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现代运筹学起源于1937年英国的鲍德西研究站，这是该站负责人 A.P.Rowe 和劳勃·沃森-瓦特发起的一项倡议的结果。罗伊将这一想法视为一种分析和改善英国预警雷达系统(代号为“连锁住宅”(Chain Home，CH))运作的手段。最初，罗分析了雷达设备及其通信网络的运行情况，后来扩展到包括操作人员的行为。这暴露了 CH 网络的局限性，并允许采取补救行动。

 

现代运筹学起源于1937年英国的鲍德西研究站，这离不开该站负责人 A.P.Rowe 和劳勃·沃森-瓦特发起的一项倡议的。罗伊将这一学科视为一种分析和改善英国预警雷达系统(代号为“连锁住宅”(Chain Home，CH))运作的手段。最初，罗分析了雷达设备及其通信网络的运行情况，后来扩展到包括操作人员的行为。这暴露了 CH 网络的局限性，并允许采取补救行动。

Scientists in the United Kingdom (including Patrick Blackett (later Lord Blackett OM PRS), Cecil Gordon, Solly Zuckerman, (later Baron Zuckerman OM, KCB, FRS), C. H. Waddington, Owen Wansbrough-Jones, Frank Yates, Jacob Bronowski and Freeman Dyson), and in the United States (George Dantzig) looked for ways to make better decisions in such areas as logistics and training schedules.

Scientists in the United Kingdom (including Patrick Blackett (later Lord Blackett OM PRS), Cecil Gordon, Solly Zuckerman, (later Baron Zuckerman OM, KCB, FRS), C. H. Waddington, Owen Wansbrough-Jones, Frank Yates, Jacob Bronowski and Freeman Dyson), and in the United States (George Dantzig) looked for ways to make better decisions in such areas as logistics and training schedules.

英国的科学家(包括帕特里克 · 布莱克特(后来的布莱克特勋爵 OM PRS)、塞西尔 · 戈登(Cecil Gordon)、索利 · 祖克曼(后来的扎克曼男爵 OM、 KCB、 FRS)、 C · H · 沃丁顿(C. H. Waddington)、欧文 · 万斯布罗-琼斯(Owen Wansbrough-Jones)、弗兰克 · 耶茨(Frank Yates)、雅各布 · 布罗诺夫斯基(Jacob Bronowski)和弗里曼 · 戴森(Freeman Dyson)) ，以及美国的科学家(乔治 · 丹齐格(George Dantzig))都在寻找在后勤和培训。

英国的科学家(包括帕特里克 · 布莱克特(后来的布莱克特勋爵 OM PRS)、塞西尔 · 戈登(Cecil Gordon)、索利 · 祖克曼(后来的扎克曼男爵 OM、 KCB、 FRS)、 C · H · 沃丁顿(C. H. Waddington)、欧文 · 万斯布罗-琼斯(Owen Wansbrough-Jones)、弗兰克 · 耶茨(Frank Yates)、雅各布 · 布罗诺夫斯基(Jacob Bronowski)和弗里曼 · 戴森(Freeman Dyson)) ，以及美国的科学家(乔治 · 丹齐格(George Dantzig))都在寻找物流运输过程与事物运作规程的更优解。

 

 

