随附性

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文件:Levels of existence.svg

The upper levels on this chart can be considered to supervene on the lower levels.

thumb|right|The upper levels on this chart can be considered to supervene on the lower levels.

图表的上层可以被认为是下层的附属物。

In medicine supervene means a preexisting condition can become worse as a result of an accident or new disease.

In medicine supervene means a preexisting condition can become worse as a result of an accident or new disease.

在医学上，意味着由于事故或新的疾病，先前存在的状况可能变得更糟。

In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts. X is said to supervene on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible. Some examples include:

In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts. X is said to supervene on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible. Some examples include:

在哲学中，附随是指一组属性或一组事实之间的关系。当且仅当 Y 的某些差异是 X 的任何差异可能存在的必要条件时，称 X 附加于 Y。一些例子包括:

• Whether there is a table in the living room supervenes on the positions of molecules in the living room.
• The truth value of (A) supervenes on the truth value of (¬A). For the same reason, the truth value of (¬A) supervenes on that of (A).
• Properties of individual molecules supervene on the properties of individual atoms.
• One's moral character supervenes on one's action(s).

• Whether there is a table in the living room supervenes on the positions of molecules in the living room.
• The truth value of (A) supervenes on the truth value of (¬A). For the same reason, the truth value of (¬A) supervenes on that of (A).
• Properties of individual molecules supervene on the properties of individual atoms.
• One's moral character supervenes on one's action(s).

• 起居室里是否有一张桌子，取决于起居室里分子的位置。
• (A)的真值附加在(A)的真值之上。出于同样的原因，(A)的真值超过(A)的真值。
• 单个分子的性质随单个原子的性质而变化。一个人的道德品质会随着他的行为而改变。

These are examples of supervenience because in each case the truth values of some propositions cannot vary unless the truth values of some other propositions vary.

These are examples of supervenience because in each case the truth values of some propositions cannot vary unless the truth values of some other propositions vary.

这些都是附带的例子，因为在每种情况下，一些命题的真值不会变化，除非另一些命题的真值变化。

Supervenience is of interest to philosophers because it differs from other nearby relations, for example entailment. Some philosophers believe it possible for some A to supervene on some B without being entailed by B. In such cases it may seem puzzling why A should supervene on B and equivalently why changes in A should require changes in B. Two important applications of supervenience involve cases like this. One of these is the supervenience of mental properties (like the sensation of pain) on physical properties (like the firing of 'pain neurons'). A second is the supervenience of normative facts (facts about how things ought to be) on natural facts (facts about how things are).

Supervenience is of interest to philosophers because it differs from other nearby relations, for example entailment. Some philosophers believe it possible for some A to supervene on some B without being entailed by B. In such cases it may seem puzzling why A should supervene on B and equivalently why changes in A should require changes in B. Two important applications of supervenience involve cases like this. One of these is the supervenience of mental properties (like the sensation of pain) on physical properties (like the firing of 'pain neurons'). A second is the supervenience of normative facts (facts about how things ought to be) on natural facts (facts about how things are).

附随是哲学家感兴趣的，因为它不同于其他附近的关系，例如蕴涵。有些哲学家认为，有些 A 可以附加在某些 B 上，而不受 B 的限制。在这种情况下，为什么 A 应该附加在 B 上，同样地，为什么 A 的变化需要 B 的变化，这似乎令人困惑。两个重要的附加应用涉及到这样的案件。其中之一就是心理属性(比如疼痛感)对物理属性(比如“疼痛神经元”的放电)的附带影响。第二是规范性事实(关于事物应该如何的事实)对自然事实(关于事物如何的事实)的附随。

These applications are elaborated below. But an illustrative note bears adding here. It is sometimes claimed模板:By whom that what is at issue in these problems is the supervenience claim itself. For example, it has been claimed that what is at issue with respect to the mind-body problem is whether mental phenomena do in fact supervene on physical phenomena. This is incorrect. It is by and large agreed that some form of supervenience holds in these cases: Pain happens when the appropriate neurons fire. The disagreement is over why this is so. Materialists claim that we observe supervenience because the neural phenomena entail the mental phenomena, while dualists deny this. The dualist's challenge is to explain supervenience without entailment.

These applications are elaborated below. But an illustrative note bears adding here. It is sometimes claimed that what is at issue in these problems is the supervenience claim itself. For example, it has been claimed that what is at issue with respect to the mind-body problem is whether mental phenomena do in fact supervene on physical phenomena. This is incorrect. It is by and large agreed that some form of supervenience holds in these cases: Pain happens when the appropriate neurons fire. The disagreement is over why this is so. Materialists claim that we observe supervenience because the neural phenomena entail the mental phenomena, while dualists deny this. The dualist's challenge is to explain supervenience without entailment.

这些应用程序详述如下。但是这里还有一个说明性的注解。有时人们声称，这些问题的争议点在于附带权利主张本身。例如，有人声称，关于心身二分法的问题在于心理现象是否实际上是附加在物理现象之上。这是错误的。大体上同意，在这些情况下存在某种形式的附带效应: 当适当的神经元激活时，疼痛就会发生。分歧在于为什么会这样。唯物主义者声称我们之所以观察到顺从，是因为神经现象包含了心理现象，而二元论者否认这一点。二元论者面临的挑战是解释没有蕴涵的顺从。

The problem is similar with respect to the supervenience of normative facts on natural facts. Discussing the is-ought problem it is agreed that facts about how persons ought to act are not entailed by natural facts but cannot vary unless natural facts vary, and this rigid binding without entailment might seem puzzling.

