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第1行： − + − + − {{short description|Systems concept which entails automatic reproduction and maintenance}} − − [[File:3D-SIM-4 Anaphase 3 color.jpg|thumb|3D representation of a living cell during the process of [[mitosis]], example of an autopoietic system]] − − 3D representation of a living cell during the process of [[mitosis, example of an autopoietic system]] − − 【图1：3D representation of a living cell during the process of mitosis, example of an autopoietic system 三维形式的有丝分裂过程中的活细胞——一个自创生系统的例子】 − − − The term '''autopoiesis''' ({{ety|gre|''αὐτo-'' (auto-)|self||''ποίησις'' ([[poiesis]])|creation, production}}) refers to a [[system]] capable of reproducing and maintaining itself. − The term autopoiesis refers to a system capable of reproducing and maintaining itself. − “自创生”指的是一个能够自我繁殖和维持的系统。+ − The original definition can be found in ''[[Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living]]'' (1st edition 1973, 2nd 1980):<ref>Maturana, Varela, 1980, p. 89.</ref> − The original definition can be found in “Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living” (1st edition 1973, 2nd 1980):+ − 最初的定义可以在《自创生和认知：生命的实现 Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living》(1973年第1版，1980年第2版)中找到:+ − − quotation|Page 16: It was in these circumstances ... in which he analyzed Don Quixote's dilemma of whether to follow the path of arms (praxis, action) or the path of letters (poiesis, creation, production), I understood for the first time the power of the word "poiesis" and invented the word that we needed: autopoiesis. This was a word without a history, a word that could directly mean what takes place in the dynamics of the autonomy proper to living systems. − − − − Page 78: An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network. − − {{quotation|Page 16: It was in these circumstances ... in which he analyzed Don Quixote's dilemma of whether to follow the path of arms (''praxis'', action) or the path of letters (''poiesis'', creation, production), I understood for the first time the power of the word "poiesis" and invented the word that we needed: ''autopoiesis''. This was a word without a history, a word that could directly mean what takes place in the dynamics of the autonomy proper to living systems. − − Page 78: An autopoietic [[machine]] is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network.<ref>Maturana, Varela, 1980, p. 78.</ref> − − Page 89: ... the space defined by an autopoietic system is self-contained and cannot be described by using dimensions that define another space. When we refer to our interactions with a concrete autopoietic system, however, we project this system on the space of our manipulations and make a description of this projection.}} − − Page 89: ... the space defined by an autopoietic system is self-contained and cannot be described by using dimensions that define another space. When we refer to our interactions with a concrete autopoietic system, however, we project this system on the space of our manipulations and make a description of this projection.}} + − − − The term was introduced in 1972 by Chilean biologists [[Humberto Maturana]] and [[Francisco Varela]] to define the self-maintaining [[chemistry]] of living [[cells (biology)|cells]]. Since then the concept has been also applied to the fields of [[cognition]], [[systems theory]], [[architecture]] and [[sociology]]. − − The term was introduced in 1972 by Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela to define the self-maintaining chemistry of living cells. Since then the concept has been also applied to the fields of cognition, systems theory, architecture and sociology. − + − − − 意义 − − Autopoiesis was originally presented as a system description that was said to define and explain the nature of [[living systems]]. A canonical example of an autopoietic system is the [[biological cell]]. The [[Eukaryote|eukaryotic]] cell, for example, is made of various [[biochemical]] components such as [[nucleic acid]]s and [[protein]]s, and is organized into bounded structures such as the [[cell nucleus]], various [[organelle]]s, a [[cell membrane]] and [[cytoskeleton]]. These structures, based on an external flow of molecules and energy, ''produce'' the components which, in turn, continue to maintain the organized bounded structure that gives rise to these components (not unlike a wave propagating through a medium). − − Autopoiesis was originally presented as a system description that was said to define and explain the nature of living systems. A canonical example of an autopoietic system is the biological cell. The eukaryotic cell, for example, is made of various biochemical components such as nucleic acids and proteins, and is organized into bounded structures such as the cell nucleus, various organelles, a cell membrane and cytoskeleton. These structures, based on an external flow of molecules and energy, produce the components which, in turn, continue to maintain the organized bounded structure that gives rise to these components (not unlike a wave propagating through a medium). − + − − An autopoietic system is to be contrasted with an [[allopoietic]] system, such as a car factory, which uses raw materials (components) to generate a car (an organized structure) which is something ''other'' than itself (the factory). However, if the system is extended from the factory to include components in the factory's "environment", such as supply chains, plant / equipment, workers, dealerships, customers, contracts, competitors, cars, spare parts, and so on, then as a total viable system it could be considered to be autopoietic.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Knowledge production in organizations : a processual autopoietic view | first = Kaj U | last = Koskinen | name-list-style = vanc |date=2013 |publisher=Springer |isbn=9783319001043 |location=Heidelberg |oclc=846465493}}</ref> − − An autopoietic system is to be contrasted with an allopoietic system, such as a car factory, which uses raw materials (components) to generate a car (an organized structure) which is something other than itself (the factory). However, if the system is extended from the factory to include components in the factory's "environment", such as supply chains, plant / equipment, workers, dealerships, customers, contracts, competitors, cars, spare parts, and so on, then as a total viable system it could be considered to be autopoietic. − − 自创生系统应与异创生系统形成对比。以汽车工厂为例：它使用原材料（部件）来生成汽车（一个有组织的结构），而汽车却是自身（工厂）以外的东西。然而，如果该系统从工厂拓展到工厂的“环境”中的组成组分，如供应链、工厂/设备、工人、经销商、客户、合同、竞争对手、汽车、备件等等，那么该系统作为一个能独立生存的系统，可以被认为是自创生的。 − Though others have often used the term as a synonym for [[self-organization]], Maturana himself stated he would "[n]ever use the notion of self-organization ... Operationally it is impossible. That is, if the organization of a thing changes, the thing changes".<ref>{{cite book |last=Maturana |first=Humberto | name-list-style = vanc |year=1987 |chapter=Everything is said by an observer |title=Gaia, a Way of Knowing: Political Implications of the New Biology |editor=Thompson, William Irwin |publisher=Lindisfarne Press |location=Great Barrington, MA |pages=65–82, 71 |oclc=15792540 |isbn=978-0-940262-23-2}}</ref> Moreover, an autopoietic system is autonomous and operationally closed, in the sense that there are sufficient processes within it to maintain the whole. Autopoietic systems are "structurally coupled" with their medium, embedded in a dynamic of changes that can be recalled as [[sensory-motor coupling]].<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Allen M, Friston KJ | title = From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind | journal = Synthese | volume = 195 | issue = 6 | pages = 2459–2482 | date = 2018-06-01 | pmid = 29887647 | pmc = 5972168 | doi = 10.1007/s11229-016-1288-5 }}</ref> This continuous dynamic is considered as a rudimentary form of [[knowledge]] or [[cognition]] and can be observed throughout life-forms.+ − Though others have often used the term as a synonym for self-organization, Maturana himself stated he would "[n]ever use the notion of self-organization ... Operationally it is impossible. That is, if the organization of a thing changes, the thing changes". Moreover, an autopoietic system is autonomous and operationally closed, in the sense that there are sufficient processes within it to maintain the whole. Autopoietic systems are "structurally coupled" with their medium, embedded in a dynamic of changes that can be recalled as sensory-motor coupling. This continuous dynamic is considered as a rudimentary form of knowledge or cognition and can be observed throughout life-forms. − 尽管其他人经常使用该术语来作为自组织self-organization的同义词，Maturana本人表示他“永远不会使自组织的概念……在操作上它是不可能的。换句话说，如果一个事物的组织发生了变化，这个事物也就发生了变化。”。此外，自创生系统是自主的，并且在操作上是封闭的。也就是说，它内部有足够的过程，来维持整个系统。自创生系统和它们的媒介“在结构上是耦合的”，嵌入在一种变化的动态中，可以被称为感知-运动的耦合。这种连续的动态被认为是知识或认知的初级形式，可以在整个生命形式中观察到。 + − An application of the concept of autopoiesis to [[sociology]] can be found in [[Niklas Luhmann]]'s [[Systems theory#Sociology and Sociocybernetics|Systems Theory]], which was subsequently adapted by [[Bob Jessop]] in his studies of the capitalist state system. [[Marjatta Maula]] adapted the concept of autopoiesis in a business context.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Maula M | <!-- author-link1 = Marjatta Maula --> | date = 2006 | series = Advanced Series in Management | title = Organizations as learning systems: 'Living composition' as an enabling infrastructure. | publisher = Emerald Group Publishing }}</ref> The theory of autopoiesis has also been applied in the context of legal systems by not only Niklas Luhmann, but also Gunther Teubner.<ref>{{cite book | first = Gunther | last = Teubner | name-list-style = vanc | title = Law as an Autopoietic System | publisher = The European University Institute Press | date = 1992 }}</ref><ref>For a discussion on the evolution and development of autopoietic legal systems, see, {{cite book | first = Neil T. | last = Lyons | chapter = Autopoiesis: Evolution, Assimilation, and Causation of Normative Closure | title = Law, Justice, and Miscommunications: Essays in Applied Legal Philosophy | veditors = Kaye T | publisher = Vanderplas Publishing | date = 2011 | isbn = 978-1-60042-152-5 }}</ref>+ − An application of the concept of autopoiesis to sociology can be found in Niklas Luhmann's Systems Theory, which was subsequently adapted by Bob Jessop in his studies of the capitalist state system. Marjatta Maula adapted the concept of autopoiesis in a business context. The theory of autopoiesis has also been applied in the context of legal systems by not only Niklas Luhmann, but also Gunther Teubner. − 在Niklas Luhmann的系统理论Systems Theory里，可以找到自创生概念在社会学中的应用。