is not an emphasis of Piaget and Glasersfeld.

How does constructivism relate to enactivism? From the above remarks it can be seen that Glasersfeld expresses an interactivity between the knower and the known quite acceptable to an enactivist, but does not emphasize the structured probing of the environment by the knower that leads to the "perturbation relative to some expected result" that then leads to a new understanding. It is this probing activity, especially where it is not accidental but deliberate, that characterizes enaction, and invokes affect, that is, the motivation and planning that lead to doing and to fashioning the probing, both observing and modifying the environment, so that "perceptions and nature condition one another through generating one another." The questioning nature of this probing activity is not an emphasis of Piaget and Glasersfeld.

建构主义和积极主义有什么关系？从上面的评论中可以看出，格拉斯菲尔德表达了知者和积极分子可以接受的已知事物之间的互动，但并没有强调知者对环境的结构性探索，这种探索导致了“相对于某些预期结果的扰动”，然后导致了新的理解。正是这种探索活动，特别是在它不是偶然而是故意的情况下，才具有行动的特征，并引发影响，即导致行动和形成探索的动机和计划，既观察环境又改变环境，以便“感知和自然通过相互生成而相互制约”皮亚杰和格拉斯菲尔德并没有强调这种探究活动的质疑本质。

Sharing enactivism's stress upon both action and embodiment in the incorporation of knowledge, but giving Glasersfeld's mechanism of viability an evolutionary emphasis,^[33] is evolutionary epistemology. Inasmuch as an organism must reflect its environment well enough for the organism to be able to survive in it, and to be competitive enough to be able to reproduce at sustainable rate, the structure and reflexes of the organism itself embody knowledge of its environment. This biology-inspired theory of the growth of knowledge is closely tied to universal Darwinism, and is associated with evolutionary epistemologists such as Karl Popper, Donald T. Campbell, Peter Munz, and Gary Cziko.^[34] According to Munz, "an organism is an embodied theory about its environment... Embodied theories are also no longer expressed in language, but in anatomical structures or reflex responses, etc."^[34]^[35]

Sharing enactivism's stress upon both action and embodiment in the incorporation of knowledge, but giving Glasersfeld's mechanism of viability an evolutionary emphasis, is evolutionary epistemology. Inasmuch as an organism must reflect its environment well enough for the organism to be able to survive in it, and to be competitive enough to be able to reproduce at sustainable rate, the structure and reflexes of the organism itself embody knowledge of its environment. This biology-inspired theory of the growth of knowledge is closely tied to universal Darwinism, and is associated with evolutionary epistemologists such as Karl Popper, Donald T. Campbell, Peter Munz, and Gary Cziko. According to Munz, "an organism is an embodied theory about its environment... Embodied theories are also no longer expressed in language, but in anatomical structures or reflex responses, etc."

分享能动主义强调知识的结合中的行动和具体化，但是把格拉斯菲尔德的生存机制作为进化的重点，是进化认识论。由于一个生物体必须足够好地反映其环境，使其能够在其中生存，并具有足够的竞争力，能够以可持续的速度繁殖，生物体本身的结构和反射体现了对其环境的认识。这种以生物学为灵感的知识增长理论与普遍的达尔文主义密切相关，并与进化认识论学家如卡尔 · 波普尔、唐纳德 · t · 坎贝尔、彼得 · 蒙茨和加里 · 奇科联系在一起。按照 Munz 的说法，“有机体是关于其环境的具身理论... ..。体验理论也不再用语言来表达，而是用解剖结构或反射反应等来表达。”

One objection to enactive approaches to cognition is the so-called "scale-up objection". According to this objection, enactive theories only have limited value because they cannot "scale up" to explain more complex cognitive capacities like human thoughts. Those phenomena are extremely difficult to explain without positing representation.^[36] But recently, some philosophers are trying to respond to such objection. For example, Adrian Downey (2020) provides a non-representational account of Obsessive-compulsive disorder, and then argues that ecological-enactive approaches can respond to the "scaling up" objection.^[37]

One objection to enactive approaches to cognition is the so-called "scale-up objection". According to this objection, enactive theories only have limited value because they cannot "scale up" to explain more complex cognitive capacities like human thoughts. Those phenomena are extremely difficult to explain without positing representation. But recently, some philosophers are trying to respond to such objection. For example, Adrian Downey (2020) provides a non-representational account of Obsessive-compulsive disorder, and then argues that ecological-enactive approaches can respond to the "scaling up" objection.

