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{{Short description|Philosophical view explaining systems in terms of smaller parts}}

{{Short description|Philosophical view explaining systems in terms of smaller parts}}

[[File:Digesting Duck.jpg|thumb|300px|[[René Descartes]], in [[The World (Descartes)|De homine]] (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as [[automaton|automata]]; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this [[Digesting Duck]].]]

[[File:Digesting Duck.jpg|thumb|300px|[[René Descartes]], in [[The World (Descartes)|De homine]] (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as [[automaton|automata]]; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this [[Digesting Duck]].|链接=Special:FilePath/Digesting_Duck.jpg]]

[[René Descartes, in De homine (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as automata; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this Digesting Duck.]]

[[René Descartes, in De homine (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as automata; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this Digesting Duck.]]

[ rené Descartes，in De homine (1662) ，声称非人类动物可以还原地解释为自动机; 本质上意味着这种消化鸭的更复杂的机械版本]

勒内·笛卡尔（[[René Descartes, in De homine (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as automata; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this Digesting Duck.|René Descartes]]）在其1662年出版的《人论》(De Homine)中宣称：非人类动物可以还原地解释为自动机，本质上是一种类似于消化鸭的复杂机械。

== Definitions ==

== Definitions ==

''[[The Oxford Companion to Philosophy]]'' suggests that reductionism is "one of the most used and abused terms in the philosophical lexicon" and suggests a three part division:<ref name=Ruse>{{cite book |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |author=Michael Ruse |editor=Ted Honderich |isbn=978-0-19-103747-4 |year=2005 |edition=2nd |chapter=Entry for "reductionism" |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=793 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bJFCAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT1884}}</ref>

''[[The Oxford Companion to Philosophy]]'' suggests that reductionism is "one of the most used and abused terms in the philosophical lexicon" and suggests a three part division:<ref name="Ruse">{{cite book |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |author=Michael Ruse |editor=Ted Honderich |isbn=978-0-19-103747-4 |year=2005 |edition=2nd |chapter=Entry for "reductionism" |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=793 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bJFCAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT1884}}</ref>

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy suggests that reductionism is "one of the most used and abused terms in the philosophical lexicon" and suggests a three part division:

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy suggests that reductionism is "one of the most used and abused terms in the philosophical lexicon" and suggests a three part division:

大多数哲学家将还原论和反还原论分为三种类型。

大多数哲学家将还原论和反还原论分为三种类型。

Other definitions are used by other authors. For example, what [[John Polkinghorne]] terms 'conceptual' or 'epistemological' reductionism<ref name=Polkinghorne /> is the definition provided by [[Simon Blackburn]]<ref name=Blackburn>{{cite book |author=Simon Blackburn |title= Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy |chapter=Entry on ‘reductionism’ |date= 27 October 2005 |page=311 |isbn= 978-0-19-861013-7 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5wTQtwB1NdgC&pg=PA311}}</ref> and by [[Jaegwon Kim]]:<ref name=Kim>{{cite book |author=Jaegwon Kim |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy  |editor=Ted Honderich |isbn=978-0-19-103747-4 |year=2005 |edition=2nd |chapter=Entry for ‘mental reductionism’ |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=794 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bJFCAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT1885}}</ref> that form of reductionism which concerns a program of replacing the facts or entities involved in one type of discourse with other facts or entities from another type, thereby providing a relationship between them. Richard Jones distinguishes ontological and epistemological reductionism, arguing that many ontological and epistemological reductionists affirm the need for different concepts for different degrees of complexity while affirming a reduction of theories.<ref name=Jones />

Other definitions are used by other authors. For example, what [[John Polkinghorne]] terms 'conceptual' or 'epistemological' reductionism<ref name=Polkinghorne /> is the definition provided by [[Simon Blackburn]]<ref name="Blackburn">{{cite book |author=Simon Blackburn |title= Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy |chapter=Entry on ‘reductionism’ |date= 27 October 2005 |page=311 |isbn= 978-0-19-861013-7 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5wTQtwB1NdgC&pg=PA311}}</ref> and by [[Jaegwon Kim]]:<ref name="Kim">{{cite book |author=Jaegwon Kim |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy  |editor=Ted Honderich |isbn=978-0-19-103747-4 |year=2005 |edition=2nd |chapter=Entry for ‘mental reductionism’ |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=794 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bJFCAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT1885}}</ref> that form of reductionism which concerns a program of replacing the facts or entities involved in one type of discourse with other facts or entities from another type, thereby providing a relationship between them. Richard Jones distinguishes ontological and epistemological reductionism, arguing that many ontological and epistemological reductionists affirm the need for different concepts for different degrees of complexity while affirming a reduction of theories.<ref name=Jones />

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== In philosophy ==

== In philosophy ==

The term fragmentalism is usually applied to reductionist modes of thought, often with the related pejorative term scientism. This usage is popular among some ecological activists: <blockquote>There is a need now to move away from scientism and the ideology of cause-and-effect determinism toward a radical empiricism, such as William James proposed, as an epistemology of science.</blockquote> These perspectives are not new; during the early 20th century, William James noted that rationalist science emphasized what he called fragmentation and disconnection.</blockquote>

The term fragmentalism is usually applied to reductionist modes of thought, often with the related pejorative term scientism. This usage is popular among some ecological activists: <blockquote>There is a need now to move away from scientism and the ideology of cause-and-effect determinism toward a radical empiricism, such as William James proposed, as an epistemology of science.</blockquote> These perspectives are not new; during the early 20th century, William James noted that rationalist science emphasized what he called fragmentation and disconnection.

