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| |discoverer = John Maynard Smith and George R. Price | | |discoverer = John Maynard Smith and George R. Price |
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− | 约翰·梅纳德·史密斯和 George r. Price | + | 约翰·梅纳德·史密斯和 乔治·R·普莱斯 |
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| |example = [[Hawk-dove]] | | |example = [[Hawk-dove]] |
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| |example = Hawk-dove | | |example = Hawk-dove |
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− | 鹰鸽博弈
| + | 例子:鹰鸽博弈 |
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| |usedfor = [[Biology|Biological modeling]] and [[Evolutionary game theory]] | | |usedfor = [[Biology|Biological modeling]] and [[Evolutionary game theory]] |
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| An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy (or set of strategies) which, if adopted by a population in a given environment, is impenetrable, meaning that it cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy (or strategies) that are initially rare. It is relevant in game theory, behavioural ecology, and evolutionary psychology. An ESS is an equilibrium refinement of the Nash equilibrium. It is a Nash equilibrium that is "evolutionarily" stable: once it is fixed in a population, natural selection alone is sufficient to prevent alternative (mutant) strategies from invading successfully. The theory is not intended to deal with the possibility of gross external changes to the environment that bring new selective forces to bear. | | An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy (or set of strategies) which, if adopted by a population in a given environment, is impenetrable, meaning that it cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy (or strategies) that are initially rare. It is relevant in game theory, behavioural ecology, and evolutionary psychology. An ESS is an equilibrium refinement of the Nash equilibrium. It is a Nash equilibrium that is "evolutionarily" stable: once it is fixed in a population, natural selection alone is sufficient to prevent alternative (mutant) strategies from invading successfully. The theory is not intended to deal with the possibility of gross external changes to the environment that bring new selective forces to bear. |
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− | '''<font color="#ff8000"> 进化均衡策略Evolutionarily Stable Strategy(ESS)</font>'''是指一个种群在特定环境下采用的策略或策略组,它具有不可渗透性,即该群体不可能被初期占比小的其他策略或策略组所入侵。它与'''<font color="#ff8000"> 博弈论Game Theory</font>''','''<font color="#ff8000"> 行为生态学Behavioural Ecology</font>'''和'''<font color="#ff8000"> 进化心理学Evolutionary Psychology</font>'''有关。进化均衡策略是'''<font color="#ff8000"> 纳什均衡Nash equilibrium</font>'''的细化,相当于是稳定进化的纳什均衡:一旦该种群采取了此策略,仅依靠自然选择过程就足以防止其他策略(如变异)的成功入侵。'''<font color="#32CD32">该理论并非通过有目的性地处理外部环境可能发生的变化,来引入新的种群进化选择力。</font>'''/这一理论阐述的并非要处理外部环境发生重大变化的可能性,而是变化会带来新的选择性力量。 | + | '''<font color="#ff8000"> 进化均衡策略Evolutionarily Stable Strategy(ESS)</font>'''是指一个种群在特定环境下采用的策略或策略组,它具有不可渗透性,即该群体的进化策略不可能受到初期占比小的其他策略或策略组的影响。这与'''<font color="#ff8000"> 博弈论Game Theory</font>''','''<font color="#ff8000"> 行为生态学Behavioural Ecology</font>'''和'''<font color="#ff8000"> 进化心理学Evolutionary Psychology</font>'''有关。进化均衡策略是'''<font color="#ff8000"> 纳什均衡Nash equilibrium</font>'''的细化,相当于是稳定进化的纳什均衡:一旦该种群固定了所采用的策略,仅依靠自然选择过程就足以防止其他策略(如变异)的成功入侵。'''<font color="#32CD32">该理论并非通过有目的性地处理外部环境可能发生的变化,来引入新的种群进化选择力。</font>'''/这一理论想要阐述的不是处理外部环境发生重大变化的可能性,而是这种变化会带来新的选择性力量。 |
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| First published as a specific term in the 1972 book by John Maynard Smith, the ESS is widely used in behavioural ecology and economics, and has been used in anthropology, evolutionary psychology, philosophy, and political science. | | First published as a specific term in the 1972 book by John Maynard Smith, the ESS is widely used in behavioural ecology and economics, and has been used in anthropology, evolutionary psychology, philosophy, and political science. |
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− | 在1972年约翰·梅纳德·史密斯John Maynard Smith出版的书中,进化均衡策略首次作为一个特定的术语出现并被广泛应用于行为生态学和经济学之中。如今在人类学、进化心理学、哲学和政治科学中,这一概念也已得到使用。 | + | 在1972年约翰·梅纳德·史密斯John Maynard Smith出版的书中,进化均衡策略首次作为一个特定的术语出现并被广泛应用于行为生态学和经济学之中。如今在人类学、进化心理学、哲学和政治学中,这一概念也已得到使用。 |