一个反对采取积极的认识方法的理由是所谓的“放大反对”。根据这种反对意见，激活理论只有有限的价值，因为它们不能“放大”，以解释更复杂的认知能力，如人类的思想。如果没有假定的表象，这些现象极难解释。但是最近，一些哲学家试图回应这种反对意见。例如，Adrian Downey (2020)提供了一个关于强迫症的非代表性的解释，然后认为生态激活方法可以回应“扩大”的反对意见。

Psychological aspects

McGann & others^[38] argue that enactivism attempts to mediate between the explanatory role of the coupling between cognitive agent and environment and the traditional emphasis on brain mechanisms found in neuroscience and psychology. In the interactive approach to social cognition developed by De Jaegher & others,^[39]^[40]^[41] the dynamics of interactive processes are seen to play significant roles in coordinating interpersonal understanding, processes that in part include what they call participatory sense-making.^[42]^[43] Recent developments of enactivism in the area of social neuroscience involve the proposal of The Interactive Brain Hypothesis^[44] where social cognition brain mechanisms, even those used in non-interactive situations, are proposed to have interactive origins.

McGann & others

argue that enactivism attempts to mediate between the explanatory role of the coupling between cognitive agent and environment and the traditional emphasis on brain mechanisms found in neuroscience and psychology.  In the interactive approach to social cognition developed by De Jaegher &  others,

the dynamics of interactive processes are seen to play significant roles in coordinating interpersonal understanding, processes that in part include what they call participatory sense-making.

Recent developments of enactivism in the area of social neuroscience involve the proposal of The Interactive Brain Hypothesis
where social cognition brain mechanisms, even those used in non-interactive situations, are proposed to have interactive origins.

心理学方面麦克甘和其他人认为，激进主义试图在认知因素和环境之间的耦合的解释性作用和神经科学和心理学中对大脑机制的传统强调之间进行调解。在 De Jaegher 和其他人开发的社会认知交互方法中，交互过程的动态性被认为在协调人际理解方面发挥了重要作用，这种过程部分包括他们所说的参与性意义的形成。在社会神经科学领域，能动主义的最新发展涉及到交互式大脑假说的提出，在这个假说中，社会认知的大脑机制，甚至那些在非交互式情况下使用的大脑机制，都被认为具有交互式的起源。

Enactive views of perception

In the enactive view, perception "is not conceived as the transmission of information but more as an exploration of the world by various means. Cognition is not tied into the workings of an 'inner mind', some cognitive core, but occurs in directed interaction between the body and the world it inhabits."^[45]

In the enactive view, perception "is not conceived as the transmission of information but more as an exploration of the world by various means. Cognition is not tied into the workings of an 'inner mind', some cognitive core, but occurs in directed interaction between the body and the world it inhabits."

在动态的观点中，感知“不被认为是信息的传递，而更多的是通过各种方式对世界的探索。认知并不与某种认知核心“内心”的运作联系在一起，而是发生在身体与其所居住的世界之间的直接互动中。”

Alva Noë in advocating an enactive view of perception^[46] sought to resolve how we perceive three-dimensional objects, on the basis of two-dimensional input. He argues that we perceive this solidity (or 'volumetricity') by appealing to patterns of sensorimotor expectations. These arise from our agent-active 'movements and interaction' with objects, or 'object-active' changes in the object itself. The solidity is perceived through our expectations and skills in knowing how the object's appearance would change with changes in how we relate to it. He saw all perception as an active exploration of the world, rather than being a passive process, something which happens to us.

