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The modern field of operational research arose during World War II. In the World War II era, operational research was defined as "a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control".<ref name=C67-3-4-48-para-1>"Operational Research in the British Army 1939–1945", October 1947, Report C67/3/4/48, UK National Archives file WO291/1301<br />Quoted on the dust-jacket of: Morse, Philip M, and Kimball, George E, ''Methods of Operation Research'', 1st edition revised, MIT Press & J Wiley, 5th printing, 1954.</ref> Other names for it included operational analysis (UK Ministry of Defence from 1962)<ref name=PROCATWO291>[http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=109&CATLN=2&Highlight=&FullDetails=True UK National Archives Catalogue for WO291] lists a War Office organisation called [[Army Operational Research Group]] (AORG) that existed from 1946 to 1962. "In January 1962 the name was changed to Army Operational Research Establishment (AORE). Following the creation of a unified Ministry of Defence, a tri-service operational research organisation was established: the [[Defence Operational Analysis Establishment|Defence Operational Research Establishment]] (DOAE) which was formed in 1965, and it the Army Operational Research Establishment based at West Byfleet."</ref> and quantitative management.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://brochure.unisa.ac.za/myunisa/data/subjects/Quantitative%20Management.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=7 October 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110812213540/http://brochure.unisa.ac.za/myunisa/data/subjects/Quantitative%20Management.pdf |archive-date=12 August 2011 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

The modern field of operational research arose during World War II. In the World War II era, operational research was defined as "a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control".<ref name=C67-3-4-48-para-1>"Operational Research in the British Army 1939–1945", October 1947, Report C67/3/4/48, UK National Archives file WO291/1301<br />Quoted on the dust-jacket of: Morse, Philip M, and Kimball, George E, ''Methods of Operation Research'', 1st edition revised, MIT Press & J Wiley, 5th printing, 1954.</ref> Other names for it included operational analysis (UK Ministry of Defence from 1962)<ref name=PROCATWO291>[http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=109&CATLN=2&Highlight=&FullDetails=True UK National Archives Catalogue for WO291] lists a War Office organisation called [[Army Operational Research Group]] (AORG) that existed from 1946 to 1962. "In January 1962 the name was changed to Army Operational Research Establishment (AORE). Following the creation of a unified Ministry of Defence, a tri-service operational research organisation was established: the [[Defence Operational Analysis Establishment|Defence Operational Research Establishment]] (DOAE) which was formed in 1965, and it the Army Operational Research Establishment based at West Byfleet."</ref> and quantitative management.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://brochure.unisa.ac.za/myunisa/data/subjects/Quantitative%20Management.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=7 October 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110812213540/http://brochure.unisa.ac.za/myunisa/data/subjects/Quantitative%20Management.pdf |archive-date=12 August 2011 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

The modern field of operational research arose during World War II. In the World War II era, operational research was defined as "a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control"."Operational Research in the British Army 1939–1945", October 1947, Report C67/3/4/48, UK National Archives file WO291/1301<br />Quoted on the dust-jacket of: Morse, Philip M, and Kimball, George E, Methods of Operation Research, 1st edition revised, MIT Press & J Wiley, 5th printing, 1954. Other names for it included operational analysis (UK Ministry of Defence from 1962)UK National Archives Catalogue for WO291 lists a War Office organisation called Army Operational Research Group (AORG) that existed from 1946 to 1962. "In January 1962 the name was changed to Army Operational Research Establishment (AORE). Following the creation of a unified Ministry of Defence, a tri-service operational research organisation was established: the Defence Operational Research Establishment (DOAE) which was formed in 1965, and it the Army Operational Research Establishment based at West Byfleet." and quantitative management.

The modern field of operational research arose during World War II. In the World War II era, operational research was defined as "a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control."

During the [[World War II|Second World War]] close to 1,000 men and women in Britain were engaged in operational research. About 200 operational research scientists worked for the [[British Army]].<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA117 p. 117] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130827004623/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA117 |date=27 August 2013 }}</ref>

During the [[World War II|Second World War]], nearly 1,000 men and women in Britain were engaged in operational research. About 200 operational research scientists worked for the [[British Army]].<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA117 p. 117] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130827004623/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA117 |date=27 August 2013 }}</ref>

在第二次世界大战期间，英国有将近1000名男女从事作战研究。大约200名作战研究科学家为英国陆军工作。

在第二次世界大战期间，英国有将近1000名男女从事作战研究。大约200名作战研究科学家为英国陆军工作。

[[File:B 24 in raf service 23 03 05.jpg|thumb|A [[Consolidated B-24 Liberator|Liberator]] in standard RAF green/dark earth/black night bomber finish as originally used by Coastal Command|链接=Special:FilePath/B_24_in_raf_service_23_03_05.jpg]]

[[File:B 24 in raf service 23 03 05.jpg|thumb|A [[Consolidated B-24 Liberator|Liberator]] in standard RAF green/dark earth/black night bomber finish as originally used by Coastal Command|链接=Special:FilePath/B_24_in_raf_service_23_03_05.jpg]]

