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第1行： − {{other uses}} − − {{short description|Canonical example of a game analyzed in game theory}} 第65行：
第62行： − The '''prisoner's dilemma''' is a standard example of a game analyzed in [[game theory]] that shows why two completely [[Rationality#Economics|rational]] individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so. It was originally framed by [[Merrill Flood]] and [[Melvin Dresher]] while working at [[RAND Corporation|RAND]] in 1950. [[Albert W. Tucker]] formalized the game with prison sentence rewards and named it "prisoner's dilemma",<ref>Poundstone, 1992</ref> presenting it as follows:+ − − The prisoner's dilemma is a standard example of a game analyzed in game theory that shows why two completely rational individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so. It was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher while working at RAND in 1950. Albert W. Tucker formalized the game with prison sentence rewards and named it "prisoner's dilemma", prensenting it as follows: − − <font color="#ff8000"> 囚徒困境prisoner's dilemma</font>是<font color="#ff8000"> 博弈论game theory</font>分析博弈的一个代表性例子，它揭示了为什么两个完全理性的个体可能不会合作，即使这样做符合他们的最大利益。它最初是由梅里尔·弗勒德 Merrill Flood和 梅文·加舍尔 Melvin Dresher于1950年在兰德公司工作时构建的。阿尔伯特.W.塔克 Albert W. Tucker将这种博弈以监禁刑罚奖励的方式正式化，并将其命名为囚徒困境，具体阐述如下： − − − − {{quote|Two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of communicating with the other. The prosecutors lack sufficient evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge, but they have enough to convict both on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the prosecutors offer each prisoner a bargain. Each prisoner is given the opportunity either to betray the other by testifying that the other committed the crime, or to cooperate with the other by remaining silent. The possible outcomes are: − − {{quote|Two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of communicating with the other. The prosecutors lack sufficient evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge, but they have enough to convict both on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the prosecutors offer each prisoner a bargain. Each prisoner is given the opportunity either to betray the other by testifying that the other committed the crime, or to cooperate with the other by remaining silent. The possible outcomes are: − * If A and B each betray the other, each of them serves two years in prison − * If A betrays B but B remains silent, A will be set free and B will serve three years in prison − * If A remains silent but B betrays A, A will serve three years in prison and B will be set free − * If A and B both remain silent, both of them will serve only one year in prison (on the lesser charge).}} − {{一个犯罪团伙的两名成员被捕入狱。每个囚犯都被单独监禁，与他人无法沟通。检察官缺乏足够的证据来对这两个人定罪，但有足够的证据以较低的罪名定罪。同时，检察官向每个犯人提供了一个交易。每个囚犯都有机会出卖对方，证明对方犯下的罪行，或者他们可以合作，保持沉默。可能的结果有:+ − + +
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此词条由Henry初步翻译。已由Smile审校。
此词条由Henry初步翻译。已由Smile审校。
{| class="wikitable floatright"
{| class="wikitable floatright"
'''囚徒困境 prisoner's dilemma'''是[[博弈论]]分析博弈的一个代表性例子，它揭示了为什么两个完全理性的个体可能不会合作，即使这样做符合他们的最大利益。它最初是由梅里尔·弗勒德 Merrill Flood和 梅文·加舍尔 Melvin Dresher于1950年在兰德公司工作时构建的。阿尔伯特.W.塔克 Albert W. Tucker将这种博弈以监禁刑罚奖励的方式正式化，并将其命名为囚徒困境 <ref>Poundstone, 1992</ref>，具体阐述如下：
<qouteblock>一个犯罪团伙的两名成员被捕入狱。每个囚犯都被单独监禁，与他人无法沟通。检察官缺乏足够的证据来对这两个人定罪，但有足够的证据以较低的罪名定罪。同时，检察官向每个犯人提供了一个交易。每个囚犯都有机会出卖对方，证明对方犯下的罪行，或者他们可以合作，保持沉默。可能的结果有:
*如果A和B都背叛了对方，他们都会在监狱服刑两年。
*如果A和B都背叛了对方，他们都会在监狱服刑两年。
*如果A背叛了B但B保持沉默，A会被无罪释放而B会服刑三年。
*如果A背叛了B但B保持沉默，A会被无罪释放而B会服刑三年。
*如果A保持沉默但B背叛了A，A会服刑三年而B会无罪释放。
*如果A保持沉默但B背叛了A，A会服刑三年而B会无罪释放。
*如果A和B都保持沉默，他们就只用服刑一年（以较低的罪名）。}}
