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Moved page from wikipedia:en:Evolutionarily stable strategy (history)
此词条暂由彩云小译翻译，未经人工整理和审校，带来阅读不便，请见谅。
{{short description|Strategy which, if adopted by a population in a given environment, cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy that is initially rare}}
{{Infobox equilibrium
{{Infobox equilibrium
{{Infobox equilibrium
|name = Evolutionarily stable strategy
|name = Evolutionarily stable strategy
Evolutional stable strategy
|subsetof = [[Nash equilibrium]]
|subsetof = Nash equilibrium
|subsetof = Nash equilibrium
|supersetof = [[Stochastically stable equilibrium]], Stable [[Strong Nash equilibrium]]
|supersetof = Stochastically stable equilibrium, Stable Strong Nash equilibrium
随机稳定的均衡，稳定的强纳什均衡点
|intersectwith = [[Subgame perfect equilibrium]], [[Trembling hand perfect equilibrium]], [[Perfect Bayesian equilibrium]]|
|intersectwith = Subgame perfect equilibrium, Trembling hand perfect equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium|
子博弈精炼纳什均衡，颤抖手完美均衡，完美贝叶斯均衡
|discoverer = [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]]
|discoverer = John Maynard Smith and George R. Price
发现者 = 约翰·梅纳德·史密斯和 George r. Price
|example = [[Hawk-dove]]
|example = Hawk-dove
| example = Hawk-dove
|usedfor = [[Biology|Biological modeling]] and [[Evolutionary game theory]]
|usedfor = Biological modeling and Evolutionary game theory
生物建模和进化博弈论
}}
}}
}}
An '''evolutionarily stable strategy''' ('''ESS''') is a [[strategy (game theory)|strategy]] (or set of strategies) which, if adopted by a [[population genetics|population]] in a given environment, is impenetrable, meaning that it cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy (or strategies) that are initially rare. It is relevant in [[game theory]], [[behavioural ecology]], and [[evolutionary psychology]]. An ESS is an [[equilibrium refinement]] of the [[Nash equilibrium]]. It is a Nash equilibrium that is "[[evolution]]arily" [[Ecological stability|stable]]: once it is [[Fixation (population genetics)|fixed]] in a population, [[natural selection]] alone is sufficient to prevent alternative ([[mutant]]) strategies from invading successfully. The theory is not intended to deal with the possibility of gross external changes to the environment that bring new selective forces to bear.
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy (or set of strategies) which, if adopted by a population in a given environment, is impenetrable, meaning that it cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy (or strategies) that are initially rare. It is relevant in game theory, behavioural ecology, and evolutionary psychology. An ESS is an equilibrium refinement of the Nash equilibrium. It is a Nash equilibrium that is "evolutionarily" stable: once it is fixed in a population, natural selection alone is sufficient to prevent alternative (mutant) strategies from invading successfully. The theory is not intended to deal with the possibility of gross external changes to the environment that bring new selective forces to bear.
Evolutional stable strategy 是一种策略(或一组策略) ，如果在特定的环境中被一个种群所采用，那么它是不可渗透的，这意味着它不会被任何一种最初罕见的替代策略(或策略)所侵入。这与博弈论、行为生态学和进化心理学有关。斯洛文尼亚进化系统是纳什均衡点的一个平衡优化。这是一个进化稳定的纳什均衡点: 一旦它在一个种群中固定下来，单独的自然选择就足以防止替代(突变)策略的成功入侵。这一理论的目的不是要处理环境可能发生的重大外部变化，从而产生新的选择性力量。
First published as a specific term in the 1972 book by John Maynard Smith,<ref name="OEJMS">{{cite book |author=Maynard Smith, J. |authorlink=John Maynard Smith |chapter=Game Theory and The Evolution of Fighting |title=On Evolution |publisher=Edinburgh University Press |year=1972 |isbn=0-85224-223-9 |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/onevolution0000mayn }}</ref> the ESS is widely used in [[behavioural ecology]] and [[economics]], and has been used in [[anthropology]], [[evolutionary psychology]], [[philosophy]], and [[political science]].
First published as a specific term in the 1972 book by John Maynard Smith, the ESS is widely used in behavioural ecology and economics, and has been used in anthropology, evolutionary psychology, philosophy, and political science.
在1972年由约翰·梅纳德·史密斯出版的书中，ESS 首次作为一个特定的术语出版，它被广泛应用于行为生态学和经济学，并且已经在人类学、进化心理学、哲学和政治科学中使用。
==History==
Evolutionarily stable strategies were defined and introduced by [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]] in a 1973 ''[[Nature (journal)|Nature]]'' paper.<ref name="JMSandP73">{{cite journal |doi=10.1038/246015a0 |author1=Maynard Smith, J. |authorlink1=John Maynard Smith |author2=Price, G.R. |authorlink2=George R. Price |title=The logic of animal conflict |journal=Nature |volume=246 |issue=5427 |pages=15–8 |year=1973 |bibcode=1973Natur.246...15S}}</ref> Such was the time taken in peer-reviewing the paper for ''Nature'' that this was preceded by a 1972 essay by Maynard Smith in a book of essays titled ''On Evolution''.<ref name="OEJMS"/> The 1972 essay is sometimes cited instead of the 1973 paper, but university libraries are much more likely to have copies of ''Nature''. Papers in ''Nature'' are usually short; in 1974, Maynard Smith published a longer paper in the ''[[Journal of Theoretical Biology]]''.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1016/0022-5193(74)90110-6 |author=Maynard Smith, J. |title=The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflicts |journal=Journal of Theoretical Biology |volume=47 |issue=1 |pages=209–21 |year=1974 |pmid=4459582 |url=http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4448.pdf }}</ref> Maynard Smith explains further in his 1982 book ''[[Evolution and the Theory of Games]]''.<ref name="JMS82">{{cite book |author=Maynard Smith, John |title=Evolution and the Theory of Games |year=1982 |isbn=0-521-28884-3 |title-link=Evolution and the Theory of Games }}</ref> Sometimes these are cited instead. In fact, the ESS has become so central to game theory that often no citation is given, as the reader is assumed to be familiar with it.
Evolutionarily stable strategies were defined and introduced by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price in a 1973 Nature paper. Such was the time taken in peer-reviewing the paper for Nature that this was preceded by a 1972 essay by Maynard Smith in a book of essays titled On Evolution. Maynard Smith explains further in his 1982 book Evolution and the Theory of Games. Sometimes these are cited instead. In fact, the ESS has become so central to game theory that often no citation is given, as the reader is assumed to be familiar with it.
进化稳定策略是由约翰·梅纳德·史密斯和 George r. Price 在1973年的《自然》杂志上定义和提出的。同行评议《自然》的论文花费的时间如此之长，以至于在此之前，梅纳德 · 史密斯在1972年的一本论文集《论进化论》中发表了一篇论文。梅纳德 · 史密斯在他1982年出版的《进化论和博弈论》一书中进一步解释了这个问题。有时这些被引用。事实上，斯洛文尼亚就业服务系统已成为博弈论的核心，往往没有引证给出，因为读者被认为是熟悉它。
Maynard Smith mathematically formalised a verbal argument made by Price, which he read while peer-reviewing Price's paper. When Maynard Smith realized that the somewhat disorganised Price was not ready to revise his article for publication, he offered to add Price as co-author.
Maynard Smith mathematically formalised a verbal argument made by Price, which he read while peer-reviewing Price's paper. When Maynard Smith realized that the somewhat disorganised Price was not ready to revise his article for publication, he offered to add Price as co-author.
梅纳德 · 史密斯用数学方法正式化了普莱斯的一个口头论点，他是在同行评议普莱斯论文时读到这个论点的。当梅纳德 · 史密斯意识到有点杂乱无章的普莱斯还没有准备好修改他的文章以供出版时，他提出加上普莱斯作为合著者。
The concept was derived from [[Robert MacArthur|R. H. MacArthur]]<ref>{{cite book |author=MacArthur, R. H. |authorlink=Robert MacArthur |editor=Waterman T. |editor2=Horowitz H. |title=Theoretical and mathematical biology |publisher=Blaisdell |location=New York |year=1965 }}</ref> and [[W. D. Hamilton]]'s<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1126/science.156.3774.477 |author=Hamilton, W.D. |authorlink=W. D. Hamilton |title=Extraordinary sex ratios |journal=Science |volume=156 |issue=3774 |pages=477–88 |year=1967 |pmid=6021675 |jstor=1721222|bibcode = 1967Sci...156..477H }}</ref> work on [[sex ratio]]s, derived from [[Fisher's principle]], especially Hamilton's (1967) concept of an [[unbeatable strategy]]. Maynard Smith was jointly awarded the 1999 [[Crafoord Prize]] for his development of the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies and the application of game theory to the evolution of behaviour.<ref>[http://www.crafoordprize.se/press/arkivpressreleases/thecrafoordprize1999.5.32d4db7210df50fec2d800018201.html Press release] for the 1999 Crafoord Prize</ref>
The concept was derived from R. H. MacArthur and W. D. Hamilton's work on sex ratios, derived from Fisher's principle, especially Hamilton's (1967) concept of an unbeatable strategy. Maynard Smith was jointly awarded the 1999 Crafoord Prize for his development of the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies and the application of game theory to the evolution of behaviour.
这个概念来源于 r · h · 麦克阿瑟和 w · d · 汉密尔顿关于性别比例的工作，来源于费舍尔原理，特别是汉密尔顿(1967)关于无敌战略的概念。梅纳德 · 史密斯由于发展了进化稳定策略的概念，并将博弈论应用于行为的进化，共同获得了1999年的克拉福德奖。
Uses of ESS:
Uses of ESS:
斯洛文尼亚就业服务局的用途:
* The ESS was a major element used to analyze evolution in [[Richard Dawkins]]' bestselling 1976 book ''[[The Selfish Gene]]''.
* The ESS was first used in the [[social sciences]] by [[Robert Axelrod]] in his 1984 book ''[[The Evolution of Cooperation]]''. Since then, it has been widely used in the social sciences, including [[anthropology]], [[economics]], [[philosophy]], and [[political science]].
* In the social sciences, the primary interest is not in an ESS as the end of [[biological]] evolution, but as an end point in [[cultural evolution]] or individual learning.<ref name="AlexanderSEP">{{cite encyclopedia |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-evolutionary/ |title=Evolutionary Game Theory |accessdate=31 August 2007 |last1=Alexander|first1=Jason McKenzie |date=23 May 2003 |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref>
* In [[evolutionary psychology]], ESS is used primarily as a model for [[human evolution|human biological evolution]].
==Motivation==
The [[Nash equilibrium]] is the traditional [[solution concept]] in [[game theory]]. It depends on the cognitive abilities of the players. It is assumed that players are aware of the [[extensive form|structure of the game]] and consciously try to predict the [[Move (game theory)|moves]] of their opponents and to maximize their own [[Payoff (game theory)|payoffs]]. In addition, it is presumed that all the players know this (see [[common knowledge (logic)|common knowledge]]). These assumptions are then used to explain why players choose Nash equilibrium strategies.
The Nash equilibrium is the traditional solution concept in game theory. It depends on the cognitive abilities of the players. It is assumed that players are aware of the structure of the game and consciously try to predict the moves of their opponents and to maximize their own payoffs. In addition, it is presumed that all the players know this (see common knowledge). These assumptions are then used to explain why players choose Nash equilibrium strategies.
纳什均衡点是博弈论中传统的解决方案概念。这取决于运动员的认知能力。这是假设玩家知道游戏的结构，并有意识地试图预测他们的对手的动作和最大化他们自己的收益。此外，假定所有的玩家都知道这一点(参见常识)。这些假设然后被用来解释为什么玩家选择纳什均衡点/投资策略。
Evolutionarily stable strategies are motivated entirely differently. Here, it is presumed that the players' strategies are biologically encoded and [[heritable]]. Individuals have no control over their strategy and need not be aware of the game. They reproduce and are subject to the forces of [[natural selection]], with the payoffs of the game representing reproductive success (biological [[fitness (biology)|fitness]]). It is imagined that alternative strategies of the game occasionally occur, via a process like [[mutation]]. To be an ESS, a strategy must be resistant to these alternatives.
