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第343行： − + − − ===Closed-bag exchange=== − <font color="#ff8000">封闭袋子交换 Closed-bag exchange </font> − [[File:Prisoner's Dilemma briefcase exchange (colorized).svg|thumb|The prisoner's dilemma as a briefcase exchange]] − The prisoner's dilemma as a briefcase exchange+ − [[Douglas Hofstadter]]<ref name="dh">{{cite book | first=Douglas R. | last=Hofstadter| authorlink=Douglas Hofstadter | title= Metamagical Themas: questing for the essence of mind and pattern | publisher= Bantam Dell Pub Group| year=1985 | isbn=978-0-465-04566-2|chapter= Ch.29 ''The Prisoner's Dilemma Computer Tournaments and the Evolution of Cooperation''.| title-link=Metamagical Themas}}</ref> once suggested that people often find problems such as the PD problem easier to understand when it is illustrated in the form of a simple game, or trade-off. One of several examples he used was "closed bag exchange": − − Douglas Hofstadter once suggested that people often find problems such as the PD problem easier to understand when it is illustrated in the form of a simple game, or trade-off. One of several examples he used was "closed bag exchange": − {{quote|Two people meet and exchange closed bags, with the understanding that one of them contains money, and the other contains a purchase. Either player can choose to honor the deal by putting into his or her bag what he or she agreed, or he or she can defect by handing over an empty bag.}}+ − 两人相遇并交换包裹，事先知道一个包里装着钱，一个装着订单。任一玩家都可选择尊重交易，放入事先约定的东西；也可以选择背叛，交换空的公文包。 − − − Defection always gives a game-theoretically preferable outcome.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://users.auth.gr/kehagiat/Research/GameTheory/06GamesToPlay/Prisoner%27s_dilemma.htm#Closed_Bag_Exchange|title=Prisoner's dilemma - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia|website=users.auth.gr|access-date=2020-04-12}}</ref> − Defection always gives a game-theoretically preferable outcome. 第371行：
第359行： − + − 朋友还是敌人？ − ''[[Friend or Foe? (TV series)|Friend or Foe?]]'' is a game show that aired from 2002 to 2005 on the [[Game Show Network]] in the US. It is an example of the prisoner's dilemma game tested on real people, but in an artificial setting. On the game show, three pairs of people compete. When a pair is eliminated, they play a game similar to the prisoner's dilemma to determine how the winnings are split. If they both cooperate (Friend), they share the winnings 50–50. If one cooperates and the other defects (Foe), the defector gets all the winnings and the cooperator gets nothing. If both defect, both leave with nothing. Notice that the reward matrix is slightly different from the standard one given above, as the rewards for the "both defect" and the "cooperate while the opponent defects" cases are identical. This makes the "both defect" case a weak equilibrium, compared with being a strict equilibrium in the standard prisoner's dilemma. If a contestant knows that their opponent is going to vote "Foe", then their own choice does not affect their own winnings. In a specific sense, ''Friend or Foe'' has a rewards model between prisoner's dilemma and the [[Chicken (game)|game of Chicken]]. − − Friend or Foe? is a game show that aired from 2002 to 2005 on the Game Show Network in the US. It is an example of the prisoner's dilemma game tested on real people, but in an artificial setting. On the game show, three pairs of people compete. When a pair is eliminated, they play a game similar to the prisoner's dilemma to determine how the winnings are split. If