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第1行： − 此词条暂由彩云小译翻译，未经人工整理和审校，带来阅读不便，请见谅。+ + + − 演示单个故障如何在整个网络中导致其他故障的动画。+ 第13行：
第15行： − 连锁故障是一个相互连接的部件系统中的一个或几个部件的故障可以引发其他部件的故障等过程。这种故障可能发生在许多类型的系统中，包括动力传输、计算机网络、金融、交通系统、有机体、人体和生态系统。+ 第21行：
第23行： − 当系统的一部分发生故障时，可能会发生级联故障。当这种情况发生时，其他部分必须补偿失败的组件。这反过来又会重载这些节点，导致它们也失败，促使其他节点一个接一个地失败。+ + 第33行：
第36行： − 级联故障在电网中很常见，当其中一个元件发生故障(完全或部分)并将其负荷转移到系统中附近的元件时。那些附近的元素然后被推动超出他们的能力，所以他们成为超载和转移他们的负载到其他元素。级联故障是高压系统中常见的一种现象，在一个满负荷或轻微超载的系统中，一个单点故障(SPF)会导致系统所有节点突然出现尖峰。这种浪涌电流可能会导致已经超载的节点发生故障，引发更多的过载，从而在很短的时间内使整个系统瘫痪。+ + 第41行：
第45行： − 这个故障过程就像池塘上的涟漪一样通过系统的各个元素，并且持续到系统中的所有元素被破坏和/或系统从功能上与其负载的来源断开为止。例如，在某些情况下，一个大型电网可能因为单个变压器的故障而崩溃。+ 第49行：
第53行： − 实时监控系统的运行，明智地断开部件可以帮助阻止级联。另一种常用的技术是在可能发生故障的计算机模拟计算系统的安全裕度，建立安全运行水平，低于这个水平的任何计算方案都不会导致级联故障，并确定网络中最有可能导致级联故障的部分。+ 第57行：
第61行： − 防止电网故障的主要问题之一是，控制信号的速度不快于传播功率过载的速度，也就是说，控制信号的速度不快于传播功率过载的速度。由于控制信号和电力以相同的速度运行，所以不可能通过提前发送警告来隔离元件来隔离断电。+ 第65行：
第69行： − 大庆等人已经研究了电网故障是否相关的问题。以及 Paul DH Hines 等人。+ + − + 第75行：
第80行： − 级联故障导致下列停电:+ + + + + + + + + + + + 第105行：
第121行： − 计算机网络(例如互联网)也可能发生级联故障，由于硬件或软件故障或断开，网络通信严重受损，或在网络较大部分之间停止。在这种背景下，级联失效这一术语被称为级联失效。级联故障可以影响大量的人员和系统。+ 第113行：
第129行： − 级联故障的原因通常是一个单一的、关键的路由器或节点的超载，这会导致节点宕机，甚至是短暂的宕机。它也可能是由于为了维护或升级而关闭一个节点引起的。在这两种情况下，流量都被路由到或通过另一条(可选)路径。结果，这个替代路径变得超载，导致它下降，等等。它还会影响依赖于节点进行常规操作的系统。+ + 第125行：
第142行： − + 第133行：
第150行： − 如果有足够多的路由由于级联故障而中断，网络或互联网的一个完整部分就会变得无法访问。尽管不希望如此，但这可以帮助加快从此失败中恢复，因为连接将超时，其他节点将放弃尝试建立到已被切断的节点的连接，从而减少涉及的节点的负载。+ 第141行：
第158行： − 级联故障中经常发生的一种情况是行走故障，部分下降，导致下一部分失败，之后第一部分返回。在恢复稳定性之前，这个波纹可以通过相同的部分或连接节点进行多次传递。+ − + 第153行：
第170行： − 级联故障是一个相对较新的发展，随着流量的大量增加和系统与网络之间的高度互连性。这个术语最早是在20世纪90年代末由一位荷兰 IT 专业人士在这种背景下使用的，现在已经慢慢成为这种大规模失败的一个相对常见的术语。+ + + 第165行：
第184行： − 网络故障通常在单个网络节点故障时开始。最初，通常会通过该节点的流量被停止。系统和用户会因无法到达主机而出错。通常，ISP 的冗余系统响应非常快，通过不同的主干网选择另一条路径。通过这个替代路径的路由路径更长，具有更多的跳数，并随后通过更多的系统，通常不处理突然提供的流量量。+ 第173行：
第192行： − 这可能导致一个或多个系统沿着另一条路径下降，从而产生它们自己的类似问题。+ 第181行：
第200行： − 此外，在这种情况下，相关系统也会受到影响。例如，DNS 解析可能会失败，通常会导致系统互联的情况可能会破坏甚至不直接涉及实际系统的连接。反过来，这可能会导致看似不相关的节点产生问题，从而可能导致另一个级联失败。+ 第189行：
第208行： − 2012年12月，全球范围内发生了部分 Gmail 服务中断(40%) ，时间长达18分钟。这种服务的丢失是由于包含错误逻辑的负载平衡软件的例行更新造成的---- 在这种情况下，错误是由于逻辑使用了[ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/why-gmail-went-down-google-misconfigured-chromes-sync-server/不恰当的所有而不是更适当的一些]通过对网络中单个节点的全面更新而不是对所有节点的部分更新，修复了级联错误。+ + 第199行：
第219行： − 某些承重结构与分立的结构组件可以受到“拉链效应” ，其中一个单一的结构成员的失败增加了对相邻成员的负荷。在倒塌的情况下，当一个垂直悬挂杆失效时，一个悬挂人行道(由于施工错误已经过度受力)失效，导致相邻的杆超载，相继失效(即:。像拉链一样)。一座可能发生这种破坏的桥梁被称为断裂临界桥梁，许多桥梁的垮塌都是由单一部分的破坏引起的。正确设计的结构使用足够的安全系数和/或交替加载路径，以防止这种类型的机械叶栅失效。+ + + + 第213行：
第236行： − 生物化学级联存在于生物学中，在那里一个小的反应可以有全系统的含义。一个负面的例子是缺血性级联反应，在这种反应中，一个小的缺血性发作释放出的毒素比最初的损伤杀死更多的细胞，导致更多的毒素被释放。目前的研究正在寻找一种方法来阻断脑卒中患者的这种级联反应，以最大限度地减少损伤。+ 第221行：
第244行： − 在物种灭绝的研究中，有时一个物种的灭绝会导致许多其他物种的灭绝。这样的物种被称为关键种。+ + + 第231行：
第256行： − 另一个例子是考克饶夫沃尔顿发电机，它也可以经历级联故障，其中一个失败的二极管可以导致所有的二极管失败在几分之一秒。+ 第239行：
第264行： − 在科学实验中，这种效应的另一个例子是2001年用于超级神冈探测器实验的数千个脆弱的玻璃探测器的内爆，在那里，由单个探测器故障引起的冲击波似乎触发了其他探测器在连锁反应中的内爆。+ + + − === Finance === + + 第251行：
第279行： − 在金融领域，金融机构连锁性破产的风险被称为系统性风险: 一家金融机构的破产可能导致其他金融机构(其交易对手)破产，从而在整个系统内连锁破产。+ 第257行：
第285行： − + 第265行：
第293行： − 然而，请注意，系统性风险不是由于个别机构本身，而是由于相互关联。有关经济学和金融学的详细模型，请参阅埃利奥特等人的文章。(2014)和 Acemoglu 等人。(2015).+ 第273行：
第301行： − 一个相关的(虽然不同)类型的级联失效的金融发生在股票市场，例如2010年闪电崩盘。+ 第286行：
第314行： + + 第291行：
第321行： − 图。1: 说明不同基础设施之间的相互依存关系+ 第297行：
第327行： − 图。2.一阶和二阶渗流过渡的示意图演示。在二阶情况下，在逾渗阈值 p = p _ c 处，巨分量连续接近零。在一阶情况下，巨分量不连续地趋近于零+ 第305行：
第335行： − 各种各样的基础设施，如供水、交通、燃料和发电站是相互联系、相互依存的。1.由于这种耦合，相互依赖的网络对随机故障，特别是对有针对性的攻击极为敏感，以至于一个网络中一小部分节点的故障可以导致几个相互依赖的网络中一连串的故障。电力中断往往是由于相互依赖的网络之间的一连串故障造成的，最近几年发生的几次大规模停电就是这个问题的最好例证。停电是网络间依赖关系所扮演的重要角色的有趣演示。例如，2003年意大利大停电导致铁路网、卫生保健系统和金融服务大面积瘫痪，此外还严重影响了电信网络。通信系统的局部故障反过来又进一步损害了电网管理系统，从而对电网产生正反馈。这个例子强调了相互依赖如何能够显著地放大交互网络系统中的损害。基于渗流理论，最近发展了一个研究耦合网络之间级联故障的框架。1 = r.在相互依赖的网络中灾难性的级联故障 | 杂志 = 自然 | 年 = 2010 | 卷 = 464 | 页 = 1025-8 | doi = 10.1038/nature08932 | url = http://Havlin.biu.ac.il/publications.php?keyword=Catastrophic+cascade+of+failures+in+interdependent+networks&year=*&match=all|pmid=20393559|issue=7291+ − + − 相对于网络连续崩溃的单一网络，级联故障可能导致突然崩溃，见图。2.+ 第317行：
第347行： − 空间嵌入式系统中的级联故障已经成为当前研究的热点+ 第323行：
第353行： − 会导致极度的脆弱。有关级联故障的动态过程，请参阅。为了避免连锁故障的发生，建立了一个故障修复模型。+ − 第336行：
第365行： + 第341行：
第371行： − 过载传播引起的连锁故障模型是 Motter-Lai 模型。赵等人研究了这类故障的时空传播特性。+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 第388行：
第438行： + + 第394行：
第446行： + +
无编辑摘要
本词条由11初步翻译