Alva Noë in advocating an enactive view of perception

sought to resolve how we perceive three-dimensional objects, on the basis of two-dimensional input.  He argues that we perceive this solidity (or 'volumetricity') by appealing to patterns of sensorimotor expectations. These arise from our agent-active  'movements and interaction' with objects, or 'object-active' changes in the object itself. The solidity is perceived through our expectations and skills in knowing how the object's appearance would change with changes in how we relate to it. He saw all perception as an active exploration of the world, rather than being a passive process, something which happens to us.

阿尔瓦 · 诺伊提倡一种感知活动观，试图解决我们如何在二维输入的基础上感知三维物体的问题。他认为，我们感知这种固体性(或“体积性”)是通过吸引感觉运动预期的模式。这些变化来自于我们的主体——主动的“运动和交互”，或者对象本身的“主动对象”变化。这种可靠性是通过我们的期望和技能来感知的，我们知道物体的外观会随着我们与它的关系的改变而改变。他认为所有的感知都是对世界的积极探索，而不是发生在我们身上的消极过程。

Noë's idea of the role of 'expectations' in three-dimensional perception has been opposed by several philosophers, notably by Andy Clark.^[47] Clark points to difficulties of the enactive approach. He points to internal processing of visual signals, for example, in the ventral and dorsal pathways, the two-streams hypothesis. This results in an integrated perception of objects (their recognition and location, respectively) yet this processing cannot be described as an action or actions. In a more general criticism, Clark suggests that perception is not a matter of expectations about sensorimotor mechanisms guiding perception. Rather, although the limitations of sensorimotor mechanisms constrain perception, this sensorimotor activity is drastically filtered to fit current needs and purposes of the organism, and it is these imposed 'expectations' that govern perception, filtering for the 'relevant' details of sensorimotor input (called "sensorimotor summarizing").^[47]

Noë's idea of the role of 'expectations' in three-dimensional perception has been opposed by several philosophers, notably by Andy Clark. Clark points to difficulties of the enactive approach. He points to internal processing of visual signals, for example, in the ventral and dorsal pathways, the two-streams hypothesis. This results in an integrated perception of objects (their recognition and location, respectively) yet this processing cannot be described as an action or actions. In a more general criticism, Clark suggests that perception is not a matter of expectations about sensorimotor mechanisms guiding perception. Rather, although the limitations of sensorimotor mechanisms constrain perception, this sensorimotor activity is drastically filtered to fit current needs and purposes of the organism, and it is these imposed 'expectations' that govern perception, filtering for the 'relevant' details of sensorimotor input (called "sensorimotor summarizing").

诺伊关于“期望”在三维感知中的作用的观点遭到了一些哲学家的反对，尤其是安迪 · 克拉克。克拉克指出了激活方法的困难。他指出视觉信号的内部处理，例如，在腹侧和背侧通路，两流假说。这导致了对物体的综合感知(分别是它们的识别和位置) ，然而这个过程不能被描述为一个动作或行为。在一个更普遍的批评中，克拉克认为感知不是一个关于感觉运动机制指导感知的期望问题。相反，虽然感觉运动机制限制知觉的局限性，这种感觉运动活动是彻底过滤，以适应当前的需要和目的的生物体，正是这些强加的“预期”，控制知觉，过滤感觉运动输入的“相关”细节(称为“感觉运动概述”)。

These sensorimotor-centered and purpose-centered views appear to agree on the general scheme but disagree on the dominance issue – is the dominant component peripheral or central. Another view, the closed-loop perception one, assigns equal a-priori dominance to the peripheral and central components. In closed-loop perception, perception emerges through the process of inclusion of an item in a motor-sensory-motor loop, i.e., a loop (or loops) connecting the peripheral and central components that are relevant to that item.^[48] The item can be a body part (in which case the loops are in steady-state) or an external object (in which case the loops are perturbed and gradually converge to a steady state). These enactive loops are always active, switching dominance by the need.

