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In addiction research / behavioral economics, George Ainslie points out that addiction can be cast as an intertemporal PD problem between the present and future selves of the addict.  In this case, defecting means relapsing, and it is easy to see that not defecting both today and in the future is by far the best outcome. The case where one abstains today but relapses in the future is the worst outcome – in some sense the discipline and self-sacrifice involved in abstaining today have been "wasted" because the future relapse means that the addict is right back where he started and will have to start over (which is quite demoralizing, and makes starting over more difficult).  Relapsing today and tomorrow is a slightly "better" outcome, because while the addict is still addicted, they haven't put the effort in to trying to stop. The final case, where one engages in the addictive behavior today while abstaining "tomorrow" will be familiar to anyone who has struggled with an addiction.  The problem here is that (as in other PDs) there is an obvious benefit to defecting "today", but tomorrow one will face the same PD, and the same obvious benefit will be present then, ultimately leading to an endless string of defections.

In addiction research / behavioral economics, George Ainslie points out that addiction can be cast as an intertemporal PD problem between the present and future selves of the addict.  In this case, defecting means relapsing, and it is easy to see that not defecting both today and in the future is by far the best outcome. The case where one abstains today but relapses in the future is the worst outcome – in some sense the discipline and self-sacrifice involved in abstaining today have been "wasted" because the future relapse means that the addict is right back where he started and will have to start over (which is quite demoralizing, and makes starting over more difficult).  Relapsing today and tomorrow is a slightly "better" outcome, because while the addict is still addicted, they haven't put the effort in to trying to stop. The final case, where one engages in the addictive behavior today while abstaining "tomorrow" will be familiar to anyone who has struggled with an addiction.  The problem here is that (as in other PDs) there is an obvious benefit to defecting "today", but tomorrow one will face the same PD, and the same obvious benefit will be present then, ultimately leading to an endless string of defections.

在成瘾研究 / 行为经济学中，乔治·安斯利指出，成瘾可以被描述为成瘾者现在和未来自我之间的跨期囚徒困境问题。在这种情况下，叛变意味着反复，很容易看出，不在今天和未来叛变是迄今为止最好的结果。如果一个人今天戒了，但在将来又复吸，这是最糟糕的结果——从某种意义上来说，今天戒瘾所包含的纪律和自我牺牲已经被“浪费”了，因为未来的复吸意味着瘾君子又回到了他开始的地方，将不得不重新开始(这相当令人沮丧，也使得重新开始更加困难)。今天和明天复发是一个稍微“更好”的结果，因为当瘾君子仍然上瘾时，他们没有努力去尝试停止。最后一种情况，一个人在今天进行成瘾行为，而在明天弃权，这对于任何一个与成瘾作斗争的人来说都是熟悉的。这里的问题是(和其他囚徒困境一样) ，背叛“今天”有一个明显的好处，但明天一个人将面临同样的囚徒困境，同样明显的好处将出现，最终导致一连串无休止的叛变。

在成瘾研究 / 行为经济学中，乔治·安斯利指出，成瘾可以被描述为成瘾者现在和未来自我之间的跨期囚徒困境问题。在这种情况下，叛变意味着反复，很容易看出，不在今天和未来叛变是迄今为止最好的结果。如果一个人今天戒了，但在将来又复吸，这是最糟糕的结果——从某种意义上来说，今天戒瘾所包含的纪律和自我牺牲已经被“浪费”了，因为未来的复吸意味着瘾君子又回到了他开始的地方，将不得不重新开始(这相当令人沮丧，也使得重新开始更加困难)。今天和明天复发是一个稍微“更好”的结果，因为当瘾君子仍然上瘾时，他们没有努力去尝试停止。最后一种情况，一个人在今天进行成瘾行为，而在明天弃权，这对于任何一个与成瘾作斗争的人来说都是熟悉的。这里的问题是(和其他囚徒困境一样) ，背叛“今天”有一个明显的好处，但明天这个个人将面临同样的囚徒困境，同样明显的好处将出现，最终导致一连串无休止的叛变。

John Gottman in his research described in "the science of trust" defines good relationships as those where partners know not to enter the (D,D) cell or at least not to get dynamically stuck there in a loop.

John Gottman in his research described in "the science of trust" defines good relationships as those where partners know not to enter the (D,D) cell or at least not to get dynamically stuck there in a loop.

John Gottman 在他的研究《信任的科学》中将良好的关系定义为伴侣知道不要进入(d，d)细胞或者至少不要陷入一个循环中。

John Gottman 在他的研究《信任的科学》中将良好的关系定义为伴侣知道不要进入(叛变，叛变）牢房中或者至少不要陷入这样一个循环中。

The prisoner's dilemma has been called the E. coli of social psychology, and it has been used widely to research various topics such as oligopolistic competition and collective action to produce a collective good.  