{{short description|System of interconnected parts in which the failure of one or few parts can trigger the failure of others}}
{{short description|System of interconnected parts in which the failure of one or few parts can trigger the failure of others}}
[[Image:Networkfailure.gif|thumb|right|An animation demonstrating how a single failure may result in other failures throughout a network.]]
[[Image:Networkfailure.gif|thumb|right|An animation demonstrating how a single failure may result in other failures throughout a network.]]
[[Image:Networkfailure.gif|thumb|right|演示单个故障如何导致整个网络中其他故障的动画]]
An animation demonstrating how a single failure may result in other failures throughout a network.
An animation demonstrating how a single failure may result in other failures throughout a network.
演示单个故障如何导致整个网络中其他故障的动画。
A '''cascading failure''' is a process in a system of [[interconnection|interconnected]] parts in which the failure of one or few parts can trigger the failure of other parts and so on. Such a failure may happen in many types of systems, including power transmission, computer networking, finance, transportation systems, organisms, the human body, and ecosystems.
A '''cascading failure''' is a process in a system of [[interconnection|interconnected]] parts in which the failure of one or few parts can trigger the failure of other parts and so on. Such a failure may happen in many types of systems, including power transmission, computer networking, finance, transportation systems, organisms, the human body, and ecosystems.
A cascading failure is a process in a system of interconnected parts in which the failure of one or few parts can trigger the failure of other parts and so on. Such a failure may happen in many types of systems, including power transmission, computer networking, finance, transportation systems, organisms, the human body, and ecosystems.
A cascading failure is a process in a system of interconnected parts in which the failure of one or few parts can trigger the failure of other parts and so on. Such a failure may happen in many types of systems, including power transmission, computer networking, finance, transportation systems, organisms, the human body, and ecosystems.
'''<font color="#ff8000"> 级联故障 Cascading Failure'''是一个相互连接的部件系统中的一个或几个部件的故障可以引发其他部件的故障等过程。这种故障可能发生在许多类型的系统中，包括电力输送、计算机网络、金融、交通系统、微生物、人体和生态系统。
Cascading failures may occur when one part of the system fails. When this happens, other parts must then compensate for the failed component. This in turn overloads these nodes, causing them to fail as well, prompting additional nodes to fail one after another.
Cascading failures may occur when one part of the system fails. When this happens, other parts must then compensate for the failed component. This in turn overloads these nodes, causing them to fail as well, prompting additional nodes to fail one after another.
当系统的一部分发生故障时，可能会发生级联故障。当这种情况发生时，其他部分必须对发生故障的部分进行补偿，这反过来又使这些节点超载，导致它们也发生故障，促使更多的节点相继发生故障。
== In power transmission ==
== In power transmission ==
== 在电力输送中==
Cascading failure is common in power grids when one of the elements fails (completely or partially) and shifts its load to nearby elements in the system. Those nearby elements are then pushed beyond their capacity so they become overloaded and shift their load onto other elements. Cascading failure is a common effect seen in high voltage systems, where a single point of failure (SPF) on a fully loaded or slightly overloaded system results in a sudden spike across all nodes of the system. This surge current can induce the already overloaded nodes into failure, setting off more overloads and thereby taking down the entire system in a very short time.
Cascading failure is common in power grids when one of the elements fails (completely or partially) and shifts its load to nearby elements in the system. Those nearby elements are then pushed beyond their capacity so they become overloaded and shift their load onto other elements. Cascading failure is a common effect seen in high voltage systems, where a single point of failure (SPF) on a fully loaded or slightly overloaded system results in a sudden spike across all nodes of the system. This surge current can induce the already overloaded nodes into failure, setting off more overloads and thereby taking down the entire system in a very short time.