Evolutionarily stable strategies are motivated entirely differently. Here, it is presumed that the players' strategies are biologically encoded and heritable. Individuals have no control over their strategy and need not be aware of the game. They reproduce and are subject to the forces of natural selection, with the payoffs of the game representing reproductive success (biological fitness). It is imagined that alternative strategies of the game occasionally occur, via a process like mutation. To be an ESS, a strategy must be resistant to these alternatives.
进化稳定策略的动机完全不同。在这里，我们假设玩家的策略是生物编码的，是可遗传的。个人无法控制他们的策略，也不需要意识到这个游戏。它们繁殖后代，受自然选择的影响，这种游戏的回报代表着繁殖成功(生物适应性)。可以想象，这个游戏的替代策略偶尔会发生，通过一个类似突变的过程。要成为一个 ESS，一个战略必须抵抗这些选择。
Given the radically different motivating assumptions, it may come as a surprise that ESSes and Nash equilibria often coincide. In fact, every ESS corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, but some Nash equilibria are not ESSes.
Given the radically different motivating assumptions, it may come as a surprise that ESSes and Nash equilibria often coincide. In fact, every ESS corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, but some Nash equilibria are not ESSes.
考虑到激励因素完全不同的假设，ESSes 和纳什均衡往往是一致的，这可能会让人感到惊讶。事实上，每个 ESS 对应于一个纳什均衡点，但是有些纳什均衡不是 ESSes。
== Nash equilibrium ==
<!--
<!--
<!--
{{Payoff matrix | Name = Harm thy neighbor
{{Payoff matrix | Name = Harm thy neighbor
{支付矩阵 | 名称 = 伤害你的邻居
| 2L = A | 2R = B |
| 2L = A | 2R = B |
2 l = a | 2 r = b |
1U = A | UL = 2, 2 | UR = 1, 2 |
1U = A | UL = 2, 2 | UR = 1, 2 |
1 u = a | UL = 2,2 | UR = 1,2 |
1D = B | DL = 2, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1D = B | DL = 2, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1 d = b | DL = 2,1 | DR = 2,2}
-->
-->
-->
An ESS is a [[solution concept|refined]] or modified form of a [[Nash equilibrium]]. (See the next section for examples which contrast the two.) In a Nash equilibrium, if all players adopt their respective parts, no player can ''benefit'' by switching to any alternative strategy. In a two player game, it is a strategy pair. Let E(''S'',''T'') represent the payoff for playing strategy ''S'' against strategy ''T''. The strategy pair (''S'', ''S'') is a Nash equilibrium in a two player game if and only if this is true for both players and for all ''T''≠''S'':
An ESS is a refined or modified form of a Nash equilibrium. (See the next section for examples which contrast the two.) In a Nash equilibrium, if all players adopt their respective parts, no player can benefit by switching to any alternative strategy. In a two player game, it is a strategy pair. Let E(S,T) represent the payoff for playing strategy S against strategy T. The strategy pair (S, S) is a Nash equilibrium in a two player game if and only if this is true for both players and for all T≠S:
斯洛文尼亚应用服务系统是纳什均衡点应用服务系统的改进或修改形式。(请参阅下一节中对比两者的例子。)在纳什均衡点游戏中，如果所有玩家都采用各自的角色，没有玩家可以通过切换到任何替代策略而获益。在两人博弈中，这是一对策略。设 e (s，t)表示策略 s 对策略 t 的收益。策略对(s，s)是双人博弈中的纳什均衡点对，当且仅当这对双方都成立且 t ≠ s 时:
:E(''S'',''S'') ≥ E(''T'',''S'')
E(S,S) ≥ E(T,S)
E(S,S) ≥ E(T,S)
In this definition, strategy ''T'' can be a neutral alternative to ''S'' (scoring equally well, but not better).
In this definition, strategy T can be a neutral alternative to S (scoring equally well, but not better).
在这个定义中，策略 t 可以是 s 的一个中性替代品(得分同样好，但不是更好)。
<!--For example, in ''Harm thy neighbour'', (''A'', ''A'') is a Nash equilibrium because one cannot do ''better'' by switching to ''B''. **will move this to "comparison" section, trying to avoid mixing A&B and S&T strategies in same paragraph -->
<!--For example, in Harm thy neighbour, (A, A) is a Nash equilibrium because one cannot do better by switching to B. **will move this to "comparison" section, trying to avoid mixing A&B and S&T strategies in same paragraph -->
<！例如，在《伤害你的邻居》中，(a，a)是一个纳什均衡点，因为一个人不能通过转换到 b 来做得更好。* * 将把这一部分移到“比较”部分，尽量避免在同一段落中将 a & b 和科技策略混为一谈 -- >
A Nash equilibrium is presumed to be stable even if ''T'' scores equally, on the assumption that there is no long-term incentive for players to adopt ''T'' instead of ''S''. This fact represents the point of departure of the ESS.
A Nash equilibrium is presumed to be stable even if T scores equally, on the assumption that there is no long-term incentive for players to adopt T instead of S. This fact represents the point of departure of the ESS.
即使 t 得分相同，一个纳什均衡点也被认为是稳定的，前提是玩家没有长期的动机去使用 t 而不是 s。这一事实代表了斯洛文尼亚就业服务局的出发点。
[[John Maynard Smith|Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price|Price]]<ref name="JMSandP73"/> specify two conditions for a strategy ''S'' to be an ESS. For all ''T''≠''S'', either
Maynard Smith and Price specify two conditions for a strategy S to be an ESS. For all T≠S, either
Maynard Smith 和 Price 为策略 s 指定了两个成为 ESS 的条件。对于所有 t ≠ s，也是如此
# E(''S'',''S'') > E(''T'',''S''), '''or'''
E(S,S) > E(T,S), or
E (s，s) > e (t，s) ，或
# E(''S'',''S'') = E(''T'',''S'') and E(''S'',''T'') > E(''T'',''T'')
E(S,S) = E(T,S) and E(S,T) > E(T,T)
E (s，s) = e (t，s)和 e (s，t) > e (t，t)
The first condition is sometimes called a ''strict'' Nash equilibrium.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1007/BF01737572 |author=Harsanyi, J |authorlink=John Harsanyi |title=Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof |journal=Int. J. Game Theory |volume=2 |issue=1 |pages=235–50 |year=1973 }}</ref> The second is sometimes called "Maynard Smith's second condition". The second condition means that although strategy ''T'' is neutral with respect to the payoff against strategy ''S'', the population of players who continue to play strategy ''S'' has an advantage when playing against ''T''.
The first condition is sometimes called a strict Nash equilibrium. The second is sometimes called "Maynard Smith's second condition". The second condition means that although strategy T is neutral with respect to the payoff against strategy S, the population of players who continue to play strategy S has an advantage when playing against T.
第一种情况有时被称为严格的纳什均衡点。第二种情况有时被称为“梅纳德 · 史密斯的第二种情况”。第二个条件意味着尽管策略 t 相对于策略 s 的收益是中性的，但是继续使用策略 s 的玩家在对抗策略 t 时有优势。
There is also an alternative, stronger definition of ESS, due to Thomas.<ref name="Thomas85">{{cite journal |author=Thomas, B. |title=On evolutionarily stable sets |journal=J. Math. Biology |volume=22 |pages=105–115 |year=1985 |doi=10.1007/bf00276549}}</ref> This places a different emphasis on the role of the Nash equilibrium concept in the ESS concept. Following the terminology given in the first definition above, this definition requires that for all ''T''≠''S''
There is also an alternative, stronger definition of ESS, due to Thomas. This places a different emphasis on the role of the Nash equilibrium concept in the ESS concept. Following the terminology given in the first definition above, this definition requires that for all T≠S
由于托马斯的缘故，还有另一种更强有力的 ESS 定义。这就不同程度地强调了纳什均衡点概念在斯洛文尼亚就业服务系统中的作用。根据上面第一个定义中给出的术语，这个定义要求对于所有 t ≠ s
# E(''S'',''S'') ≥ E(''T'',''S''), '''and'''
E(S,S) ≥ E(T,S), and
E(S,S) ≥ E(T,S), and
# E(''S'',''T'') > E(''T'',''T'')
E(S,T) > E(T,T)
E (s，t) > e (t，t)
In this formulation, the first condition specifies that the strategy is a Nash equilibrium, and the second specifies that Maynard Smith's second condition is met. Note that the two definitions are not precisely equivalent: for example, each pure strategy in the coordination game below is an ESS by the first definition but not the second.
In this formulation, the first condition specifies that the strategy is a Nash equilibrium, and the second specifies that Maynard Smith's second condition is met. Note that the two definitions are not precisely equivalent: for example, each pure strategy in the coordination game below is an ESS by the first definition but not the second.
在这个公式中，第一个条件指定策略是纳什均衡点，第二个条件指定 Maynard Smith 的第二个条件是满足的。请注意，这两个定义并不完全等价: 例如，下面协调博弈中的每个纯策略按照第一个定义都是 ESS，但不是第二个定义。
In words, this definition looks like this: The payoff of the first player when both players play strategy S is higher than (or equal to) the payoff of the first player when he changes to another strategy T and the second player keeps his strategy S ''and'' the payoff of the first player when only his opponent changes his strategy to T is higher than his payoff in case that both of players change their strategies to T.
In words, this definition looks like this: The payoff of the first player when both players play strategy S is higher than (or equal to) the payoff of the first player when he changes to another strategy T and the second player keeps his strategy S and the payoff of the first player when only his opponent changes his strategy to T is higher than his payoff in case that both of players change their strategies to T.
换句话说，这个定义是这样的: 当第一个参与人同时使用策略 s 时，第一个参与人改用另一个策略 t 时，第一个参与人的收益大于(或等于)第一个参与人改用策略 t 时的收益，第二个参与人保留策略 s 时的收益，第一个参与人改用策略 t 时的收益大于第一个参与人改用策略 t 时的收益。
This formulation more clearly highlights the role of the Nash equilibrium condition in the ESS. It also allows for a natural definition of related concepts such as a [[weak ESS]] or an [[evolutionarily stable set]].<ref name="Thomas85"/>
This formulation more clearly highlights the role of the Nash equilibrium condition in the ESS. It also allows for a natural definition of related concepts such as a weak ESS or an evolutionarily stable set.
这个公式更清楚地强调了纳什均衡点条件在斯洛文尼亚就业服务系统中的作用。它还允许相关概念的自然定义，如弱 ESS 或进化稳定集。
===Examples of differences between Nash equilibria and ESSes===
{|align=block
{|align=block
{ | align = block
|-
|-
|-
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Prisoner's Dilemma
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Prisoner's Dilemma
| {支付矩阵 | 名称 = 囚徒困境
| 2L = Cooperate | 2R = Defect |
| 2L = Cooperate | 2R = Defect |
2 l = 合作 | 2 r = 缺陷 |
1U = Cooperate | UL = 3, 3 | UR = 1, 4 |
1U = Cooperate | UL = 3, 3 | UR = 1, 4 |
1U = Cooperate | UL = 3, 3 | UR = 1, 4 |
1D = Defect | DL = 4, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1D = Defect | DL = 4, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1 d = 缺陷 | DL = 4,1 | DR = 2,2}
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Harm thy neighbor
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Harm thy neighbor
| {支付矩阵 | 名称 = 伤害你的邻居
| 2L = A | 2R = B |
| 2L = A | 2R = B |
2 l = a | 2 r = b |
1U = A | UL = 2, 2 | UR = 1, 2 |
1U = A | UL = 2, 2 | UR = 1, 2 |
1 u = a | UL = 2,2 | UR = 1,2 |
1D = B | DL = 2, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1D = B | DL = 2, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1 d = b | DL = 2,1 | DR = 2,2}
|}
|}
|}
In most simple games, the ESSes and Nash equilibria coincide perfectly. For instance, in the [[prisoner's dilemma]] there is only one Nash equilibrium, and its strategy (''Defect'') is also an ESS.