随后，Bob Jessop在研究资本主义国家系统时对其进行了调整。Marjatta在商业背景下改造了自创生的概念。把自创生的理论应用于法律体系的除了Niklas Luhmann还有Gunther Teubner。 + − In the context of textual studies, [[Jerome McGann]] argues that texts are "autopoietic mechanisms operating as self-generating feedback systems that cannot be separated from those who manipulate and use them".<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = McGann J | title = The Textual Condition | publisher = Princeton University Press | date = 1986 | page = 15 }}</ref> Citing Maturana and Varela, he defines an autopoietic system as "a closed topological space that 'continuously generates and specifies its own organization through its operation as a system of production of its own components, and does this in an endless turnover of components{{'"}}, concluding that "Autopoietic systems are thus distinguished from allopoietic systems, which are Cartesian and which 'have as the product of their functioning something different from themselves{{'"}}. Coding and markup appear [[allopoietic]]", McGann argues, but are generative parts of the system they serve to maintain, and thus language and print or electronic technology are autopoietic systems.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = McGann J | chapter = Marking Texts of Many Dimensions | veditors = Schreibman S, Siemens RG, Unsworth JM | title = A Companion to Digital Humanities | publisher = John Wiley & Sons | date = 2000 | pages = 200–201 }}</ref>+ − In the context of textual studies, Jerome McGann argues that texts are "autopoietic mechanisms operating as self-generating feedback systems that cannot be separated from those who manipulate and use them". Citing Maturana and Varela, he defines an autopoietic system as "a closed topological space that 'continuously generates and specifies its own organization through its operation as a system of production of its own components, and does this in an endless turnover of components, concluding that "Autopoietic systems are thus distinguished from allopoietic systems, which are Cartesian and which 'have as the product of their functioning something different from themselves. Coding and markup appear allopoietic", McGann argues, but are generative parts of the system they serve to maintain, and thus language and print or electronic technology are autopoietic systems.+ − 在文本研究的背景下，Jerome McGann认为，文本是“作为自生成的反馈系统运作的自创生机制，不能与操纵和使用它们的人分开”。他引用Maturana和Varela的观点，将自创生系统定义为“一个封闭的拓扑空间，它‘作为一个生产其自身组成部分的系统运作，以此不断产生和规定其自身的组织，并在其组成部分的无穷更替中做到这一点’”，结论是“自创生系统因此区别与异创生系统，后者是笛卡尔式的，‘其运作的产物与自身不同’。McGann认为，编码和标记看起来是异创生的，但却是用它们来维持的系统的生成部分，因此语言和印刷或电子技术是自创生系统。 − + − + − In his discussion of Hegel, the philosopher [[Slavoj Žižek]] argues, "Hegel is – to use today's terms – the ultimate thinker of autopoiesis, of the process of the emergence of necessary features out of chaotic contingency, the thinker of contingency's gradual self-organisation, of the gradual rise of order out of chaos."<ref>{{cite book | first = Slavoj | last = Žižek | name-list-style = vanc | author-link = Slavoj Žižek | title = Less Than Nothing | publisher = Verso | date = 2012 | page = 467 }}</ref> − − In his discussion of Hegel, the philosopher Slavoj Žižek argues, "Hegel is – to use today's terms – the ultimate thinker of autopoiesis, of the process of the emergence of necessary features out of chaotic contingency, the thinker of contingency's gradual self-organisation, of the gradual rise of order out of chaos." − − 哲学家Slavoj Žižek在讨论黑格尔Hegel时认为：“黑格尔——用今天的话来说——是关于自创生的终极思想家，思考了从混乱的偶然性中必然特征的涌现，偶然性的逐渐自我组织，从混乱中秩序的逐渐上升。” − − − − ==Relation to complexity== − − − 与复杂性的关系 − − Autopoiesis can be defined as the ratio between the complexity of a system and the complexity of its environment. − − 自创生可以定义为一个系统的复杂性与其所处环境的复杂性之间的比率。 − − − Autopoiesis can be defined as the ratio between the complexity of a system and the complexity of its environment.<ref name="Fernández"> − − − − {{cite book |chapter=Chapter 2: Information Measures of Complexity, Emergence, Self-organization, Homeostasis, and Autopoiesis | vauthors = Fernandez N, Maldonado C, Gershenson C |title=Guided self-organization: Inception |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-642-53734-9 |pages=19–51 |year=2013 |arxiv=1304.1842|bibcode=2013arXiv1304.1842F }} − − </ref> − − − − {{quote|This generalized view of autopoiesis considers systems as self-producing not in terms of their physical components, but in terms of its organization, which can be measured in terms of information and complexity. In other words, we can describe autopoietic systems as those producing more of their own complexity than the one produced by their environment.<ref name=Gershenson>{{cite arXiv |title=Requisite Variety, Autopoiesis, and Self-organization | first = Carlos | last = Gershenson | name-list-style = vanc | author-link = Carlos Gershenson|date=26 Sep 2014 |eprint= 1409.7475| class = nlin.AO }}</ref>}} − − − This generalized view of autopoiesis considers systems as self-producing not in terms of their physical components, but in terms of its organization, which can be measured in terms of information and complexity. In other words, we can describe autopoietic systems as those producing more of their own complexity than the one produced by their environment. − − 这种关于自创生的笼统观点认为：系统的自我生产指的不是其物理成分，而是其组织，可以用信息和复杂度来衡量。换句话说，我们可以把自创生系统描述为那些自己产生的复杂性多于环境产生的复杂性的系统。 − An extensive discussion of the connection of autopoiesis to cognition is provided by Thompson. The basic notion of autopoiesis as involving constructive interaction with the environment is extended to include cognition. Initially, Maturana defined cognition as behavior of an organism "with relevance to the maintenance of itself". However, computer models that are self-maintaining but non-cognitive have been devised, so some additional restrictions are needed, and the suggestion is that the maintenance process, to be cognitive, involves readjustment of the internal workings of the system in some metabolic process. On this basis it is claimed that autopoiesis is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for cognition. Thompson (p. 127) takes the view that this distinction may or may not be fruitful, but what matters is that living systems involve autopoiesis and (if it is necessary to add this point) cognition as well. It can be noted that this definition of 'cognition' is restricted, and does not necessarily entail any awareness or consciousness by the living system. − − Evan Thompson在其2007年出版的《生命中的心智》（Mind in Life）中，对自创生与认知的联系进行了广泛的讨论。自创生的基本概念——涉及与环境的建构性互动——被扩展到能够包括认知。最初，Maturana将认知定义为有机体“与维持自身有关”的行为。然而，人们已经设计出了能自我维持但不具有认知性的计算机模型，因此，“认知”需要一些额外的限制。维持过程要具有认知性，最好涉及某些代谢过程中对系统内部运作的重新调整。在此基础上，可以宣称自创生是认知的必要不充分条件。Thompson写道：这种区分可能有结果，也可能没结果；但重要的是，生命系统涉及自创生，认知也涉及（如果有必要加上这点的话）。可以注意到，这种对“认知”的定义是有限制的，不一定需要生命系统的任何意识或觉察。 − − ==Relation to cognition== − − 与认知的关系 − − An extensive discussion of the connection of autopoiesis to cognition is provided by Thompson.[13] The basic notion of autopoiesis as involving constructive interaction with the environment is extended to include cognition. Initially, Maturana defined cognition as behavior of an organism "with relevance to the maintenance of itself".[14] However, computer models that are self-maintaining but non-cognitive have been devised, so some additional restrictions are needed, and the suggestion is that the maintenance process, to be cognitive, involves readjustment of the internal workings of the system in some metabolic process. On this basis it is claimed that autopoiesis is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for cognition.[15] Thompson (p. 127) takes the view that this distinction may or may not be fruitful, but what matters is that living systems involve autopoiesis and (if it is necessary to add this point) cognition as well. It can be noted that this definition of 'cognition' is restricted, and does not necessarily entail any awareness or consciousness by the living system. − An extensive discussion of the connection of autopoiesis to [[cognition]] is provided by Thompson.<ref name=Thompson> − − {{cite book |title=Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind | first = Evan | last = Thompson | name-list-style = vanc |isbn=978-0-674-02511-0 |publisher=Harvard University Press |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OVGna4ZEpWwC&pg=PA91 |chapter=Chapter 5: Autopoiesis: The organization of the living |pages=91–127 |year=2007}} − − − The connection of autopoiesis to cognition, or if necessary, of living systems to cognition, is an objective assessment ascertainable by observation of a living system. − − − 自创生（如果有必要的话，特指生命系统的自创生）与认知的关系，是一种可以通过观察生命系统来确定的客观评估。 − − − </ref> The basic notion of autopoiesis as involving constructive interaction with the environment is extended to include cognition. Initially, Maturana defined cognition as behavior of an organism "with relevance to the maintenance of itself".<ref name=Maturana> − − {{cite book |title=Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living |chapter=The cognitive process |page=13 |isbn=978-90-277-1016-1 |year=1980 |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media | vauthors = Maturana HR, Varela FJ |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nVmcN9Ja68kC&pg=PA13}} − − − One question that arises is about the connection between cognition seen in this manner and consciousness. The separation of cognition and consciousness recognizes that the organism may be unaware of the substratum where decisions are made. What is the connection between these realms? Thompson refers to this issue as the "explanatory gap", and one aspect of it is the hard problem of consciousness, how and why we have qualia. + − 由此出现的一个问题是意识与用这种方式看待的认知之间的联系。认知与意识的分离让我们意识到，有机体可能并不能意识到做出决定的底层机制。这两个领域的联系是什么？Thompson把这个问题称为“解释的鸿沟”explanatory gap，其中的一个方面是“意识的难题”the hard problem of consciousness，即我们如何以及为什么会有“感质”qualia的问题。+ + − </ref> However, computer models that are self-maintaining but non-cognitive have been devised, so some additional restrictions are needed, and the suggestion is that the maintenance process, to be cognitive, involves readjustment of the internal workings of the system in some [[Metabolism|metabolic process]]. On this basis it is claimed that autopoiesis is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for cognition.