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Moved page from wikipedia:en:Cascading failure (history)
此词条暂由彩云小译翻译，未经人工整理和审校，带来阅读不便，请见谅。
{{short description|System of interconnected parts in which the failure of one or few parts can trigger the failure of others}}
[[Image:Networkfailure.gif|thumb|right|An animation demonstrating how a single failure may result in other failures throughout a network.]]
An animation demonstrating how a single failure may result in other failures throughout a network.
演示单个故障如何在整个网络中导致其他故障的动画。
A '''cascading failure''' is a process in a system of [[interconnection|interconnected]] parts in which the failure of one or few parts can trigger the failure of other parts and so on. Such a failure may happen in many types of systems, including power transmission, computer networking, finance, transportation systems, organisms, the human body, and ecosystems.
A cascading failure is a process in a system of interconnected parts in which the failure of one or few parts can trigger the failure of other parts and so on. Such a failure may happen in many types of systems, including power transmission, computer networking, finance, transportation systems, organisms, the human body, and ecosystems.
连锁故障是一个相互连接的部件系统中的一个或几个部件的故障可以引发其他部件的故障等过程。这种故障可能发生在许多类型的系统中，包括动力传输、计算机网络、金融、交通系统、有机体、人体和生态系统。
Cascading failures may occur when one part of the system fails. When this happens, other parts must then compensate for the failed component. This in turn overloads these nodes, causing them to fail as well, prompting additional nodes to fail one after another.
Cascading failures may occur when one part of the system fails. When this happens, other parts must then compensate for the failed component. This in turn overloads these nodes, causing them to fail as well, prompting additional nodes to fail one after another.
当系统的一部分发生故障时，可能会发生级联故障。当这种情况发生时，其他部分必须补偿失败的组件。这反过来又会重载这些节点，导致它们也失败，促使其他节点一个接一个地失败。
== In power transmission ==
Cascading failure is common in [[power grid]]s when one of the elements fails (completely or partially) and shifts its load to nearby elements in the system. Those nearby elements are then pushed beyond their capacity so they become overloaded and shift their load onto other elements. Cascading failure is a common effect seen in [[high voltage]] systems, where a [[single point of failure]] (SPF) on a fully loaded or slightly overloaded system results in a sudden spike across all nodes of the system. This surge current can induce the already overloaded nodes into failure, setting off more overloads and thereby taking down the entire system in a very short time.
Cascading failure is common in power grids when one of the elements fails (completely or partially) and shifts its load to nearby elements in the system. Those nearby elements are then pushed beyond their capacity so they become overloaded and shift their load onto other elements. Cascading failure is a common effect seen in high voltage systems, where a single point of failure (SPF) on a fully loaded or slightly overloaded system results in a sudden spike across all nodes of the system. This surge current can induce the already overloaded nodes into failure, setting off more overloads and thereby taking down the entire system in a very short time.
级联故障在电网中很常见，当其中一个元件发生故障(完全或部分)并将其负荷转移到系统中附近的元件时。那些附近的元素然后被推动超出他们的能力，所以他们成为超载和转移他们的负载到其他元素。级联故障是高压系统中常见的一种现象，在一个满负荷或轻微超载的系统中，一个单点故障(SPF)会导致系统所有节点突然出现尖峰。这种浪涌电流可能会导致已经超载的节点发生故障，引发更多的过载，从而在很短的时间内使整个系统瘫痪。
This failure process cascades through the elements of the system like a ripple on a pond and continues until substantially all of the elements in the system are compromised and/or the system becomes functionally disconnected from the source of its load. For example, under certain conditions a large power grid can collapse after the failure of a single transformer.
This failure process cascades through the elements of the system like a ripple on a pond and continues until substantially all of the elements in the system are compromised and/or the system becomes functionally disconnected from the source of its load. For example, under certain conditions a large power grid can collapse after the failure of a single transformer.
这个故障过程就像池塘上的涟漪一样通过系统的各个元素，并且持续到系统中的所有元素被破坏和/或系统从功能上与其负载的来源断开为止。例如，在某些情况下，一个大型电网可能因为单个变压器的故障而崩溃。
Monitoring the operation of a system, in [[real-time computing|real-time]], and judicious disconnection of parts can help stop a cascade. Another common technique is to calculate a safety margin for the system by computer simulation of possible failures, to establish safe operating levels below which none of the calculated scenarios is predicted to cause cascading failure, and to identify the parts of the network which are most likely to cause cascading failures.<ref name="chao">{{cite arXiv |last1=Zhai |first1=Chao |title=Modeling and Identification of Worst-Case Cascading Failures in Power Systems |eprint=1703.05232 |class=cs.SY |year=2017}}</ref>
Monitoring the operation of a system, in real-time, and judicious disconnection of parts can help stop a cascade. Another common technique is to calculate a safety margin for the system by computer simulation of possible failures, to establish safe operating levels below which none of the calculated scenarios is predicted to cause cascading failure, and to identify the parts of the network which are most likely to cause cascading failures.
实时监控系统的运行，明智地断开部件可以帮助阻止级联。另一种常用的技术是在可能发生故障的计算机模拟计算系统的安全裕度，建立安全运行水平，低于这个水平的任何计算方案都不会导致级联故障，并确定网络中最有可能导致级联故障的部分。
One of the primary problems with preventing electrical grid failures is that the speed of the control signal is no faster than the speed of the propagating power overload, i.e. since both the control signal and the electrical power are moving at the same speed, it is not possible to isolate the outage by sending a warning ahead to isolate the element.
One of the primary problems with preventing electrical grid failures is that the speed of the control signal is no faster than the speed of the propagating power overload, i.e. since both the control signal and the electrical power are moving at the same speed, it is not possible to isolate the outage by sending a warning ahead to isolate the element.
防止电网故障的主要问题之一是，控制信号的速度不快于传播功率过载的速度，也就是说，控制信号的速度不快于传播功率过载的速度。由于控制信号和电力以相同的速度运行，所以不可能通过提前发送警告来隔离元件来隔离断电。
The question if power grid failures are correlated have been studied in Daqing Li et al.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Daqing|first=Li|last2=Yinan|first2=Jiang|last3=Rui|first3=Kang|last4=Havlin|first4=Shlomo|date=2014-06-20|title=Spatial correlation analysis of cascading failures: Congestions and Blackouts|journal=Scientific Reports|language=En|volume=4|issue=1|pages=5381|doi=10.1038/srep05381|pmid=24946927|pmc=4064325|issn=2045-2322|bibcode=2014NatSR...4E5381D}}</ref> as well as by Paul DH Hines et al.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hines|first=Paul D. H.|last2=Dobson|first2=Ian|last3=Rezaei|first3=Pooya|date=2016|title=Cascading Power Outages Propagate Locally in an Influence Graph that is not the Actual Grid Topology|arxiv=1508.01775|journal=IEEE Transactions on Power Systems|pages=1|doi=10.1109/TPWRS.2016.2578259|issn=0885-8950}}</ref>
The question if power grid failures are correlated have been studied in Daqing Li et al. as well as by Paul DH Hines et al.
大庆等人已经研究了电网故障是否相关的问题。以及 Paul DH Hines 等人。
=== Examples ===
Cascading failure caused the following [[power outage]]s:
Cascading failure caused the following power outages:
级联故障导致下列停电:
* [[Northeast blackout of 1965|Blackout in Northeast America in 1965]]
* [[1999 Southern Brazil blackout|Blackout in Southern Brazil in 1999]]
* [[Northeast blackout of 2003|Blackout in Northeast America in 2003]]
* [[2003 Italy blackout|Blackout in Italy in 2003]]
* [[2003 London blackout|Blackout in London in 2003]]
* [[2006 European blackout|European Blackout in 2006]]
* [[2012 northern India power grid failure|Blackout in Northern India in 2012]]
* [[2016 South Australian blackout|Blackout in South Australia in 2016]]
* [[2019 Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay blackout|Blackout in southeast South America in 2019]]
== In computer networks ==
Cascading failures can also occur in [[computer network]]s (such as the [[Internet]]) in which [[Network traffic control|network traffic]] is severely impaired or halted to or between larger sections of the network, caused by failing or disconnected hardware or software. In this context, the cascading failure is known by the term '''cascade failure'''. A cascade failure can affect large groups of people and systems.
Cascading failures can also occur in computer networks (such as the Internet) in which network traffic is severely impaired or halted to or between larger sections of the network, caused by failing or disconnected hardware or software. In this context, the cascading failure is known by the term cascade failure. A cascade failure can affect large groups of people and systems.
计算机网络(例如互联网)也可能发生级联故障，由于硬件或软件故障或断开，网络通信严重受损，或在网络较大部分之间停止。在这种背景下，级联失效这一术语被称为级联失效。级联故障可以影响大量的人员和系统。
The cause of a cascade failure is usually the overloading of a single, crucial [[Router (computing)|router]] or node, which causes the node to go down, even briefly. It can also be caused by taking a node down for maintenance or upgrades. In either case, traffic is [[routing|routed]] to or through another (alternative) path. This alternative path, as a result, becomes overloaded, causing it to go down, and so on. It will also affect systems which depend on the node for regular operation.
The cause of a cascade failure is usually the overloading of a single, crucial router or node, which causes the node to go down, even briefly. It can also be caused by taking a node down for maintenance or upgrades. In either case, traffic is routed to or through another (alternative) path. This alternative path, as a result, becomes overloaded, causing it to go down, and so on. It will also affect systems which depend on the node for regular operation.
级联故障的原因通常是一个单一的、关键的路由器或节点的超载，这会导致节点宕机，甚至是短暂的宕机。它也可能是由于为了维护或升级而关闭一个节点引起的。在这两种情况下，流量都被路由到或通过另一条(可选)路径。结果，这个替代路径变得超载，导致它下降，等等。它还会影响依赖于节点进行常规操作的系统。
=== Symptoms ===
The symptoms of a cascade failure include: [[packet loss]] and high network [[lag|latency]], not just to single systems, but to whole sections of a network or the internet. The high latency and packet loss is caused by the nodes that fail to operate due to [[congestion collapse]], which causes them to still be present in the network but without much or any useful communication going through them. As a result, routes can still be considered valid, without them actually providing communication.
The symptoms of a cascade failure include: packet loss and high network latency, not just to single systems, but to whole sections of a network or the internet. The high latency and packet loss is caused by the nodes that fail to operate due to congestion collapse, which causes them to still be present in the network but without much or any useful communication going through them. As a result, routes can still be considered valid, without them actually providing communication.