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− | ==History 历史== | + | ==History 发展历史== |
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| Evolutionarily stable strategies were defined and introduced by [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]] in a 1973 ''[[Nature (journal)|Nature]]'' paper.<ref name="JMSandP73">{{cite journal |doi=10.1038/246015a0 |author1=Maynard Smith, J. |authorlink1=John Maynard Smith |author2=Price, G.R. |authorlink2=George R. Price |title=The logic of animal conflict |journal=Nature |volume=246 |issue=5427 |pages=15–8 |year=1973 |bibcode=1973Natur.246...15S}}</ref> Such was the time taken in peer-reviewing the paper for ''Nature'' that this was preceded by a 1972 essay by Maynard Smith in a book of essays titled ''On Evolution''.<ref name="OEJMS"/> The 1972 essay is sometimes cited instead of the 1973 paper, but university libraries are much more likely to have copies of ''Nature''. Papers in ''Nature'' are usually short; in 1974, Maynard Smith published a longer paper in the ''[[Journal of Theoretical Biology]]''.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1016/0022-5193(74)90110-6 |author=Maynard Smith, J. |title=The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflicts |journal=Journal of Theoretical Biology |volume=47 |issue=1 |pages=209–21 |year=1974 |pmid=4459582 |url=http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4448.pdf }}</ref> Maynard Smith explains further in his 1982 book ''[[Evolution and the Theory of Games]]''.<ref name="JMS82">{{cite book |author=Maynard Smith, John |title=Evolution and the Theory of Games |year=1982 |isbn=0-521-28884-3 |title-link=Evolution and the Theory of Games }}</ref> Sometimes these are cited instead. In fact, the ESS has become so central to game theory that often no citation is given, as the reader is assumed to be familiar with it. | | Evolutionarily stable strategies were defined and introduced by [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]] in a 1973 ''[[Nature (journal)|Nature]]'' paper.<ref name="JMSandP73">{{cite journal |doi=10.1038/246015a0 |author1=Maynard Smith, J. |authorlink1=John Maynard Smith |author2=Price, G.R. |authorlink2=George R. Price |title=The logic of animal conflict |journal=Nature |volume=246 |issue=5427 |pages=15–8 |year=1973 |bibcode=1973Natur.246...15S}}</ref> Such was the time taken in peer-reviewing the paper for ''Nature'' that this was preceded by a 1972 essay by Maynard Smith in a book of essays titled ''On Evolution''.<ref name="OEJMS"/> The 1972 essay is sometimes cited instead of the 1973 paper, but university libraries are much more likely to have copies of ''Nature''. Papers in ''Nature'' are usually short; in 1974, Maynard Smith published a longer paper in the ''[[Journal of Theoretical Biology]]''.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1016/0022-5193(74)90110-6 |author=Maynard Smith, J. |title=The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflicts |journal=Journal of Theoretical Biology |volume=47 |issue=1 |pages=209–21 |year=1974 |pmid=4459582 |url=http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4448.pdf }}</ref> Maynard Smith explains further in his 1982 book ''[[Evolution and the Theory of Games]]''.<ref name="JMS82">{{cite book |author=Maynard Smith, John |title=Evolution and the Theory of Games |year=1982 |isbn=0-521-28884-3 |title-link=Evolution and the Theory of Games }}</ref> Sometimes these are cited instead. In fact, the ESS has become so central to game theory that often no citation is given, as the reader is assumed to be familiar with it. |
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| Evolutionarily stable strategies were defined and introduced by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price in a 1973 Nature paper. Such was the time taken in peer-reviewing the paper for Nature that this was preceded by a 1972 essay by Maynard Smith in a book of essays titled On Evolution. (wiki后期添加的内容The 1972 essay is sometimes cited instead of the 1973 paper, but university libraries are much more likely to have copies of Nature. Papers in Nature are usually short; in 1974, Maynard Smith published a longer paper in the Journal of Theoretical Biology.