they both cooperate (Friend), they share the winnings 50–50. If one cooperates and the other defects (Foe), the defector gets all the winnings and the cooperator gets nothing. If both defect, both leave with nothing. Notice that the reward matrix is slightly different from the standard one given above, as the rewards for the "both defect" and the "cooperate while the opponent defects" cases are identical. This makes the "both defect" case a weak equilibrium, compared with being a strict equilibrium in the standard prisoner's dilemma. If a contestant knows that their opponent is going to vote "Foe", then their own choice does not affect their own winnings. In a specific sense, Friend or Foe has a rewards model between prisoner's dilemma and the game of Chicken. − − − The rewards matrix is − − The rewards matrix is − {| class="wikitable"+ − ! {{diagonal split header|{{color|#009|Pair 1}}|{{color|#900|Pair 2}}}} − ! scope="col" style="width:6em;" | {{color|#900|"Friend"<br />(cooperate)}}+ − ! scope="col" style="width:6em;" | {{color|#900|"Foe"<br />(defect)}} − |- − − ! scope="row" style="width:6em;" | {{color|#009|"Friend"<br />(cooperate)}} − − | {{diagonal split header|{{color|#009|1}}|{{color|#900|1}}|transparent}} − − | {{diagonal split header|{{color|#009|0}}|{{color|#900|2}}|transparent}} − − |- − − ! scope="row" | {{color|#009|"Foe"<br />(defect)}} − − | {{diagonal split header|{{color|#009|2}}|{{color|#900|0}}|transparent}} − − | {{diagonal split header|{{color|#009|0}}|{{color|#900|0}}|transparent}} − − |} − − − − {| class="wikitable" − − ! {{diagonal split header|{{color|#009|Pair 1}}|{{color|#900|Pair 2}}}} − − ! scope="col" style="width:6em;" | {{color|#900|"朋友"<br />(合作)}} − − ! scope="col" style="width:6em;" | {{color|#900|"敌人"<br />(背叛)}} − − |- − − ! scope="row" style="width:6em;" | {{color|#009|"朋友"<br />(合作)}} − − | {{diagonal split header|{{color|#009|1}}|{{color|#900|1}}|transparent}} − − | {{diagonal split header|{{color|#009|0}}|{{color|#900|2}}|transparent}} − − |- − − ! scope="row" | {{color|#009|"敌人"<br />(背叛)}} − − | {{diagonal split header|{{color|#009|2}}|{{color|#900|0}}|transparent}} − − | {{diagonal split header|{{color|#009|0}}|{{color|#900|0}}|transparent}} − − |} − − − − − This payoff matrix has also been used on the [[United Kingdom|British]] [[television]] programmes ''Trust Me'', ''[[Shafted]]'', ''[[The Bank Job (TV series)|The Bank Job]]'' and ''[[Golden Balls]]'', and on the [[United States|American]] shows ''[[Bachelor Pad]]'' and ''[[Take It All (game show)|Take It All]]''. Game data from the ''[[Golden Balls]]'' series has been analyzed by a team of economists, who found that cooperation was "surprisingly high" for amounts of money that would seem consequential in the real world, but were comparatively low in the context of the game.<ref>{{cite journal | ssrn=1592456 | title=Split or Steal? Cooperative Behavior When the Stakes Are Large | author=Van den Assem, Martijn J. | journal=Management Science |date=January 2012 | volume=58 | issue=1 | pages=2–20 | doi=10.1287/mnsc.1110.1413| url=http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/richard.thaler/research/pdf/Split%20or%20Steal%20Cooperative%20Behavior%20When%20the%20Stakes%20Are%20Large.pdf }}</ref> − − This payoff matrix has also been used on the British television programmes Trust Me, Shafted, The Bank Job and Golden Balls, and on the American shows Bachelor Pad and Take It All. Game data from the Golden Balls series has been analyzed by a team of economists, who found that cooperation was "surprisingly high" for amounts of money that would seem consequential in the real world, but were comparatively low in the context of the game. − − 英国电视节目《相信我》、《阴影》、《银行工作》和《黄金球》以及美国电视节目《单身公寓》和《全部拿走》也采用了这种奖励矩阵。