级联故障的症状包括: 数据包丢失和高网络延迟，不仅仅是对单个系统，而是对整个网络或互联网部分。高延迟和数据包丢失是由于网络拥塞崩溃导致的节点无法正常运行所造成的，这使得它们仍然存在于网络中，但是没有多少或任何有用的通信通过它们。因此，路由仍然可以被认为是有效的，而实际上它们并没有提供通信。
If enough routes go down because of a cascade failure, a complete section of the network or internet can become unreachable. Although undesired, this can help speed up the recovery from this failure as connections will time out, and other nodes will give up trying to establish connections to the section(s) that have become cut off, decreasing load on the involved nodes.
If enough routes go down because of a cascade failure, a complete section of the network or internet can become unreachable. Although undesired, this can help speed up the recovery from this failure as connections will time out, and other nodes will give up trying to establish connections to the section(s) that have become cut off, decreasing load on the involved nodes.
如果有足够多的路由由于级联故障而中断，网络或互联网的一个完整部分就会变得无法访问。尽管不希望如此，但这可以帮助加快从此失败中恢复，因为连接将超时，其他节点将放弃尝试建立到已被切断的节点的连接，从而减少涉及的节点的负载。
A common occurrence during a cascade failure is a '''walking failure''', where sections go down, causing the next section to fail, after which the first section comes back up. This '''ripple''' can make several passes through the same sections or connecting nodes before stability is restored.
A common occurrence during a cascade failure is a walking failure, where sections go down, causing the next section to fail, after which the first section comes back up. This ripple can make several passes through the same sections or connecting nodes before stability is restored.
级联故障中经常发生的一种情况是行走故障，部分下降，导致下一部分失败，之后第一部分返回。在恢复稳定性之前，这个波纹可以通过相同的部分或连接节点进行多次传递。
=== History ===
Cascade failures are a relatively recent development, with the massive increase in traffic and the high interconnectivity between systems and networks. The term was first applied in this context in the late 1990s by a Dutch IT professional and has slowly become a relatively common term for this kind of large-scale failure.{{Citation needed|date=January 2009}}
Cascade failures are a relatively recent development, with the massive increase in traffic and the high interconnectivity between systems and networks. The term was first applied in this context in the late 1990s by a Dutch IT professional and has slowly become a relatively common term for this kind of large-scale failure.
级联故障是一个相对较新的发展，随着流量的大量增加和系统与网络之间的高度互连性。这个术语最早是在20世纪90年代末由一位荷兰 IT 专业人士在这种背景下使用的，现在已经慢慢成为这种大规模失败的一个相对常见的术语。
=== Example ===
Network failures typically start when a single network node fails. Initially, the traffic that would normally go through the node is stopped. Systems and users get errors about not being able to reach hosts. Usually, the redundant systems of an ISP respond very quickly, choosing another path through a different backbone. The routing path through this alternative route is longer, with more [[Hop (telecommunications)|hops]] and subsequently going through more systems that normally do not process the amount of traffic suddenly offered.
Network failures typically start when a single network node fails. Initially, the traffic that would normally go through the node is stopped. Systems and users get errors about not being able to reach hosts. Usually, the redundant systems of an ISP respond very quickly, choosing another path through a different backbone. The routing path through this alternative route is longer, with more hops and subsequently going through more systems that normally do not process the amount of traffic suddenly offered.
网络故障通常在单个网络节点故障时开始。最初，通常会通过该节点的流量被停止。系统和用户会因无法到达主机而出错。通常，ISP 的冗余系统响应非常快，通过不同的主干网选择另一条路径。通过这个替代路径的路由路径更长，具有更多的跳数，并随后通过更多的系统，通常不处理突然提供的流量量。
This can cause one or more systems along the alternative route to go down, creating similar problems of their own.
This can cause one or more systems along the alternative route to go down, creating similar problems of their own.
这可能导致一个或多个系统沿着另一条路径下降，从而产生它们自己的类似问题。
Also, related systems are affected in this case. As an example, [[Domain name system|DNS]] resolution might fail and what would normally cause systems to be interconnected, might break connections that are not even directly involved in the actual systems that went down. This, in turn, may cause seemingly unrelated nodes to develop problems, that can cause another cascade failure all on its own.
Also, related systems are affected in this case. As an example, DNS resolution might fail and what would normally cause systems to be interconnected, might break connections that are not even directly involved in the actual systems that went down. This, in turn, may cause seemingly unrelated nodes to develop problems, that can cause another cascade failure all on its own.
此外，在这种情况下，相关系统也会受到影响。例如，DNS 解析可能会失败，通常会导致系统互联的情况可能会破坏甚至不直接涉及实际系统的连接。反过来，这可能会导致看似不相关的节点产生问题，从而可能导致另一个级联失败。
In December 2012, a partial loss (40%) of [[Gmail]] service occurred globally, for 18 minutes. This loss of service was caused by a routine update of load balancing software which contained faulty logic—in this case, the error was caused by logic using an [https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/why-gmail-went-down-google-misconfigured-chromes-sync-server/ inappropriate ''all'' instead of the more appropriate ''some''.] The cascading error was fixed by fully updating a single node in the network instead of partially updating all nodes at one time.
In December 2012, a partial loss (40%) of Gmail service occurred globally, for 18 minutes. This loss of service was caused by a routine update of load balancing software which contained faulty logic—in this case, the error was caused by logic using an [https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/why-gmail-went-down-google-misconfigured-chromes-sync-server/ inappropriate all instead of the more appropriate some.] The cascading error was fixed by fully updating a single node in the network instead of partially updating all nodes at one time.
2012年12月，全球范围内发生了部分 Gmail 服务中断(40%) ，时间长达18分钟。这种服务的丢失是由于包含错误逻辑的负载平衡软件的例行更新造成的---- 在这种情况下，错误是由于逻辑使用了[ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/why-gmail-went-down-google-misconfigured-chromes-sync-server/不恰当的所有而不是更适当的一些]通过对网络中单个节点的全面更新而不是对所有节点的部分更新，修复了级联错误。
== Cascading structural failure ==
Certain load-bearing structures with discrete structural components can be subject to the "zipper effect", where the failure of a single structural member increases the load on adjacent members. In the case of the [[Hyatt Regency walkway collapse]], a suspended walkway (which was already overstressed due to an error in construction) failed when a single vertical suspension rod failed, overloading the neighboring rods which failed sequentially (i.e. like a [[zipper]]). A bridge that can have such a failure is called fracture critical, and numerous bridge collapses have been caused by the failure of a single part. Properly designed structures use an adequate [[factor of safety]] and/or alternate load paths to prevent this type of mechanical cascade failure.<ref name="petroski">{{cite book| title=To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Structural Design| first=Henry| last=Petroski| year=1992| isbn=978-0-679-73416-1| publisher=Vintage| place=| url-access=registration| url=https://archive.org/details/toengineerishuma00petr}}</ref>
Certain load-bearing structures with discrete structural components can be subject to the "zipper effect", where the failure of a single structural member increases the load on adjacent members. In the case of the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse, a suspended walkway (which was already overstressed due to an error in construction) failed when a single vertical suspension rod failed, overloading the neighboring rods which failed sequentially (i.e. like a zipper). A bridge that can have such a failure is called fracture critical, and numerous bridge collapses have been caused by the failure of a single part. Properly designed structures use an adequate factor of safety and/or alternate load paths to prevent this type of mechanical cascade failure.
某些承重结构与分立的结构组件可以受到“拉链效应” ，其中一个单一的结构成员的失败增加了对相邻成员的负荷。在倒塌的情况下，当一个垂直悬挂杆失效时，一个悬挂人行道(由于施工错误已经过度受力)失效，导致相邻的杆超载，相继失效(即:。像拉链一样)。一座可能发生这种破坏的桥梁被称为断裂临界桥梁，许多桥梁的垮塌都是由单一部分的破坏引起的。正确设计的结构使用足够的安全系数和/或交替加载路径，以防止这种类型的机械叶栅失效。
== Other examples ==
=== Biology ===
[[Biochemical cascade]]s exist in biology, where a small reaction can have system-wide implications. One negative example is [[ischemic cascade]], in which a small [[ischemia|ischemic]] attack releases [[toxin]]s which kill off far more cells than the initial damage, resulting in more toxins being released. Current research is to find a way to block this cascade in [[stroke]] patients to minimize the damage.
Biochemical cascades exist in biology, where a small reaction can have system-wide implications. One negative example is ischemic cascade, in which a small ischemic attack releases toxins which kill off far more cells than the initial damage, resulting in more toxins being released. Current research is to find a way to block this cascade in stroke patients to minimize the damage.
生物化学级联存在于生物学中，在那里一个小的反应可以有全系统的含义。一个负面的例子是缺血性级联反应，在这种反应中，一个小的缺血性发作释放出的毒素比最初的损伤杀死更多的细胞，导致更多的毒素被释放。目前的研究正在寻找一种方法来阻断脑卒中患者的这种级联反应，以最大限度地减少损伤。
In the study of extinction, sometimes the extinction of one species will cause many other extinctions to happen. Such a species is known as a [[keystone species]].
In the study of extinction, sometimes the extinction of one species will cause many other extinctions to happen. Such a species is known as a keystone species.
在物种灭绝的研究中，有时一个物种的灭绝会导致许多其他物种的灭绝。这样的物种被称为关键种。
=== Electronics ===
Another example is the [[Cockcroft–Walton generator]], which can also experience cascade failures wherein one failed [[diode]] can result in all the diodes failing in a fraction of a second.
Another example is the Cockcroft–Walton generator, which can also experience cascade failures wherein one failed diode can result in all the diodes failing in a fraction of a second.
另一个例子是考克饶夫沃尔顿发电机，它也可以经历级联故障，其中一个失败的二极管可以导致所有的二极管失败在几分之一秒。
Yet another example of this effect in a scientific experiment was the [[Implosion (mechanical process)|implosion]] in 2001 of several thousand fragile glass photomultiplier tubes used in the [[Super-Kamiokande]] experiment, where the shock wave caused by the failure of a single detector appears to have triggered the implosion of the other detectors in a chain reaction.
Yet another example of this effect in a scientific experiment was the implosion in 2001 of several thousand fragile glass photomultiplier tubes used in the Super-Kamiokande experiment, where the shock wave caused by the failure of a single detector appears to have triggered the implosion of the other detectors in a chain reaction.
在科学实验中，这种效应的另一个例子是2001年用于超级神冈探测器实验的数千个脆弱的玻璃探测器的内爆，在那里，由单个探测器故障引起的冲击波似乎触发了其他探测器在连锁反应中的内爆。
=== Finance ===
{{main|Systemic risk}} {{main|Cascades in financial networks}}
In [[finance]], the risk of cascading failures of financial institutions is referred to as ''[[systemic risk]]:'' the failure of one financial institution may cause other financial institutions (its [[Counterparty|counterparties]]) to fail, cascading throughout the system.<ref name="HuangVodenska2013">{{cite journal|last1=Huang|first1=Xuqing|last2=Vodenska|first2=Irena|last3=Havlin|first3=Shlomo|last4=Stanley|first4=H. Eugene|title=Cascading Failures in Bi-partite Graphs: Model for Systemic Risk Propagation|journal=Scientific Reports|volume=3|pages=1219|year=2013|issn=2045-2322|doi=10.1038/srep01219|pmid=23386974|pmc=3564037|arxiv=1210.4973|bibcode=2013NatSR...3E1219H}}</ref>
In finance, the risk of cascading failures of financial institutions is referred to as systemic risk: the failure of one financial institution may cause other financial institutions (its counterparties) to fail, cascading throughout the system.