*如果A和B都保持沉默，他们就只用服刑一年（以较低的罪名）。</qouteblock>
It is implied that the prisoners will have no opportunity to reward or punish their partner other than the prison sentences they get and that their decision will not affect their reputation in the future. Because betraying a partner offers a greater reward than cooperating with them, all purely rational self-interested prisoners will betray the other, meaning the only possible outcome for two purely rational prisoners is for them to betray each other.<ref>{{cite web|last=Milovsky|first=Nicholas|title=The Basics of Game Theory and Associated Games|url=https://issuu.com/johnsonnick895/docs/game_theory_paper|accessdate=11 February 2014}}</ref> In reality, humans display a [[systemic bias]] towards cooperative behavior in this and similar games despite what is predicted by simple models of "rational" self-interested action.<ref name = Fehr>{{cite journal | last1=Fehr | first1= Ernst | last2=Fischbacher | first2=Urs | date= Oct 23, 2003 | title=The Nature of human altruism |journal=Nature | volume=425 | pages=785–91 | doi=10.1038/nature02043 | url=http://www.iwp.jku.at/born/mpwfst/04/nature02043_f_born.pdf | accessdate=February 27, 2013 | pmid=14574401 | issue=6960|bibcode = 2003Natur.425..785F }}</ref><ref name = Amos>{{cite book | title=Preference, belief, and similarity: selected writings. | publisher=Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press | first1= Amos | last1=Tversky | first2=Eldar | last2=Shafir | url=http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~gary/PAPER-SUGGESTIONS/Preference,%20Belief,%20and%20Similarity%20Selected%20Writings%20(Bradford%20Books).pdf | year=2004 | isbn=9780262700931 | accessdate=February 27, 2013}}</ref><ref name="Ahn">{{cite journal |last1 = Toh-Kyeong|first1 = Ahn|last2 = Ostrom|first2 = Elinor|last3 = Walker|first3 = James|date = Sep 5, 2002|title = Incorporating Motivational Heterogeneity into Game-Theoretic Models of Collective Action|journal = Public Choice|volume = 117|issue = 3–4|pages = 295–314|doi =10.1023/b:puch.0000003739.54365.fd |url = http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/seminars/papers/ahnostromwalker_092402.pdf|accessdate = June 27, 2015|hdl = 10535/4697}}</ref><ref name="Hessel">{{cite journal|last1 = Oosterbeek|first1 = Hessel|last2 = Sloof|first2 = Randolph|last3 = Van de Kuilen|first3 = Gus|date = Dec 3, 2003|title = Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis|journal = Experimental Economics|volume = 7|issue = 2|pages = 171–88|doi = 10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026978.14316.74|url = http://www.econ.nagoya-cu.ac.jp/~yhamagu/ultimatum.pdf|accessdate = February 27, 2013|url-status = dead|archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20130512175243/http://www.econ.nagoya-cu.ac.jp/~yhamagu/ultimatum.pdf|archivedate = May 12, 2013}}</ref> This bias towards cooperation has been known since the test was first conducted at RAND; the secretaries involved trusted each other and worked together for the best common outcome.<ref>{{Cite book | url=https://books.google.com/?id=WIhZlB86nJwC&pg=PT96&lpg=PT96&dq=rand+secretaries+prisoner%27s+dilemma#v=onepage |title = Why Most Things Fail|isbn = 9780571266142|last1 = Ormerod|first1 = Paul|date = 2010-12-22}}</ref> The prisoner's dilemma became the focus of extensive experimental research.<ref>Deutsch, M. (1958). Trust and suspicion. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2(4), 265–279. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200275800200401</ref> <ref>Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. M. (1965). Prisoner’s Dilemma: A study of conflict and cooperation. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.</ref>