In most simple games, the ESSes and Nash equilibria coincide perfectly. For instance, in the prisoner's dilemma there is only one Nash equilibrium, and its strategy (Defect) is also an ESS.
在最简单的博弈中，ESSes 和纳什均衡完全吻合。例如，在囚徒困境中只有一个纳什均衡点，它的策略(缺陷)也是一个 ESS。
Some games may have Nash equilibria that are not ESSes. For example, in [[harm thy neighbor]] (whose payoff matrix is shown here) both (''A'', ''A'') and (''B'', ''B'') are Nash equilibria, since players cannot do better by switching away from either. However, only ''B'' is an ESS (and a strong Nash). ''A'' is not an ESS, so ''B'' can neutrally invade a population of ''A'' strategists and predominate, because ''B'' scores higher against ''B'' than ''A'' does against ''B''. This dynamic is captured by Maynard Smith's second condition, since E(''A'', ''A'') = E(''B'', ''A''), but it is not the case that E(''A'',''B'') > E(''B'',''B'').
Some games may have Nash equilibria that are not ESSes. For example, in harm thy neighbor (whose payoff matrix is shown here) both (A, A) and (B, B) are Nash equilibria, since players cannot do better by switching away from either. However, only B is an ESS (and a strong Nash). A is not an ESS, so B can neutrally invade a population of A strategists and predominate, because B scores higher against B than A does against B. This dynamic is captured by Maynard Smith's second condition, since E(A, A) = E(B, A), but it is not the case that E(A,B) > E(B,B).
有些博弈可能有非雌性的纳什均衡。例如，在伤害你的邻居(其收益矩阵在这里显示)两者(a，a)和(b，b)都是纳什均衡，因为玩家不能通过从其中任何一个切换来做得更好。然而，只有 b 是 ESS (和强 Nash)。不是 ESS，因此 b 可以中立地入侵 a 战略家的人群并占主导地位，因为 b 对 b 的得分高于 a 对 b 的得分。这个动态被 Maynard Smith 的第二个条件所捕获，因为 e (a，a) = e (b，a) ，但是它不是 e (a，b) > e (b，b)的情况。
{|align=block style="clear: right"
{|align=block style="clear: right"
{ | align = block style = “ clear: right”
|-
|-
|-
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Harm everyone
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Harm everyone
| {支付矩阵 | 姓名 = 伤害每个人
| 2L = C | 2R = D |
| 2L = C | 2R = D |
2 l = c | 2 r = d |
1U = C | UL = 2, 2 | UR = 1, 2 |
1U = C | UL = 2, 2 | UR = 1, 2 |
1 u = c | UL = 2,2 | UR = 1,2 |
1D = D | DL = 2, 1 | DR = 0, 0 }}
1D = D | DL = 2, 1 | DR = 0, 0 }}
1 d = d | DL = 2,1 | DR = 0,0}
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Chicken
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Chicken
| {支付矩阵 | 名称 = 鸡
| 2L = Swerve | 2R = Stay |
| 2L = Swerve | 2R = Stay |
2 l = Swerve | 2 r = Stay |
1U = Swerve | UL = 0,0 | UR = −1,+1 |
1U = Swerve | UL = 0,0 | UR = −1,+1 |
1U = Swerve | UL = 0,0 | UR = −1,+1 |
1D = Stay | DL = +1,−1 | DR = −20,−20 }}
1D = Stay | DL = +1,−1 | DR = −20,−20 }}
1D = 停留 | DL = + 1,-1 | DR =-20,-20}
|}
|}
|}
Nash equilibria with equally scoring alternatives can be ESSes. For example, in the game ''Harm everyone'', ''C'' is an ESS because it satisfies Maynard Smith's second condition. ''D'' strategists may temporarily invade a population of ''C'' strategists by scoring equally well against ''C'', but they pay a price when they begin to play against each other; ''C'' scores better against ''D'' than does ''D''. So here although E(''C'', ''C'') = E(''D'', ''C''), it is also the case that E(''C'',''D'') > E(''D'',''D''). As a result, ''C'' is an ESS.
Nash equilibria with equally scoring alternatives can be ESSes. For example, in the game Harm everyone, C is an ESS because it satisfies Maynard Smith's second condition. D strategists may temporarily invade a population of C strategists by scoring equally well against C, but they pay a price when they begin to play against each other; C scores better against D than does D. So here although E(C, C) = E(D, C), it is also the case that E(C,D) > E(D,D). As a result, C is an ESS.
具有相同得分的替代方案的纳什均衡可以是。例如，在游戏 Harm everyone 中，c 是一个 ESS，因为它满足 Maynard Smith 的第二个条件。D 战略家可能会暂时侵入 c 战略家群体，因为他们对 c 的得分同样高，但是当他们开始互相竞争时，他们付出了代价; c 对 d 的得分比 d 高。这里虽然 e (c，c) = e (d，c) ，但是 e (c，d) > e (d，d)的情况也是如此。因此，c 是一个 ESS。
Even if a game has pure strategy Nash equilibria, it might be that none of those pure strategies are ESS. Consider the [[Chicken (game)|Game of chicken]]. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game (''Swerve'', ''Stay'') and (''Stay'', ''Swerve''). However, in the absence of an [[uncorrelated asymmetry]], neither ''Swerve'' nor ''Stay'' are ESSes. There is a third Nash equilibrium, a [[mixed strategy]] which is an ESS for this game (see [[Chicken (game)|Hawk-dove game]] and [[Best response]] for explanation).
Even if a game has pure strategy Nash equilibria, it might be that none of those pure strategies are ESS. Consider the Game of chicken. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game (Swerve, Stay) and (Stay, Swerve). However, in the absence of an uncorrelated asymmetry, neither Swerve nor Stay are ESSes. There is a third Nash equilibrium, a mixed strategy which is an ESS for this game (see Hawk-dove game and Best response for explanation).
即使一个博弈有纯策略纳什均衡，也可能没有纯策略是 ESS。想想胆小鬼的游戏。在这个博弈中有两个纯策略纳什均衡(Swerve，Stay)和(Stay，Swerve)。然而，在没有不相关的不对称性的情况下，Swerve 和 Stay 都不是 ESSes。还有第三个纳什均衡点，一个混合策略，这是一个 ESS 的游戏(见鹰鸽游戏和最佳对策解释)。
This last example points to an important difference between Nash equilibria and ESS. Nash equilibria are defined on ''strategy sets'' (a specification of a strategy for each player), while ESS are defined in terms of strategies themselves. The equilibria defined by ESS must always be [[Symmetric equilibrium|symmetric]], and thus have fewer equilibrium points.
This last example points to an important difference between Nash equilibria and ESS. Nash equilibria are defined on strategy sets (a specification of a strategy for each player), while ESS are defined in terms of strategies themselves. The equilibria defined by ESS must always be symmetric, and thus have fewer equilibrium points.
最后这个例子指出了纳什均衡和 ESS 之间的一个重要区别。纳什均衡是在策略集上定义的(每个参与者的策略规格) ，而 ESS 则是根据策略本身定义的。由 ESS 定义的平衡点必须总是对称的，因此平衡点较少。
== Vs. evolutionarily stable state ==
In population biology, the two concepts of an ''evolutionarily stable strategy'' (ESS) and an ''[[evolutionarily stable state]]'' are closely linked but describe different situations.
In population biology, the two concepts of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and an evolutionarily stable state are closely linked but describe different situations.
在种群生物学中，evolutional stable strategy 和进化稳定状态这两个概念紧密相连，但描述的情况却不同。
In an evolutionarily stable ''strategy,'' if all the members of a population adopt it, no mutant strategy can invade.<ref name="JMS82"/> Once virtually all members of the population use this strategy, there is no 'rational' alternative. ESS is part of classical [[game theory]].
In an evolutionarily stable strategy, if all the members of a population adopt it, no mutant strategy can invade. Once virtually all members of the population use this strategy, there is no 'rational' alternative. ESS is part of classical game theory.
在 evolutional stable strategy 中，如果一个种群的所有成员都采用它，那么任何变异策略都不能入侵。一旦几乎所有的人都使用这种策略，就没有理性的选择了。ESS 是经典博弈论的一部分。
In an evolutionarily stable ''state,'' a population's genetic composition is restored by selection after a disturbance, if the disturbance is not too large. An evolutionarily stable state is a dynamic property of a population that returns to using a strategy, or mix of strategies, if it is perturbed from that initial state. It is part of [[population genetics]], [[dynamical system]], or [[evolutionary game theory]]. This is now called convergent stability.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Apaloo |first1=J. |last2=Brown |first2=J. S. |last3=Vincent |first3=T. L. |date=2009 |title=Evolutionary game theory: ESS, convergence stability, and NIS |url=http://www.evolutionary-ecology.com/abstracts/v11/2445.html |journal=Evolutionary Ecology Research |volume=11 |pages=489–515 |access-date=2018-01-10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170809115301/http://www.evolutionary-ecology.com/abstracts/v11/2445.html |archive-date=2017-08-09 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
In an evolutionarily stable state, a population's genetic composition is restored by selection after a disturbance, if the disturbance is not too large. An evolutionarily stable state is a dynamic property of a population that returns to using a strategy, or mix of strategies, if it is perturbed from that initial state. It is part of population genetics, dynamical system, or evolutionary game theory. This is now called convergent stability.
在进化稳定状态下，如果干扰不太大，通过干扰后的选择恢复种群的遗传组成。进化稳定状态是种群的一个动态特性，当种群从初始状态受到扰动时，它会返回到使用策略或混合策略的状态。这是群体遗传学、动力系统或者进化博弈论的一部分。现在称之为收敛稳定性。
B. Thomas (1984) applies the term ESS to an individual strategy which may be mixed, and evolutionarily stable population state to a population mixture of pure strategies which may be formally equivalent to the mixed ESS.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1016/0040-5809(84)90023-6 |author=Thomas, B. |title=Evolutionary stability: states and strategies |journal=Theor. Popul. Biol. |volume=26 |issue=1 |pages=49–67 |year=1984 }}</ref>
B. Thomas (1984) applies the term ESS to an individual strategy which may be mixed, and evolutionarily stable population state to a population mixture of pure strategies which may be formally equivalent to the mixed ESS.
托马斯(1984)将 ESS 一词应用于可能混合的个体策略，而将进化稳定的种群状态应用于纯策略的种群混合，这种混合策略在形式上等价于混合的 ESS。
Whether a population is evolutionarily stable does not relate to its genetic diversity: it can be genetically monomorphic or [[Polymorphism (biology)|polymorphic]].<ref name="JMS82"/>
Whether a population is evolutionarily stable does not relate to its genetic diversity: it can be genetically monomorphic or polymorphic.
一个种群是否进化稳定与其遗传多样性无关: 它可以是遗传单态或多态的。
== Stochastic ESS ==
In the classic definition of an ESS, no mutant strategy can invade. In finite populations, any mutant could in principle invade, albeit at low probability, implying that no ESS can exist. In an infinite population, an ESS can instead be defined as a strategy which, should it become invaded by a new mutant strategy with probability p, would be able to counterinvade from a single starting individual with probability >p, as illustrated by the evolution of [[Bet-hedging (biology)|bet-hedging]].<ref>{{cite journal |last=King |first=Oliver D. |author2=Masel, Joanna |author2link=Joanna Masel |title=The evolution of bet-hedging adaptations to rare scenarios |journal=Theoretical Population Biology|date=1 December 2007 |volume=72 |issue=4 |pages=560–575 |doi=10.1016/j.tpb.2007.08.006 |pmid=17915273 |pmc=2118055}}</ref>
In the classic definition of an ESS, no mutant strategy can invade. In finite populations, any mutant could in principle invade, albeit at low probability, implying that no ESS can exist. In an infinite population, an ESS can instead be defined as a strategy which, should it become invaded by a new mutant strategy with probability p, would be able to counterinvade from a single starting individual with probability >p, as illustrated by the evolution of bet-hedging.
