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| ===Definitions=== | | ===Definitions=== |
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| + | Philosophers often understand emergence as a claim about the etiology of a system's properties. An emergent property of a system, in this context, is one that is not a property of any component of that system, but is still a feature of the system as a whole. Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), one of the first modern philosophers to write on emergence, termed this a categorial novum (new category). |
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| + | 哲学家通常把涌现理解为一种对系统特性的发生学的主张。在这此文本中,系统的涌现属性不是系统的任何组件各自的属性,但却仍然是整个系统的特征。尼古拉·哈特曼(1882-1950) ,首批写出涌现论的现代哲学家之一,把这种现象称为范畴新见习(新范畴)。 |
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| 定义 | | 定义 |
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| This idea of emergence has been around since at least the time of Aristotle. The many scientists and philosophers<ref>Being Emergence vs. Pattern Emergence: Complexity, Control, and Goal-Directedness in Biological Systems | | This idea of emergence has been around since at least the time of Aristotle. The many scientists and philosophers<ref>Being Emergence vs. Pattern Emergence: Complexity, Control, and Goal-Directedness in Biological Systems |
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− | 这个涌现的概念至少在亚里士多德时代就已经存在了。许多科学家和哲学家提出存在涌现 vs. 模式涌现: 生物系统中的复杂性、控制性和目标导向性
| + | 这个涌现的概念至少在亚里士多德时代就已经存在了。许多科学家和哲学家写过关于这个概念的文章,其中包括《约翰·斯图尔特·密尔《原因的构成》和《朱利安 · 赫胥黎》。同样的提出存在涌现 vs. 模式涌现: 生物系统中的复杂性、控制性和目标导向性等议题。 |
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| Jason Winning & William Bechtel | | Jason Winning & William Bechtel |
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| The philosopher G. H. Lewes coined the term "emergent", writing in 1875: | | The philosopher G. H. Lewes coined the term "emergent", writing in 1875: |
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− | 哲学家 g · h · 刘易斯(g. h. Lewes)在1875年创造了“涌现”(emergent)一词: | + | 哲学家 g· h·刘易斯(g. h. Lewes)在1875年创造了“涌现”(emergent)一词 |
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| <blockquote>Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant forces; their sum, when their directions are the same – their difference, when their directions are contrary. Further, every resultant is clearly traceable in its components, because these are [[homogeneous]] and [[Commensurability (philosophy of science)|commensurable]]. It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable motion to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-operation of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference.<ref> | | <blockquote>Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant forces; their sum, when their directions are the same – their difference, when their directions are contrary. Further, every resultant is clearly traceable in its components, because these are [[homogeneous]] and [[Commensurability (philosophy of science)|commensurable]]. It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable motion to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-operation of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference.<ref> |
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| <blockquote>Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant forces; their sum, when their directions are the same – their difference, when their directions are contrary. Further, every resultant is clearly traceable in its components, because these are homogeneous and commensurable. It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable motion to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-operation of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference.<ref> | | <blockquote>Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant forces; their sum, when their directions are the same – their difference, when their directions are contrary. Further, every resultant is clearly traceable in its components, because these are homogeneous and commensurable. It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable motion to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-operation of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference.<ref> |