In 1941, Blackett moved from the RAE to the Navy, after first working with [[RAF Coastal Command]], in 1941 and then early in 1942 to the [[British Admiralty|Admiralty]].<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA109 p. 96,109] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131002032938/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA109 |date=2 October 2013 }}</ref> Blackett's team at Coastal Command's Operational Research Section (CC-ORS) included two future [[Nobel prize]] winners and many other people who went on to be pre-eminent in their fields.<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA96 p. 96] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140327234509/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA96 |date=27 March 2014 }}</ref><ref name= dyson >[[Freeman Dyson]], ''MIT Technology Review'' (1 November 2006) "[https://www.technologyreview.com/s/406789/a-failure-of-intelligence/ A Failure of Intelligence: Part I]"</ref> They undertook a number of crucial analyses that aided the war effort. Britain introduced the [[convoy]] system to reduce shipping losses, but while the principle of using warships to accompany merchant ships was generally accepted, it was unclear whether it was better for convoys to be small or large. Convoys travel at the speed of the slowest member, so small convoys can travel faster. It was also argued that small convoys would be harder for German [[U-boat]]s to detect. On the other hand, large convoys could deploy more warships against an attacker. Blackett's staff showed that the losses suffered by convoys depended largely on the number of escort vessels present, rather than the size of the convoy. Their conclusion was that a few large convoys are more defensible than many small ones.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.familyheritage.ca/Articles/victory1943.html |title="Numbers are Essential": Victory in the North Atlantic Reconsidered, March–May 1943 |publisher=Familyheritage.ca |date=24 May 1943 |access-date=13 November 2011}}</ref>

In 1941, Blackett moved from the RAE to the Navy, after first working with [[RAF Coastal Command]], Then, early in 1942, to the [[British Admiralty|Admiralty]].<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA109 p. 96,109] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131002032938/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA109 |date=2 October 2013 }}</ref> Blackett's team at Coastal Command's Operational Research Section (CC-ORS) included two future [[Nobel prize]] winners and many other people who went on to be pre-eminent in their fields.<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA96 p. 96] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140327234509/https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA96 |date=27 March 2014 }}</ref><ref name= dyson >[[Freeman Dyson]], ''MIT Technology Review'' (1 November 2006) "[https://www.technologyreview.com/s/406789/a-failure-of-intelligence/ A Failure of Intelligence: Part I]"</ref> They undertook a number of crucial analyses that aided the war effort. Britain introduced the [[convoy]] system to reduce shipping losses, but while the principle of using warships to accompany merchant ships was generally accepted, it was unclear whether it was better for convoys to be small or large. Convoys travel at the speed of the slowest member, so small convoys can travel faster. It was also argued that small convoys would be harder for German [[U-boat]]s to detect. On the other hand, large convoys could deploy more warships against an attacker. Blackett's staff showed that the losses suffered by convoys depended largely on the number of escort vessels present, rather than the size of the convoy. Their conclusion was that a few large convoys are more defensible than many small ones.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.familyheritage.ca/Articles/victory1943.html |title="Numbers are Essential": Victory in the North Atlantic Reconsidered, March–May 1943 |publisher=Familyheritage.ca |date=24 May 1943 |access-date=13 November 2011}}</ref>

1941年，布莱克特从英国皇家空军转入海军，此前他曾在英国皇家空军海防司令部工作，1941年转入英国皇家空军，1942年初转入英国海军部。布莱克特在海岸司令部作战研究部(CC-ORS)的团队包括两位未来的诺贝尔奖获得者和许多其他人，他们在自己的领域中继续取得卓越成就。科比，第96页，弗里曼戴森，麻省理工学院技术评论(2006年11月1日)“智力的失败: 第一部分”他们进行了一些关键的分析，以帮助战争的努力。英国引入护航系统是为了减少航运损失，但是尽管使用军舰陪同商船的原则得到普遍接受，但是护航船队是小型还是大型还不清楚。车队以最慢的成员的速度行驶，因此小型车队可以行驶得更快。还有人认为，小型护航舰队将更难被德国 U 型潜艇发现。另一方面，大型护航舰队可以部署更多的战舰对付攻击者。布莱克特的工作人员表示，护航船队遭受的损失在很大程度上取决于护航船只的数量，而不是护航船队的规模。他们的结论是，少数大型车队比许多小型车队更容易防御。

1941年，布莱克特从英国皇家空军转入海军，此前他曾在英国皇家空军海防司令部工作，1942年初转入英国海军部。布莱克特在海岸司令部作战研究部(CC-ORS)的团队包括两位未来的诺贝尔奖获得者和其他在自己的领域中继续取得卓越成就的人。他们进行了一些关键的分析，以协助战争胜利。英国引入护航系统是为了减少航运损失。尽管使用军舰陪同商船的原则得到普遍接受，但护航船队是小型还是大型还不清楚。船队虽然以最慢的速度行驶，但船小好调头，因此小型船队可以行驶得更快。还有人认为，小型护航舰队将更难被德国 U 型潜艇发现。另一方面，大型护航舰队可以部署更多的战舰对付攻击者。布莱克特的工作人员表示，护航船队遭受的损失程度在很大程度上取决于护航船只的数量，而不是护航船队的规模。他们的结论是，小型船队比大型船队更有利于迂回作战。