在 ESS 的经典定义中，任何突变策略都不能入侵。在有限的群体中，任何突变体原则上都可以入侵，尽管概率很低，这意味着没有 ESS 可以存在。在一个无限种群中，ESS 可以被定义为一种策略，当它被一个新的概率为 p 的突变策略入侵时，它能够以概率大于 p 的方式从一个单独的起始个体中反击入侵，这可以用下注对冲的进化来说明。
== Prisoner's dilemma ==
{{Payoff matrix | Name = Prisoner's Dilemma
{{Payoff matrix | Name = Prisoner's Dilemma
{{支付矩阵 | 名称 = 囚徒困境
| 2L = Cooperate | 2R = Defect |
| 2L = Cooperate | 2R = Defect |
2 l = 合作 | 2 r = 缺陷 |
1U = Cooperate | UL = 3, 3 | UR = 1, 4 |
1U = Cooperate | UL = 3, 3 | UR = 1, 4 |
1U = Cooperate | UL = 3, 3 | UR = 1, 4 |
1D = Defect | DL = 4, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1D = Defect | DL = 4, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1 d = 缺陷 | DL = 4,1 | DR = 2,2}
A common model of [[altruism]] and social cooperation is the [[Prisoner's dilemma]]. Here a group of players would collectively be better off if they could play ''Cooperate'', but since ''Defect'' fares better each individual player has an incentive to play ''Defect''. One solution to this problem is to introduce the possibility of retaliation by having individuals play the game repeatedly against the same player. In the so-called ''[[repeated game|iterated]]'' Prisoner's dilemma, the same two individuals play the prisoner's dilemma over and over. While the Prisoner's dilemma has only two strategies (''Cooperate'' and ''Defect''), the iterated Prisoner's dilemma has a huge number of possible strategies. Since an individual can have different contingency plan for each history and the game may be repeated an indefinite number of times, there may in fact be an infinite number of such contingency plans.
A common model of altruism and social cooperation is the Prisoner's dilemma. Here a group of players would collectively be better off if they could play Cooperate, but since Defect fares better each individual player has an incentive to play Defect. One solution to this problem is to introduce the possibility of retaliation by having individuals play the game repeatedly against the same player. In the so-called iterated Prisoner's dilemma, the same two individuals play the prisoner's dilemma over and over. While the Prisoner's dilemma has only two strategies (Cooperate and Defect), the iterated Prisoner's dilemma has a huge number of possible strategies. Since an individual can have different contingency plan for each history and the game may be repeated an indefinite number of times, there may in fact be an infinite number of such contingency plans.
一种常见的利他主义和社会合作模式是囚徒困境。在这里，一组玩家如果能够玩合作游戏，那么他们的整体状况会更好，但是因为缺陷的收益更好，所以每个玩家都有一个玩缺陷游戏的动机。这个问题的一个解决方案是引入报复的可能性，让个人对同一个玩家重复进行游戏。在所谓的重复囚徒困境中，同样的两个人一遍又一遍地玩着囚徒困境。囚徒困境只有两种策略(合作策略和缺陷策略) ，重复囚徒困境有大量的可能策略。由于每个人可能对每个历史有不同的应急计划，而且游戏可能无限次地重复，因此事实上可能有无限次这样的应急计划。
Three simple contingency plans which have received substantial attention are ''Always Defect'', ''Always Cooperate'', and ''[[Tit for Tat]]''. The first two strategies do the same thing regardless of the other player's actions, while the latter responds on the next round by doing what was done to it on the previous round—it responds to ''Cooperate'' with ''Cooperate'' and ''Defect'' with ''Defect''.
Three simple contingency plans which have received substantial attention are Always Defect, Always Cooperate, and Tit for Tat. The first two strategies do the same thing regardless of the other player's actions, while the latter responds on the next round by doing what was done to it on the previous round—it responds to Cooperate with Cooperate and Defect with Defect.
三个受到广泛关注的简单应急计划是总是缺陷、总是合作和以牙还牙。前两种策略做同样的事情，而不管其他玩家的行动，而后者在下一轮做出回应，做上一轮做的事情ーー它回应与合作和缺陷合作。
If the entire population plays ''Tit-for-Tat'' and a mutant arises who plays ''Always Defect'', ''Tit-for-Tat'' will outperform ''Always Defect''. If the population of the mutant becomes too large — the percentage of the mutant will be kept small. ''Tit for Tat'' is therefore an ESS, ''with respect to '''only''' these two strategies''. On the other hand, an island of ''Always Defect'' players will be stable against the invasion of a few ''Tit-for-Tat'' players, but not against a large number of them.<ref>{{cite book |author=Axelrod, Robert |authorlink=Robert Axelrod |title=The Evolution of Cooperation |year=1984 |isbn=0-465-02121-2 |title-link=The Evolution of Cooperation }}</ref> If we introduce ''Always Cooperate'', a population of ''Tit-for-Tat'' is no longer an ESS. Since a population of ''Tit-for-Tat'' players always cooperates, the strategy ''Always Cooperate'' behaves identically in this population. As a result, a mutant who plays ''Always Cooperate'' will not be eliminated. However, even though a population of ''Always Cooperate'' and ''Tit-for-Tat'' can coexist, if there is a small percentage of the population that is ''Always Defect'', the selective pressure is against ''Always Cooperate'', and in favour of ''Tit-for-Tat''. This is due to the lower payoffs of cooperating than those of defecting in case the opponent defects.
If the entire population plays Tit-for-Tat and a mutant arises who plays Always Defect, Tit-for-Tat will outperform Always Defect. If the population of the mutant becomes too large — the percentage of the mutant will be kept small. Tit for Tat is therefore an ESS, with respect to only these two strategies. On the other hand, an island of Always Defect players will be stable against the invasion of a few Tit-for-Tat players, but not against a large number of them. If we introduce Always Cooperate, a population of Tit-for-Tat is no longer an ESS. Since a population of Tit-for-Tat players always cooperates, the strategy Always Cooperate behaves identically in this population. As a result, a mutant who plays Always Cooperate will not be eliminated. However, even though a population of Always Cooperate and Tit-for-Tat can coexist, if there is a small percentage of the population that is Always Defect, the selective pressure is against Always Cooperate, and in favour of Tit-for-Tat. This is due to the lower payoffs of cooperating than those of defecting in case the opponent defects.
如果整个种群都玩以牙还牙的游戏，而一个变种人出现了，他总是玩“缺陷”游戏，那么“以牙还牙”游戏就会胜过“总是缺陷”游戏。如果突变体的种群数量过大，则突变体的比例将保持在较小的水平。一报还一报因此是一个斯洛文尼亚就只有这两个战略。另一方面，一个永远有缺陷的玩家的岛屿可以稳定地对抗少数以牙还牙的玩家的入侵，但不能对抗大量的他们。如果我们引入总是合作，一个以牙还牙的群体就不再是 ESS 了。由于一群以牙还牙的玩家总是合作，策略总是合作在这群人中表现一致。因此，一个总是合作的变种人将不会被淘汰。然而，即使“永远合作”和“以牙还牙”的人群可以共存，如果有一小部分人“永远不合作” ，那么选择性的压力就是反对“永远合作” ，赞成“以牙还牙”。这是因为在对手缺陷的情况下，合作的回报低于背叛的回报。
This demonstrates the difficulties in applying the formal definition of an ESS to games with large strategy spaces, and has motivated some to consider alternatives.
This demonstrates the difficulties in applying the formal definition of an ESS to games with large strategy spaces, and has motivated some to consider alternatives.
这表明了在将 ESS 的形式化定义应用于具有大型战略空间的博弈中的困难，并促使一些人考虑其他选择。
== Human behavior ==
The fields of [[sociobiology]] and [[evolutionary psychology]] attempt to explain animal and human behavior and social structures, largely in terms of evolutionarily stable strategies. [[Psychopathy#Sociopathy|Sociopathy]] (chronic antisocial or criminal behavior) may be a result of a combination of two such strategies.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1017/S0140525X00039595 |author=Mealey, L. |title=The sociobiology of sociopathy: An integrated evolutionary model |journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences |volume=18 |issue=3 |pages=523–99 |year=1995 }}</ref>
The fields of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology attempt to explain animal and human behavior and social structures, largely in terms of evolutionarily stable strategies. Sociopathy (chronic antisocial or criminal behavior) may be a result of a combination of two such strategies.
社会生物学和进化心理学试图用进化稳定策略来解释动物和人类的行为和社会结构。反社会人格(慢性反社会或犯罪行为)可能是两种策略结合的结果。
Evolutionarily stable strategies were originally considered for biological evolution, but they can apply to other contexts. In fact, there are stable states for a large class of [[adaptive dynamics]]. As a result, they can be used to explain human behaviours that lack any genetic influences.
Evolutionarily stable strategies were originally considered for biological evolution, but they can apply to other contexts. In fact, there are stable states for a large class of adaptive dynamics. As a result, they can be used to explain human behaviours that lack any genetic influences.
进化稳定策略最初被认为是生物进化的策略，但它们可以应用于其他情况。事实上，对于一大类自适应动态系统，存在稳定状态。因此，它们可以用来解释没有任何遗传影响的人类行为。
==See also==
*[[Antipredator adaptation]]
*[[Behavioral ecology]]
*[[Evolutionary psychology]]
*[[Fitness landscape]]
*[[Chicken (game)|Hawk–dove game]]
*[[Koinophilia]]
*[[Sociobiology]]
*[[War of attrition (game)]]
== References ==
{{Reflist}}
==Further reading==
* {{Cite book | last1=Weibull | first1=Jörgen | title=Evolutionary game theory | publisher=[[MIT Press]] | isbn= 978-0-262-73121-8| year=1997 }} Classic reference textbook.
* {{cite journal | doi = 10.1016/0040-5809(87)90029-3 | last1 = Hines | first1 = W. G. S. | year = 1987 | title = Evolutionary stable strategies: a review of basic theory | url = | journal = Theoretical Population Biology | volume = 31 | issue = 2| pages = 195–272 | pmid = 3296292 }}
* {{Cite book | last2=Shoham | first2=Yoav | last1=Leyton-Brown | first1=Kevin | title=Essentials of Game Theory: A Concise, Multidisciplinary Introduction | publisher=Morgan & Claypool Publishers | isbn=978-1-59829-593-1 | url=http://www.gtessentials.org | year=2008 | location=San Rafael, CA }}. An 88-page mathematical introduction; see Section 3.8. [http://www.morganclaypool.com/doi/abs/10.2200/S00108ED1V01Y200802AIM003 Free online] at many universities.
* [[Geoff Parker|Parker, G. A.]] (1984) Evolutionary stable strategies. In ''Behavioural Ecology: an Evolutionary Approach'' (2nd ed) [[John Krebs|Krebs, J. R.]] & Davies N.B., eds. pp 30–61. Blackwell, Oxford.
* {{Cite book | last1=Shoham | first1=Yoav | last2=Leyton-Brown | first2=Kevin | title=Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations | publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] | isbn=978-0-521-89943-7 | url=http://www.masfoundations.org | year=2009 | location=New York }}. A comprehensive reference from a computational perspective; see Section 7.7. [http://www.masfoundations.org/download.html Downloadable free online].
* [[John Maynard Smith|Maynard Smith, John]]. (1982) ''[[Evolution and the Theory of Games]]''. {{ISBN|0-521-28884-3}}. Classic reference.
==External links==
* [http://www.animalbehavioronline.com/ess.html Evolutionarily Stable Strategies] at Animal Behavior: An Online Textbook by Michael D. Breed.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20060906092853/http://www.holycross.edu/departments/biology/kprestwi/behavior/ESS/ESS_index_frmset.html Game Theory and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies], Kenneth N. Prestwich's site at College of the Holy Cross.
