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[[René Descartes, in De homine (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as automata; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this Digesting Duck.]]

[[René Descartes, in De homine (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as automata; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this Digesting Duck.]]

勒内·笛卡尔（[[René Descartes, in De homine (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as automata; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this Digesting Duck.|René Descartes]]）在其1662年出版的《人论》(De Homine)中宣称：非人类动物可以还原地解释为自动机，本质上是一种类似于消化鸭的复杂机械。

勒内·笛卡尔（[[René Descartes, in De homine (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as automata; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this Digesting Duck.|René Descartes]]）在其1662年出版的《人论》(De Homine)中宣称：非人类动物可以还原地解释为自动机，本质上是一种更复杂的机械版本的消化鸭。

'''Reductionism''' is any of several related [[Philosophy|philosophical]] ideas regarding the associations between [[Phenomenon|phenomena]], which can be described in terms of other simpler or more fundamental phenomena.<ref name=MerriamWebster /> It is also described as an intellectual and philosophical position that interprets a complex system as the sum of its parts.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Kricheldorf|first=Hans R.|title=Getting It Right in Science and Medicine: Can Science Progress through Errors? Fallacies and Facts|publisher=Springer|year=2016|isbn=978-3-319-30386-4|location=Cham|pages=63|language=en}}</ref>

'''Reductionism''' is any of several related [[Philosophy|philosophical]] ideas regarding the associations between [[Phenomenon|phenomena]], which can be described in terms of other simpler or more fundamental phenomena.<ref name=MerriamWebster /> It is also described as an intellectual and philosophical position that interprets a complex system as the sum of its parts.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Kricheldorf|first=Hans R.|title=Getting It Right in Science and Medicine: Can Science Progress through Errors? Fallacies and Facts|publisher=Springer|year=2016|isbn=978-3-319-30386-4|location=Cham|pages=63|language=en}}</ref>

== Definitions ==

== 定义 ==

''[[The Oxford Companion to Philosophy]]'' suggests that reductionism is "one of the most used and abused terms in the philosophical lexicon" and suggests a three part division:<ref name="Ruse">{{cite book |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |author=Michael Ruse |editor=Ted Honderich |isbn=978-0-19-103747-4 |year=2005 |edition=2nd |chapter=Entry for "reductionism" |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=793 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bJFCAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT1884}}</ref>

''[[The Oxford Companion to Philosophy]]'' suggests that reductionism is "one of the most used and abused terms in the philosophical lexicon" and suggests a three part division:<ref name="Ruse">{{cite book |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |author=Michael Ruse |editor=Ted Honderich |isbn=978-0-19-103747-4 |year=2005 |edition=2nd |chapter=Entry for "reductionism" |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=793 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bJFCAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT1884}}</ref>

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy suggests that reductionism is "one of the most used and abused terms in the philosophical lexicon" and suggests a three part division:

《牛津哲学指南》指出，还原论是“哲学词汇中最常用和最常被滥用的术语之一”，并将其划分为三部分:<ref name="Ruse" />

 

# '''Ontological reductionism''': a belief that the whole of reality consists of a minimal number of parts.

# '''Ontological reductionism''': a belief that the whole of reality consists of a minimal number of parts.

  Ontological reductionism: a belief that the whole of reality consists of a minimal number of parts.

  Ontological reductionism: a belief that the whole of reality consists of a minimal number of parts.

本体论还原论: 一种认为整个现实由最小数量的部分组成的信念。

本体论还原论: 一种认为所有现实均是由最小数量的部分组成的信念。

# '''Methodological reductionism''': the scientific attempt to provide explanation in terms of ever smaller entities.

# '''Methodological reductionism''': the scientific attempt to provide explanation in terms of ever smaller entities.

  Theory reductionism: the suggestion that a newer theory does not replace or absorb an older one, but reduces it to more basic terms. Theory reduction itself is divisible into three parts: translation, derivation and explanation.

  Theory reductionism: the suggestion that a newer theory does not replace or absorb an older one, but reduces it to more basic terms. Theory reduction itself is divisible into three parts: translation, derivation and explanation.

理论还原论: 认为新的理论不会取代或吸收旧的理论，而是将其简化为更基本的术语。理论还原本身可以分为翻译、推导和解释三个部分。

理论还原论: 认为新的理论不会取代或吸收旧的理论，而是将其简化为更基本的术语。理论还原本身可以分为翻译、推导和解释三个部分<ref name="Ney" />。

Reductionism can be applied to any [[phenomenon]], including [[object (philosophy)|objects]], problems, [[explanation]]s, [[theory|theories]], and meanings.<ref name=Ney /><ref name=Polkinghorne>{{cite encyclopedia |title=Reductionism  |author=John Polkinghorne |url=http://www.disf.org/en/Voci/104.asp |encyclopedia=Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Religion and Science|date=2002 |publisher=Advanced School for Interdisciplinary Research; Pontifical University of the Holy Cross}}</ref><ref>For reductionism referred to [[explanation]]s, [[theory|theories]], and meanings, see [[Willard Van Orman Quine]]'s ''[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]''. Quine objected to the [[positivism|positivistic]], reductionist "belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience" as an intractable problem.</ref>