在金融领域，金融机构连锁性破产的风险被称为系统性风险: 一家金融机构的破产可能导致其他金融机构(其交易对手)破产，从而在整个系统内连锁破产。
Institutions that are believed to pose systemic risk are deemed either "[[too big to fail]]" (TBTF) or "too interconnected to fail" (TICTF), depending on why they appear to pose a threat.
Institutions that are believed to pose systemic risk are deemed either "too big to fail" (TBTF) or "too interconnected to fail" (TICTF), depending on why they appear to pose a threat.
那些被认为构成系统性风险的机构要么被视为“太大而不能倒”(TBTF) ，要么被视为“太相关而不能倒”(TICTF) ，这取决于它们为什么似乎构成了威胁。
Note however that systemic risk is not due to individual institutions per se, but due to the interconnections. For detailed models in economics and finance, see Elliott et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2015).<ref name="Acemoglu Ozdaglar Tahbaz-Salehi 2015 pp. 564–608">{{cite journal | last=Acemoglu | first=Daron | last2=Ozdaglar | first2=Asuman | last3=Tahbaz-Salehi | first3=Alireza | title=Systemic Risk and Stability in Financial Networks | journal=American Economic Review | publisher=American Economic Association | volume=105 | issue=2 | year=2015 | issn=0002-8282 | doi=10.1257/aer.20130456 | pages=564–608| hdl=1721.1/100979 | hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Elliott Golub Jackson 2014 pp. 3115–3153">{{cite journal | last=Elliott | first=Matthew | last2=Golub | first2=Benjamin | last3=Jackson | first3=Matthew O. | title=Financial Networks and Contagion | journal=American Economic Review | publisher=American Economic Association | volume=104 | issue=10 | year=2014 | issn=0002-8282 | doi=10.1257/aer.104.10.3115 | pages=3115–3153}}</ref>
Note however that systemic risk is not due to individual institutions per se, but due to the interconnections. For detailed models in economics and finance, see Elliott et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2015).
然而，请注意，系统性风险不是由于个别机构本身，而是由于相互关联。有关经济学和金融学的详细模型，请参阅埃利奥特等人的文章。(2014)和 Acemoglu 等人。(2015).
A related (though distinct) type of cascading failure in finance occurs in the stock market, exemplified by the [[2010 Flash Crash]].
A related (though distinct) type of cascading failure in finance occurs in the stock market, exemplified by the 2010 Flash Crash.
一个相关的(虽然不同)类型的级联失效的金融发生在股票市场，例如2010年闪电崩盘。
For another framework to study and predict the effect of cascading failures in finance see <ref>{{cite journal|last1=Li|first1=W|last2=Kenett|first2=DY|last3=Yamasaki|first3=K|last4=Stanley|first4=HE|last5=Havlin|first5=S|title=Ranking the economic importance of countries and industries|journal=Journal of Network Theory in Finance|volume=3|pages=1–17|year=2017|issn=2055-7795|doi=10.21314/JNTF.2017.031|arxiv=1408.0443}}</ref><ref name="HuangVodenska2013"/>
For another framework to study and predict the effect of cascading failures in finance see
有关研究和预测金融连锁反应影响的另一个框架，请参见
== Interdependent cascading failures ==
[[File:Interdependent_relationship_among_different_infrastructures.tif|thumb|right|Fig. 1: Illustration of the interdependent relationship among different infrastructures]]
Fig. 1: Illustration of the interdependent relationship among different infrastructures
图。1: 说明不同基础设施之间的相互依存关系
[[File:Schematic_demonstration_of_first-_and_second-order_percolation_transitions.tif|thumb|right|Fig. 2. Schematic demonstration of first- and second-order percolation transitions. In the second-order case, the giant component is continuously approaching zero at the percolation threshold p = p_c. In the first-order case, the giant component approaches zero discontinuously]]
Fig. 2. Schematic demonstration of first- and second-order percolation transitions. In the second-order case, the giant component is continuously approaching zero at the percolation threshold p = p_c. In the first-order case, the giant component approaches zero discontinuously
图。2.一阶和二阶渗流过渡的示意图演示。在二阶情况下，在逾渗阈值 p = p _ c 处，巨分量连续接近零。在一阶情况下，巨分量不连续地趋近于零
Diverse [[infrastructure]]s such as [[water supply]], [[transportation]], fuel and [[power station]]s are coupled together and depend on each other for functioning, see Fig. 1. Owing to this coupling, interdependent networks are extremely sensitive to random failures, and in particular to [[Targeted threat|targeted attacks]], such that a failure of a small fraction of nodes in one network can triger an iterative cascade of failures in several interdependent networks.<ref>{{cite web|title=Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack|url=http://empcommission.org/docs/A2473-EMP_Commission-7MB.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Rinaldi|first=S.M.|last2=Peerenboom|first2=J.P.|last3=Kelly|first3=T.K.|date=2001|title=Identifying, understanding, and analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies|url=|journal= IEEE Control Systems Magazine|volume=21|pages=11–25|via=}}</ref> [[Power outage|Electrical blackouts]] frequently result from a cascade of failures between interdependent networks, and the problem has been dramatically exemplified by the several large-scale blackouts that have occurred in recent years. Blackouts are a fascinating demonstration of the important role played by the dependencies between networks. For example, the [[2003 Italy blackout]] resulted in a widespread failure of the [[Rail transport|railway network]], [[Health system|health care systems]], and [[financial services]] and, in addition, severely influenced the [[telecommunication network]]s. The partial failure of the communication system in turn further impaired the [[electrical grid]] management system, thus producing a positive feedback on the power grid.<ref>{{cite journal|last=V. Rosato |first=Issacharoff, L., Tiriticco, F., Meloni, S., Porcellinis, S.D., & Setola, R. |title=Modelling interdependent infrastructures using interacting dynamical models |journal=International Journal of Critical Infrastructures |year=2008 |volume=4 |pages=63–79 |doi=10.1504/IJCIS.2008.016092 }}</ref> This example emphasizes how inter-dependence can significantly magnify the damage in an interacting network system. A framework to study the cascading failures between coupled networks based on percolation theory was developed recently.<ref>{{cite journal|last=S. V. Buldyrev|first=R. Parshani, G. Paul, H. E. Stanley, S. Havlin|title=Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks|journal=Nature|year=2010|volume=464|pages=1025–8|doi=10.1038/nature08932|url=http://havlin.biu.ac.il/Publications.php?keyword=Catastrophic+cascade+of+failures+in+interdependent+networks&year=*&match=all|pmid=20393559|issue=7291
Diverse infrastructures such as water supply, transportation, fuel and power stations are coupled together and depend on each other for functioning, see Fig. 1. Owing to this coupling, interdependent networks are extremely sensitive to random failures, and in particular to targeted attacks, such that a failure of a small fraction of nodes in one network can triger an iterative cascade of failures in several interdependent networks. Electrical blackouts frequently result from a cascade of failures between interdependent networks, and the problem has been dramatically exemplified by the several large-scale blackouts that have occurred in recent years. Blackouts are a fascinating demonstration of the important role played by the dependencies between networks. For example, the 2003 Italy blackout resulted in a widespread failure of the railway network, health care systems, and financial services and, in addition, severely influenced the telecommunication networks. The partial failure of the communication system in turn further impaired the electrical grid management system, thus producing a positive feedback on the power grid. This example emphasizes how inter-dependence can significantly magnify the damage in an interacting network system. A framework to study the cascading failures between coupled networks based on percolation theory was developed recently.<ref>{{cite journal|last=S. V. Buldyrev|first=R. Parshani, G. Paul, H. E. Stanley, S. Havlin|title=Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks|journal=Nature|year=2010|volume=464|pages=1025–8|doi=10.1038/nature08932|url=http://havlin.biu.ac.il/Publications.php?keyword=Catastrophic+cascade+of+failures+in+interdependent+networks&year=*&match=all|pmid=20393559|issue=7291
各种各样的基础设施，如供水、交通、燃料和发电站是相互联系、相互依存的。1.由于这种耦合，相互依赖的网络对随机故障，特别是对有针对性的攻击极为敏感，以至于一个网络中一小部分节点的故障可以导致几个相互依赖的网络中一连串的故障。电力中断往往是由于相互依赖的网络之间的一连串故障造成的，最近几年发生的几次大规模停电就是这个问题的最好例证。停电是网络间依赖关系所扮演的重要角色的有趣演示。例如，2003年意大利大停电导致铁路网、卫生保健系统和金融服务大面积瘫痪，此外还严重影响了电信网络。通信系统的局部故障反过来又进一步损害了电网管理系统，从而对电网产生正反馈。这个例子强调了相互依赖如何能够显著地放大交互网络系统中的损害。基于渗流理论，最近发展了一个研究耦合网络之间级联故障的框架。1 = r.在相互依赖的网络中灾难性的级联故障 | 杂志 = 自然 | 年 = 2010 | 卷 = 464 | 页 = 1025-8 | doi = 10.1038/nature08932 | url = http://Havlin.biu.ac.il/publications.php?keyword=Catastrophic+cascade+of+failures+in+interdependent+networks&year=*&match=all|pmid=20393559|issue=7291
|arxiv=1012.0206|bibcode=2010Natur.464.1025B}}</ref> The cascading failures can lead to abrupt collapse compare to percolation in a single network where the breakdown of the network is continuous, see Fig. 2.
|arxiv=1012.0206|bibcode=2010Natur.464.1025B}}</ref> The cascading failures can lead to abrupt collapse compare to percolation in a single network where the breakdown of the network is continuous, see Fig. 2.
相对于网络连续崩溃的单一网络，级联故障可能导致突然崩溃，见图。2.