The problem is similar with respect to the supervenience of normative facts on natural facts. Discussing the is-ought problem it is agreed that facts about how persons ought to act are not entailed by natural facts but cannot vary unless natural facts vary, and this rigid binding without entailment might seem puzzling.

这个问题与规范性事实对自然事实的附带影响相似。在讨论“应当”问题时，人们一致认为，关于人们应当如何行动的事实并非由自然事实引起的，而是除非自然事实发生变化，否则不可能有所变化，而这种没有引起变化的严格约束似乎令人费解。

The possibility of "supervenience without entailment" or "supervenience without reduction" is contested territory among philosophers.

The possibility of "supervenience without entailment" or "supervenience without reduction" is contested territory among philosophers.

“附随而无蕴涵”或“附随而无还原”的可能性是哲学家们争论的领域。

= 历史 =

Supervenience, which means literally "coming or occurring as something novel, additional, or unexpected", from "super," meaning on, above, or additional, and "venire," meaning to come in Latin, shows occurrences in the Oxford English Dictionary dating back to 1844.

Supervenience, which means literally "coming or occurring as something novel, additional, or unexpected",Horgan, Terry (1993) "From supervenience to superdupervenience: meeting the demands of a material world." Mind. 102: 555-86. from "super," meaning on, above, or additional, and "venire," meaning to come in Latin, shows occurrences in the Oxford English Dictionary dating back to 1844.

附属，字面意思是“作为新奇的、附加的或意外的事物来到或发生”，霍根，特里(1993)“从附属到附属: 满足物质世界的要求。”思想。102:555-86.从“ super”到“ venire”，意思是在上面、上面或者附加，再到“ venire”，意思是来自拉丁语，表示出现在1844年的牛津英语词典中。

Its systematic use in philosophy is considered to have begun in early 20th-century meta-ethics and emergentism. As G.E. Moore wrote in 1922, "if a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, then... anything exactly like it, must, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree" (p. 261). This usage also carried over into the work of R. M. Hare. For discussion of the emergentist roots of supervenience see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supervenience.

Its systematic use in philosophy is considered to have begun in early 20th-century meta-ethics and emergentism. As G.E. Moore wrote in 1922,"The Conception of Intrinsic Value", in Philosophical Studies, Nww York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., pp. 253-75. "if a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, then... anything exactly like it, must, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree" (p. 261). This usage also carried over into the work of R. M. Hare. For discussion of the emergentist roots of supervenience see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supervenience.

它在哲学中的系统应用被认为开始于20世纪早期的元伦理学和新生主义。作为 GE。摩尔于1922年在《哲学研究，Nww York: 哈考特，布雷斯和公司》一书中写道，“内在价值的概念”。253-75.“如果一个给定的事物在某种程度上具有某种内在价值，那么... ... 任何与它完全相似的事物，在任何情况下，都必须在完全相同的程度上具有它”(第261页)。这种用法也延续到 R.M.Hare 的工作中。关于紧急根源的讨论见斯坦福大学哲学百科全书: 紧急根源。

In the 1970s, Donald Davidson was the first to use the term to describe a broadly physicalist (and non-reductive) approach to the philosophy of mind, called anomalous monism. As he said in 1970, "supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respects, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respects without altering in some physical respects."

In the 1970s, Donald Davidson was the first to use the term to describe a broadly physicalist (and non-reductive) approach to the philosophy of mind, called anomalous monism. As he said in 1970, "supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respects, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respects without altering in some physical respects."Davidson, Donald (1970) "Mental Events." Reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press

在20世纪70年代，唐纳德 · 戴维森是第一个使用这个术语来描述广泛的物理主义(和非还原)方法的心灵哲学，称为反常一元论。正如他在1970年所说，“附随可能被理解为意味着不可能有两个事件在所有物理方面相同但在某些精神方面不同，或者一个对象不能改变在某些精神方面而不改变在某些物理方面。戴维森，唐纳德(1970)《精神事件》转载于《行动与事件论文集》。牛津: 克拉伦登出版社

In subsequent years Terence ("Terry") Horgan, David Lewis, and especially Jaegwon Kim formalized the concept and began applying it to many issues in the philosophy of mind. This raised numerous questions about how various formulations relate to one another, how adequate the formulation is to various philosophical tasks (in particular, the task of formulating physicalism), and whether it avoids or entails reductionism.

In subsequent years Terence ("Terry") Horgan, David Lewis, and especially Jaegwon Kim formalized the concept and began applying it to many issues in the philosophy of mind. This raised numerous questions about how various formulations relate to one another, how adequate the formulation is to various philosophical tasks (in particular, the task of formulating physicalism), and whether it avoids or entails reductionism.

在接下来的几年里，特伦斯(“特里”)霍根，大卫刘易斯，特别是金在元正式确立了这个概念，并开始将其应用到心灵哲学的许多问题上。这就提出了许多问题: 各种公式如何相互关联，这些公式对各种哲学任务(特别是制定物理主义的任务)是否足够，以及它是否避免或引起了还原主义。

= 定义 =

In the contemporary literature, there are two primary (and non-equivalent) formulations of supervenience (for both definitions let A and B be sets of properties).

In the contemporary literature, there are two primary (and non-equivalent) formulations of supervenience (for both definitions let A and B be sets of properties).

