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[[René Descartes, in De homine (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as automata; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this Digesting Duck.]]

[[René Descartes, in De homine (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as automata; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this Digesting Duck.]]

勒内·笛卡尔（[[René Descartes, in De homine (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as automata; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this Digesting Duck.|René Descartes]]）在其1662年出版的《人论》(De Homine，1662)中宣称：非人类动物可以被简化为自动机，从本质上讲，是消化鸭的机械复杂版本。

勒内·笛卡尔（[[René Descartes, in De homine (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as automata; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this Digesting Duck.|René Descartes]]）在其1662年出版的《人论》(De Homine，1662)中宣称：非人类动物可以被简化为自动机，从本质上讲，是这种消化鸭的机械复杂版本。

对于科学而言，方法论还原论试图从个体、组成部分及其相互作用的角度对整个系统进行解释。例如，对气体温度的降低不能超过其运动着的分子的平均动能。托马斯 · 内格尔（Thomas Nagel）和其他人还谈到了“心理物理学还原论”(试图将心理现象还原为物理和化学)和“物理化学还原论”(试图将生物学还原为物理和化学)<ref name="Nagel" />。

对于科学而言，方法论还原论试图从个体、组成部分及其相互作用的角度对整个系统进行解释。例如，对气体温度的降低不能超过其运动着的分子的平均动能。托马斯 · 内格尔（Thomas Nagel）和其他人还谈到了“心理物理学还原论”(试图将心理现象还原为物理和化学)和“物理化学还原论”(试图将生物学还原为物理和化学)<ref name="Nagel" />。

 

In a very simplified and sometimes contested form, reductionism is said to imply that a system is nothing but the sum of its parts.<ref name="Polkinghorne" /><ref name="GodfreySmith" /> However, a more nuanced opinion is that a system is composed entirely of its parts, but the system will have features that none of the parts have (which, in essence is the basis of [[emergentism]]).<ref name="Jones" /> "The point of mechanistic explanations is usually showing how the higher level features arise from the parts."<ref name="GodfreySmith" />

 

In a very simplified and sometimes contested form, reductionism is said to imply that a system is nothing but the sum of its parts.<ref name=Polkinghorne /><ref name=GodfreySmith /> However, a more nuanced opinion is that a system is composed entirely of its parts, but the system will have features that none of the parts have (which, in essence is the basis of [[emergentism]]).<ref name=Jones /> "The point of mechanistic explanations is usually showing how the higher level features arise from the parts."<ref name=GodfreySmith />

在一种非常简化的，有时是有争议的形式中，还原论被认为暗示一个系统只是它的部分的总和<ref name="Polkinghorne" /><ref name="GodfreySmith" />。然而，与之有着细微差别的观点是，一个系统完全由它的部分组成，但该系统将具有任何部分都没有的特征(这在本质上是涌现论的基础)<ref name="Jones" />。“机械论则侧重于解释整体更高层次的特征是如何从部分中产生的。”

在一种非常简化的，有时是有争议的形式中，还原论被认为暗示一个系统只是它的部分的总和<ref name="Polkinghorne" /><ref name="GodfreySmith" />。然而，与之有着细微差别的观点是，一个系统完全由它的部分组成，但该系统将具有任何部分都没有的特征(这在本质上是涌现论的基础)<ref name="Jones" />。“机械论则侧重于解释整体更高层次的特征是如何从部分中产生的。”