*[http://knol.google.com/k/klaus-rohde/evolutionarily-stable-strategies-and/xk923bc3gp4/50# Evolutionarily stable strategies knol]{{Dead link|date=December 2019 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}
{{Game theory}}
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[[Category:Game theory equilibrium concepts]]
Category:Game theory equilibrium concepts
范畴: 博弈论均衡概念
[[Category:Evolutionary game theory]]
Category:Evolutionary game theory
范畴: 进化博弈论
<noinclude>
<small>This page was moved from [[wikipedia:en:Evolutionarily stable strategy]]. Its edit history can be viewed at [[进化均衡策略/edithistory]]</small></noinclude>
[[Category:待整理页面]]
{{short description|Strategy which, if adopted by a population in a given environment, cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy that is initially rare}}
{{Infobox equilibrium
{{Infobox equilibrium
{{Infobox equilibrium
|name = Evolutionarily stable strategy
|name = Evolutionarily stable strategy
Evolutional stable strategy
|subsetof = [[Nash equilibrium]]
|subsetof = Nash equilibrium
|subsetof = Nash equilibrium
|supersetof = [[Stochastically stable equilibrium]], Stable [[Strong Nash equilibrium]]
|supersetof = Stochastically stable equilibrium, Stable Strong Nash equilibrium
随机稳定的均衡，稳定的强纳什均衡点
|intersectwith = [[Subgame perfect equilibrium]], [[Trembling hand perfect equilibrium]], [[Perfect Bayesian equilibrium]]|
|intersectwith = Subgame perfect equilibrium, Trembling hand perfect equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium|
子博弈精炼纳什均衡，颤抖手完美均衡，完美贝叶斯均衡
|discoverer = [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]]
|discoverer = John Maynard Smith and George R. Price
发现者 = 约翰·梅纳德·史密斯和 George r. Price
|example = [[Hawk-dove]]
|example = Hawk-dove
| example = Hawk-dove
|usedfor = [[Biology|Biological modeling]] and [[Evolutionary game theory]]
|usedfor = Biological modeling and Evolutionary game theory
生物建模和进化博弈论
}}
}}
}}
An '''evolutionarily stable strategy''' ('''ESS''') is a [[strategy (game theory)|strategy]] (or set of strategies) which, if adopted by a [[population genetics|population]] in a given environment, is impenetrable, meaning that it cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy (or strategies) that are initially rare. It is relevant in [[game theory]], [[behavioural ecology]], and [[evolutionary psychology]]. An ESS is an [[equilibrium refinement]] of the [[Nash equilibrium]]. It is a Nash equilibrium that is "[[evolution]]arily" [[Ecological stability|stable]]: once it is [[Fixation (population genetics)|fixed]] in a population, [[natural selection]] alone is sufficient to prevent alternative ([[mutant]]) strategies from invading successfully. The theory is not intended to deal with the possibility of gross external changes to the environment that bring new selective forces to bear.
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy (or set of strategies) which, if adopted by a population in a given environment, is impenetrable, meaning that it cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy (or strategies) that are initially rare. It is relevant in game theory, behavioural ecology, and evolutionary psychology. An ESS is an equilibrium refinement of the Nash equilibrium. It is a Nash equilibrium that is "evolutionarily" stable: once it is fixed in a population, natural selection alone is sufficient to prevent alternative (mutant) strategies from invading successfully. The theory is not intended to deal with the possibility of gross external changes to the environment that bring new selective forces to bear.
Evolutional stable strategy 是一种策略(或一组策略) ，如果在特定的环境中被一个种群所采用，那么它是不可渗透的，这意味着它不会被任何一种最初罕见的替代策略(或策略)所侵入。这与博弈论、行为生态学和进化心理学有关。斯洛文尼亚进化系统是纳什均衡点的一个平衡优化。这是一个进化稳定的纳什均衡点: 一旦它在一个种群中固定下来，单独的自然选择就足以防止替代(突变)策略的成功入侵。这一理论的目的不是要处理环境可能发生的重大外部变化，从而产生新的选择性力量。
First published as a specific term in the 1972 book by John Maynard Smith,<ref name="OEJMS">{{cite book |author=Maynard Smith, J. |authorlink=John Maynard Smith |chapter=Game Theory and The Evolution of Fighting |title=On Evolution |publisher=Edinburgh University Press |year=1972 |isbn=0-85224-223-9 |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/onevolution0000mayn }}</ref> the ESS is widely used in [[behavioural ecology]] and [[economics]], and has been used in [[anthropology]], [[evolutionary psychology]], [[philosophy]], and [[political science]].
First published as a specific term in the 1972 book by John Maynard Smith, the ESS is widely used in behavioural ecology and economics, and has been used in anthropology, evolutionary psychology, philosophy, and political science.
在1972年由约翰·梅纳德·史密斯出版的书中，ESS 首次作为一个特定的术语出版，它被广泛应用于行为生态学和经济学，并且已经在人类学、进化心理学、哲学和政治科学中使用。
==History==
Evolutionarily stable strategies were defined and introduced by [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]] in a 1973 ''[[Nature (journal)|Nature]]'' paper.<ref name="JMSandP73">{{cite journal |doi=10.1038/246015a0 |author1=Maynard Smith, J. |authorlink1=John Maynard Smith |author2=Price, G.R. |authorlink2=George R. Price |title=The logic of animal conflict |journal=Nature |volume=246 |issue=5427 |pages=15–8 |year=1973 |bibcode=1973Natur.246...15S}}</ref> Such was the time taken in peer-reviewing the paper for ''Nature'' that this was preceded by a 1972 essay by Maynard Smith in a book of essays titled ''On Evolution''.<ref name="OEJMS"/> The 1972 essay is sometimes cited instead of the 1973 paper, but university libraries are much more likely to have copies of ''Nature''. Papers in ''Nature'' are usually short; in 1974, Maynard Smith published a longer paper in the ''[[Journal of Theoretical Biology]]''.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1016/0022-5193(74)90110-6 |author=Maynard Smith, J. |title=The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflicts |journal=Journal of Theoretical Biology |volume=47 |issue=1 |pages=209–21 |year=1974 |pmid=4459582 |url=http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4448.pdf }}</ref> Maynard Smith explains further in his 1982 book ''[[Evolution and the Theory of Games]]''.<ref name="JMS82">{{cite book |author=Maynard Smith, John |title=Evolution and the Theory of Games |year=1982 |isbn=0-521-28884-3 |title-link=Evolution and the Theory of Games }}</ref> Sometimes these are cited instead. In fact, the ESS has become so central to game theory that often no citation is given, as the reader is assumed to be familiar with it.
Evolutionarily stable strategies were defined and introduced by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price in a 1973 Nature paper. Such was the time taken in peer-reviewing the paper for Nature that this was preceded by a 1972 essay by Maynard Smith in a book of essays titled On Evolution. Maynard Smith explains further in his 1982 book Evolution and the Theory of Games. Sometimes these are cited instead. In fact, the ESS has become so central to game theory that often no citation is given, as the reader is assumed to be familiar with it.
进化稳定策略是由约翰·梅纳德·史密斯和 George r. Price 在1973年的《自然》杂志上定义和提出的。同行评议《自然》的论文花费的时间如此之长，以至于在此之前，梅纳德 · 史密斯在1972年的一本论文集《论进化论》中发表了一篇论文。梅纳德 · 史密斯在他1982年出版的《进化论和博弈论》一书中进一步解释了这个问题。有时这些被引用。事实上，斯洛文尼亚就业服务系统已成为博弈论的核心，往往没有引证给出，因为读者被认为是熟悉它。
Maynard Smith mathematically formalised a verbal argument made by Price, which he read while peer-reviewing Price's paper. When Maynard Smith realized that the somewhat disorganised Price was not ready to revise his article for publication, he offered to add Price as co-author.
Maynard Smith mathematically formalised a verbal argument made by Price, which he read while peer-reviewing Price's paper. When Maynard Smith realized that the somewhat disorganised Price was not ready to revise his article for publication, he offered to add Price as co-author.
梅纳德 · 史密斯用数学方法正式化了普莱斯的一个口头论点，他是在同行评议普莱斯论文时读到这个论点的。当梅纳德 · 史密斯意识到有点杂乱无章的普莱斯还没有准备好修改他的文章以供出版时，他提出加上普莱斯作为合著者。
The concept was derived from [[Robert MacArthur|R. H. MacArthur]]<ref>{{cite book |author=MacArthur, R. H. |authorlink=Robert MacArthur |editor=Waterman T. |editor2=Horowitz H. |title=Theoretical and mathematical biology |publisher=Blaisdell |location=New York |year=1965 }}</ref> and [[W. D. Hamilton]]'s<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1126/science.156.3774.477 |author=Hamilton, W.D. |authorlink=W. D. Hamilton |title=Extraordinary sex ratios |journal=Science |volume=156 |issue=3774 |pages=477–88 |year=1967 |pmid=6021675 |jstor=1721222|bibcode = 1967Sci...156..477H }}</ref> work on [[sex ratio]]s, derived from [[Fisher's principle]], especially Hamilton's (1967) concept of an [[unbeatable strategy]]. Maynard Smith was jointly awarded the 1999 [[Crafoord Prize]] for his development of the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies and the application of game theory to the evolution of behaviour.<ref>[http://www.crafoordprize.se/press/arkivpressreleases/thecrafoordprize1999.5.32d4db7210df50fec2d800018201.html Press release] for the 1999 Crafoord Prize</ref>
The concept was derived from R. H. MacArthur and W. D. Hamilton's work on sex ratios, derived from Fisher's principle, especially Hamilton's (1967) concept of an unbeatable strategy. Maynard Smith was jointly awarded the 1999 Crafoord Prize for his development of the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies and the application of game theory to the evolution of behaviour.
这个概念来源于 r · h · 麦克阿瑟和 w · d · 汉密尔顿关于性别比例的工作，来源于费舍尔原理，特别是汉密尔顿(1967)关于无敌战略的概念。梅纳德 · 史密斯由于发展了进化稳定策略的概念，并将博弈论应用于行为的进化，共同获得了1999年的克拉福德奖。
Uses of ESS:
Uses of ESS:
斯洛文尼亚就业服务局的用途:
* The ESS was a major element used to analyze evolution in [[Richard Dawkins]]' bestselling 1976 book ''[[The Selfish Gene]]''.
* The ESS was first used in the [[social sciences]] by [[Robert Axelrod]] in his 1984 book ''[[The Evolution of Cooperation]]''. Since then, it has been widely used in the social sciences, including [[anthropology]], [[economics]], [[philosophy]], and [[political science]].
* In the social sciences, the primary interest is not in an ESS as the end of [[biological]] evolution, but as an end point in [[cultural evolution]] or individual learning.<ref name="AlexanderSEP">{{cite encyclopedia |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-evolutionary/ |title=Evolutionary Game Theory |accessdate=31 August 2007 |last1=Alexander|first1=Jason McKenzie |date=23 May 2003 |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref>
* In [[evolutionary psychology]], ESS is used primarily as a model for [[human evolution|human biological evolution]].
==Motivation==
The [[Nash equilibrium]] is the traditional [[solution concept]] in [[game theory]]. It depends on the cognitive abilities of the players. It is assumed that players are aware of the [[extensive form|structure of the game]] and consciously try to predict the [[Move (game theory)|moves]] of their opponents and to maximize their own [[Payoff (game theory)|payoffs]]. In addition, it is presumed that all the players know this (see [[common knowledge (logic)|common knowledge]]). These assumptions are then used to explain why players choose Nash equilibrium strategies.
The Nash equilibrium is the traditional solution concept in game theory. It depends on the cognitive abilities of the players. It is assumed that players are aware of the structure of the game and consciously try to predict the moves of their opponents and to maximize their own payoffs. In addition, it is presumed that all the players know this (see common knowledge). These assumptions are then used to explain why players choose Nash equilibrium strategies.
纳什均衡点是博弈论中传统的解决方案概念。这取决于运动员的认知能力。这是假设玩家知道游戏的结构，并有意识地试图预测他们的对手的动作和最大化他们自己的收益。此外，假定所有的玩家都知道这一点(参见常识)。这些假设然后被用来解释为什么玩家选择纳什均衡点/投资策略。
Evolutionarily stable strategies are motivated entirely differently. Here, it is presumed that the players' strategies are biologically encoded and [[heritable]]. Individuals have no control over their strategy and need not be aware of the game. They reproduce and are subject to the forces of [[natural selection]], with the payoffs of the game representing reproductive success (biological [[fitness (biology)|fitness]]). It is imagined that alternative strategies of the game occasionally occur, via a process like [[mutation]]. To be an ESS, a strategy must be resistant to these alternatives.
