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The idea of an emergent quality that was something new in nature was further taken up by [[George Henry Lewes]] (1874–1875), who again noted, as with Galen earlier, that these evolutionary "emergent" qualities are distinguishable from adaptive, additive "resultants." [[Henry Drummond (evangelist)|Henry Drummond]] in ''The Descent of Man'' (1894) stated that emergence can be seen in the fact that the laws of nature are different for the organic or vital compared to the inertial inorganic realm.

The idea of an emergent quality that was something new in nature was further taken up by [[George Henry Lewes]] (1874–1875), who again noted, as with Galen earlier, that these evolutionary "emergent" qualities are distinguishable from adaptive, additive "resultants." [[Henry Drummond (evangelist)|Henry Drummond]] in ''The Descent of Man'' (1894) stated that emergence can be seen in the fact that the laws of nature are different for the organic or vital compared to the inertial inorganic realm.

乔治·刘易斯 George Henry Lewes（1874-1875）进一步提出了自然界中的新事物乃是一种涌现的观点。与前面的盖伦一样，他再次指出，这些进化的 "涌现 "特质与适应性、加成性的“结果”是有区别的。[[Henry Drummond (evangelist)|Henry Drummond]]在 《人类的后裔》（1894）中指出，自然规律对于有机界或生命界来说，与惯性的无机界相比是不同的，涌现就在这之中体现出来。

<font color="#ff8000">'''乔治·刘易斯 George Henry Lewes'''</font>（1874-1875）进一步提出了自然界中的新事物乃是一种涌现的观点。与前面的盖伦一样，他再次指出，这些进化的 "涌现 "特质与适应性、加成性的“结果”是有区别的。<font color="#ff8000">'''亨利·德拉蒙德 Henry Drummond'''</font>在 《人类的后裔》（1894）中指出，自然规律对于有机界或生命界来说，与惯性的无机界相比是不同的，涌现就在这之中体现出来。

When we pass from the inorganic to the organic we come upon a new set of laws - but the reason why the lower set do not seem to operate in the higher sphere is not that they are annhilated, but that they are overruled. (Drummond 1883, p. 405, quoted in Reid)<ref name=Reid />

When we pass from the inorganic to the organic we come upon a new set of laws - but the reason why the lower set do not seem to operate in the higher sphere is not that they are annhilated, but that they are overruled. (Drummond 1883, p. 405, quoted in Reid)<ref name=Reid />

As Reid points out, Drummond also realized that greater complexity brought greater adaptability. (Reid. p.&nbsp;73)<ref name=Reid />

As Reid points out, Drummond also realized that greater complexity brought greater adaptability. (Reid. p.&nbsp;73)<ref name=Reid />

正如 Reid 所指出的那样，Drummond 也意识到，更大的复杂性带来了更大的适应性。

正如雷德所指出的那样，德雷蒙德也意识到，更大的复杂性带来了更大的适应性(Reid. p.&nbsp;73)<ref name=Reid />。

[[Samuel Alexander]] took up the idea that emergences had properties that overruled the demands of the lower levels of organization. And more recently, this theme is taken up by John Holland (1998):

[[Samuel Alexander]] took up the idea that emergences had properties that overruled the demands of the lower levels of organization. And more recently, this theme is taken up by John Holland (1998):

[[Samuel Alexander]]提出了这样的观点，即涌现性具有凌驾于低级组织需求之上的特性。最近，John Holland（1998）又提出了这一主题。

<font color="#ff8000">'''塞缪尔·亚历山大 Samuel Alexander'''</font>提出了这样的观点，即涌现性具有凌驾于低级组织需求之上的特性。最近，[[约翰·霍兰德_John_H_Holland|约翰·霍兰德]]又提出了这一主题。

If we turn reductionism on its head we add levels. More carefully, we add new laws that satisfy the constraints imposed by laws already in place. Moreover these new laws apply to complex phenomena that are consequences of the original laws; they are at a new level.<ref name=Holland>{{cite book|last=Holland|first=John|title=Emergence. From Chaos to Order|year=1998|publisher=Addison-Wesley|location=Reading, Massachusetts}}</ref>