级联故障在电网中很常见，当其中一个元件(完全或部分)发生故障并将其负荷转移到系统中附近的元件时，就会推动那些附近的元件超出其容量，从而过载，并将其负荷转移到其他元件上。级联故障在高压系统中也很常见，在一个满载或轻度过载的系统中，一个'''<font color="#ff8000"> 单点故障 Single Point of Failure (SPF)</font>'''会导致系统所有节点突然出现尖峰。这种'''<font color="#ff8000"> 浪涌电流
Surge Current</font>'''可能会导致已经超载的节点发生故障，引发更多过载，从而在很短的时间内使整个系统瘫痪。
This failure process cascades through the elements of the system like a ripple on a pond and continues until substantially all of the elements in the system are compromised and/or the system becomes functionally disconnected from the source of its load. For example, under certain conditions a large power grid can collapse after the failure of a single transformer.
This failure process cascades through the elements of the system like a ripple on a pond and continues until substantially all of the elements in the system are compromised and/or the system becomes functionally disconnected from the source of its load. For example, under certain conditions a large power grid can collapse after the failure of a single transformer.
这个故障过程就像池塘上的涟漪一样，在系统的各个元件中层层叠加，直到系统中的所有元件都受到损害和/或系统在功能上与负载源断开。例如，在某些情况下，一个大型电网可能因为单个变压器的故障而崩溃。
Monitoring the operation of a system, in real-time, and judicious disconnection of parts can help stop a cascade. Another common technique is to calculate a safety margin for the system by computer simulation of possible failures, to establish safe operating levels below which none of the calculated scenarios is predicted to cause cascading failure, and to identify the parts of the network which are most likely to cause cascading failures.
Monitoring the operation of a system, in real-time, and judicious disconnection of parts can help stop a cascade. Another common technique is to calculate a safety margin for the system by computer simulation of possible failures, to establish safe operating levels below which none of the calculated scenarios is predicted to cause cascading failure, and to identify the parts of the network which are most likely to cause cascading failures.
实时监测系统的运行情况，并明智地断开部件的连接，有助于阻止级联。 另一种常见的技术是通过计算机模拟可能发生的故障来计算系统的安全边际，确定安全运行水平，在此水平之下，预计计算出的任何一种情况都不会引起级联故障，并确定网络中最有可能引起级联故障的部分。
One of the primary problems with preventing electrical grid failures is that the speed of the control signal is no faster than the speed of the propagating power overload, i.e. since both the control signal and the electrical power are moving at the same speed, it is not possible to isolate the outage by sending a warning ahead to isolate the element.
One of the primary problems with preventing electrical grid failures is that the speed of the control signal is no faster than the speed of the propagating power overload, i.e. since both the control signal and the electrical power are moving at the same speed, it is not possible to isolate the outage by sending a warning ahead to isolate the element.
防止电网故障的主要问题之一是，控制信号的速度不快于传播功率过载的速度，即由于控制信号和电力都以同样的速度运动，所以无法通过提前发出警告来隔离元件从而隔离停电。
The question if power grid failures are correlated have been studied in Daqing Li et al. as well as by Paul DH Hines et al.
The question if power grid failures are correlated have been studied in Daqing Li et al. as well as by Paul DH Hines et al.
电网故障是否具有相关性的问题，李大庆等人以及Paul DH Hines等人都有研究。
=== Examples ===
=== Examples ===
=== 案例 ===
Cascading failure caused the following [[power outage]]s:
Cascading failure caused the following [[power outage]]s:
Cascading failure caused the following power outages:
Cascading failure caused the following power outages:
级联故障曾导致以下停电:
* [[Northeast blackout of 1965|Blackout in Northeast America in 1965]]
* [[Northeast blackout of 1965|Blackout in Northeast America in 1965]]
* [[1965年东北大停电|1965年美国东北大停电]]
* [[1999 Southern Brazil blackout|Blackout in Southern Brazil in 1999]]
* [[1999 Southern Brazil blackout|Blackout in Southern Brazil in 1999]]
* [[1999年巴西南部停电|1999年巴西南部停电]]
* [[Northeast blackout of 2003|Blackout in Northeast America in 2003]]
* [[Northeast blackout of 2003|Blackout in Northeast America in 2003]]
* [[2003年东北大停电|2003年美国东北大停电]]
* [[2003 Italy blackout|Blackout in Italy in 2003]]
* [[2003 Italy blackout|Blackout in Italy in 2003]]
* [[2003年意大利停电|2003年意大利停电]]
* [[2003 London blackout|Blackout in London in 2003]]
* [[2003 London blackout|Blackout in London in 2003]]
* [[2003年伦敦大停电|2003年伦敦大停电]]
* [[2006 European blackout|European Blackout in 2006]]
* [[2006 European blackout|European Blackout in 2006]]
* [[2006年欧洲停电|2006年欧洲停电]]
* [[2012 northern India power grid failure|Blackout in Northern India in 2012]]
* [[2012 northern India power grid failure|Blackout in Northern India in 2012]]
* [[2012年印度北部电网故障|2012年印度北部停电]]
* [[2016 South Australian blackout|Blackout in South Australia in 2016]]
* [[2016 South Australian blackout|Blackout in South Australia in 2016]]
* [[2016年南澳停电|2016年南澳停电]]
* [[2019 Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay blackout|Blackout in southeast South America in 2019]]
* [[2019 Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay blackout|Blackout in southeast South America in 2019]]
* [[2019年阿根廷、巴拉圭和乌拉圭停电|2019年南美洲东南部停电]]
== In computer networks ==
== In computer networks ==
== 在计算机网络中 ==
Cascading failures can also occur in computer networks (such as the Internet) in which network traffic is severely impaired or halted to or between larger sections of the network, caused by failing or disconnected hardware or software. In this context, the cascading failure is known by the term cascade failure. A cascade failure can affect large groups of people and systems.
Cascading failures can also occur in computer networks (such as the Internet) in which network traffic is severely impaired or halted to or between larger sections of the network, caused by failing or disconnected hardware or software. In this context, the cascading failure is known by the term cascade failure. A cascade failure can affect large groups of people and systems.
级联故障也可能发生在计算机网络(如因特网)中，由于硬件或软件的故障或断开，导致网络中较大部分的网络通信严重受损或停止。在这种情况下，级联故障被称为术语级联故障。级联故障会影响到大批人员和系统。
The cause of a cascade failure is usually the overloading of a single, crucial router or node, which causes the node to go down, even briefly. It can also be caused by taking a node down for maintenance or upgrades. In either case, traffic is routed to or through another (alternative) path. This alternative path, as a result, becomes overloaded, causing it to go down, and so on. It will also affect systems which depend on the node for regular operation.
The cause of a cascade failure is usually the overloading of a single, crucial router or node, which causes the node to go down, even briefly. It can also be caused by taking a node down for maintenance or upgrades. In either case, traffic is routed to or through another (alternative) path. This alternative path, as a result, becomes overloaded, causing it to go down, and so on. It will also affect systems which depend on the node for regular operation.