The prisoner's dilemma has been called the E. coli of social psychology, and it has been used widely to research various topics such as oligopolistic competition and collective action to produce a collective good.  

Advertising is sometimes cited as a real-example of the prisoner's dilemma.  When cigarette advertising was legal in the United States, competing cigarette manufacturers had to decide how much money to spend on advertising.  The effectiveness of Firm A's advertising was partially determined by the advertising conducted by Firm B.  Likewise, the profit derived from advertising for Firm B is affected by the advertising conducted by Firm A.  If both Firm A and Firm B chose to advertise during a given period, then the advertisement from each firm negates the other's, receipts remain constant, and expenses increase due to the cost of advertising.  Both firms would benefit from a reduction in advertising.  However, should Firm B choose not to advertise, Firm A could benefit greatly by advertising. Nevertheless, the optimal amount of advertising by one firm depends on how much advertising the other undertakes. As the best strategy is dependent on what the other firm chooses there is no dominant strategy, which makes it slightly different from a prisoner's dilemma. The outcome is similar, though, in that both firms would be better off were they to advertise less than in the equilibrium. Sometimes cooperative behaviors do emerge in business situations.  For instance, cigarette manufacturers endorsed the making of laws banning cigarette advertising, understanding that this would reduce costs and increase profits across the industry. This analysis is likely to be pertinent in many other business situations involving advertising.

Advertising is sometimes cited as a real-example of the prisoner's dilemma.  When cigarette advertising was legal in the United States, competing cigarette manufacturers had to decide how much money to spend on advertising.  The effectiveness of Firm A's advertising was partially determined by the advertising conducted by Firm B.  Likewise, the profit derived from advertising for Firm B is affected by the advertising conducted by Firm A.  If both Firm A and Firm B chose to advertise during a given period, then the advertisement from each firm negates the other's, receipts remain constant, and expenses increase due to the cost of advertising.  Both firms would benefit from a reduction in advertising.  However, should Firm B choose not to advertise, Firm A could benefit greatly by advertising. Nevertheless, the optimal amount of advertising by one firm depends on how much advertising the other undertakes. As the best strategy is dependent on what the other firm chooses there is no dominant strategy, which makes it slightly different from a prisoner's dilemma. The outcome is similar, though, in that both firms would be better off were they to advertise less than in the equilibrium. Sometimes cooperative behaviors do emerge in business situations.  For instance, cigarette manufacturers endorsed the making of laws banning cigarette advertising, understanding that this would reduce costs and increase profits across the industry. This analysis is likely to be pertinent in many other business situations involving advertising.

广告有时被引用为囚徒困境的一个真实例子。当香烟广告在美国是合法的时候，相互竞争的香烟制造商必须决定在广告上花多少钱。公司 a 的广告效果部分取决于公司 b 的广告效果。同样，公司 b 的广告利润也受到公司 a 的广告影响。如果公司 a 和公司 b 都选择在给定的时间段内做广告，那么两家公司的广告就会抵消对方的广告，收入保持不变，费用因广告成本而增加。两家公司都将从广告减少中获益。然而，如果 b 公司选择不做广告，a 公司可以通过广告获得巨大的利益。然而，一家公司的最佳广告数量取决于另一家公司承担了多少广告。由于最佳策略取决于其他公司的选择，因此没有占主导地位的策略，这使得它与囚徒困境略有不同。结果是相似的，尽管，在这两个公司会更好，如果他们的广告少于在均衡。有时合作行为确实会在商业环境中出现。例如，香烟制造商支持立法禁止香烟广告，理解这将降低成本和增加整个行业的利润。这种分析可能适用于许多其他涉及广告的商业情况。

广告有时被引用为囚徒困境的一个真实例子。当香烟广告在美国是合法的时候，相互竞争的香烟制造商必须决定在广告上花多少钱。公司 a 的广告效果部分取决于公司 b 的广告效果。同样，公司 b 的广告带来的利润也受到公司 a 的广告影响。如果公司 a 和公司 b 都选择在给定的时间段内做广告，那么一家公司的广告就会抵消另一方的广告，倘若收入保持不变，费用就会因广告成本而增加。两家公司都将从广告减少中获益。然而，如果 b 公司选择不做广告，a 公司就可以通过广告获得巨大的利益。尽管如此，一家公司的最佳广告数量仍取决于另一家公司从事了多少广告。由于最佳策略取决于其他公司的选择，因此这里没有占主导地位的策略，这使得它与囚徒困境略有不同。但结果是相似的，如果两家公司的广告都少于均衡他们的处境会更好。有时合作行为确实会在商业环境中出现。例如，香烟制造商支持立法禁止香烟广告，理解这将降低成本和增加整个行业的利润。这种分析可能适用于许多其他涉及广告的商业情况。

Without enforceable agreements, members of a cartel are also involved in a (multi-player) prisoner's dilemma. 'Cooperating' typically means keeping prices at a pre-agreed minimum level. 'Defecting' means selling under this minimum level, instantly taking business (and profits) from other cartel members. Anti-trust authorities want potential cartel members to mutually defect, ensuring the lowest possible prices for consumers.