It is implied that the prisoners will have no opportunity to reward or punish their partner other than the prison sentences they get and that their decision will not affect their reputation in the future. Because betraying a partner offers a greater reward than cooperating with them, all purely rational self-interested prisoners will betray the other, meaning the only possible outcome for two purely rational prisoners is for them to betray each other.<ref>{{cite web|last=Milovsky|first=Nicholas|title=The Basics of Game Theory and Associated Games|url=https://issuu.com/johnsonnick895/docs/game_theory_paper|accessdate=11 February 2014}}</ref> In reality, humans display a [[systemic bias]] towards cooperative behavior in this and similar games despite what is predicted by simple models of "rational" self-interested action.<ref name = Fehr>{{cite journal | last1=Fehr | first1= Ernst | last2=Fischbacher | first2=Urs | date= Oct 23, 2003 | title=The Nature of human altruism |journal=Nature | volume=425 | pages=785–91 | doi=10.1038/nature02043 | url=http://www.iwp.jku.at/born/mpwfst/04/nature02043_f_born.pdf | accessdate=February 27, 2013 | pmid=14574401 | issue=6960|bibcode = 2003Natur.425..785F }}</ref><ref name = Amos>{{cite book | title=Preference, belief, and similarity: selected writings. | publisher=Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press | first1= Amos | last1=Tversky | first2=Eldar | last2=Shafir | url=http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~gary/PAPER-SUGGESTIONS/Preference,%20Belief,%20and%20Similarity%20Selected%20Writings%20(Bradford%20Books).pdf | year=2004 | isbn=9780262700931 | accessdate=February 27, 2013}}</ref><ref name="Ahn">{{cite journal |last1 = Toh-Kyeong|first1 = Ahn|last2 = Ostrom|first2 = Elinor|last3 = Walker|first3 = James|date = Sep 5, 2002|title = Incorporating Motivational Heterogeneity into Game-Theoretic Models of Collective Action|journal = Public Choice|volume = 117|issue = 3–4|pages = 295–314|doi =10.1023/b:puch.0000003739.54365.fd |url = http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/seminars/papers/ahnostromwalker_092402.pdf|accessdate = June 27, 2015|hdl = 10535/4697}}</ref><ref name="Hessel">{{cite journal|last1 = Oosterbeek|first1 = Hessel|last2 = Sloof|first2 = Randolph|last3 = Van de Kuilen|first3 = Gus|date = Dec 3, 2003|title = Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis|journal = Experimental Economics|volume = 7|issue = 2|pages = 171–88|doi = 10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026978.14316.74|url = http://www.econ.nagoya-cu.ac.jp/~yhamagu/ultimatum.pdf|accessdate = February 27, 2013|url-status = dead|archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20130512175243/http://www.econ.nagoya-cu.ac.jp/~yhamagu/ultimatum.pdf|archivedate = May 12, 2013}}</ref> This bias towards cooperation has been known since the test was first conducted at RAND; the secretaries involved trusted each other and worked together for the best common outcome.<ref>{{Cite book | url=https://books.google.com/?id=WIhZlB86nJwC&pg=PT96&lpg=PT96&dq=rand+secretaries+prisoner%27s+dilemma#v=onepage |title = Why Most Things Fail|isbn = 9780571266142|last1 = Ormerod|first1 = Paul|date = 2010-12-22}}</ref> The prisoner's dilemma became the focus of extensive experimental research.<ref>Deutsch, M. (1958). Trust and suspicion. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2(4), 265–279. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200275800200401</ref> <ref>Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. M. (1965). Prisoner’s Dilemma: A study of conflict and cooperation. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.</ref>