These sensorimotor-centered and purpose-centered views appear to agree on the general scheme but disagree on the dominance issue – is the dominant component peripheral or central. Another view, the closed-loop perception one, assigns equal a-priori dominance to the peripheral and central components. In closed-loop perception, perception emerges through the process of inclusion of an item in a motor-sensory-motor loop, i.e., a loop (or loops) connecting the peripheral and central components that are relevant to that item.Ahissar, E. and E. Assa (2016) Perception as a closed-loop convergence process. eLife 5:e12830.DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.12830 The item can be a body part (in which case the loops are in steady-state) or an external object (in which case the loops are perturbed and gradually converge to a steady state). These enactive loops are always active, switching dominance by the need.

这些以感觉运动为中心和以目的为中心的观点似乎同意一般的计划，但不同意的优势问题-是支配的部分外围或中心。另一种观点，闭环知觉，赋予相等的先验优势的外围和中心组成部分。在闭环知觉中，知觉是通过一个项目包含在运动感觉运动回路中的过程而产生的，也就是说，一个回路(或回路)连接与该项目相关的外围和中心部件。Ahissar，e. 和 e. Assa (2016)认知为一个闭环收敛过程。这个 https://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.12830可以是身体的一部分(在这种情况下，循环处于稳定状态) ，也可以是外部的物体(在这种情况下，循环受到扰动并逐渐收敛到稳定状态)。这些活化循环总是活跃的，根据需要改变主导地位。

Another application of enaction to perception is analysis of the human hand. The many remarkably demanding uses of the hand are not learned by instruction, but through a history of engagements that lead to the acquisition of skills. According to one interpretation, it is suggested that "the hand [is]...an organ of cognition", not a faithful subordinate working under top-down instruction, but a partner in a "bi-directional interplay between manual and brain activity."^[49] According to Daniel Hutto: "Enactivists are concerned to defend the view that our most elementary ways of engaging with the world and others - including our basic forms of perception and perceptual experience - are mindful in the sense of being phenomenally charged and intentionally directed, despite being non-representational and content-free."^[50] Hutto calls this position 'REC' (Radical Enactive Cognition): "According to REC, there is no way to distinguish neural activity that is imagined to be genuinely content involving (and thus truly mental, truly cognitive) from other non-neural activity that merely plays a supporting or enabling role in making mind and cognition possible."^[50]

Another application of enaction to perception is analysis of the human hand. The many remarkably demanding uses of the hand are not learned by instruction, but through a history of engagements that lead to the acquisition of skills. According to one interpretation, it is suggested that "the hand [is]...an organ of cognition", not a faithful subordinate working under top-down instruction, but a partner in a "bi-directional interplay between manual and brain activity."

According to Daniel Hutto: "Enactivists are concerned to defend the view that our most elementary ways of engaging with the world and others - including our basic forms of perception and perceptual experience - are mindful in the sense of being phenomenally charged and intentionally directed, despite being non-representational and content-free."

Hutto calls this position 'REC' (Radical Enactive Cognition): "According to REC, there is no way to distinguish neural activity that is imagined to be genuinely content involving (and thus truly mental, truly cognitive) from other non-neural activity that merely plays a supporting or enabling role in making mind and cognition possible."

感知的另一个应用是对人手的分析。许多非常苛刻的手的使用不是通过指导学习的，而是通过导致获得技能的参与历史。根据一种解释，有人认为“手是... ... 一个认知器官”，不是在自上而下的指令下工作的忠实下属，而是“手和大脑活动之间双向相互作用的伙伴”据丹尼尔 · 胡托说: “激进分子关心的是捍卫这样一种观点，即我们与世界和其他人打交道的最基本方式——包括我们的基本感知形式和感知经验——是在被现象地控制和故意指导的意义上的正念，尽管它是非代表性的和无内容的。”Hutto 称这种状态为‘ REC’(激活式认知) : “根据 REC，没有办法区分想象中的真正内容涉及(因此是真正的思维，真正的认知)的神经活动和其他非神经活动，后者仅仅在使思维和认知成为可能方面发挥支持或扶持作用。”