<ref name=Bitbol>+ − {{cite journal | vauthors = Bitbol M, Luisi PL | title = Autopoiesis with or without cognition: defining life at its edge | journal = Journal of the Royal Society, Interface | volume = 1 | issue = 1 | pages = 99–107 | date = November 2004 | pmid = 16849156 | pmc = 1618936 | doi = 10.1098/rsif.2004.0012 }} − − − A second question is whether autopoiesis can provide a bridge between these concepts. Thompson discusses this issue from the standpoint of enactivism. An autopoietic cell actively relates to its environment. Its sensory responses trigger motor behavior governed by autopoiesis, and this behavior (it is claimed) is a simplified version of a nervous system behavior. The further claim is that real-time interactions like this require attention, and an implication of attention is awareness. − − − 第二个问题是自创生能否在这些概念之间提供一个桥梁。Tompson从交互理论enactivism的角度讨论了这个问题。一个自创生的细胞积极地与它的环境发生联系。它的感觉反应触发了由自创生支配的运动行为，而这种行为（据说）是神经网络行为的简化版。进一步说，像这样的实时互动需要注意力，而注意力的一个含义就是意识。 − − − </ref> Thompson (p. 127) takes the view that this distinction may or may not be fruitful, but what matters is that living systems involve autopoiesis and (if it is necessary to add this point) cognition as well. It can be noted that this definition of 'cognition' is restricted, and does not necessarily entail any awareness or [[consciousness]] by the living system. − − ==Relation to consciousness== − − 与意识的关系 − − The connection of autopoiesis to cognition, or if necessary, of living systems to cognition, is an objective assessment ascertainable by observation of a living system. + − One question that arises is about the connection between cognition seen in this manner and consciousness. The separation of cognition and consciousness recognizes that the organism may be unaware of the substratum where decisions are made. What is the connection between these realms? Thompson refers to this issue as the "explanatory gap", and one aspect of it is the [[hard problem of consciousness]], how and why we have [[qualia]].+ − − 由此出现的一个问题是意识与用这种方式看待的认知之间的联系。认知与意识的分离让我们意识到，有机体可能并不能意识到做出决定的底层机制。这两个领域的联系是什么？Thompson把这个问题称为“解释的鸿沟”explanatory gap，其中的一个方面是“意识的难题”the hard problem of consciousness，即我们如何以及为什么会有“感质”qualia的问题。 − − A second question is whether autopoiesis can provide a bridge between these concepts. Thompson discusses this issue from the standpoint of [[enactivism]]. An autopoietic cell actively relates to its environment. Its sensory responses trigger motor behavior governed by autopoiesis, and this behavior (it is claimed) is a simplified version of a nervous system behavior. The further claim is that real-time interactions like this require attention, and an implication of attention is awareness. − − − − − − One question that arises is about the connection between cognition seen in this manner and consciousness. The separation of cognition and consciousness recognizes that the organism may be unaware of the substratum where decisions are made. What is the connection between these realms? Thompson refers to this issue as the "explanatory gap", and one aspect of it is the [[hard problem of consciousness]], how and why we have [[qualia]].<ref name=Thompson2> − − − − {{columns-list|colwidth=35em| − − { column-list | colwidth = 35em | − </ref> + − A second question is whether autopoiesis can provide a bridge between these concepts. Thompson discusses this issue from the standpoint of [[enactivism]]. An autopoietic cell actively relates to its environment. Its sensory responses trigger motor behavior governed by autopoiesis, and this behavior (it is claimed) is a simplified version of a nervous system behavior. The further claim is that real-time interactions like this require attention, and an implication of attention is awareness.<ref name=Thompson3> − + − </ref> − + − − 批评 − − There are multiple criticisms of the use of the term in both its original context, as an attempt to define and explain the living, and its various expanded usages, such as applying it to self-organizing systems in general or social systems in particular.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Fleischaker G | year = 1992 | title = Autopoiesis in Systems Analysis: A Debate | url = | journal = International Journal of General Systems | volume = 21 | issue = 2| pages = 131–271 | doi=10.1080/03081079208945065}}</ref> Critics have argued that the concept and its theory fail to define or explain living systems and that, because of the extreme language of [[self-referential]]ity it uses without any external reference, it is really an attempt to give substantiation to Maturana's radical [[constructivist epistemology|constructivist]] or [[solipsistic]] [[epistemology]],<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Swenson R |year=1992 |title=Autocatakinetics, Yes—Autopoiesis, No: Steps Toward a Unified Theory of Evolutionary Ordering |journal=International Journal of General Systems |volume=21 |issue=2 |pages=207–208 |doi=10.1080/03081079208945072}}</ref> or what [[Danilo Zolo]]<ref>{{Cite journal | vauthors = Kenny V, Gardner G |year=1988 |title=The constructions of self-organizing systems |journal=The Irish Journal of Psychology |volume=9 |pages=1–24 |issue=1 |doi=10.1080/03033910.1988.10557704}}</ref><ref name="Wolfe">{{cite book |last=Wolfe |first=Cary | name-list-style = vanc |title=Critical environments: postmodern theory and the pragmatics of the "outside" |publisher=University of Minnesota Press |year=1998 |pages=62–3 |isbn=978-0-8166-3019-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tBQSBBWVg2cC&pg=PT85&lpg=PT85&dq=Zolo+Autopoiesis#v=onepage}}</ref> has called instead a "desolate theology". An example is the assertion by Maturana and Varela that "We do not see what we do not see and what we do not see does not exist".<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Maturana H, Varela F | date = 1988 | title = The Tree of Knowledge. | series = New Science Library | publisher = Shambhala Publications | location = Boston | page = 242 }}</ref> The autopoietic model, said Rod Swenson,<ref>{{Cite journal | vauthors = Swenson R |year=1992 |title=Galileo, Babel, and Autopoiesis (It's Turtles All The Way Down) |journal=International Journal of General Systems |volume=21 |pages=267–269 |issue=2 |doi=10.1080/03081079208945080}}</ref> is "miraculously decoupled from the physical world by its progenitors ... (and thus) grounded on a solipsistic foundation that flies in the face of both common sense and scientific knowledge". − − − 对于该术语的应用，无论是在其最初的语境中（即试图定义和解释生命体），还是在其各种扩展的使用中（如将其应用到一般的自组织系统，特别是社会系统），都有多种批评意见。批评者认为，该概念及其理论未能定义或解释生命系统。而且，由于其使用的极端的自我指涉语言没有任何外部参照，它实际上是在为Maturana的激进建构主义constructivist或唯我论solipsistic的认识论epistemology（又被Danilo Zolo称为“荒凉神学”）提供证据。自我指涉的一个例子是Maturana和Varela的断言：“我们看不到我们没有看到的东西，我们没有看到的东西也不存在。”Rod Swenson说，自创生模型 "奇迹般地与物理世界脱钩...... (因此)建立在违背常识和科学知识的唯心主义基础上。" − − == See also == − − ==Notes and references== 第237行：
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第121行： − Category:Cybernetics − − 类别: 控制论 − − {{refend}} − − Category:Systems theory − − 范畴: 系统论 − − − − Category:Philosophy of mind − − 类别: 心灵哲学 − − == External links == − − Category:Enactive cognition − − 类别: 激活认知 − − {{Wiktionary|autopoiesis}} − − Category:Consciousness studies − − 类别: 意识研究 − − * [http://www.enolagaia.com/AT.html ''The Observer Web: Autopoiesis and Enaction'': a website with more explanations] − − Category:Self-replication − − 类别: 自我复制 − − * [http://archonic.net Several papers on autopoietic theory are available through archonic.net] − − Category:Non-equilibrium thermodynamics − − 类别: 非平衡态热力学 − Category:Biological hypotheses − − 类别: 生物学假说 − − <noinclude> − − <small>This page was moved from [[wikipedia:en:Autopoiesis]]. Its edit history can be viewed at [[自创生理论/edithistory]]</small></noinclude> − − [[Category:待整理页面]] − {{#seo: − |keywords=生命起源,自创生, Autopoiesis,人工生命 − |description=生命起源,自创生, Autopoiesis,人工生命 − }} 第387行：
第187行： − 目前，我已经对整个思想有了一个大致的描述，这一节开始更加详细的描述Maturana和Varela的理论细节。+ 第558行：
第358行： − − − ==英文原文== − − 2.1 The essential idea of Autopoiesis − − The fundamental question Maturana and Varela set out to answer is: what distinguishes entities or systems that we would call living from other systems, apparently equally complex, which we would not? How, for example, should a Martian distinguish between a horse and a car? This is an example that Monod (1974, p. 19) uses in addressing the similar but not identical question of distinguishing between natural and artificial systems. − − This has always been a problem for biologists, who have developed a variety of answers. First came vitalism (Bergson, 1911; Driesch, 1908), which held that there is some substance or force or principle, as yet unobserved, which must account for the peculiar characteristics of life. Then system theory, with the development of concepts such as feedback, homeostasis, and open systems, paved the way for explanations of the complex, goal-seeking behavior of organisms in purely mechanistic term ( for example, Cannon, 1939; Priban, 1968). While this was a significant advance, such mechanisms could equally well be built into simple machines that would never qualify as living organisms. − − A third approach, the most common recently, is to specify a list of necessary characteristics that any living organism must have – such as reproductive ability, information-processing capabilities, carbon-based chemistry, and nucleic acids (see, for example, Miller, 1978; Bunge, 1979). The first difficulty with this approach is that it is entirely descriptive and not in any real sense explanatory. It works by observing systems that are accepted as living and noting some of their common characteristics. However, this tactic assumes precisely that which is in need of explanation – the distinction between the living and the nonliving. The approach fails to define the characteristics particular to living systems alone or to give any explanation as to how such characteristics might generate the observed phenomena. Second, there is, inevitably, always a lack of agreement about the contents of such lists. Any two lists will contain different characteristics, and it is difficult to prove that every feature in a list is really necessary or that the list is actually complete. − − Maturana’s and Varela’s work is based on a number of fundamental observations about the nature of living systems. They will be introduced briefly here but discussed in more detail in later chapters. − − 1. Somewhat in opposition to current trends that focus on the species or the genes (Dawkins,1978), Maturana and Varela pick out the single, biological individual (for instance, a single celled creature such as an amoeba) as the central example of a living system. One essential feature of such living entities is their individual autonomy. Although they are part of organisms, populations, and species and are affected by their environment, individuals are bounded, self-defined