Evolutionarily stable strategies are motivated entirely differently. Here, it is presumed that the players' strategies are biologically encoded and heritable. Individuals have no control over their strategy and need not be aware of the game. They reproduce and are subject to the forces of natural selection, with the payoffs of the game representing reproductive success (biological fitness). It is imagined that alternative strategies of the game occasionally occur, via a process like mutation. To be an ESS, a strategy must be resistant to these alternatives.
进化稳定策略的动机完全不同。在这里，我们假设玩家的策略是生物编码的，是可遗传的。个人无法控制他们的策略，也不需要意识到这个游戏。它们繁殖后代，受自然选择的影响，这种游戏的回报代表着繁殖成功(生物适应性)。可以想象，这个游戏的替代策略偶尔会发生，通过一个类似突变的过程。要成为一个 ESS，一个战略必须抵抗这些选择。
Given the radically different motivating assumptions, it may come as a surprise that ESSes and Nash equilibria often coincide. In fact, every ESS corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, but some Nash equilibria are not ESSes.
Given the radically different motivating assumptions, it may come as a surprise that ESSes and Nash equilibria often coincide. In fact, every ESS corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, but some Nash equilibria are not ESSes.
考虑到激励因素完全不同的假设，ESSes 和纳什均衡往往是一致的，这可能会让人感到惊讶。事实上，每个 ESS 对应于一个纳什均衡点，但是有些纳什均衡不是 ESSes。
== Nash equilibrium ==
<!--
<!--
<!--
{{Payoff matrix | Name = Harm thy neighbor
{{Payoff matrix | Name = Harm thy neighbor
{支付矩阵 | 名称 = 伤害你的邻居
| 2L = A | 2R = B |
| 2L = A | 2R = B |
2 l = a | 2 r = b |
1U = A | UL = 2, 2 | UR = 1, 2 |
1U = A | UL = 2, 2 | UR = 1, 2 |
1 u = a | UL = 2,2 | UR = 1,2 |
1D = B | DL = 2, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1D = B | DL = 2, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1 d = b | DL = 2,1 | DR = 2,2}
-->
-->
-->
An ESS is a [[solution concept|refined]] or modified form of a [[Nash equilibrium]]. (See the next section for examples which contrast the two.) In a Nash equilibrium, if all players adopt their respective parts, no player can ''benefit'' by switching to any alternative strategy. In a two player game, it is a strategy pair. Let E(''S'',''T'') represent the payoff for playing strategy ''S'' against strategy ''T''. The strategy pair (''S'', ''S'') is a Nash equilibrium in a two player game if and only if this is true for both players and for all ''T''≠''S'':
An ESS is a refined or modified form of a Nash equilibrium. (See the next section for examples which contrast the two.) In a Nash equilibrium, if all players adopt their respective parts, no player can benefit by switching to any alternative strategy. In a two player game, it is a strategy pair. Let E(S,T) represent the payoff for playing strategy S against strategy T. The strategy pair (S, S) is a Nash equilibrium in a two player game if and only if this is true for both players and for all T≠S:
斯洛文尼亚应用服务系统是纳什均衡点应用服务系统的改进或修改形式。(请参阅下一节中对比两者的例子。)在纳什均衡点游戏中，如果所有玩家都采用各自的角色，没有玩家可以通过切换到任何替代策略而获益。在两人博弈中，这是一对策略。设 e (s，t)表示策略 s 对策略 t 的收益。策略对(s，s)是双人博弈中的纳什均衡点对，当且仅当这对双方都成立且 t ≠ s 时:
:E(''S'',''S'') ≥ E(''T'',''S'')
E(S,S) ≥ E(T,S)
E(S,S) ≥ E(T,S)
In this definition, strategy ''T'' can be a neutral alternative to ''S'' (scoring equally well, but not better).
In this definition, strategy T can be a neutral alternative to S (scoring equally well, but not better).
在这个定义中，策略 t 可以是 s 的一个中性替代品(得分同样好，但不是更好)。
<!--For example, in ''Harm thy neighbour'', (''A'', ''A'') is a Nash equilibrium because one cannot do ''better'' by switching to ''B''. **will move this to "comparison" section, trying to avoid mixing A&B and S&T strategies in same paragraph -->
<!--For example, in Harm thy neighbour, (A, A) is a Nash equilibrium because one cannot do better by switching to B. **will move this to "comparison" section, trying to avoid mixing A&B and S&T strategies in same paragraph -->
<！例如，在《伤害你的邻居》中，(a，a)是一个纳什均衡点，因为一个人不能通过转换到 b 来做得更好。* * 将把这一部分移到“比较”部分，尽量避免在同一段落中将 a & b 和科技策略混为一谈 -- >
A Nash equilibrium is presumed to be stable even if ''T'' scores equally, on the assumption that there is no long-term incentive for players to adopt ''T'' instead of ''S''. This fact represents the point of departure of the ESS.
A Nash equilibrium is presumed to be stable even if T scores equally, on the assumption that there is no long-term incentive for players to adopt T instead of S. This fact represents the point of departure of the ESS.
即使 t 得分相同，一个纳什均衡点也被认为是稳定的，前提是玩家没有长期的动机去使用 t 而不是 s。这一事实代表了斯洛文尼亚就业服务局的出发点。
[[John Maynard Smith|Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price|Price]]<ref name="JMSandP73"/> specify two conditions for a strategy ''S'' to be an ESS. For all ''T''≠''S'', either
Maynard Smith and Price specify two conditions for a strategy S to be an ESS. For all T≠S, either
Maynard Smith 和 Price 为策略 s 指定了两个成为 ESS 的条件。对于所有 t ≠ s，也是如此
# E(''S'',''S'') > E(''T'',''S''), '''or'''
E(S,S) > E(T,S), or
E (s，s) > e (t，s) ，或
# E(''S'',''S'') = E(''T'',''S'') and E(''S'',''T'') > E(''T'',''T'')
E(S,S) = E(T,S) and E(S,T) > E(T,T)
E (s，s) = e (t，s)和 e (s，t) > e (t，t)
The first condition is sometimes called a ''strict'' Nash equilibrium.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1007/BF01737572 |author=Harsanyi, J |authorlink=John Harsanyi |title=Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof |journal=Int. J. Game Theory |volume=2 |issue=1 |pages=235–50 |year=1973 }}</ref> The second is sometimes called "Maynard Smith's second condition". The second condition means that although strategy ''T'' is neutral with respect to the payoff against strategy ''S'', the population of players who continue to play strategy ''S'' has an advantage when playing against ''T''.
The first condition is sometimes called a strict Nash equilibrium. The second is sometimes called "Maynard Smith's second condition". The second condition means that although strategy T is neutral with respect to the payoff against strategy S, the population of players who continue to play strategy S has an advantage when playing against T.
第一种情况有时被称为严格的纳什均衡点。第二种情况有时被称为“梅纳德 · 史密斯的第二种情况”。第二个条件意味着尽管策略 t 相对于策略 s 的收益是中性的，但是继续使用策略 s 的玩家在对抗策略 t 时有优势。
There is also an alternative, stronger definition of ESS, due to Thomas.<ref name="Thomas85">{{cite journal |author=Thomas, B. |title=On evolutionarily stable sets |journal=J. Math. Biology |volume=22 |pages=105–115 |year=1985 |doi=10.1007/bf00276549}}</ref> This places a different emphasis on the role of the Nash equilibrium concept in the ESS concept. Following the terminology given in the first definition above, this definition requires that for all ''T''≠''S''
There is also an alternative, stronger definition of ESS, due to Thomas. This places a different emphasis on the role of the Nash equilibrium concept in the ESS concept. Following the terminology given in the first definition above, this definition requires that for all T≠S
由于托马斯的缘故，还有另一种更强有力的 ESS 定义。这就不同程度地强调了纳什均衡点概念在斯洛文尼亚就业服务系统中的作用。根据上面第一个定义中给出的术语，这个定义要求对于所有 t ≠ s
# E(''S'',''S'') ≥ E(''T'',''S''), '''and'''
E(S,S) ≥ E(T,S), and
E(S,S) ≥ E(T,S), and
# E(''S'',''T'') > E(''T'',''T'')
E(S,T) > E(T,T)
E (s，t) > e (t，t)
In this formulation, the first condition specifies that the strategy is a Nash equilibrium, and the second specifies that Maynard Smith's second condition is met. Note that the two definitions are not precisely equivalent: for example, each pure strategy in the coordination game below is an ESS by the first definition but not the second.
In this formulation, the first condition specifies that the strategy is a Nash equilibrium, and the second specifies that Maynard Smith's second condition is met. Note that the two definitions are not precisely equivalent: for example, each pure strategy in the coordination game below is an ESS by the first definition but not the second.
在这个公式中，第一个条件指定策略是纳什均衡点，第二个条件指定 Maynard Smith 的第二个条件是满足的。请注意，这两个定义并不完全等价: 例如，下面协调博弈中的每个纯策略按照第一个定义都是 ESS，但不是第二个定义。
In words, this definition looks like this: The payoff of the first player when both players play strategy S is higher than (or equal to) the payoff of the first player when he changes to another strategy T and the second player keeps his strategy S ''and'' the payoff of the first player when only his opponent changes his strategy to T is higher than his payoff in case that both of players change their strategies to T.
In words, this definition looks like this: The payoff of the first player when both players play strategy S is higher than (or equal to) the payoff of the first player when he changes to another strategy T and the second player keeps his strategy S and the payoff of the first player when only his opponent changes his strategy to T is higher than his payoff in case that both of players change their strategies to T.
换句话说，这个定义是这样的: 当第一个参与人同时使用策略 s 时，第一个参与人改用另一个策略 t 时，第一个参与人的收益大于(或等于)第一个参与人改用策略 t 时的收益，第二个参与人保留策略 s 时的收益，第一个参与人改用策略 t 时的收益大于第一个参与人改用策略 t 时的收益。
This formulation more clearly highlights the role of the Nash equilibrium condition in the ESS. It also allows for a natural definition of related concepts such as a [[weak ESS]] or an [[evolutionarily stable set]].<ref name="Thomas85"/>
This formulation more clearly highlights the role of the Nash equilibrium condition in the ESS. It also allows for a natural definition of related concepts such as a weak ESS or an evolutionarily stable set.
这个公式更清楚地强调了纳什均衡点条件在斯洛文尼亚就业服务系统中的作用。它还允许相关概念的自然定义，如弱 ESS 或进化稳定集。
===Examples of differences between Nash equilibria and ESSes===
{|align=block
{|align=block
{ | align = block
|-
|-
|-
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Prisoner's Dilemma
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Prisoner's Dilemma
| {支付矩阵 | 名称 = 囚徒困境
| 2L = Cooperate | 2R = Defect |
| 2L = Cooperate | 2R = Defect |
2 l = 合作 | 2 r = 缺陷 |
1U = Cooperate | UL = 3, 3 | UR = 1, 4 |
1U = Cooperate | UL = 3, 3 | UR = 1, 4 |
1U = Cooperate | UL = 3, 3 | UR = 1, 4 |
1D = Defect | DL = 4, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1D = Defect | DL = 4, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1 d = 缺陷 | DL = 4,1 | DR = 2,2}
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Harm thy neighbor
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Harm thy neighbor
| {支付矩阵 | 名称 = 伤害你的邻居
| 2L = A | 2R = B |
| 2L = A | 2R = B |
2 l = a | 2 r = b |
1U = A | UL = 2, 2 | UR = 1, 2 |
1U = A | UL = 2, 2 | UR = 1, 2 |
1 u = a | UL = 2,2 | UR = 1,2 |
1D = B | DL = 2, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1D = B | DL = 2, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1 d = b | DL = 2,1 | DR = 2,2}
|}
|}
|}
In most simple games, the ESSes and Nash equilibria coincide perfectly. For instance, in the [[prisoner's dilemma]] there is only one Nash equilibrium, and its strategy (''Defect'') is also an ESS.
In most simple games, the ESSes and Nash equilibria coincide perfectly. For instance, in the prisoner's dilemma there is only one Nash equilibrium, and its strategy (Defect) is also an ESS.