Participatory sense-making

= = 参与式意识形态 =

Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007)^[42] have extended the enactive concept of sense-making^[20] into the social domain. The idea takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter.^[51] De Jaegher and Di Paolo argue that the interaction process itself can take on a form of autonomy (operationally defined). This allows them to define social cognition as the generation of meaning and its transformation through interacting individuals.

Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007) have extended the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. The idea takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter.

De Jaegher and Di Paolo argue that the interaction process itself can take on a form of autonomy (operationally defined). This allows them to define social cognition as the generation of meaning and its transformation through interacting individuals.

Hanne De Jaegher 和 Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007年)已经将意义形成的活跃概念扩展到社会领域。这一观点以社会交往中个体之间的互动过程为出发点。De Jaegher 和 Di Paolo 认为互动过程本身可以采取一种自治的形式(操作上定义的)。这使得他们可以将社会认知定义为意义的产生及其通过相互作用的个体的转化。

The notion of participatory sense-making has led to the proposal that interaction processes can sometimes play constitutive roles in social cognition (De Jaegher, Di Paolo, Gallagher, 2010).^[43] It has been applied to research in social neuroscience^[44]^[52] and autism.^[53]

The notion of participatory sense-making has led to the proposal that interaction processes can sometimes play constitutive roles in social cognition (De Jaegher, Di Paolo, Gallagher, 2010). It has been applied to research in social neuroscience

and autism.

参与式意识形成的概念导致了这样一种观点，即互动过程有时可以在社会认知中发挥构成性的作用。它已经应用于社会神经科学和自闭症的研究。

In a similar vein, "an inter-enactive approach to agency holds that the behavior of agents in a social situation unfolds not only according to their individual abilities and goals, but also according to the conditions and constraints imposed by the autonomous dynamics of the interaction process itself".^[54] According to Torrance, enactivism involves five interlocking themes related to the question "What is it to be a (cognizing, conscious) agent?" It is:^[54]

1. to be a biologically autonomous (autopoietic) organism

2. to generate significance or meaning, rather than to act via...updated internal representations of the external world

3. to engage in sense-making via dynamic coupling with the environment

4. to 'enact' or 'bring forth' a world of significances by mutual co-determination of the organism with its enacted world

5. to arrive at an experiential awareness via lived embodiment in the world.

In a similar vein, "an inter-enactive approach to agency holds that the behavior of agents in a social situation unfolds not only according to their individual abilities and goals, but also according to the conditions and constraints imposed by the autonomous dynamics of the interaction process itself".

According to Torrance, enactivism involves five interlocking themes related to the question "What is it to be a (cognizing, conscious) agent?" It is:

1. to be a biologically autonomous (autopoietic) organism

2. to generate significance or meaning, rather than to act via...updated internal representations of the external world

3. to engage in sense-making via dynamic coupling with the environment

4. to 'enact' or 'bring forth' a world of significances by mutual co-determination of the organism with its enacted world

5. to arrive at an experiential awareness via lived embodiment in the world.

同样,”对行为主体的互动方法认为，行为主体在社会情境中的行为不仅取决于其个人能力和目标，而且取决于互动过程本身的自主动力所施加的条件和限制”。托伦斯认为，能动主义包括五个相互关联的主题，它们都与“一个(认知的、有意识的)行为者是什么”这个问题有关时间是: : 1。成为一个具有生物学自主性的生物体: 2。产生意义或意义，而不是通过... ... 更新外部世界的内部表征: 3。通过与环境的动态耦合进行感觉造意: 4。通过有机体与它所制定的世界的相互共同决定，“制定”或“创造”一个有意义的世界。通过活在世界中的具体化达到一种经验意识。

