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| | == 在哲学中 == | | == 在哲学中 == |
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| − | The concept of [[downward causation]] poses an alternative to reductionism within philosophy. This opinion is developed by [[Peter Bøgh Andersen]], [[Claus Emmeche]], [[Niels Ole Finnemann]], and [[Peder Voetmann Christiansen]], among others. These philosophers explore ways in which one can talk about phenomena at a larger-scale level of organization exerting causal influence on a smaller-scale level, and find that some, but not all proposed types of downward causation are compatible with science. In particular, they find that constraint is one way in which downward causation can operate.<ref>P.B. Andersen, C. Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann, P.V. Christiansen, ''Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter'', Aarhus University Press ({{ISBN|87-7288-814-8}}) (2001)</ref> The notion of causality as constraint has also been explored as a way to shed light on scientific concepts such as [[self-organization]], [[natural selection]], [[adaptation]], and control.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Einmag_Abstr/AJuarrero.html |first1=A |last1=Juarrero |title=Causality as Constraint |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110612013407/http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Einmag_Abstr/AJuarrero.html |archive-date=June 12, 2011 }}</ref> | + | The concept of [[downward causation]] poses an alternative to reductionism within philosophy. This opinion is developed by [[Peter Bøgh Andersen]], [[Claus Emmeche]], [[Niels Ole Finnemann]], and [[Peder Voetmann Christiansen]], among others. These philosophers explore ways in which one can talk about phenomena at a larger-scale level of organization exerting causal influence on a smaller-scale level, and find that some, but not all proposed types of downward causation are compatible with science. In particular, they find that constraint is one way in which downward causation can operate.<ref name=":28">P.B. Andersen, C. Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann, P.V. Christiansen, ''Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter'', Aarhus University Press ({{ISBN|87-7288-814-8}}) (2001)</ref> The notion of causality as constraint has also been explored as a way to shed light on scientific concepts such as [[self-organization]], [[natural selection]], [[adaptation]], and control.<ref name=":29">{{cite web|url=http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Einmag_Abstr/AJuarrero.html |first1=A |last1=Juarrero |title=Causality as Constraint |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110612013407/http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Einmag_Abstr/AJuarrero.html |archive-date=June 12, 2011 }}</ref> |
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| − | 向下因果关系的概念在哲学中提出了一种还原论的替代方法。这个观点是由 Peter b ø gh Andersen,Claus Emmeche,Niels Ole Finnemann,和 Peder Voetmann Christiansen 等人提出的。这些哲学家探索的方式,其中一个可以谈论的现象,在较大规模的组织水平产生因果影响的较小规模的水平,并发现,一些,但不是所有类型的向下因果关系是与科学兼容的。特别是,他们发现,约束是向下因果关系可以运作的一种方式。因果关系作为约束的概念也被探索作为一种阐明科学概念的方式,例如自我组织、自然选择、适应和控制。
| + | 在哲学中,向下因果关系的概念提供了一种还原论的替代方法。这个观点是由彼得·博格·安徒生([[Peter Bøgh Andersen]]),克劳斯([[Claus Emmeche]]),尼尔斯·奥立(Niels Ole Finnemann),和 彼得(Peder Voetmann Christiansen )等人提出的。这些哲学家探索人们可以在更大范围的组织层面上谈论的现象,在更小范围的组织层面上施加因果影响的方式,并发现一些(但不是所有)向下的因果类型与科学是相容的<ref name=":28" /> 。特别地,他们发现约束是向下因果关系的一种运作方式。因果关系作为约束的概念也作为一种阐明科学概念的方式,例如自组织、自然选择、适应和控制<ref name=":29" />。 |
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| | === 自由意志 === | | === 自由意志 === |
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| − | Philosophers of the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] worked to insulate human free will from reductionism. [[Descartes]] separated the material world of mechanical necessity from the world of mental free will. German philosophers introduced the concept of the "[[Noumenon|noumenal]]" realm that is not governed by the deterministic laws of "[[Phenomena (philosophy)|phenomenal]]" nature, where every event is completely determined by chains of causality.