在当代文献中，有两个主要的(和非等价的)附加公式(对于这两个定义，让 A 和 B 是一组属性)。

(1) A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if all things that are B-indiscernible are A-indiscernible. Formally:

• [math]\displaystyle{ \forall x \forall y (\forall X_{\in B} (Xx \leftrightarrow Xy) \rightarrow \forall Y_{\in A} (Yx \leftrightarrow Yy)) }[/math]

(2) A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if anything that has an A-property has some B-property such that anything that has that B-property also has that A-property. Formally:

• [math]\displaystyle{ \forall x \forall X_{\in A} (Xx \rightarrow \exists Y_{\in B} (Yx \land \forall y (Yy \rightarrow Xy))) }[/math]

(1) A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if all things that are B-indiscernible are A-indiscernible. Formally:

• \forall x \forall y (\forall X_{\in B} (Xx \leftrightarrow Xy) \rightarrow \forall Y_{\in A} (Yx \leftrightarrow Yy))

(2) A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if anything that has an A-property has some B-property such that anything that has that B-property also has that A-property. Formally:

• \forall x \forall X_{\in A} (Xx \rightarrow \exists Y_{\in B} (Yx \land \forall y (Yy \rightarrow Xy)))

(1)当且仅当所有 B- 不可分辨的事物都是 A- 不可分辨的时候，A- 性质附加于 B- 性质之上。形式上:

• forall x forall y (forall x _ { in b }(Xx left trightarrow Xy) right tarrow forall y _ { in a }(Yx left trightarrow 广州欢聚时代))(2)当且仅当任何具有 a 性质的东西具有某种 b 性质，使得任何具有该 b 性质的东西也具有该 a 性质时，附属于 b 性质。形式上:
• for all x for all x _ { in a }(x 右箭头存在于 b }(Yx land for all y (广州欢聚时代右箭头 x y)))

For example, if one lets A be a set of mental properties, lets B be a set of physical properties, and chooses a domain of discourse consisting of persons, then (1) says that any two persons who are physically indiscernible are mentally indiscernible, and (2) says that any person who has a mental property has some physical property such that any person with that physical property has that mental property.

For example, if one lets A be a set of mental properties, lets B be a set of physical properties, and chooses a domain of discourse consisting of persons, then (1) says that any two persons who are physically indiscernible are mentally indiscernible, and (2) says that any person who has a mental property has some physical property such that any person with that physical property has that mental property.

例如，如果一个人让 a 成为一组精神属性，让 b 成为一组物理属性，并选择一个由人组成的论域，那么(1)说任何两个身体上无法分辨的人都是精神上无法分辨的，(2)说任何拥有精神属性的人都有一些物理属性，使任何拥有该物理属性的人都拥有该精神属性。

Some points of clarification: first, the definitions above involve quantification over properties and hence higher-order logic. Second, in (1), expressions of the form [math]\displaystyle{ (\forall X (Xx \leftrightarrow Xy)) }[/math] capture the concept of sharing all properties, or being indiscernible with respect to a set of properties. Thus, (1) can be understood more intuitively as the claim that all objects that are indiscernible with respect to a base set of properties are indiscernible with respect to a supervenient set of properties, or, as it is also sometimes said, that B-twins are A-twins. Finally, supervenience claims typically involve some modal force, however, the way that modal force is specified depends on which more specific variety of supervenience one decides upon (see below).

Some points of clarification: first, the definitions above involve quantification over properties and hence higher-order logic. Second, in (1), expressions of the form (\forall X (Xx \leftrightarrow Xy)) capture the concept of sharing all properties, or being indiscernible with respect to a set of properties. Thus, (1) can be understood more intuitively as the claim that all objects that are indiscernible with respect to a base set of properties are indiscernible with respect to a supervenient set of properties, or, as it is also sometimes said, that B-twins are A-twins. Finally, supervenience claims typically involve some modal force, however, the way that modal force is specified depends on which more specific variety of supervenience one decides upon (see below).

需要澄清的一些问题: 首先，上述定义涉及对物业的量化，因此也涉及高阶逻辑。其次，在(1)中，表单的表达式(forall X (Xx left trightarrow Xy))捕获了共享所有属性的概念，或者对于一组属性是不可分辨的。因此，(1)可以更直观地理解为声称所有对基本属性集不可分辨的对象对于附属属性集不可分辨，或者，如有时所说的，B 孪生子是 A 孪生子。最后，附加索赔通常涉及一些模态力，然而，模态力的具体方式取决于哪一个更具体的附加品决定(见下文)。

(1) and (2) are sometimes called "schemata" because they do not correspond to actual supervenience relations until the sets of properties A and B, the domain of entities to which those properties apply, and a modal force have been specified. For modal forms of supervenience, the modal strength of the relation is usually taken to be a parameter (that is, the possible worlds appealed to may be physically possible, logically possible, etc.). Also, note that in the early literature properties were not always central, and there remain some who prefer to frame the relation in terms of predicates, facts, or entities instead, for example.

(1) and (2) are sometimes called "schemata" because they do not correspond to actual supervenience relations until the sets of properties A and B, the domain of entities to which those properties apply, and a modal force have been specified. For modal forms of supervenience, the modal strength of the relation is usually taken to be a parameter (that is, the possible worlds appealed to may be physically possible, logically possible, etc.). Also, note that in the early literature properties were not always central, and there remain some who prefer to frame the relation in terms of predicates, facts, or entities instead, for example.

(1)和(2)有时被称为“模式”，因为它们不对应于实际的附属关系，直到属性 A 和 B 的集合，这些属性适用的实体的领域，和模态力已经被指定。对于附随的模态形式，关系的模态强度通常被认为是一个参数(也就是说，可能的世界上诉可能是物理上可能的，逻辑上可能的，等等)。此外，请注意，在早期的文学性质并不总是中心，仍然有一些人喜欢框架的关系，谓词，事实，或实体而不是，例如。

Varieties of supervenience

Beginning in the 1980s, inspired largely by Jaegwon Kim's work, philosophers proposed many varieties of supervenience, which David Lewis called the "unlovely proliferation". These varieties are based both on (1) and (2) above, but because (1) is more common we shall focus on varieties of supervenience based on it.