Torrance adds that "many kinds of agency, in particular the agency of human beings, cannot be understood separately from understanding the nature of the interaction that occurs between agents." That view introduces the social applications of enactivism. "Social cognition is regarded as the result of a special form of action, namely social interaction...the enactive approach looks at the circular dynamic within a dyad of embodied agents."^[55]

In cultural psychology, enactivism is seen as a way to uncover cultural influences upon feeling, thinking and acting.^[56] Baerveldt and Verheggen argue that "It appears that seemingly natural experience is thoroughly intertwined with sociocultural realities." They suggest that the social patterning of experience is to be understood through enactivism, "the idea that the reality we have in common, and in which we find ourselves, is neither a world that exists independently from us, nor a socially shared way of representing such a pregiven world, but a world itself brought forth by our ways of communicating and our joint action....The world we inhabit is manufactured of 'meaning' rather than 'information'.^[57]

Torrance adds that "many kinds of agency, in particular the agency of human beings, cannot be understood separately from understanding the nature of the interaction that occurs between agents." That view introduces the social applications of enactivism. "Social cognition is regarded as the result of a special form of action, namely social interaction...the enactive approach looks at the circular dynamic within a dyad of embodied agents."

In cultural psychology, enactivism is seen as a way to uncover cultural influences upon feeling, thinking and acting. Baerveldt and Verheggen argue that "It appears that seemingly natural experience is thoroughly intertwined with sociocultural realities." They suggest that the social patterning of experience is to be understood through enactivism, "the idea that the reality we have in common, and in which we find ourselves, is neither a world that exists independently from us, nor a socially shared way of representing such a pregiven world, but a world itself brought forth by our ways of communicating and our joint action....The world we inhabit is manufactured of 'meaning' rather than 'information'.

托伦斯补充说，“许多种类的行为，特别是人类的行为，不能脱离理解行为者之间相互作用的性质来理解。”这种观点介绍了能动主义的社会应用。“社会认知被认为是一种特殊行为形式的结果，即社会互动... ... 激活方法关注体内代理二元结构中的循环动力。”在文化心理学中，能动主义被看作是一种揭示文化对情感、思维和行为影响的方式。巴尔韦尔特和维尔赫根认为，“看似自然的经验与社会文化现实完全交织在一起。”他们认为，社会模式的经验是通过能动主义来理解的，“我们共同拥有的现实，在其中我们发现自己，既不是一个独立存在的世界，也不是一个社会共享的方式来代表这样一个预先给定的世界，而是一个世界本身带来了我们的沟通方式和我们的联合行动... ... 我们居住的世界是由‘意义’而不是‘信息’制造的。

Luhmann attempted to apply Maturana and Varela's notion of autopoiesis to social systems.^[58] "A core concept of social systems theory is derived from biological systems theory: the concept of autopoiesis. Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana come up with the concept to explain how biological systems such as cells are a product of their own production." "Systems exist by way of operational closure and this means that they each construct themselves and their own realities."^[59]

Luhmann attempted to apply Maturana and Varela's notion of autopoiesis to social systems.

"A core concept of social systems theory is derived from biological systems theory: the concept of autopoiesis. Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana come up with the concept to explain how biological systems such as cells are a product of their own production." "Systems exist by way of operational closure and this means that they each construct themselves and their own realities."

卢曼试图将马图拉纳和瓦雷拉的自创生理论应用于社会系统。“社会系统理论的一个核心概念来源于生物系统理论: 自创生的概念。智利生物学家温贝托 · 马图拉纳提出了这个概念，来解释诸如细胞之类的生物系统是如何自我生产的。”“系统通过操作封闭的方式存在，这意味着它们各自构建自己和自己的现实。”

Educational aspects

The first definition of enaction was introduced by psychologist Jerome Bruner,^[60]^[61] who introduced enaction as 'learning by doing' in his discussion of how children learn, and how they can best be helped to learn.^[62]^[63] He associated enaction with two other ways of knowledge organization: Iconic and Symbolic.^[64]