If we turn reductionism on its head we add levels. More carefully, we add new laws that satisfy the constraints imposed by laws already in place. Moreover these new laws apply to complex phenomena that are consequences of the original laws; they are at a new level.<ref name=Holland>{{cite book|last=Holland|first=John|title=Emergence. From Chaos to Order|year=1998|publisher=Addison-Wesley|location=Reading, Massachusetts}}</ref>

如果我们把还原论颠倒过来，我们就增加层次。更仔细地说，我们增加了新的法则，这些法则满足已经存在的法则所施加的约束。此外，这些新的法则适用于复杂的现象，这些现象是原有定律的结果；它们处于一个新的层次。

如果我们把还原论颠倒过来，我们就增加层次。更仔细地说，我们增加了新的法则，这些法则满足已经存在的法则所施加的约束。此外，这些新的法则适用于复杂的现象，这些现象是原有定律的结果；它们处于一个新的层次。<ref name=Holland>{{cite book|last=Holland|first=John|title=Emergence. From Chaos to Order|year=1998|publisher=Addison-Wesley|location=Reading, Massachusetts}}</ref>

}}

=== C. Lloyd Morgan and emergent evolution ===

===康韦·劳埃德·摩根与涌现进化 C. Lloyd Morgan and emergent evolution ===

Another major scientist to question natural selection as the motive force of evolution was [[C. Lloyd Morgan]], a zoologist and student of [[T.H. Huxley]], who had a strong influence on Samuel Alexander. His ''Emergent Evolution'' (1923) established the central idea that an emergence might have the appearance of [[Saltation (biology)|saltation]] but was best regarded as "a qualitative change of direction or critical turning point."(quoted in Reid, p.&nbsp;73-74)<ref name=Reid />  Morgan, due to his work in animal psychology, had earlier (1894) questioned the  continuity view of mental evolution, and held that there were various discontinuities in cross-species mental abilities. To offset any attempt to read [[anthropomorphism]] into his view, he created the famous, but often misunderstood methodological canon:

Another major scientist to question natural selection as the motive force of evolution was [[C. Lloyd Morgan]], a zoologist and student of [[T.H. Huxley]], who had a strong influence on Samuel Alexander. His ''Emergent Evolution'' (1923) established the central idea that an emergence might have the appearance of [[Saltation (biology)|saltation]] but was best regarded as "a qualitative change of direction or critical turning point."(quoted in Reid, p.&nbsp;73-74)<ref name=Reid />  Morgan, due to his work in animal psychology, had earlier (1894) questioned the  continuity view of mental evolution, and held that there were various discontinuities in cross-species mental abilities. To offset any attempt to read [[anthropomorphism]] into his view, he created the famous, but often misunderstood methodological canon:

另一位质疑自然选择是进化的动力的主要科学家是[[C. Lloyd Morgan]]，他是动物学家，也是[[T.H. Huxley]]的学生，他对 Samuel Alexander 影响很大。他的''涌现进化''（1923）确立了中心思想，即涌现可能具有[[盐化(生物学)|盐化]]的外观，但最好被视为 "方向的质变或关键的转折点。"(引自Reid，p.&nbsp;73-74)<ref name=Reid /> Morgan 由于他在动物心理学方面的工作，早些时候（1894）就对心理进化的连续性观点提出了质疑，并认为跨物种的心理能力存在着各种不连续性。为了避免任何将 拟人化[[anthropomorphism]] 引入他的观点的企图，他创造了著名的、但经常被误解的方法论典籍：

另一位质疑自然选择是进化动力的主要科学家是<font color="#ff8000">'''康韦·劳埃德·摩根 C. Lloyd Morgan'''</font>，他是动物学家，也是赫胥黎的学生，他对 塞缪尔·亚历山大的影响很大。他确立了''涌现进化''（1923）的中心思想，即涌现可能看起来会有突然的变化，但最好被视为“方向的质变或关键的转折点”。(引自Reid，p.&nbsp;73-74)<ref name=Reid /> 摩根由于他在动物心理学方面的工作，早些时候（1894）就对心理进化的连续性观点提出了质疑，并认为跨物种的心理能力存在着各种不连续性。为了避免任何将拟人化引入他的观点的企图，他创造了著名的、但经常被误解的方法论经典：