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− | 每个合力要么是合作力的和,要么是合作力的差; 当它们的方向相同时,它们的和——当它们的方向相反时,它们的差。此外,每个结果在其组成部分中都可以清楚地追溯,因为这些组成部分是同质的和可公度的。与紧急情况不同的是,不是在可测量的运动中加入可测量的运动,或者在同类的其他个体中加入某种事物,而是在不同种类的事物之间进行合作。突现不同于其组成部分,因为这些部分是不可通约的,不能简化为它们的总和或差异。 裁判 | + | 每个合力要么是合作力的和,要么是合作力的差; 当它们的方向相同时,是它们的和——当它们的方向相反时,则是它们的差。此外,每个成果在其组成部分中都可以清楚地朔源,因为这些组成部分是同质的和有公度的(commensurable)。与涌现(这里需要重新翻译一下)情况不同的是,这不是在可测量的运动中嵌入可测量的运动,或者在同类的其他个体中嵌入某种事物,而是在不同种类的事物之间进行协作自组织。涌现不同于其组成部分,因为这些部分是不可通约的(有共同因子),不能仅仅简化为它们的总和或差异。 |
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| {{cite book | | {{cite book |
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| In 1999, economist Jeffrey Goldstein provided a current definition of emergence in the journal Emergence. Goldstein initially defined emergence as: "the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of self-organization in complex systems". | | In 1999, economist Jeffrey Goldstein provided a current definition of emergence in the journal Emergence. Goldstein initially defined emergence as: "the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of self-organization in complex systems". |
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− | 1999年,经济学家杰弗里•戈尔茨坦(Jeffrey Goldstein)在《涌现》(Emergence)杂志上提出了目前对“涌现”的定义。Goldstein 最初将涌现定义为: “在复杂系统的自我组织过程中产生的新颖连贯的结构、模式和性质”。 | + | 1999年,经济学家杰弗里•戈尔茨坦(Jeffrey Goldstein)在《涌现》(Emergence)杂志上提出了现有的对“涌现”的定义。Goldstein 最初将涌现定义为: “在复杂系统的自组织过程中产生的新颖质的发生、逻辑结构、模式和性质”。 |
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| <blockquote>The common characteristics are: (1) radical novelty (features not previously observed in systems); (2) coherence or correlation (meaning integrated wholes that maintain themselves over some period of time); (3) A global or macro "level" (i.e. there is some property of "wholeness"); (4) it is the product of a dynamical process (it evolves); and (5) it is "ostensive" (it can be perceived).</blockquote> | | <blockquote>The common characteristics are: (1) radical novelty (features not previously observed in systems); (2) coherence or correlation (meaning integrated wholes that maintain themselves over some period of time); (3) A global or macro "level" (i.e. there is some property of "wholeness"); (4) it is the product of a dynamical process (it evolves); and (5) it is "ostensive" (it can be perceived).</blockquote> |
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− | 它们的共同特征是: (1)根本的新颖性(以前在系统中没有观察到的特征) ; (2)连贯性或相关性(意味着在一段时间内维持自身的整体) ; (3)全局或宏观的“层次”(即:。它是一个动力学过程的产物(它在进化) ,它是一个明示的过程(它可以被感知)。 / blockquote | + | 它们的共同特征是: (1)根本的新颖性(以前在系统中没有观察到的特征) ; (2)连贯性或相关性(意味着在一段时间内维持自身的整体) ; (3)全局或宏观的“层次”(即:。它是一个动力学过程的产物(进化状态中) ,它是一个明示的过程(它可以被感知)。 / blockquote |
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| Corning suggests a narrower definition, requiring that the components be unlike in kind (following Lewes), and that they involve division of labor between these components. He also says that living systems (like the game of chess), while emergent, cannot be reduced to underlying laws of emergence: | | Corning suggests a narrower definition, requiring that the components be unlike in kind (following Lewes), and that they involve division of labor between these components. He also says that living systems (like the game of chess), while emergent, cannot be reduced to underlying laws of emergence: |