Beginning in the 1980s, inspired largely by Jaegwon Kim's work, philosophers proposed many varieties of supervenience, which David Lewis called the "unlovely proliferation".Lewis, David (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. These varieties are based both on (1) and (2) above, but because (1) is more common we shall focus on varieties of supervenience based on it.

从20世纪80年代开始，哲学家们主要受到金在元的作品的启发，提出了许多种附属品，大卫 · 刘易斯称之为“不可爱的扩散”。刘易斯，大卫(1986)论世界的多元性。牛津: 牛津大学出版社。这些品种都是基于上面的(1)和(2) ，但是因为(1)更为常见，我们将重点关注基于它的附属品种。

We can begin by distinguishing between local and global supervenience:

We can begin by distinguishing between local and global supervenience:

我们可以从区分地方性和全球性的附属开始:

• Local: For any two objects x and y, if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible.

• Local: For any two objects x and y, if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible.

• Local: 对于任意两个对象 x 和 y，如果 x 和 y 是基数不可分辨的，则它们是附加的，不可分辨的。

For example, if mental states locally supervene on brain states, then being in the same brain state entails being in the same mental state.

For example, if mental states locally supervene on brain states, then being in the same brain state entails being in the same mental state.

例如，如果精神状态局部附加在大脑状态上，那么处于相同的大脑状态就意味着处于相同的精神状态。

• Global: For any two worlds w1 and w2, if w1 and w2 are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible.

• Global: For any two worlds w1 and w2, if w1 and w2 are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible.

• 全局: 对于任何两个世界 w1和 w2，如果 w1和 w2是基数-不可分辨的，它们是附加的-不可分辨的。

For example, if psychological properties globally supervene on physical properties, then any two worlds physically the same will be psychologically the same. The value of global supervenience is that it allows for supervenient properties to be determined not by local properties of an individual thing alone, but by some wider spatiotemporal distribution of things and properties. For example, something's being a dollar bill depends not only on the paper and the inks it is made out of, but also on a widely dispersed variety of features of the world it occupies.

For example, if psychological properties globally supervene on physical properties, then any two worlds physically the same will be psychologically the same. The value of global supervenience is that it allows for supervenient properties to be determined not by local properties of an individual thing alone, but by some wider spatiotemporal distribution of things and properties. For example, something's being a dollar bill depends not only on the paper and the inks it is made out of, but also on a widely dispersed variety of features of the world it occupies.

例如，如果心理属性在物理属性上是全球性的，那么任何两个在物理上相同的世界在心理上都是相同的。全局附属性的价值在于，它允许附属性不仅由单个事物的局部性质决定，而且由事物和属性的一些更广泛的时空分布决定。例如，一张美元纸币不仅取决于它的纸张和墨水，而且还取决于它所占据的世界的广泛分布的各种特征。

Both local and global supervenience come in many forms. Local supervenience comes in strong and weak varieties:

Both local and global supervenience come in many forms. Local supervenience comes in strong and weak varieties:

地方和全球的附带影响有多种形式。当地的附属品种有强有弱:

• Weak: For any world w, and for any two objects x in w and y in w, if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible.
• Strong: For any worlds w1 and w2, and for any two objects x in w1 and y in w2, if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible.

• Weak: For any world w, and for any two objects x in w and y in w, if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible.
• Strong: For any worlds w1 and w2, and for any two objects x in w1 and y in w2, if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible.

弱: 对于任何世界 w，对于 w 中的 x 和 w 中的 y 中的任何两个对象，如果 x 和 y 是基数-不可分辨的，它们是附加的-不可分辨的。

• Strong: 对于任何世界 w1和 w2，以及对于 w1中的任何两个对象 x 和 w2中的任何两个对象，如果 x 和 y 是基数-不可分辨的，则它们是附加的-不可分辨的。

The difference is essentially whether correlations between base and supervenient properties hold within actual worlds only, or across possible worlds. For example, if psychological properties strongly locally supervene on physical properties, then any two people physically the same, in any two worlds, will also be psychologically the same. On the other hand, if psychological properties only weakly locally supervene on physical properties, then those correlations between base and supervenient properties that hold in virtue of the supervenience relation are maintained within each world, but can be different in different worlds. For example, my physical duplicates in the actual world will have the same thoughts as I have; but my physical duplicates in other possible worlds may have different thoughts than I have in the actual world.

The difference is essentially whether correlations between base and supervenient properties hold within actual worlds only, or across possible worlds. For example, if psychological properties strongly locally supervene on physical properties, then any two people physically the same, in any two worlds, will also be psychologically the same. On the other hand, if psychological properties only weakly locally supervene on physical properties, then those correlations between base and supervenient properties that hold in virtue of the supervenience relation are maintained within each world, but can be different in different worlds. For example, my physical duplicates in the actual world will have the same thoughts as I have; but my physical duplicates in other possible worlds may have different thoughts than I have in the actual world.