= = 第二次世界大战 = =  

= Second World War 第二次世界大战 =  

The modern field of operational research arose during World War II.{{dubious||what about "[[Bawdsey Research Station|Telecommunications Research Establishment]] in 1937" above?|date=March 2019}} In the World War II era, operational research was defined as "a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control".<ref name=C67-3-4-48-para-1>"Operational Research in the British Army 1939–1945", October 1947, Report C67/3/4/48, UK National Archives file WO291/1301<br />Quoted on the dust-jacket of: Morse, Philip M, and Kimball, George E, ''Methods of Operation Research'', 1st edition revised, MIT Press & J Wiley, 5th printing, 1954.</ref> Other names for it included operational analysis (UK Ministry of Defence from 1962)<ref name=PROCATWO291>[http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=109&CATLN=2&Highlight=&FullDetails=True UK National Archives Catalogue for WO291] lists a War Office organisation called [[Army Operational Research Group]] (AORG) that existed from 1946 to 1962. "In January 1962 the name was changed to Army Operational Research Establishment (AORE). Following the creation of a unified Ministry of Defence, a tri-service operational research organisation was established: the [[Defence Operational Analysis Establishment|Defence Operational Research Establishment]] (DOAE) which was formed in 1965, and it the Army Operational Research Establishment based at West Byfleet."</ref> and quantitative management.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://brochure.unisa.ac.za/myunisa/data/subjects/Quantitative%20Management.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=7 October 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110812213540/http://brochure.unisa.ac.za/myunisa/data/subjects/Quantitative%20Management.pdf |archive-date=12 August 2011 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

The modern field of operational research arose during World War II. In the World War II era, operational research was defined as "a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control".<ref name=C67-3-4-48-para-1>"Operational Research in the British Army 1939–1945", October 1947, Report C67/3/4/48, UK National Archives file WO291/1301<br />Quoted on the dust-jacket of: Morse, Philip M, and Kimball, George E, ''Methods of Operation Research'', 1st edition revised, MIT Press & J Wiley, 5th printing, 1954.</ref> Other names for it included operational analysis (UK Ministry of Defence from 1962)<ref name=PROCATWO291>[http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=109&CATLN=2&Highlight=&FullDetails=True UK National Archives Catalogue for WO291] lists a War Office organisation called [[Army Operational Research Group]] (AORG) that existed from 1946 to 1962. "In January 1962 the name was changed to Army Operational Research Establishment (AORE). Following the creation of a unified Ministry of Defence, a tri-service operational research organisation was established: the [[Defence Operational Analysis Establishment|Defence Operational Research Establishment]] (DOAE) which was formed in 1965, and it the Army Operational Research Establishment based at West Byfleet."</ref> and quantitative management.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://brochure.unisa.ac.za/myunisa/data/subjects/Quantitative%20Management.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=7 October 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110812213540/http://brochure.unisa.ac.za/myunisa/data/subjects/Quantitative%20Management.pdf |archive-date=12 August 2011 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

The modern field of operational research arose during World War II. In the World War II era, operational research was defined as "a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control"."Operational Research in the British Army 1939–1945", October 1947, Report C67/3/4/48, UK National Archives file WO291/1301<br />Quoted on the dust-jacket of: Morse, Philip M, and Kimball, George E, Methods of Operation Research, 1st edition revised, MIT Press & J Wiley, 5th printing, 1954. Other names for it included operational analysis (UK Ministry of Defence from 1962)UK National Archives Catalogue for WO291 lists a War Office organisation called Army Operational Research Group (AORG) that existed from 1946 to 1962. "In January 1962 the name was changed to Army Operational Research Establishment (AORE). Following the creation of a unified Ministry of Defence, a tri-service operational research organisation was established: the Defence Operational Research Establishment (DOAE) which was formed in 1965, and it the Army Operational Research Establishment based at West Byfleet." and quantitative management.

The modern field of operational research arose during World War II. In the World War II era, operational research was defined as "a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control"."Operational Research in the British Army 1939–1945", October 1947, Report C67/3/4/48, UK National Archives file WO291/1301<br />Quoted on the dust-jacket of: Morse, Philip M, and Kimball, George E, Methods of Operation Research, 1st edition revised, MIT Press & J Wiley, 5th printing, 1954. Other names for it included operational analysis (UK Ministry of Defence from 1962)UK National Archives Catalogue for WO291 lists a War Office organisation called Army Operational Research Group (AORG) that existed from 1946 to 1962. "In January 1962 the name was changed to Army Operational Research Establishment (AORE). Following the creation of a unified Ministry of Defence, a tri-service operational research organisation was established: the Defence Operational Research Establishment (DOAE) which was formed in 1965, and it the Army Operational Research Establishment based at West Byfleet." and quantitative management.