In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale.|Morgan, 1894, p. 53

In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale.(Morgan, 1894, p. 53)

在任何情况下，我们都不能把一个行动解释为行使较高的心理能力的结果，如果它可以被解释为行使一个较低的心理等级的结果。|Morgan, 1894, p. 53

在任何情况下，如果一个行动可以被解释为行使一个较低级心理等级能力的结果，我们就不能把它解释为行使较高级心理能力的结果，(Morgan, 1894, p. 53)。

However, Morgan realizing that this was being misused to advocate reductionism (rather than as a general methodological caution), introduced a qualification into the second edition of his ''An Introduction to Comparative Psychology'' (1903):

However, Morgan realizing that this was being misused to advocate reductionism (rather than as a general methodological caution), introduced a qualification into the second edition of his ''An Introduction to Comparative Psychology'' (1903):

To this, however, it should be added, lest the range of the principle be misunderstood, that the canon by no means excludes the interpretation of a particular activity in terms of the higher processes, if we already have independent evidence of the occurrence of these higher processes in the animal under observation.|Morgan, 1903, p. 59

To this, however, it should be added, lest the range of the principle be misunderstood, that the canon by no means excludes the interpretation of a particular activity in terms of the higher processes, if we already have independent evidence of the occurrence of these higher processes in the animal under observation.(Morgan, 1903, p. 59)

然而，我们应该补充一点，以免该原则的范围被误解，如果我们已经有独立的证据表明在被观察的动物中发生了这些更高级的过程，那么该原则绝不排除对某一特定活动的解释。|Morgan, 1903, p. 59

然而，我们应该补充一点，以免该原则的范围被误解：如果我们已经有独立的证据表明在被观察的动物中发生了这些更高级的过程，那么该原则绝不排除对某一特定活动的解释(Morgan, 1903, p. 59)。

As Reid observes,

As Reid observes,

正如 Reid 所言，

正如 Reid 所言，

While the so-called historiographical "rehabilitation of the canon" has been underway for some time now, Morgan's emergent evolutionist position (which was the highest expression of his attempt to place the study of mind back into such a "wider" natural history) is seldom mentioned in more than passing terms even within contemporary history of psychology textbooks.<ref name=Reid />

While the so-called historiographical "rehabilitation of the canon" has been underway for some time now, Morgan's emergent evolutionist position (which was the highest expression of his attempt to place the study of mind back into such a "wider" natural history) is seldom mentioned in more than passing terms even within contemporary history of psychology textbooks.<ref name=Reid />

虽然所谓的史学上的 "恢复正典 "已经进行了一段时间，但 Morgan 的涌现进化论立场（这是他试图将心灵研究放回这样一个 "更广泛" 的自然史中的最高表现），即使在当代心理学史的教科书中也很少被人提及，只是一带而过。<ref name=Reid />

虽然所谓的史学上的 "恢复正典 "已经进行了一段时间，但摩根的涌现进化论立场（这是他试图将心灵研究放回这样一个 "更广泛" 的自然史中的最高表现），即使在当代心理学史的教科书中也很少被人提及，只是一带而过。<ref name=Reid />

</blockquote>

Morgan also fought against the [[Behaviorism|behaviorist school]] and clarified even more his emergent views on evolution:

Morgan also fought against the [[Behaviorism|behaviorist school]] and clarified even more his emergent views on evolution:

An influential school of 'behaviorists' roundly deny that mental relations, if such there be, are in any sense or in any manner effective... My message is that one may speak of mental relations as effective no less 'scientifically' than... physical relations...|Morgan, 1930, p. 72

An influential school of 'behaviorists' roundly deny that mental relations, if such there be, are in any sense or in any manner effective... My message is that one may speak of mental relations as effective no less 'scientifically' than... physical relations...|Morgan, 1930, p. 72