在最简单的博弈中，ESSes 和纳什均衡完全吻合。例如，在囚徒困境中只有一个纳什均衡点，它的策略(缺陷)也是一个 ESS。
Some games may have Nash equilibria that are not ESSes. For example, in [[harm thy neighbor]] (whose payoff matrix is shown here) both (''A'', ''A'') and (''B'', ''B'') are Nash equilibria, since players cannot do better by switching away from either. However, only ''B'' is an ESS (and a strong Nash). ''A'' is not an ESS, so ''B'' can neutrally invade a population of ''A'' strategists and predominate, because ''B'' scores higher against ''B'' than ''A'' does against ''B''. This dynamic is captured by Maynard Smith's second condition, since E(''A'', ''A'') = E(''B'', ''A''), but it is not the case that E(''A'',''B'') > E(''B'',''B'').
Some games may have Nash equilibria that are not ESSes. For example, in harm thy neighbor (whose payoff matrix is shown here) both (A, A) and (B, B) are Nash equilibria, since players cannot do better by switching away from either. However, only B is an ESS (and a strong Nash). A is not an ESS, so B can neutrally invade a population of A strategists and predominate, because B scores higher against B than A does against B. This dynamic is captured by Maynard Smith's second condition, since E(A, A) = E(B, A), but it is not the case that E(A,B) > E(B,B).
有些博弈可能有非雌性的纳什均衡。例如，在伤害你的邻居(其收益矩阵在这里显示)两者(a，a)和(b，b)都是纳什均衡，因为玩家不能通过从其中任何一个切换来做得更好。然而，只有 b 是 ESS (和强 Nash)。不是 ESS，因此 b 可以中立地入侵 a 战略家的人群并占主导地位，因为 b 对 b 的得分高于 a 对 b 的得分。这个动态被 Maynard Smith 的第二个条件所捕获，因为 e (a，a) = e (b，a) ，但是它不是 e (a，b) > e (b，b)的情况。
{|align=block style="clear: right"
{|align=block style="clear: right"
{ | align = block style = “ clear: right”
|-
|-
|-
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Harm everyone
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Harm everyone
| {支付矩阵 | 姓名 = 伤害每个人
| 2L = C | 2R = D |
| 2L = C | 2R = D |
2 l = c | 2 r = d |
1U = C | UL = 2, 2 | UR = 1, 2 |
1U = C | UL = 2, 2 | UR = 1, 2 |
1 u = c | UL = 2,2 | UR = 1,2 |
1D = D | DL = 2, 1 | DR = 0, 0 }}
1D = D | DL = 2, 1 | DR = 0, 0 }}
1 d = d | DL = 2,1 | DR = 0,0}
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Chicken
|{{Payoff matrix | Name = Chicken
| {支付矩阵 | 名称 = 鸡
| 2L = Swerve | 2R = Stay |
| 2L = Swerve | 2R = Stay |
2 l = Swerve | 2 r = Stay |
1U = Swerve | UL = 0,0 | UR = −1,+1 |
1U = Swerve | UL = 0,0 | UR = −1,+1 |
1U = Swerve | UL = 0,0 | UR = −1,+1 |
1D = Stay | DL = +1,−1 | DR = −20,−20 }}
1D = Stay | DL = +1,−1 | DR = −20,−20 }}
1D = 停留 | DL = + 1,-1 | DR =-20,-20}
|}
|}
|}
Nash equilibria with equally scoring alternatives can be ESSes. For example, in the game ''Harm everyone'', ''C'' is an ESS because it satisfies Maynard Smith's second condition. ''D'' strategists may temporarily invade a population of ''C'' strategists by scoring equally well against ''C'', but they pay a price when they begin to play against each other; ''C'' scores better against ''D'' than does ''D''. So here although E(''C'', ''C'') = E(''D'', ''C''), it is also the case that E(''C'',''D'') > E(''D'',''D''). As a result, ''C'' is an ESS.
Nash equilibria with equally scoring alternatives can be ESSes. For example, in the game Harm everyone, C is an ESS because it satisfies Maynard Smith's second condition. D strategists may temporarily invade a population of C strategists by scoring equally well against C, but they pay a price when they begin to play against each other; C scores better against D than does D. So here although E(C, C) = E(D, C), it is also the case that E(C,D) > E(D,D). As a result, C is an ESS.
具有相同得分的替代方案的纳什均衡可以是。例如，在游戏 Harm everyone 中，c 是一个 ESS，因为它满足 Maynard Smith 的第二个条件。D 战略家可能会暂时侵入 c 战略家群体，因为他们对 c 的得分同样高，但是当他们开始互相竞争时，他们付出了代价; c 对 d 的得分比 d 高。这里虽然 e (c，c) = e (d，c) ，但是 e (c，d) > e (d，d)的情况也是如此。因此，c 是一个 ESS。
Even if a game has pure strategy Nash equilibria, it might be that none of those pure strategies are ESS. Consider the [[Chicken (game)|Game of chicken]]. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game (''Swerve'', ''Stay'') and (''Stay'', ''Swerve''). However, in the absence of an [[uncorrelated asymmetry]], neither ''Swerve'' nor ''Stay'' are ESSes. There is a third Nash equilibrium, a [[mixed strategy]] which is an ESS for this game (see [[Chicken (game)|Hawk-dove game]] and [[Best response]] for explanation).
Even if a game has pure strategy Nash equilibria, it might be that none of those pure strategies are ESS. Consider the Game of chicken. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game (Swerve, Stay) and (Stay, Swerve). However, in the absence of an uncorrelated asymmetry, neither Swerve nor Stay are ESSes. There is a third Nash equilibrium, a mixed strategy which is an ESS for this game (see Hawk-dove game and Best response for explanation).
即使一个博弈有纯策略纳什均衡，也可能没有纯策略是 ESS。想想胆小鬼的游戏。在这个博弈中有两个纯策略纳什均衡(Swerve，Stay)和(Stay，Swerve)。然而，在没有不相关的不对称性的情况下，Swerve 和 Stay 都不是 ESSes。还有第三个纳什均衡点，一个混合策略，这是一个 ESS 的游戏(见鹰鸽游戏和最佳对策解释)。
This last example points to an important difference between Nash equilibria and ESS. Nash equilibria are defined on ''strategy sets'' (a specification of a strategy for each player), while ESS are defined in terms of strategies themselves. The equilibria defined by ESS must always be [[Symmetric equilibrium|symmetric]], and thus have fewer equilibrium points.
This last example points to an important difference between Nash equilibria and ESS. Nash equilibria are defined on strategy sets (a specification of a strategy for each player), while ESS are defined in terms of strategies themselves. The equilibria defined by ESS must always be symmetric, and thus have fewer equilibrium points.
最后这个例子指出了纳什均衡和 ESS 之间的一个重要区别。纳什均衡是在策略集上定义的(每个参与者的策略规格) ，而 ESS 则是根据策略本身定义的。由 ESS 定义的平衡点必须总是对称的，因此平衡点较少。
== Vs. evolutionarily stable state ==
In population biology, the two concepts of an ''evolutionarily stable strategy'' (ESS) and an ''[[evolutionarily stable state]]'' are closely linked but describe different situations.
In population biology, the two concepts of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and an evolutionarily stable state are closely linked but describe different situations.
在种群生物学中，evolutional stable strategy 和进化稳定状态这两个概念紧密相连，但描述的情况却不同。
In an evolutionarily stable ''strategy,'' if all the members of a population adopt it, no mutant strategy can invade.<ref name="JMS82"/> Once virtually all members of the population use this strategy, there is no 'rational' alternative. ESS is part of classical [[game theory]].
In an evolutionarily stable strategy, if all the members of a population adopt it, no mutant strategy can invade. Once virtually all members of the population use this strategy, there is no 'rational' alternative. ESS is part of classical game theory.
在 evolutional stable strategy 中，如果一个种群的所有成员都采用它，那么任何变异策略都不能入侵。一旦几乎所有的人都使用这种策略，就没有理性的选择了。ESS 是经典博弈论的一部分。
In an evolutionarily stable ''state,'' a population's genetic composition is restored by selection after a disturbance, if the disturbance is not too large. An evolutionarily stable state is a dynamic property of a population that returns to using a strategy, or mix of strategies, if it is perturbed from that initial state. It is part of [[population genetics]], [[dynamical system]], or [[evolutionary game theory]]. This is now called convergent stability.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Apaloo |first1=J. |last2=Brown |first2=J. S. |last3=Vincent |first3=T. L. |date=2009 |title=Evolutionary game theory: ESS, convergence stability, and NIS |url=http://www.evolutionary-ecology.com/abstracts/v11/2445.html |journal=Evolutionary Ecology Research |volume=11 |pages=489–515 |access-date=2018-01-10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170809115301/http://www.evolutionary-ecology.com/abstracts/v11/2445.html |archive-date=2017-08-09 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
In an evolutionarily stable state, a population's genetic composition is restored by selection after a disturbance, if the disturbance is not too large. An evolutionarily stable state is a dynamic property of a population that returns to using a strategy, or mix of strategies, if it is perturbed from that initial state. It is part of population genetics, dynamical system, or evolutionary game theory. This is now called convergent stability.
在进化稳定状态下，如果干扰不太大，通过干扰后的选择恢复种群的遗传组成。进化稳定状态是种群的一个动态特性，当种群从初始状态受到扰动时，它会返回到使用策略或混合策略的状态。这是群体遗传学、动力系统或者进化博弈论的一部分。现在称之为收敛稳定性。
B. Thomas (1984) applies the term ESS to an individual strategy which may be mixed, and evolutionarily stable population state to a population mixture of pure strategies which may be formally equivalent to the mixed ESS.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1016/0040-5809(84)90023-6 |author=Thomas, B. |title=Evolutionary stability: states and strategies |journal=Theor. Popul. Biol. |volume=26 |issue=1 |pages=49–67 |year=1984 }}</ref>
B. Thomas (1984) applies the term ESS to an individual strategy which may be mixed, and evolutionarily stable population state to a population mixture of pure strategies which may be formally equivalent to the mixed ESS.
托马斯(1984)将 ESS 一词应用于可能混合的个体策略，而将进化稳定的种群状态应用于纯策略的种群混合，这种混合策略在形式上等价于混合的 ESS。
Whether a population is evolutionarily stable does not relate to its genetic diversity: it can be genetically monomorphic or [[Polymorphism (biology)|polymorphic]].<ref name="JMS82"/>
Whether a population is evolutionarily stable does not relate to its genetic diversity: it can be genetically monomorphic or polymorphic.
一个种群是否进化稳定与其遗传多样性无关: 它可以是遗传单态或多态的。
== Stochastic ESS ==
In the classic definition of an ESS, no mutant strategy can invade. In finite populations, any mutant could in principle invade, albeit at low probability, implying that no ESS can exist. In an infinite population, an ESS can instead be defined as a strategy which, should it become invaded by a new mutant strategy with probability p, would be able to counterinvade from a single starting individual with probability >p, as illustrated by the evolution of [[Bet-hedging (biology)|bet-hedging]].<ref>{{cite journal |last=King |first=Oliver D. |author2=Masel, Joanna |author2link=Joanna Masel |title=The evolution of bet-hedging adaptations to rare scenarios |journal=Theoretical Population Biology|date=1 December 2007 |volume=72 |issue=4 |pages=560–575 |doi=10.1016/j.tpb.2007.08.006 |pmid=17915273 |pmc=2118055}}</ref>
In the classic definition of an ESS, no mutant strategy can invade. In finite populations, any mutant could in principle invade, albeit at low probability, implying that no ESS can exist. In an infinite population, an ESS can instead be defined as a strategy which, should it become invaded by a new mutant strategy with probability p, would be able to counterinvade from a single starting individual with probability >p, as illustrated by the evolution of bet-hedging.