Reductionism can be applied to any [[phenomenon]], including [[object (philosophy)|objects]], problems, [[explanation]]s, [[theory|theories]], and meanings.<ref name=Ney /><ref name=Polkinghorne>{{cite encyclopedia |title=Reductionism  |author=John Polkinghorne |url=http://www.disf.org/en/Voci/104.asp |encyclopedia=Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Religion and Science|date=2002 |publisher=Advanced School for Interdisciplinary Research; Pontifical University of the Holy Cross}}</ref><ref name=":2">For reductionism referred to [[explanation]]s, [[theory|theories]], and meanings, see [[Willard Van Orman Quine]]'s ''[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]''. Quine objected to the [[positivism|positivistic]], reductionist "belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience" as an intractable problem.</ref>

 

For the sciences, application of methodological reductionism attempts explanation of entire systems in terms of their individual, constituent parts and their interactions. For example, the temperature of a gas is reduced to nothing beyond the average kinetic energy of its molecules in motion. Thomas Nagel and others speak of 'psychophysical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of psychological phenomena to physics and chemistry), and 'physico-chemical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of biology to physics and chemistry). and by Jaegwon Kim: that form of reductionism which concerns a program of replacing the facts or entities involved in one type of discourse with other facts or entities from another type, thereby providing a relationship between them. Richard Jones distinguishes ontological and epistemological reductionism, arguing that many ontological and epistemological reductionists affirm the need for different concepts for different degrees of complexity while affirming a reduction of theories. Some physicists, however, claim that reductionism and emergentism are complementary: both are needed to explain natural processes.

For the sciences, application of methodological reductionism attempts explanation of entire systems in terms of their individual, constituent parts and their interactions. For example, the temperature of a gas is reduced to nothing beyond the average kinetic energy of its molecules in motion. Thomas Nagel and others speak of 'psychophysical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of psychological phenomena to physics and chemistry), and 'physico-chemical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of biology to physics and chemistry). and by Jaegwon Kim: that form of reductionism which concerns a program of replacing the facts or entities involved in one type of discourse with other facts or entities from another type, thereby providing a relationship between them. Richard Jones distinguishes ontological and epistemological reductionism, arguing that many ontological and epistemological reductionists affirm the need for different concepts for different degrees of complexity while affirming a reduction of theories. Some physicists, however, claim that reductionism and emergentism are complementary: both are needed to explain natural processes.

对于科学而言，方法论还原论的应用试图从整个系统的个体、组成部分及其相互作用的角度对其进行解释。例如，气体的温度被降低到除了运动中分子的平均动能之外的零值。托马斯 · 内格尔和其他人谈到了“心理物理学还原论”(试图将心理现象还原为物理和化学)和“物理化学还原论”(试图将生物学还原为物理和化学)。以及 Jaegwon Kim 提出的还原论: 这种还原论的形式涉及一种程序，用另一种类型的其他事实或实体替换一种类型的论述中涉及的事实或实体，从而在它们之间提供一种关系。理查德 · 琼斯区分了本体论和认识论的还原论，他认为许多本体论和认识论的还原论者在肯定理论的还原时，肯定了不同复杂程度的不同概念的必要性。然而，一些物理学家声称还原论和浮现论是互补的: 两者都需要用来解释自然过程。

对于科学而言，方法论还原论试图从个体、组成部分及其相互作用的角度对整个系统进行解释。例如，对气体温度的降低不能超过其运动着的分子的平均动能。托马斯 · 内格尔（Thomas Nagel）和其他人还谈到了“心理物理学还原论”(试图将心理现象还原为物理和化学)和“物理化学还原论”(试图将生物学还原为物理和化学)<ref name="Nagel" />。以及金在权（Jaegwon Kim） 提出的还原论: 还原论从形式上用另一类型的其他事实或实体替换论述中提及的某种类型的事实或实体，从而在它们之间提供一种联系。理查德 · 琼斯（Richard Jones）区分了本体论和认识论的还原论，他认为许多本体论和认识论的还原论者在肯定理论还原的同时，也肯定了不同程度的复杂性需要不同的概念。然而，一些物理学家声称还原论和涌现论是互补的: 对自然过程的解释二者都是必需的。

For the sciences, application of methodological reductionism attempts explanation of entire systems in terms of their individual, constituent parts and their interactions. For example, the temperature of a gas is reduced to nothing beyond the average kinetic energy of its molecules in motion. [[Thomas Nagel]] and others speak of 'psychophysical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of psychological phenomena to physics and chemistry), and 'physico-chemical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of biology to physics and chemistry).<ref name=Nagel /> In a very simplified and sometimes contested form, reductionism is said to imply that a system is nothing but the sum of its parts.<ref name=Polkinghorne /><ref name=GodfreySmith /> However, a more nuanced opinion is that a system is composed entirely of its parts, but the system will have features that none of the parts have (which, in essence is the basis of [[emergentism]]).<ref name=Jones /> "The point of mechanistic explanations is usually showing how the higher level features arise from the parts."<ref name=GodfreySmith />

In a very simplified and sometimes contested form, reductionism is said to imply that a system is nothing but the sum of its parts.<ref name=Polkinghorne /><ref name=GodfreySmith /> However, a more nuanced opinion is that a system is composed entirely of its parts, but the system will have features that none of the parts have (which, in essence is the basis of [[emergentism]]).<ref name=Jones /> "The point of mechanistic explanations is usually showing how the higher level features arise from the parts."<ref name=GodfreySmith />

 

Most philosophers delineate three types of reductionism and anti-reductionism.