Without enforceable agreements, members of a cartel are also involved in a (multi-player) prisoner's dilemma. 'Cooperating' typically means keeping prices at a pre-agreed minimum level. 'Defecting' means selling under this minimum level, instantly taking business (and profits) from other cartel members. Anti-trust authorities want potential cartel members to mutually defect, ensuring the lowest possible prices for consumers.

没有可强制执行的协议，卡特尔的成员国也会陷入(多玩家)囚徒困境。“合作”通常意味着将价格保持在预先商定的最低水平。“叛逃”意味着在这个最低水平下销售，立即从其他卡特尔成员那里获得业务(和利润)。反垄断机构希望潜在的卡特尔成员相互背叛，确保消费者获得尽可能低的价格。

没有可强制执行的协议，卡特尔的成员国也会陷入(多玩家)囚徒困境。“合作”通常意味着将价格保持在预先商定的最低水平。“叛变”意味着在这个最低价格水平下方销售，立即从其他卡特尔成员那里获得业务(和利润)。反垄断机构希望潜在的卡特尔成员相互叛变，确保消费者获得尽可能低的价格。

Two competing athletes have the option to use an illegal and/or dangerous drug to boost their performance. If neither athlete takes the drug, then neither gains an advantage. If only one does, then that athlete gains a significant advantage over their competitor, reduced by the legal and/or medical dangers of having taken the drug. If both athletes take the drug, however, the benefits cancel out and only the dangers remain, putting them both in a worse position than if neither had used doping.

Two competing athletes have the option to use an illegal and/or dangerous drug to boost their performance. If neither athlete takes the drug, then neither gains an advantage. If only one does, then that athlete gains a significant advantage over their competitor, reduced by the legal and/or medical dangers of having taken the drug. If both athletes take the drug, however, the benefits cancel out and only the dangers remain, putting them both in a worse position than if neither had used doping.

In international political theory, the Prisoner's Dilemma is often used to demonstrate the coherence of strategic realism, which holds that in international relations, all states (regardless of their internal policies or professed ideology), will act in their rational self-interest given international anarchy. A classic example is an arms race like the Cold War and similar conflicts. During the Cold War the opposing alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact both had the choice to arm or disarm. From each side's point of view, disarming whilst their opponent continued to arm would have led to military inferiority and possible annihilation. Conversely, arming whilst their opponent disarmed would have led to superiority. If both sides chose to arm, neither could afford to attack the other, but both incurred the high cost of developing and maintaining a nuclear arsenal. If both sides chose to disarm, war would be avoided and there would be no costs.

In international political theory, the Prisoner's Dilemma is often used to demonstrate the coherence of strategic realism, which holds that in international relations, all states (regardless of their internal policies or professed ideology), will act in their rational self-interest given international anarchy. A classic example is an arms race like the Cold War and similar conflicts. During the Cold War the opposing alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact both had the choice to arm or disarm. From each side's point of view, disarming whilst their opponent continued to arm would have led to military inferiority and possible annihilation. Conversely, arming whilst their opponent disarmed would have led to superiority. If both sides chose to arm, neither could afford to attack the other, but both incurred the high cost of developing and maintaining a nuclear arsenal. If both sides chose to disarm, war would be avoided and there would be no costs.

在国际政治理论中，囚徒困境经常被用来证明战略现实主义的一致性，这种战略现实主义认为，在国际关系中，由于国际无政府状态，所有国家(无论其国内政策或公开宣称的意识形态如何)都会为了自身的理性利益。一个典型的例子是类似冷战和类似冲突的军备竞赛。在冷战期间，北约和华沙条约组织的对立联盟都可以选择武装或解除武装。从双方的观点来看，解除武装而对手继续武装将导致军事劣势和可能的歼灭。相反，如果武装的时候对手已经解除了武装，那么就会获得优势。如果双方都选择武装对方，那么任何一方都承担不起攻击对方的代价，但是双方都为发展和维持核武库付出了高昂的代价。如果双方都选择裁军，战争就可以避免，也不会有任何代价。