在 ESS 的经典定义中，任何突变策略都不能入侵。在有限的群体中，任何突变体原则上都可以入侵，尽管概率很低，这意味着没有 ESS 可以存在。在一个无限种群中，ESS 可以被定义为一种策略，当它被一个新的概率为 p 的突变策略入侵时，它能够以概率大于 p 的方式从一个单独的起始个体中反击入侵，这可以用下注对冲的进化来说明。
== Prisoner's dilemma ==
{{Payoff matrix | Name = Prisoner's Dilemma
{{Payoff matrix | Name = Prisoner's Dilemma
{{支付矩阵 | 名称 = 囚徒困境
| 2L = Cooperate | 2R = Defect |
| 2L = Cooperate | 2R = Defect |
2 l = 合作 | 2 r = 缺陷 |
1U = Cooperate | UL = 3, 3 | UR = 1, 4 |
1U = Cooperate | UL = 3, 3 | UR = 1, 4 |
1U = Cooperate | UL = 3, 3 | UR = 1, 4 |
1D = Defect | DL = 4, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1D = Defect | DL = 4, 1 | DR = 2, 2 }}
1 d = 缺陷 | DL = 4,1 | DR = 2,2}
A common model of [[altruism]] and social cooperation is the [[Prisoner's dilemma]]. Here a group of players would collectively be better off if they could play ''Cooperate'', but since ''Defect'' fares better each individual player has an incentive to play ''Defect''. One solution to this problem is to introduce the possibility of retaliation by having individuals play the game repeatedly against the same player. In the so-called ''[[repeated game|iterated]]'' Prisoner's dilemma, the same two individuals play the prisoner's dilemma over and over. While the Prisoner's dilemma has only two strategies (''Cooperate'' and ''Defect''), the iterated Prisoner's dilemma has a huge number of possible strategies. Since an individual can have different contingency plan for each history and the game may be repeated an indefinite number of times, there may in fact be an infinite number of such contingency plans.
A common model of altruism and social cooperation is the Prisoner's dilemma. Here a group of players would collectively be better off if they could play Cooperate, but since Defect fares better each individual player has an incentive to play Defect. One solution to this problem is to introduce the possibility of retaliation by having individuals play the game repeatedly against the same player. In the so-called iterated Prisoner's dilemma, the same two individuals play the prisoner's dilemma over and over. While the Prisoner's dilemma has only two strategies (Cooperate and Defect), the iterated Prisoner's dilemma has a huge number of possible strategies. Since an individual can have different contingency plan for each history and the game may be repeated an indefinite number of times, there may in fact be an infinite number of such contingency plans.
一种常见的利他主义和社会合作模式是囚徒困境。在这里，一组玩家如果能够玩合作游戏，那么他们的整体状况会更好，但是因为缺陷的收益更好，所以每个玩家都有一个玩缺陷游戏的动机。这个问题的一个解决方案是引入报复的可能性，让个人对同一个玩家重复进行游戏。在所谓的重复囚徒困境中，同样的两个人一遍又一遍地玩着囚徒困境。囚徒困境只有两种策略(合作策略和缺陷策略) ，重复囚徒困境有大量的可能策略。由于每个人可能对每个历史有不同的应急计划，而且游戏可能无限次地重复，因此事实上可能有无限次这样的应急计划。
Three simple contingency plans which have received substantial attention are ''Always Defect'', ''Always Cooperate'', and ''[[Tit for Tat]]''. The first two strategies do the same thing regardless of the other player's actions, while the latter responds on the next round by doing what was done to it on the previous round—it responds to ''Cooperate'' with ''Cooperate'' and ''Defect'' with ''Defect''.
Three simple contingency plans which have received substantial attention are Always Defect, Always Cooperate, and Tit for Tat. The first two strategies do the same thing regardless of the other player's actions, while the latter responds on the next round by doing what was done to it on the previous round—it responds to Cooperate with Cooperate and Defect with Defect.
三个受到广泛关注的简单应急计划是总是缺陷、总是合作和以牙还牙。前两种策略做同样的事情，而不管其他玩家的行动，而后者在下一轮做出回应，做上一轮做的事情ーー它回应与合作和缺陷合作。
If the entire population plays ''Tit-for-Tat'' and a mutant arises who plays ''Always Defect'', ''Tit-for-Tat'' will outperform ''Always Defect''. If the population of the mutant becomes too large — the percentage of the mutant will be kept small. ''Tit for Tat'' is therefore an ESS, ''with respect to '''only''' these two strategies''. On the other hand, an island of ''Always Defect'' players will be stable against the invasion of a few ''Tit-for-Tat'' players, but not against a large number of them.<ref>{{cite book |author=Axelrod, Robert |authorlink=Robert Axelrod |title=The Evolution of Cooperation |year=1984 |isbn=0-465-02121-2 |title-link=The Evolution of Cooperation }}</ref> If we introduce ''Always Cooperate'', a population of ''Tit-for-Tat'' is no longer an ESS. Since a population of ''Tit-for-Tat'' players always cooperates, the strategy ''Always Cooperate'' behaves identically in this population. As a result, a mutant who plays ''Always Cooperate'' will not be eliminated. However, even though a population of ''Always Cooperate'' and ''Tit-for-Tat'' can coexist, if there is a small percentage of the population that is ''Always Defect'', the selective pressure is against ''Always Cooperate'', and in favour of ''Tit-for-Tat''. This is due to the lower payoffs of cooperating than those of defecting in case the opponent defects.
If the entire population plays Tit-for-Tat and a mutant arises who plays Always Defect, Tit-for-Tat will outperform Always Defect. If the population of the mutant becomes too large — the percentage of the mutant will be kept small. Tit for Tat is therefore an ESS, with respect to only these two strategies. On the other hand, an island of Always Defect players will be stable against the invasion of a few Tit-for-Tat players, but not against a large number of them. If we introduce Always Cooperate, a population of Tit-for-Tat is no longer an ESS. Since a population of Tit-for-Tat players always cooperates, the strategy Always Cooperate behaves identically in this population. As a result, a mutant who plays Always Cooperate will not be eliminated. However, even though a population of Always Cooperate and Tit-for-Tat can coexist, if there is a small percentage of the population that is Always Defect, the selective pressure is against Always Cooperate, and in favour of Tit-for-Tat. This is due to the lower payoffs of cooperating than those of defecting in case the opponent defects.
如果整个种群都玩以牙还牙的游戏，而一个变种人出现了，他总是玩“缺陷”游戏，那么“以牙还牙”游戏就会胜过“总是缺陷”游戏。如果突变体的种群数量过大，则突变体的比例将保持在较小的水平。一报还一报因此是一个斯洛文尼亚就只有这两个战略。另一方面，一个永远有缺陷的玩家的岛屿可以稳定地对抗少数以牙还牙的玩家的入侵，但不能对抗大量的他们。如果我们引入总是合作，一个以牙还牙的群体就不再是 ESS 了。由于一群以牙还牙的玩家总是合作，策略总是合作在这群人中表现一致。因此，一个总是合作的变种人将不会被淘汰。然而，即使“永远合作”和“以牙还牙”的人群可以共存，如果有一小部分人“永远不合作” ，那么选择性的压力就是反对“永远合作” ，赞成“以牙还牙”。这是因为在对手缺陷的情况下，合作的回报低于背叛的回报。
This demonstrates the difficulties in applying the formal definition of an ESS to games with large strategy spaces, and has motivated some to consider alternatives.
This demonstrates the difficulties in applying the formal definition of an ESS to games with large strategy spaces, and has motivated some to consider alternatives.
这表明了在将 ESS 的形式化定义应用于具有大型战略空间的博弈中的困难，并促使一些人考虑其他选择。
== Human behavior ==
The fields of [[sociobiology]] and [[evolutionary psychology]] attempt to explain animal and human behavior and social structures, largely in terms of evolutionarily stable strategies. [[Psychopathy#Sociopathy|Sociopathy]] (chronic antisocial or criminal behavior) may be a result of a combination of two such strategies.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1017/S0140525X00039595 |author=Mealey, L. |title=The sociobiology of sociopathy: An integrated evolutionary model |journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences |volume=18 |issue=3 |pages=523–99 |year=1995 }}</ref>
The fields of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology attempt to explain animal and human behavior and social structures, largely in terms of evolutionarily stable strategies. Sociopathy (chronic antisocial or criminal behavior) may be a result of a combination of two such strategies.
社会生物学和进化心理学试图用进化稳定策略来解释动物和人类的行为和社会结构。反社会人格(慢性反社会或犯罪行为)可能是两种策略结合的结果。
Evolutionarily stable strategies were originally considered for biological evolution, but they can apply to other contexts. In fact, there are stable states for a large class of [[adaptive dynamics]]. As a result, they can be used to explain human behaviours that lack any genetic influences.
Evolutionarily stable strategies were originally considered for biological evolution, but they can apply to other contexts. In fact, there are stable states for a large class of adaptive dynamics. As a result, they can be used to explain human behaviours that lack any genetic influences.
进化稳定策略最初被认为是生物进化的策略，但它们可以应用于其他情况。事实上，对于一大类自适应动态系统，存在稳定状态。因此，它们可以用来解释没有任何遗传影响的人类行为。
==See also==
*[[Antipredator adaptation]]
*[[Behavioral ecology]]
*[[Evolutionary psychology]]
*[[Fitness landscape]]
*[[Chicken (game)|Hawk–dove game]]
*[[Koinophilia]]
*[[Sociobiology]]
*[[War of attrition (game)]]
== References ==
{{Reflist}}
==Further reading==
* {{Cite book | last1=Weibull | first1=Jörgen | title=Evolutionary game theory | publisher=[[MIT Press]] | isbn= 978-0-262-73121-8| year=1997 }} Classic reference textbook.
* {{cite journal | doi = 10.1016/0040-5809(87)90029-3 | last1 = Hines | first1 = W. G. S. | year = 1987 | title = Evolutionary stable strategies: a review of basic theory | url = | journal = Theoretical Population Biology | volume = 31 | issue = 2| pages = 195–272 | pmid = 3296292 }}
* {{Cite book | last2=Shoham | first2=Yoav | last1=Leyton-Brown | first1=Kevin | title=Essentials of Game Theory: A Concise, Multidisciplinary Introduction | publisher=Morgan & Claypool Publishers | isbn=978-1-59829-593-1 | url=http://www.gtessentials.org | year=2008 | location=San Rafael, CA }}. An 88-page mathematical introduction; see Section 3.8. [http://www.morganclaypool.com/doi/abs/10.2200/S00108ED1V01Y200802AIM003 Free online] at many universities.
* [[Geoff Parker|Parker, G. A.]] (1984) Evolutionary stable strategies. In ''Behavioural Ecology: an Evolutionary Approach'' (2nd ed) [[John Krebs|Krebs, J. R.]] & Davies N.B., eds. pp 30–61. Blackwell, Oxford.
* {{Cite book | last1=Shoham | first1=Yoav | last2=Leyton-Brown | first2=Kevin | title=Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations | publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] | isbn=978-0-521-89943-7 | url=http://www.masfoundations.org | year=2009 | location=New York }}. A comprehensive reference from a computational perspective; see Section 7.7. [http://www.masfoundations.org/download.html Downloadable free online].
* [[John Maynard Smith|Maynard Smith, John]]. (1982) ''[[Evolution and the Theory of Games]]''. {{ISBN|0-521-28884-3}}. Classic reference.
==External links==
* [http://www.animalbehavioronline.com/ess.html Evolutionarily Stable Strategies] at Animal Behavior: An Online Textbook by Michael D. Breed.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20060906092853/http://www.holycross.edu/departments/biology/kprestwi/behavior/ESS/ESS_index_frmset.html Game Theory and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies], Kenneth N. Prestwich's site at College of the Holy Cross.
*[http://knol.google.com/k/klaus-rohde/evolutionarily-stable-strategies-and/xk923bc3gp4/50# Evolutionarily stable strategies knol]{{Dead link|date=December 2019 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}
{{Game theory}}
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Category:Game theory equilibrium concepts
范畴: 博弈论均衡概念
[[Category:Evolutionary game theory]]
Category:Evolutionary game theory
范畴: 进化博弈论
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<small>This page was moved from [[wikipedia:en:Evolutionarily stable strategy]]. Its edit history can be viewed at [[进化均衡策略/edithistory]]</small></noinclude>
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