<ref>Paul Guyer, "18th Century German Aesthetics," [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetics-18th-german/ ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'']</ref> The most influential formulation was by [[Immanuel Kant]], who distinguished between the causal deterministic framework the mind imposes on the world—the phenomenal realm—and the world as it exists for itself, the noumenal realm, which, as he believed, included free will. To insulate theology from reductionism, 19th century post-Enlightenment German theologians, especially [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] and [[Albrecht Ritschl]], used the [[Romanticism|Romantic]] method of basing religion on the human spirit, so that it is a person's feeling or sensibility about spiritual matters that comprises religion.<ref>Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson, eds. ''The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science'' (2006) p. 161</ref> | + | Philosophers of the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] worked to insulate human free will from reductionism. [[Descartes]] separated the material world of mechanical necessity from the world of mental free will. German philosophers introduced the concept of the "[[Noumenon|noumenal]]" realm that is not governed by the deterministic laws of "[[Phenomena (philosophy)|phenomenal]]" nature, where every event is completely determined by chains of causality.<ref name=":30">Paul Guyer, "18th Century German Aesthetics," [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetics-18th-german/ ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'']</ref> The most influential formulation was by [[Immanuel Kant]], who distinguished between the causal deterministic framework the mind imposes on the world—the phenomenal realm—and the world as it exists for itself, the noumenal realm, which, as he believed, included free will. To insulate theology from reductionism, 19th century post-Enlightenment German theologians, especially [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] and [[Albrecht Ritschl]], used the [[Romanticism|Romantic]] method of basing religion on the human spirit, so that it is a person's feeling or sensibility about spiritual matters that comprises religion.<ref name=":31">Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson, eds. ''The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science'' (2006) p. 161</ref> |
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| − | 启蒙运动时期的哲学家致力于将人类的自由意志与还原论隔离开来。笛卡尔将机械必然性的物质世界与精神自由意志的世界分开。德国哲学家引入了“本体”领域的概念,这一领域不受“现象”自然界的决定论法则的支配,在这一领域中,每一个事件都完全由一系列因果关系所决定。最有影响力的公式是伊曼努尔 · 康德提出的,他区分了心智强加于世界的因果决定论框架ーー现象领域ーー和现象领域本身存在的世界ーー本体领域,正如他所相信的,这个领域包括自由意志。为了将神学与还原论隔离开来,19世纪后启蒙时代的德国神学家,尤其是弗里德里希·施莱尔马赫和阿尔布雷赫特·立敕尔,使用了浪漫主义的方法,将宗教建立在人类精神的基础之上,因此,一个人对精神事物的感觉或情感构成了宗教。
| + | 启蒙运动时期的哲学家致力于将人类的自由意志与还原论分割开来。笛卡尔将机械必然性的物质世界与精神自由意志的世界分开。德国哲学家引入了“本体”领域的概念,这一领域不受“现象”自然的决定论法则的控制,在“现象”自然中,每一个事件都完全由一系列因果关系所决定<ref name=":30" /> 。最有影响力的是伊曼努尔·康德(Immanuel Kant),他区分了思维强加于世界(现象界)的因果决定论框架和它自己存在的世界(本体界),他认为本体界包括自由意志。为了将神学与还原论相互剥离,19世纪后启蒙时代的德国神学家们,尤其是施莱马赫(Friedrich Schleiermacher)和阿尔布雷希特·里施(Albrecht Ritschl),采用了浪漫主义的方法,将宗教建立在人类精神的基础上,从而,一个人对精神事物的感觉或情感构成了宗教<ref name=":31" />。 |
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| | === 因果关系 === | | === 因果关系 === |
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| | Most common philosophical understandings of [[Causality|causation]] involve reducing it to some collection of non-causal facts. Opponents of these reductionist views have given arguments that the non-causal facts in question are insufficient to determine the causal facts.<ref name="Carroll">{{cite book |title=The Oxford Handbook of Causation |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xGnZtUtG-nIC&pg=PA292 |page=292 |author=John W Carroll |chapter=Chapter 13: Anti-reductionism |isbn=978-0-19-927973-9 |publisher=Oxford Handbooks Online |year=2009 |editor1=Helen Beebee |editor2=Christopher Hitchcock |editor3=Peter Menzies }}</ref> | | Most common philosophical understandings of [[Causality|causation]] involve reducing it to some collection of non-causal facts. Opponents of these reductionist views have given arguments that the non-causal facts in question are insufficient to determine the causal facts.<ref name="Carroll">{{cite book |title=The Oxford Handbook of Causation |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xGnZtUtG-nIC&pg=PA292 |page=292 |author=John W Carroll |chapter=Chapter 13: Anti-reductionism |isbn=978-0-19-927973-9 |publisher=Oxford Handbooks Online |year=2009 |editor1=Helen Beebee |editor2=Christopher Hitchcock |editor3=Peter Menzies }}</ref> |
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| − | Most common philosophical understandings of causation involve reducing it to some collection of non-causal facts. Opponents of these reductionist views have given arguments that the non-causal facts in question are insufficient to determine the causal facts.