entities. − − 2. Living systems operate in an essentially mechanistic way. They consist of particular components that have various properties and interactions. The overall behavior of the whole is generated purely by these components and their properties through the interactions of neighboring elements. Thus any explanation of living systems must be a purely mechanistic one. − − 3. All explanations or descriptions are made by observers (i.e., people) who are external to the system. One must not confuse that which pertains to the observer with that which pertains to the observed. Observers can perceive both an entity and its environment and see how the two relate to each other. Components within an entity, however, cannot do this, but act purely in response to other components. − − 4. The last two lead to the idea that any explanation of living systems should be nonteleological, i.e., it should not have recourse to ideas of function and purpose. The observable phenomena of living systems result purely from the interactions of neighboring internal components. The observation that certain parts appear to have a function with regard to the whole can be made only by an observer who can interact with both the component and with the whole and describe the relation of the two. − − − − To explain the nature of living systems, Maturana and Varela focus on a single basic example – the individual, living cell. Briefly, a cell consists of cell membrane or boundary enclosing various structures such as nucleus, mitochondria, and lysosomes as well as many (and often complex) molecules produced from within. These structures are in constant chemical interplay both with each other and, in the case of the membrane, with their external medium. It is a dynamic, integrated chemical network of incredible sophistication (see for example Alberts et al.,1989; Raven and Johnson,1991). − − What is it that characterizes this as an autonomous, dynamic, living whole? What distinguishes it from machine such as a chemical factory which also consists of complex components and interacting processes of production forming an organized whole? It can not be to do with any functions or purposes that any single cell might fulfill in a larger multi-cellular organism since there are single-cellular organisms that survive by themselves. Nor can it explained in a reductionist way through particular structures or components of the cell such as the nucleus or DNA/RNA. The difference must stem from the way of the parts are organized as a whole. To understand Maturana and Varela’s answer, we need to look at two related questions – what is it that the cell does, that is what is it the cell produces? And what is it that produces the cell? By this I mean the cell itself rather than the results of their reproduction. − − What does a cell do? This will be looked at in detail in Section 2.3 but, in essence, it produces many complex and simple substances which remain in the cell (become of the cell membrane) and participate in those very same production processes. Some molecules are excreted from the cell, through the membrane, as waste. What is it that produces the components of the cell? With the help of some basic chemicals imported from its medium, the cell produces its own constituents. So a cell produces its own components, which are therefore what produces it in a circular, ongoing process (Fig. 2.1) − − It produces, and is produced by, nothing other than itself. This simple idea is all that is meant by autopoiesis. The word means “self-producing” and that is what the cell does: it continually produces itself. Living systems are autopoietic – they are organized in such a way that their processes produce the very components necessary for the continuance of these processes. Systems which do not produce themselves are called allopoietic, meaning “other-producing” – for example, a river or a crystal. Maturana and Varela also refer to human-created systems as heteropoietic. An exemple is a chemical factory. Superficially, this is similar to cell, but it produces chemicals that are used elsewhere, and is itself produced or maintained by other systems. It is not self-producing. − − At first sight this may seem an almost trivial idea, yet further contemplation reviews how significance it is. For example: − − 1. Imagine try to build autopoietic machine. Save for energy and some basic chemicals, everything within it would itself have to be produced by the machine itself. So, there would have to be machines to produce the various components. Of course, these machines themselves would have to be produced, maintained, and repaired by yet more machines, and so on, all within the same single entity. The machine would soon encompass the whole economy. − − 2. Suppose that you succeed. Then surely what you have created would be autonomous and independent. It would have the ability to construct and reconstruct itself, and would, in a very real sense, be no longer controlled by us, its creators. Would it not seem appropriate to call it living? − − 3. As life on earth originated from a sea of chemicals, a cell in which a set of chemicals interacted such that the cell created and re-created its own constituents would generate a stable, self-defined entity with a vastly enhanced chance of future development. This indeed is the basis for current research, to be described in section 2.4.1 − − 4. What of death? If, for some reason, either internal or external, any part of the self-production process breaks down, then there is nothing else to produce the necessary components and the whole process falls apart. Autopoiesis is all or nothing – all the processes must be working, or the systems disintegrates. − − This, then, is the central idea of autopoiesis: a living system is one organized in such a way that all its components and processes jointly produce those self-producing entity. This concept has nearly been grasped by other biologists, as the quotation from Rose at the start of this chapter shows. But Maturana and Varela were the first to coin a word for this life-generating mechanism, to set out criteria for it (Varela et al., 1974), and to explore its consequences in a rigorous way. − − Considering the derivation of the word itself, Maturana explains that he had the main idea of a circular, self-referring organization without the term autopoiesis. In fact, biology of cognition, the first major exposition of the idea, does not use it. Maturana coined the term in relation to the distinction between praxis (the path of arms, or action) and poiesis (the path of letters, or creation). However, it is interesting to see how closely Maturana’s usage of auto- and allopoiesis is actually foreshadowed by the German phenomenological philosopher Martin Heidegger. In the quotation at the start of Chapter 1, Heidegger uses the term poiesis as a bringing-forth and draws the contrast between the self-production (heautoi) of nature and the other-production (alloi) that humans do. Heidegger’s relevance to Maturana’s work will be considered further in Section 7.5.2 − − 2.2 Formal Specification of Autopoiesis − − Now that I have sketched the idea in general terms, this section will describe in more detail Maturana’s and Varela’s specification and vocabulary. − − We begin from the observation that all descriptions and explanations are made by observers who distinguish an entity or phenomenon from the general background. Such descriptions always depend in part on the choices and processes of the observer and may or may not correspond to the actual domain of the observed entity. That which is distinguished by an observer, Maturana calls a unity, that is, a whole distinguished from a background. In making the distinction, the properties which specify the unity as a whole are established by the observer. For example, in calling something “a car,” certain basic attributes or defining features (it is mobile, carries people, is steerable) are specified. An observer may go further and analyze a unity into components and their relations. There are different, equally valid, ways in which this can be done. The result will be a description of a composite unity of components and the organization which combines its components together into a whole. − − Maturana and Varela draw an important distinction between the organization of a unity and its structure: − − [Organization]refers to the relations between components that define and specify a system as a composite unity of a particular class, and determine its properties as such a unity … by specifying a domain in which it can interact as an unanalyzable whole endowed with constitutive properties. − − [Structure] refers to the actual components and the actual relations that these must satisfy in their participation in the constitution of a given composite unity [and] determines the space in which it exists as a composite unity that can be perturbed through the interactions of its components, but the structure does not determine its properties as a unity. − − Maturana (1978, p. 32) − − The organization consists of the relations among components and the necessary properties of the components that characterize or define the unity in general as belonging to a particular type or class. This determines its properties as a whole. At its most simple, we can illustrate this distinction with the concept of a square. A square is defined in terms of the (spatial) relations between components – a figure with four equal sides, connected together at right angles. This is its organization. Any particular physically existing square is a particular structure that embodies these relations. Another example is a an airplane, which may be defined by describing necessary components such as wings, engines, controls, brakes, seating, and the relations between them allowing it to fly. If a unity has such an organization, then it may be identified as a plane since this particular organizatio would produce the properties we expect in a plane as a whole. Structure, on the other hand, describes the actual components and actual relations of a particular real example of any such entity, such as the Boeing 757 I board at the airport. − − This is a rather unusual use of the term structure (Andrew, 1979). Generally, in the description of a system, structure is contrasted with process to refer to those parts of the system which change only slowly; structure and organization would be almost interchangeable. Here, however, structure refers to both the static and dynamic elements. The distinction between structure and organization is between the reality of an actual example and the abstract generality