一个经济学家团队分析了“金球奖”系列的游戏数据，他们发现，现实生活中，合作对于金额而言“惊人地高” ，但在游戏的背景下，相对较低。<ref>{{cite journal | ssrn=1592456 | title=Split or Steal? Cooperative Behavior When the Stakes Are Large | author=Van den Assem, Martijn J. | journal=Management Science |date=January 2012 | volume=58 | issue=1 | pages=2–20 | doi=10.1287/mnsc.1110.1413| url=http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/richard.thaler/research/pdf/Split%20or%20Steal%20Cooperative%20Behavior%20When%20the%20Stakes%20Are%20Large.pdf }}</ref> − − − − ===Iterated snowdrift=== − <font color="#ff8000">重复雪堆 Iterated snowdrift </font> − {{main|snowdrift game}} − − − − Researchers from the [[University of Lausanne]] and the [[University of Edinburgh]] have suggested that the "Iterated Snowdrift Game" may more closely reflect real-world social situations. Although this model is actually a [[chicken game]], it will be described here. In this model, the risk of being exploited through defection is lower, and individuals always gain from taking the cooperative choice. The snowdrift game imagines two drivers who are stuck on opposite sides of a [[snowdrift]], each of whom is given the option of shoveling snow to clear a path, or remaining in their car. A player's highest payoff comes from leaving the opponent to clear all the snow by themselves, but the opponent is still nominally rewarded for their work. − − Researchers from the University of Lausanne and the University of Edinburgh have suggested that the "Iterated Snowdrift Game" may more closely reflect real-world social situations. Although this model is actually a chicken game, it will be described here. In this model, the risk of being exploited through defection is lower, and individuals always gain from taking the cooperative choice. The snowdrift game imagines two drivers who are stuck on opposite sides of a snowdrift, each of whom is given the option of shoveling snow to clear a path, or remaining in their car. A player's highest payoff comes from leaving the opponent to clear all the snow by themselves, but the opponent is still nominally rewarded for their work. + − − − This may better reflect real world scenarios, the researchers giving the example of two scientists collaborating on a report, both of whom would benefit if the other worked harder. "But when your collaborator doesn’t do any work, it’s probably better for you to do all the work yourself. You’ll still end up with a completed project."<ref>{{cite web|last=Kümmerli|first=Rolf|title='Snowdrift' game tops 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in explaining cooperation|url=http://phys.org/news111145481.html|accessdate=11 April 2012}}</ref> − − This may better reflect real world scenarios, the researchers giving the example of two scientists collaborating on a report, both of whom would benefit if the other worked harder. "But when your collaborator doesn’t do any work, it’s probably better for you to do all the work yourself. You’ll still end up with a completed project." + − + − − {| − − |- − − | − − {| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;" − − |+ Example snowdrift payouts (A, B) − − ! {{diagonal split header| A|B }} !! Cooperates !! Defects − − |- − − ! Cooperates − − | 200, 200 || 100, 300 − − |- − − ! Defects − − | 300, 100 || 0, 0 − − |} − − || − − {| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;margin-left:2em;" − − |+ Example PD payouts (A, B) − − ! {{diagonal split header| A|B }} !! Cooperates !! Defects − − |- − − ! Cooperates − − | 200, 200 || -100, 300 − − |- − − ! Defects − − | 300, -100 || 0, 0 − − |} − − − − {| − − |- − − | − − {| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;" − − |+ 重复雪堆的支出示例 (A, B) − − ! {{diagonal split header| A|B }} !! 