在国际政治理论中，囚徒困境经常被用来证明战略现实主义的一致性，这种战略现实主义认为，在国际关系中，由于国际无政府状态，所有国家(无论其国内政策或公开宣称的意识形态如何)都会为了自身的理性利益来行动。一个典型的例子是类似冷战和类似冲突的军备竞赛。在冷战期间，北约和华约组织的对立联盟都可以选择武装或解除武装。从双方的观点来看，解除武装而对手继续武装将导致军事劣势和可能的被歼灭。相反，如果武装的时候对手已经解除了武装，那么就会获得优势。如果双方都选择武装自己，那么任何一方都承担不起攻击对方的代价，但是双方都为发展和维持核武库付出了高昂的代价。如果双方都选择裁军，战争就可以避免，也不会有任何代价。

Although the 'best' overall outcome is for both sides to disarm, the rational course for both sides is to arm, and this is indeed what happened. Both sides poured enormous resources into military research and armament in a war of attrition for the next thirty years until the Soviet Union could not withstand the economic cost. The same logic could be applied in any similar scenario, be it economic or technological competition between sovereign states.

Although the 'best' overall outcome is for both sides to disarm, the rational course for both sides is to arm, and this is indeed what happened. Both sides poured enormous resources into military research and armament in a war of attrition for the next thirty years until the Soviet Union could not withstand the economic cost. The same logic could be applied in any similar scenario, be it economic or technological competition between sovereign states.

Many real-life dilemmas involve multiple players. Although metaphorical, Hardin's tragedy of the commons may be viewed as an example of a multi-player generalization of the PD: Each villager makes a choice for personal gain or restraint. The collective reward for unanimous (or even frequent) defection is very low payoffs (representing the destruction of the "commons"). A commons dilemma most people can relate to is washing the dishes in a shared house.  By not washing dishes an individual can gain by saving his time, but if that behavior is adopted by every resident the collective cost is no clean plates for anyone.

Many real-life dilemmas involve multiple players. Although metaphorical, Hardin's tragedy of the commons may be viewed as an example of a multi-player generalization of the PD: Each villager makes a choice for personal gain or restraint. The collective reward for unanimous (or even frequent) defection is very low payoffs (representing the destruction of the "commons"). A commons dilemma most people can relate to is washing the dishes in a shared house.  By not washing dishes an individual can gain by saving his time, but if that behavior is adopted by every resident the collective cost is no clean plates for anyone.

许多现实生活中的困境牵涉到多个参与者。虽然比喻性的，Hardin 的公地悲剧可以被看作是 PD 的多人泛化的一个例子: 每个村民做出选择是为了个人利益还是为了克制。对于一致(甚至频繁)叛逃的集体奖励是非常低的回报(代表了对“公共资源”的破坏)。一个大多数人都能理解的共同困境就是在一个共享的房子里洗碗。通过不洗碗，个人可以节省时间，但如果这种行为被每个居民采纳，集体成本是没有干净的盘子为任何人。

许多现实生活中的困境牵涉到多个参与者。虽然是比喻性的，哈丁的公地悲剧可以被看作是囚徒困境的多人泛化的一个例子: 每个村民做出选择是为了个人利益还是为了克制。对于一致(甚至频繁)叛变的集体回报是非常低的回报(代表了对“公共资源”的破坏)。一个大多数人都能理解的共同困境就是在一个共享的房子里洗碗。通过不洗碗，个人可以节省时间，但如果这种行为被每个居民采纳，集体成本是任何人都没有干净的盘子。

The commons are not always exploited: William Poundstone, in a book about the prisoner's dilemma (see References below), describes a situation in New Zealand where newspaper boxes are left unlocked. It is possible for people to take a paper without paying (defecting) but very few do, feeling that if they do not pay then neither will others, destroying the system. Subsequent research by Elinor Ostrom, winner of the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, hypothesized that the tragedy of the commons is oversimplified, with the negative outcome influenced by outside influences. Without complicating pressures, groups communicate and manage the commons among themselves for their mutual benefit, enforcing social norms to preserve the resource and achieve the maximum good for the group, an example of effecting the best case outcome for PD.

The commons are not always exploited: William Poundstone, in a book about the prisoner's dilemma (see References below), describes a situation in New Zealand where newspaper boxes are left unlocked. It is possible for people to take a paper without paying (defecting) but very few do, feeling that if they do not pay then neither will others, destroying the system. Subsequent research by Elinor Ostrom, winner of the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, hypothesized that the tragedy of the commons is oversimplified, with the negative outcome influenced by outside influences. Without complicating pressures, groups communicate and manage the commons among themselves for their mutual benefit, enforcing social norms to preserve the resource and achieve the maximum good for the group, an example of effecting the best case outcome for PD.