Cascading failures in spatially embedded systems have been
Cascading failures in spatially embedded systems have been
空间嵌入式系统中的级联故障已经成为当前研究的热点
shown to lead to extreme vulnerability.<ref name="BashanBerezin2013">{{cite journal|last1=Bashan|first1=Amir|last2=Berezin|first2=Yehiel|last3=Buldyrev|first3=Sergey V.|last4=Havlin|first4=Shlomo|title=The extreme vulnerability of interdependent spatially embedded networks|journal=Nature Physics|year=2013|issn=1745-2473|doi=10.1038/nphys2727|volume=9|issue=10|pages=667–672|arxiv=1206.2062|bibcode=2013NatPh...9..667B}}</ref> For the dynamic process of cascading failures see ref.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Zhou|first=D.|last2=Bashan|first2=A.|last3=Cohen|first3=R.|last4=Berezin|first4=Y.|last5=Shnerb|first5=N.|last6=Havlin|first6=S.|date=2014|title=Simultaneous first- and second-order percolation transitions in interdependent networks|url=|journal=Phys. Rev. E|volume=90|issue=1|pages=012803|bibcode=2014PhRvE..90a2803Z|doi=10.1103/PhysRevE.90.012803|pmid=25122338|arxiv=1211.2330}}</ref> A model for repairing failures in order to avoid cascading failures was developed by Di Muro et al.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Di Muro|first=M. A.|last2=La Rocca|first2=C. E.|last3=Stanley|first3=H. E.|last4=Havlin|first4=S.|last5=Braunstein|first5=L. A.|date=2016-03-09|title=Recovery of Interdependent Networks|journal=Scientific Reports|language=En|volume=6|issue=1|pages=22834|doi=10.1038/srep22834|pmid=26956773|pmc=4783785|issn=2045-2322|arxiv=1512.02555|bibcode=2016NatSR...622834D}}</ref>
shown to lead to extreme vulnerability. For the dynamic process of cascading failures see ref. A model for repairing failures in order to avoid cascading failures was developed by Di Muro et al.
会导致极度的脆弱。有关级联故障的动态过程，请参阅。为了避免连锁故障的发生，建立了一个故障修复模型。
Furthermore, it was shown that such systems when embedded in space are extremely vulnerable to localized attacks or failures. Above a critical radius of damage, the failure may spread to the entire system.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Berezin|first=Yehiel|last2=Bashan|first2=Amir|last3=Danziger|first3=Michael M.|last4=Li|first4=Daqing|last5=Havlin|first5=Shlomo|date=2015-03-11|title=Localized attacks on spatially embedded networks with dependencies|journal=Scientific Reports|language=en|volume=5|issue=1|pages=8934|doi=10.1038/srep08934|pmid=25757572|pmc=4355725|issn=2045-2322|bibcode=2015NatSR...5E8934B}}</ref>
Furthermore, it was shown that such systems when embedded in space are extremely vulnerable to localized attacks or failures. Above a critical radius of damage, the failure may spread to the entire system.
此外，研究表明，当这种系统嵌入空间时，极易受到局部攻击或故障的影响。超过临界损伤半径，故障可能扩散到整个系统。
== Model for overload cascading failures ==
A model for cascading failures due to overload propagation is the Motter–Lai model.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Motter|first=A. E.|last2=Lai|first2=Y. C.|date=2002|title=Cascade-based attacks on complex networks|url=|journal=Phys. Rev. E|volume=66|issue=6 Pt 2|pages=065102|doi=10.1103/PhysRevE.66.065102|pmid=12513335|bibcode=2002PhRvE..66f5102M|arxiv=cond-mat/0301086}}</ref> The tempo-spatial propagation of such failures have been studied by Jichang Zhao et al.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Zhao|first=J.|last2=Li|first2=D.|last3=Sanhedrai|first3=H.|last4=Cohen|first4=R.|last5=Havlin|first5=S.|date=2016|title=Spatio-temporal propagation of cascading overload failures in spatially embedded networks|url=|journal=Nature Communications|volume=7|pages=10094|bibcode=2016NatCo...710094Z|doi=10.1038/ncomms10094|pmid=26754065|pmc=4729926}}</ref>
A model for cascading failures due to overload propagation is the Motter–Lai model. The tempo-spatial propagation of such failures have been studied by Jichang Zhao et al.
过载传播引起的连锁故障模型是 Motter-Lai 模型。赵等人研究了这类故障的时空传播特性。
== See also ==
{{div col}}
* [[Power outage|Blackouts]]
* [[Brittle system]]
* [[Butterfly effect]]
* [[Byzantine failure]]
* [[Cascading rollback]]
* [[Chain reaction]]
* [[Chaos theory]]
* [[Cache stampede]]
* [[Congestion collapse]]
* [[Domino effect]]
* [[For Want of a Nail (proverb)]]
* [[Interdependent networks]]
* [[Kessler Syndrome]]
* [[Percolation theory]]
* [[Progressive collapse]]
* [[Virtuous circle and vicious circle]]
* [[Wicked problem]]
{{div col end}}
== References ==
{{reflist}}
== Further reading ==
* {{cite web
|url=http://www.jaist.ac.jp/library/thesis/ks-master-2005/abstract/tmiyazak/abstract.pdf
|url=http://www.jaist.ac.jp/library/thesis/ks-master-2005/abstract/tmiyazak/abstract.pdf
Http://www.jaist.ac.jp/library/thesis/ks-master-2005/abstract/tmiyazak/abstract.pdf
|title=Comparison of defense strategies for cascade breakdown on SF networks with degree correlations
|title=Comparison of defense strategies for cascade breakdown on SF networks with degree correlations
具有度相关性的 SF 网络级联故障的防御策略比较
|author=Toshiyuki Miyazaki
|author=Toshiyuki Miyazaki
|author=Toshiyuki Miyazaki
|date=1 March 2005
|date=1 March 2005
日期 = 2005年3月1日
|url-status=dead
|url-status=dead
地位 = 死亡
|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20090220024018/http://www.jaist.ac.jp/library/thesis/ks-master-2005/abstract/tmiyazak/abstract.pdf
|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20090220024018/http://www.jaist.ac.jp/library/thesis/ks-master-2005/abstract/tmiyazak/abstract.pdf
2012年3月24日 | archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20090220024018/http://www.jaist.ac.jp/library/thesis/ks-master-2005/abstract/tmiyazak/abstract.pdf
|archivedate=2009-02-20
|archivedate=2009-02-20
| archivedate = 2009-02-20
}}
}}
}}
* {{cite web
|url=http://redmondmag.com/columns/print.asp?EditorialsID=1000
|url=http://redmondmag.com/columns/print.asp?EditorialsID=1000
1000 http://redmondmag.com/columns/print.asp
|title=(In)Secure Shell?
|title=(In)Secure Shell?
| title = (In) Secure Shell? ？
|accessdate=2007-09-08
|accessdate=2007-09-08
2007-09-08
|author=Russ Cooper
|author=Russ Cooper
作者: Russ Cooper
|date=1 June 2005
|date=1 June 2005
日期 = 2005年6月1日
|publisher=RedmondMag.com
|publisher=RedmondMag.com
| publisher = RedmondMag.com
|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928164525/http://redmondmag.com/columns/print.asp?EditorialsID=1000
|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928164525/http://redmondmag.com/columns/print.asp?EditorialsID=1000
1000 https://web.archive.org/web/20070928164525/http://redmondmag.com/columns/print.asp
|archivedate=2007-09-28
|archivedate=2007-09-28
| archivedate = 2007-09-28
|url-status=dead
|url-status=dead
地位 = 死亡
}}
}}
}}
* {{cite web
|url=http://www.chds.us/?research/software&d=list
|url=http://www.chds.us/?research/software&d=list
Http://www.chds.us/?research/software&d=list
|title=Cascade Net (simulation program)
|title=Cascade Net (simulation program)
| title = Cascade Net (仿真程序)
|accessdate=2007-09-08
|accessdate=2007-09-08
2007-09-08
|author=US Department of Homeland Security
|author=US Department of Homeland Security
美国国土安全部
|date=5 February 2007
|date=5 February 2007
| 日期 = 2007年2月5日
|publisher=Center for Homeland Defense and Security
|publisher=Center for Homeland Defense and Security
| publisher = 国土安全防御中心
|url-status=dead
|url-status=dead
地位 = 死亡
|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20081228044520/http://www.chds.us/?research%2Fsoftware&d=list
|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20081228044520/http://www.chds.us/?research%2Fsoftware&d=list
2012年3月24日 | archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20081228044520/http://www.chds.us/?research%2fsoftware&d=list
|archivedate=2008-12-28
|archivedate=2008-12-28
| archivedate = 2008-12-28
}}
}}
}}
== External links ==
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20060827050151/http://www.windows.ucar.edu/spaceweather/blackout.html Space Weather: Blackout — Massive Power Grid Failure]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20071022110507/http://vlab.infotech.monash.edu.au/simulations/networks/cascading-failure/ Cascading failure demo applet] (Monash University's Virtual Lab)
* A. E. Motter and Y.-C. Lai, [http://chaos1.la.asu.edu/~yclai/papers/PRE_02_ML_3.pdf ''Cascade-based attacks on complex networks,''] Physical Review E (Rapid Communications) 66, 065102 (2002).
* P. Crucitti, V. Latora and M. Marchiori, [https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/aeda/97ccce03a5979dd4196fb7544ee0dc546f18.pdf ''Model for cascading failures in complex networks,''] Physical Review E (Rapid Communications) 69, 045104 (2004).
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20040704132003/http://www.epri.com/programHigh.asp?objid=261741 Protection Strategies for Cascading Grid Failures — A Shortcut Approach]
* I. Dobson, B. A. Carreras, and D. E. Newman, [https://web.archive.org/web/20060222073252/http://eceserv0.ece.wisc.edu/~dobson/PAPERS/dobsonPEIS05.pdf preprint] A loading-dependent model of probabilistic cascading failure, Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences, vol. 19, no. 1, January 2005, pp. 15–32.
* [https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/3105_aircrash.html Nova: Crash of Flight 111] on September 2, 1998. [[Swissair Flight 111]] flying from New York to Geneva slammed into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Nova Scotia with 229 people aboard. Originally believed a terrorist act. After $39 million investigation, insurance settlement of $1.5 billion and more than four years, investigators unravel the puzzle: cascading failure. What is the legacy of Swissair 111? "We have a window into the internal structure of design, checks and balances, protection, and safety." -David Evans, Editor-in-Chief of Air Safety Week.
* PhysicsWeb story: [http://physicsweb.org/articles/news/5/11/9 Accident grounds neutrino lab]
* [http://necsi.edu/affiliates/braha/StructureandDynamics.htm The Structure and Dynamics of Large Scale Organizational Networks (Dan Braha, New England Complex Systems Institute)]
*From Single Network to Network of Networks http://havlin.biu.ac.il/Pdf/Bremen070715a.pdf
{{Electricity delivery}}
[[Category:Failure]]
Category:Failure
类别: 失败
[[Category:Reliability engineering]]
Category:Reliability engineering
类别: 可靠度
[[Category:Electric power transmission]]
Category:Electric power transmission
类别: 输电系统
[[Category:Systemic risk]]
Category:Systemic risk
类别: 系统性风险
[[Category:Systems science]]
Category:Systems science
类别: 系统科学
<noinclude>
<small>This page was moved from [[wikipedia:en:Cascading failure]]. Its edit history can be viewed at [[级联故障/edithistory]]</small></noinclude>
[[Category:待整理页面]]
{{short description|System of interconnected parts in which the failure of one or few parts can trigger the failure of others}}
[[Image:Networkfailure.gif|thumb|right|An animation demonstrating how a single failure may result in other failures throughout a network.]]