本质上的区别在于基本属性和附属属性之间的相关性是仅在实际世界中保持，还是在可能的世界中保持。例如，如果心理属性强烈地局部附加在物理属性上，那么在任何两个世界中，任何两个身体上相同的人在心理上也将是相同的。另一方面，如果心理属性只是在物理属性上弱的局部附属，那么基本属性和附属属性之间凭借附属关系的相关性在每个世界中保持，但在不同的世界中可能是不同的。例如，我在现实世界中的物理副本和我有相同的想法; 但是我在其他可能的世界中的物理副本可能和我在现实世界中有不同的想法。

There are also several kinds of global supervenience relations, which were introduced to handle cases in which worlds are the same at the base level and also at the supervenient level, but where the ways the properties are connected and distributed in the worlds differ. For example, it is consistent with global mental–physical supervenience on the simple formulation described above for two worlds to have the same number of people in the same physical states, but for the mental states to be distributed over those people in different ways (e.g. I have my father's thoughts in the other world, and he has my thoughts). To handle this, property-preserving isomorphisms (1-1 and onto functions between the objects of two worlds, whereby an object in one world has a property if and only if the object which that function takes you to in the other world does) are used, and once this is done, several varieties of global supervenience can be defined.

There are also several kinds of global supervenience relations, which were introduced to handle cases in which worlds are the same at the base level and also at the supervenient level, but where the ways the properties are connected and distributed in the worlds differ. For example, it is consistent with global mental–physical supervenience on the simple formulation described above for two worlds to have the same number of people in the same physical states, but for the mental states to be distributed over those people in different ways (e.g. I have my father's thoughts in the other world, and he has my thoughts). To handle this, property-preserving isomorphisms (1-1 and onto functions between the objects of two worlds, whereby an object in one world has a property if and only if the object which that function takes you to in the other world does) are used, and once this is done, several varieties of global supervenience can be defined.

还有几种全局附属关系，它们被用来处理这样的情况: 世界在基本层次上是相同的，在附属层次上也是相同的，但是这些属性在世界中的连接和分布的方式是不同的。例如，上面描述的两个世界有相同数量的人处于相同的物理状态，但是心理状态以不同的方式分布在这些人身上的简单公式是一致的。我有我父亲在另一个世界的想法，他也有我的想法)。为了解决这个问题，使用了属性保持同构(1-1和两个世界对象之间的函数，即一个世界中的一个对象有属性，当且仅当那个函数把你带到另一个世界中的对象有属性) ，一旦这样做了，就可以定义几种全局附属性。

Other varieties of supervenience include multiple-domains supervenience and similarity-based supervenience.

Other varieties of supervenience include multiple-domains supervenience and similarity-based supervenience.

其他类型的附带性包括多域附带性和基于相似性的附带性。

= 附加属性的例子 =

Value properties

The value of a physical object to an agent is sometimes held to be supervenient upon the physical properties of the object. In aesthetics, the beauty of La Grande Jatte might supervene on the physical composition of the painting (the specific molecules that make up the painting), the artistic composition of the painting (in this case, dots), the figures and forms of the painted image, or the painted canvas as a whole. In ethics, the goodness of an act of charity might supervene on the physical properties of the agent, the mental state of the agent (his or her intention), or the external state of affairs itself. Similarly, the overall suffering caused by an earthquake might supervene on the spatiotemporal entities that constituted it, the deaths it caused, or the natural disaster itself. The claim that moral properties are supervenient upon non-moral properties is called moral supervenience.

The value of a physical object to an agent is sometimes held to be supervenient upon the physical properties of the object. In aesthetics, the beauty of La Grande Jatte might supervene on the physical composition of the painting (the specific molecules that make up the painting), the artistic composition of the painting (in this case, dots), the figures and forms of the painted image, or the painted canvas as a whole. In ethics, the goodness of an act of charity might supervene on the physical properties of the agent, the mental state of the agent (his or her intention), or the external state of affairs itself. Similarly, the overall suffering caused by an earthquake might supervene on the spatiotemporal entities that constituted it, the deaths it caused, or the natural disaster itself. The claim that moral properties are supervenient upon non-moral properties is called moral supervenience.

= = 值属性 = = = 物理对象对代理的值有时被认为是附加在对象的物理属性之上的。在美学上，《大玉》的美可能会附加在绘画的物理构成(构成绘画的特定分子) ，绘画的艺术构成(在这种情况下，是点) ，绘画图像的数字和形式，或绘画画布作为一个整体。在伦理学中，慈善行为的善意可能会附加在行为主体的物理属性、行为主体的精神状态(他或她的意图)或事务本身的外部状态上。同样地，地震造成的整体痛苦可能会随之而来，影响到构成地震的时空实体、地震造成的死亡或自然灾害本身。道德属性附加于非道德属性的说法称为道德附加。

Mental properties

In philosophy of mind, many philosophers make the general claim that the mental supervenes on the physical. In its most recent form this position derives from the work of Donald Davidson, although in more rudimentary forms it had been advanced earlier by others. The claim can be taken in several senses, perhaps most simply in the sense that the mental properties of a person are supervenient on their physical properties. Then:

In philosophy of mind, many philosophers make the general claim that the mental supervenes on the physical. In its most recent form this position derives from the work of Donald Davidson, although in more rudimentary forms it had been advanced earlier by others. The claim can be taken in several senses, perhaps most simply in the sense that the mental properties of a person are supervenient on their physical properties. Then:

在心灵哲学中，许多哲学家普遍认为心灵是附属于身体的。在其最近的形式，这一立场来源于唐纳德戴维森的工作，虽然在更基本的形式，它已提出了较早的其他。这种说法可以从几个意义上来理解，也许最简单的意义是，一个人的精神属性是附加在他们的物理属性之上的。然后:

• If two persons are indistinguishable in all of their physical properties, they must also be indistinguishable in all of their mental properties.