级联故障的原因通常是一个单个关键的路由器或节点的超载，导致节点宕机或短暂地宕机。它也可能是由于为了维护或升级而关闭一个节点引起的。在这两种情况下，流量都被路由到或通过另一条(替代)路径。结果，这条替代路径变得过载，导致它宕机，等等。它还会影响依赖该节点正常运行的系统。
=== Symptoms ===
=== Symptoms ===
=== 症状 ===
The symptoms of a cascade failure include: packet loss and high network latency, not just to single systems, but to whole sections of a network or the internet. The high latency and packet loss is caused by the nodes that fail to operate due to congestion collapse, which causes them to still be present in the network but without much or any useful communication going through them. As a result, routes can still be considered valid, without them actually providing communication.
The symptoms of a cascade failure include: packet loss and high network latency, not just to single systems, but to whole sections of a network or the internet. The high latency and packet loss is caused by the nodes that fail to operate due to congestion collapse, which causes them to still be present in the network but without much or any useful communication going through them. As a result, routes can still be considered valid, without them actually providing communication.
级联故障的症状包括: 数据包丢失和高网络延迟，不仅仅是对单个系统，而是对整个网络或互联网部分。高延迟和数据包丢失是由于网络拥塞崩溃导致的节点无法正常运行所造成的，这使得它们仍然存在于网络中，但是没有多少或任何有用的通信通过它们。因此，路由仍然可以被认为是有效的，而实际上它们并没有提供通信。
级联故障的症状包括: 数据包丢失和高网络延迟，不仅仅是对单个系统，而是对整个网络或互联网部分。高延迟和数据包丢失是由于网络拥塞崩溃导致节点无法正常运行，这使得它们仍然存在于网络中，但是没有太多或任何有用的通信通过它们。因此，路由仍然可被认为是有效的，而实际上它们并没有提供通信。
If enough routes go down because of a cascade failure, a complete section of the network or internet can become unreachable. Although undesired, this can help speed up the recovery from this failure as connections will time out, and other nodes will give up trying to establish connections to the section(s) that have become cut off, decreasing load on the involved nodes.
If enough routes go down because of a cascade failure, a complete section of the network or internet can become unreachable. Although undesired, this can help speed up the recovery from this failure as connections will time out, and other nodes will give up trying to establish connections to the section(s) that have become cut off, decreasing load on the involved nodes.
如果有足够多的路由因为级联故障而中断，网络或互联网的一个完整部分就会无法访问。尽管我们不希望出现这种情况，但这有助于加快从故障中恢复的速度，因为连接会超时，其他节点会放弃尝试与被切断的部分建立连接，从而减少相关节点的负载。
A common occurrence during a cascade failure is a walking failure, where sections go down, causing the next section to fail, after which the first section comes back up. This ripple can make several passes through the same sections or connecting nodes before stability is restored.
A common occurrence during a cascade failure is a walking failure, where sections go down, causing the next section to fail, after which the first section comes back up. This ripple can make several passes through the same sections or connecting nodes before stability is restored.
在级联故障中，一个常见的现象是行走故障，即各段下行，导致下一段故障，之后第一段回升。在恢复稳定之前，这种波纹可能会在相同的区段或连接节点上进行多次传递。
=== History ===
=== History ===
=== 历史 ===
Cascade failures are a relatively recent development, with the massive increase in traffic and the high interconnectivity between systems and networks. The term was first applied in this context in the late 1990s by a Dutch IT professional and has slowly become a relatively common term for this kind of large-scale failure.
Cascade failures are a relatively recent development, with the massive increase in traffic and the high interconnectivity between systems and networks. The term was first applied in this context in the late 1990s by a Dutch IT professional and has slowly become a relatively common term for this kind of large-scale failure.
级联故障是一个相对较新的发展，随着流量的大量增加和系统与网络之间的高度互连性而出现。这个术语最早是在90年代末由一位荷兰的IT专业人员在此情况下使用的，后来慢慢成为这种大规模故障的一个比较常见的术语。
=== Example ===
=== Example ===
=== 案例 ===
Network failures typically start when a single network node fails. Initially, the traffic that would normally go through the node is stopped. Systems and users get errors about not being able to reach hosts. Usually, the redundant systems of an ISP respond very quickly, choosing another path through a different backbone. The routing path through this alternative route is longer, with more hops and subsequently going through more systems that normally do not process the amount of traffic suddenly offered.
Network failures typically start when a single network node fails. Initially, the traffic that would normally go through the node is stopped. Systems and users get errors about not being able to reach hosts. Usually, the redundant systems of an ISP respond very quickly, choosing another path through a different backbone. The routing path through this alternative route is longer, with more hops and subsequently going through more systems that normally do not process the amount of traffic suddenly offered.
网络故障通常在单个网络节点故障时开始。最初，正常情况下会经过该节点的流量被停止。系统和用户会得到无法到达主机的错误。通常，ISP的冗余系统会很快做出反应，选择另一条通过不同骨干网的路径。通过这条替代路径的路由路径更长，跳数更多，随后要经过更多的系统，而这些系统通常不会处理突然提供的流量。
This can cause one or more systems along the alternative route to go down, creating similar problems of their own.
This can cause one or more systems along the alternative route to go down, creating similar problems of their own.
这可能会导致替代路线上的一个或多个系统瘫痪，造成自身的类似问题。
Also, related systems are affected in this case. As an example, DNS resolution might fail and what would normally cause systems to be interconnected, might break connections that are not even directly involved in the actual systems that went down. This, in turn, may cause seemingly unrelated nodes to develop problems, that can cause another cascade failure all on its own.
Also, related systems are affected in this case. As an example, DNS resolution might fail and what would normally cause systems to be interconnected, might break connections that are not even directly involved in the actual systems that went down. This, in turn, may cause seemingly unrelated nodes to develop problems, that can cause another cascade failure all on its own.
此外，在这种情况下，相关系统也会受到影响。例如，DNS解析可能会失败，通常会导致系统互连的情况可能会破坏甚至没有直接参与实际系统故障的连接。而这又可能导致看似不相关的节点出现问题，从而导致另一个级联故障的发生。
In December 2012, a partial loss (40%) of Gmail service occurred globally, for 18 minutes. This loss of service was caused by a routine update of load balancing software which contained faulty logic—in this case, the error was caused by logic using an [https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/why-gmail-went-down-google-misconfigured-chromes-sync-server/ inappropriate all instead of the more appropriate some.] The cascading error was fixed by fully updating a single node in the network instead of partially updating all nodes at one time.
In December 2012, a partial loss (40%) of Gmail service occurred globally, for 18 minutes. This loss of service was caused by a routine update of load balancing software which contained faulty logic—in this case, the error was caused by logic using an [https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/why-gmail-went-down-google-misconfigured-chromes-sync-server/ inappropriate all instead of the more appropriate some.] The cascading error was fixed by fully updating a single node in the network instead of partially updating all nodes at one time.