An animation demonstrating how a single failure may result in other failures throughout a network.
演示单个故障如何在整个网络中导致其他故障的动画。
A '''cascading failure''' is a process in a system of [[interconnection|interconnected]] parts in which the failure of one or few parts can trigger the failure of other parts and so on. Such a failure may happen in many types of systems, including power transmission, computer networking, finance, transportation systems, organisms, the human body, and ecosystems.
A cascading failure is a process in a system of interconnected parts in which the failure of one or few parts can trigger the failure of other parts and so on. Such a failure may happen in many types of systems, including power transmission, computer networking, finance, transportation systems, organisms, the human body, and ecosystems.
连锁故障是一个相互连接的部件系统中的一个或几个部件的故障可以引发其他部件的故障等过程。这种故障可能发生在许多类型的系统中，包括动力传输、计算机网络、金融、交通系统、有机体、人体和生态系统。
Cascading failures may occur when one part of the system fails. When this happens, other parts must then compensate for the failed component. This in turn overloads these nodes, causing them to fail as well, prompting additional nodes to fail one after another.
Cascading failures may occur when one part of the system fails. When this happens, other parts must then compensate for the failed component. This in turn overloads these nodes, causing them to fail as well, prompting additional nodes to fail one after another.
当系统的一部分发生故障时，可能会发生级联故障。当这种情况发生时，其他部分必须补偿失败的组件。这反过来又会重载这些节点，导致它们也失败，促使其他节点一个接一个地失败。
== In power transmission ==
Cascading failure is common in [[power grid]]s when one of the elements fails (completely or partially) and shifts its load to nearby elements in the system. Those nearby elements are then pushed beyond their capacity so they become overloaded and shift their load onto other elements. Cascading failure is a common effect seen in [[high voltage]] systems, where a [[single point of failure]] (SPF) on a fully loaded or slightly overloaded system results in a sudden spike across all nodes of the system. This surge current can induce the already overloaded nodes into failure, setting off more overloads and thereby taking down the entire system in a very short time.
Cascading failure is common in power grids when one of the elements fails (completely or partially) and shifts its load to nearby elements in the system. Those nearby elements are then pushed beyond their capacity so they become overloaded and shift their load onto other elements. Cascading failure is a common effect seen in high voltage systems, where a single point of failure (SPF) on a fully loaded or slightly overloaded system results in a sudden spike across all nodes of the system. This surge current can induce the already overloaded nodes into failure, setting off more overloads and thereby taking down the entire system in a very short time.
级联故障在电网中很常见，当其中一个元件发生故障(完全或部分)并将其负荷转移到系统中附近的元件时。那些附近的元素然后被推动超出他们的能力，所以他们成为超载和转移他们的负载到其他元素。级联故障是高压系统中常见的一种现象，在一个满负荷或轻微超载的系统中，一个单点故障(SPF)会导致系统所有节点突然出现尖峰。这种浪涌电流可能会导致已经超载的节点发生故障，引发更多的过载，从而在很短的时间内使整个系统瘫痪。
This failure process cascades through the elements of the system like a ripple on a pond and continues until substantially all of the elements in the system are compromised and/or the system becomes functionally disconnected from the source of its load. For example, under certain conditions a large power grid can collapse after the failure of a single transformer.
This failure process cascades through the elements of the system like a ripple on a pond and continues until substantially all of the elements in the system are compromised and/or the system becomes functionally disconnected from the source of its load. For example, under certain conditions a large power grid can collapse after the failure of a single transformer.
这个故障过程就像池塘上的涟漪一样通过系统的各个元素，并且持续到系统中的所有元素被破坏和/或系统从功能上与其负载的来源断开为止。例如，在某些情况下，一个大型电网可能因为单个变压器的故障而崩溃。
Monitoring the operation of a system, in [[real-time computing|real-time]], and judicious disconnection of parts can help stop a cascade. Another common technique is to calculate a safety margin for the system by computer simulation of possible failures, to establish safe operating levels below which none of the calculated scenarios is predicted to cause cascading failure, and to identify the parts of the network which are most likely to cause cascading failures.<ref name="chao">{{cite arXiv |last1=Zhai |first1=Chao |title=Modeling and Identification of Worst-Case Cascading Failures in Power Systems |eprint=1703.05232 |class=cs.SY |year=2017}}</ref>
Monitoring the operation of a system, in real-time, and judicious disconnection of parts can help stop a cascade. Another common technique is to calculate a safety margin for the system by computer simulation of possible failures, to establish safe operating levels below which none of the calculated scenarios is predicted to cause cascading failure, and to identify the parts of the network which are most likely to cause cascading failures.
实时监控系统的运行，明智地断开部件可以帮助阻止级联。另一种常用的技术是在可能发生故障的计算机模拟计算系统的安全裕度，建立安全运行水平，低于这个水平的任何计算方案都不会导致级联故障，并确定网络中最有可能导致级联故障的部分。
One of the primary problems with preventing electrical grid failures is that the speed of the control signal is no faster than the speed of the propagating power overload, i.e. since both the control signal and the electrical power are moving at the same speed, it is not possible to isolate the outage by sending a warning ahead to isolate the element.
One of the primary problems with preventing electrical grid failures is that the speed of the control signal is no faster than the speed of the propagating power overload, i.e. since both the control signal and the electrical power are moving at the same speed, it is not possible to isolate the outage by sending a warning ahead to isolate the element.
防止电网故障的主要问题之一是，控制信号的速度不快于传播功率过载的速度，也就是说，控制信号的速度不快于传播功率过载的速度。由于控制信号和电力以相同的速度运行，所以不可能通过提前发送警告来隔离元件来隔离断电。
The question if power grid failures are correlated have been studied in Daqing Li et al.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Daqing|first=Li|last2=Yinan|first2=Jiang|last3=Rui|first3=Kang|last4=Havlin|first4=Shlomo|date=2014-06-20|title=Spatial correlation analysis of cascading failures: Congestions and Blackouts|journal=Scientific Reports|language=En|volume=4|issue=1|pages=5381|doi=10.1038/srep05381|pmid=24946927|pmc=4064325|issn=2045-2322|bibcode=2014NatSR...4E5381D}}</ref> as well as by Paul DH Hines et al.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hines|first=Paul D. H.|last2=Dobson|first2=Ian|last3=Rezaei|first3=Pooya|date=2016|title=Cascading Power Outages Propagate Locally in an Influence Graph that is not the Actual Grid Topology|arxiv=1508.01775|journal=IEEE Transactions on Power Systems|pages=1|doi=10.1109/TPWRS.2016.2578259|issn=0885-8950}}</ref>
The question if power grid failures are correlated have been studied in Daqing Li et al. as well as by Paul DH Hines et al.
大庆等人已经研究了电网故障是否相关的问题。以及 Paul DH Hines 等人。
=== Examples ===
Cascading failure caused the following [[power outage]]s:
Cascading failure caused the following power outages:
级联故障导致下列停电:
* [[Northeast blackout of 1965|Blackout in Northeast America in 1965]]
* [[1999 Southern Brazil blackout|Blackout in Southern Brazil in 1999]]
* [[Northeast blackout of 2003|Blackout in Northeast America in 2003]]
* [[2003 Italy blackout|Blackout in Italy in 2003]]
* [[2003 London blackout|Blackout in London in 2003]]
* [[2006 European blackout|European Blackout in 2006]]
* [[2012 northern India power grid failure|Blackout in Northern India in 2012]]
* [[2016 South Australian blackout|Blackout in South Australia in 2016]]
* [[2019 Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay blackout|Blackout in southeast South America in 2019]]
== In computer networks ==
Cascading failures can also occur in [[computer network]]s (such as the [[Internet]]) in which [[Network traffic control|network traffic]] is severely impaired or halted to or between larger sections of the network, caused by failing or disconnected hardware or software. In this context, the cascading failure is known by the term '''cascade failure'''. A cascade failure can affect large groups of people and systems.
Cascading failures can also occur in computer networks (such as the Internet) in which network traffic is severely impaired or halted to or between larger sections of the network, caused by failing or disconnected hardware or software. In this context, the cascading failure is known by the term cascade failure. A cascade failure can affect large groups of people and systems.
计算机网络(例如互联网)也可能发生级联故障，由于硬件或软件故障或断开，网络通信严重受损，或在网络较大部分之间停止。在这种背景下，级联失效这一术语被称为级联失效。级联故障可以影响大量的人员和系统。
The cause of a cascade failure is usually the overloading of a single, crucial [[Router (computing)|router]] or node, which causes the node to go down, even briefly. It can also be caused by taking a node down for maintenance or upgrades. In either case, traffic is [[routing|routed]] to or through another (alternative) path. This alternative path, as a result, becomes overloaded, causing it to go down, and so on. It will also affect systems which depend on the node for regular operation.
The cause of a cascade failure is usually the overloading of a single, crucial router or node, which causes the node to go down, even briefly. It can also be caused by taking a node down for maintenance or upgrades. In either case, traffic is routed to or through another (alternative) path. This alternative path, as a result, becomes overloaded, causing it to go down, and so on. It will also affect systems which depend on the node for regular operation.
级联故障的原因通常是一个单一的、关键的路由器或节点的超载，这会导致节点宕机，甚至是短暂的宕机。它也可能是由于为了维护或升级而关闭一个节点引起的。在这两种情况下，流量都被路由到或通过另一条(可选)路径。结果，这个替代路径变得超载，导致它下降，等等。它还会影响依赖于节点进行常规操作的系统。
=== Symptoms ===
The symptoms of a cascade failure include: [[packet loss]] and high network [[lag|latency]], not just to single systems, but to whole sections of a network or the internet. The high latency and packet loss is caused by the nodes that fail to operate due to [[congestion collapse]], which causes them to still be present in the network but without much or any useful communication going through them. As a result, routes can still be considered valid, without them actually providing communication.
The symptoms of a cascade failure include: packet loss and high network latency, not just to single systems, but to whole sections of a network or the internet. The high latency and packet loss is caused by the nodes that fail to operate due to congestion collapse, which causes them to still be present in the network but without much or any useful communication going through them. As a result, routes can still be considered valid, without them actually providing communication.
级联故障的症状包括: 数据包丢失和高网络延迟，不仅仅是对单个系统，而是对整个网络或互联网部分。高延迟和数据包丢失是由于网络拥塞崩溃导致的节点无法正常运行所造成的，这使得它们仍然存在于网络中，但是没有多少或任何有用的通信通过它们。因此，路由仍然可以被认为是有效的，而实际上它们并没有提供通信。
If enough routes go down because of a cascade failure, a complete section of the network or internet can become unreachable. Although undesired, this can help speed up the recovery from this failure as connections will time out, and other nodes will give up trying to establish connections to the section(s) that have become cut off, decreasing load on the involved nodes.