一个有影响力的 "行为主义者" 学派全面否认心理关系（如果有的话）在任何意义上或以任何方式是有效的 ...... 我的信息是，人们可以说心理关系是有效的，不亚于...... 物理关系 ...... |Morgan, 1930, p. 72

一个颇具影响力的 "行为主义者" 学派全面否认了心理关系（如果有的话）在任何意义上或以任何方式是有效的 ...... 我的观点是，人们可以说心理关系是有效的，不亚于...... 物理关系 ......(Morgan, 1930, p. 72)

His ''Animal Conduct'' (1930) explicitly distinguishes between three "grades" or "levels of mentality" which he labeled: 'percipient, perceptive, and reflective.' (p.&nbsp;42)

His ''Animal Conduct'' (1930) explicitly distinguishes between three "grades" or "levels of mentality" which he labeled: 'percipient, perceptive, and reflective.' (p.&nbsp;42)

他的 ''动物行为''（1930）明确区分了三个 "等级 "或 "心态水平"，他把这三个 "等级 "标记为："知觉的、感性的和反思的"。(p.&nbsp;42)

他的 《动物行为》（1930）明确区分了三个 "等级 "或 "心态水平"，他把这三个 "等级 "标记为："感知的、感性的和反思的（percipient, perceptive, and reflective）"。(p.&nbsp;42)

=== Alexander and the emergence of mind ===

 

 

===亚历山大以及心智的涌现 Alexander and the emergence of mind ===

 

Morgan's idea of a polaric relationship between lower and higher, was taken up by Samuel Alexander, who argued that the mental process is not reducible to the neural processes on which it depends at the physical-material level. Instead, they are two poles of a unity of function. Further, the neural process that expressed mental process itself possesses a quality (mind) that the other neural processes don’t. At the same time, the mental process, because it is functionally identical to this particular neural process, is also a vital one.<ref name=Alexander>{{cite book|last=Alexander|first=Samuel|title=Space, Time and Deity|year=1916–18|publisher=Gifford Lectures|location=Glasgow|url=https://archive.org/details/spacetimeanddei00alexgoog}}</ref>

Morgan's idea of a polaric relationship between lower and higher, was taken up by Samuel Alexander, who argued that the mental process is not reducible to the neural processes on which it depends at the physical-material level. Instead, they are two poles of a unity of function. Further, the neural process that expressed mental process itself possesses a quality (mind) that the other neural processes don’t. At the same time, the mental process, because it is functionally identical to this particular neural process, is also a vital one.<ref name=Alexander>{{cite book|last=Alexander|first=Samuel|title=Space, Time and Deity|year=1916–18|publisher=Gifford Lectures|location=Glasgow|url=https://archive.org/details/spacetimeanddei00alexgoog}}</ref>

Morgan 关于低级和高级之间的两极关系的观点，被 Samuel Alexander 所采纳，他认为，心理过程不能还原为它在物理物质层面所依赖的神经过程。相反，它们是功能统一体的两极。而且，表达心理过程的神经过程本身就具有其他神经过程所不具备的品质（心智）。同时，精神过程由于在功能上与这个特殊的神经过程相同，所以也是一个至关重要的过程。

摩根关于低级和高级之间的两极关系的观点，被塞缪尔·亚历山大所采纳，他认为，心理过程不能还原为它在物理物质层面所依赖的神经过程。相反，它们是功能统一体的两极。而且，表达心理过程的神经过程本身就具有其他神经过程所不具备的品质（心智）。同时，精神过程由于在功能上与这个特殊的神经过程相同，所以也是一个至关重要的过程。<ref name=Alexander>{{cite book|last=Alexander|first=Samuel|title=Space, Time and Deity|year=1916–18|publisher=Gifford Lectures|location=Glasgow|url=https://archive.org/details/spacetimeanddei00alexgoog}}</ref>

 

And mental process is also "something new, "a fresh creation", which precludes a psycho-physiological parallelism. Reductionism is also contrary to empirical fact.

And mental process is also "something new, "a fresh creation", which precludes a psycho-physiological parallelism. Reductionism is also contrary to empirical fact.