During the [[World War II|Second World War]] close to 1,000 men and women in Britain were engaged in operational research. About 200 operational research scientists worked for the [[British Army]].<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA117 p. 117] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130827004623/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA117 |date=27 August 2013 }}</ref>

During the [[World War II|Second World War]] close to 1,000 men and women in Britain were engaged in operational research. About 200 operational research scientists worked for the [[British Army]].<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA117 p. 117] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130827004623/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA117 |date=27 August 2013 }}</ref>

 

[[Patrick Blackett]] worked for several different organizations during the war. Early in the war while working for the [[Royal Aircraft Establishment]] (RAE) he set up a team known as the "Circus" which helped to reduce the number of [[anti-aircraft artillery]] rounds needed to shoot down an enemy aircraft from an average of over 20,000 at the start of the [[Battle of Britain]] to 4,000 in 1941.<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA94 pp. 91–94] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130827041022/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA94 |date=27 August 2013 }}</ref>  

[[Patrick Blackett]] worked for several different organizations during the war. Early in the war while working for the [[Royal Aircraft Establishment]] (RAE) he set up a team known as the "Circus" which helped to reduce the number of [[anti-aircraft artillery]] rounds needed to shoot down an enemy aircraft from an average of over 20,000 at the start of the [[Battle of Britain]] to 4,000 in 1941.<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA94 pp. 91–94] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130827041022/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA94 |date=27 August 2013 }}</ref>  

[[File:B 24 in raf service 23 03 05.jpg|thumb|A [[Consolidated B-24 Liberator|Liberator]] in standard RAF green/dark earth/black night bomber finish as originally used by Coastal Command|链接=Special:FilePath/B_24_in_raf_service_23_03_05.jpg]]

[[File:B 24 in raf service 23 03 05.jpg|thumb|A [[Consolidated B-24 Liberator|Liberator]] in standard RAF green/dark earth/black night bomber finish as originally used by Coastal Command|链接=Special:FilePath/B_24_in_raf_service_23_03_05.jpg]]

In 1941, Blackett moved from the RAE to the Navy, after first working with [[RAF Coastal Command]], in 1941 and then early in 1942 to the [[British Admiralty|Admiralty]].<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA109 p. 96,109] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131002032938/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA109 |date=2 October 2013 }}</ref> Blackett's team at Coastal Command's Operational Research Section (CC-ORS) included two future [[Nobel prize]] winners and many other people who went on to be pre-eminent in their fields.<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA96 p. 96] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140327234509/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA96 |date=27 March 2014 }}</ref><ref name= dyson >[[Freeman Dyson]], ''MIT Technology Review'' (1 November 2006) "[https://www.technologyreview.com/s/406789/a-failure-of-intelligence/ A Failure of Intelligence: Part I]"</ref> They undertook a number of crucial analyses that aided the war effort. Britain introduced the [[convoy]] system to reduce shipping losses, but while the principle of using warships to accompany merchant ships was generally accepted, it was unclear whether it was better for convoys to be small or large. Convoys travel at the speed of the slowest member, so small convoys can travel faster. It was also argued that small convoys would be harder for German [[U-boat]]s to detect. On the other hand, large convoys could deploy more warships against an attacker. Blackett's staff showed that the losses suffered by convoys depended largely on the number of escort vessels present, rather than the size of the convoy. Their conclusion was that a few large convoys are more defensible than many small ones.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.familyheritage.ca/Articles/victory1943.html |title="Numbers are Essential": Victory in the North Atlantic Reconsidered, March–May 1943 |publisher=Familyheritage.ca |date=24 May 1943 |access-date=13 November 2011}}</ref>