| + | 大多数关于因果关系的哲学理解都将因果关系还原为一些非因果事实的集合。对这些还原论观点持反对意见的人认为,所讨论的非因果事实不足以确定因果事实<ref name="Carroll" />。 |
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| − | 最常见的哲学上对因果关系的理解包括将它归纳为一些非因果事实的集合。这些简化论观点的反对者认为,所讨论的非因果事实不足以确定因果事实。
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| − | == Criticism == | + | == 批评 == |
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| − | Ecologist Sven Erik Jorgensen makes both theoretical and practical arguments for a holistic method in certain topics of science, especially ecology. He argues that many systems are so complex that they can ever be described in complete detail. In analogy to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in physics, he argues that many interesting ecological phenomena cannot be replicated in laboratory conditions, and so cannot be measured or observed without changing the system in some way. He also indicates the importance of inter-connectedness in biological systems. He believes that science can only progress by outlining questions that are unanswerable and by using models that do not try to explain everything in terms of smaller hierarchical levels of organization, but instead model them on the scale of the system itself, taking into account some (but not all) factors from levels higher and lower in the hierarchy.
| + | === 反还原论主义 === |
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| − | 生态学家斯文 · 埃里克 · 乔根森在某些科学领域,特别是生态学领域,为整体方法提供了理论和实践两方面的论据。他认为,许多系统是如此复杂,以至于它们可以被完全详细地描述。类比于物理学中的海森堡测不准原理,他认为许多有趣的生态现象不能在实验室条件下复制,因此不能在不以某种方式改变系统的情况下测量或观察。他还指出了生物系统内部相互联系的重要性。他认为,科学只有通过勾勒出无法回答的问题,通过使用模型,而不是试图从较小的组织层次来解释一切,而是根据系统本身的规模来模拟它们,考虑到来自较高层次和较低层次的一些(但不是全部)因素,才能取得进展。
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| − | === Antireductionism === | |
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| | In cognitive psychology, George Kelly developed "constructive alternativism" as a form of personal construct psychology and an alternative to what he considered "accumulative fragmentalism". For this theory, knowledge is seen as the construction of successful mental models of the exterior world, rather than the accumulation of independent "nuggets of truth". | | In cognitive psychology, George Kelly developed "constructive alternativism" as a form of personal construct psychology and an alternative to what he considered "accumulative fragmentalism". For this theory, knowledge is seen as the construction of successful mental models of the exterior world, rather than the accumulation of independent "nuggets of truth". |
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| | == Alternatives == | | == Alternatives == |
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| | The development of [[systems thinking]] has provided methods that seek to describe issues in a [[holism|holistic]] rather than a reductionist way, and many scientists use a [[Holism in science|holistic paradigm]].<ref>[[Dossey, Larry]]. ''Reinventing Medicine: Beyond Mind-Body to a New Era of Healing.'' ({{ISBN|0-06-251622-1}}) HarperSanFrancisco. (1999)</ref> When the terms are used in a scientific context, holism and reductionism refer primarily to what sorts of [[scientific model|models]] or theories offer valid explanations of the natural world; the scientific method of falsifying hypotheses, checking empirical data against theory, is largely unchanged, but the method guides which theories are considered. | | The development of [[systems thinking]] has provided methods that seek to describe issues in a [[holism|holistic]] rather than a reductionist way, and many scientists use a [[Holism in science|holistic paradigm]].