公共资源并不总是被利用: 威廉 · 庞德斯通在一本关于囚徒困境的书(见下文参考文献)中描述了新西兰的一种情况，报纸盒子没有上锁。人们可以不付钱就拿报纸(叛逃) ，但很少有人这样做，他们觉得如果他们不付钱，那么其他人也不会付钱，这会摧毁整个体系。2009年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者 Elinor Ostrom 随后的研究假设，公地悲剧经济学过于简单化，其负面结果受到外部影响。在没有复杂压力的情况下，团体之间为了共同利益进行沟通和管理，执行社会规范以保护资源并为团体实现最大利益，这是影响方案发展最佳结果的一个例子。

公共资源并不总是被利用: 威廉·庞德斯通在一本关于囚徒困境的书(见下文参考文献)中描述了新西兰的一种情况，报纸盒子没有上锁。人们可以不付钱就拿报纸(叛变) ，但很少有人这样做，他们觉得如果他们不付钱，那么其他人也不会付钱，这会摧毁整个体系。2009年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆随后的研究认为公地悲剧经济学过于简单化，其负面结果受到外部影响。在没有复杂压力的情况下，团体之间为了共同利益进行沟通和管理，执行社会规范以保护资源并为团体实现最大利益，这是影响囚徒困境发展最佳结果的一个例子。

Douglas Hofstadter once suggested that people often find problems such as the PD problem easier to understand when it is illustrated in the form of a simple game, or trade-off. One of several examples he used was "closed bag exchange":

Douglas Hofstadter once suggested that people often find problems such as the PD problem easier to understand when it is illustrated in the form of a simple game, or trade-off. One of several examples he used was "closed bag exchange":

侯世达曾经指出，人们通常会发现问题，比如 PD 问题，当它以一个简单游戏的形式表现出来时，或者以权衡的方式表现出来时，会更容易理解。他使用的几个例子之一是“封闭式袋子交换” :

侯世达曾经指出，人们通常会发现问题，比如囚徒困境问题，当它以一个简单博弈的形式表现出来时，或者以权衡的方式表现出来时，会更容易理解。他使用的几个例子之一是“封闭式袋子交换” :

{{quote|Two people meet and exchange closed bags, with the understanding that one of them contains money, and the other contains a purchase. Either player can choose to honor the deal by putting into his or her bag what he or she agreed, or he or she can defect by handing over an empty bag.}}

{{quote|Two people meet and exchange closed bags, with the understanding that one of them contains money, and the other contains a purchase. Either player can choose to honor the deal by putting into his or her bag what he or she agreed, or he or she can defect by handing over an empty bag.}}

Defection always gives a game-theoretically preferable outcome.

Defection always gives a game-theoretically preferable outcome.

Friend or Foe? is a game show that aired from 2002 to 2005 on the Game Show Network in the US.  It is an example of the prisoner's dilemma game tested on real people, but in an artificial setting. On the game show, three pairs of people compete. When a pair is eliminated, they play a game similar to the prisoner's dilemma to determine how the winnings are split. If they both cooperate (Friend), they share the winnings 50–50. If one cooperates and the other defects (Foe), the defector gets all the winnings and the cooperator gets nothing. If both defect, both leave with nothing. Notice that the reward matrix is slightly different from the standard one given above, as the rewards for the "both defect" and the "cooperate while the opponent defects" cases are identical. This makes the "both defect" case a weak equilibrium, compared with being a strict equilibrium in the standard prisoner's dilemma. If a contestant knows that their opponent is going to vote "Foe", then their own choice does not affect their own winnings. In a specific sense, Friend or Foe has a rewards model between prisoner's dilemma and the game of Chicken.

Friend or Foe? is a game show that aired from 2002 to 2005 on the Game Show Network in the US.  It is an example of the prisoner's dilemma game tested on real people, but in an artificial setting. On the game show, three pairs of people compete. When a pair is eliminated, they play a game similar to the prisoner's dilemma to determine how the winnings are split. If they both cooperate (Friend), they share the winnings 50–50. If one cooperates and the other defects (Foe), the defector gets all the winnings and the cooperator gets nothing. If both defect, both leave with nothing. Notice that the reward matrix is slightly different from the standard one given above, as the rewards for the "both defect" and the "cooperate while the opponent defects" cases are identical. This makes the "both defect" case a weak equilibrium, compared with being a strict equilibrium in the standard prisoner's dilemma. If a contestant knows that their opponent is going to vote "Foe", then their own choice does not affect their own winnings. In a specific sense, Friend or Foe has a rewards model between prisoner's dilemma and the game of Chicken.

