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第323行：
第323行： − 具有相同得分的替代方案的纳什均衡可以是。例如，在游戏 Harm everyone 中，c 是一个 ESS，因为它满足 Maynard Smith 的第二个条件。D 战略家可能会暂时侵入 c 战略家群体，因为他们对 c 的得分同样高，但是当他们开始互相竞争时，他们付出了代价; c 对 d 的得分比 d 高。这里虽然 e (c，c) = e (d，c) ，但是 e (c，d) > e (d，d)的情况也是如此。因此，c 是一个 ESS。+ − 第331行：
第330行： − 即使一个博弈有纯策略纳什均衡，也可能没有纯策略是 ESS。想想胆小鬼的游戏。在这个博弈中有两个纯策略纳什均衡(Swerve，Stay)和(Stay，Swerve)。然而，在没有不相关的不对称性的情况下，Swerve 和 Stay 都不是 ESSes。还有第三个纳什均衡点，一个混合策略，这是一个 ESS 的游戏(见鹰鸽游戏和最佳对策解释)。+ − − 第339行：
第336行： − 最后这个例子指出了纳什均衡和 ESS 之间的一个重要区别。纳什均衡是在策略集上定义的(每个参与者的策略规格) ，而 ESS 则是根据策略本身定义的。由 ESS 定义的平衡点必须总是对称的，因此平衡点较少。+
→Examples of differences between Nash equilibria and ESSes 纳什平衡与进化均衡策略之间差异的示例
Nash equilibria with equally scoring alternatives can be ESSes. For example, in the game Harm everyone, C is an ESS because it satisfies Maynard Smith's second condition. D strategists may temporarily invade a population of C strategists by scoring equally well against C, but they pay a price when they begin to play against each other; C scores better against D than does D. So here although E(C, C) = E(D, C), it is also the case that E(C,D) > E(D,D). As a result, C is an ESS.
Nash equilibria with equally scoring alternatives can be ESSes. For example, in the game Harm everyone, C is an ESS because it satisfies Maynard Smith's second condition. D strategists may temporarily invade a population of C strategists by scoring equally well against C, but they pay a price when they begin to play against each other; C scores better against D than does D. So here although E(C, C) = E(D, C), it is also the case that E(C,D) > E(D,D). As a result, C is an ESS.
纳什平衡以及同等评分的策略都可以是进化均衡策略。例如，在游戏《伤害大家Harm everyone》中，C是进化均衡策略，因为它满足了梅纳德·史密斯的第二条件。D策略可以暂时入侵C策略群体，因为D策略可以获得和C策略一样的评分。但是当他们开始互相对抗时，他们会付出一定的代价；C对D的得分比D对D的得分高。因此，尽管E（C，C）=E（D，C），但E（C，D）> E（D，D）。因此，最后C是最终进化均衡策略。
Even if a game has pure strategy Nash equilibria, it might be that none of those pure strategies are ESS. Consider the Game of chicken. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game (Swerve, Stay) and (Stay, Swerve). However, in the absence of an uncorrelated asymmetry, neither Swerve nor Stay are ESSes. There is a third Nash equilibrium, a mixed strategy which is an ESS for this game (see Hawk-dove game and Best response for explanation).
Even if a game has pure strategy Nash equilibria, it might be that none of those pure strategies are ESS. Consider the Game of chicken. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game (Swerve, Stay) and (Stay, Swerve). However, in the absence of an uncorrelated asymmetry, neither Swerve nor Stay are ESSes. There is a third Nash equilibrium, a mixed strategy which is an ESS for this game (see Hawk-dove game and Best response for explanation).
还有一些游戏即使具有纯粹的纳什均衡策略，但可能它们都不是进化均衡策略。比如游戏《小鸡博弈The Game of Chicken》,该游戏中有两种纯粹的纳什均衡策略（转身离开Swerve，留下Stay）和（留下Stay，转身离开Swerve）。但是，在无关联不对称Uncorrelated Asymmetry缺失的情况下，Swerve和Stay都不是进化均衡策略。此时存在第三种纳什平衡，它属于混合策略并且是该游戏的进化均衡策略（详情请参见《鹰鸽博弈Hawk-dove》游戏和《最佳响应Best Response》以获得解释）。
This last example points to an important difference between Nash equilibria and ESS. Nash equilibria are defined on ''strategy sets'' (a specification of a strategy for each player), while ESS are defined in terms of strategies themselves. The equilibria defined by ESS must always be [[Symmetric equilibrium|symmetric]], and thus have fewer equilibrium points.
This last example points to an important difference between Nash equilibria and ESS. Nash equilibria are defined on ''strategy sets'' (a specification of a strategy for each player), while ESS are defined in terms of strategies themselves. The equilibria defined by ESS must always be [[Symmetric equilibrium|symmetric]], and thus have fewer equilibrium points.
This last example points to an important difference between Nash equilibria and ESS. Nash equilibria are defined on strategy sets (a specification of a strategy for each player), while ESS are defined in terms of strategies themselves. The equilibria defined by ESS must always be symmetric, and thus have fewer equilibrium points.
This last example points to an important difference between Nash equilibria and ESS. Nash equilibria are defined on strategy sets (a specification of a strategy for each player), while ESS are defined in terms of strategies themselves. The equilibria defined by ESS must always be symmetric, and thus have fewer equilibrium points.
最后一个示例指出了纳什平衡与进化均衡策略之间的重要区别。纳什平衡是在策略集（每个参与者的策略规范）上定义的，而进化均衡策略是根据策略本身定义的。进化均衡策略定义的平衡必须始终是对称的，因此其平衡点更少。
== Vs. evolutionarily stable state ==
== Vs. evolutionarily stable state ==