<ref>[[Dossey, Larry]]. ''Reinventing Medicine: Beyond Mind-Body to a New Era of Healing.'' ({{ISBN|0-06-251622-1}}) HarperSanFrancisco. (1999)</ref> When the terms are used in a scientific context, holism and reductionism refer primarily to what sorts of [[scientific model|models]] or theories offer valid explanations of the natural world; the scientific method of falsifying hypotheses, checking empirical data against theory, is largely unchanged, but the method guides which theories are considered. |
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| − | The development of systems thinking has provided methods that seek to describe issues in a holistic rather than a reductionist way, and many scientists use a holistic paradigm. When the terms are used in a scientific context, holism and reductionism refer primarily to what sorts of models or theories offer valid explanations of the natural world; the scientific method of falsifying hypotheses, checking empirical data against theory, is largely unchanged, but the method guides which theories are considered.
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| | 系统思维的发展提供了寻求以整体而非简化的方式来描述问题的方法,许多科学家使用整体范式。当术语在科学语境中使用时,整体论和还原论主要指的是什么类型的模型或理论提供对自然世界的有效解释; 证伪假设的科学方法,检查经验数据与理论,大体上是不变的,但方法指导哪些理论被考虑。 | | 系统思维的发展提供了寻求以整体而非简化的方式来描述问题的方法,许多科学家使用整体范式。当术语在科学语境中使用时,整体论和还原论主要指的是什么类型的模型或理论提供对自然世界的有效解释; 证伪假设的科学方法,检查经验数据与理论,大体上是不变的,但方法指导哪些理论被考虑。 |
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| | In many cases (such as the [[kinetic theory of gases]]), given a good understanding of the components of the system, one can predict all the important properties of the system as a whole. In other systems, especially concerned with life and life's emergent properties ([[morphogenesis]], [[autopoiesis]], and [[metabolism]]), [[emergent properties]] of the system are said to be almost impossible to predict from knowledge of the parts of the system. [[Complex systems|Complexity theory]] studies systems and properties of the latter type. | | In many cases (such as the [[kinetic theory of gases]]), given a good understanding of the components of the system, one can predict all the important properties of the system as a whole. In other systems, especially concerned with life and life's emergent properties ([[morphogenesis]], [[autopoiesis]], and [[metabolism]]), [[emergent properties]] of the system are said to be almost impossible to predict from knowledge of the parts of the system. [[Complex systems|Complexity theory]] studies systems and properties of the latter type. |
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| − | In many cases (such as the kinetic theory of gases), given a good understanding of the components of the system, one can predict all the important properties of the system as a whole. In other systems, especially concerned with life and life's emergent properties (morphogenesis, autopoiesis, and metabolism), emergent properties of the system are said to be almost impossible to predict from knowledge of the parts of the system. Complexity theory studies systems and properties of the latter type.