While performing an analysis of the methods used by [[RAF Coastal Command]] to hunt and destroy submarines, one of the analysts asked what colour the aircraft were. As most of them were from Bomber Command they were painted black for night-time operations. At the suggestion of CC-ORS a test was run to see if that was the best colour to camouflage the aircraft for daytime operations in the grey North Atlantic skies. Tests showed that aircraft painted white were on average not spotted until they were 20% closer than those painted black. This change indicated that 30% more submarines would be attacked and sunk for the same number of sightings.<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA101 p. 101]</ref> As a result of these findings Coastal Command changed their aircraft to using white undersurfaces.

While performing an analysis of the methods used by [[RAF Coastal Command]] to hunt and destroy submarines, one of the analysts asked what colour the aircraft were. As most of them were from Bomber Command they were painted black for night-time operations. At the suggestion of CC-ORS a test was run to see if that was the best colour to camouflage the aircraft for daytime operations in the grey North Atlantic skies. Tests showed that aircraft painted white were on average not spotted until they were 20% closer than those painted black. This change indicated that 30% more submarines would be attacked and sunk for the same number of sightings.<ref>Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA101 p. 101]</ref> As a result of these findings Coastal Command changed their aircraft to using white undersurfaces.

在分析英国皇家空军海防司令部捕猎和摧毁潜艇的方法时，其中一名分析师询问这些飞机是什么颜色的。由于他们中的大多数是从轰炸机司令部，他们被涂成黑色的夜间行动。根据 CC-ORS 的建议，进行了一次测试，以确定这是否是在北大西洋灰色天空中白天作业时对飞机进行伪装的最佳颜色。试验表明，涂成白色的飞机平均要比涂成黑色的飞机近20% 才会被发现。这一变化表明，同样数量的目击事件将导致30% 以上的潜艇被攻击和击沉。柯比，第101页由于这些发现，海岸指挥部改变了他们的飞机使用白色的下表面。

在分析英国皇家空军海防司令部捕猎和摧毁潜艇的方法时，其中一名分析师询问这些飞机是什么颜色的。由于他们中的大多数飞机属于轰炸机司令部，他们被涂成黑色，用作夜间行动。根据 CC-ORS 的建议，进行了一次测试，以确定这是否是在北大西洋灰色天空中白天作业时对飞机进行伪装的最佳颜色。试验表明，涂成白色的飞机平均要比涂成黑色的飞机的距离近20%才会被发现。这一变化表明，同样数量的目击事件将导致30% 以上的潜艇被攻击和击沉。由于这些发现，海岸指挥部改变了他们的飞机使用白色的下表面。

Other work by the CC-ORS indicated that on average if the trigger depth of aerial-delivered [[depth charge]]s were changed from 100 to 25 feet, the kill ratios would go up. The reason was that if a U-boat saw an aircraft only shortly before it arrived over the target then at 100 feet the charges would do no damage (because the U-boat wouldn't have had time to descend as far as 100 feet), and if it saw the aircraft a long way from the target it had time to alter course under water so the chances of it being within the 20-foot kill zone of the charges was small. It was more efficient to attack those submarines close to the surface when the targets' locations were better known than to attempt their destruction at greater depths when their positions could only be guessed. Before the change of settings from 100 to 25 feet, 1% of submerged U-boats were sunk and 14% damaged. After the change, 7% were sunk and 11% damaged; if submarines were caught on the surface but had time to submerge just before being attacked, the numbers rose to 11% sunk and 15% damaged. Blackett observed "there can be few cases where such a great operational gain had been obtained by such a small and simple change of tactics".<ref>(Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA103 pp. 102,103])</ref>

Other work by the CC-ORS indicated that on average if the trigger depth of aerial-delivered [[depth charge]]s were changed from 100 to 25 feet, the kill ratios would go up. The reason was that if a U-boat saw an aircraft only shortly before it arrived over the target then at 100 feet the charges would do no damage (because the U-boat wouldn't have had time to descend as far as 100 feet), and if it saw the aircraft a long way from the target it had time to alter course under water so the chances of it being within the 20-foot kill zone of the charges was small. It was more efficient to attack those submarines close to the surface when the targets' locations were better known than to attempt their destruction at greater depths when their positions could only be guessed. Before the change of settings from 100 to 25 feet, 1% of submerged U-boats were sunk and 14% damaged. After the change, 7% were sunk and 11% damaged; if submarines were caught on the surface but had time to submerge just before being attacked, the numbers rose to 11% sunk and 15% damaged. Blackett observed "there can be few cases where such a great operational gain had been obtained by such a small and simple change of tactics".<ref>(Kirby, [https://books.google.com/books?id=DWITTpkFPEAC&lpg=PA141&pg=PA103 pp. 102,103])</ref>