In 1941, Blackett moved from the RAE to the Navy, after first working with [[RAF Coastal Command]], in 1941 and then early in 1942 to the [[British Admiralty|Admiralty]].<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA109 p. 96,109] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131002032938/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA109 |date=2 October 2013 }}</ref> Blackett's team at Coastal Command's Operational Research Section (CC-ORS) included two future [[Nobel prize]] winners and many other people who went on to be pre-eminent in their fields.<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA96 p. 96] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140327234509/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA96 |date=27 March 2014 }}</ref><ref name= dyson >[[Freeman Dyson]], ''MIT Technology Review'' (1 November 2006) "[https://www.technologyreview.com/s/406789/a-failure-of-intelligence/ A Failure of Intelligence: Part I]"</ref> They undertook a number of crucial analyses that aided the war effort. Britain introduced the [[convoy]] system to reduce shipping losses, but while the principle of using warships to accompany merchant ships was generally accepted, it was unclear whether it was better for convoys to be small or large. Convoys travel at the speed of the slowest member, so small convoys can travel faster. It was also argued that small convoys would be harder for German [[U-boat]]s to detect. On the other hand, large convoys could deploy more warships against an attacker. Blackett's staff showed that the losses suffered by convoys depended largely on the number of escort vessels present, rather than the size of the convoy. Their conclusion was that a few large convoys are more defensible than many small ones.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.familyheritage.ca/Articles/victory1943.html |title="Numbers are Essential": Victory in the North Atlantic Reconsidered, March–May 1943 |publisher=Familyheritage.ca |date=24 May 1943 |access-date=13 November 2011}}</ref>

1941年，布莱克特从英国皇家空军转入海军，此前他曾在英国皇家空军海防司令部工作，1941年转入英国皇家空军，1942年初转入英国海军部。布莱克特在海岸司令部作战研究部(CC-ORS)的团队包括两位未来的诺贝尔奖获得者和许多其他人，他们在自己的领域中继续取得卓越成就。科比，第96页，弗里曼戴森，麻省理工学院技术评论(2006年11月1日)“智力的失败: 第一部分”他们进行了一些关键的分析，以帮助战争的努力。英国引入护航系统是为了减少航运损失，但是尽管使用军舰陪同商船的原则得到普遍接受，但是护航船队是小型还是大型还不清楚。车队以最慢的成员的速度行驶，因此小型车队可以行驶得更快。还有人认为，小型护航舰队将更难被德国 U 型潜艇发现。另一方面，大型护航舰队可以部署更多的战舰对付攻击者。布莱克特的工作人员表示，护航船队遭受的损失在很大程度上取决于护航船只的数量，而不是护航船队的规模。他们的结论是，少数大型车队比许多小型车队更容易防御。

1941年，布莱克特从英国皇家空军转入海军，此前他曾在英国皇家空军海防司令部工作，1941年转入英国皇家空军，1942年初转入英国海军部。布莱克特在海岸司令部作战研究部(CC-ORS)的团队包括两位未来的诺贝尔奖获得者和许多其他人，他们在自己的领域中继续取得卓越成就。科比，第96页，弗里曼戴森，麻省理工学院技术评论(2006年11月1日)“智力的失败: 第一部分”他们进行了一些关键的分析，以帮助战争的努力。英国引入护航系统是为了减少航运损失，但是尽管使用军舰陪同商船的原则得到普遍接受，但是护航船队是小型还是大型还不清楚。车队以最慢的成员的速度行驶，因此小型车队可以行驶得更快。还有人认为，小型护航舰队将更难被德国 U 型潜艇发现。另一方面，大型护航舰队可以部署更多的战舰对付攻击者。布莱克特的工作人员表示，护航船队遭受的损失在很大程度上取决于护航船只的数量，而不是护航船队的规模。他们的结论是，少数大型车队比许多小型车队更容易防御。

While performing an analysis of the methods used by [[RAF Coastal Command]] to hunt and destroy submarines, one of the analysts asked what colour the aircraft were. As most of them were from Bomber Command they were painted black for night-time operations. At the suggestion of CC-ORS a test was run to see if that was the best colour to camouflage the aircraft for daytime operations in the grey North Atlantic skies. Tests showed that aircraft painted white were on average not spotted until they were 20% closer than those painted black. This change indicated that 30% more submarines would be attacked and sunk for the same number of sightings.<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA101 p. 101]</ref> As a result of these findings Coastal Command changed their aircraft to using white undersurfaces.