合作 !! 背叛 − − |- − − ! 合作 − − | 200, 200 || 100, 300 − − |- − − ! 背叛 − − | 300, 100 || 0, 0 − − |} − − || − − {| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;margin-left:2em;" − − |+ 囚徒困境支出示例 (A, B) − − ! {{diagonal split header| A|B }} !! 合作 !! 背叛 − − |- − − ! 合作 − − | 200, 200 || -100, 300 − − |- − − ! 背叛 − − | 300, -100 || 0, 0 − − |} − − − − − − <font color="#ff8000">协调博弈 Coordination games</font> − {{main|coordination games}} − − In coordination games, players must coordinate their strategies for a good outcome. An example is two cars that abruptly meet in a blizzard; each must choose whether to swerve left or right. If both swerve left, or both right, the cars do not collide. The local [[left- and right-hand traffic]] convention helps to co-ordinate their actions. − − In coordination games, players must coordinate their strategies for a good outcome. An example is two cars that abruptly meet in a blizzard; each must choose whether to swerve left or right. If both swerve left, or both right, the cars do not collide. The local left- and right-hand traffic convention helps to co-ordinate their actions. − − − Symmetrical co-ordination games include [[Stag hunt]] and [[Bach or Stravinsky]]. − − Symmetrical co-ordination games include Stag hunt and Bach or Stravinsky. 第595行：
第389行： − + − − <font color="#ff8000">不对称的囚徒困境 Asymmetric prisoner's dilemmas</font> − − A more general set of games are asymmetric. As in the prisoner's dilemma, the best outcome is co-operation, and there are motives for defection. Unlike the symmetric prisoner's dilemma, though, one player has more to lose and/or more to gain than the other. Some such games have been described as a prisoner's dilemma in which one prisoner has an [[alibi]], whence the term "alibi game".<ref>{{cite conference|last1=Robinson |first1=D.R. |last2=Goforth |first2=D.J. |title=Alibi games: the Asymmetric Prisoner' s Dilemmas |date=May 5, 2004 |url=https://economics.ca/2004/papers/0359.pdf |conference=Meetings of the Canadian Economics Association, Toronto, June 4-6, 2004}}</ref> − − A more general set of games are asymmetric. As in the prisoner's dilemma, the best outcome is co-operation, and there are motives for defection. Unlike the symmetric prisoner's dilemma, though, one player has more to lose and/or more to gain than the other. Some such games have been described as a prisoner's dilemma in which one prisoner has an alibi, whence the term "alibi game". − − − In experiments, players getting unequal payoffs in repeated games may seek to maximize profits, but only under the condition that both players receive equal payoffs; this may lead to a stable equilibrium strategy in which the disadvantaged player defects every X games, while the other always co-operates. Such behaviour may depend on the experiment's social norms around fairness.<ref>{{cite chapter|last1=Beckenkamp |first1=Martin |last2=Hennig-Schmidt |first2=Heike |last3=Maier-Rigaud |first3=Frank P. |chapter=Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games |date=March 4, 2007 |chapter-url=http://homepage.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2006_25online.pdf |title=[[Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods]]}}</ref> − − In experiments, players getting unequal payoffs in repeated games may seek to maximize profits, but only under the condition that both players receive equal payoffs; this may lead to a stable equilibrium strategy in which the disadvantaged player defects every X games, while the other always co-operates. Such behaviour may depend on the experiment's social norms around fairness. − +