Most philosophers delineate three types of reductionism and anti-reductionism.

大多数哲学家将还原论和反还原论分为三种类型。

大多数哲学家将还原论和反还原论分为三种类型。

Nancey Murphy has claimed that there are two species of ontological reductionism: one that claims that wholes are nothing more than their parts; and atomist reductionism, claiming that wholes are not "really real". She admits that the phrase "really real" is apparently senseless but she has tried to explicate the supposed difference between the two.

Nancey Murphy has claimed that there are two species of ontological reductionism: one that claims that wholes are nothing more than their parts; and atomist reductionism, claiming that wholes are not "really real". She admits that the phrase "really real" is apparently senseless but she has tried to explicate the supposed difference between the two.

Nancey Murphy 声称有两种本体论还原论: 一种声称整体不过是它们的部分; 另一种声称整体不是“真正的”，是原子论还原论。她承认，“真实”这个短语显然毫无意义，但她试图解释两者之间所谓的区别。

南希·墨菲（Nancey Murphy） 断言有两种本体论还原论: 一种声称整体不过是它们的部分; 而另一种则是原子论还原论，认为整体不是“真实的（really real）”。她承认，“真实的（really real）”这个短语显然毫无意义，但她试图解释这两种还原论之间假定的差异。

Ontological reductionism denies the idea of ontological emergence, and claims that emergence is an epistemological phenomenon that only exists through analysis or description of a system, and does not exist fundamentally.

Ontological reductionism denies the idea of ontological emergence, and claims that emergence is an epistemological phenomenon that only exists through analysis or description of a system, and does not exist fundamentally.

Reductionism should be distinguished from [[Eliminative materialism|eliminationism]]: reductionists do not deny the existence of phenomena, but explain them in terms of another reality; eliminationists deny the existence of the phenomena themselves. For example, eliminationists deny the existence of life by their explanation in terms of physical and chemical processes.

Reductionism should be distinguished from [[Eliminative materialism|eliminationism]]: reductionists do not deny the existence of phenomena, but explain them in terms of another reality; eliminationists deny the existence of the phenomena themselves. For example, eliminationists deny the existence of life by their explanation in terms of physical and chemical processes.

 

Ontological reductionism takes two forms: token ontological reductionism and type ontological reductionism.

Ontological reductionism takes two forms: token ontological reductionism and type ontological reductionism.

Reductionism does not preclude the existence of what might be termed [[Emergence|emergent phenomena]], but it does imply the ability to understand those phenomena completely in terms of the processes from which they are composed. This reductionist understanding is very different from ontological or strong [[emergentism]], which intends that what emerges in "emergence" is more than the sum of the processes from which it emerges, respectively either in the ontological sense or in the epistemological sense.<ref>Axelrod and Cohen "Harnessing Complexity"</ref> Some physicists, however, claim that reductionism and emergentism are complementary: both are needed to explain natural processes.<ref>Piers Coleman, Center for Materials Theory, Rutgers, Hubbard Theory Consortium and Physics Department, Royal Holloway, University of London; contribution to [https://www.d-iep.org/diep DIEP]-conference "Emergence at all lengthscales" 22-01-2019</ref>

Reductionism does not preclude the existence of what might be termed [[Emergence|emergent phenomena]], but it does imply the ability to understand those phenomena completely in terms of the processes from which they are composed. This reductionist understanding is very different from ontological or strong [[emergentism]], which intends that what emerges in "emergence" is more than the sum of the processes from which it emerges, respectively either in the ontological sense or in the epistemological sense.<ref>Axelrod and Cohen "Harnessing Complexity"</ref> Some physicists, however, claim that reductionism and emergentism are complementary: both are needed to explain natural processes.<ref>Piers Coleman, Center for Materials Theory, Rutgers, Hubbard Theory Consortium and Physics Department, Royal Holloway, University of London; contribution to [https://www.d-iep.org/diep DIEP]-conference "Emergence at all lengthscales" 22-01-2019</ref>

 

Token ontological reductionism is the idea that every item that exists is a sum item. For perceivable items, it affirms that every perceivable item is a sum of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Token ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is generally accepted.

Token ontological reductionism is the idea that every item that exists is a sum item. For perceivable items, it affirms that every perceivable item is a sum of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Token ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is generally accepted.

== Types ==

== Types ==