The first definition of enaction was introduced by psychologist Jerome Bruner,

who introduced enaction as 'learning by doing' in his discussion of how children learn, and how they can best be helped to learn. He associated enaction with two other ways of knowledge organization: Iconic and Symbolic.Quote from
as quoted from

第一个关于行动的定义是由心理学家杰罗姆 · 布鲁纳提出的，他在他关于孩子如何学习以及如何最好地帮助他们学习的讨论中将行动介绍为‘边干边学’。他将 enaction 与知识组织的另外两种方式联系起来: 标志性和象征性

"Any domain of knowledge (or any problem within that domain of knowledge) can be represented in three ways: by a set of actions appropriate for achieving a certain result (enactive representation); by a set of summary images or graphics that stand for a concept without defining it fully (iconic representation); and by a set of symbolic or logical propositions drawn from a symbolic system that is governed by rules or laws for forming and transforming propositions (symbolic representation)"

The term 'enactive framework' was elaborated upon by Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana.^[65]

"Any domain of knowledge (or any problem within that domain of knowledge) can be represented in three ways: by a set of actions appropriate for achieving a certain result (enactive representation); by a set of summary images or graphics that stand for a concept without defining it fully (iconic representation); and by a set of symbolic or logical propositions drawn from a symbolic system that is governed by rules or laws for forming and transforming propositions (symbolic representation)"

The term 'enactive framework' was elaborated upon by Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana.

”任何知识领域(或该知识领域内的任何问题)都可以用三种方式表示: 通过一系列适合于实现某种结果的行动(实现表示) ; 通过一系列代表某一概念的摘要图像或图形(没有完全界定它) ; 以及通过一系列符号性命题或逻辑命题从一个符号系统中提取，这些符号性命题受到形成和转化规则或法则(实现表示)的制约””弗朗西斯科 · 瓦雷拉和汉贝托 · 马图拉纳阐述了”实现框架”这一术语。

Sriramen argues that enactivism provides "a rich and powerful explanatory theory for learning and being."^[66] and that it is closely related to both the ideas of cognitive development of Piaget, and also the social constructivism of Vygotsky.^[66] Piaget focused on the child's immediate environment, and suggested cognitive structures like spatial perception emerge as a result of the child's interaction with the world.^[67] According to Piaget, children construct knowledge, using what they know in new ways and testing it, and the environment provides feedback concerning the adequacy of their construction.^[68] In a cultural context, Vygotsky suggested that the kind of cognition that can take place is not dictated by the engagement of the isolated child, but is also a function of social interaction and dialogue that is contingent upon a sociohistorical context.^[69] Enactivism in educational theory "looks at each learning situation as a complex system consisting of teacher, learner, and context, all of which frame and co-create the learning situation."^[70] Enactivism in education is very closely related to situated cognition,^[71] which holds that "knowledge is situated, being in part a product of the activity, context, and culture in which it is developed and used."^[72] This approach challenges the "separating of what is learned from how it is learned and used."^[72]

Sriramen argues that enactivism provides "a rich and powerful explanatory theory for learning and being."

and that it is closely related to both the ideas of cognitive development of Piaget, and also the social constructivism of Vygotsky. Piaget focused on the child's immediate environment, and suggested cognitive structures like spatial perception emerge as a result of the child's interaction with the world.

According to Piaget, children construct knowledge, using what they know in new ways and testing it, and the environment provides feedback concerning the adequacy of their construction.

In a cultural context, Vygotsky suggested that the kind of cognition that can take place is not dictated by the engagement of the isolated child, but is also a function of social interaction and dialogue that is contingent upon a sociohistorical context.

 Enactivism in educational theory "looks at each learning situation as a complex system consisting of teacher, learner, and context, all of which frame and co-create the learning situation."