2012年12月，Gmail服务在全球范围内出现了部分损失(40%)，持续了18分钟。这次服务损失是由包含错误逻辑的负载平衡软件的例行更新引起的--在这种情况下，该错误是由使用[https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/why-gmail-went-down-google-misconfigured-chromes-sync-server/ 不合适的all而不是更合适的some]的逻辑引起的。通过完全更新网络中的一个节点，而不是一次部分更新所有节点，修复了级联错误。
== Cascading structural failure ==
== Cascading structural failure ==
== 级联结构故障 ==
Certain load-bearing structures with discrete structural components can be subject to the "zipper effect", where the failure of a single structural member increases the load on adjacent members. In the case of the [[Hyatt Regency walkway collapse]], a suspended walkway (which was already overstressed due to an error in construction) failed when a single vertical suspension rod failed, overloading the neighboring rods which failed sequentially (i.e. like a [[zipper]]). A bridge that can have such a failure is called fracture critical, and numerous bridge collapses have been caused by the failure of a single part. Properly designed structures use an adequate [[factor of safety]] and/or alternate load paths to prevent this type of mechanical cascade failure.<ref name="petroski">{{cite book| title=To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Structural Design| first=Henry| last=Petroski| year=1992| isbn=978-0-679-73416-1| publisher=Vintage| place=| url-access=registration| url=https://archive.org/details/toengineerishuma00petr}}</ref>
Certain load-bearing structures with discrete structural components can be subject to the "zipper effect", where the failure of a single structural member increases the load on adjacent members. In the case of the [[Hyatt Regency walkway collapse]], a suspended walkway (which was already overstressed due to an error in construction) failed when a single vertical suspension rod failed, overloading the neighboring rods which failed sequentially (i.e. like a [[zipper]]). A bridge that can have such a failure is called fracture critical, and numerous bridge collapses have been caused by the failure of a single part. Properly designed structures use an adequate [[factor of safety]] and/or alternate load paths to prevent this type of mechanical cascade failure.<ref name="petroski">{{cite book| title=To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Structural Design| first=Henry| last=Petroski| year=1992| isbn=978-0-679-73416-1| publisher=Vintage| place=| url-access=registration| url=https://archive.org/details/toengineerishuma00petr}}</ref>
Certain load-bearing structures with discrete structural components can be subject to the "zipper effect", where the failure of a single structural member increases the load on adjacent members. In the case of the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse, a suspended walkway (which was already overstressed due to an error in construction) failed when a single vertical suspension rod failed, overloading the neighboring rods which failed sequentially (i.e. like a zipper). A bridge that can have such a failure is called fracture critical, and numerous bridge collapses have been caused by the failure of a single part. Properly designed structures use an adequate factor of safety and/or alternate load paths to prevent this type of mechanical cascade failure.
Certain load-bearing structures with discrete structural components can be subject to the "zipper effect", where the failure of a single structural member increases the load on adjacent members. In the case of the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse, a suspended walkway (which was already overstressed due to an error in construction) failed when a single vertical suspension rod failed, overloading the neighboring rods which failed sequentially (i.e. like a zipper). A bridge that can have such a failure is called fracture critical, and numerous bridge collapses have been caused by the failure of a single part. Properly designed structures use an adequate factor of safety and/or alternate load paths to prevent this type of mechanical cascade failure.
某些具有离散结构构件的承重结构可能会出现 "拉链效应"，即单个结构构件的失效会增加相邻构件的荷载。 在凯悦酒店人行道坍塌事件中，当单根垂直悬杆失效时，悬空的人行道（由于施工中的错误，人行道已经过度受力）失效，使相邻的悬杆超载，相邻的悬杆依次失效（像拉链一样）。一座可能发生这种破坏的桥梁被称为断裂临界桥梁，许多桥梁的坍塌都是由单一部件的故障引起的。正确设计的结构使用足够的安全系数和/或交替的荷载路径来防止这种类型的机械级联失效。
== Other examples ==
== Other examples ==
== 其他例子 ==
=== Biology ===
=== Biology ===
=== 生物 ===
[[Biochemical cascade]]s exist in biology, where a small reaction can have system-wide implications. One negative example is [[ischemic cascade]], in which a small [[ischemia|ischemic]] attack releases [[toxin]]s which kill off far more cells than the initial damage, resulting in more toxins being released. Current research is to find a way to block this cascade in [[stroke]] patients to minimize the damage.
[[Biochemical cascade]]s exist in biology, where a small reaction can have system-wide implications. One negative example is [[ischemic cascade]], in which a small [[ischemia|ischemic]] attack releases [[toxin]]s which kill off far more cells than the initial damage, resulting in more toxins being released. Current research is to find a way to block this cascade in [[stroke]] patients to minimize the damage.
Biochemical cascades exist in biology, where a small reaction can have system-wide implications. One negative example is ischemic cascade, in which a small ischemic attack releases toxins which kill off far more cells than the initial damage, resulting in more toxins being released. Current research is to find a way to block this cascade in stroke patients to minimize the damage.
Biochemical cascades exist in biology, where a small reaction can have system-wide implications. One negative example is ischemic cascade, in which a small ischemic attack releases toxins which kill off far more cells than the initial damage, resulting in more toxins being released. Current research is to find a way to block this cascade in stroke patients to minimize the damage.
生物学中存在着生化级联，一个小的反应就会对整个系统产生影响。一个负面的例子是缺血性级联反应，在这种反应中，一个小的缺血性发作释放出的毒素比最初的损伤杀死更多的细胞，导致更多的毒素被释放。目前的研究正在寻找一种方法来阻断中风患者的这种级联反应，以最大限度地减少损伤。
In the study of extinction, sometimes the extinction of one species will cause many other extinctions to happen. Such a species is known as a keystone species.
In the study of extinction, sometimes the extinction of one species will cause many other extinctions to happen. Such a species is known as a keystone species.
在物种灭绝的研究中，有时一个物种的灭绝会导致许多其他物种的灭绝。这样的物种被称为关键物种。
=== Electronics ===
=== Electronics ===
=== 电子学 ===
Another example is the [[Cockcroft–Walton generator]], which can also experience cascade failures wherein one failed [[diode]] can result in all the diodes failing in a fraction of a second.
Another example is the [[Cockcroft–Walton generator]], which can also experience cascade failures wherein one failed [[diode]] can result in all the diodes failing in a fraction of a second.
Another example is the Cockcroft–Walton generator, which can also experience cascade failures wherein one failed diode can result in all the diodes failing in a fraction of a second.
Another example is the Cockcroft–Walton generator, which can also experience cascade failures wherein one failed diode can result in all the diodes failing in a fraction of a second.
另一个例子是Cockcroft-Walton发电机，它也会发生级联故障，其中一个故障的二极管会导致所有二极管在几分之一秒内发生故障。
Yet another example of this effect in a scientific experiment was the implosion in 2001 of several thousand fragile glass photomultiplier tubes used in the Super-Kamiokande experiment, where the shock wave caused by the failure of a single detector appears to have triggered the implosion of the other detectors in a chain reaction.