Other definitions are used by other authors. For example, what [[John Polkinghorne]] terms 'conceptual' or 'epistemological' reductionism<ref name="Polkinghorne" /> is the definition provided by [[Simon Blackburn]]<ref name="Blackburn">{{cite book |author=Simon Blackburn |title= Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy |chapter=Entry on ‘reductionism’ |date= 27 October 2005 |page=311 |isbn= 978-0-19-861013-7 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5wTQtwB1NdgC&pg=PA311}}</ref> and by [[Jaegwon Kim]]:<ref name="Kim">{{cite book |author=Jaegwon Kim |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy  |editor=Ted Honderich |isbn=978-0-19-103747-4 |year=2005 |edition=2nd |chapter=Entry for ‘mental reductionism’ |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=794 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bJFCAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT1885}}</ref> that form of reductionism which concerns a program of replacing the facts or entities involved in one type of discourse with other facts or entities from another type, thereby providing a relationship between them. Richard Jones distinguishes ontological and epistemological reductionism, arguing that many ontological and epistemological reductionists affirm the need for different concepts for different degrees of complexity while affirming a reduction of theories.<ref name="Jones" />

Other definitions are used by other authors. For example, what [[John Polkinghorne]] terms 'conceptual' or 'epistemological' reductionism<ref name="Polkinghorne" /> is the definition provided by [[Simon Blackburn]]<ref name="Blackburn">{{cite book |author=Simon Blackburn |title= Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy |chapter=Entry on ‘reductionism’ |date= 27 October 2005 |page=311 |isbn= 978-0-19-861013-7 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5wTQtwB1NdgC&pg=PA311}}</ref> and by [[Jaegwon Kim]]:<ref name="Kim">{{cite book |author=Jaegwon Kim |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy  |editor=Ted Honderich |isbn=978-0-19-103747-4 |year=2005 |edition=2nd |chapter=Entry for ‘mental reductionism’ |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=794 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bJFCAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT1885}}</ref> that form of reductionism which concerns a program of replacing the facts or entities involved in one type of discourse with other facts or entities from another type, thereby providing a relationship between them. Richard Jones distinguishes ontological and epistemological reductionism, arguing that many ontological and epistemological reductionists affirm the need for different concepts for different degrees of complexity while affirming a reduction of theories.<ref name="Jones" />

不过也有作者使用另外的定义。例如，约翰·鲍金霍恩（John Polkinghorne）所称的“观念的”或“认识论的”还原论是西蒙·布莱克本<ref name="Blackburn" /> （Simon Blackburn）和金在权<ref name="Kim" /> （Jaegwon Kim）所使用的定义: 还原论从形式上用另一类型的其他事实或实体替换论述中提及的某种类型的事实或实体，从而在它们之间提供一种联系。理查德 · 琼斯（Richard Jones）区分了本体论和认识论的还原论，他认为许多本体论和认识论的还原论者在肯定理论还原的同时，也肯定了不同程度的复杂性需要不同的概念<ref name="Jones" />。

不过也有作者使用另外的定义。例如，约翰·鲍金霍恩（John Polkinghorne）所称的“观念”或“认识论”的还原论是西蒙·布莱克本<ref name="Blackburn" /> （Simon Blackburn）和金在权<ref name="Kim" /> （Jaegwon Kim）所使用的定义: 还原论从形式上用另一类型的其他事实或实体替换论述中提及的某种类型的事实或实体，从而在它们之间提供一种联系。理查德 · 琼斯（Richard Jones）区分了本体论和认识论的还原论，他认为许多本体论和认识论的还原论者在肯定理论还原的同时，也肯定了不同程度的复杂性需要不同的概念<ref name="Jones" />。

还原论的观点可以用解释的“层次”来表达，根据需要可以将较高的层次还原到较低的层次。这种对理解层次的使用在一定程度上反映了人类在记忆细节方面的局限性。然而，“大多数哲学家会坚持认为，我们在概念化现实中的角色(我们对理解层次的需要)不会改变现实中不同层次的组织确实有不同的‘属性’这一事实<ref name="Jones" />。”

还原论的观点可以用解释的“层次”来表达，根据需要可以将较高的层次还原到较低的层次。这种对理解层次的使用在一定程度上反映了人类在记忆细节方面的局限性。然而，“大多数哲学家会坚持认为，我们在概念化现实中的角色(我们对理解层次的需要)不会改变现实中不同层次的组织确实有不同的‘属性’这一事实<ref name="Jones" />。”