朋友还是敌人？是一个游戏节目，从2002年至2005年在美国的游戏节目网络播出。这是囚徒困境游戏在真人身上测试的一个例子，但是是在人为的环境中。在游戏节目中，有三对选手参加比赛。当一对被淘汰时，他们会玩一个类似囚徒困境的游戏来决定奖金如何分配。如果他们都合作(朋友) ，他们分享奖金50-50。如果一方合作而另一方有缺陷(敌人) ，那么叛逃者将得到所有的奖金，而合作者将一无所获。如果双方都有缺陷，那么双方都将一无所有。请注意，奖励矩阵与上面给出的标准矩阵略有不同，因为“双方都有缺陷”和“合作而对方有缺陷”情况下的奖励是相同的。与标准囚徒困境中的严格均衡相比，这使得“两个缺陷”情况成为一个弱均衡。如果一个参赛者知道他们的对手将投票给“敌人” ，那么他们自己的选择不会影响他们自己的奖金。从特定意义上讲，《敌友》在囚徒困境和“胆小鬼”博弈之间有一个奖励模型。

朋友还是敌人？是一个竞赛节目，从2002年至2005年在美国的竞赛节目网络播出。这是囚徒困境博弈在真人身上测试的一个例子，但是是在人为的环境中。在游戏节目中，有三对选手参加比赛。当一对被淘汰时，他们会玩一个类似囚徒困境的游戏来决定奖金如何分配。如果他们都合作(朋友) ，他们分享奖金50-50。如果一方合作而另一方叛变(敌人) ，那么叛变者将得到所有的奖金，而合作者将一无所获。如果双方都叛变，那么双方都将一无所有。请注意，奖励矩阵与上面给出的标准矩阵略有不同，因为“双方都叛变”和“合作而对方叛变”情况下的奖励是相同的。与标准囚徒困境中的严格均衡相比，这使得“两个都叛变”情况成为一个弱均衡。如果一个参赛者知道他们的对手将投票给“敌人” ，那么他们自己的选择不会影响他们自己的奖金。从特定意义上讲，“朋友还是敌人”节目在囚徒困境和“胆小鬼”博弈之间有一个奖励模型。

This payoff matrix has also been used on the British television programmes Trust Me, Shafted, The Bank Job and Golden Balls, and on the American shows Bachelor Pad and Take It All. Game data from the Golden Balls series has been analyzed by a team of economists, who found that cooperation was "surprisingly high" for amounts of money that would seem consequential in the real world, but were comparatively low in the context of the game.

This payoff matrix has also been used on the British television programmes Trust Me, Shafted, The Bank Job and Golden Balls, and on the American shows Bachelor Pad and Take It All. Game data from the Golden Balls series has been analyzed by a team of economists, who found that cooperation was "surprisingly high" for amounts of money that would seem consequential in the real world, but were comparatively low in the context of the game.

英国电视节目《相信我》、《阴影》、《银行工作》和《黄金球》以及美国电视节目《单身公寓》和《全部拿走》也采用了这种盈利模式。一个经济学家团队分析了金球系列的游戏数据，他们发现，对于在现实世界中看似重要的金钱数量，合作程度“惊人地高” ，但在游戏的背景下，合作程度相对较低。

英国电视节目《相信我》、《阴影》、《银行工作》和《黄金球》以及美国电视节目《单身公寓》和《全部拿走》也采用了这种奖励矩阵。一个经济学家团队分析了金球系列的游戏数据，他们发现，对于看似重要的金钱数量，现实生活中合作程度“惊人地高” ，但在游戏的背景下，合作程度相对较低。

Researchers from the University of Lausanne and the University of Edinburgh have suggested that the "Iterated Snowdrift Game" may more closely reflect real-world social situations. Although this model is actually a chicken game, it will be described here. In this model, the risk of being exploited through defection is lower, and individuals always gain from taking the cooperative choice. The snowdrift game imagines two drivers who are stuck on opposite sides of a snowdrift, each of whom is given the option of shoveling snow to clear a path, or remaining in their car. A player's highest payoff comes from leaving the opponent to clear all the snow by themselves, but the opponent is still nominally rewarded for their work.

Researchers from the University of Lausanne and the University of Edinburgh have suggested that the "Iterated Snowdrift Game" may more closely reflect real-world social situations. Although this model is actually a chicken game, it will be described here. In this model, the risk of being exploited through defection is lower, and individuals always gain from taking the cooperative choice. The snowdrift game imagines two drivers who are stuck on opposite sides of a snowdrift, each of whom is given the option of shoveling snow to clear a path, or remaining in their car. A player's highest payoff comes from leaving the opponent to clear all the snow by themselves, but the opponent is still nominally rewarded for their work.