 

 

All the available evidence of fact leads to the conclusion that the mental element is essential to the neural process which it is said to accompany...and is not accidental to it, nor is it in turn indifferent to the mental feature. Epiphenomenalism is a mere fallacy of observation.<ref name="Alexander"/>

All the available evidence of fact leads to the conclusion that the mental element is essential to the neural process which it is said to accompany...and is not accidental to it, nor is it in turn indifferent to the mental feature. Epiphenomenalism is a mere fallacy of observation.<ref name="Alexander"/>

所有现有的事实证据都可以得出这样的结论：精神因素对它所说的伴随着的神经过程是必不可少的 ...... 不是偶然的，也不是反过来对精神特征无动于衷的。表象主义 Epiphenomenalism 只是一种观察的谬误。

所有现有的事实证据都可以得出这样的结论：精神因素对与之相关的神经过程是必不可少的......这并不是偶然的，也不是反过来对精神特征毫无影响。<font color="#ff8000">'''表象主义 Epiphenomenalism '''</font>只是一种观察的谬误。<ref name="Alexander"/>

At the same time Alexander stated that his view was not one of animism or vitalism, where the mind is an independent entity action on the brain, or conversely, acted upon by the brain. Mental activity is an emergent, a new "thing" not reducible to its initial neural parts.

At the same time Alexander stated that his view was not one of animism or vitalism, where the mind is an independent entity action on the brain, or conversely, acted upon by the brain. Mental activity is an emergent, a new "thing" not reducible to its initial neural parts.

 

For Alexander, the world unfolds in space-time, which has the inherent quality of motion. This motion through space-time results in new “complexities of motion” in the form of a new quality or emergent. The emergent retains the qualities of the prior “complexities of motion” but also has something new that was not there before. This something new comes with its own laws of behavior. Time is the quality that creates motion through Space, and matter is simply motion expressed in forms in Space, or as Alexander says a little later, “complexes of motion.” Matter arises out of the basic ground of Space-Time continuity and has an element of “body” (lower order) and an element of “mind” (higher order), or “the conception that a secondary quality is the mind of its primary substrate.”

For Alexander, the world unfolds in space-time, which has the inherent quality of motion. This motion through space-time results in new “complexities of motion” in the form of a new quality or emergent. The emergent retains the qualities of the prior “complexities of motion” but also has something new that was not there before. This something new comes with its own laws of behavior. Time is the quality that creates motion through Space, and matter is simply motion expressed in forms in Space, or as Alexander says a little later, “complexes of motion.” Matter arises out of the basic ground of Space-Time continuity and has an element of “body” (lower order) and an element of “mind” (higher order), or “the conception that a secondary quality is the mind of its primary substrate.”

对 Alexander 来说，世界是在时空中展开的，时空具有运动的内在品质。这种在时空中的运动导致了新的 "运动的复杂性"，其形式是一种新的质量或涌现。新出现的东西保留了先前 "运动的复杂性 "的品质，但也有一些新的东西，而这些新的东西是先前没有的。这种新的东西有其自身的行为规律。时间是通过空间产生运动的特质，而物质只是在空间中以形式表现出来的运动，或者如 Alexander 稍后所说的 "运动的复杂性"。物质产生于空间-时间连续性的基本基础上，具有 "身体"（低阶）的要素和 "心灵"（高阶）的要素，或者说 "这样一种概念：一个次要品质是其主要基质的心灵"。

对亚历山大来说，世界是在时空中展开的，时空具有运动的内在属性。这种在时空中的运动导致了新的 "运动的复杂性"，其形式是一种新的属性或涌现。新出现的东西保留了先前 "运动的复杂性 "的品质，但也有一些新的东西，而这些新的东西是先前没有的。这种新的东西有其自身的行为规律。时间是通过空间产生运动的特质，而物质只是在空间中以形式表现出来的运动，或者如亚历山大稍后所说的，"运动的复杂性"。物质产生于空间-时间连续性的基本基础上，具有 "身体"（低阶）的要素和 "心灵"（高阶）的要素，或者说 "这样一种概念：一个次要品质是其主要基质的心灵"。