If enough routes go down because of a cascade failure, a complete section of the network or internet can become unreachable. Although undesired, this can help speed up the recovery from this failure as connections will time out, and other nodes will give up trying to establish connections to the section(s) that have become cut off, decreasing load on the involved nodes.
如果有足够多的路由由于级联故障而中断，网络或互联网的一个完整部分就会变得无法访问。尽管不希望如此，但这可以帮助加快从此失败中恢复，因为连接将超时，其他节点将放弃尝试建立到已被切断的节点的连接，从而减少涉及的节点的负载。
A common occurrence during a cascade failure is a '''walking failure''', where sections go down, causing the next section to fail, after which the first section comes back up. This '''ripple''' can make several passes through the same sections or connecting nodes before stability is restored.
A common occurrence during a cascade failure is a walking failure, where sections go down, causing the next section to fail, after which the first section comes back up. This ripple can make several passes through the same sections or connecting nodes before stability is restored.
级联故障中经常发生的一种情况是行走故障，部分下降，导致下一部分失败，之后第一部分返回。在恢复稳定性之前，这个波纹可以通过相同的部分或连接节点进行多次传递。
=== History ===
Cascade failures are a relatively recent development, with the massive increase in traffic and the high interconnectivity between systems and networks. The term was first applied in this context in the late 1990s by a Dutch IT professional and has slowly become a relatively common term for this kind of large-scale failure.{{Citation needed|date=January 2009}}
Cascade failures are a relatively recent development, with the massive increase in traffic and the high interconnectivity between systems and networks. The term was first applied in this context in the late 1990s by a Dutch IT professional and has slowly become a relatively common term for this kind of large-scale failure.
级联故障是一个相对较新的发展，随着流量的大量增加和系统与网络之间的高度互连性。这个术语最早是在20世纪90年代末由一位荷兰 IT 专业人士在这种背景下使用的，现在已经慢慢成为这种大规模失败的一个相对常见的术语。
=== Example ===
Network failures typically start when a single network node fails. Initially, the traffic that would normally go through the node is stopped. Systems and users get errors about not being able to reach hosts. Usually, the redundant systems of an ISP respond very quickly, choosing another path through a different backbone. The routing path through this alternative route is longer, with more [[Hop (telecommunications)|hops]] and subsequently going through more systems that normally do not process the amount of traffic suddenly offered.
Network failures typically start when a single network node fails. Initially, the traffic that would normally go through the node is stopped. Systems and users get errors about not being able to reach hosts. Usually, the redundant systems of an ISP respond very quickly, choosing another path through a different backbone. The routing path through this alternative route is longer, with more hops and subsequently going through more systems that normally do not process the amount of traffic suddenly offered.
网络故障通常在单个网络节点故障时开始。最初，通常会通过该节点的流量被停止。系统和用户会因无法到达主机而出错。通常，ISP 的冗余系统响应非常快，通过不同的主干网选择另一条路径。通过这个替代路径的路由路径更长，具有更多的跳数，并随后通过更多的系统，通常不处理突然提供的流量量。
This can cause one or more systems along the alternative route to go down, creating similar problems of their own.
This can cause one or more systems along the alternative route to go down, creating similar problems of their own.
这可能导致一个或多个系统沿着另一条路径下降，从而产生它们自己的类似问题。
Also, related systems are affected in this case. As an example, [[Domain name system|DNS]] resolution might fail and what would normally cause systems to be interconnected, might break connections that are not even directly involved in the actual systems that went down. This, in turn, may cause seemingly unrelated nodes to develop problems, that can cause another cascade failure all on its own.
Also, related systems are affected in this case. As an example, DNS resolution might fail and what would normally cause systems to be interconnected, might break connections that are not even directly involved in the actual systems that went down. This, in turn, may cause seemingly unrelated nodes to develop problems, that can cause another cascade failure all on its own.
此外，在这种情况下，相关系统也会受到影响。例如，DNS 解析可能会失败，通常会导致系统互联的情况可能会破坏甚至不直接涉及实际系统的连接。反过来，这可能会导致看似不相关的节点产生问题，从而可能导致另一个级联失败。
In December 2012, a partial loss (40%) of [[Gmail]] service occurred globally, for 18 minutes. This loss of service was caused by a routine update of load balancing software which contained faulty logic—in this case, the error was caused by logic using an [https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/why-gmail-went-down-google-misconfigured-chromes-sync-server/ inappropriate ''all'' instead of the more appropriate ''some''.] The cascading error was fixed by fully updating a single node in the network instead of partially updating all nodes at one time.
In December 2012, a partial loss (40%) of Gmail service occurred globally, for 18 minutes. This loss of service was caused by a routine update of load balancing software which contained faulty logic—in this case, the error was caused by logic using an [https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/why-gmail-went-down-google-misconfigured-chromes-sync-server/ inappropriate all instead of the more appropriate some.] The cascading error was fixed by fully updating a single node in the network instead of partially updating all nodes at one time.
2012年12月，全球范围内发生了部分 Gmail 服务中断(40%) ，时间长达18分钟。这种服务的丢失是由于包含错误逻辑的负载平衡软件的例行更新造成的---- 在这种情况下，错误是由于逻辑使用了[ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/why-gmail-went-down-google-misconfigured-chromes-sync-server/不恰当的所有而不是更适当的一些]通过对网络中单个节点的全面更新而不是对所有节点的部分更新，修复了级联错误。
== Cascading structural failure ==
Certain load-bearing structures with discrete structural components can be subject to the "zipper effect", where the failure of a single structural member increases the load on adjacent members. In the case of the [[Hyatt Regency walkway collapse]], a suspended walkway (which was already overstressed due to an error in construction) failed when a single vertical suspension rod failed, overloading the neighboring rods which failed sequentially (i.e. like a [[zipper]]). A bridge that can have such a failure is called fracture critical, and numerous bridge collapses have been caused by the failure of a single part. Properly designed structures use an adequate [[factor of safety]] and/or alternate load paths to prevent this type of mechanical cascade failure.<ref name="petroski">{{cite book| title=To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Structural Design| first=Henry| last=Petroski| year=1992| isbn=978-0-679-73416-1| publisher=Vintage| place=| url-access=registration| url=https://archive.org/details/toengineerishuma00petr}}</ref>
Certain load-bearing structures with discrete structural components can be subject to the "zipper effect", where the failure of a single structural member increases the load on adjacent members. In the case of the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse, a suspended walkway (which was already overstressed due to an error in construction) failed when a single vertical suspension rod failed, overloading the neighboring rods which failed sequentially (i.e. like a zipper). A bridge that can have such a failure is called fracture critical, and numerous bridge collapses have been caused by the failure of a single part. Properly designed structures use an adequate factor of safety and/or alternate load paths to prevent this type of mechanical cascade failure.
某些承重结构与分立的结构组件可以受到“拉链效应” ，其中一个单一的结构成员的失败增加了对相邻成员的负荷。在倒塌的情况下，当一个垂直悬挂杆失效时，一个悬挂人行道(由于施工错误已经过度受力)失效，导致相邻的杆超载，相继失效(即:。像拉链一样)。一座可能发生这种破坏的桥梁被称为断裂临界桥梁，许多桥梁的垮塌都是由单一部分的破坏引起的。正确设计的结构使用足够的安全系数和/或交替加载路径，以防止这种类型的机械叶栅失效。
== Other examples ==
=== Biology ===
[[Biochemical cascade]]s exist in biology, where a small reaction can have system-wide implications. One negative example is [[ischemic cascade]], in which a small [[ischemia|ischemic]] attack releases [[toxin]]s which kill off far more cells than the initial damage, resulting in more toxins being released. Current research is to find a way to block this cascade in [[stroke]] patients to minimize the damage.
Biochemical cascades exist in biology, where a small reaction can have system-wide implications. One negative example is ischemic cascade, in which a small ischemic attack releases toxins which kill off far more cells than the initial damage, resulting in more toxins being released. Current research is to find a way to block this cascade in stroke patients to minimize the damage.
生物化学级联存在于生物学中，在那里一个小的反应可以有全系统的含义。一个负面的例子是缺血性级联反应，在这种反应中，一个小的缺血性发作释放出的毒素比最初的损伤杀死更多的细胞，导致更多的毒素被释放。目前的研究正在寻找一种方法来阻断脑卒中患者的这种级联反应，以最大限度地减少损伤。
In the study of extinction, sometimes the extinction of one species will cause many other extinctions to happen. Such a species is known as a [[keystone species]].
In the study of extinction, sometimes the extinction of one species will cause many other extinctions to happen. Such a species is known as a keystone species.
在物种灭绝的研究中，有时一个物种的灭绝会导致许多其他物种的灭绝。这样的物种被称为关键种。
=== Electronics ===
Another example is the [[Cockcroft–Walton generator]], which can also experience cascade failures wherein one failed [[diode]] can result in all the diodes failing in a fraction of a second.
Another example is the Cockcroft–Walton generator, which can also experience cascade failures wherein one failed diode can result in all the diodes failing in a fraction of a second.
另一个例子是考克饶夫沃尔顿发电机，它也可以经历级联故障，其中一个失败的二极管可以导致所有的二极管失败在几分之一秒。
Yet another example of this effect in a scientific experiment was the [[Implosion (mechanical process)|implosion]] in 2001 of several thousand fragile glass photomultiplier tubes used in the [[Super-Kamiokande]] experiment, where the shock wave caused by the failure of a single detector appears to have triggered the implosion of the other detectors in a chain reaction.
Yet another example of this effect in a scientific experiment was the implosion in 2001 of several thousand fragile glass photomultiplier tubes used in the Super-Kamiokande experiment, where the shock wave caused by the failure of a single detector appears to have triggered the implosion of the other detectors in a chain reaction.
在科学实验中，这种效应的另一个例子是2001年用于超级神冈探测器实验的数千个脆弱的玻璃探测器的内爆，在那里，由单个探测器故障引起的冲击波似乎触发了其他探测器在连锁反应中的内爆。
=== Finance ===
{{main|Systemic risk}} {{main|Cascades in financial networks}}
In [[finance]], the risk of cascading failures of financial institutions is referred to as ''[[systemic risk]]:'' the failure of one financial institution may cause other financial institutions (its [[Counterparty|counterparties]]) to fail, cascading throughout the system.<ref name="HuangVodenska2013">{{cite journal|last1=Huang|first1=Xuqing|last2=Vodenska|first2=Irena|last3=Havlin|first3=Shlomo|last4=Stanley|first4=H. Eugene|title=Cascading Failures in Bi-partite Graphs: Model for Systemic Risk Propagation|journal=Scientific Reports|volume=3|pages=1219|year=2013|issn=2045-2322|doi=10.1038/srep01219|pmid=23386974|pmc=3564037|arxiv=1210.4973|bibcode=2013NatSR...3E1219H}}</ref>
In finance, the risk of cascading failures of financial institutions is referred to as systemic risk: the failure of one financial institution may cause other financial institutions (its counterparties) to fail, cascading throughout the system.