lying behind all such examples. This is strongly reminiscent of the philosophy of classic structuralism in which an empirical surface “structure” of events is related to an unobservable deep structure (“organization”) of basic relationships which generate the surface. − − An existing, composite unity, therefore, has both a structure and an organization. There are many different structures that can realize the same organization, and the structure will have many properties and relations not specified by the organization and essentially irrelevant to it – for example, the shape, color, size, and material of a particular airplane. Moreover, the structure can change or be changed without necessarily altering the organization. For example, as the plane ages, has new parts installed, and gets repainted it still maintains its identity as a plane because its underlying organization has not changed. Some changes, however, will not be compatible with the maintenance of the organization – for example, a crash which converts the plane into a wreck. − − The essential distinction between organization and structure is between a whole and its parts. Only the plane as a whole can fly – this is its constitutive property as a unity, its organization. Its parts, however, can interact in their own domains depending on all their properties, but they do so only as individual components. Sucking in a bird can stop an engine; a short circuit can damage the controls. These are perturbations of the structure, which may affect the whole and lead to a loss of organization or which may be compensable, in which can the plane is still able to fly. − − With this background, we can consider Maturana’s and Varela’s definition of autopoiesis. A unity is characterized by describing the organization that defines the unity as a member of a particular class that is, which can be seen to generate the observed behavior of unities of that type. Maturana and Varela see living systems as being essentially characterized as dynamic and autonomous and hold that it is their self-production which leads to these qualities. Thus the organization of living systems is one of self-production – autopoiesis. Such an organization can, of course, be realized in infinitely many structures. − − A more explicit definition of an autopoietic system is − − A dynamic system that is defined as a composite unity as a network of productions of components that, − − a) through their interactions recursively regenerate the network of productions that produced them, and − − b) realize this network as a unity in the space in which they exist by constituting and specifying its boundaries as surfaces of cleavage from the background through their preferential interactions within the network, is an autopoietic system. Maturana (1980b, p. 29) − − − The first part of this quotation details the general idea of a system of self-production, while the second specifies that the system must be actually realized in an entity that produces its own boundaries. This latter point, about producing boundaries, is particularly important when one attempts to apply autopoiesis to other domains, such as the social world, and is a recurring point of debate. Notice also that the definition does not specify that the realization must be a physical one, although in the case of a cell it clearly is. This leaves open the idea of some abstract autopoietic systems such as a set of concepts, a cellular automaton, or a process of communication. What might the boundaries of such a system be? And would we really want to call such a system “living”? Again, this is the subject of much debate – See section 3.3.2 − − This somewhat bare concept is further developed by considering the nature of such an organization. In particular, as an organization it will involve particular relations among components. These relations, in the case of a physical system, must be of three types according to Maturana and Varela (1973): constitution, specification, and order. Relations of constitution concern the physical topology of the system (say, a cell) – its three-dimensional geometry. For example, that it has a cell membrane, that components are particular distances from each other, that they are the required sizes and shapes. Relations of specification determine that the components produced by the various production processes are in fact the specific ones necessary for the continuation of autopoiesis. Finally, relations of order concern the dynamics of the processes – for example, that the appropriate amounts of various molecules are produced at the correct rate and at the correct time. Specific examples of these relations will be given later, but it can be seen that these correspond roughly to specifying the “where”,”what”, and “when” of the complex production processes occurring in the cell. − − It might appear that this description of relations “necessary” for autopoiesis has a functionalist, teleological tone. This is not really the case, as Maturana and Varela strongly object to such explanations. It is simply that, if such components and relationships do occur, they give rise to electrochemical processes that themselves produce further components and processes of the right types and at the right rates to generate an autopoietic system. But there is no necessity to this; it is simply a combination that does, or does not, occur, just as a plant may, or may not, grow depending on the combination of water, light, and nutrients. − − In an early attempt to make this abstract characterization more operational, a computer model of an autopoietic cellular automaton was developed together with a six-point key for identifying an autopoitic system (Varela et al., 1974). The key is specified as follows: − − i) Determine, through interactions, if the unity has identifiable boundaries. If the boundaries can be determined, proceed to 2. If not, the entity is indescribable and we can say nothing. − − ii) Determine if ther are constitutive elements of the unity, that is, components of the unity. If these components can be described, proceed to 3. If not, the unity is an unanalyzable whole and therefore not an autopoietic system. − − iii) Determine if the unity is a mechanistic system, that is, the component properties are capable of satisfying certain relations that determine in the unity the interactions and transformations of these components. If this is the case, proceed to 4. If not, the unity is not an autopoietic system. − − iv) Determine if the components that constitute the boundaries of the unity constitute these boundaries through preferential neighborhood interactions and relations between themselves, as determined by their properties in the space of their interactions. If this is not the case, you do not have an autopoietic unity because you are determining its boundaries, not the unity itself. If 4 is the case, however, proceed to 5. − − v) Determine if the components of the boundaries of the unity are produced by the interactions of the components of the unity, either by transformation of previously produced components, or by transformations and/or coupling of non-component elements that enter the unity trough its boundaries. If not, you do not have an autopoietic unity; if yes proceed to 6. − − vi) If all the other components of the unity are also produced by the interactions of its components as in 5, and if those which are not produced by the interactions of other components participate as necessary permanent constitutive components in the production of other components, you have an autopoietic unity in the space in which its components exist. If this is not the case, and there are components in the unity not produced by components of the unity as in 5, or if there are components of the unity which do not participate in the production of other components, you do not have an autopoietic unity. − − The first three criteria are general, specifying that there is an identifiable entity with a clear boundary, that it can be analyzed into components, and that it operates mechanistically, i.e., its operation is determined by the properties and relations of its components. The core autopoietic ideas are specified in the last three points. These describe a dynamic network of interacting processes of production (vi), contained within and producing a boundary (v) that is maintained by the preferential interactions of components. The key notions, especially when considering the extension of autopoiesis to nonphysical systems, are the idea of production of components, and the necessity for a boundary constituted by produced components. − − These key criteria will be applied to the cell in the next section. This section will describe briefly embodiments of the autopoietic relations outlined above in the chemistry of the cell. Alberts et al. or Freifelder are good introductions to molecular biology, as is Raven and Johnson to the cell. − − 2.3 An illustration of Autopoiesis in the Cell − − This section will describe briefly embodiments of the autopoietic relations outlined above in the chemistry of the cell. Alberts et al. are good introductions to molecular biology, as is Raven and Johnson to the cell. − − 2.3.1 Applying the Six Criteria − − Zeleny and Hufford analyze a typical cell with the six key points. A schematic of two typical cells is shown in Fig 2. One is a eukaryotic cell, i.e., one that has a nucleus, and the other is a prokaryotic cell, which does not. − − 1. The cell has an identifiable boundary formed by the plasma membrane. Thus, the cell is identifiable. − − 2.The cell has identifiable components such as the mitochondria, the nucleus, and the membranous network known as the endoplasmic reticulum. Thus, the cell is analyzable. − − 3. The components have electrochemical properties that follow general physical laws determining the transformations and interactions that occur within the cell. Thus, the cell is a mechanistic system. − − 4.The boundary of the cell is formed by a plasma membrane consisting of phospholipids molecules and certain proteins (fig 3). The lipid molecules are aligned in a double layer, forming a selectively permeable barrier; the proteins are wedged in this bilayer, mediating many of the membrane functions. A lipid molecule consists of two parts – a polar head, which is attracted to water, and a hydrocarbon (fatty) tail, which is repelled. In solution, the tails join together to form the two layers with the heads outside. The integral proteins also have areas that seek or avoid water. The boundary is therefore self-maintained through preferential neighborhood relations. − − 5. The lipid and protein