• If two persons are indistinguishable in all of their physical properties, they must also be indistinguishable in all of their mental properties.

• 如果两个人的所有身体特征无法区分，他们的所有精神特征也必须无法区分。

An alternative claim, advanced especially by John Haugeland, is a kind of weak local supervenience claim; or, weaker still, mere global supervenience. The claim that mental properties supervene globally on physical properties requires only a quite modest commitment: any difference between two possible worlds with respect to their instantiated mental properties entails at least some difference in the physical properties instantiated in those two worlds. Importantly, it does not require that the mental properties of an individual person supervene only on that person's physical state.

An alternative claim, advanced especially by John Haugeland, is a kind of weak local supervenience claim; or, weaker still, mere global supervenience. The claim that mental properties supervene globally on physical properties requires only a quite modest commitment: any difference between two possible worlds with respect to their instantiated mental properties entails at least some difference in the physical properties instantiated in those two worlds. Importantly, it does not require that the mental properties of an individual person supervene only on that person's physical state.

另一种主张，尤其是约翰 · 豪格兰提出的主张，是一种弱的局部附带主张; 或者，更弱的，仅仅是全球附带主张。精神属性在物理属性上全球附带的说法只需要一个相当适度的承诺: 两个可能的世界之间的任何差异，就其精神属性的实例化而言，至少需要在这两个世界的实例化物理属性的一些差异。重要的是，它并不要求一个人的精神特性仅仅依赖于他的身体状态。

This weak global thesis is particularly important in the light of direct reference theories, and semantic externalism with regard to the content both of words and (more relevant to our concerns here) of thoughts. Imagine two persons who are indistinguishable in their local physical properties. One has a dog in front of his eyes and the other has a dog-image artificially projected onto his retinae. It might be reasonable to say that the former is in the mental state of seeing a dog (and of knowing that he does so), whereas the latter is not in such a state of seeing a dog (but falsely believes that he sees one).

This weak global thesis is particularly important in the light of direct reference theories, and semantic externalism with regard to the content both of words and (more relevant to our concerns here) of thoughts. Imagine two persons who are indistinguishable in their local physical properties. One has a dog in front of his eyes and the other has a dog-image artificially projected onto his retinae. It might be reasonable to say that the former is in the mental state of seeing a dog (and of knowing that he does so), whereas the latter is not in such a state of seeing a dog (but falsely believes that he sees one).

鉴于直接指称理论和语义外在主义对词汇内容和思想内容(与我们在这里关注的更相关)的影响，这个薄弱的全局论点显得尤为重要。想象一下，两个人在他们当地的物理属性上是难以区分的。其中一只眼睛前面有一只狗，另一只眼睛的视网膜上人工投影出一只狗的形象。可以合理地说，前者处于看到狗的精神状态(并且知道他看到了) ，而后者不处于这种看到狗的精神状态(但是错误地认为他看到了一只狗)。

There is also discussion among philosophers about mental supervenience and our experience of duration. If all mental properties supervene only upon some physical properties at durationless moments, then it may be difficult to explain our experience of duration. The philosophical belief that mental and physical events exist as a series of durationless moments that lie between the physical past and the physical future is known as presentism.

There is also discussion among philosophers about mental supervenience and our experience of duration. If all mental properties supervene only upon some physical properties at durationless moments, then it may be difficult to explain our experience of duration. The philosophical belief that mental and physical events exist as a series of durationless moments that lie between the physical past and the physical future is known as presentism.

哲学家之间也有关于心理上的顺应和我们的持续经验的讨论。如果所有的心理属性只在无持续时间的某些物理属性上附带，那么就很难解释我们的持续经验。哲学上认为，心理和生理事件存在于一系列介于物质过去和物质未来之间的无持续时间的时刻，这种观点被称为现在主义。

Computational properties

There are several examples of supervenience to be found in computer networking. For example, in a dial-up internet connection, the audio signal on a phone line transports IP packets between the user's computer and the Internet service provider's computer. In this case, the arrangement of bytes in that packet supervenes on the physical properties of the phone signal. More generally, each layer of the OSI Model of computer networking supervenes on the layers below it.

There are several examples of supervenience to be found in computer networking. For example, in a dial-up internet connection, the audio signal on a phone line transports IP packets between the user's computer and the Internet service provider's computer. In this case, the arrangement of bytes in that packet supervenes on the physical properties of the phone signal. More generally, each layer of the OSI Model of computer networking supervenes on the layers below it.

= = = 计算性能 = = = 在计算机网络中可以找到几个附带的例子。例如，在拨号互联网连接中，电话线上的音频信号在用户的计算机和互联网服务提供商的计算机之间传输 IP 数据包。在这种情况下，数据包中字节的排列会随着电话信号的物理属性而改变。更一般地说，计算机网络的 OSI 模型的每一层都附属于它下面的层。

We can find supervenience wherever a message is conveyed by a representational medium. When we see a letter "a" in a page of print, for example, the meaning Latin lowercase "a" supervenes on the geometry of the boundary of the printed glyph, which in turn supervenes on the ink deposition on the paper.

We can find supervenience wherever a message is conveyed by a representational medium. When we see a letter "a" in a page of print, for example, the meaning Latin lowercase "a" supervenes on the geometry of the boundary of the printed glyph, which in turn supervenes on the ink deposition on the paper.