→Related games
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<br>
==Related games==
==相关博弈==
相关博弈
===封闭袋子交换===
囚徒困境是一个公文包式的交换
囚徒困境是一个公文包式的交换
侯世达 Douglas Hofstadter <ref name="dh">{{cite book | first=Douglas R. | last=Hofstadter| authorlink=Douglas Hofstadter | title= Metamagical Themas: questing for the essence of mind and pattern | publisher= Bantam Dell Pub Group| year=1985 | isbn=978-0-465-04566-2|chapter= Ch.29 ''The Prisoner's Dilemma Computer Tournaments and the Evolution of Cooperation''.| title-link=Metamagical Themas}}</ref>曾经指出，人们通常会发现诸如囚徒困境的问题，比如，当它以一个简单囚徒困境博弈的形式，或者以权衡的方式表现出来时，会更容易理解。他使用的几个例子之一是“封闭袋子交换” :
侯世达 Douglas Hofstadter <ref name="dh">{{cite book | first=Douglas R. | last=Hofstadter| authorlink=Douglas Hofstadter | title= Metamagical Themas: questing for the essence of mind and pattern | publisher= Bantam Dell Pub Group| year=1985 | isbn=978-0-465-04566-2|chapter= Ch.29 ''The Prisoner's Dilemma Computer Tournaments and the Evolution of Cooperation''.| title-link=Metamagical Themas}}</ref>曾经指出，人们通常会发现诸如囚徒困境的问题，比如，当它以一个简单囚徒困境博弈的形式，或者以权衡的方式表现出来时，会更容易理解。他使用的几个例子之一是“封闭袋子交换” :
<blockqoute>两人相遇并交换包裹，事先知道一个包里装着钱，一个装着订单。任一玩家都可选择尊重交易，放入事先约定的东西；也可以选择背叛，交换空的公文包。</blockqoute>
背叛总是会带来一个理论上更可取的结果。<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://users.auth.gr/kehagiat/Research/GameTheory/06GamesToPlay/Prisoner%27s_dilemma.htm#Closed_Bag_Exchange|title=Prisoner's dilemma - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia|website=users.auth.gr|access-date=2020-04-12}}</ref>
背叛总是会带来一个理论上更可取的结果。<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://users.auth.gr/kehagiat/Research/GameTheory/06GamesToPlay/Prisoner%27s_dilemma.htm#Closed_Bag_Exchange|title=Prisoner's dilemma - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia|website=users.auth.gr|access-date=2020-04-12}}</ref>
===''Friend or Foe?''===
===''朋友还是敌人？''===
朋友还是敌人？是一个竞赛节目，从2002年至2005年在美国的Game show Network播出。这是囚徒困境博弈在真人身上测试的一个例子，只是在人为的环境中。在游戏节目中，有三对选手参加比赛。当一对被淘汰时，他们会玩一个类似囚徒困境的游戏来决定奖金如何分配。如果他们都合作(朋友) ，他们分享奖金50-50。如果一方合作而另一方背叛(敌人) ，那么叛变者将得到所有的奖金，而合作者将一无所获。如果双方都背叛，那么双方都将一无所有。请注意，奖励矩阵与上面给出的标准矩阵略有不同，因为“双方都背叛”和“合作而对方背叛”情况下的奖励是相同的。与标准囚徒困境中的严格均衡相比，这使得“两个都背叛”情况成为一个弱均衡。如果一个参赛者知道他们的对手将投票给“敌人” ，那么他们自己的选择不会影响他们自己的奖金。从特定意义上讲，“朋友还是敌人”节目在囚徒困境和“胆小鬼”博弈之间有一个奖励模型。
朋友还是敌人？是一个竞赛节目，从2002年至2005年在美国的Game show Network播出。这是囚徒困境博弈在真人身上测试的一个例子，只是在人为的环境中。在游戏节目中，有三对选手参加比赛。当一对被淘汰时，他们会玩一个类似囚徒困境的游戏来决定奖金如何分配。如果他们都合作(朋友) ，他们分享奖金50-50。如果一方合作而另一方背叛(敌人) ，那么叛变者将得到所有的奖金，而合作者将一无所获。如果双方都背叛，那么双方都将一无所有。请注意，奖励矩阵与上面给出的标准矩阵略有不同，因为“双方都背叛”和“合作而对方背叛”情况下的奖励是相同的。与标准囚徒困境中的严格均衡相比，这使得“两个都背叛”情况成为一个弱均衡。如果一个参赛者知道他们的对手将投票给“敌人” ，那么他们自己的选择不会影响他们自己的奖金。从特定意义上讲，“朋友还是敌人”节目在囚徒困境和“胆小鬼”博弈之间有一个奖励模型。
奖励矩阵是
奖励矩阵是
[[File:奖励矩阵.png|300px|center]]
英国电视节目《相信我 Trust Me》、《阴影 Shafted》、《银行工作 The Bank Job》和《黄金球 Golden Balls》以及美国电视节目《单身公寓 Bachelor Pad》和《全部拿走 Take It All》也采用了这种奖励矩阵。一个经济学家团队分析了“黄金球”系列的游戏数据，他们发现，现实生活中，合作对于金额而言“惊人地高” ，但在游戏的背景下，相对较低。<ref>{{cite journal | ssrn=1592456 | title=Split or Steal? Cooperative Behavior When the Stakes Are Large | author=Van den Assem, Martijn J. | journal=Management Science |date=January 2012 | volume=58 | issue=1 | pages=2–20 | doi=10.1287/mnsc.1110.1413| url=http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/richard.thaler/research/pdf/Split%20or%20Steal%20Cooperative%20Behavior%20When%20the%20Stakes%20Are%20Large.pdf }}</ref>