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| | 在许多情况下(例如分子运动论) ,只要对系统的组成部分有很好的了解,就可以预测整个系统的所有重要特性。在其他系统中,特别是关于生命和生命的涌现特性(形态发生、自创生和新陈代谢) ,系统的涌现特性据说几乎不可能从系统各部分的知识中预测。复杂性理论研究系统和后一种类型的性质。 | | 在许多情况下(例如分子运动论) ,只要对系统的组成部分有很好的了解,就可以预测整个系统的所有重要特性。在其他系统中,特别是关于生命和生命的涌现特性(形态发生、自创生和新陈代谢) ,系统的涌现特性据说几乎不可能从系统各部分的知识中预测。复杂性理论研究系统和后一种类型的性质。 |
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| | [[Ecologist]] [[Sven Erik Jorgensen]] makes both theoretical and practical arguments for a [[holistic]] method in certain topics of science, especially [[ecology]]. He argues that many systems are so complex that they can ever be described in complete detail. In analogy to the Heisenberg [[uncertainty principle]] in physics, he argues that many interesting ecological phenomena cannot be replicated in laboratory conditions, and so cannot be measured or observed without changing the system in some way. He also indicates the importance of inter-connectedness in biological systems. He believes that science can only progress by outlining questions that are unanswerable and by using models that do not try to explain everything in terms of smaller hierarchical levels of organization, but instead model them on the scale of the system itself, taking into account some (but not all) factors from levels higher and lower in the hierarchy.<ref>S. E. Jørgensen, ''Integration of Ecosystem Theories: A Pattern'', 3rd ed. Kluwer Academic Publishers, ({{ISBN|1-4020-0651-9}}) (2002) Chapters 1 & 2.</ref> | | [[Ecologist]] [[Sven Erik Jorgensen]] makes both theoretical and practical arguments for a [[holistic]] method in certain topics of science, especially [[ecology]]. He argues that many systems are so complex that they can ever be described in complete detail. In analogy to the Heisenberg [[uncertainty principle]] in physics, he argues that many interesting ecological phenomena cannot be replicated in laboratory conditions, and so cannot be measured or observed without changing the system in some way. He also indicates the importance of inter-connectedness in biological systems. He believes that science can only progress by outlining questions that are unanswerable and by using models that do not try to explain everything in terms of smaller hierarchical levels of organization, but instead model them on the scale of the system itself, taking into account some (but not all) factors from levels higher and lower in the hierarchy.<ref>S. E. Jørgensen, ''Integration of Ecosystem Theories: A Pattern'', 3rd ed. Kluwer Academic Publishers, ({{ISBN|1-4020-0651-9}}) (2002) Chapters 1 & 2.</ref> |
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| − | | + | 生态学家斯文 · 埃里克 · 乔根森在某些科学领域,特别是生态学领域,为整体方法提供了理论和实践两方面的论据。他认为,许多系统是如此复杂,以至于它们可以被完全详细地描述。类比于物理学中的海森堡测不准原理,他认为许多有趣的生态现象不能在实验室条件下复制,因此不能在不以某种方式改变系统的情况下测量或观察。他还指出了生物系统内部相互联系的重要性。他认为,科学只有通过勾勒出无法回答的问题,通过使用模型,而不是试图从较小的组织层次来解释一切,而是根据系统本身的规模来模拟它们,考虑到来自较高层次和较低层次的一些(但不是全部)因素,才能取得进展。 |
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| | In [[cognitive psychology]], [[George Kelly (psychologist)|George Kelly]] developed "constructive alternativism" as a form of [[personal construct psychology]] and an alternative to what he considered "accumulative fragmentalism". For this theory, knowledge is seen as the construction of successful [[mental model]]s of the exterior world, rather than the accumulation of independent "nuggets of truth".<ref>{{cite journal|vauthors=Pope ML, Watts M |title=Constructivist Goggles: Implications for Process in Teaching and Learning Physics|journal=Eur. J. Phys.|volume=9|pages=101–109|year=1988|doi=10.1088/0143-0807/9/2/004|issue=2|bibcode = 1988EJPh....9..101P }}</ref> | | In [[cognitive psychology]], [[George Kelly (psychologist)|George Kelly]] developed "constructive alternativism" as a form of [[personal construct psychology]] and an alternative to what he considered "accumulative fragmentalism". For this theory, knowledge is seen as the construction of successful [[mental model]]s of the exterior world, rather than the accumulation of independent "nuggets of truth".<ref>{{cite journal|vauthors=Pope ML, Watts M |title=Constructivist Goggles: Implications for Process in Teaching and Learning Physics|journal=Eur. J. Phys.|volume=9|pages=101–109|year=1988|doi=10.1088/0143-0807/9/2/004|issue=2|bibcode = 1988EJPh....9..101P }}</ref> |