!  !! Cooperates !! Defects

!  !! Cooperates !! Defects

!!!合作！缺陷

!!!合作！叛变

|-

|-

!  !! Cooperates !! Defects

!  !! Cooperates !! Defects

!!!合作！缺陷

!!!合作！叛变

|-

|-

! Defects

! Defects

!缺陷

!叛变

| 300, -100 || 0, 0

| 300, -100 || 0, 0

In coordination games, players must coordinate their strategies for a good outcome. An example is two cars that abruptly meet in a blizzard; each must choose whether to swerve left or right. If both swerve left, or both right, the cars do not collide. The local left- and right-hand traffic convention helps to co-ordinate their actions.

In coordination games, players must coordinate their strategies for a good outcome. An example is two cars that abruptly meet in a blizzard; each must choose whether to swerve left or right. If both swerve left, or both right, the cars do not collide. The local left- and right-hand traffic convention helps to co-ordinate their actions.

A more general set of games are asymmetric. As in the prisoner's dilemma, the best outcome is co-operation, and there are motives for defection. Unlike the symmetric prisoner's dilemma, though, one player has more to lose and/or more to gain than the other. Some such games have been described as a prisoner's dilemma in which one prisoner has an alibi, whence the term "alibi game".

A more general set of games are asymmetric. As in the prisoner's dilemma, the best outcome is co-operation, and there are motives for defection. Unlike the symmetric prisoner's dilemma, though, one player has more to lose and/or more to gain than the other. Some such games have been described as a prisoner's dilemma in which one prisoner has an alibi, whence the term "alibi game".

In experiments, players getting unequal payoffs in repeated games may seek to maximize profits, but only under the condition that both players receive equal payoffs; this may lead to a stable equilibrium strategy in which the disadvantaged player defects every X games, while the other always co-operates. Such behaviour may depend on the experiment's social norms around fairness.

In experiments, players getting unequal payoffs in repeated games may seek to maximize profits, but only under the condition that both players receive equal payoffs; this may lead to a stable equilibrium strategy in which the disadvantaged player defects every X games, while the other always co-operates. Such behaviour may depend on the experiment's social norms around fairness.

在实验中，重复博弈中获得不平等收益的参与者可能会寻求利润最大化，但是只有在两个参与者获得相同收益的条件下，这可能导致一个稳定的均衡策略，即弱势参与者在每个 x 博弈中都会缺陷，而另一个参与者总是合作。这种行为可能取决于实验围绕公平的社会规范。

在实验中，重复博弈中获得不平等收益的参与者可能会寻求利润最大化，但是只有在两个参与者获得相同收益的条件下，这可能导致一个稳定的均衡策略，即弱势参与者在每个 x 博弈中都会叛变，而另一个参与者总是合作。这种行为可能取决于实验围绕公平的社会规范。

Hannu Rajaniemi set the opening scene of his The Quantum Thief trilogy in a "dilemma prison". The main theme of the series has been described as the "inadequacy of a binary universe" and the ultimate antagonist is a character called the All-Defector.  Rajaniemi is particularly interesting as an artist treating this subject in that he is a Cambridge-trained mathematician and holds a PhD in mathematical physics – the interchangeability of matter and information is a major feature of the books, which take place in a "post-singularity" future.  The first book in the series was published in 2010, with the two sequels, The Fractal Prince and The Causal Angel, published in 2012 and 2014, respectively.

Hannu Rajaniemi set the opening scene of his The Quantum Thief trilogy in a "dilemma prison". The main theme of the series has been described as the "inadequacy of a binary universe" and the ultimate antagonist is a character called the All-Defector.  Rajaniemi is particularly interesting as an artist treating this subject in that he is a Cambridge-trained mathematician and holds a PhD in mathematical physics – the interchangeability of matter and information is a major feature of the books, which take place in a "post-singularity" future.  The first book in the series was published in 2010, with the two sequels, The Fractal Prince and The Causal Angel, published in 2012 and 2014, respectively.

汉努 · 拉贾尼埃米将他的《量子窃贼》三部曲的开场场景设置在一个“进退两难的监狱”中。该系列的主题被描述为“双重宇宙的不足” ，最终的对手是一个叫做全面叛逃者的角色。拉贾尼埃米作为一个处理这个问题的艺术家尤其有趣，因为他是剑桥大学培养的数学家，拥有数学物理学博士学位——物质和信息的可互换性是这本书的一个主要特征，它发生在“后奇点”的未来。该系列的第一本书于2010年出版，其续集《分形王子》和《因果天使》分别于2012年和2014年出版。

汉努 · 拉贾尼埃米将他的《量子窃贼》三部曲的开场场景设置在一个“进退两难的监狱”中。该系列的主题被描述为“双重宇宙的不足” ，最终的对手是一个叫做全面叛变者的角色。拉贾尼埃米作为一个处理这个问题的艺术家尤其有趣，因为他是剑桥大学培养的数学家，拥有数学物理学博士学位——物质和信息的可互换性是这本书的一个主要特征，它发生在“后奇点”的未来。该系列的第一本书于2010年出版，其续集《分形王子》和《因果天使》分别于2012年和2014年出版。

A game modeled after the (iterated) prisoner's dilemma is a central focus of the 2012 video game Zero Escape: Virtue's Last Reward and a minor part in its 2016 sequel Zero Escape: Zero Time Dilemma.