Enactivism in education is very closely related to situated cognition,

which holds that "knowledge is situated, being in part a product of the activity, context, and culture in which it is developed and used."

This approach challenges the "separating of what is learned from how it is learned and used."

斯里拉曼认为，能动主义为学习和存在提供了“丰富而有力的解释性理论”这与皮亚杰的认知发展观以及 Vygotsky 的社会建构主义都有密切关系。皮亚杰专注于儿童所处的直接环境，认为空间知觉等认知结构是儿童与世界互动的结果。根据皮亚杰的观点，孩子们建构知识，用新的方式使用他们所知道的并测试它，环境提供关于他们建构的充分性的反馈。在文化背景下，维果茨基认为，能够发生的那种认知并不是由孤立儿童的参与决定的，而是社会互动和对话的功能，取决于社会历史背景。教育理论中的能动主义“把每一个学习情境看作是一个由教师、学习者和情境组成的复杂系统，所有这些都构成并共同创造了学习情境。”教育行动主义与情境认知密切相关，认为“知识位于情境之中，是其发展和使用的活动、背景和文化的一部分产物。”这种方法挑战了“将学到的东西与如何学习和使用的东西分开”

Artificial intelligence aspects

The ideas of enactivism regarding how organisms engage with their environment have interested those involved in robotics and man-machine interfaces. The analogy is drawn that a robot can be designed to interact and learn from its environment in a manner similar to the way an organism does,^[73] and a human can interact with a computer-aided design tool or data base using an interface that creates an enactive environment for the user, that is, all the user's tactile, auditory, and visual capabilities are enlisted in a mutually explorative engagement, capitalizing upon all the user's abilities, and not at all limited to cerebral engagement.^[74] In these areas it is common to refer to affordances as a design concept, the idea that an environment or an interface affords opportunities for enaction, and good design involves optimizing the role of such affordances.^[75]^[76]^[77]引用错误：没有找到与</ref>对应的<ref>标签^[78]

</ref>

</ref >

The activity in the AI community has influenced enactivism as a whole. Referring extensively to modeling techniques for evolutionary robotics by Beer,^[79] the modeling of learning behavior by Kelso,^[80] and to modeling of sensorimotor activity by Saltzman,^[81] McGann, De Jaegher, and Di Paolo discuss how this work makes the dynamics of coupling between an agent and its environment, the foundation of enactivism, "an operational, empirically observable phenomenon."^[82] That is, the AI environment invents examples of enactivism using concrete examples that, although not as complex as living organisms, isolate and illuminate basic principles.

The activity in the AI community has influenced enactivism as a whole. Referring extensively to modeling techniques for evolutionary robotics by Beer,

the modeling of learning behavior by Kelso,

and to modeling of sensorimotor activity by Saltzman,

McGann, De Jaegher, and Di Paolo discuss how this work makes the dynamics of coupling between an agent and its environment, the foundation of enactivism, "an operational, empirically observable phenomenon."
That is, the AI environment invents examples of enactivism using concrete examples that, although not as complex as living organisms, isolate and illuminate basic principles.

人工智能领域的活动对整个能动主义产生了影响。参考了 Beer 的进化机器人建模技术，Kelso 的学习行为建模技术，Saltzman，McGann，De Jaegher 和 Di Paolo 的感知运动活动建模技术，讨论了这项工作如何使一个主体和它的环境之间的动态耦合，能行主义的基础，“一个可操作的，经验上可观察的现象。”也就是说，人工智能环境创造了能动性的例子，使用具体的例子，虽然不像活的有机体那么复杂，但隔离和阐明了基本原则。

References

引用错误：Closing tag missing for <references>

自创生生成论

目录

Philosophical aspects

Philosophical aspects

= 哲学方面 =

Psychological aspects

Enactive views of perception

Participatory sense-making

Participatory sense-making

= = 参与式意识形态 =

Educational aspects

Artificial intelligence aspects

See also

References

Further reading

= = 进一步阅读 =

Notes

External links

= 外部链接 = =