在金融领域，金融机构连锁性破产的风险被称为系统性风险: 一家金融机构的破产可能导致其他金融机构(其交易对手)破产，从而在整个系统内连锁破产。
Institutions that are believed to pose systemic risk are deemed either "[[too big to fail]]" (TBTF) or "too interconnected to fail" (TICTF), depending on why they appear to pose a threat.
Institutions that are believed to pose systemic risk are deemed either "too big to fail" (TBTF) or "too interconnected to fail" (TICTF), depending on why they appear to pose a threat.
那些被认为构成系统性风险的机构要么被视为“太大而不能倒”(TBTF) ，要么被视为“太相关而不能倒”(TICTF) ，这取决于它们为什么似乎构成了威胁。
Note however that systemic risk is not due to individual institutions per se, but due to the interconnections. For detailed models in economics and finance, see Elliott et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2015).<ref name="Acemoglu Ozdaglar Tahbaz-Salehi 2015 pp. 564–608">{{cite journal | last=Acemoglu | first=Daron | last2=Ozdaglar | first2=Asuman | last3=Tahbaz-Salehi | first3=Alireza | title=Systemic Risk and Stability in Financial Networks | journal=American Economic Review | publisher=American Economic Association | volume=105 | issue=2 | year=2015 | issn=0002-8282 | doi=10.1257/aer.20130456 | pages=564–608| hdl=1721.1/100979 | hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Elliott Golub Jackson 2014 pp. 3115–3153">{{cite journal | last=Elliott | first=Matthew | last2=Golub | first2=Benjamin | last3=Jackson | first3=Matthew O. | title=Financial Networks and Contagion | journal=American Economic Review | publisher=American Economic Association | volume=104 | issue=10 | year=2014 | issn=0002-8282 | doi=10.1257/aer.104.10.3115 | pages=3115–3153}}</ref>
Note however that systemic risk is not due to individual institutions per se, but due to the interconnections. For detailed models in economics and finance, see Elliott et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2015).
然而，请注意，系统性风险不是由于个别机构本身，而是由于相互关联。有关经济学和金融学的详细模型，请参阅埃利奥特等人的文章。(2014)和 Acemoglu 等人。(2015).
A related (though distinct) type of cascading failure in finance occurs in the stock market, exemplified by the [[2010 Flash Crash]].
A related (though distinct) type of cascading failure in finance occurs in the stock market, exemplified by the 2010 Flash Crash.
一个相关的(虽然不同)类型的级联失效的金融发生在股票市场，例如2010年闪电崩盘。
For another framework to study and predict the effect of cascading failures in finance see <ref>{{cite journal|last1=Li|first1=W|last2=Kenett|first2=DY|last3=Yamasaki|first3=K|last4=Stanley|first4=HE|last5=Havlin|first5=S|title=Ranking the economic importance of countries and industries|journal=Journal of Network Theory in Finance|volume=3|pages=1–17|year=2017|issn=2055-7795|doi=10.21314/JNTF.2017.031|arxiv=1408.0443}}</ref><ref name="HuangVodenska2013"/>
For another framework to study and predict the effect of cascading failures in finance see
有关研究和预测金融连锁反应影响的另一个框架，请参见
== Interdependent cascading failures ==
[[File:Interdependent_relationship_among_different_infrastructures.tif|thumb|right|Fig. 1: Illustration of the interdependent relationship among different infrastructures]]
Fig. 1: Illustration of the interdependent relationship among different infrastructures
图。1: 说明不同基础设施之间的相互依存关系
[[File:Schematic_demonstration_of_first-_and_second-order_percolation_transitions.tif|thumb|right|Fig. 2. Schematic demonstration of first- and second-order percolation transitions. In the second-order case, the giant component is continuously approaching zero at the percolation threshold p = p_c. In the first-order case, the giant component approaches zero discontinuously]]
Fig. 2. Schematic demonstration of first- and second-order percolation transitions. In the second-order case, the giant component is continuously approaching zero at the percolation threshold p = p_c. In the first-order case, the giant component approaches zero discontinuously
图。2.一阶和二阶渗流过渡的示意图演示。在二阶情况下，在逾渗阈值 p = p _ c 处，巨分量连续接近零。在一阶情况下，巨分量不连续地趋近于零
Diverse [[infrastructure]]s such as [[water supply]], [[transportation]], fuel and [[power station]]s are coupled together and depend on each other for functioning, see Fig. 1. Owing to this coupling, interdependent networks are extremely sensitive to random failures, and in particular to [[Targeted threat|targeted attacks]], such that a failure of a small fraction of nodes in one network can triger an iterative cascade of failures in several interdependent networks.<ref>{{cite web|title=Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack|url=http://empcommission.org/docs/A2473-EMP_Commission-7MB.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Rinaldi|first=S.M.|last2=Peerenboom|first2=J.P.|last3=Kelly|first3=T.K.|date=2001|title=Identifying, understanding, and analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies|url=|journal= IEEE Control Systems Magazine|volume=21|pages=11–25|via=}}</ref> [[Power outage|Electrical blackouts]] frequently result from a cascade of failures between interdependent networks, and the problem has been dramatically exemplified by the several large-scale blackouts that have occurred in recent years. Blackouts are a fascinating demonstration of the important role played by the dependencies between networks. For example, the [[2003 Italy blackout]] resulted in a widespread failure of the [[Rail transport|railway network]], [[Health system|health care systems]], and [[financial services]] and, in addition, severely influenced the [[telecommunication network]]s. The partial failure of the communication system in turn further impaired the [[electrical grid]] management system, thus producing a positive feedback on the power grid.<ref>{{cite journal|last=V. Rosato |first=Issacharoff, L., Tiriticco, F., Meloni, S., Porcellinis, S.D., & Setola, R. |title=Modelling interdependent infrastructures using interacting dynamical models |journal=International Journal of Critical Infrastructures |year=2008 |volume=4 |pages=63–79 |doi=10.1504/IJCIS.2008.016092 }}</ref> This example emphasizes how inter-dependence can significantly magnify the damage in an interacting network system. A framework to study the cascading failures between coupled networks based on percolation theory was developed recently.<ref>{{cite journal|last=S. V. Buldyrev|first=R. Parshani, G. Paul, H. E. Stanley, S. Havlin|title=Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks|journal=Nature|year=2010|volume=464|pages=1025–8|doi=10.1038/nature08932|url=http://havlin.biu.ac.il/Publications.php?keyword=Catastrophic+cascade+of+failures+in+interdependent+networks&year=*&match=all|pmid=20393559|issue=7291
Diverse infrastructures such as water supply, transportation, fuel and power stations are coupled together and depend on each other for functioning, see Fig. 1. Owing to this coupling, interdependent networks are extremely sensitive to random failures, and in particular to targeted attacks, such that a failure of a small fraction of nodes in one network can triger an iterative cascade of failures in several interdependent networks. Electrical blackouts frequently result from a cascade of failures between interdependent networks, and the problem has been dramatically exemplified by the several large-scale blackouts that have occurred in recent years. Blackouts are a fascinating demonstration of the important role played by the dependencies between networks. For example, the 2003 Italy blackout resulted in a widespread failure of the railway network, health care systems, and financial services and, in addition, severely influenced the telecommunication networks. The partial failure of the communication system in turn further impaired the electrical grid management system, thus producing a positive feedback on the power grid. This example emphasizes how inter-dependence can significantly magnify the damage in an interacting network system. A framework to study the cascading failures between coupled networks based on percolation theory was developed recently.<ref>{{cite journal|last=S. V. Buldyrev|first=R. Parshani, G. Paul, H. E. Stanley, S. Havlin|title=Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks|journal=Nature|year=2010|volume=464|pages=1025–8|doi=10.1038/nature08932|url=http://havlin.biu.ac.il/Publications.php?keyword=Catastrophic+cascade+of+failures+in+interdependent+networks&year=*&match=all|pmid=20393559|issue=7291
各种各样的基础设施，如供水、交通、燃料和发电站是相互联系、相互依存的。1.由于这种耦合，相互依赖的网络对随机故障，特别是对有针对性的攻击极为敏感，以至于一个网络中一小部分节点的故障可以导致几个相互依赖的网络中一连串的故障。电力中断往往是由于相互依赖的网络之间的一连串故障造成的，最近几年发生的几次大规模停电就是这个问题的最好例证。停电是网络间依赖关系所扮演的重要角色的有趣演示。例如，2003年意大利大停电导致铁路网、卫生保健系统和金融服务大面积瘫痪，此外还严重影响了电信网络。通信系统的局部故障反过来又进一步损害了电网管理系统，从而对电网产生正反馈。这个例子强调了相互依赖如何能够显著地放大交互网络系统中的损害。基于渗流理论，最近发展了一个研究耦合网络之间级联故障的框架。1 = r.在相互依赖的网络中灾难性的级联故障 | 杂志 = 自然 | 年 = 2010 | 卷 = 464 | 页 = 1025-8 | doi = 10.1038/nature08932 | url = http://Havlin.biu.ac.il/publications.php?keyword=Catastrophic+cascade+of+failures+in+interdependent+networks&year=*&match=all|pmid=20393559|issue=7291
|arxiv=1012.0206|bibcode=2010Natur.464.1025B}}</ref> The cascading failures can lead to abrupt collapse compare to percolation in a single network where the breakdown of the network is continuous, see Fig. 2.
|arxiv=1012.0206|bibcode=2010Natur.464.1025B}}</ref> The cascading failures can lead to abrupt collapse compare to percolation in a single network where the breakdown of the network is continuous, see Fig. 2.
相对于网络连续崩溃的单一网络，级联故障可能导致突然崩溃，见图。2.