我们可以在任何通过代表性媒介传递信息的地方找到附属品。例如，当我们在一页印刷品中看到一个字母“ a”时，意思拉丁小写的“ a”附在印刷字形边界的几何形状上，而后者又附在纸张上的墨水沉积上。

Biological properties

In biological systems phenotype can be said to supervene on genotype. This is because any genotype encodes a finite set of unique phenotypes, but any given phenotype is not produced by a finite set of genotypes. Innumerable examples of convergent evolution can be used to support this claim. Throughout nature, convergent evolution produces incredibly similar phenotypes from a diverse set of taxa with fundamentally different genotypes underpinning the phenotypes. One example is evolution on islands which is a remarkably predictable example of convergent evolution where the same phenotypes consistently evolve for the same reasons. Organisms released from predation tend to become larger, while organisms limited by food tend to become smaller. Yet there are almost infinite numbers of genetic changes that might lead to changes in body size. Another example of convergent evolution is the loss of sight that almost universally occurs in cave fish living in lightless pools. Eyes are expensive, and in lightless cave pools there is little reason for fish to have eyes. Yet, despite the remarkably consistent convergent evolution producing sightless cave fish, the genetics that produce the loss of sight phenotype is different nearly every time. This is because phenotype supervenes on genotype.

In biological systems phenotype can be said to supervene on genotype. This is because any genotype encodes a finite set of unique phenotypes, but any given phenotype is not produced by a finite set of genotypes. Innumerable examples of convergent evolution can be used to support this claim. Throughout nature, convergent evolution produces incredibly similar phenotypes from a diverse set of taxa with fundamentally different genotypes underpinning the phenotypes. One example is evolution on islands which is a remarkably predictable example of convergent evolution where the same phenotypes consistently evolve for the same reasons. Organisms released from predation tend to become larger, while organisms limited by food tend to become smaller. Yet there are almost infinite numbers of genetic changes that might lead to changes in body size. Another example of convergent evolution is the loss of sight that almost universally occurs in cave fish living in lightless pools. Eyes are expensive, and in lightless cave pools there is little reason for fish to have eyes. Yet, despite the remarkably consistent convergent evolution producing sightless cave fish, the genetics that produce the loss of sight phenotype is different nearly every time. This is because phenotype supervenes on genotype.

在生物系统中，表型可以说是基因型上的附属物。这是因为任何基因型都编码一组有限的独特表型，但任何给定的表型都不是由一组有限的基因型产生的。无数的趋同演化可以用来支持这种说法。在整个自然界中，趋同演化从不同的分类群中产生极其相似的表型，这些分类群具有基本不同的基因型来支撑表型。其中一个例子是岛屿上的进化，这是一个非常可预测的趋同演化的例子，相同的表型因相同的原因不断进化。从捕食中释放出来的有机体趋向于变大，而受食物限制的有机体趋向于变小。然而，几乎有无数的基因变化可能导致身体大小的变化。另一个趋同演化失明的例子是，几乎所有生活在没有光线的水池中的洞穴鱼都会失明。眼睛是昂贵的，在没有光线的洞穴水池里，鱼没有什么理由长眼睛。然而，尽管生产失明洞穴鱼的趋同演化非常一致，但导致失明表型的基因几乎每次都不同。这是因为表型附加在基因型上。

Arguments against supervenience-based formulations of physicalism

Although supervenience seems to be perfectly suited to explain the predictions of physicalism (i.e. the mental is dependent on the physical), there are four main problems with it. They are Epiphenomenal ectoplasm, the lone ammonium molecule problem, modal status problem and the problem of necessary beings.

Although supervenience seems to be perfectly suited to explain the predictions of physicalism (i.e. the mental is dependent on the physical), there are four main problems with it. They are Epiphenomenal ectoplasm, the lone ammonium molecule problem, modal status problem and the problem of necessary beings.

尽管物理主义的预言似乎完全适合于解释物理主义的预言。精神依赖于身体) ，这里有四个主要的问题。它们是附现象外质、孤铵分子问题、模态状态问题和必要存在问题。

= 非凡的灵质 =

Epiphenomenal ectoplasm was proposed by Horgan and Lewis in 1983; they envisioned a possible world (a world that could possibly exist) W which is identical to our world in the distribution of all mental and physical characteristics (i.e. they are identical), except world W contains an experience called epiphenomenal ectoplasm that does not causally interact with that world. The possibility of such a world should be compatible with physicalism as this is a property of the actual world; but a supervenience-based definition of physicalism would imply that such a world could not exist, because it differs from the actual world with respect to a mental property, but is physically identical. A typical response to this objection is Frank Jackson's; he adjusted the supervenience-based definition of physicalism to state "Physicalism is true at a possible world W if and only if any world which is a minimal physical duplicate (i.e. is physically identical) of W is a duplicate of W simpliciter." This avoids the problem because the "ectoplasm" world is not a minimal physical duplicate, so its identity with the actual world need not follow.

Epiphenomenal ectoplasm was proposed by Horgan and Lewis in 1983; they envisioned a possible world (a world that could possibly exist) W which is identical to our world in the distribution of all mental and physical characteristics (i.e. they are identical), except world W contains an experience called epiphenomenal ectoplasm that does not causally interact with that world. The possibility of such a world should be compatible with physicalism as this is a property of the actual world; but a supervenience-based definition of physicalism would imply that such a world could not exist, because it differs from the actual world with respect to a mental property, but is physically identical. A typical response to this objection is Frank Jackson's; he adjusted the supervenience-based definition of physicalism to state "Physicalism is true at a possible world W if and only if any world which is a minimal physical duplicate (i.e. is physically identical) of W is a duplicate of W simpliciter." This avoids the problem because the "ectoplasm" world is not a minimal physical duplicate, so its identity with the actual world need not follow.