A game modeled after the (iterated) prisoner's dilemma is a central focus of the 2012 video game Zero Escape: Virtue's Last Reward and a minor part in its 2016 sequel Zero Escape: Zero Time Dilemma.

一个模仿囚徒困境的游戏是2012年电子游戏《零度逃脱: 美德的最后奖励》的中心焦点，也是2016年续集《零度逃脱: 极限脱出刻之困境》的一个次要部分。

一个模仿迭代囚徒困境的游戏《零度逃脱: 美德的最后奖励》是2012年电子游戏的中心焦点，也是2016年续集《零度逃脱: 极限脱出刻之困境》的一个次要部分。

In The Mysterious Benedict Society and the Prisoner's Dilemma by Trenton Lee Stewart, the main characters start by playing a version of the game and escaping from the "prison" altogether. Later they become actual prisoners and escape once again.

In The Mysterious Benedict Society and the Prisoner's Dilemma by Trenton Lee Stewart, the main characters start by playing a version of the game and escaping from the "prison" altogether. Later they become actual prisoners and escape once again.

在特伦顿 · 李 · 斯图尔特(Trenton Lee Stewart)的《神秘的本尼迪克特社会和囚徒困境》(The Mysterious Benedict Society and The Prisoner’s Dilemma)中，主要角色从玩一个版本的游戏开始，然后一起逃离“监狱”。后来他们变成了真正的囚犯，再次越狱。

在特伦顿· 李 ·斯图尔特的《神秘的本尼迪克特社会和囚徒困境》中，主要角色从玩一个版本的游戏开始，然后一起逃离“监狱”。后来他们变成了真正的囚犯，再次越狱。

In The Adventure Zone: Balance during The Suffering Game subarc, the player characters are twice presented with the prisoner's dilemma during their time in two liches' domain, once cooperating and once defecting.

In The Adventure Zone: Balance during The Suffering Game subarc, the player characters are twice presented with the prisoner's dilemma during their time in two liches' domain, once cooperating and once defecting.

在冒险区: 苦难游戏中的平衡中，玩家角色在他们在两个领域的时间内两次被呈现囚徒困境，一次是合作，一次是叛逃。

在冒险区: 苦难游戏中的平衡中，玩家角色在他们在两个领域的时间内两次被呈现囚徒困境，一次是合作，一次是叛变。

In the 8th novel from the author James S. A. Corey Tiamat's Wrath . Winston Duarte explains the prisoners dilemma in his 14-year-old daughter, Teresa, to train her in strategic thinking.  

In the 8th novel from the author James S. A. Corey Tiamat's Wrath . Winston Duarte explains the prisoners dilemma in his 14-year-old daughter, Teresa, to train her in strategic thinking.  

==See also==

==See also==

 

{{div col|colwidth=18em}}

{{div col|colwidth=18em}}

* [[Abilene paradox]]

* [[Abilene paradox]]

 

* [[Centipede game]]

* [[Centipede game]]

 

* [[Christmas truce]]

* [[Christmas truce]]

 

* [[Folk theorem (game theory)]]

* [[Folk theorem (game theory)]]

 

* [[Free-rider problem]]

* [[Free-rider problem]]

 

* [[Hobbesian trap]]

* [[Hobbesian trap]]

 

* [[Innocent prisoner's dilemma]]

* [[Innocent prisoner's dilemma]]

 

* [[Liar Game]]

* [[Liar Game]]

 

* [[Optional prisoner's dilemma]]

* [[Optional prisoner's dilemma]]

 

* [[Robert H. Frank#Prisoner's dilemma and cooperation|Prisoner's dilemma and cooperation]]

* [[Robert H. Frank#Prisoner's dilemma and cooperation|Prisoner's dilemma and cooperation]]

 

* [[Public goods game]]

* [[Public goods game]]

 

* [[Gift-exchange game]]

* [[Gift-exchange game]]

 

* [[Reciprocal altruism]]

* [[Reciprocal altruism]]

 

* [[Social preferences]]

* [[Social preferences]]

 

* [[Swift trust theory]]

* [[Swift trust theory]]

 

* [[Unscrupulous diner's dilemma]]

* [[Unscrupulous diner's dilemma]]

 

{{div col end}}

{{div col end}}

==References==

==References==

 

{{notelist}}

{{notelist}}

==Further reading==

==Further reading==

 

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{{refbegin|30em}}