components of the boundary are themselves produced by the cell. For example, most of the lipid molecules required for new membrane formation are produced by the endoplasmic reticulum, which is itself a complex, membranous component of the cell. The boundary components are thus self-produced. − − 6. All of the other components of the cell (e.g., the mitochondria, the nucleus, the ribosomes, the endoplasimic reticulum) are also produced by and within the cell. Certain chemicals (such as metal ions) not produced by the cell are imported through the membrane and then become part of the operations of the cell. Cell components are thus self-produced. − − 2.3.2 Autopoietic Relations of Constitution, Specification, and Order − − Apart from the six-point key, autopoiesis was also defined by three necessary types of relations. These can be illustrated as follows for a typical cell. − − 2.3.2.1 Relations of Constitution − − Relations of constitution determine the three-dimensional shape and structure of the cell so as to enable the other relations of production to be maintained. This occurs through the production of molecules which, through their particular stereochemical properties, enable other processes to continue. − − An obvious example is the construction of membranes or cell boundaries. In animal cells, the membrane surrounding the mitochondria, like that around the cell itself, serves to harbor cell contents and control the rate of reaction through diffusion. Various reactive molecules are distributed along the inner membrane in an appropriate order to allow energy-producing sequences to proceed efficiently. In plant cells, in addition to the plasma membrane, there is a cell wall, which consists of cellulose, a material made up of long, straight chains of glucose units packed together to form strong rigid threads. These give plants their rigidity. − − A second example is the active sites on enzymatic proteins. These act as catalysts for most reactions, changing a particular substrate in an appropriate way to allow it to react more easily. Generally, the active site is found in certain specific parts of the enzyme molecule where the configuration of amino acids is structured to fit the particular substrate, sometimes with the help of “activators” or co-enzymes. The substrate molecule interlocks with the active site and in so doing changes appropriately so that it no longer fits, and thus frees itself. − − 2.3.2.2 Relations of Specification − − These determine the identity, in chemical properties, of the components of the cell in such a way that through their interactions they participate in the production of the cell. There are two main types of structural correspondence, that among DNA, RNA, and the proteins they produce and that between enzymes and the substrates they catalyze. − − Protein synthesis is particularly complex because each protein is formed by linking up to twenty different amino acids in a specific combination, often containing 300 or more units in all. This requires an RNA template molecule, tailor-made for each protein, containing specific spaces for each of the amino acids in order, together with an enzyme and t-RNA for each acid. − − As already mentioned, enzymes are necessary to help most of the reactions in the cell, and again, each specific reaction requires an enzyme specific to the reaction and to the substrate involved. Hundreds of such enzymes are needed, and all must be produced by the cell. − − 2.3.2.3 Relations of Order − − Relations of order concern the dynamics of the cell’s production processes. Various chemicals and complex feedback loops ensure that both the rate and the sequence of the various production processes continue autopoiesis. For instance, the production of energy through oxidation is controlled by the amount of phosphate and ADP (adenosine diphosphate) in the mitochondria. At the same time, reactions that use energy actually produce ADP and phosphate so that, automatically, a high usage of energy leads to a high production rate of these necessary substances. − − 2.3.3 Other Possible Autopoietic Systems − − An interesting question leading from the idea of the cell as an autopoietic system is whether or not there are other instances of autopoietic systems. Are multicellular organisms also autopoietic systems? Maturana is equivocal, suggesting that organisms such as animals and plants may be second-order autopoietic systems, with the components being not the cells themselves but various molecules produced by the cells. On the other hand, he suggests that some cellular systems may not actually constitute autopoietic systems, but may be merely colonies. What about a system that appears to have a closed and circular organization but is not generally classified as living, such as the pilot light of a gas boiler? Finally, what about nonphysical systems such as the autopoietic automata mentioned in section 2.2.1 and described more fully in section 4.4, or systems such as a set of ideas or a society? These possibilities will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3. − − 2.4．Applications of Autopoiesis in Biology and Chemistry − − One would have expected that, given the importance and nature of its claims, autopoiesis would have had a major impact on the field of biology. In fact, for many years there was a noticeable reluctance to take the ideas seriously at all. In 1979, I wrote to an eminent British biologist – Professor Steven Rose at the Open University – querying the status of autopoiesis. He replied to the effect that he did not wish to comment on autopoiesis but that Maturana was a reputable biologist. One notable exception is Lynn Margulis, whose own theory, that eukaryotic cells evolved through the symbiosis of simpler units, is itself quite controversial. − − However, recently interest has been growing in two areas: research into the origins of life and the creation of chemical systems that, although not living, display some of the characteristics of autopoietic self-production. Autopoiesis has also been compared with Prigogine’s dissipative structures. Varela has also pursued work on the nature of the immune system, viewing it as organizationally closed but not autopoietic. However, as this topic is very technical and not of primary relevance, it cannot be pursued here. − − 2.4.1 Minimal Cells and the Origin of Life − − There are two main lines of approach to theories concerning the origin of life on Earth. In the first approach, based on study of the enzymes and genes, life is characterized as being molecular and a defining feature is the structure and function of the genes. In the second approach, life is characterized as cellular, and its defining feature is metabolic functioning within the cell. However, neither approach can really specify a standard or model for life against which important questions may be answered. In particular, at what point did prebiotic chemical systems become biotic living systems? And how could we recognize nonterrestrial living systems. Which might be radically different in structure from our own? − − Fleischaker proposes that the concept of autopoiesis, together with notions of minimal cell, can provide a sound theoretical framework to tackle these questions within the second tradition mentioned above. Autopoiesis clearly does aim to provide a specific and operationally useful definition of life, although Fleischaker argues that the concept of autopoiesis does need some modification. This modification would restrict “living” systems to autopoietic system in the physical domain rather that allow the possibility of nonphysical living systems, a possibility which ( as mentioned above) is left open by the formal definition of autopoiesis. This will be discussed in Section 3.3.2 − − Given autopoiesis (or modified version) as a definition of life, the next step in theorizing about the origin of life is to consider how an elementary autopoietic system might have formed. Note that autopoiesis is all or nothing. A self-producing system either exists and produces itself or it does not – there can be no halfway stage. This leads to the idea of a theoretical “minimal” cell which could plausibly emerge, given the early conditions on earth. In fact, Fleischaker considers three different characterizations of minimal cells: a minimal cell representative of the evolved life forms that we know today; a minimal cell that would characterize both terrestrial and nonterrestrial life regardless of its constituents. − − About the last, little can be put forward beyond the six-point autopoietic characteristics in the physical space; to be more specific would constrain the possibilities unnecessarily. On the other hand, we can be quite specific about a modern-day cell. Such a cell could be described as “a volume of cytoplasmic solvent capable of DNA-cycled, ATP-driven and enzyme-mediated metabolism enclosed within a phosphor-lipoprotein membrane capable of energy transduction”, This generalized specification can cover both prokaryotes (bacterial) and eukaryotes (algal, fungal, animal, and plant cells) even though there are important differences in their operation. − − The most interesting minimal cell scenario concerns the origin of life. The first cell need be only a very basic cell without the later elaborations such as enzymes. Fleischaker suggests that such a cell must exhibit a number of operations (Fig.2.4): − − 1、The cell must demonstrate the formation and maintenance of a boundary structure that creates a hospitable inner environment and allows selective permeability for incoming and outgoing molecules and ions. The lipid bilayer found in contemporary cells is a good possibility since the hydropholic nature of lipid molecules leads them to form closed spheres in order to avoid contact with water. Lipid bilayers are also permeable in certain ways – for example, to flows of protons or sodium atoms – without the need for the complex enzymes prevalent in contemporary cells. − − 2. The cell must also demonstrate some form of active energy transduction to maintain it away from entropic chemical equilibrium. One possibility is an early form of photopigment system driven by light. Pigment molecules would become embedded in the membrane and act as proton pumps, leading to the concentration of variety of raw material in the cell. − − 3. The cell would also need to transport and transform material elements and use these in the production of the cell’s components and its boundary. A possible start in this direction would be the import of carbon dioxide and the physio-chemical transformation of its carbon and oxygen through light-driven carbon