While performing an analysis of the methods used by [[RAF Coastal Command]] to hunt and destroy submarines, one of the analysts asked what colour the aircraft were. As most of them were from Bomber Command they were painted black for night-time operations. At the suggestion of CC-ORS a test was run to see if that was the best colour to camouflage the aircraft for daytime operations in the grey North Atlantic skies. Tests showed that aircraft painted white were on average not spotted until they were 20% closer than those painted black. This change indicated that 30% more submarines would be attacked and sunk for the same number of sightings.<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA101 p. 101]</ref> As a result of these findings Coastal Command changed their aircraft to using white undersurfaces.

在分析英国皇家空军海防司令部捕猎和摧毁潜艇的方法时，其中一名分析师询问这些飞机是什么颜色的。由于他们中的大多数是从轰炸机司令部，他们被涂成黑色的夜间行动。根据 CC-ORS 的建议，进行了一次测试，以确定这是否是在北大西洋灰色天空中白天作业时对飞机进行伪装的最佳颜色。试验表明，涂成白色的飞机平均要比涂成黑色的飞机近20% 才会被发现。这一变化表明，同样数量的目击事件将导致30% 以上的潜艇被攻击和击沉。柯比，第101页由于这些发现，海岸指挥部改变了他们的飞机使用白色的下表面。

在分析英国皇家空军海防司令部捕猎和摧毁潜艇的方法时，其中一名分析师询问这些飞机是什么颜色的。由于他们中的大多数是从轰炸机司令部，他们被涂成黑色的夜间行动。根据 CC-ORS 的建议，进行了一次测试，以确定这是否是在北大西洋灰色天空中白天作业时对飞机进行伪装的最佳颜色。试验表明，涂成白色的飞机平均要比涂成黑色的飞机近20% 才会被发现。这一变化表明，同样数量的目击事件将导致30% 以上的潜艇被攻击和击沉。柯比，第101页由于这些发现，海岸指挥部改变了他们的飞机使用白色的下表面。

产出与投入的“汇率”比率是运筹学的一个特征。通过比较盟军飞机投入的飞行时数和某一地区发现 U 型潜艇的次数，可以将飞机重新分配到生产力更高的巡逻区。比较汇率确定的“有效性比率”在规划中有用。每艘沉船埋设60枚地雷的比例在几次战役中都很常见: 德国在英国港口埋设地雷，英国在德国航线埋设地雷，美国在日本航线埋设地雷。

 

产出与投入的比率是运筹学的一个特征。通过比较盟军飞机投入的飞行时数和某一地区发现 U 型潜艇的次数，可以将飞机重新分配到生产力更高的巡逻区。比较汇率确定的“有效性比率”在规划中有用。每艘沉船埋设60枚地雷的比例在几次战役中都很常见: 德国在英国港口埋设地雷，英国在德国航线埋设地雷，美国在日本航线埋设地雷。

Operational research doubled the on-target bomb rate of [[B-29]]s bombing Japan from the [[Marianas Islands]] by increasing the training ratio from 4 to 10 percent of flying hours; revealed that wolf-packs of three United States submarines were the most effective number to enable all members of the pack to engage targets discovered on their individual patrol stations; revealed that glossy enamel paint was more effective camouflage for night fighters than traditional dull camouflage paint finish, and a smooth paint finish increased airspeed by reducing skin friction.<ref name="Proceedings"/>

Operational research doubled the on-target bomb rate of [[B-29]]s bombing Japan from the [[Marianas Islands]] by increasing the training ratio from 4 to 10 percent of flying hours; revealed that wolf-packs of three United States submarines were the most effective number to enable all members of the pack to engage targets discovered on their individual patrol stations; revealed that glossy enamel paint was more effective camouflage for night fighters than traditional dull camouflage paint finish, and a smooth paint finish increased airspeed by reducing skin friction.<ref name="Proceedings"/>