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==Basic tools==
==Basic tools==
基本工具
For potential games, it has been shown that an emergence-producing equilibrium based on information via Shannon information entropy produces the same equilibrium measure (Gibbs measure from statistical mechanics) as a stochastic dynamical equation, both of which are based on bounded rationality models used by economists.
For potential games, it has been shown that an emergence-producing equilibrium based on information via Shannon information entropy produces the same equilibrium measure (Gibbs measure from statistical mechanics) as a stochastic dynamical equation, both of which are based on bounded rationality models used by economists.
对于'''<font color="#ff8000">势博弈 Potential game</font>'''，已经证明了一个基于信息的涌现均衡通过香农熵产生了与随机动力方程相同的均衡测度(来自统计力学的'''<font color="#ff8000">吉布斯测度 Gibbs measure</font>''') ，这两者都是基于经济学家使用的'''<font color="#ff8000">有限理性 Bounded Rationality</font>'''模型。
The fluctuation-dissipation theorem connects the two to establish a concrete correspondence of "temperature", "entropy", "free potential/energy", and other physics notions to an economics system. The statistical mechanics model is not constructed a-priori - it is a result of a boundedly rational assumption and modeling on existing neoclassical models. It has been used to prove the "inevitability of collusion" result of [[Huw Dixon]] in a case for which the neoclassical version of the model does not predict collusion.<ref name="HD">{{cite journal | last = Dixon | first = Huw| title = keeping up with the Joneses: competition and the evolution of collusion| journal = Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization| volume = 43| issue = 2| pages = 223–238| date = 2000| doi=10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00117-7}}</ref>
The fluctuation-dissipation theorem connects the two to establish a concrete correspondence of "temperature", "entropy", "free potential/energy", and other physics notions to an economics system. The statistical mechanics model is not constructed a-priori - it is a result of a boundedly rational assumption and modeling on existing neoclassical models. It has been used to prove the "inevitability of collusion" result of [[Huw Dixon]] in a case for which the neoclassical version of the model does not predict collusion.<ref name="HD">{{cite journal | last = Dixon | first = Huw| title = keeping up with the Joneses: competition and the evolution of collusion| journal = Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization| volume = 43| issue = 2| pages = 223–238| date = 2000| doi=10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00117-7}}</ref>