Yet another example of this effect in a scientific experiment was the implosion in 2001 of several thousand fragile glass photomultiplier tubes used in the Super-Kamiokande experiment, where the shock wave caused by the failure of a single detector appears to have triggered the implosion of the other detectors in a chain reaction.
在科学实验中，这种效应的另一个例子是2001年用于超级神冈探测器实验中使用的几千支易碎的玻璃光电倍增管发生内爆，其中一个探测器的故障造成的冲击波似乎引发了连锁反应中其他探测器的内爆。
=== Finance ===
=== 金融 ===
{{main|Systemic risk}} {{main|Cascades in financial networks}}
{{main|Systemic risk}} {{main|Cascades in financial networks}}
{{主要}系统性风险}} {{主要}金融网络中的级联}}}
In [[finance]], the risk of cascading failures of financial institutions is referred to as ''[[systemic risk]]:'' the failure of one financial institution may cause other financial institutions (its [[Counterparty|counterparties]]) to fail, cascading throughout the system.<ref name="HuangVodenska2013">{{cite journal|last1=Huang|first1=Xuqing|last2=Vodenska|first2=Irena|last3=Havlin|first3=Shlomo|last4=Stanley|first4=H. Eugene|title=Cascading Failures in Bi-partite Graphs: Model for Systemic Risk Propagation|journal=Scientific Reports|volume=3|pages=1219|year=2013|issn=2045-2322|doi=10.1038/srep01219|pmid=23386974|pmc=3564037|arxiv=1210.4973|bibcode=2013NatSR...3E1219H}}</ref>
In [[finance]], the risk of cascading failures of financial institutions is referred to as ''[[systemic risk]]:'' the failure of one financial institution may cause other financial institutions (its [[Counterparty|counterparties]]) to fail, cascading throughout the system.<ref name="HuangVodenska2013">{{cite journal|last1=Huang|first1=Xuqing|last2=Vodenska|first2=Irena|last3=Havlin|first3=Shlomo|last4=Stanley|first4=H. Eugene|title=Cascading Failures in Bi-partite Graphs: Model for Systemic Risk Propagation|journal=Scientific Reports|volume=3|pages=1219|year=2013|issn=2045-2322|doi=10.1038/srep01219|pmid=23386974|pmc=3564037|arxiv=1210.4973|bibcode=2013NatSR...3E1219H}}</ref>
In finance, the risk of cascading failures of financial institutions is referred to as systemic risk: the failure of one financial institution may cause other financial institutions (its counterparties) to fail, cascading throughout the system.
In finance, the risk of cascading failures of financial institutions is referred to as systemic risk: the failure of one financial institution may cause other financial institutions (its counterparties) to fail, cascading throughout the system.
在金融领域，金融机构连锁倒闭的风险被称为系统性风险：一家金融机构的倒闭可能会引起其他金融机构（其交易对手）的倒闭，在整个系统中连锁倒闭。
Institutions that are believed to pose systemic risk are deemed either "[[too big to fail]]" (TBTF) or "too interconnected to fail" (TICTF), depending on why they appear to pose a threat.
Institutions that are believed to pose systemic risk are deemed either "[[too big to fail]]" (TBTF) or "too interconnected to fail" (TICTF), depending on why they appear to pose a threat.
Institutions that are believed to pose systemic risk are deemed either "too big to fail" (TBTF) or "too interconnected to fail" (TICTF), depending on why they appear to pose a threat.
Institutions that are believed to pose systemic risk are deemed either "too big to fail" (TBTF) or "too interconnected to fail" (TICTF), depending on why they appear to pose a threat.
那些被认为构成系统性风险的机构要么被视为“太大而不能倒”(TBTF) ，要么被视为“太相关而不能倒”(TICTF) ，这取决于它们为什么似乎构成了威胁。
那些被认为构成系统性风险的机构要么被视为“太大而不能倒”(TBTF) ，要么被视为“太相关而不能倒闭”(TICTF) ，这取决于它们为什么会构成威胁。
Note however that systemic risk is not due to individual institutions per se, but due to the interconnections. For detailed models in economics and finance, see Elliott et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2015).
Note however that systemic risk is not due to individual institutions per se, but due to the interconnections. For detailed models in economics and finance, see Elliott et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2015).
但请注意，系统性风险不是由于单个机构本身造成的，而是由于它们相互之间的联系。关于经济学和金融学的详细模型，请参阅Elliott等人（2014）和Acemoglu等人（2015）的文章。
A related (though distinct) type of cascading failure in finance occurs in the stock market, exemplified by the 2010 Flash Crash.
A related (though distinct) type of cascading failure in finance occurs in the stock market, exemplified by the 2010 Flash Crash.