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− | 康宁公司提出了一个狭义的定义,要求零部件不同于实物(跟随刘易斯) ,并且它们涉及这些零部件之间的劳动分工。他还表示,生命系统(如国际象棋)虽然是自然发生的,但不能简化为自然发生的基本规律:
| + | 康宁公司提出了一个狭义的定义,要求组成部件不同于实体(following Lewes) ,并且它们涉及这些组成部件之间的劳动分工。他还表示,生命系统(如国际象棋)虽然是涌现的,但不能简化为涌现的基本规律: |
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| <blockquote><span id="CorningDefn" class="citation">Rules, or laws, have no causal efficacy; they do not in fact 'generate' anything. They serve merely to describe regularities and consistent relationships in nature. These patterns may be very illuminating and important, but the underlying causal agencies must be separately specified (though often they are not). But that aside, the game of chess illustrates ... why any laws or rules of emergence and evolution are insufficient. Even in a chess game, you cannot use the rules to predict 'history' – i.e., the course of any given game. Indeed, you cannot even reliably predict the next move in a chess game. Why? Because the 'system' involves more than the rules of the game. It also includes the players and their unfolding, moment-by-moment decisions among a very large number of available options at each choice point. The game of chess is inescapably historical, even though it is also constrained and shaped by a set of rules, not to mention the laws of physics. Moreover, and this is a key point, the game of chess is also shaped by teleonomic, cybernetic, feedback-driven influences. It is not simply a self-ordered process; it involves an organized, 'purposeful' activity.</span></blockquote> | | <blockquote><span id="CorningDefn" class="citation">Rules, or laws, have no causal efficacy; they do not in fact 'generate' anything. They serve merely to describe regularities and consistent relationships in nature. These patterns may be very illuminating and important, but the underlying causal agencies must be separately specified (though often they are not). But that aside, the game of chess illustrates ... why any laws or rules of emergence and evolution are insufficient. Even in a chess game, you cannot use the rules to predict 'history' – i.e., the course of any given game. Indeed, you cannot even reliably predict the next move in a chess game. Why? Because the 'system' involves more than the rules of the game. It also includes the players and their unfolding, moment-by-moment decisions among a very large number of available options at each choice point. The game of chess is inescapably historical, even though it is also constrained and shaped by a set of rules, not to mention the laws of physics. Moreover, and this is a key point, the game of chess is also shaped by teleonomic, cybernetic, feedback-driven influences. It is not simply a self-ordered process; it involves an organized, 'purposeful' activity.</span></blockquote> |
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− | 这些规则,或者说法律,没有因果效力; 它们事实上并不‘产生’任何东西。它们只是用来描述自然界中的规律性和一致性关系。这些模式可能非常具有启发性和重要性,但必须分别说明潜在的因果机构(尽管通常不是这样)。但是除此之外,国际象棋游戏说明了... 为什么任何关于出现和进化的法则和规则都是不够的。即使在国际象棋游戏中,你也不能用这些规则来预测“历史”——也就是说,任何给定游戏的过程。事实上,你甚至无法可靠地预测下一步棋的走法。为什么?因为系统不仅仅包含游戏规则。它还包括球员和他们的展开,每时每刻的决定在一个非常大的数量可用的选择,在每个选择点。国际象棋是不可避免的历史游戏,尽管它也受到一系列规则的约束和塑造,更不用说物理定律了。此外,这是一个关键点,国际象棋的游戏也形成了,遥控,控制论,反馈驱动的影响。它不仅仅是一个自我有序的过程,它还包括一个有组织的、“有目的的”活动
| + | 这些规则,或者说定律,没有其因果效力; 因为它们实际上并不‘产生’任何东西。它们只是用来描述自然界中的规律性和一致性关系。这些模式可能非常重要且给人以启发,但必须分别说明潜在的因果关系(尽管通常不是这样)。但是除此之外,国际象棋游戏说明了... 为什么任何关于出现和进化的法则和规则都是不足自证的。即使在国际象棋游戏中,你也不能用这些规则来预测发生的“历史”——也就是说,任何给定游戏的过程都不能被预测。事实上,你甚至无法可靠地预测下一步棋的走法。为什么?因为系统不仅仅包含游戏规则。它还包括球员和他们的自我展现,每时每刻的决定归于一个可用的大数量选择集内,在每个选择点中。国际象棋是不可避免地具有历史性的游戏,尽管它也受到一系列规则的约束和塑造,在此之上更不用说物理定律了。此外,着重点也在这,国际象棋的游戏也塑形于目的性,控制论,反馈驱动的影响。它不仅仅是一个自我有序的过程,它还包括一个有组织的、“有目的的”活动 |
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| ===Strong and weak emergence=== | | ===Strong and weak emergence=== |