碎片主义一词通常用于还原主义的思维模式，通常带有相关的贬义词科学主义。这种用法在一些生态活动家中很流行: 现在有必要摆脱科学主义和因果决定论的思想，转向彻底的经验主义，如威廉 · 詹姆斯提出的科学认识论。这些观点并不新鲜; 在20世纪早期，威廉 · 詹姆斯注意到理性主义科学强调他所谓的分裂和脱节。</blockquote >

碎片主义一词通常用于还原主义的思维模式，通常带有相关的贬义词科学主义。这种用法在一些生态活动家中很流行: 现在有必要摆脱科学主义和因果决定论的思想，转向彻底的经验主义，如威廉 · 詹姆斯提出的科学认识论。这些观点并不新鲜; 在20世纪早期，威廉 · 詹姆斯注意到理性主义科学强调他所谓的分裂和脱节。  

The concept of [[downward causation]] poses an alternative to reductionism within philosophy. This opinion is developed by [[Peter Bøgh Andersen]], [[Claus Emmeche]], [[Niels Ole Finnemann]], and [[Peder Voetmann Christiansen]], among others. These philosophers explore ways in which one can talk about phenomena at a larger-scale level of organization exerting causal influence on a smaller-scale level, and find that some, but not all proposed types of downward causation are compatible with science. In particular, they find that constraint is one way in which downward causation can operate.<ref>P.B. Andersen, C. Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann, P.V. Christiansen, ''Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter'', Aarhus University Press ({{ISBN|87-7288-814-8}}) (2001)</ref> The notion of causality as constraint has also been explored as a way to shed light on scientific concepts such as [[self-organization]], [[natural selection]], [[adaptation]], and control.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Einmag_Abstr/AJuarrero.html |first1=A |last1=Juarrero |title=Causality as Constraint |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110612013407/http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Einmag_Abstr/AJuarrero.html |archive-date=June 12, 2011 }}</ref>

The concept of [[downward causation]] poses an alternative to reductionism within philosophy. This opinion is developed by [[Peter Bøgh Andersen]], [[Claus Emmeche]], [[Niels Ole Finnemann]], and [[Peder Voetmann Christiansen]], among others. These philosophers explore ways in which one can talk about phenomena at a larger-scale level of organization exerting causal influence on a smaller-scale level, and find that some, but not all proposed types of downward causation are compatible with science. In particular, they find that constraint is one way in which downward causation can operate.<ref>P.B. Andersen, C. Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann, P.V. Christiansen, ''Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter'', Aarhus University Press ({{ISBN|87-7288-814-8}}) (2001)</ref> The notion of causality as constraint has also been explored as a way to shed light on scientific concepts such as [[self-organization]], [[natural selection]], [[adaptation]], and control.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Einmag_Abstr/AJuarrero.html |first1=A |last1=Juarrero |title=Causality as Constraint |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110612013407/http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Einmag_Abstr/AJuarrero.html |archive-date=June 12, 2011 }}</ref>

=== Causation ===

=== Causation ===

Most common philosophical understandings of [[Causality|causation]] involve reducing it to some collection of non-causal facts. Opponents of these reductionist views have given arguments that the non-causal facts in question are insufficient to determine the causal facts.<ref name=Carroll>{{cite book |title=The Oxford Handbook of Causation |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xGnZtUtG-nIC&pg=PA292 |page=292 |author=John W Carroll |chapter=Chapter 13: Anti-reductionism |isbn=978-0-19-927973-9 |publisher=Oxford Handbooks Online |year=2009 |editor1=Helen Beebee |editor2=Christopher Hitchcock |editor3=Peter Menzies }}</ref>

Most common philosophical understandings of [[Causality|causation]] involve reducing it to some collection of non-causal facts. Opponents of these reductionist views have given arguments that the non-causal facts in question are insufficient to determine the causal facts.<ref name="Carroll">{{cite book |title=The Oxford Handbook of Causation |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xGnZtUtG-nIC&pg=PA292 |page=292 |author=John W Carroll |chapter=Chapter 13: Anti-reductionism |isbn=978-0-19-927973-9 |publisher=Oxford Handbooks Online |year=2009 |editor1=Helen Beebee |editor2=Christopher Hitchcock |editor3=Peter Menzies }}</ref>

Alfred North Whitehead's metaphysics opposed reductionism. He refers to this as the "fallacy of the misplaced concreteness". His scheme was to frame a rational, general understanding of phenomena, derived from our reality.

Alfred North Whitehead's metaphysics opposed reductionism. He refers to this as the "fallacy of the misplaced concreteness". His scheme was to frame a rational, general understanding of phenomena, derived from our reality.

* ''[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]''

* ''[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]''