fixation. − − What is important is not the particular mechanisms for any of these general operations but that whichever mechanisms are postulated, all operations need to be part of a continuous network to form a dynamic, self-producing whole. − − 2.4.2 Chemical Autopoiesis − − Beyond theoretical constructs of minimal cells, it is also interesting to look at attempts to identify or create chemical systems based on autopoietic criteria, and to consider whether or not these are living. We shall look at three examples: autocatalytic processes, osmotic growth, and self-replicating micelles. − − 2.4.2.1. Autocatalytic Reactions − − A catalyst is a molecular substance whose presence is necessary for the occurrence of a particular chemical reaction, or which speeds the reaction up, but which is not changed by the reaction. The complex productions of contemporary cells (as opposed to cells that may have existed at the origin of life) require many catalysts, and this is one of the main functions of the enzymes. An autocatalytic process is one in which the specific catalysts required are themselves produced as by-products of the reactions. The process thus self-catalyzes. An example is RNA itself which, in certain circumstances, can form a complex surface that acts like an enzyme in reaction with other RNA molecules (Alberts et al.) Kauffman has a detailed discussion within the context of complexity theory. − − Although this process can be described as a self-referring interaction, the system does not qualify as autopoietic because it does not produce its own boundary components and thus cannot establish itself as an autonomous operational entity (Maturana and Varela). Complex, interdependent chemical processes abound in nature, but they are not autopoietic unless they form self-bounded unities that embody the autopoietic organization. − − 2.4.2.2 Osmotic Growth − − Zeleny and Hufford have suggested that a particular form of osmotic growth, studied by Leduc, can be seen as autopoietic. The growth is precipitation of inorganic salt that expands and forms a permeable osmotic boundary. This can be demonstrated by putting calcium chloride into a saturated solution of sodium phosphate. Interaction of the calcium and phosphate ions leads to the precipitation of calcium phosphate in a thin boundary layer. This layer then separates the phosphate from the calcium, water enters through the boundary by osmosis, and the increased internal pressure breaks the precipitated calcium phosphate. This break allows further contact between the internal calcium and the external phosphate, leading to further precipitation. Thus the precipitated layer grows. − − Zeleny and Hufford argue that this system fulfills the six autopoietic criteria: − − 1. It is distinguishable entity because of its precipitate boundary. − − 2. It is analyzable into components such as the calcium phosphate boundary and the calcium chloride. − − 3. It follows mechanistic laws. − − 4. The boundary components (calcium phosphate) aggregate because of their preferred neighborhood relations. − − 5. The boundary components are formed by the interaction of internal and external components following osmosis through the membrane. − − 6. The components (calcium chloride) are not produced by the cell but are permanent constituent components in the production of other components (the precipitate) − − This hypothesis does cause problems, as Leduc’s system is clearly inorganic and not what would be called living. If it is accepted that the system does properly fulfill the criteria of autopoiesis, i.e., that it is an autopoietic system as currently defined, then either we must expand our concept of living or accept that autopoiesis is in need of redefinition to exclude such examples. In fact, it is debatable whether or not this osmotic growth does correctly fulfill the six criteria. It certainly meets the first three, but it is not clear that it is a dynamic network of processes of production. − − As for the fourth criterion, the precipitate that forms the boundary is unlike a cell membrane. It is static and inactive, more like a stone wall than an active membrane. It is not formed through “preferential neighborhood interactions”; in fact, once formed, it does not interact at all. Considering the fifth criterion, the boundary components are not continuously produced by the internal processes of production. Rather, a split or rupture occurs and more boundary is precipitated at the split through the interaction of internal and external chemicals. It is only because of, and at, the rupture that new boundary is produced. Finally, chloride, which is introduced artificially at the beginning, is not produced by the system, and eventually runs out. − − 2.4.2.3 Self-replicating Micelles − − An approach with more potential, currently being researched by Bachmann and colleagues, was first proposed by Luisi. It has been discussed by Maddox and Hadlington. A micelle is a small droplet of an organic chemical such as alcohol stabilized in an aqueous solution by a boundary or “surfactant” A reverse micelle is a droplet of water similarly stabilized in an organic solvent. Chemical reactions occur within the micelle, producing more of the boundary surfactant. Eventually, this leads to the splitting of the micelle and the generation of a new one, a process of self-replication. Experiments have been carried out with both ordinary and reverse micelles and with an enzymatically driven system. − − − In the reverse micelle experiments, the water droplets contain dissolved lithium hydroxide, one of the surfactants is sodium octanoate, and the other is 1-octanol, which is also a solvent. The other solvent is isooctane. The main reaction is one in which the components of the boundary are themselves produced at the boundary. Octyl octanoate is hydrolyzed using the lithium as a catalyst. This produces both the surfactants (sodium octanoate and 1-octanol). Since the lithium hydroxide is insoluble in the organic solvent, it remains within the water micelle, thus confining the reaction to the boundary layer. Once the system is initiated, large numbers of new micelles are produced, although the average size of the micelles decreases. − − It is not clear that these systems could yet be called autopoietic. First, the raw materials(the water-lithium mixture or the enzyme catalyst) are not produced within the system. This limits the amount of replication which can occur; the system eventually stops. Even if these materials could be added on a regular basis, the system would still not be self-producing. Second, the single-layer surfactant does not allow transport of raw materials into the micelle. For this to happen, a double-layer boundary would be necessary, as exists in actual cell membranes. Moreover, the researchers themselves, and seem most interested in the fact that the micelles reproduce themselves, and seem to identify this as autopoietic. However, reproduction of the whole is quite secondary to the autopoietic process of self-production of components. Nevertheless, this does represent an interesting step toward generating real autopoietic systems. − − −
无编辑摘要
{{#seo:
{{#seo:
|keywords=生物学，关系生物学
|keywords=生命起源,自创生, Autopoiesis,人工生命
|description=罗伯特·罗森(1934年6月27日——1998年12月28日)是美国达尔豪斯大学的理论生物学家和生物物理学教授，曾担任通用系统研究学会(ISSS)主席。罗伯特罗森的工作结合了复杂的数学和激进的关于生命系统和科学本质的新观点，被称为“生物学的牛顿”。
|description=生命起源,自创生, Autopoiesis,人工生命
}}
}}
[[File:3D-SIM-4 Anaphase 3 color.jpg|thumb|图1：三维形式的有丝分裂过程中的活细胞——一个自创生系统的例子]]
“自创生”指的是一个能够自我繁殖和维持的系统，最初的定义可以在《自创生和认知：生命的实现 Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living》(1973年第1版，1980年第2版)中找到<ref>Maturana, Varela, 1980, p. 89.</ref>:
<blockquote>第16页: “正是在这种情况下……他分析了堂吉诃德Don Quixote的两难处境：走武装之路（praxis，行动）还是走文字之路（poiesis，创造，生产）。我第一次理解了‘poiesis’这个词的力量，并发明了我们需要的词：autopoiesis。这是一个前所未有的词，一个可以直接表达‘在生命系统特有的自主性的动态中发生了什么’的词。”
第16页: “正是在这种情况下……他分析了堂吉诃德Don Quixote的两难处境：走武装之路（praxis，行动）还是走文字之路（poiesis，创造，生产）。我第一次理解了‘poiesis’这个词的力量，并发明了我们需要的词：autopoiesis。这是一个前所未有的词，一个可以直接表达‘在生命系统特有的自主性的动态中发生了什么’的词。”
第78页: “自创生机器是一个（作为一个整体）被组织成网络的机器。这个网络是一个部件生产（转换和破坏）的过程网络，它(1) 通过相互作用和转换，不断再生和实现部件生产的过程（关系）网络；(ii)通过将其实现的拓扑域规定为这样一个网络，将机器构成为部件在空间中存在的具体统一体。”
第78页: “自创生机器是一个（作为一个整体）被组织成网络的机器。这个网络是一个部件生产（转换和破坏）的过程网络，它(1) 通过相互作用和转换，不断再生和实现部件生产的过程（关系）网络；(ii)通过将其实现的拓扑域规定为这样一个网络，将机器构成为部件在空间中存在的具体统一体。”
第89页: ... “由自创生系统定义的空间是自包含的，这个空间不能用定义另一个空间的维度来描述。然而，当我们提到我们与一个具体的自创生系统的相互作用时，我们把这个系统投射到我们的操作空间上，并对这个投射进行描述。”
第89页: ... “由自创生系统定义的空间是自包含的，这个空间不能用定义另一个空间的维度来描述。然而，当我们提到我们与一个具体的自创生系统的相互作用时，我们把这个系统投射到我们的操作空间上，并对这个投射进行描述。”
</blockquote>
这个术语是由智利生物学家Humberto Maturana 和Francisco Varela于1972年提出的，用描述活细胞自我维持的化学。从那时起，这个概念也被应用于认知、系统理论、建筑和社会学领域。
这个术语是由智利生物学家Humberto Maturana 和Francisco Varela于1972年提出的，用描述活细胞自我维持的化学。从那时起，这个概念也被应用于认知、系统理论、建筑和社会学领域。
==意义==
==Meaning==
自创生系统最初是作为一种系统描述提出来的，据说可以定义和解释生命系统的性质。自创生系统的一个典型例子是生物细胞。例如，真核细胞由各种生化成分（如核酸和蛋白质）组成，并被组织成有界限的结构（如细胞核、各种细胞器、细胞膜和细胞骨架）。这些结构以分子和能量的内部流动为基础，产生了各种成分，而这些成分又继续维持着产生这些成分的有组织的约束性结构。
自创生系统最初是作为一种系统描述提出来的，据说可以定义和解释生命系统的性质。自创生系统的一个典型例子是生物细胞。例如，真核细胞由各种生化成分（如核酸和蛋白质）组成，并被组织成有界限的结构（如细胞核、各种细胞器、细胞膜和细胞骨架）。这些结构以分子和能量的内部流动为基础，产生了各种成分，而这些成分又继续维持着产生这些成分的有组织的约束性结构。
自创生系统应与异创生系统形成对比。以汽车工厂为例：它使用原材料（部件）来生成汽车（一个有组织的结构），而汽车却是自身（工厂）以外的东西。然而，如果该系统从工厂拓展到工厂的“环境”中的组成组分，如供应链、工厂/设备、工人、经销商、客户、合同、竞争对手、汽车、备件等等，那么该系统作为一个能独立生存的系统，可以被认为是自创生的。<ref>{{Cite book |title=Knowledge production in organizations : a processual autopoietic view | first = Kaj U | last = Koskinen | name-list-style = vanc |date=2013 |publisher=Springer |isbn=9783319001043 |location=Heidelberg |oclc=846465493}}</ref>
尽管其他人经常使用该术语来作为自组织 self-organization的同义词，Maturana本人表示他“永远不会使自组织的概念……在操作上它是不可能的。换句话说，如果一个事物的组织发生了变化，这个事物也就发生了变化。”<ref>{{cite book |last=Maturana |first=Humberto | name-list-style = vanc |year=1987 |chapter=Everything is said by an observer |title=Gaia, a Way of Knowing: Political Implications of the New Biology |editor=Thompson, William Irwin |publisher=Lindisfarne Press |location=Great Barrington, MA |pages=65–82, 71 |oclc=15792540 |isbn=978-0-940262-23-2}}</ref>此外，自创生系统是自主的，并且在操作上是封闭的。也就是说，它内部有足够的过程，来维持整个系统。自创生系统和它们的媒介“在结构上是耦合的”，嵌入在一种变化的动态中，可以被称为感知-运动的耦合。<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Allen M, Friston KJ | title = From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind | journal = Synthese | volume = 195 | issue = 6 | pages = 2459–2482 | date = 2018-06-01 | pmid = 29887647 | pmc = 5972168 | doi = 10.1007/s11229-016-1288-5 }}</ref>这种连续的动态被认为是知识或认知的初级形式，可以在整个生命形式中观察到。