Cascading failures in spatially embedded systems have been
Cascading failures in spatially embedded systems have been
空间嵌入式系统中的级联故障已经成为当前研究的热点
shown to lead to extreme vulnerability.<ref name="BashanBerezin2013">{{cite journal|last1=Bashan|first1=Amir|last2=Berezin|first2=Yehiel|last3=Buldyrev|first3=Sergey V.|last4=Havlin|first4=Shlomo|title=The extreme vulnerability of interdependent spatially embedded networks|journal=Nature Physics|year=2013|issn=1745-2473|doi=10.1038/nphys2727|volume=9|issue=10|pages=667–672|arxiv=1206.2062|bibcode=2013NatPh...9..667B}}</ref> For the dynamic process of cascading failures see ref.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Zhou|first=D.|last2=Bashan|first2=A.|last3=Cohen|first3=R.|last4=Berezin|first4=Y.|last5=Shnerb|first5=N.|last6=Havlin|first6=S.|date=2014|title=Simultaneous first- and second-order percolation transitions in interdependent networks|url=|journal=Phys. Rev. E|volume=90|issue=1|pages=012803|bibcode=2014PhRvE..90a2803Z|doi=10.1103/PhysRevE.90.012803|pmid=25122338|arxiv=1211.2330}}</ref> A model for repairing failures in order to avoid cascading failures was developed by Di Muro et al.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Di Muro|first=M. A.|last2=La Rocca|first2=C. E.|last3=Stanley|first3=H. E.|last4=Havlin|first4=S.|last5=Braunstein|first5=L. A.|date=2016-03-09|title=Recovery of Interdependent Networks|journal=Scientific Reports|language=En|volume=6|issue=1|pages=22834|doi=10.1038/srep22834|pmid=26956773|pmc=4783785|issn=2045-2322|arxiv=1512.02555|bibcode=2016NatSR...622834D}}</ref>
shown to lead to extreme vulnerability. For the dynamic process of cascading failures see ref. A model for repairing failures in order to avoid cascading failures was developed by Di Muro et al.
会导致极度的脆弱。有关级联故障的动态过程，请参阅。为了避免连锁故障的发生，建立了一个故障修复模型。
Furthermore, it was shown that such systems when embedded in space are extremely vulnerable to localized attacks or failures. Above a critical radius of damage, the failure may spread to the entire system.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Berezin|first=Yehiel|last2=Bashan|first2=Amir|last3=Danziger|first3=Michael M.|last4=Li|first4=Daqing|last5=Havlin|first5=Shlomo|date=2015-03-11|title=Localized attacks on spatially embedded networks with dependencies|journal=Scientific Reports|language=en|volume=5|issue=1|pages=8934|doi=10.1038/srep08934|pmid=25757572|pmc=4355725|issn=2045-2322|bibcode=2015NatSR...5E8934B}}</ref>
Furthermore, it was shown that such systems when embedded in space are extremely vulnerable to localized attacks or failures. Above a critical radius of damage, the failure may spread to the entire system.
此外，研究表明，当这种系统嵌入空间时，极易受到局部攻击或故障的影响。超过临界损伤半径，故障可能扩散到整个系统。
== Model for overload cascading failures ==
A model for cascading failures due to overload propagation is the Motter–Lai model.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Motter|first=A. E.|last2=Lai|first2=Y. C.|date=2002|title=Cascade-based attacks on complex networks|url=|journal=Phys. Rev. E|volume=66|issue=6 Pt 2|pages=065102|doi=10.1103/PhysRevE.66.065102|pmid=12513335|bibcode=2002PhRvE..66f5102M|arxiv=cond-mat/0301086}}</ref> The tempo-spatial propagation of such failures have been studied by Jichang Zhao et al.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Zhao|first=J.|last2=Li|first2=D.|last3=Sanhedrai|first3=H.|last4=Cohen|first4=R.|last5=Havlin|first5=S.|date=2016|title=Spatio-temporal propagation of cascading overload failures in spatially embedded networks|url=|journal=Nature Communications|volume=7|pages=10094|bibcode=2016NatCo...710094Z|doi=10.1038/ncomms10094|pmid=26754065|pmc=4729926}}</ref>
A model for cascading failures due to overload propagation is the Motter–Lai model. The tempo-spatial propagation of such failures have been studied by Jichang Zhao et al.
过载传播引起的连锁故障模型是 Motter-Lai 模型。赵等人研究了这类故障的时空传播特性。
== See also ==
{{div col}}
* [[Power outage|Blackouts]]
* [[Brittle system]]
* [[Butterfly effect]]
* [[Byzantine failure]]
* [[Cascading rollback]]
* [[Chain reaction]]
* [[Chaos theory]]
* [[Cache stampede]]
* [[Congestion collapse]]
* [[Domino effect]]
* [[For Want of a Nail (proverb)]]
* [[Interdependent networks]]
* [[Kessler Syndrome]]
* [[Percolation theory]]
* [[Progressive collapse]]
* [[Virtuous circle and vicious circle]]
* [[Wicked problem]]
{{div col end}}
== References ==
{{reflist}}
== Further reading ==
* {{cite web
|url=http://www.jaist.ac.jp/library/thesis/ks-master-2005/abstract/tmiyazak/abstract.pdf
|url=http://www.jaist.ac.jp/library/thesis/ks-master-2005/abstract/tmiyazak/abstract.pdf
Http://www.jaist.ac.jp/library/thesis/ks-master-2005/abstract/tmiyazak/abstract.pdf
|title=Comparison of defense strategies for cascade breakdown on SF networks with degree correlations
|title=Comparison of defense strategies for cascade breakdown on SF networks with degree correlations
具有度相关性的 SF 网络级联故障的防御策略比较
|author=Toshiyuki Miyazaki
|author=Toshiyuki Miyazaki
|author=Toshiyuki Miyazaki
|date=1 March 2005
|date=1 March 2005
日期 = 2005年3月1日
|url-status=dead
|url-status=dead
地位 = 死亡
|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20090220024018/http://www.jaist.ac.jp/library/thesis/ks-master-2005/abstract/tmiyazak/abstract.pdf
|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20090220024018/http://www.jaist.ac.jp/library/thesis/ks-master-2005/abstract/tmiyazak/abstract.pdf
2012年3月24日 | archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20090220024018/http://www.jaist.ac.jp/library/thesis/ks-master-2005/abstract/tmiyazak/abstract.pdf
|archivedate=2009-02-20
|archivedate=2009-02-20
| archivedate = 2009-02-20
}}
}}
}}
* {{cite web
|url=http://redmondmag.com/columns/print.asp?EditorialsID=1000
|url=http://redmondmag.com/columns/print.asp?EditorialsID=1000
1000 http://redmondmag.com/columns/print.asp
|title=(In)Secure Shell?
|title=(In)Secure Shell?
| title = (In) Secure Shell? ？
|accessdate=2007-09-08
|accessdate=2007-09-08
2007-09-08
|author=Russ Cooper
|author=Russ Cooper
作者: Russ Cooper
|date=1 June 2005
|date=1 June 2005
日期 = 2005年6月1日
|publisher=RedmondMag.com
|publisher=RedmondMag.com
| publisher = RedmondMag.com
|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928164525/http://redmondmag.com/columns/print.asp?EditorialsID=1000
|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928164525/http://redmondmag.com/columns/print.asp?EditorialsID=1000
1000 https://web.archive.org/web/20070928164525/http://redmondmag.com/columns/print.asp
|archivedate=2007-09-28
|archivedate=2007-09-28
| archivedate = 2007-09-28
|url-status=dead
|url-status=dead
地位 = 死亡
}}
}}
}}
* {{cite web
|url=http://www.chds.us/?research/software&d=list
|url=http://www.chds.us/?research/software&d=list
Http://www.chds.us/?research/software&d=list
|title=Cascade Net (simulation program)
|title=Cascade Net (simulation program)
| title = Cascade Net (仿真程序)
|accessdate=2007-09-08
|accessdate=2007-09-08
2007-09-08
|author=US Department of Homeland Security
|author=US Department of Homeland Security
美国国土安全部
|date=5 February 2007
|date=5 February 2007
| 日期 = 2007年2月5日
|publisher=Center for Homeland Defense and Security
|publisher=Center for Homeland Defense and Security
| publisher = 国土安全防御中心
|url-status=dead
|url-status=dead
地位 = 死亡
|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20081228044520/http://www.chds.us/?research%2Fsoftware&d=list
|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20081228044520/http://www.chds.us/?research%2Fsoftware&d=list
2012年3月24日 | archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20081228044520/http://www.chds.us/?research%2fsoftware&d=list
|archivedate=2008-12-28
|archivedate=2008-12-28
| archivedate = 2008-12-28
}}
}}
}}
== External links ==
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20060827050151/http://www.windows.ucar.edu/spaceweather/blackout.html Space Weather: Blackout — Massive Power Grid Failure]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20071022110507/http://vlab.infotech.monash.edu.au/simulations/networks/cascading-failure/ Cascading failure demo applet] (Monash University's Virtual Lab)
* A. E. Motter and Y.-C. Lai, [http://chaos1.la.asu.edu/~yclai/papers/PRE_02_ML_3.pdf ''Cascade-based attacks on complex networks,''] Physical Review E (Rapid Communications) 66, 065102 (2002).
* P. Crucitti, V. Latora and M. Marchiori, [https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/aeda/97ccce03a5979dd4196fb7544ee0dc546f18.pdf ''Model for cascading failures in complex networks,''] Physical Review E (Rapid Communications) 69, 045104 (2004).
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20040704132003/http://www.epri.com/programHigh.asp?objid=261741 Protection Strategies for Cascading Grid Failures — A Shortcut Approach]
* I. Dobson, B. A. Carreras, and D. E. Newman, [https://web.archive.org/web/20060222073252/http://eceserv0.ece.wisc.edu/~dobson/PAPERS/dobsonPEIS05.pdf preprint] A loading-dependent model of probabilistic cascading failure, Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences, vol. 19, no. 1, January 2005, pp. 15–32.
* [https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/3105_aircrash.html Nova: Crash of Flight 111] on September 2, 1998. [[Swissair Flight 111]] flying from New York to Geneva slammed into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Nova Scotia with 229 people aboard. Originally believed a terrorist act. After $39 million investigation, insurance settlement of $1.5 billion and more than four years, investigators unravel the puzzle: cascading failure. What is the legacy of Swissair 111? "We have a window into the internal structure of design, checks and balances, protection, and safety." -David Evans, Editor-in-Chief of Air Safety Week.
* PhysicsWeb story: [http://physicsweb.org/articles/news/5/11/9 Accident grounds neutrino lab]
* [http://necsi.edu/affiliates/braha/StructureandDynamics.htm The Structure and Dynamics of Large Scale Organizational Networks (Dan Braha, New England Complex Systems Institute)]
*From Single Network to Network of Networks http://havlin.biu.ac.il/Pdf/Bremen070715a.pdf
{{Electricity delivery}}
[[Category:Failure]]
Category:Failure
类别: 失败
[[Category:Reliability engineering]]
Category:Reliability engineering
类别: 可靠度
[[Category:Electric power transmission]]
Category:Electric power transmission
类别: 输电系统
[[Category:Systemic risk]]
Category:Systemic risk
类别: 系统性风险
[[Category:Systems science]]
Category:Systems science
类别: 系统科学
<noinclude>
<small>This page was moved from [[wikipedia:en:Cascading failure]]. Its edit history can be viewed at [[级联故障/edithistory]]</small></noinclude>
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