超现象外质是由霍根和刘易斯在1983年提出的; 他们设想了一个可能的世界(一个可能存在的世界) W，它与我们的世界在所有精神和物理特征的分布(即。它们是完全相同的) ，除了 W 世界包含了一种叫做附现象外质的体验，它与那个世界没有因果关系。这样一个世界的可能性应该与物理主义兼容，因为这是现实世界的一个属性; 但是基于附随的物理主义定义将意味着这样一个世界不可能存在，因为它不同于现实世界的精神属性，但是在物理上是相同的。对这个反对意见的一个典型的回应是弗兰克 · 杰克逊(Frank Jackson)的; 他调整了物理主义的基于附带性的定义，声明“物理主义在一个可能的世界 W 中是正确的，当且仅当任何一个世界是最小的物理重复(即。是 W 单纯化器的复制品。”这避免了这个问题，因为“外质”世界不是一个最小的物理重复，所以它与实际世界的同一性不需要遵循。

= 孤立的铵分子问题 = =

The lone ammonium molecule problem provides a problem for Jackson's solution to epiphenomenal ectoplasm. It was proposed by Jaegwon Kim in 1993 when he stated that according to Jackson's idea of supervenience, a possible world W was identical to the actual world, except it possessed an extra ammonium molecule on one of Saturn's rings. This may not seem to provide much of a problem, but because Jackson's solution refers only to minimal physical duplicates, this allows for the mental properties of W to be vastly different from those in the actual world. If such a difference would cause mental differences on Earth, it would not be consistent with our understanding of physicalism.

The lone ammonium molecule problem provides a problem for Jackson's solution to epiphenomenal ectoplasm. It was proposed by Jaegwon Kim in 1993 when he stated that according to Jackson's idea of supervenience, a possible world W was identical to the actual world, except it possessed an extra ammonium molecule on one of Saturn's rings. This may not seem to provide much of a problem, but because Jackson's solution refers only to minimal physical duplicates, this allows for the mental properties of W to be vastly different from those in the actual world. If such a difference would cause mental differences on Earth, it would not be consistent with our understanding of physicalism.

孤铵分子问题为杰克逊解副现象外质提供了一个难题。1993年，金积元提出了这个观点，当时他声称，根据杰克逊的地上观点，一个可能的世界 W 与现实世界完全相同，只不过它在土星的一个光环上多了一个铵分子。这看起来似乎不会带来太多的问题，但是因为杰克逊的解决方案只涉及最小的物理重复，这使得 W 的精神属性与现实世界中的大不相同。如果这样的差异会导致地球上的精神差异，这将不符合我们对物理主义的理解。

= = 模态状态 = =

Suppose that the supervenience thesis for physicalism is stated as a nomological constraint, rather than a metaphysical one; this avoids any objection based on the thesis ruling out metaphysical possibilities which a physicalist would leave open. But the thesis would not rule out the metaphysical possibility of philosophical zombies, although their impossibility is a clear consequence of physicalism.

Suppose that the supervenience thesis for physicalism is stated as a nomological constraint, rather than a metaphysical one; this avoids any objection based on the thesis ruling out metaphysical possibilities which a physicalist would leave open. But the thesis would not rule out the metaphysical possibility of philosophical zombies, although their impossibility is a clear consequence of physicalism.

假设物理主义的附随论题被描述为一个法理约束，而不是一个形而上学的约束; 这就避免了基于排除物理主义者可能留下的形而上学可能性的论题的任何反对意见。但本文不排除哲学僵尸形而上学的可能性，尽管它们的不可能性是物理主义的明显结果。

= = 必要存在的问题 = =

The problem of necessary beings was proposed by Jackson in 1998, in which he stated that the existence of a non-physical necessary being (in all possible worlds) would prove physicalism false. However, physicalism allows for the existence of necessary beings, because any minimal physical duplicate would have the same necessary being as the actual world. This however is paradoxical, based on the fact that physicalism both permits and prevents the existence of such beings.

The problem of necessary beings was proposed by Jackson in 1998, in which he stated that the existence of a non-physical necessary being (in all possible worlds) would prove physicalism false. However, physicalism allows for the existence of necessary beings, because any minimal physical duplicate would have the same necessary being as the actual world. This however is paradoxical, based on the fact that physicalism both permits and prevents the existence of such beings.

必然存在的问题是由杰克逊在1998年提出的，他在其中指出，一个非物质的必然存在(在所有可能的世界)的存在将证明物理主义是错误的。然而，物理主义允许必要存在物的存在，因为任何最小的物理复制物都会有与现实世界相同的必要存在物。然而，这是自相矛盾的，基于这样一个事实，即物理主义既允许也阻止这样的存在。

See also

• Functionalism (philosophy of mind)
• Emergentism
• Downward causation

• Functionalism (philosophy of mind)
• Emergentism
• Downward causation

= 参见 =

• 功能主义(心灵哲学)
• 紧急主义
• 向下的因果关系

External links

• 模板:Cite SEP
• 模板:Cite IEP
• 模板:Cite IEP
• 模板:PhilPapers
• 模板:InPho

= 外部链接 =

Category:Concepts in logic Category:Concepts in metaphysics Category:Concepts in the philosophy of mind Category:Concepts in the philosophy of science Category:Metaphysical theories Category:Metaphysics of mind Category:Ontology Category:Physicalism

范畴: 逻辑范畴的概念: 形而上学范畴的概念: 心灵哲学范畴的概念: 科学哲学范畴的概念: 形而上学理论范畴: 心灵的形而上学范畴: 本体论范畴: 物理主义

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