在Niklas Luhmann的系统理论Systems Theory里<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Maula M | <!-- author-link1 = Marjatta Maula --> | date = 2006 | series = Advanced Series in Management | title = Organizations as learning systems: 'Living composition' as an enabling infrastructure. | publisher = Emerald Group Publishing }}</ref>，可以找到自创生概念在社会学中的应用。随后，Bob Jessop在研究资本主义国家系统时对其进行了调整。Marjatta在商业背景下改造了自创生的概念。把自创生的理论应用于法律体系的除了Niklas Luhmann还有Gunther Teubner。<ref>{{cite book | first = Gunther | last = Teubner | name-list-style = vanc | title = Law as an Autopoietic System | publisher = The European University Institute Press | date = 1992 }}</ref><ref>For a discussion on the evolution and development of autopoietic legal systems, see, {{cite book | first = Neil T. | last = Lyons | chapter = Autopoiesis: Evolution, Assimilation, and Causation of Normative Closure | title = Law, Justice, and Miscommunications: Essays in Applied Legal Philosophy | veditors = Kaye T | publisher = Vanderplas Publishing | date = 2011 | isbn = 978-1-60042-152-5 }}</ref>
在文本研究的背景下，Jerome McGann认为，文本是“作为自生成的反馈系统运作的自创生机制，不能与操纵和使用它们的人分开”。<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = McGann J | title = The Textual Condition | publisher = Princeton University Press | date = 1986 | page = 15 }}</ref>他引用Maturana和Varela的观点，将自创生系统定义为“一个封闭的拓扑空间，它‘作为一个生产其自身组成部分的系统运作，以此不断产生和规定其自身的组织，并在其组成部分的无穷更替中做到这一点’”，结论是“自创生系统因此区别与异创生系统，后者是笛卡尔式的，‘其运作的产物与自身不同’。McGann认为，编码和标记看起来是异创生的，但却是用它们来维持的系统的生成部分，因此语言和印刷或电子技术是自创生系统。<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = McGann J | chapter = Marking Texts of Many Dimensions | veditors = Schreibman S, Siemens RG, Unsworth JM | title = A Companion to Digital Humanities | publisher = John Wiley & Sons | date = 2000 | pages = 200–201 }}</ref>
哲学家Slavoj Žižek在讨论黑格尔Hegel时认为：“黑格尔——用今天的话来说——是关于自创生的终极思想家，思考了从混乱的偶然性中必然特征的涌现，偶然性的逐渐自我组织，从混乱中秩序的逐渐上升。”<ref>{{cite book | first = Slavoj | last = Žižek | name-list-style = vanc | author-link = Slavoj Žižek | title = Less Than Nothing | publisher = Verso | date = 2012 | page = 467 }}</ref>
==与复杂性的关系==
自创生可以定义为一个系统的复杂性与其所处环境的复杂性之间的比率。<ref name="Fernández">{{cite book |chapter=Chapter 2: Information Measures of Complexity, Emergence, Self-organization, Homeostasis, and Autopoiesis | vauthors = Fernandez N, Maldonado C, Gershenson C |title=Guided self-organization: Inception |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-642-53734-9 |pages=19–51 |year=2013 |arxiv=1304.1842|bibcode=2013arXiv1304.1842F }}</ref>
这种关于自创生的笼统观点认为：系统的自我生产指的不是其物理成分，而是其组织，可以用信息和复杂度来衡量。换句话说，我们可以把自创生系统描述为那些自己产生的复杂性多于环境产生的复杂性的系统。<ref name=Gershenson>{{cite arXiv |title=Requisite Variety, Autopoiesis, and Self-organization | first = Carlos | last = Gershenson | name-list-style = vanc | author-link = Carlos Gershenson|date=26 Sep 2014 |eprint= 1409.7475| class = nlin.AO }}</ref>
【------对照原wiki---------】
——Carlos Gershenson，“必要的多样性、自创生与自组织” 。
——Carlos Gershenson，“必要的多样性、自创生与自组织” 。
Evan Thompson在其2007年出版的《生命中的心智》（Mind in Life）中，对自创生与认知的联系进行了广泛的讨论。自创生的基本概念——涉及与环境的建构性互动——被扩展到能够包括认知。最初，Maturana将认知定义为有机体“与维持自身有关”的行为。然而，人们已经设计出了能自我维持但不具有认知性的计算机模型，因此，“认知”需要一些额外的限制。维持过程要具有认知性，最好涉及某些代谢过程中对系统内部运作的重新调整。在此基础上，可以宣称自创生是认知的必要不充分条件。Thompson写道：这种区分可能有结果，也可能没结果；但重要的是，生命系统涉及自创生，认知也涉及（如果有必要加上这点的话）。可以注意到，这种对“认知”的定义是有限制的，不一定需要生命系统的任何意识或觉察。
Evan Thompson在其2007年出版的《生命中的心智》（Mind in Life）中，对自创生与认知的联系进行了广泛的讨论。自创生的基本概念——涉及与环境的建构性互动——被扩展到能够包括认知。最初，Maturana将认知定义为有机体“与维持自身有关”的行为。然而，人们已经设计出了能自我维持但不具有认知性的计算机模型，因此，“认知”需要一些额外的限制。维持过程要具有认知性，最好涉及某些代谢过程中对系统内部运作的重新调整。在此基础上，可以宣称自创生是认知的必要不充分条件。Thompson写道：这种区分可能有结果，也可能没结果；但重要的是，生命系统涉及自创生，认知也涉及（如果有必要加上这点的话）。可以注意到，这种对“认知”的定义是有限制的，不一定需要生命系统的任何意识或觉察。
==与认知的关系==
Evan Thompson在其2007年出版的《生命中的心智》（Mind in Life）中，对自创生与认知的联系进行了广泛的讨论。<ref name=Thompson>{{cite book |title=Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind | first = Evan | last = Thompson | name-list-style = vanc |isbn=978-0-674-02511-0 |publisher=Harvard University Press |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OVGna4ZEpWwC&pg=PA91 |chapter=Chapter 5: Autopoiesis: The organization of the living |pages=91–127 |year=2007}}</ref>
自创生的基本概念——涉及与环境的建构性互动——被扩展到能够包括认知。最初，Maturana将认知定义为有机体“与维持自身有关”的行为。<ref name=Maturana>{{cite book |title=Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living |chapter=The cognitive process |page=13 |isbn=978-90-277-1016-1 |year=1980 |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media | vauthors = Maturana HR, Varela FJ |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nVmcN9Ja68kC&pg=PA13}}</ref>然而，人们已经设计出了能自我维持但不具有认知性的计算机模型，因此，“认知”需要一些额外的限制。维持过程要具有认知性，最好涉及某些代谢过程中对系统内部运作的重新调整。在此基础上，可以宣称自创生是认知的必要不充分条件。<ref name=Bitbol>{{cite journal | vauthors = Bitbol M, Luisi PL | title = Autopoiesis with or without cognition: defining life at its edge | journal = Journal of the Royal Society, Interface | volume = 1 | issue = 1 | pages = 99–107 | date = November 2004 | pmid = 16849156 | pmc = 1618936 | doi = 10.1098/rsif.2004.0012 }}</ref>Thompson写道：这种区分可能有结果，也可能没结果；但重要的是，生命系统涉及自创生，认知也涉及（如果有必要加上这点的话）。可以注意到，这种对“认知”的定义是有限制的，不一定需要生命系统的任何意识或觉察。
==与意识的关系==
自创生（如果有必要的话，特指生命系统的自创生）与认知的关系，是一种可以通过观察生命系统来确定的客观评估。
自创生（如果有必要的话，特指生命系统的自创生）与认知的关系，是一种可以通过观察生命系统来确定的客观评估。
由此出现的一个问题是意识与用这种方式看待的认知之间的联系。认知与意识的分离让我们意识到，有机体可能并不能意识到做出决定的底层机制。这两个领域的联系是什么？Thompson把这个问题称为“解释的鸿沟”explanatory gap，其中的一个方面是“意识的难题”the hard problem of consciousness，即我们如何以及为什么会有“感质”qualia的问题。<ref name=Thompson2>{{cite book |title=Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind | first = Evan | last = Thompson | name-list-style = vanc |isbn=978-0-674-02511-0 |publisher=Harvard University Press |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OVGna4ZEpWwC&pg=PA7 |chapter=Cognitivism |page=7 |year=2007}}</ref>
第二个问题是自创生能否在这些概念之间提供一个桥梁。Tompson从交互理论enactivism的角度讨论了这个问题。一个自创生的细胞积极地与它的环境发生联系。它的感觉反应触发了由自创生支配的运动行为，而这种行为（据说）是神经网络行为的简化版。进一步说，像这样的实时互动需要注意力，而注意力的一个含义就是意识。<ref name=Thompson3>{{cite book |title=Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind | first = Evan | last = Thompson | name-list-style = vanc |isbn=978-0-674-02511-0 |publisher=Harvard University Press |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OVGna4ZEpWwC&pg=PA243 |chapter=Sensorimotor subjectivity |pages=243 ''ff'' |year=2007}}</ref>
第二个问题是自创生能否在这些概念之间提供一个桥梁。Tompson从交互理论enactivism的角度讨论了这个问题。一个自创生的细胞积极地与它的环境发生联系。它的感觉反应触发了由自创生支配的运动行为，而这种行为（据说）是神经网络行为的简化版。进一步说，像这样的实时互动需要注意力，而注意力的一个含义就是意识。
{{cite book |title=Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind | first = Evan | last = Thompson | name-list-style = vanc |isbn=978-0-674-02511-0 |publisher=Harvard University Press |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OVGna4ZEpWwC&pg=PA7 |chapter=Cognitivism |page=7 |year=2007}}
==批评==
{{cite book |title=Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind | first = Evan | last = Thompson | name-list-style = vanc |isbn=978-0-674-02511-0 |publisher=Harvard University Press |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OVGna4ZEpWwC&pg=PA243 |chapter=Sensorimotor subjectivity |pages=243 ''ff'' |year=2007}}
对于该术语的应用，无论是在其最初的语境中（即试图定义和解释生命体），还是在其各种扩展的使用中（如将其应用到一般的自组织系统，特别是社会系统），都有多种批评意见。<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Fleischaker G | year = 1992 | title = Autopoiesis in Systems Analysis: A Debate | url = | journal = International Journal of General Systems | volume = 21 | issue = 2| pages = 131–271 | doi=10.1080/03081079208945065}}</ref>批评者认为，该概念及其理论未能定义或解释生命系统。而且，由于其使用的极端的自我指涉语言没有任何外部参照，它实际上是在为Maturana的激进建构主义constructivist或唯我论solipsistic的认识论epistemology<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Swenson R |year=1992 |title=Autocatakinetics, Yes—Autopoiesis, No: Steps Toward a Unified Theory of Evolutionary Ordering |journal=International Journal of General Systems |volume=21 |issue=2 |pages=207–208 |doi=10.1080/03081079208945072}}</ref>（又被Danilo Zolo称为“荒凉神学”<ref>{{Cite journal | vauthors = Kenny V, Gardner G |year=1988 |title=The constructions of self-organizing systems |journal=The Irish Journal of Psychology |volume=9 |pages=1–24 |issue=1 |doi=10.1080/03033910.1988.10557704}}</ref><ref name="Wolfe">{{cite book |last=Wolfe |first=Cary | name-list-style = vanc |title=Critical environments: postmodern theory and the pragmatics of the "outside" |publisher=University of Minnesota Press |year=1998 |pages=62–3 |isbn=978-0-8166-3019-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tBQSBBWVg2cC&pg=PT85&lpg=PT85&dq=Zolo+Autopoiesis#v=onepage}}</ref>）提供证据。自我指涉的一个例子是Maturana和Varela的断言：“我们看不到我们没有看到的东西，我们没有看到的东西也不存在。<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Maturana H, Varela F | date = 1988 | title = The Tree of Knowledge. | series = New Science Library | publisher = Shambhala Publications | location = Boston | page = 242 }}</ref>”Rod Swenson说<ref>{{Cite journal | vauthors = Swenson R |year=1992 |title=Galileo, Babel, and Autopoiesis (It's Turtles All The Way Down) |journal=International Journal of General Systems |volume=21 |pages=267–269 |issue=2 |doi=10.1080/03081079208945080}}</ref>，自创生模型 "奇迹般地与物理世界脱钩...... (因此)建立在违背常识和科学知识的唯心主义基础上。"
==Criticism==
==参考文献==
{{Reflist|30em}}
{{Reflist|30em}}
== Further reading ==
== 拓展阅读 ==
{{refbegin|30em}}
{{refbegin|30em}}
* {{cite book | vauthors = Winograd T, Flores F | author-link1 = Terry Winograd | author-link2 = Fernando Flores | date = 1990 | title = Understanding Computers and Cognition: A New Foundation for Design | url = https://archive.org/details/understandingcom00wino | url-access = registration | publisher = Ablex Pub. Corp. }} —cognitive systems perspective on autopoiesis
* {{cite book | vauthors = Winograd T, Flores F | author-link1 = Terry Winograd | author-link2 = Fernando Flores | date = 1990 | title = Understanding Computers and Cognition: A New Foundation for Design | url = https://archive.org/details/understandingcom00wino | url-access = registration | publisher = Ablex Pub. Corp. }} —cognitive systems perspective on autopoiesis
* [http://www.systems-thinking.de/selforganization.html A mindmap-collection of links and papers visualized by Ragnar Heil]
* [http://www.systems-thinking.de/selforganization.html A mindmap-collection of links and papers visualized by Ragnar Heil]
### 张江老师的翻译
### 张江老师的翻译
Autopoiesis——自创生理论：生命系统的组织
Autopoiesis——自创生理论：生命系统的组织
==Autopoiesis理论的正式描述==
==Autopoiesis理论的正式描述==
目前，我们已经对整个思想有了一个大致的描述，这一节开始更加详细的描述Maturana和Varela的理论细节。
我们观察到：所有的描述和解释都是来源于观察者，他（她）把一个实体或者一种现象从背景中区分出来。这种描述往往部分依赖于观察者的选择和观察过程，而且或多或少都会对被观察对象的实际行为造成影响。
我们观察到：所有的描述和解释都是来源于观察者，他（她）把一个实体或者一种现象从背景中区分出来。这种描述往往部分依赖于观察者的选择和观察过程，而且或多或少都会对被观察对象的实际行为造成影响。
这些系统被称为是自创生的是值得怀疑的。首先，原始材料（水和铝的混合物或者酶催化剂）不是在系统内部产生的。这就限制了复制的发生次数，系统最终会停止下来。甚至如果这些材料可以被持续添加，系统仍然不是自生产的。第二，单层次表面活性剂不能被原始材料输送到胶体中。所以，一种如真实细胞膜的双层次边界就是必需的了。进一步，研究者们更加关注的是胶化物的自我复制，并认为这就是自创生的。然而，自复制是自创生的第二阶段。无论如何，这种现象说明这不是自创生的过程。
这些系统被称为是自创生的是值得怀疑的。首先，原始材料（水和铝的混合物或者酶催化剂）不是在系统内部产生的。这就限制了复制的发生次数，系统最终会停止下来。甚至如果这些材料可以被持续添加，系统仍然不是自生产的。第二，单层次表面活性剂不能被原始材料输送到胶体中。所以，一种如真实细胞膜的双层次边界就是必需的了。进一步，研究者们更加关注的是胶化物的自我复制，并认为这就是自创生的。然而，自复制是自创生的第二阶段。无论如何，这种现象说明这不是自创生的过程。