金融领域的一种相关的（但不同的）级联失败发生在股票市场，2010年的闪电崩盘就是一个例子。
== Interdependent cascading failures ==
== Interdependent cascading failures ==
== 相互依赖的级联故障 ==
[[File:Interdependent_relationship_among_different_infrastructures.tif|thumb|right|Fig. 1: Illustration of the interdependent relationship among different infrastructures]]
[[File:Interdependent_relationship_among_different_infrastructures.tif|thumb|right|Fig. 1: Illustration of the interdependent relationship among different infrastructures]]
Fig. 1: Illustration of the interdependent relationship among different infrastructures
Fig. 1: Illustration of the interdependent relationship among different infrastructures
图1: 不同基础设施之间的相互依存关系的说明
[[File:Schematic_demonstration_of_first-_and_second-order_percolation_transitions.tif|thumb|right|Fig. 2. Schematic demonstration of first- and second-order percolation transitions. In the second-order case, the giant component is continuously approaching zero at the percolation threshold p = p_c. In the first-order case, the giant component approaches zero discontinuously]]
[[File:Schematic_demonstration_of_first-_and_second-order_percolation_transitions.tif|thumb|right|Fig. 2. Schematic demonstration of first- and second-order percolation transitions. In the second-order case, the giant component is continuously approaching zero at the percolation threshold p = p_c. In the first-order case, the giant component approaches zero discontinuously]]
Fig. 2. Schematic demonstration of first- and second-order percolation transitions. In the second-order case, the giant component is continuously approaching zero at the percolation threshold p = p_c. In the first-order case, the giant component approaches zero discontinuously
Fig. 2. Schematic demonstration of first- and second-order percolation transitions. In the second-order case, the giant component is continuously approaching zero at the percolation threshold p = p_c. In the first-order case, the giant component approaches zero discontinuously
图2： 一阶和二阶渗流过渡的示意图。在二阶情况下，'''<font color="#32CD32">最大连通分支 giant component</font>'''在渗流阈值p=p_c时不断接近零。在一阶情况下，最大连通分支不连续地接近零。
Diverse infrastructures such as water supply, transportation, fuel and power stations are coupled together and depend on each other for functioning, see Fig. 1. Owing to this coupling, interdependent networks are extremely sensitive to random failures, and in particular to targeted attacks, such that a failure of a small fraction of nodes in one network can triger an iterative cascade of failures in several interdependent networks. Electrical blackouts frequently result from a cascade of failures between interdependent networks, and the problem has been dramatically exemplified by the several large-scale blackouts that have occurred in recent years. Blackouts are a fascinating demonstration of the important role played by the dependencies between networks. For example, the 2003 Italy blackout resulted in a widespread failure of the railway network, health care systems, and financial services and, in addition, severely influenced the telecommunication networks. The partial failure of the communication system in turn further impaired the electrical grid management system, thus producing a positive feedback on the power grid. This example emphasizes how inter-dependence can significantly magnify the damage in an interacting network system. A framework to study the cascading failures between coupled networks based on percolation theory was developed recently.<ref>{{cite journal|last=S. V. Buldyrev|first=R. Parshani, G. Paul, H. E. Stanley, S. Havlin|title=Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks|journal=Nature|year=2010|volume=464|pages=1025–8|doi=10.1038/nature08932|url=http://havlin.biu.ac.il/Publications.php?keyword=Catastrophic+cascade+of+failures+in+interdependent+networks&year=*&match=all|pmid=20393559|issue=7291
Diverse infrastructures such as water supply, transportation, fuel and power stations are coupled together and depend on each other for functioning, see Fig. 1. Owing to this coupling, interdependent networks are extremely sensitive to random failures, and in particular to targeted attacks, such that a failure of a small fraction of nodes in one network can triger an iterative cascade of failures in several interdependent networks. Electrical blackouts frequently result from a cascade of failures between interdependent networks, and the problem has been dramatically exemplified by the several large-scale blackouts that have occurred in recent years. Blackouts are a fascinating demonstration of the important role played by the dependencies between networks. For example, the 2003 Italy blackout resulted in a widespread failure of the railway network, health care systems, and financial services and, in addition, severely influenced the telecommunication networks. The partial failure of the communication system in turn further impaired the electrical grid management system, thus producing a positive feedback on the power grid. This example emphasizes how inter-dependence can significantly magnify the damage in an interacting network system. A framework to study the cascading failures between coupled networks based on percolation theory was developed recently.<ref>{{cite journal|last=S. V. Buldyrev|first=R. Parshani, G. Paul, H. E. Stanley, S. Havlin|title=Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks|journal=Nature|year=2010|volume=464|pages=1025–8|doi=10.1038/nature08932|url=http://havlin.biu.ac.il/Publications.php?keyword=Catastrophic+cascade+of+failures+in+interdependent+networks&year=*&match=all|pmid=20393559|issue=7291
诸如供水、运输、燃料和发电站等多种基础设施都是耦合在一起的，并相互依赖着运行，见图1。 由于这种耦合，相互依存的网络对随机故障，特别是对有针对性的攻击极为敏感，因此，一个网络中一小部分节点的故障就会导致几个相互依存的网络中出现一连串的故障。电气停电经常是由相互依赖的网络之间的故障级联造成的，近年来发生的几次大规模停电事件就极大地说明了这个问题。停电是网络之间的依存关系所起的重要作用的一个引人入胜的证明。例如，2003年意大利大停电导致铁路网、医疗系统、金融服务大面积瘫痪，此外，还严重影响了电信网络。通信系统的部分故障又进一步损害了电网管理系统，从而对电网产生了正反馈。这个例子强调了在一个相互影响的网络系统中，相互依赖性是如何显著放大损害的。基于'''<font color="#ff8000"> 渗流理论 Percolation Theory</font>'''，最近发展了一个研究耦合网络之间级联故障的框架。1 = r.在相互依赖的网络中灾难性的级联故障 | 杂志 = 自然 | 年 = 2010 | 卷 = 464 | 页 = 1025-8 | doi = 10.1038/nature08932 | url = http://Havlin.biu.ac.il/publications.php?keyword=Catastrophic+cascade+of+failures+in+interdependent+networks&year=*&match=all|pmid=20393559|issue=7291
|arxiv=1012.0206|bibcode=2010Natur.464.1025B}}</ref> The cascading failures can lead to abrupt collapse compare to percolation in a single network where the breakdown of the network is continuous, see Fig. 2.
|arxiv=1012.0206|bibcode=2010Natur.464.1025B}}</ref> The cascading failures can lead to abrupt collapse compare to percolation in a single network where the breakdown of the network is continuous, see Fig. 2.
|arxiv=1012.0206|bibcode=2010Natur.464.1025B}}</ref> The cascading failures can lead to abrupt collapse compare to percolation in a single network where the breakdown of the network is continuous, see Fig. 2.
|arxiv=1012.0206|bibcode=2010Natur.464.1025B}}</ref> The cascading failures can lead to abrupt collapse compare to percolation in a single network where the breakdown of the network is continuous, see Fig. 2.