[3] )Maynard Smith explains further in his 1982 book Evolution and the Theory of Games. Sometimes these are cited instead. In fact, the ESS has become so central to game theory that often no citation is given, as the reader is assumed to be familiar with it. | | Evolutionarily stable strategies were defined and introduced by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price in a 1973 Nature paper. Such was the time taken in peer-reviewing the paper for Nature that this was preceded by a 1972 essay by Maynard Smith in a book of essays titled On Evolution. (wiki后期添加的内容The 1972 essay is sometimes cited instead of the 1973 paper, but university libraries are much more likely to have copies of Nature. Papers in Nature are usually short; in 1974, Maynard Smith published a longer paper in the Journal of Theoretical Biology.[3] )Maynard Smith explains further in his 1982 book Evolution and the Theory of Games. Sometimes these are cited instead. In fact, the ESS has become so central to game theory that often no citation is given, as the reader is assumed to be familiar with it. |
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− | 进化均衡策略是由约翰·梅纳德·史密斯John Maynard Smith和 乔治·普赖斯George R. Price 在1973年的《自然》杂志上提出并定义的。但是由于同行评审《自然》中的论文花费了大量时间,导致在此之前,梅纳德`史密斯就在1972年的一本论文集《论进化论》中发表了另一篇论文,因此有时学者们会选择引用1972年他在《论进化论》上发表的论文而非1973年《自然》杂志上的,不过大学图书馆可能收藏有《自然》的副本,尽管通常《自然》杂志上的论文很短;随后1974年,梅纳德·史密斯在《理论生物学》杂志上又发表了一篇更长的论文。在1982年梅纳德·史密斯的新著作《演化与博弈论Evolution and the Theory of Games》中,他又进一步解释了这个概念。之后该版本的解释时常被引用。实际上,进化均衡策略已经成为了博弈论的核心,虽然往往没有引证给出,因为引用者已经假定了读者是熟悉它的。
| + | 进化均衡策略是由约翰·梅纳德·史密斯(John·Maynard·Smith)和 乔治·R·普赖斯(George·R·Price) 在1973年的《自然》杂志上提出并定义的。但是由于同行评审《自然》中的论文花费了大量时间,导致在此之前,梅纳德`史密斯就在1972年的一本论文集《论进化论》中发表了另一篇论文,因此有时学者们会选择引用他在1972年出版的《论进化论》上发表的论文而非1973年《自然》杂志上的,尽管通常《自然》杂志上的论文很短,但是大学图书馆可能收藏有《自然》的副本;随后1974年,梅纳德·史密斯在《理论生物学》杂志上又发表了一篇更长的论文。梅纳德·史密斯在1982年的新著作《演化与博弈论Evolution and the Theory of Games》中,他又进一步解释了这个概念。之后该版本的解释时常被引用。实际上,虽然往往没有引证给出,但是因为引用者已经假定了读者是熟悉它的,因此进化均衡策略已经成为了博弈论的核心。 |
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| Maynard Smith mathematically formalised a verbal argument made by Price, which he read while peer-reviewing Price's paper. When Maynard Smith realized that the somewhat disorganised Price was not ready to revise his article for publication, he offered to add Price as co-author. | | Maynard Smith mathematically formalised a verbal argument made by Price, which he read while peer-reviewing Price's paper. When Maynard Smith realized that the somewhat disorganised Price was not ready to revise his article for publication, he offered to add Price as co-author. |
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− | 梅纳德·史密斯在同行评审普莱斯论文的时候读到了这个论点,随后他将这个口头论点数学形式化。之后史密斯意识到杂乱无章的普莱斯应该是还没有准备修改他自己的文章去发表,于是他就提出在文末加上普莱斯名字作为合著者。
| + | 梅纳德·史密斯在同行评审普莱斯论文的时候读到了这个论点,随后他将这个口头论点数学形式化。之后史密斯意识到普莱斯并没有准备好去修改并发表他的文章,于是他就提出在文末加上普莱斯名字让其成为作为合著者。 |
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| The concept was derived from R. H. MacArthur and W. D. Hamilton's work on sex ratios, derived from Fisher's principle, especially Hamilton's (1967) concept of an unbeatable strategy. Maynard Smith was jointly awarded the 1999 Crafoord Prize for his development of the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies and the application of game theory to the evolution of behaviour. | | The concept was derived from R. H. MacArthur and W. D. Hamilton's work on sex ratios, derived from Fisher's principle, especially Hamilton's (1967) concept of an unbeatable strategy. Maynard Smith was jointly awarded the 1999 Crafoord Prize for his development of the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies and the application of game theory to the evolution of behaviour. |
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− | 其实“进化均衡”这个概念源自于麦克阿瑟R. H. MacArthur和汉密尔顿W. D. Hamilton关于性别比例的研究,以及'''<font color="#ff8000"> 费雪原理Fisher's principle</font>''',另外尤其是汉密尔顿(1967)提出的“'''<font color="#ff8000"> 无敌战略Unbeatable Strategy</font>'''”。随后1999年,梅纳德·史密斯因其对“进化均衡策略”概念的发展,以及“行为进化博弈论“的应用研究做出了杰出贡献,与以上学者共同获得了著名的Crafoord奖。
| + | 事实上“进化均衡”这个概念源自于麦克阿瑟(R·H·MacArthur)和汉密尔顿(W·D·Hamilton)关于性别比例的研究,以及'''<font color="#ff8000"> 费雪原理Fisher's principle</font>''',尤其是汉密尔顿(1967)提出的“'''<font color="#ff8000"> 无敌战略Unbeatable Strategy</font>'''”。随后1999年,梅纳德·史密斯因其对“进化均衡策略”概念的发展以及“行为进化博弈论“的应用研究做出了杰出贡献,与以上学者共同获得了著名的Crafoord奖。 |
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