===重复雪堆===
来自洛桑大学和爱丁堡大学的研究人员认为，“重复雪堆游戏”可能更能反映现实世界的社会状况。虽然这个模型实际上是一个胆小鬼博弈。在这个模型中，由于背叛可以降低被剥削的风险，个体总是从合作选择中获益。这个雪堆游戏可以设想两个司机被困在雪堆的两侧，每个司机都可以选择铲雪清理道路，或者留在自己的车里。一个玩家的最高回报来自于让对手清除所有的积雪，但是仍然可以从对手的工作中得到回报。
来自洛桑大学和爱丁堡大学的研究人员认为，“重复雪堆游戏”可能更能反映现实世界的社会状况。虽然这个模型实际上是一个胆小鬼博弈。在这个模型中，由于背叛可以降低被剥削的风险，个体总是从合作选择中获益。这个雪堆游戏可以设想两个司机被困在雪堆的两侧，每个司机都可以选择铲雪清理道路，或者留在自己的车里。一个玩家的最高回报来自于让对手清除所有的积雪，但是仍然可以从对手的工作中得到回报。
这可能更好地反映了现实世界的情景，研究人员举了两位科学家合作完成一份报告的例子，如果另一位科学家更加努力地工作，这两位科学家都会受益。“但当你的合作者不做任何工作时，你自己完成所有的工作可能会更好。你最终还是会完成一个项目。” <ref>{{cite web|last=Kümmerli|first=Rolf|title='Snowdrift' game tops 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in explaining cooperation|url=http://phys.org/news111145481.html|accessdate=11 April 2012}}</ref>
这可能更好地反映了现实世界的情景，研究人员举了两位科学家合作完成一份报告的例子，如果另一位科学家更加努力地工作，这两位科学家都会受益。“但当你的合作者不做任何工作时，你自己完成所有的工作可能会更好。你最终还是会完成一个项目。” <ref>{{cite web|last=Kümmerli|first=Rolf|title='Snowdrift' game tops 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in explaining cooperation|url=http://phys.org/news111145481.html|accessdate=11 April 2012}}</ref>
[[File:重复雪堆.png|400px]]
===协调博弈===
===Coordination games===
在协调博弈中，参与者必须协调自己的策略以获得一个好的结果。一个例子是两辆车在暴风雪中突然相遇，每辆车必须选择是左转还是右转。如果两辆车都向左转弯，或者都向右转弯，那么两辆车就不会相撞。当地的左右向交通惯例有助于协调他们的行动。
在协调博弈中，参与者必须协调自己的策略以获得一个好的结果。一个例子是两辆车在暴风雪中突然相遇，每辆车必须选择是左转还是右转。如果两辆车都向左转弯，或者都向右转弯，那么两辆车就不会相撞。当地的左右向交通惯例有助于协调他们的行动。
对称的协调游戏包括猎鹿 Stag hunt和巴赫 Bach或斯特拉文斯基 Stravinsky。
对称的协调游戏包括猎鹿 Stag hunt和巴赫 Bach或斯特拉文斯基 Stravinsky。
===Asymmetric prisoner's dilemmas===
===不对称的囚徒困境===
一个更一般的博弈集是不对称的。就像在囚徒困境中一样，最好的结果是合作，而背叛是有动机的。与对称的囚徒困境不同的是一个玩家比另一个玩家有更多的损失或收获。这样的博弈被描述为囚徒困境，其中一个囚徒有不在场证明，这就是术语“不在场证明游戏”的由来。<ref>{{cite conference|last1=Robinson |first1=D.R. |last2=Goforth |first2=D.J. |title=Alibi games: the Asymmetric Prisoner' s Dilemmas |date=May 5, 2004 |url=https://economics.ca/2004/papers/0359.pdf |conference=Meetings of the Canadian Economics Association, Toronto, June 4-6, 2004}}</ref>
一个更一般的博弈集是不对称的。就像在囚徒困境中一样，最好的结果是合作，而背叛是有动机的。与对称的囚徒困境不同的是一个玩家比另一个玩家有更多的损失或收获。这样的博弈被描述为囚徒困境，其中一个囚徒有不在场证明，这就是术语“不在场证明游戏”的由来。<ref>{{cite conference|last1=Robinson |first1=D.R. |last2=Goforth |first2=D.J. |title=Alibi games: the Asymmetric Prisoner' s Dilemmas |date=May 5, 2004 |url=https://economics.ca/2004/papers/0359.pdf |conference=Meetings of the Canadian Economics Association, Toronto, June 4-6, 2004}}</ref>
在实验中，在重复博弈中获得不均等收益的参与者可能会寻求利润最大化，但是前提是两个玩家都必须获得均等的收益。这可能会导致一个稳定的均衡策略，即弱势参与者在每隔X场博弈中都会背叛，而另一个参与者总是保持合作。这种行为可能取决于实验围绕公平的社会规范。<ref>{{cite chapter|last1=Beckenkamp |first1=Martin |last2=Hennig-Schmidt |first2=Heike |last3=Maier-Rigaud |first3=Frank P. |chapter=Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games |date=March 4, 2007 |chapter-url=http://homepage.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2006_25online.pdf |title=[[Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods]]}}</ref>
在实验中，在重复博弈中获得不均等收益的参与者可能会寻求利润最大化，但是前提是两个玩家都必须获得均等的收益。这可能会导致一个稳定的均衡策略，即弱势参与者在每隔X场博弈中都会背叛，而另一个参与者总是保持合作。这种行为可能取决于实验围绕公平的社会规范。<ref>{{cite chapter|last1=Beckenkamp |first1=Martin |last2=Hennig-Schmidt |first2=Heike |last3=Maier-Rigaud |first3=Frank P. |chapter=Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games |date=March 4, 2007 |chapter-url=http://homepage.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2006_25online.pdf |title=[[Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods]]}}</ref>
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==Software==
==Software==