与级联故障可能会导致突然崩溃相比，在单一网络中，网络的崩溃是连续的，见图2。
Cascading failures in spatially embedded systems have been
Cascading failures in spatially embedded systems have been
Cascading failures in spatially embedded systems have been
Cascading failures in spatially embedded systems have been
空间嵌入式系统中的级联故障已经成为当前研究的热点。
shown to lead to extreme vulnerability.<ref name="BashanBerezin2013">{{cite journal|last1=Bashan|first1=Amir|last2=Berezin|first2=Yehiel|last3=Buldyrev|first3=Sergey V.|last4=Havlin|first4=Shlomo|title=The extreme vulnerability of interdependent spatially embedded networks|journal=Nature Physics|year=2013|issn=1745-2473|doi=10.1038/nphys2727|volume=9|issue=10|pages=667–672|arxiv=1206.2062|bibcode=2013NatPh...9..667B}}</ref> For the dynamic process of cascading failures see ref.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Zhou|first=D.|last2=Bashan|first2=A.|last3=Cohen|first3=R.|last4=Berezin|first4=Y.|last5=Shnerb|first5=N.|last6=Havlin|first6=S.|date=2014|title=Simultaneous first- and second-order percolation transitions in interdependent networks|url=|journal=Phys. Rev. E|volume=90|issue=1|pages=012803|bibcode=2014PhRvE..90a2803Z|doi=10.1103/PhysRevE.90.012803|pmid=25122338|arxiv=1211.2330}}</ref> A model for repairing failures in order to avoid cascading failures was developed by Di Muro et al.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Di Muro|first=M. A.|last2=La Rocca|first2=C. E.|last3=Stanley|first3=H. E.|last4=Havlin|first4=S.|last5=Braunstein|first5=L. A.|date=2016-03-09|title=Recovery of Interdependent Networks|journal=Scientific Reports|language=En|volume=6|issue=1|pages=22834|doi=10.1038/srep22834|pmid=26956773|pmc=4783785|issn=2045-2322|arxiv=1512.02555|bibcode=2016NatSR...622834D}}</ref>
shown to lead to extreme vulnerability.<ref name="BashanBerezin2013">{{cite journal|last1=Bashan|first1=Amir|last2=Berezin|first2=Yehiel|last3=Buldyrev|first3=Sergey V.|last4=Havlin|first4=Shlomo|title=The extreme vulnerability of interdependent spatially embedded networks|journal=Nature Physics|year=2013|issn=1745-2473|doi=10.1038/nphys2727|volume=9|issue=10|pages=667–672|arxiv=1206.2062|bibcode=2013NatPh...9..667B}}</ref> For the dynamic process of cascading failures see ref.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Zhou|first=D.|last2=Bashan|first2=A.|last3=Cohen|first3=R.|last4=Berezin|first4=Y.|last5=Shnerb|first5=N.|last6=Havlin|first6=S.|date=2014|title=Simultaneous first- and second-order percolation transitions in interdependent networks|url=|journal=Phys. Rev. E|volume=90|issue=1|pages=012803|bibcode=2014PhRvE..90a2803Z|doi=10.1103/PhysRevE.90.012803|pmid=25122338|arxiv=1211.2330}}</ref> A model for repairing failures in order to avoid cascading failures was developed by Di Muro et al.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Di Muro|first=M. A.|last2=La Rocca|first2=C. E.|last3=Stanley|first3=H. E.|last4=Havlin|first4=S.|last5=Braunstein|first5=L. A.|date=2016-03-09|title=Recovery of Interdependent Networks|journal=Scientific Reports|language=En|volume=6|issue=1|pages=22834|doi=10.1038/srep22834|pmid=26956773|pmc=4783785|issn=2045-2322|arxiv=1512.02555|bibcode=2016NatSR...622834D}}</ref>
shown to lead to extreme vulnerability. For the dynamic process of cascading failures see ref. A model for repairing failures in order to avoid cascading failures was developed by Di Muro et al.
shown to lead to extreme vulnerability. For the dynamic process of cascading failures see ref. A model for repairing failures in order to avoid cascading failures was developed by Di Muro et al.
显示会导致极端的脆弱性。关于级联故障的动态过程见参考文献。Di Muro等人开发了一个修复故障的模型，以避免级联故障。
== Model for overload cascading failures ==
== Model for overload cascading failures ==
== 过载级联故障模型 ==
A model for cascading failures due to overload propagation is the Motter–Lai model.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Motter|first=A. E.|last2=Lai|first2=Y. C.|date=2002|title=Cascade-based attacks on complex networks|url=|journal=Phys. Rev. E|volume=66|issue=6 Pt 2|pages=065102|doi=10.1103/PhysRevE.66.065102|pmid=12513335|bibcode=2002PhRvE..66f5102M|arxiv=cond-mat/0301086}}</ref> The tempo-spatial propagation of such failures have been studied by Jichang Zhao et al.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Zhao|first=J.|last2=Li|first2=D.|last3=Sanhedrai|first3=H.|last4=Cohen|first4=R.|last5=Havlin|first5=S.|date=2016|title=Spatio-temporal propagation of cascading overload failures in spatially embedded networks|url=|journal=Nature Communications|volume=7|pages=10094|bibcode=2016NatCo...710094Z|doi=10.1038/ncomms10094|pmid=26754065|pmc=4729926}}</ref>
A model for cascading failures due to overload propagation is the Motter–Lai model.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Motter|first=A. E.|last2=Lai|first2=Y. C.|date=2002|title=Cascade-based attacks on complex networks|url=|journal=Phys. Rev. E|volume=66|issue=6 Pt 2|pages=065102|doi=10.1103/PhysRevE.66.065102|pmid=12513335|bibcode=2002PhRvE..66f5102M|arxiv=cond-mat/0301086}}</ref> The tempo-spatial propagation of such failures have been studied by Jichang Zhao et al.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Zhao|first=J.|last2=Li|first2=D.|last3=Sanhedrai|first3=H.|last4=Cohen|first4=R.|last5=Havlin|first5=S.|date=2016|title=Spatio-temporal propagation of cascading overload failures in spatially embedded networks|url=|journal=Nature Communications|volume=7|pages=10094|bibcode=2016NatCo...710094Z|doi=10.1038/ncomms10094|pmid=26754065|pmc=4729926}}</ref>
A model for cascading failures due to overload propagation is the Motter–Lai model. The tempo-spatial propagation of such failures have been studied by Jichang Zhao et al.
A model for cascading failures due to overload propagation is the Motter–Lai model. The tempo-spatial propagation of such failures have been studied by Jichang Zhao et al.
过载传播导致的级联故障的模型是Motter-Lai模型。赵继昌等人对这种故障的速度空间传播进行了研究。
== See also ==
== See also ==
== 请参阅 ==
{{div col}}
{{div col}}
* [[Power outage|Blackouts]]
* [[Power outage|Blackouts]]
*[[停电|停电]]。
* [[Brittle system]]
* [[Brittle system]]
* [[脆性系统]]
* [[Butterfly effect]]
* [[Butterfly effect]]
* [[蝴蝶效应]]
* [[Byzantine failure]]
* [[Byzantine failure]]
* [[拜占庭故障]]
* [[Cascading rollback]]
* [[Cascading rollback]]
* [[级联回滚]]
* [[Chain reaction]]
* [[Chain reaction]]
* [[连锁反应]]
* [[Chaos theory]]
* [[Chaos theory]]
* [[混沌理论]]
* [[Cache stampede]]
* [[Cache stampede]]
* [[缓存雪崩]]
* [[Congestion collapse]]
* [[Congestion collapse]]
* [[拥堵崩溃]]
* [[Domino effect]]
* [[Domino effect]]
* [[多米诺效应]]
* [[For Want of a Nail (proverb)]]
* [[For Want of a Nail (proverb)]]
* [[只因少了一颗钉子（谚语）]]
* [[Interdependent networks]]
* [[Interdependent networks]]
* [[相互依赖的网络]]
* [[Kessler Syndrome]]
* [[Kessler Syndrome]]
* [[凯斯勒综合症]]
* [[Percolation theory]]
* [[Percolation theory]]
* [[渗流理论]]
* [[Progressive collapse]]
* [[Progressive collapse]]
* [[渐进式崩溃]]
* [[Virtuous circle and vicious circle]]
* [[Virtuous circle and vicious circle]]
*[[良性循环和恶性循环]]
* [[Wicked problem]]
* [[Wicked problem]]
* [[抗解问题]]
{{div col end}}
{{div col end}}
== References ==
== References ==
== 参考 ==
{{reflist}}
{{reflist}}
== Further reading ==
== Further reading ==
== 进一步阅读 ==
* {{cite web
* {{cite web